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Executive Summary

Food and pharmaceutical industry actors have historically sought to influence the U.S. Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA), and have had financial ties to nutrition experts on the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee (DGAC), which reviews the latest science on diet, nutrition, and health outcomes to make recommendations for the DGA.

A 2017 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) urged the U.S. Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS) to avoid appointing DGAC members with significant conflicts of interest, and to more fully disclose their industry ties.

This year, for the first time, USDA and HHS released partial public disclosures of conflicts of interest of the 2025 DGAC, which showed that DGAC members have ties to large food and pharmaceutical companies and industry groups. However, these disclosures were voluntary, aggregated across all DGAC members, did not identify each individual member’s conflicts, and only covered the last year.

The aim of this report is to provide fuller disclosure of conflicts of interest of the members of the 2025 DGAC, including financial and other ties during the last five years to the food, pharmaceutical, grocery, and other industries with a stake in the outcome of the dietary guidelines.

We compiled publicly available data related to each of the 20 DGAC members, noting conflicts of interest.

We found that 13 of 20 DGAC members had high-risk, medium-risk or possible conflicts of interest with industry actors. Findings include:

- 9 of 20 members had high-risk (8) or medium-risk (1) conflicts of interest with food (8), pharmaceutical (3), and weight loss (2) companies or industry groups, most often in the form of research support and consultancy.
- 4 of 20 members had possible conflicts of interest with food and pharmaceutical companies or organizations that have a history of corporate sponsorship and lobbying in the development of the guidelines.
- Particular actors had ties to two or more members, including Abbott (4), Novo Nordisk (3), National Dairy Council (3), Eli Lilly (2), and Weight Watchers (WW) International (2).

* Data collection consisted of a web search (first 100 search results on Google; social media accounts; biography and/or CV; institutional and personal websites; and CMS’s Open Payments website) and literature review (PubMed, Google Scholar, and the Web of Science Core Collection for all papers published by the member in the past five years).

** Please see methodology for our assessment of possible conflicts.
Leading professional nutrition organizations in the U.S.—the American Society for Nutrition and the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, which both have a history of corporate sponsorship and lobbying in the development of the guidelines—have wide-ranging ties to DGAC members.

We also found signs of progress. While some DGAC members had high-risk conflicts of interest, seven members had no relationships in the past five years that met our definition of conflict of interest. An additional four members only had one instance of possible conflict of interest, although these range from a large, multi-year grant from a food company to a single speaking appearance at an industry-funded conference or an associate editor role at a journal that accepts corporate funding.

Surely, there is room for further improvement. With high-risk conflicts of interest still present on the DGAC, the public cannot have confidence that the official dietary advice of the U.S. government is free from industry influence.

Our findings point to six recommendations to improve the selection and operation of the DGAC. USDA and HHS should: (1) not appoint members with high-risk conflicts of interest; (2) disclose individual members’ conflicts during the last five years; (3) use a transparent disclosure form—not OGE form 450, due to its confidentiality; (4) publish a list of provisional appointees prior to appointment, open for public comment, as recommended by NASEM; and, (5) include leadership roles or paid roles at conflicted nutrition organizations in disclosures of possible conflicts of interest. Congress should (6) expand the Physician Payments Sunshine Act to cover the nutrition field.
Introduction

Corporate interest in the Dietary Guidelines for Americans

The Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) provide advice on what to eat and drink to “build a healthy diet that can promote healthy growth and development, help prevent diet-related chronic diseases, and meet nutrient needs.” Every five years, these guidelines are updated by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS). They are considered the “gold standard” for dietary advice in the U.S. and around the world. They influence which foods are served in schools, hospitals, and military facilities. They inform the advice we receive from healthcare professionals. They influence how federal food aid is distributed, how nutrition labels look, and how food products are formulated. It is, therefore, essential that the DGA be evidence-based and trustworthy because it is the scientific foundation for virtually all government-based nutrition policies and programs.

The Dietary Guidelines stand as a vital tool for public health. In recent years, however, the DGAC nominations process and concerns about conflicts of interest (COI) have been the subject of heightened scrutiny and calls for increased transparency. Fundamentally, the DGAs are created through a politicized process that is open to influence by corporations that benefit from the existing food system. Food, beverage, and pharmaceutical companies, as well as large grocery chains with a financial stake in the DGA, have repeatedly attempted—often successfully—to influence the guidelines.

Corporations try to influence food policies in many ways, channeling millions of dollars to political candidates,* lobbying activities,** and trade groups and industry-affiliated nonprofits that influence research, public perceptions and lobbying efforts that inform the DGA.***

Food and drug companies also exert influence by designing and funding nutrition research that may advance their interests. Food industry influence over nutrition research is a phenomenon “so systematic that it has a name: The Funding Effect,” says nutrition expert Marion Nestle, a leading authority on how the food industry influences food policy. A large body of scientific evidence shows unsurprisingly that

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** Lobbying expenditures for the agribusiness industry in 2022 topped $169 million, with 1,311 lobbyists reported. The food and beverage industry spent $29 million on lobbying in 2022, with 325 lobbyists reported. Agribusiness: Lobbying, 2022, OpenSecrets; Food & Beverage: Lobbying, 2022, OpenSecrets, accessed September 14, 2023. Most of these lobbyists—61.5% for the agribusiness industry and 74% for the food and beverage industry—were “revolvers,” meaning they are part of what OpenSecrets describes as a “revolving door that shuffles former federal employees into jobs as lobbyists, consultants and strategists, just as the door pulls former hired guns into government careers.” Overview: Revolving Door, OpenSecrets, accessed September 2023.
*** U.S. Right to Know has co-authored 15 public health studies showing how the food and beverage industries and industry-funded groups use multiple channels to influence public opinion, scientific research, public health conferences and government policies related to diet and nutrition. U.S. Right to Know, Academic Work.
food-industry funding biases research in favor of the funders.14,15,16,17 This bias often shows up in how research questions are framed and how results are interpreted, in ways that may not be transparent to the public.18 Food industry sponsorship is nearly ubiquitous in the fields of nutrition, food, and agriculture, with sponsorship of academics, conferences and professional organizations that inform nutrition policies.19,20

Numerous public health organizations and advocates have voiced concerns about food and beverage industries’ influence on the development of the dietary guidelines.21,22,23 They argue that corporate influence can lead to recommendations that prioritize industry profits over public health. Research has shown that the food and beverage industries share similarities with the tobacco industry in the actions these industries have taken to downplay the harms of their products.24,25,26

The public health implications are clear: Poor diet contributes to the development of many chronic diseases and illnesses, including obesity,27,28 type 2 diabetes,29,30 cardiovascular disease,31,32 cancer,33,34 dementia,35 depression,36 chronic kidney disease37 and all-cause mortality.38,39

Diet-related diseases disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S.,40,41 perpetuating health inequalities.42 Obesity now afflicts 4 in 10 Americans.43 By one estimate, by 2030, nearly 1 in 2 Americans will have obesity and nearly 1 in 4 will have severe obesity, with large disparities among vulnerable subgroups, especially women, Black adults and low-income adults.44 Healthier diets could save many lives and billions of dollars in U.S. healthcare costs.45

**Industry influence and transparency: The Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee**

One route for the food industry to exert influence on the DGA is through the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee (DGAC)46—a panel of food and nutrition experts appointed by HHS and USDA every five years to review the latest science and make recommendations to the agencies for updating the DGA. The committee evaluates scientific findings to assess the relationships between diet, nutrition and health outcomes. They compile these findings into a comprehensive scientific report that summarizes the evidence and presents potential recommendations for the guidelines.47 The draft scientific report is published for review and comment by stakeholders, including experts, organizations, and the general public.

Corporations and their allies can directly influence the DGAC throughout its deliberations by submitting comments to the DGAC, both written and oral, and they are prolific in doing so. Of the public comments from organizations submitted to the 2020 DGAC, nearly 70 percent came from the food and beverage industry, according to Corporate Accountability.48 After the comment period, the DGAC finishes the report, and USDA and HHS use it as a foundation to develop the guidelines.*

Health groups, scientists and nutrition experts49,50,51,52—including a 2017 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM)53—have called for tougher policies against conflicts of interests among DGAC members, and full disclosure of their

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* Although the DGAC report is influential, it is only one of many channels for corporate influence in the development of the guidelines. HHS and USDA can accede to corporate lobbying and overrule the DGAC’s recommendations—as they did in 2020 when they dismissed the DGAC’s recommendation to set lower targets for the consumption of sugar and alcohol. (Roni Caryn Rabin, “U.S. Diet Guidelines Sidestep Scientific Advice to Cut Sugar and Alcohol,” *New York Times*, December 29, 2020.) Congress can intervene in the process, too. When the 2015 DGAC report recommended a largely plant-based diet for environmental as well as health reasons, food industry lobbyists convinced Congress to use the appropriations process to set limits on what the guidelines can say. (Marion Nestle, “Congress Continues to Intervene in Dietary Guidelines,” *Food Politics by Marion Nestle*, July 23, 2015.) Although outside of the scope of this report, these channels of influence are important for further research.
industry ties. NASEM proposed a redesign of the DGA process “to improve transparency, promote diversity of expertise and experience, support a deliberative process, foster independence in decision-making, and strengthen scientific rigor.”

NASEM urged USDA and HHS to avoid appointing DGAC members with significant conflicts of interest. In cases where conflicts cannot be avoided, NASEM recommended that the agencies identify and manage these conflicts of interest, and develop a policy to address any biases.

The USDA and HHS have not thoroughly followed these recommendations. A March 2022 analysis by public health researchers found “significant and widespread” conflicts of interest in the previous DGAC (2020–2025). At least 95% of those DGAC members had ties to the food, and/or pharmaceutical industries throughout their careers. Several members had ties to multiple companies or industry groups. These included Kellogg, Abbott, Kraft, Mead Johnson, General Mills, Danone, and the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), an industry group funded by food, beverage, and agriculture companies.

Public health groups and an influential U.S. Senator have called on USDA and HHS to follow the NASEM’s recommendations, but the agencies did not mandate public disclosure of COI for the 2020 or 2025 DGAC. In 2023, USDA and HHS did publish voluntary COI disclosures for the 2025 DGAC. The four-page disclosure document revealed potential conflicts for DGAC members with drug companies, such as Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, and Pfizer, and several food industry actors with a stake in the committee’s work, including Abbott Nutrition, the American Egg Board, Beyond Meat, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association and National Dairy Council. HHS and USDA required the committee members to fill out the standard financial disclosure form, OGE 450, but these forms are confidential and not disclosed to the public.

The COI disclosures for the 2025 DGAC have two key failings:

1. They cover only the last year, not five years.
2. They are aggregated, and do not identify which members have which conflicts. In other words, they obfuscate the industry ties of individual DGAC members.

Complete disclosures for each DGAC member covering at least five years are crucial for understanding the conflicts of the new DGAC members.

This report is an effort to close that transparency gap. We report here on the conflicts of interest of the members of the 2025 DGAC, including financial and other ties to the food, pharmaceutical, grocery and other industries that have a stake in the dietary guidelines, related food and nutrition policies, and the foods Americans choose to buy and eat.
Methodology

We searched for COI in publicly available data related to each of the 20 members of the 2025 DGAC. Searches were conducted in June and July, 2023. Our criteria for data categorization are based on a modification of those developed by Parker and Bero (2022). They include additional criteria to match additional types of data we found.

We define COI as a financial or nonfinancial link between a DGAC member and an industry actor which creates a risk of impaired professional judgment relevant to the DGA. We define an industry actor as a food, agribusiness or relevant pharmaceutical company whose interests may be affected by the committee’s report, or an organization that receives funding from such a company. We included the following as industry actors with relevant interests before the committee: food and beverage producers and manufacturers; agribusiness and large scale farming and processing corporations; large grocery chains or superstores; trade organizations and public relations entities that represent food company interests; pharmaceutical corporations with products related to diet, weight loss, or diet-related chronic disease management; and industry groups, and professional and academic nutrition organizations that receive funding from companies with interests before the DGAC; and other entities, such as corporate foundations and research institutes, that receive funding from any actors listed above.

We noted all disclosures of financial or other types of linkages between a DGAC member and the above actors that coincide with their service on the DGAC, occurred within five years prior to service on the DGAC, or is anticipated in the next two years, following recommendations in Parker and Bero (2022).

Data collection consisted of a web search and literature review. For each DGAC member, web searches included a review of: the first 100 Google search results; social media accounts; biography and/or CV on their institutional website; personal websites, if any; and CMS’s Open Payments website. The literature review included a search on PubMed, Google Scholar, and the Web of Science Core Collection for all papers published by the member between June 2018 and June 2023. We examined the following sections of studies for COI: Competing interests/declaration of interest; funding; acknowledgements; author disclosures; ethics statements/disclosures; and author affiliations.

Three authors then independently categorized the compiled data into four levels of risk, according to criteria adapted from Parker and Bero (2022). (See Appendix A for our criteria).

1. high-risk (such as direct financial links with large industry actors, or being in a position of decision-making at a small food industry company)

* We included financial ties to these organizations, as well as leadership positions that have decision-making capacity. We did not include membership, committee leadership or other roles. Please see Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of the inclusion of professional nutrition societies in our analysis.

** We searched members’ names on Google Scholar and reviewed all results, except for Dr. Chris Taylor whose name produced more than 3 million search results. For Dr. Taylor, we reviewed publications listed under his user profile on Google Scholar, found here: Christopher A. Taylor, PhD, RDN, LD, FAND, accessed July 2023.
2. medium-risk (such as financial links with a government-industry partnership, or employment at a small food industry company)

3. low-risk (such as professional interests of the member, including contents of past publications)

4. minimal or no risk (such as personal values, religious beliefs or habits)

We included high- and medium-risk relationships as COI in our results, and excluded data with low, minimal or no risk. We conducted further research on all data for which we were not unanimous in categorization and resolved any disagreement through discussion in reference to our definition of COI.

When available information was insufficient to ascertain whether a specific relationship fulfilled the definitions of high or medium risk COI, but we could reasonably infer a high-or medium-risk relationship based on the limited information, we presented them as “possible COI.” For example, it was often impossible to ascertain whether any payments were made for each speaking engagement at industry-sponsored conferences. We included speaking at industry-sponsored conferences as “possible COI” if they happened in person, because such engagements often include payments of honoraria, travel expenses or lodging support. We also included editor positions at industry-supported journals as “possible COI” as they are often paid, but not positions on editorial boards as they are often unpaid. To avoid over-representing a member’s COI, we deleted all possible duplicates even if we could not verify that they were duplicates. For example, if multiple publications in a given year disclosed a grant or relationship, we assumed a single COI.

**A COI is a risk of harm, not necessarily actual harm**

We assessed data as COI based on the presence of a risk of impairment of judgment in the DGAC member’s service on the committee, and not on whether the industry relationship in and of itself was worthy of criticism.

Writing on COI in the field of medicine, McCoy and Emanuel (2017) clarify this distinction. “Conflicts of interest in medicine can thus lead to harm via 3 steps in a causal chain: (1) a physician or a researcher has a secondary—often financial—interest that threatens to bias his or her professional judgment; (2) the secondary interest does in fact bias the judgment of the physician or the researcher; and (3) this biased judgment results in harm to patients or to the integrity of research. Importantly, only the first of these 3 steps is necessary for a COI. A COI describes a situation in which there is a risk of bias and resulting harm, not a situation in which bias or harm necessarily occurs.”

This understanding of COI is necessary given the ethical rationale for limiting COI. “Usually, it is difficult for observers to determine when a physician’s or a researcher’s judgment has been biased by a secondary interest. Even if bias can be detected, it will typically be only after the fact when harm has already occurred. The rationale for limiting COI is grounded in the ethical imperative to minimize risk to patients, the integrity of research, and other activities. Thus, failing to limit COIs to the extent possible is unethical even if those conflicts never result in patient harm or compromised research.”

The results below are COI in relation to the DGAC. For example, if a DGAC member receives research funding from a weight loss drug manufacturer for a study on influenza, it is not our position that the research itself is unethical or necessarily biased. However, we would count this as COI in relation to the DGAC, because such financial relationships with an interested actor presents a risk of impairment in the professional judgment while on the committee—for example, when voting on a recommendation about the use of weight loss drugs. Making these risk factors clear is the first step towards managing them so that they will not result in actual harm.
Results

The following are high-risk, medium-risk, and possible COI for each member of the 2025 DGAC. The results reflect data that were publicly available. Inclusion of more specific information (such as dollar figures) for some data but not others reflects the availability of that data, not the gravity of the conflict.

Sarah Booth, PhD
*Tufts University (DGAC Chair)*

Medium-risk COI

Research support from a government-industry partnership: Dr. Booth co-authored an infant feeding study partially funded by grants from the USDA, National Dairy Council and the Gerber Foundation.74

Decision-making role in professional nutrition organizations with industry funding: Dr. Booth has held leadership positions in the industry-funded professional group, the American Society of Nutrition (ASN). See Appendix B for description of ASN’s ties to industry. She is currently vice president of ASN,75 and was its treasurer (2021–2022).76

Possible COI

Position in industry-sponsored conferences: Dr. Booth was selected to speak at a conference sponsored by Bayer, Coca-Cola, and Abbott, among other industry actors.77

Angela Odoms-Young, PhD, MS
*Cornell University (DGAC Vice Chair)*

Possible COI

Position in organizations with industry funding: Dr. Odoms-Young is associate editor of Nutrition Reviews, a nutrition journal published on behalf of the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI),78 a food and beverage industry group funded by its member companies.79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86

Steven Abrams, MD
*University of Texas at Austin*

High-risk COI

Industry consultancy: Steven Abrams was scientific advisor to MilkPEP,87,88 the Milk Processor Education Program, until December 2018.89 MilkPEP is part of the fluid milk checkoff program, governed by the USDA and funded by milk processors. It “exist[s] to increase dairy milk awareness and drive milk consumption to benefit all processors and the entire industry,” according to its website.90

Research support: Dr. Abrams has disclosed research funding from Perrigo Nutrition,91 the third largest manufacturer of infant formula in the U.S. and Canadian markets.92

Speaker fees: Dr. Abrams has disclosed support from Abbott Nutrition for presentations.93

* Affiliations of committee members referenced are from Dietary Guidelines for Americans website, 2025 Advisory Committee Members page, accessed September 2023. Biographical sketches of committee members are available on Dietary Guidelines for Americans website, 2025 Dietary Guidelines Committee Biographical Sketches, accessed September 2023.
Possible COI

Research support: Dr. Abrams authored a study on Vitamin D in infants funded by the Nestlé Nutrition Institute.94

Position in industry-sponsored conferences: Dr. Abrams was a speaker at a conference sponsored by Nestlé Nutrition Institute and Abbott Nutrition.95 He was also a speaker at a Nestlé Nutrition Institute conference,96 and published a book chapter as part of one of the Institute's workshop series.97

Position in professional and academic nutrition organizations with industry funding: Dr. Abrams is currently editor-in-chief of Advances in Nutrition, a nutrition journal published by the American Society for Nutrition (ASN).98,99 Editor-in-Chief is a position appointed by ASN.

Cheryl Anderson, PhD, MPH, MS
University of California San Diego

High-risk COI

Industry consultancy: Dr. Anderson has received honoraria for serving on the scientific advisory board for the weight loss company WeightWatchers (WW) International.100,101,102 She also has received honoraria for her work on the scientific advisory council of the McCormick Science Institute (MSI).103,104,105 MSI is fully funded by the McCormick Company, which manufactures spices.106,107

Possible COI

Position in industry-sponsored conferences: Dr. Anderson was a keynote speaker for a symposium sponsored by Abbott, along with several other pharmaceutical companies. We note that the symposium's subject matter—heart failure—was not directly related to nutrition or to the mandate of the DGAC.108

Aline Andres, PhD, RD
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Aline Andres.

Carol Byrd-Bredbenner, PhD, RD, FAND
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Carol Byrd-Bredbenner.

Andrea Deierlein, PhD, MPH, MS
New York University

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Andrea Deierlein.

Heather Eicher-Miller, PhD
Purdue University

High-risk COI

Industry consultancy: Dr. Eicher-Miller has received personal fees for serving on the scientific advisory panel for Mead Johnson & Company (2020),109 the National Dairy Council110,111 and the Indiana Dairy Association (2014–2023).112,113 She has received honoraria for work as a grant reviewer for the American Egg Board and for Dairy Management, Inc.114 She also received an honorarium from the Council for Responsible Nutrition International,115 a “trade association for dietary supplement and functional food manufacturers.”116

Research support: Dr. Eicher-Miller has had at least four studies in the past five years funded by Eli Lilly and Company.117,118,119,120 One grant from Eli Lilly listed on Dr. Eicher-Miller’s CV totals $240,821.121 She has also received research funding for a study on eggs and micronutrient intake from the U.S. Egg Nutrition Center, the science and nutrition education division of the checkoff program of the American Egg Board, in the amount of $114,311.122

Medium-risk COI

Leadership in professional and academic nutrition organizations with industry funding: Dr. Eicher-Miller is on the 2023–2024 board of directors for the American Society of Nutrition (ASN) as director-at-large of nutrition population science.123
Possible COI

Monetary prizes: Dr. Eicher-Miller received the Danone International Prize for Alimentation, a 100,000€ prize awarded every two years by the Danone Institute International in collaboration with the French Foundation for Medical Research.\(^{124,125}\) She also received the Mead Johnson Award from the American Society for Nutrition, endowed by Mead Johnson Pediatric Nutrition Institute.\(^{126}\)

Position in industry-sponsored conferences: Dr. Eicher-Miller has spoken at several national and regional conferences, invited by or sponsored by Eli Lilly and Company.\(^{127}\)

Position in professional and academic nutrition organizations with industry funding: Dr. Eicher-Miller has received travel support from the Institute for Food Technologists (IFT), for which she was a media spokesperson (2019–2023).\(^{128}\) IFT is a professional organization for food scientists and technologists funded in part by the processed food industry.* She has also received travel support from the International Food Information Council (IFIC),\(^{129,130}\) an industry communications group that represents food, beverage, and agriculture companies.\(^{130,131}\)

Jennifer Orlet Fisher, PhD
Temple University

Possible COI

Position in industry-sponsored conferences: Dr. Orlet Fisher was a speaker for a Nestlé Nutrition Institute-sponsored satellite program at a 2019 ASN symposium.\(^{132,133}\)

Teresa Fung, ScD, RD
Simmons University

Possible COI

Position in professional and academic organizations with industry funding: Dr. Fung is associate editor for the Journal of Nutrition, published by ASN.\(^{134}\)

Christopher Gardner, PhD
Stanford University

High-risk COI

Research support: Dr. Gardner has received funding from the plant-based meat substitute company, Beyond Meat\(^{135,136,137,138,139,140}\) for research on the health effects of Beyond Meat plant-based meat alternatives.

Possible COI

Small business consultancy: Dr. Gardner advises Diet ID (online application offering dietary assessment services)\(^{141}\) and is a scientific reviewer for Zoe (membership-based health platform offering nutrition coaching and at-home test kits for gut health, blood sugar, and blood fat).\(^{142}\)

Edward Giovannucci, MD, ScD
Harvard University

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Edward Giovannucci.

Deanna Hoelscher, PhD, RDN, LD, CNS, FISBNPA
The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston School of Public Health

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Deanna Hoelscher.

Valarie Blue Bird Jernigan, DrPH, MPH
Oklahoma State University

Possible COI

Research support: Novo Nordisk recently donated $3.5 million to the Center for Indigenous Health Research and Policy (CIHRP) at Oklahoma State University’s Center for Health Sciences, of which Dr. Jernigan is director.\(^{143,144}\)

* IFT “partners” providing “program support” include PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, DuPont, General Mills and Kraft Heinz.
Cristina Palacios, PhD, MSc
Florida International University

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Cristina Palacios.

Hollie Raynor, PhD, RD, LDN
University of Tennessee Knoxville

High-risk COI

Industry consultancy: Dr. Raynor has received compensation from the weight loss company Slimming World for participating on its scientific advisory board.145,146

Research support: Dr. Raynor received research funding from the weight loss program company Weight Watchers (WW) International147,148 in the past five years.

Medium-risk COI

Research support from a government-industry partnership: Dr. Raynor is an author on a proposed study about improving outcomes of a Weight Watchers (WW) weight loss program.149 The study is government funded, while WW will provide non-financial support for this study.

Fatima Cody Stanford, MD, MPH, MPA, MBA, FAAP, FACP, FAHA, FAMWA, FTOS
Harvard University

High-risk COI

Industry consultancy: Dr. Stanford is advisor/consultant to the weight loss and diabetes drug manufacturers Novo Nordisk,150,151,152 Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Boehringer Ingelheim, Rhythm Pharmaceuticals, and Gelesis. She also advises GoodRX (prescription services).153,154,155,156,157

According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)’s disclosure program, Open Payments, Dr. Stanford received a total of $68,880 in consulting fees from multinational weight loss drug manufacturers between 2018–2022, including Novo Nordisk ($47,605), Eli Lilly ($15,050), and Boehringer Ingelheim ($6,225).158

Research support: Dr. Stanford was coauthor for a study on the safety and tolerability of new-generation anti-obesity medications, funded by Novo Nordisk.159

Honoraria and travel support: According to Open Payments, Dr. Stanford received a total of $7,100 in honoraria from Novo Nordisk ($3,500), CurraX Pharmaceuticals ($1,800), and Rhythm Pharmaceuticals ($1,800) between 2018–2022. For the same time period, she received $5,576 in travel, lodging and food support from Novo Nordisk ($5,087) and Eli Lilly ($489).

Other payments from corporations: Dr. Stanford received “compensation for services other than consulting” ($2,950) from Eli Lilly, according to Open Payments.

Medium-risk COI

Small business consultancy: Dr. Stanford advises CurraX Pharmaceuticals (products include a weight management drug).160,161

According to Open Payments, Dr. Stanford received a total of $10,500 in consulting fees from CurraX Pharmaceuticals between 2018–2022.

Possible COI

Small business consultancy: Dr. Stanford advises Sweetch (online health platform, services include disease management), Vida Health (services include weight loss coaching and prescription), Calibrate (weight loss coaching and prescription), MellitCell (type II diabetes drug discovery), LifeForce (products include semaglutide), Dox Health (services include prescription), Veri (services include continuous glucose monitors) and Ilant Health (obesity treatment).162,163,164,165,166

Position in industry-sponsored conferences and programs: Dr. Stanford was a speaker for an event sponsored by Novo Nordisk.167 She was also program faculty/co-chair for at least three continuing medical education (CME) programs supported by grants from Novo Nordisk (2)168,169 and Eli Lilly.170
Sameera Talegawkar, PhD  
The George Washington University

We found no relationships that met our definition of conflicts of interest in the past five years for Sameera Talegawkar.

Chris Taylor, PhD, RDN, LD, FAND  
The Ohio State University

High-risk COI

Research support: Dr. Taylor has authored at least 11 articles and abstracts in the past five years funded by Abbott Nutrition.\textsuperscript{171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181} One of these studies also reports non-financial support from Abbott Laboratories, Bariatrix Nutrition Corp., and the National Dairy Council.\textsuperscript{182} He has also authored a poster abstract about consumption of plant-sourced and animal-sourced protein and a study about the nutritional contribution of animal protein, both funded by the Beef Checkoff.\textsuperscript{183,184} Two of his projects about the nutritional gaps/loss from skipping breakfast were supported by grants from the American Dairy Association Mideast.\textsuperscript{185,186}

Honoraria and travel expenses: Dr. Taylor has received speaker honoraria and travel expenses from Abbott Nutrition.\textsuperscript{187,188}

Deirdre Tobias, ScD  
Harvard University

High-risk COI

Dr. Tobias authored an article, part of the COocoa Supplement and Multivitamin Outcomes Study (COSMOS), supported by an investigator-initiated grant from Mars Edge, a segment of the chocolate and snack manufacturer Mars, Incorporated.\textsuperscript{189}

Medium-risk COI

Research support from government-industry partnerships: Dr. Tobias was an author for a meta-analysis about walnut consumption which was partly funded by the California Walnut Commission,\textsuperscript{190} and a study about nut consumption partly funded by the Peanut Institute and the California Walnut Commission.\textsuperscript{191}

Partial research support from a corporate foundation: Dr. Tobias authored a study (a preprint) which received partial grant support from the Novo Nordisk Foundation.\textsuperscript{192,193}

Possible COI

Position in professional and academic organizations with industry funding: Dr. Tobias is the academic editor for the \textit{American Journal of Clinical Nutrition}, published by the American Society for Nutrition (ASN).\textsuperscript{194,195}
Limitations

Our reporting is dependent on the extent and quality of the financial disclosure data that underlies it. Where this data is incomplete or imperfect, that will be reflected in our reporting.

For example, regarding partial research funding from industry, we assessed an instance of COI on a binary (yes/no funding from industry actors), and did not (and usually could not) determine the extent of that funding. Because our data was not sufficient to fully characterize the extent of industry funding for each partially-funded study, our results in this category may lead to an over-represented perception of risk if the amount of industry funding was small.

Our methodology also presents limitations that make us prone to underreporting a DGAC member’s relationship with industry. Reliance on publicly available data limits our investigation to relationships that are disclosed by the member, the member’s institution, or by industry actors. These disclosures are often voluntary and opaque, and we did not have access to primary sources such as grant contracts or honoraria award letters. In the literature review, we were limited by the extent of journal disclosure requirements, which vary by journal. Some publications do not require disclosure of funding relationships or have statements related to conflict of interest.

We were also limited by the lack of financial relationship transparency programs like the CMS’s Open Payments program in the nutrition field. Only one member was included in the Open Payments program (Fatima Cody Stanford). Thus we could characterize her conflicts more fully and with dollar figures, compared to all others who were not covered by this program. The inclusion of

Reliance on publicly available data limits our investigation to relationships that are disclosed by the member, the member’s institution, or by industry actors. These disclosures are often voluntary and opaque.

Open Payments information for Dr. Stanford and no others does not mean that other members had fewer conflicts; we simply could not report on the data as they were not publicly available.

In addition, our results exclude data when we could not reasonably infer a high- or medium-risk relationship using available information. For example, we did not consider positions held by members in academic/professional organizations or small corporations (such as leadership roles in committees) as COI when we did not have adequate data to confidently conclude whether they were paid or decision-making positions in the organization or company overall. We also omitted relationships to some academic and professional organizations with corporate sponsorship when we could not find clear documentation on the organization’s efforts to shape the DGA. We also did not include speaker roles in industry-sponsored conferences or workshops if they took place online, given the lack of evidence to reasonably suspect that members received travel/lodging/food support or honoraria. Although we conducted further research on all unclear data and discussed whether they met our COI criteria, (see Appendix A), the lack of available information made it impossible to determine if they met our criteria for COI and thus we did not include them.
Our criteria for relevant COI do not cover some relationships that may sway a member toward specific industry interests, such as frequently co-authoring papers with industry employees, and co-authoring a paper for which other authors received industry support. For example, we found instances of members authoring papers about a specific food product in which other authors received research funding from an organization that promotes that specific food. We could not determine how authorship of such publications, reliant on industry money, benefits the member or influences the final outcomes reached even without direct compensation disclosed.

Our criteria also only cover relationships within the past five years, which presents only a fragment of some members’ longstanding ties to industry. In our web search and in CVs, we did come across data about members with significant older ties to industry. However, we did not include these data, as this was out of our scope.
Discussion and Recommendations

This report arose from concerns that the USDA and HHS continue to appoint DGAC members with conflicts of interest, and that the USDA and HHS disclosure of members’ conflicts is inadequate for understanding the extent of their relationships with industry.

In the six years since the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) report addressed the issue of COIs of prospective committee members, it has been clear that USDA and HHS ought to strengthen their DGAC selection process as well as their management and disclosure of conflicts of interest. Until this occurs, the public cannot have confidence that the panel’s recommendations to the U.S. government are free of influence from food, beverage and pharmaceutical companies. It was against this backdrop that we conceived of this report and sought to assess the extent and nature of the current committee’s COIs.

Our findings show that problems with disclosure and mitigation of COIs persist. USDA and HHS have continued to appoint DGAC members with ties to industry, without a clear and strict policy to disclose and manage these conflicts. The agencies have aggregated the list of self-reported conflicts rather than attaching them to individual members. Additionally, the disclosures only cover the last year.

In total, we found that 13 of 20 DGAC members had high-risk (8), medium-risk (1), or possible (4) conflicts of interest. Members had ties with food (8 members), pharmaceutical (4), and weight loss (2) corporations or industry groups, most often in the form of research support and consultancy. Particular industry actors had ties with two or more members: Abbott (4), Novo Nordisk (3), the National Dairy Council (3), Nestlé Nutrition Institute (2), Eli Lilly (2), and Weight Watchers (WW) International (2). In addition, members held decision-making roles (2) or had confirmed or possible financial ties (5) to professional and academic nutrition organizations that receive industry funding.

There were also encouraging findings. For the 2025 DGAC, seven members had no relationships in the past five years that met our definition of COI. In addition, four members only had one instance of possible COI. Among these four instances, the COIs range from a large, multi-year grant from a food company to a single speaking appearance at an industry-funded conference or an associate editor role at a journal that accepts corporate funding. Members free of conflicts of interest are more in line with the recommendations of public health groups and NASEM to USDA and HHS.

We recognize that a 2022 study in Public Health Nutrition about COIs for the previous DGAC may be an attractive point of comparison. The researchers found “significant and widespread COI;” 19 of 20 committee members had conflicts with food and/or pharmaceutical companies with a clear financial stake in the DGAs, with some members having over or near 100 instances of COI. However, our results cannot be directly compared to the Public Health Nutrition COI study, because it placed no time restrictions on

Our findings show that problems with disclosure and mitigation of conflicts of interest persist.
how far back to research conflicts, while our study limited COIs to those within the last five years. We also used somewhat different criteria for identifying and counting COIs.

Surely, there is room for further improvement. USDA and HHS have once again selected some DGAC members who are conflicted due to their relationships with corporations and trade groups from the food and pharmaceutical industries, which have a financial stake in the outcome of the Guidelines. We also found that professional nutrition organizations in the U.S.—the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics and the American Society for Nutrition, both financed by food companies, have wide-ranging ties to DGAC members. With the organizations’ history of corporate funding and their lobbying in the development of the guidelines, there are compelling reasons to scrutinize DGAC members’ relationships with these influential groups and their funders (See Appendix B).

USDA and HHS have once again selected some DGAC members who are conflicted due to their relationships with corporations and trade groups from the food and pharmaceutical industries.

Our findings point to six recommendations to improve the DGAC selection and COI disclosure processes.

**Recommendations**

1. **Don’t appoint members with high-risk conflicts of interest.** USDA and HHS can appoint nationally recognized nutrition and public health experts with minimal or no conflicts of interest, as exemplified by some current appointees. We urge the agencies to continue appointing such experts, and discontinue appointing those with extensive ties to industry.

2. **Disclose individual conflicts during the last five years.** The USDA and HHS’s aggregated disclosures obfuscate industry ties of individual DGAC members. Individual disclosures are crucial in identifying which members have risk of corporate influence, and from which corporations and organizations. In addition, a five year window for reporting COIs would provide the public with a fuller account of members’ backgrounds, biases, and financial entanglements.

3. **Use a better disclosure form.** At present, USDA and HHS require prospective DGAC members to fill out a “disclosure” form called Office of Government Ethics form 450. By law, form 450 is a confidential form. It is not subject to public disclosure. This has enabled the USDA and HHS to keep secret DGAC members’ financial disclosures. We support the solution offered by Center for Science in the Public Interest: create another form that would be disclosed to the public, much like the FDA does for its advisory committees.197

4. **Make a list of provisional appointees open for public comment.** NASEM urged HHS and USDA to “make a list of provisional appointees open for public comment—including short biographies and any known conflicts—for a reasonable period of time prior to appointment.”198 Such a public list would encourage scrutiny of potential DGAC members’ industry ties before rather than after their appointment, and possibly bring other unknown conflicts to light.

5. **Expand the Physician Payments Sunshine Act to cover the nutrition field.** The Physician Payments Sunshine Act is designed to increase transparency and accountability in healthcare.199,200 It requires disclosure of payments between physicians, teaching hospitals and manufacturers of drugs, medical devices and biologics. Nutrition is an integral part of public health. Congress should expand the Physician Payments Sunshine Act to include industry payments made to nutritionists and dietitians.

6. **Include ties to conflicted nutrition organizations in disclosures of possible COI.** Our results show that leading professional nutrition organizations in the U.S., financed by food companies, have important ties to DGAC members (See Appendix B). Leadership positions in nutrition organizations, as well as financial ties such as editor positions in their journals, should be included as possible conflicts of interest if the organizations accept corporate funding and are active in lobbying in the development of the guidelines.
Appendix A
Criteria on relevant linkages with industry actors

Relevant financial and non-financial relationships are as follows:

High-risk

- Financial link [for any amount of money, of any duration, and occurring concurrently, recently (last 5 years), or in future (next 2 years)] between a Committee member and a large* national or multinational food, agrichemical or agribusiness corporation, or relevant** pharmaceutical corporation or PR firm.
  - A DGAC member, partner, or child is one of the following:
    - A company employee
    - Paid adviser, director, trustee or consultant
    - Recipient of speaker fees
    - Owner of financial holdings in the company (e.g., shares, patents, royalties)
    - Recipient of research money from company or company’s nonprofit arm, if the nonprofit has financial/leadership ties to the company***
    - Recipient of monetary gift (e.g., to cover conference travel, accommodation, registration, honoraria)
  - A DGAC member, partner, or child is in a position of control, ownership, or decision making over a small food industry company
    - Example: A DGAC member, partner, or child is owner of small company

Medium-risk

- Financial link (as defined above) between a Committee member and a government-food industry partnership
  - Example: A DGAC member, partner, or child receives grant funding for food research from formal partnership between government agency and multinational food company
- Financial link between a Committee member and a small food industry company
  - Example: A DGAC member, partner, or child is a small company employee
- Financial link or decision-making role in academic or professional organization that receives industry funding
  - Example: A DGAC member, partner, or child holds a paid role or is on the board of directors for an organization that receives industry funding

* One indicator of business size is the OECD’s definition of a large enterprise as one that employs 250 or more employees.
** Companies that produce products related to diet, weight loss, or diet-related chronic disease management.
*** Examples include funding from company, and nonprofit leadership (president, board of directors) being company employees.
Appendix B

A note on the influence of professional nutrition organizations

The U.S. professional nutrition societies American Society for Nutrition and Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics are deeply engaged with each iteration of the Dietary Guidelines. They recommend nominees, generate topics and questions for the committee’s review, and submit oral and written comments on the DGAC report that forms the basis of the eventual guidelines. Both ASN and the Academy have histories of receiving—and continue to receive—corporate funding from the food and beverage industries and industry groups with a stake in the outcome of the guidelines. Both ASN and the Academy have histories of receiving—and continue to receive—corporate funding from the food and beverage industries and industry groups with a stake in the outcome of the guidelines. Both ASN and the Academy have histories of receiving—and continue to receive—corporate funding from the food and beverage industries and industry groups with a stake in the outcome of the guidelines.

Despite its high profile, ASN’s longstanding partnerships with food and beverage industry giants have also, at times, raised concerns that it puts the interests of its corporate sponsors over the public’s health.201,202,203 These episodes, which took place in the 2010s, involved some of the ultra-processed food industry’s biggest players—Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, PepsiCo, Mars, and Kraft, among them, and, amid criticism, most of these have since terminated their sponsorship arrangements with the Society.

The ASN’s 2023 “sustaining partners” include food companies and trade associations including Abbott Nutrition, the California Walnut Commission, Council for Responsible Nutrition, Egg Nutrition Council, the National Dairy Council (an employee of which also holds a seat on the ASN Board as the “Sustaining Partner Chair”),204 Nestlé Nutrition Institute, Mars, Inc., and the Peanut Institute.205 All of these “sustaining partners” also had ties with DGAC members, as seen in our results. Other current ASN “sustaining partners,” with relationships going back at least three years (2021 to the present), include: Ajinomoto Health and Nutrition North America, the General Mills Institute of Health and Nutrition, Mondelez International, and the Sugar Association.206 Past “sustaining partners” include Bayer HealthCare (2021–2022), the Corn Refiners Association (2021), and PepsiCo (2021).207

Our findings raise questions about possible COIs from a wide range of connections to the organization. Two DGAC members serve on the organization’s board of directors (Booth, Eicher-Miller), which is responsible for the overall direction of the organization (including whether to accept corporate funds, and to provide those corporations with special access, influence, favors
or other benefits). In addition, one member (Eicher-Miller) has been the recipient of an industry-ASN partnership award: the ASN/Mead Johnson Award, which is endowed by its Pediatric Nutrition Institute. Some DGAC members held editorial positions at ASN’s journals (Abrams, editor in chief; Fung, associate editor since 2012; Tobias, academic editor).

ASN’s ties to members were also apparent in data we found but did not classify as COI. DGAC members have reviewed for and served on the editorial board of ASN’s journals, received high-profile awards and chaired ASN’s research interest sections in the past five years.

The extent of direct influence by ASN on committee nominations or selection or the committee’s eventual recommendations is outside the scope of this report. ASN’s well-documented history of accepting food and beverage industry funding and its continued relationships with such sponsors, shows the need for better disclosure and transparency at all stages of the Dietary Guidelines process, both for corporate and nonprofit stakeholders who share an interest in the outcome of the guidelines.

The Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics

The Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics (“the Academy”) is, according to its website, the nation’s largest organization of food and nutrition professionals. Its membership consists of over 112,000 credentialed nutrition practitioners, who are “committed to improving the nation’s health and advancing the profession of nutrition and dietetics through research, education and advocacy.” By its own admission, the Academy plays, and touts, an active role in DGAC member nominations, selection, and in informing the committee’s eventual recommendations that become the basis of the DGAs.

It is the Academy’s history of receiving funding from the food and beverage industry — the target of scrutiny and criticism both from the public health community and from the Academy’s own members — and its involvement in the DGAC that underscores the need to examine possible conflicts of interest among current DGAC members that relate to their roles in the Academy. A 2022 study suggests that the Academy continues to “interact with unhealthy commodity corporations in a symbiotic relationship.” The study found that from 2011–17, the Academy received hundreds of thousands of dollars each from Conagra, Abbott, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Hershey, General Mills, Aramark, Unilever and Kellogg. The study also presented evidence that sponsors could procure from the Academy or its Foundation specific “rights and benefits.”


Abbott Nutrition, the pharmaceutical company that also makes infant formula, and the National Dairy Council, have been “Premier Sponsors” or “National Academy Sponsors,” the two highest sponsorship tiers, for more than a decade. As seen in our results, both Abbott and the National Dairy Council have ties to multiple members. Other current Academy sponsors who have ties to committee members include the Egg Nutrition Center, a division of the American Egg Board, Council for Responsible Nutrition (the trade association for the supplement and functional foods industry) and Reckitt/Mead Johnson Nutrition, another infant formula company.

Our research found ties between the Academy and the DGAC that are diverse and far-reaching. While none of these members’ roles within the Academy met our definition of a COI, and were therefore excluded from our results, we note them here given the Academy’s influence and its perennial involvement in the DGAC process. One DGAC member was formerly a member of the Academy’s speaker’s bureau. Notably, during the 2020-2025 DGA cycle, presumably as a way to assert its influence, the Academy established the AND-DGAC Collaborative for the Dietary
Guidelines for Americans. Two members of the current DGAC previously served as Academy representatives to this collaborative. One DGAC member served as reviewer for the Journal of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, with three also serving on the editorial board of the journal. DGAC members served as chairs of various Academy dietary practice groups, committees and projects. Two are fellows of the Academy (FAND). DGAC members also received awards and research funding from the Academy.

Whether these relationships with Academy sponsors or the Academy itself had any role in the committee members’ appointments and the views they bring to committee discussions, or could influence committee recommendations, is outside the scope of this report. It is reasonable to infer, however, that the Academy’s interests, and by extension those of its sponsors, may be well-represented among the current DGAC.
### Appendix C

**Industry actors with ties to DGAC members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbott (Abbott, Abbott Nutrition, Abbott Laboratories)</td>
<td>Manufacturer, medical devices, formula products, infant nutrition products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics</td>
<td>Organization for nutrition professionals, partially funded by industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Egg Board</td>
<td>Checkoff marketing organization for the egg industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Dairy Association Mideast</td>
<td>National Dairy Council affiliate for OH &amp; WV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Society for Nutrition</td>
<td>Organization for academic nutritionists and nutrition researchers, partially funded by industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayer</td>
<td>Manufacturer, pesticides, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, food supplements, diagnostic products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef Checkoff</td>
<td>Checkoff marketing organization for beef producers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond Meat</td>
<td>Manufacturer, plant-based meat alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boehringer Ingelheim</td>
<td>Manufacturer, diabetes and weight loss drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calibrate</td>
<td>Weight loss coaching and weight loss drug prescription services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Walnut Commission</td>
<td>Division of the California Department of Food and Agriculture, funded by walnut growers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca-Cola</td>
<td>Manufacturer, beverages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for Responsible Nutrition</td>
<td>Trade association for dietary supplement and functional foods industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currax Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>Manufacturer, weight management medication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Management, Inc.</td>
<td>Trade association for farmers and dairy importers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danone Institute International</td>
<td>Nutrition research, education and training institute established by the yogurt manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dox Health</td>
<td>Health care app, services include prescriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eli Lilly</td>
<td>Manufacturer, diabetes and weight loss drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelesis</td>
<td>Manufacturer, weight management aid drugs and other therapeutics for diet-related diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerber Foundation</td>
<td>Foundation supporting infants and young childrens' nutrition, care, and development, established by the Gerber Products Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoodRX</td>
<td>Prescription services and telemedicine platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilant Health</td>
<td>Health care platform supporting those with obesity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana Dairy Association</td>
<td>Trade group representing Indiana’s dairy farmers and its dairy industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI)</td>
<td>Food and beverage industry group funded by its member companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Food Information Council (IFIC)</td>
<td>Industry communications group representing food, beverage and agriculture companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Food Technologists (IFT)</td>
<td>Professional organization for food scientists, partially funded by the processed food industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LifeForce</td>
<td>Membership-based health care platform that sells pharmaceuticals, including semaglutide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mars Edge</td>
<td>Research branch of Mars, snack and candy maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormick Science Institute</td>
<td>Research institution funded by spice manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mead Johnson</td>
<td>Manufacturer, breastmilk substitutes and infant nutrition products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mead Johnson Pediatric Nutrition Institute</td>
<td>Research institution funded by manufacturer of breast milk substitutes and infant nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MelliCell</td>
<td>Type II diabetes drug company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MilkPEP</td>
<td>Part of checkoff marketing organization (fluid milk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Dairy Council</td>
<td>Research and education organization funded by checkoff marketing organization (dairy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nestlé Nutrition Institute</td>
<td>Research institute established by Nestlé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novo Nordisk</td>
<td>Manufacturer, diabetes and weight loss drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novo Nordisk Foundation</td>
<td>Philanthropic arm of Novo Nordisk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanut Institute</td>
<td>Research and marketing organization for the peanut industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrigo Nutrition</td>
<td>Manufacturer, infant formula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfizer</td>
<td>Manufacturer, weight loss drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhythm Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>Manufacturer, weight loss drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slimming World</td>
<td>Digital weight loss platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vida Health</td>
<td>Weight loss coaching and prescription services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW International (formerly Weight Watchers Int)</td>
<td>Weight loss programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Funding

Funding for this report was provided by Feed the Truth, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit public health advocacy organization working on food and nutrition issues. Feed the Truth is funded by the Lubetzky Family Foundation. Daniel Lubetzky is the founder of KIND, a food company. This study, including methods, findings and recommendations, were solely at the discretion of U.S. Right to Know. Feed the Truth reviewed but did not have final say over the contents of the report. KIND did not review or participate in any way.

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- Schmidt Family Foundation
- Soleil Moscona
- Swift Foundation
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- U.S. Small Business Administration
- Vital Spark Foundation
- Westreich Foundation
- Woodhouse Foundation
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Assessing Conflicts of Interest of the
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