1 2 3 4 5	Kelly A. Evans (pro hac vice) (kevans@efstriallaw.com) Jay J. Schuttert (pro hac vice) (jschuttert@efstriallaw.com) EVANS FEARS & SCHUTTERT LLP 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 900 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Tel: (702) 805-0290 Fax: (702) 805-0291	
6	Tarek Ismail (<i>pro hac vice</i>) (tismail@goldmanismail.com)	
7	Joe Tomaselli (<i>pro hac vice</i>) (jtomaselli@goldmanismail.com)	
8	GOLDMAN ISMAIL TOMASELLI BRENN 564 West Randolph Street, Suite 400	AN & BAUM LLP
9	Chicago, IL 60661 Tel: (312) 881-5970 Fax: (312) 881-5191	
11	Attorneys for Defendant MONSANTO COMI *Additional counsel listed on signature block	PANY
12	Additional counsel listed on signature block	
13	SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
14	FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA	
15	COORDINATION PROCEEDING	
16	SPECIAL TITLE (Rule 3.550)	JCCP NO. 4953 ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
17	ROUNDUP PRODUCTS CASES	JUDGE WINIFRED SMITH DEPARTMENT 21
18	THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:	MONSANTO COMPANY'S NOTICE OF
19	Alva Pilliod, et al. v. Monsanto	MOTION AND MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JAMES MILLS ON SARGON
20	Company, et al., Case No. RG17862702	GROUNDS
21		Hearing Date: March 7, 2019
22		Time: 10:00 a.m. Department: 21
23		Reservation No.: R-2048312
24	PARTY: Defendant MONSANTO COMPANY RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff ALBERTA PILLIOD	
25	SET NO.: ONE	CTATILLIOD
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TO EACH PARTY AND THEIR ATTORNEY(S) OF RECORD: 1 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 7, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in Department 21 of the above-entitled court, located at 1221 Oak Street, 3 Oakland, California, Defendant Monsanto Company hereby moves this Court pursuant to Sargon 4 Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012), and California 5 Evidence Code §§ 720(a), 801, 802, and 803 for an order excluding the testimony of Mr. James Mills. 6 7 Dated: February 12, 2019 /s/ Kirby Griffis 8 Kirby Griffis (pro hac vice) (kgriffis@hollingsworthllp.com) 9 Martin C. Calhoun (pro hac vice) (mcalhoun@hollingsworthllp.com) 10 HOLLINGSWORTH LLP 11 1350 I St, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 12 Tel: (202) 898-5800 Fax: (202) 682-1639 13 Attorneys for Defendant MONSANTO COMPANY 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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INTRODUCTION

Defendant Monsanto moves to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs' expert James Mills on the issue of Mrs. Alberta Pilliod's future expenses for the prescription drug Revlimid. Mr. Mills' opinion should be excluded for three independent reasons. First, Mr. Mills assumed a price for Revlimid different than that Mrs. Pilliod and her insurer actually pay for the drug. Specifically, his opinion is based on Revlimid prices for *uninsured customers* listed on the website "drugs.com." Mrs. Pilliod has insurance and thus these prices are irrelevant to the future costs she will incur or that will be paid on her behalf. Second, Mr. Mills' opinion relies on unsupported assumptions concerning Mrs. Pilliod's life expectancy. Third, Mr. Mills – who is not a physician and has no independent basis to inform his calculations – simply assumed that Mrs. Pilliod would require Revlimid for the rest of her life. Accordingly, Mr. Mills' opinion concerning Mrs. Pilliod's future drug costs should be excluded as speculative and unreliable.

MR. MILLS' EXPERT REPORT AND DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

Plaintiffs Alva and Alberta Pilliod designated James Mills as an economic expert to testify concerning Mrs. Pilliod's future expenses for the prescription drug Revlimid (lenalidomide). Mr. Mills opines that Mrs. Pilliod will incur \$3,943,628 in future Revlimid costs. Ex. A, Mills Report at 22. Mr. Mills' opinion is based on 1) the annual cost of Revlimid listed on drugs.com for uninsured customers; 2) a projection of life expectancy for Caucasian women born in 1944; and 3) an assumption that Mrs. Pilliod will require use of the drug for the remainder of her life.

To determine the cost of Revlimid, Mr. Mills relied exclusively on the expert report of another plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Chadhi Nabhan:

- Q: And just to be clear, the -- the basis for the pricing information for Revlimid cited in your report comes exclusively from Dr. Nabhan?
- A: Correct.
- Ex. B, Mills 2/5/19 Dep. at 54:21-24. Dr. Nabhan guessed at Mrs. Pilliod's Revlimid cost, not by looking at what her actual cost has been for the medication, but instead by looking at the listed price on a website called drugs.com:
 - Q: How did you determine the cost [of Revlimid]?

A: This is the price, not the cost. So the price. The price of 21 -- of lenalidomide, you just can go on drugs.com, and you can look at the cost, at the price.

Q: Did you use Google essentially?

A: Yeah. I mean, you just -- drugs.com . . .

Ex. C, Nabhan 1/19/19 Dep. at 128:24-129:5. He did not determine how much Mrs. Pilliod actually pays:

Q: In terms of cost, did you ask her how much she pays out-of-pocket?

A: I didn't ask her how much she pays.

Q: So you don't know?

A: I don't know how much she's paying.

Id. at 129:14-18. But the single webpage referenced by Dr. Nabhan, on its face, does not apply to Mrs. Pilliod. Instead, the drugs.com page relied on by Dr. Nabhan expressly states that the Revlimid prices "are for cash paying customers only and are not valid with insurance plans." Ex. D, Revlimid Prices, drugs.com. There is no dispute Mrs. Pilliod has an insurance plan:

Q: And did Mrs. Pilliod have an insurance plan that she's operating under?

A: Yes, she did have an insurance plan. Just don't know how much she paid versus the insurance versus out-of-pocket, et cetera.

Ex. C, Nabhan 1/19/19 Dep. at 204:21-25.

Next, using the drugs.com Revlimid price for uninsured customers of over \$20,000 for a 28-day supply, Mr. Mills calculated Mrs. Pilliod's per annum cost for the remainder of the average life expectancy of a Caucasian woman born in 1944. Ex. A, Mills Report at 24. Based on that assumed life expectancy, Mr. Mills projected that Mrs. Pilliod will live to age 87.8. Ex. B, Mills 2/5/19 Dep. at 51:24-52:14. As a result, in his analysis, Mr. Mills did not take into consideration any of Mrs. Pilliod's existing medical conditions or morbidities. *Id.* at 52:20-53:1. After adjusting for inflation, wages and wage growth, and reducing to present value, Mr. Mills opines that Mrs. Pilliod's future medical costs for Revlimid total \$3,943,628. Ex. A, Mills Report at 22.

¹ The transcript of the deposition of Dr. Nabhan has been excerpted due to volume.

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LEGAL STANDARD

In California, the trial court "has the duty to act as a 'gatekeeper' to exclude speculative expert testimony." *Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. California*, 55 Cal. 4th 747, 753 (2012). A trial court must exclude expert opinion testimony that is "(1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative." *Id.* at 771-72. In other words, "[w]here an expert bases his conclusion upon assumptions which are not supported by the record, upon matters which are not reasonably relied upon by other experts, or upon factors which are speculative, remote or conjectural, then his conclusion has no evidentiary value. In those circumstances the expert's opinion cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence." *Borger v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles*, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1118, 1122 (2011) (citations omitted in original). In short, the court's role is to make certain that an expert "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." *Sargon*, 55 Cal. 4th at 772 (citation omitted).

ARGUMENT

Mr. Mills bases his opinion for future medication costs on a drug price that is irrelevant to the actual cost incurred by Mrs. Pilliod or paid on her behalf. That alone is sufficient to exclude his testimony concerning Mrs. Pilliod's future drug costs. Moreover, with no factual support, Mr. Mills opines Mrs. Pilliod will live to age 87.8 and take Revlimid for the rest of her life. These unsubstantiated assumptions provide additional independent reasons to exclude Mr. Mills' opinion on Mrs. Pilliod's future drug costs.

First, the Revlimid price Mr. Mills uses in his damages calculation is unrelated to the actual cost incurred by Mrs. Pilliod or her insurer. To be recoverable, a plaintiff's medical expenses "must be both incurred and reasonable." *Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc.*, 52 Cal. 4th 541, 555 (2011). In *Howell*, the California Supreme Court held that "an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid through private insurance may recover as economic damages no more than the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services received or still owing at the time of trial." *Id.* at 566. The court explained that because medical providers typically enter into

agreements with private insurers in which insurers pay discounted prices, evidence of a higher billed amount is irrelevant "on the issue of past medical expenses." *Id.* at 567. The court rejected the plaintiff's collateral source rule argument, holding that it "has no bearing on amounts that were included in a provider's bill but for which the plaintiff never incurred liability because the provider, by prior agreement, accepted a lesser amount as full payment. Such sums are not damages the plaintiff would otherwise have collected from the defendant." *Id.* at 548-49. This holding was extended to future medical expenses in *Corenbaum v. Lampkin*, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1308 (2013). In *Corenbaum*, the court held that "[e]vidence of the full amount billed for past medical services provided to plaintiffs [] cannot support an expert opinion on the reasonable value of future medical services." *Id.* at 1331 (citation omitted). The court further explained that permitting an expert to base an opinion on a full amount billed for medical expenses would violate the collateral source rule because it "would lead to the introduction of evidence concerning the circumstances by which a lower price was negotiated with that plaintiff's health insurer." *Id.* at 1332 (citation omitted).

Contrary to the mandates in *Howell and Corenbaum*, Mr. Mills' damages analysis is not based on expenses Mrs. Pilliod or her insurer actually incurred. In fact, Mr. Mills never even inquired about the amount billed for Mrs. Pilliod's Revlimid, let alone her actual costs:

- Q: Do you know what Mrs. Pilliod's co-pay is on her Revlimid?
- A: No.
- Q Do you know how much her insurance company, if any, is covering for her 28-day Revlimid prescription?
- A: No.
- Q: Have you reviewed any type of explanation of benefit information from Mrs. Pilliod's insurer company insurance companies regarding her Revlimid?
- A: No.

Ex. B, Mills 2/5/19 Dep. at 51:3-14. Instead, Mr. Mills relies on Dr. Nabhan, who estimated Mrs. Pilliod's Revlimid costs based on a drugs.com listing for "cash paying customers" without "valid insurance plans." As Dr. Nabhan acknowledged in his deposition, however, Mrs. Pilliod has insurance. Ex. C, Nabhan 1/19/19 Dep. at 204:21-25. Thus, the drugs.com price is, by its own terms,

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Ex. B, Mills 2/5/19 Dep. at 58:1-13.

No.

A:

³ To the extent Plaintiffs may attempt to elicit similar opinions through Dr. Nabhan rather than Mr. Mills, that opinion testimony should be excluded for similar reasons as set forth above.

irrelevant to the actual cost to be incurred by Mrs. Pilliod or her insurer for Revlimid in the future.² As such, Mr. Mills' opinion lacks a reasonable foundation and it should be excluded under Evidence Code § 801.3

Likewise, the life expectancy assumption utilized by Mr. Mills is not based on Mrs. Pilliod's particular circumstances and is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence provided in the record thus far. Mr. Mills testified: "[T]here's nothing specific that I have to Mrs. Pilliod and her medical conditions." Ex. B, Mills 2/5/19 Dep. at 52:25-53:1. Consequently, Mr. Mills assumes Mrs. Pilliod will live to age 87.8, the average life expectancy of a Caucasian female born in 1944. However, in prior pleadings filed in connection with the application for trial preference, Mrs. Pilliod asserted her health has been "going downhill" since her 2016 cancer relapse. Ex. F, Alberta Pilliod 10/12/18 Decl. at ¶ 8. Likewise, Dr. Nabhan opined that Mrs. Pilliod "remains at a substantially high risk for disease recurrence, progression, and relapse," and should she relapse, "the disease is likely to be fatal." Ex. G, Nabhan 8/30/18 Decl. at ¶ 6. Based in large part on Mrs. Pilliod's uncertain health and the fear she might "die before trial," plaintiffs moved for – and the court granted – trial preference for the Pilliods. Plaintiffs' 8/30/18 Motion for Trial Preference at 7. Whereas plaintiffs' lawyers, Dr. Nabhan, and Mrs. Pilliod all claim she is in fragile health, Mr. Mills ignores these assertions in his analysis. Relying on a national statistic to determine life expectancy without any consideration of

² Even if this were the price paid by Mrs. Pilliod or incurred on her behalf, which again it is not, Mr. Mills provides no basis for assuming a constant price of Revlimid in the future after its patent protection expires:

Q: Have you done any research or analysis on the impact of a drug going generic on pricing?

A: No.

O: Does it stand to reason that if a drug goes generic there's more competition and the prices go down?

I mean, that's certainly, you know, what -- what I've seen and what my understanding A: is from a non-expertise point of view.

Have you done any research or analysis to see how the historical price of Revlimid --Q: Revlimid has changed?

Mrs. Pilliod's specific circumstances, Mr. Mills does not employ "the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." *Sargon*, 55 Cal. 4th at 772 (citation omitted).

Equally speculative is Mr. Mills' decision to calculate drug costs through the end of Mrs. Pilliod's life. Ex. A, Mills Report at 24. Contrary to the assumption in his report, Mr. Mills acknowledged in his deposition that Mrs. Pilliod may not need Revlimid for her full lifetime and did nothing to confirm his assumption one way or the other:

- Q: Is it your understanding that she'll need to take the Revlimid -- Revlimid for the rest of her life?
- A: Well, so what Dr. Nabhan said was for the foreseeable future. So it's not well-defined. It's -- it's not for a year, it's not until the end of his -- her life, again, in terms of what's defined. But the foreseeable future. So if that's anything other than her life expectancy, he didn't define it.

Ex. B, Mills 2/5/19 Dep. at 56:11-20. Rather than determining what Dr. Nabhan meant by foreseeable future, Mr. Mills simply forged ahead without seeking any clarification whatsoever:

- Q: Did you attempt to seek clarification on what he meant by the foreseeable future?
- A: No.

Id. at 56:21-23. As a result, Mr. Mills' entire analysis as to how long Mrs. Pilliod will require Revlimid is based on a conjectural, speculative assumption that "foreseeable future" means her entire lifetime.

At bottom, Mr. Mills bases his entire opinion as to Mrs. Pilliod's future drug costs on one three-sentence paragraph from Dr. Nabhan's expert report. *See* Ex. E, Nabhan 1/18/19 Report at 22, ¶ 19.⁴ Because Mr. Mills uses a Revlimid price in his damages calculation unrelated to any cost Mrs. Pilliod has or ever will incur, speculates that "foreseeable future" equates to Mrs. Pilliod's entire lifetime, and calculates Mrs. Pilliod's life expectancy without considering her actual medical condition or circumstances, Mr. Mills' opinion concerning Mrs. Pilliod's future Revlimid costs is unreliable, speculative, and should be excluded.

⁴ The expert report of Dr. Nabhan has been excerpted and attachments excluded due to volume.

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