EcoHealth Alliance orchestrated key scientists’ statement on “natural origin” of SARS-CoV-2

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Emails obtained by U.S. Right to Know show that a statement in The Lancet authored by 27 prominent public health scientists condemning “conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin” was organized by employees of EcoHealth Alliance, a non-profit group that has received millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer funding to genetically manipulate coronaviruses with scientists at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

The emails obtained via public records requests show that EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak drafted the Lancet statement, and that he intended it to “not be identifiable as coming from any one organization or person” but rather to be seen as “simply a letter from leading scientists”. Daszak wrote that he wanted “to avoid the appearance of a political statement”.

The scientists’ letter appeared in The Lancet on February 18, just one week after the World Health Organization announced that the disease caused by the novel coronavirus would be named COVID-19.

The 27 authors “strongly condemn[ed] conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin,” and reported that scientists from multiple countries “overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife.” The letter included no scientific references to refute a lab-origin theory of the virus. One scientist, Linda Saif, asked via email whether it would be useful “to add just one or 2 statements in support of why nCOV is not a lab generated virus and is naturally occuring? Seems critical to scientifically refute such claims!” Daszak responded, “I think we should probably stick to a broad statement.”

Growing calls to investigate the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a potential source of SARS-CoV-2 have led to increased scrutiny of EcoHealth Alliance. The emails show how members of EcoHealth Alliance played an early role in framing questions about possible lab origin of SARS-CoV-2 as “crackpot theories that need to be addressed,” as Daszak told The Guardian.

Although the phrase “EcoHealth Alliance” appeared only once in The Lancet statement, in association with co-author Daszak, several other co-authors also have direct ties to the group that were not disclosed as conflicts of interest. Rita Colwell and James Hughes are members of the Board of Directors of EcoHealth Alliance, William Karesh is the group’s Executive Vice President for Health and Policy, and Hume Field is Science and Policy Advisor.

The statement’s authors also claimed that the “rapid, open, and transparent sharing of data on this outbreak is now being threatened by rumours and misinformation around its origins.” Today, however, little is known about the origins of SARS-CoV-2, and investigations into its origins by the World Health Organization and The Lancet COVID-19 commission have been shrouded in secrecy and mired by conflicts of interests.

Peter Daszak, Rita Colwell, and The Lancet Editor Richard Horton did not provide comments in response to our requests for this story.

For more information:

A link to the entire batch of EcoHealth Alliance emails can be found here: EcoHealth Alliance emails: University of Maryland (466 pages)

U.S. Right to Know is posting documents obtained through public freedom of information (FOI) requests for our Biohazards investigation in our post: FOI documents on origins of SARS-CoV-2, hazards of gain-of-function research and biosafety labs.

Validity of key studies on origin of coronavirus in doubt; science journals investigating

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By Carey Gillam

Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019, scientists have searched for clues about what led to the emergence of its causative agent, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. Uncovering the source of SARS-CoV-2 could be crucial for preventing future outbreaks.

A series of four high profile studies published earlier this year provided scientific credence to the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 originated in bats and then jumped to humans through a type of anteater called a pangolin — among the world’s most trafficked wild animals. While that specific theory involving pangolins has been largely discounted, the four studies known as the “pangolin papers” continue to provide support for the notion that coronaviruses closely related to SARS-CoV-2 circulate in the wild, meaning the SARS-CoV-2 that caused COVID-19 probably comes from a wild animal source. 

The focus on a wild animal source, the “zoonotic” theory, has become a critical element in global discussion about the virus, directing public attention away from the possibility that the virus may have originated inside a Chinese governmental laboratory – the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

U.S. Right to Know (USRTK) has learned, however, that two of the four papers that make up the foundation for the zoonotic theory appear to be flawed, and that the editors at the journals in which the papers were published – PLoS Pathogens and Nature – are investigating the core data behind the studies and how the data was analyzed. The other two similarly appear to suffer flaws.

The problems with the research papers raise “serious questions and concerns” about the validity of the zoonotic theory overall, according to Dr. Sainath Suryanarayanan, a biologist and sociologist of science, and USRTK staff scientist.  The studies lack sufficiently reliable data, independently verifiable data sets and a transparent peer review and editorial process, according to Dr. Suryanarayanan. 

See his emails with senior authors of the papers and journal editors, and analysis: Nature and PLoS Pathogens probe scientific veracity of key studies linking pangolin coronaviruses to origin of SARS-CoV-2.

Chinese governmental authorities first promoted the idea that the source of the causal agent for COVID-19 in humans came from a wild animal in December. Chinese government-supported scientists then backed that theory in four separate studies submitted to the journals between February 7 and 18.

The World Health Organization’s China Joint Mission Team investigating the emergence and spread of COVID-19 in China stated in February : “Since the COVID-19 virus has a genome identity of 96% to a bat SARS-like coronavirus and 86%-92% to a pangolin SARS-like coronavirus, an animal source for COVID-19 is highly likely.” 

The Chinese-initiated focus on a wild animal source helped chill calls for an investigation into the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where animal coronaviruses have long been stored and genetically manipulated. Instead, resources and efforts of the international scientific and policymaking community have been funneled toward understanding the factors shaping contact between people and wildlife. 

The four papers in question are Liu et al., Xiao et al. , Lam et al. and Zhang et al.  The two that are currently being investigated by the journal editors are Liu et al and Xiao et al. In communications with the authors and journal editors of those two papers, USRTK has learned of serious problems with the publication of those studies, including the following:    

  • Liu et al. did not publish or share (upon being asked) raw and/or missing data that would allow experts to independently verify their genomic analyses.
  • Editors at both Nature and PLoS Pathogens, as well as Professor Stanley Perlman, the editor of Liu et al., have acknowledged in email communications that they are aware of serious issues with these papers and that the journals are investigating them. Yet, they have made no public disclosure of the potential problems with the papers.  

The silence of the journals regarding their ongoing investigations means that wider communities of scientists, policymakers and the public impacted by COVID-19 are unaware of the problems associated with the research papers, said Dr. Suryanarayanan. 

“We believe that these issues are important, since they may shape how institutions respond to a catastrophic pandemic that has radically affected lives and livelihoods worldwide,” he said.

Links to these emails can be found here: 

In July 2020, U.S. Right to Know began submitting public records requests in pursuit of data from public institutions in an effort to discover what is known about the origins of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which causes the disease Covid-19. Since the start of the outbreak in Wuhan, SARS-CoV-2 has killed over a million people, while sickening millions more in a global pandemic that continues to unfold.

On Nov. 5, U.S. Right to Know filed a lawsuit against the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for violating provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., seeks correspondence with or about organizations such as the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention, as well as the EcoHealth Alliance, which partnered with and funded the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

U.S. Right to Know is a nonprofit investigative research group focused on promoting transparency for public health. You can support our research and reporting by donating here. 

Nature and PLoS Pathogens probe scientific veracity of key studies linking pangolin coronaviruses to origin of SARS-CoV-2

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By Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD 

Here, we provide our emails with senior authors of Liu et al. and Xiao et al., and the editors of PLoS Pathogens and Nature. We also present an in-depth discussion of the questions and concerns raised by these emails, which put in doubt the validity of these key studies on the origin of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 that causes COVID-19. See our reporting on these emails, Validity of key studies on origin of coronavirus in doubt; science journals investigating (11.9.20)

Email communications with Dr. Jinping Chen, senior author of Liu et al:

Dr. Jinping Chen’s emails raise a number of concerns and questions: 

1– Liu et al. (2020) assembled their published pangolin coronavirus genome sequence based on coronaviruses sampled from three pangolins, two samples from a smuggled batch in March 2019, and one sample from a different batch intercepted in July 2019. The National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) database, where scientists are required to deposit sequence data to ensure independent verification and reproducibility of published results, contains the sequence read archive (SRA) data for the two March 2019 samples but is missing data for the July 2019 sample. Upon being asked about this missing sample, which Dr. Jinping Chen identifies as F9, Dr. Jinping Chen stated: “The raw data of these three samples could be found under NCBI accession number PRJNA573298, and the BioSample ID were SAMN12809952, SAMN12809953, and SAMN12809954, moreover, individual (F9) from different batch was also positive, the raw data can be seen in NCBI SRA SUB 7661929, which will be released soon for we have another MS (under review)” (our emphasis).

It is concerning that Liu et al. have not published data corresponding to 1 of the 3 pangolins samples that they used to assemble their pangolin coronavirus genome sequence. Dr. Jinping Chen also did not share this data upon being asked. The norm in science is to publish and/or share all data that would allow others to independently verify and reproduce the results. How did PLoS Pathogens let Liu et al. evade publishing crucial sample data? Why is Dr. Jinping Chen not sharing data pertaining to this third pangolin sample? Why would Liu et al. want to release unpublished data pertaining to this third pangolin sample as part of another study that has been submitted to a different journal? The concern here is that scientists would misattribute the missing pangolin sample from Liu et al. to a different study, making it difficult for others to subsequently trace important details about this pangolin sample, such as the context in which the pangolin sample was collected.

2– Dr. Jinping Chen denied that Liu et al. have had any relationship with Xiao et al.’s (2020) Nature study. He wrote: “We submitted our PLOS Pathogens paper on Feb.14, 2020 before the Nature paper (the Reference 12 in our PLOS pathogens paper, they submitted on Feb.16, 2020 from their submit date in Nature), our PLOS pathogens paper explain that SARS-Cov-2 is not from pangolin coronavirus directly and pangolin not as intermediate host. We knew their work after their news briefing on Feb. 7, 2020, and we have different opinions with them, the other two papers (Viruses and Nature) have been listed in the PLOS Pathogen paper as reference papers (reference number 10 and 12), we are different research groups from Nature paper authors, and there is no relationship with each other, and we took samples with detail sample information from the Guangdong wildlife rescue center with helps from Jiejian Zou and Fanghui Hou as our co-authors and we don’t know where the samples of the Nature paper from.” (our emphases)

The following points raise doubts about Dr. Chen’s claims above: 

a– Liu et al. (2020), Xiao et al (2020) and Liu et al. (2019) shared the following authors: Ping Liu and Jinping Chen were authors on the 2019 Viruses paper and the 2020 PLoS Pathogens paper, senior author Wu Chen on Xiao et al. (2020) was a co-author of the 2019 Viruses paper, and Jiejian Zhou and Fanghui Hou were authors on both Xiao et al. and Liu et al. 

b– Both manuscripts were deposited to the public preprint server bioRxiv on the same date: February 20, 2020. 

c– Xiao et al. “renamed pangolin samples first published by Liu et al. [2019] Viruses without citing their study as the original article that described these samples, and used the metagenomic data from these samples in their analysis” (Chan and Zhan). 

d– Liu et al.’s full pangolin coronavirus genome is 99.95% identical at the nucleotide level to the full pangolin coronavirus genome published by Xiao et al. How could Liu et al. have produced a whole genome that is 99.95% identical (only ~15 nucleotides difference) to Xiao et al. without sharing datasets and analyses?

When different research groups independently arrive at similar sets of conclusions about a given research question, it significantly increases the likelihood of truth of the involved claims. The concern here is that Liu et al. and Xiao et al. were not independently conducted studies as claimed by Dr. Chen. Was there any coordination between Liu et al. and Xiao et al. regarding their analysis and publications? If so, what was the extent and nature of that coordination? 

3– Why did Liu et al. not make publicly available the raw amplicon sequencing data that they used to assemble their pangolin coronavirus genome? Without this raw data, the pangolin coronavirus genome assembled by Liu et al., others cannot independently verify and reproduce the results of Liu et al. As mentioned earlier, the norm in science is to publish and/or share all data that would allow others to independently verify and reproduce the results. We asked Dr. Jingping Chen to share Liu et al.’s raw amplicon sequence data. He responded by sharing Liu et al.’s RT-PCR product sequence results, which are not the raw amplicon data used to assemble the pangolin coronavirus genome. Why is Dr. Jinping Chen reluctant to release the raw data that would allow others to independently verify Liu et al.’s analysis.

4– Liu et al. Viruses (2019) was published in October 2019 and its authors had deposited their pangolin coronavirus (sequence read archive) SRA data with NCBI on September 23, 2019, but waited until January 22, 2020 to make this data publicly accessible. Scientists typically release raw genomic sequence data on publicly accessible databases as soon as possible after the publication of their studies. This practice ensures that others can independently access, verify and utilize such data. Why did Liu et al. 2019 wait 4 months to make their SRA data publicly accessible? Dr. Jinping Chen chose not to directly answer this question of ours in his response on November 9, 2020.

We also got in touch with Dr. Stanley Perlman, PLoS Pathogens Editor of Liu et al. and this is what he had to say.

Notably, Dr. Perlman acknowledged that:

  • “PLoS Pathogens is investigating this paper in more detail” 
  • He “did not verify the veracity of the July 2019 sample during pre-publication peer review”
  • “[c]oncerns about similarity between the two studies [Liu et al. and Xiao et al.] came to light only after both studies had been published.”
  • He “did not see any amplicon data during peer review. The authors provided an accession number for the assembled genome…although after publication it came to light that the accession number listed in the article’s Data Availability Statement is incorrect. This error and questions around the raw contig sequencing data are currently being addressed as part of the post-publication case.”

When we contacted PLoS Pathogens with our concerns about Liu et al. we got the following response from the Senior Editor of the PLoS Publication Ethics team:

Emails from Xiao et al.

On October 28, the Chief Biological Sciences Editor of Nature replied (below) with the key phrase “we take these issues very seriously and will look into the matter you raise below very carefully.” 

On October 30, Xiao et al. finally publicly released their raw amplicon sequence data. However, as of the publication of this piece, the amplicon sequence data submitted by Xiao et al. is missing the actual raw data files that would allow for others to assemble and verify their pangolin coronavirus genome sequence.

Important questions remain that need to be addressed: 

  1. Are the pangolin coronaviruses real? The caption for Figure 1e in Xiao et al. states: “Viral particles are seen in double-membrane vesicles in the transmission electron microscopy image taken from Vero E6 cell culture inoculated with supernatant of homogenized lung tissue from one pangolin, with morphology indicative of coronavirus.” If Xiao et al. isolated the pangolin coronavirus, would they share the isolated virus sample with researchers outside of China? This could go a long way toward verifying that this virus actually exists and came from pangolin tissue.
  2. How early in 2020, or even 2019, were Liu et al., Xiao et al., Lam et al. and Zhang et al. aware that they would be publishing results based on the same dataset?
    a. Was there any coordination considering that one was preprinted on February 18 and three were preprinted on February 20?
    b. Why did Liu et al. (2019) not make their sequence read archive data publicly accessible on the date they deposited it on NCBI’s database? Why did they wait until January 22, 2020 to make this pangolin coronavirus sequence data public.
    c. Before the Liu et al. 2019 Viruses data was released on NCBI on January 22, 2020, was this data accessible to other researchers in China? If so, what database was the pangolin coronavirus sequencing data stored on, who had access, and when was the data deposited and made accessible?
  3. Will the authors cooperate in an independent investigation to track the source of these pangolin samples to see if more SARS-CoV-2-like viruses can be found in the March to July 2019 batches of smuggled animals—which could exist as frozen samples or be still alive in the Guangdong Wildlife Rescue Center?
  4. And will the authors cooperate in an independent investigation to see if the smugglers (were they imprisoned? or fined and let go?) have SARS virus antibodies from regular exposure to these viruses?

Why we are researching the origins of SARS-CoV-2, biosafety labs and GOF research

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See the Biohazards Blog for updates on our investigation, and we are posting documents from our investigation here. Sign up here to receive weekly updates. 

In July 2020, U.S. Right to Know began submitting public records requests in pursuit of data from public institutions in an effort to discover what is known about the origins of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which causes the disease Covid-19. Since the start of the outbreak in Wuhan, SARS-CoV-2 has killed over a million people, while sickening millions more in a global pandemic that continues to unfold.

We are also researching accidents, leaks and other mishaps at laboratories where pathogens of pandemic potential are stored and modified, and the public health risks of gain-of-function (GOF) research, which involves experiments to enhance aspects of the functionality of deadly pathogens, such as viral load, infectivity and transmissibility.

The public and global scientific community have a right to know what data exists about these matters.  We will report here any useful findings that may emerge from our research.

U.S. Right to Know is an investigative research group focused on promoting transparency for public health.

Why are we conducting this research?

We are concerned that the national security apparatuses of the United States, China and elsewhere, and the university, industry and governmental entities with which they collaborate, may not provide a full and honest picture of the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the dangers of gain-of-function research.

Through our research, we seek to answer three questions:

  • What is known about the origins of SARS-CoV-2?
  • Are there accidents or mishaps that have occurred at biosafety or GOF research facilities that have not been reported?
  • Are there concerns about ongoing safety risks of biosafety laboratories or GOF research that have not been reported?

What are the origins of SARS-CoV-2?

In late December 2019, in the city of Wuhan, China, news emerged of the deadly infectious disease called COVID-19, caused by SARS-CoV-2, a novel coronavirus that had not been known to exist before. The origins of SARS-CoV-2 are not known. There are two main hypotheses.

Researchers in professional networks associated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) and EcoHealth Alliance, a U.S. non-profitthat has garnered millions of dollars from taxpayer-funded grants to collaborate with WIV on coronavirus research, have written that the novel virus likely originated via natural selection in animal hosts, with its reservoir in bats. This “zoonotic” origin hypothesis was further strengthened by claims that the new coronavirus outbreak started in a “wildlife” market in Wuhan, the Huanan seafood market, where potentially infected animals may have been sold. (However, at least one-third of the first cluster of infected patients, including the earliest known case of infection from December 1, 2019, had neither direct or indirect contact with the Huanan seafood market’s human and animal attendees.)

The zoonosis hypothesis is currently the prevailing hypothesis of origin. However, the zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV-2 has yet to be definitively established, and some researchers have pointed out that it rests upon contradictory observations that require further investigation.

For further reading on these topics, see our reading list: What are the origins of SARS-CoV-2? What are the risks of gain-of-function research?

Some scientists have suggested a different hypothesis of origin; they speculate that the SARS-CoV-2 is the result of an accidental release of a wild-type or lab-modified strain of a closely related SARS-like virus that had been stored in biosafety facilities conducting coronavirus research in Wuhan, such as the WIV or the Wuhan Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Importantly, a lab-origin scenario does not necessarily exclude the zoonosis hypothesis because SARS-CoV-2 could be the outcome of lab-modifications conducted on unreported versions of SARS-like bat coronaviruses stored in WIV, or merely collection and storage of such coronaviruses. Critics of lab-origin hypotheses have dismissed these ideas as unsubstantiated speculations and conspiracy theories.

To date, there is not sufficient evidence to definitively reject either zoonotic origin or lab-origin hypotheses. We do know, based on published research articles and U.S. federal grants to the EcoHealth Alliance for funding WIV’s coronavirus research, that WIV stored hundreds of potentially dangerous SARS-like coronaviruses, and performed GOF experiments on coronaviruses in collaboration with U.S. universities, and there were biosafety concerns with WIV’s BSL-4 laboratory.

But so far, there has been no independent audit of WIV’s laboratory records and databases, and little information exists about the WIV’s internal operations. The WIV has removed from its website information such as the 2018 visit of U.S. science diplomats, and closed off access to its virus database and laboratory records of the coronavirus experiments being conducted by WIV scientists.

Understanding the origins of SARS-CoV-2 has crucial policy implications for public health and food systems. SARS-CoV-2’s potential zoonotic origin raises questions about policies that promote the expansion of industrial farming and livestock operations, which can be major drivers of the emergence of novel and highly pathogenic viruses, deforestation, biodiversity loss and habitat encroachment. The possibility that SARS-CoV-2 may have emerged from a biodefense laboratory raises questions about whether we ought to have these facilities, where wild-derived microbial pathogens are stored and modified via GOF experiments.

Whether SARS-CoV-2 is lab-modified or not, lab-origin-theorists’ investigations raise vital questions about transparency deficits regarding research on potential pandemic pathogens, and the imperatives and players that are creating increasingly widespread biosafety containment facilities where dangerous viruses are stored and modified to make them more deadly.

Is gain-of-function research worth the risk?

There is significant evidence that biosafety laboratories have had many accidents, breaches, and containment failures, and that the potential benefits of gain-of-function research may not be worth the risks of causing potential pandemics.

GOF research of concern modifies and tests dangerous pathogens such as Ebola, H1N1 influenza virus, and the SARS-related coronaviruses under the rubric of developing medical counter-measures (such as vaccines). As such, it is of interest not only to biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry but also to biodefense industry, which is concerned with the potential use of GOF research for acts of biowarfare.

GOF research on deadly pathogens is a major public health concern. Reports of accidental leaks and biosafety breaches at GOF research sites are not uncommon. After a distinguished group of virologists published an urgent consensus statement on July 14, 2014 calling for a moratorium on GOF research of concern, the U.S. government under President Barack Obama’s administration imposed a  “funding pause” on GOF experiments involving dangerous pathogens, including coronaviruses and influenza viruses.

The federal funding pause on GOF research of concern was lifted in 2017 after a period in which the U.S. government undertook a series of deliberations to assess the benefits and risks associated with studies involving GOF research of concern.

Seeking transparency

We are concerned that data that is crucial to public health policy about the origins of SARS-CoV-2, and the hazards of biosafety laboratories and gain-of-function research, may be hidden within biodefense networks of the national security apparatuses of the United States, China, and elsewhere.

We will try to shed some light on these matters through the use of public records requests. Perhaps we will succeed. We could easily fail. We will report anything useful that we may find.

Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD, is staff scientist at U.S. Right to Know and co-author of the book, “Vanishing Bees: Science, Politics and Honeybee Health” (Rutgers University Press, 2017).

Reading list: What are the origins of SARS-CoV-2? What are the risks of gain-of-function research?

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Here is a reading list about what is known and not known about the origins of SARS-CoV-2, accidents and leaks at biosafety and biowarfare laboratories, and the health risks of gain-of-function (GOF) research, which aims to increase the host range, transmissibility, infectivity or pathogenicity of potential pandemic pathogens.

This reading list is a work in progress. We will update it. Please send readings we may have missed to Sainath Suryanarayanan at

What are the origins of SARS-CoV-2?
Accidents, leaks, transparency failures in biosafety facilities
Networks of biodefense and biowarfare
Debates on gain-of-function research
Scientific papers on the origins of SARS-CoV-2

What are the origins of SARS-CoV-2?

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. To stop the next pandemic, we need to unravel the origins of COVID-19. David A. Relman. November 3, 2020.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Did the SARS-CoV-2 virus arise from a bat coronavirus research program in a Chinese laboratory? Very possibly. Milton Leitenberg. June 4, 2020.

The Washington Post. State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses. Josh Rogin. April 14, 2020.

Houston Chronicle. UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research. Nick Powell. April 23, 2020. 

The Wall Street Journal. NIH presses U.S. nonprofit for information on Wuhan virology lab. Betsy McKay. August 19, 2020.  

The Wall Street Journal. So where did the virus come from? Matt Ridley. May 29, 2020. 

Boston Magazine. Could COVID-19 have escaped from a lab? Rowan Jacobsen. September 9, 2020. 

Nature. The biggest mystery: what it will take to trace the coronavirus source. David Cyranoski. June 5, 2020.

Newsweek. The controversial experiments and Wuhan lab suspected of starting the coronavirus pandemic. Fred Guterl, Naveed Jamali and Tom O’Connor. April 27, 2020.

The Washington Post. State Department releases cable that launched claims that coronavirus escaped from Chinese lab. John Hudson and Nate Jones. July 17, 2020. 

The Telegraph. Scientists to examine possibility Covid leaked from lab as part of investigation into virus origins. Paul Nuki. September 15, 2020.  

The Wall Street Journal. On the ground in Wuhan, signs of China stalling probe of coronavirus origins. Jeremy Page and Natasha Khan. May 12, 2020. 

NBC News. Report says cellphone data suggests October shutdown at Wuhan lab, but experts are skeptical. Ken Dilanian, Ruaridh Arrow, Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee, Louise Jones and Lorand Bodo. May 9, 2020. 

Washington Post. How did covid-19 begin? Its initial origin story is shaky. David Ignatius. April 2, 2020.

The Times. Revealed: Seven year coronavirus trail from mine deaths to a Wuhan lab. George Arbuthnott, Jonathan Calvert, and Philip Sherwell. July 4, 2020.

BBC. Wuhan: City of silence; Looking for answers in the place where coronavirus started. John Sudworth. July 2020.

The New York Times, 8 questions from a disease detective on the pandemic’s origins. William J. Broad. July 8, 2020.

Science. A WHO-led mission may investigate the pandemic’s origin. Here are the key questions to ask. Jon Cohen. July 10, 2020.

The New York Times. In Hunt for Virus Source, W.H.O. Let China Take Charge. Selam Gebrekidan, Matt Apuzzo, Amy Qin and . November 2, 2020.

The Washington Post. The coronavirus’s origins are still a mystery. We need a full investigation. November 14, 2020.

Independent. Coronavirus: Former MI6 head claims pandemic ‘started as accident’ in Chinese laboratory. Andy Gregory. June 4, 2020.

The Wall Street Journal. In rare move, U.S. intelligence agencies confirm investigating if coronavirus emerged from lab accident. Warren P. Strobel and Dustin Volz. April 30, 2020.

The Wall Street Journal. China bat expert says her Wuhan lab wasn’t source of new coronavirus. James T. Areddy. April 21, 2020.

ABC News. Sorry, conspiracy theorists. Study concludes COVID-19 ‘is not a laboratory construct’. Kate Holland. March 27, 2020. 

The Economist. The pieces of the puzzle of Covid-19’s origin are coming to light. May 2, 2020. 

The Wall Street Journal. The Wuhan lab theory. The Editorial Board. May 6, 2020. 

The Guardian. Ignore the conspiracy theories: Scientists know Covid-19 wasn’t created in a lab. Peter Daszak. June 9, 2020. 

Science. Trump ‘owes us an apology.’ Chinese scientist at the center of COVID-19 origin theories speaks out. Jon Cohen. July 24, 2020.

Science. Reply to Science Magazine: Shi Zhengli Q&A. Shi Zhengli. July 15, 2020.

Minerva. Contradicting statements cast doubts on Chinese raw data. Aksel Fridstrøm. September 10, 2020. 

Minerva. The most logical explanation is that it comes from a laboratory. Aksel Fridstrøm and Nils August Andresen. July 2, 2020. 

Newsweek. Dr. Fauci backed controversial Wuhan lab with U.S. dollars for risky coronavirus research. Fred Guterl. April 28, 2020.

Independent Science News. The case is building that COVID-19 had a lab origin. Jonathan Latham and Allison Wilson. June 5, 2020.

Independent Science News. A proposed origin for SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic. Jonathan Latham and Allison Wilson. July 15, 2020.

The Federalist. Virologist explains his quest to track down the origin of COVID-19. Julian Vigo. September 2, 2020. 

Sam Husseini Blog. Questioning the CDC: Is it a complete coincidence that China’s only BSL4 is in Wuhan? Audio and video. Sam Husseini. April 17, 2020.

GMWatch. Wuhan and US scientists used undetectable methods of genetic engineering on bat coronaviruses. Jonathan Matthews and Claire Robinson. May 20, 2020. 

Corporate Crime Reporter. Andrew Kimbrell on the origins of COVID-19. Russell Mokhiber. August 11, 2020.

GMWatch. Was the COVID-19 virus genetically engineered? Jonathan Matthews. April 22, 2020.

GMWatch. Why are the lab escape denialists telling such brazen lies? Jonathan Matthews. June 17, 2020. 

NBC News. Inside the Chinese lab central to the search for the coronavirus’ origin. Janis Mackey Frayer and Denise Chow. August 10, 2020.

The Intercept. In Its Zeal to Blame China for Coronavirus, the Trump Administration Is Thwarting Investigations Into the Pandemic’s Origins. Mara Hvistendahl. May 19, 2020.

Edizioni Cantagalli. Cina Covid 19. La chimera che ha cambiato il mondo (China COVID-19: The Chimera That Changed the World). Joseph Tritto. August 2020. 

Accidents, leaks, containment failures, transparency failures in biosafety facilities

The New Yorker. The risks of building too many bio labs. Elisabeth Eaves. March 18, 2020. 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Human error in high-biocontainment labs: a likely pandemic threat. Lynn Klotz. February 25, 2019. 

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. A Guide to Investigating Outbreak Origins: Nature versus the Laboratory. Richard Pilch, Miles Pomper, Jill Luster, and Filippa Lentzos. October 2020.

ProPublica. Here are six accidents UNC researchers had with lab-created coronaviruses. Alison Young and Jessica Blake. August 17, 2020. 

CBC. Canadian scientist sent deadly viruses to Wuhan lab months before RCMP asked to investigate. June 16, 2020.

The Frederick News-Post. CDC inspection findings reveal more about USAMRIID research suspension. Heather Mongilio. November 23, 2019. 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and U.S. Department of Agriculture. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID): description of inspection findings definitions. August 2019.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. High-containment laboratories: Comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms needed to improve safety. April 19, 2016. GAO-16-305. 

USA Today. 10 incidents discovered at the nation’s biolabs. Alison Young and Nick Penzenstadler. May 29, 2015. 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Threatened pandemics and laboratory escapes: self-fulfilling prophecies. Martin Furmanski. March 31, 2014.

Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Laboratory Escapes and “Self-fulfilling prophecy” Epidemics. Martin Furmanski. February 17, 2014.

National Research Council. Biosecurity challenges of the global expansion of high-containment biological laboratories: summary of a workshop. 2012. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 

US House of Representatives. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Hearing on germs, viruses, and secrets: the silent proliferation of bio-laboratories in the United States, 110th Congress. October 4, 2007.

US House of Representatives. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Hearing on Federal Oversight Of High-Containment Biolaboratories, One Hundred Eleventh Congress. September 22, 2009.

BMJ. Breaches of safety regulations are probable cause of recent SARS outbreak, WHO says. Jane Parry. May 22, 2004. doi: 10.1136/bmj.328.7450.1222-b

Independent Science News. The long history of accidental laboratory releases of potential pandemic pathogens is being ignored in the COVID-19 media coverage. Sam Husseini. May 5, 2020.

GMWatch. COVID-19: A wake-up call for biosafety. Jonathan Matthews. April 24, 2020. 

USA Today. CDC failed to disclose lab incidents with bioterror pathogens to Congress. Alison Young. June 24, 2016.

Global Times. Biosafety guideline issued to fix chronic management loopholes at virus labs. Liu Caiyu and Leng Shumei. February 16, 2020.

CBS News. Investigation: U.S. company bungled Ebola response. The Associated Press. March 7, 2016. 

GMWatch. Journals censor lab origin theory for SARS-CoV-2. Claire Robinson. July 16, 2020. 

Networks of biodefense and biowarfare 

Salon. Did this virus come from a lab? Maybe not — but it exposes the threat of a biowarfare arms race. Sam Husseini. April 24, 2020.

Sam Husseini Blog. Averting our gaze from biowarfare: pandemics and self-fulfilling prophecies. Sam Husseini. May 2020. 

The Boston Globe. The lure of bio-weapons. Bernard Lown and Prasannan Parthasarathi. February 23, 2005. 

Monterey Institute of International Studies. Beijing on biohazards: Chinese experts on bioweapons nonproliferation issues. Amy E. Smithson, Editor. August 2007. The James Martin Center For Nonproliferation Studies.

Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945. Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa, and Malcolm Dando (Editors). Harvard University Press, 2006.

Biowarfare and Terrorism. Francis Boyle. 2005. Clarity Press, Inc.

Preventing a Biological Arms Race. Susan Wright (Editor). The MIT Press, 1990. 

Biohazard. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman. Random House: New York, 1999. 

Debates on gain-of-function research

The National Academies Press. Potential risks and benefits of gain-of-function research: summary of a workshop. 2015. 

Forbes. Should we allow scientists to create dangerous super-viruses? Steven Salzberg. October 20, 2014. 

The Cambridge Working Group. Cambridge Working Group consensus statement on the creation of potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs). July 14, 2014. 

mBio. Can limited scientific value of potential pandemic pathogen experiments justify the risks? Marc Lipsitch. October 14, 2014. doi: 

mBio. Research on Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Influenza Virus: The Way Forward. Anthony S. Fauci. September-October 2012, 3(5): e00359-12. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00359-12

mBio. Falling down the rabbit hole: aTRIP toward lexiconic precision in the “gain-of-function” debate. W. Paul Duprex and Arturo Casadevall. vol. 5,6 e02421-14. 12 Dec. 2014, doi:10.1128/mBio.02421-14

PLoS Medicine. Ethical alternatives to experiments with novel potential pandemic pathogens. Marc Lipsitch and Alison Galvani. 2014. 11(5): e1001646. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1001646  

Scientific papers on the origins of SARS-CoV-2

The Lancet. Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. Chaolin Huang et al. January 30, 2020. Volume 395: 497–506. 

Nature. A pneumonia outbreak associated with a new coronavirus of probable bat origin. Peng Zhou, Xing-Lou Yang, Xian-Guang Wang, Ben Hu,…and Zheng-Li Shi. 2020. 579(7798): 270-273. doi:10.1038/s41586-020-2012-7

Nature Medicine. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. Kristian G. Andersen, Andrew Rambaut, W. Ian Lipkin, Edward C. Holmes, Robert F. Garry. April 2020. Volume 26, pages 450-455. 

Journal of Medical Virology. Questions concerning the proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. Murat Seyran, Damiano Pizzol, Parise Adadi…and Adam M. Brufsky. September 3, 2020. doi: 

BioEssays. Might SARS‐CoV‐2 have arisen via serial passage through an animal host or cell culture? Karl Sirotkin and Dan Sirotkin. August 12, 2020.

Frontiers in Public Health. Lethal pneumonia cases in Mojiang miners (2012) and the mineshaft could provide important clues to the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Monali Rahalkar and Rahul Bahulikar. September 17, 2020. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2020.581569

BioEssays. The genetic structure of SARS‐CoV‐2 does not rule out a laboratory origin. Rossana Segreto and Yuri Deigin. November 17, 2020.

bioRxiv. SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence? Shing Hei Zhan, Benjamin E. Deverman, Yujia Alina Chan. May 2, 2020. doi: 

Zenodo. Where Did the 2019 Coronavirus Pandemic Begin and How Did it Spread? The People’s Liberation Army Hospital in Wuhan China and Line 2 of the Wuhan Metro System Are Compelling Answers. Steven Carl Quay. October 28, 2020. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.4119262

Medium. Lab-made? SARS-CoV-2 genealogy through the lens of gain-of-function research. Yuri Deigin. April 22, 2020. 

Minerva. The evidence which suggests that this is no naturally evolved virus: A reconstructed historical aetiology of the SARS-CoV-2 spike. Birger Sørensen, Angus Dalgleish & Andres Susrud. July 1, 2020.

ResearchGate. Is considering a genetic-manipulation origin for SARS-CoV-2 a conspiracy theory that must be censored? Rossana Segreto and Yuri Deigin. April 2020. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31358.13129/1

Preprints. Major concerns on the identification of bat coronavirus strain RaTG13 and quality of related Nature paper. Xiaoxu Lin, Shizhong Chen. June 5, 2020. 2020060044. doi: 10.20944/preprints202006.0044.v1 

Preprints. The abnormal nature of the fecal swab sample used for NGS analysis of RaTG13 genome sequence imposes a question on the correctness of the RaTG13 sequence. Monali Rahalkar and Rahul Bahulikar. August 11, 2020. doi: 10.20944/preprints202008.0205.v1 

OSF Preprints. COVID-19, SARS and bats coronaviruses genomes unexpected exogeneous RNA sequences. Jean-Claude Perez and Luc Montagnier. April 25, 2020. doi:10.31219/ 

Zenodo. HIV man-manipulated coronavirus genome evolution trends. Jean-Claude Perez and Luc Montagnier. August 2, 2020. 

Emerging Microbes & Infections. HIV-1 did not contribute to the 2019-nCoV genome. Xiao Chuan, Li Xiaojun, Liu Shuying, Sang Yongming, Gao Shou-Jiang and Gao Feng. 2020. 9(1): 378-381. doi: 10.1080/22221751.2020.1727299

arXiv. In silico comparison of spike protein-ACE2 binding affinities across species; significance for the possible origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Sakshi Piplani, Puneet Kumar Singh, David A. Winkler, Nikolai Petrovsky. May 13, 2020. 

Nature. Identifying SARS-CoV-2-related coronaviruses in Malayan pangolins. Tommy Tsan-Yuk Lam, Na Jia, Ya-Wei Zhang, Marcus Ho-Hin Shum, Jia-Fu Jiang, Hua-Chen Zhu, Yi-Gang Tong, Yong-Xia Shi, Xue-Bing Ni, Yun-Shi Liao, Wen-Juan Li, Bao-Gui Jiang, Wei Wei, Ting-Ting Yuan, Kui Zheng, Xiao-Ming Cui, Jie Li, Guang-Qian Pei, Xin Qiang, William Yiu-Man Cheung, Lian-Feng Li, Fang-Fang Sun, Si Qin, Ji-Cheng Huang, Gabriel M. Leung, Edward C. Holmes, Yan-Ling Hu, Yi Guan & Wu-Chun Cao. March 26, 2020. doi:

PLoS Pathogens. Are pangolins the intermediate host of the 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)? Ping Liu, Jing-Zhe Jiang, Xiu-Feng Wan, Yan Hua, Linmiao Li, Jiabin Zhou, Xiaohu Wang, Fanghui Hou, Jing Chen, Jiejian Zou, Jinping Chen. May 14, 2020. doi:

Nature. Isolation of SARS-CoV-2-related coronavirus from Malayan pangolins. Kangpeng Xiao, Junqiong Zhai, Yaoyu Feng, Niu Zhou, Xu Zhang, Jie-Jian Zou, Na Li, Yaqiong Guo, Xiaobing Li, Xuejuan Shen, Zhipeng Zhang, Fanfan Shu, Wanyi Huang, Yu Li, Ziding Zhang, Rui-Ai Chen, Ya-Jiang Wu, Shi-Ming Peng, Mian Huang, Wei-Jun Xie, Qin-Hui Cai, Fang-Hui Hou, Wu Chen, Lihua Xiao & Yongyi She. May 7, 2020. doi:

Current Biology. Probable Pangolin Origin of SARS-CoV-2 Associated with the COVID-19 Outbreak. Tao Zhang, Qunfu Wu, Zhigang Zhang. March 19, 2020. doi:

bioRxiv. Single source of pangolin CoVs with a near identical Spike RBD to SARS-CoV-2. Yujia Alina Chan and Shing Hei Zhan. October 23, 2020. doi:

Infection, Genetics and Evolution. COVID-19: Time to exonerate the pangolin from the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to humans. Roger Frutos, Jordi Serra-Cobo, Tianmu Chen and Christian A. Devaux. Volume 84, October 2020, 104493.

bioRxiv. No evidence of coronaviruses or other potentially zoonotic viruses in Sunda pangolins (Manis javanica) entering the wildlife trade via Malaysia. Jimmy Lee, Tom Hughes, Mei-Ho Lee, Hume Field, Jeffrine Japning Rovie-Ryan, Frankie Thomas Sitam, Symphorosa Sipangkui, Senthilvel K.S.S. Nathan, Diana Ramirez, Subbiah Vijay Kumar, Helen Lasimbang, Jonathan H. Epstein, Peter Daszak. June 19, 2020. doi:

Archives of Virology. A palindromic RNA sequence as a common breakpoint contributor to copy-choice recombination in SARS-CoV-2. William R. Gallaher. July 31, 2020.

Cell. A genomic perspective on the origin and emergence of SARS-CoV-2. Yong-Zhen Zhang, Edward C. Holmes. April 2020 181(2):223-227. doi: 10.1016/j.cell.2020.03.035.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Superantigenic character of an insert unique to SARS-CoV-2 spike supported by skewed TCR repertoire in patients with hyperinflammation. Mary Hongying Cheng, She Zhang, Rebecca A. Porritt, Magali Noval Rivas, Lisa Paschold, Edith Willscher, Mascha Binder, Moshe Arditi, and Ivet Bahar. September 28, 2020. doi:

Current Biology. A novel bat coronavirus closely related to SARS-CoV-2 contains natural insertions at the S1/S2 cleavage site of the spike protein. Hong Zhou, Xing Chen, Tao Hu, Juan Li, Hao Song, Yanran Liu, Peihan Wang, Di Liu, Jing Yang, Edward C. Holmes, Alice C. Hughes, Yuhai Bi, and Weifeng Shi. June 8, 2020. 30: 2196-2203. doi:

bioRxiv. Furin cleavage site is key to SARS-CoV-2 pathogenesis. Bryan A. Johnson,…Kari Debbink, Pei Yong Shi, Alexander Freiberg and Vineet Menachery. August 26, 2020. doi: 

bioRxiv. The furin cleavage site of SARS-CoV-2 spike protein is a key determinant for transmission due to enhanced replication in airway cells. Thomas Peacock, Daniel H. Goldhill, Jie Zhou,…and Wendy S. Barclay. September 30, 2020. doi. 

Zenodo. Unusual features of the SARS-CoV-2 genome suggesting sophisticated laboratory modification rather than natural evolution and delineation of its probable synthetic route. Li-Meng Yan, Shu Kang, Jie Guan, and Shanchang Hu. September 14, 2020. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.4028829  

Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. In Response: Yan et al Preprint Examinations of the Origin of SARS-CoV-2. Kelsey Lane Warmbrod, Rachel M. West, Nancy D. Connell and Gigi Kwik Gronvall. September 21, 2020.

Zenodo. Proposed SARS-CoV-2 Spillover During 2019 Review of Samples from a Mineshaft in Mojiang, Yunnan Province, China. Anonymous. September 14, 2020. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.4029544