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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Vince Chhabria, Judge

IN RE ROUNDUP PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

NO. 16-md-02741 VC

EMANUEL RICHARD GIGLIO,

Plaintiff,

VS.

NO. C 16-05658 VC

MONSANTO COMPANY,

Defendant.

San Francisco, California Wednesday, December 5, 2018

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiffs:

ANDRUS WAGSTAFF PC 7171 W. Alaska Drive

Lakewood, Colorado 80226

BY: AIMEE H. WAGSTAFF, ATTORNEY AT LAW DAVID J. WOOL, ATTORNEY AT LAW

ANDRUS WAGSTAFF PC 6315 Ascot Drive

Oakland, California 94611

BY: KATHRYN M. FORGIE, ATTORNEY AT LAW

(APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

REPORTED BY: Jo Ann Bryce, CSR No. 3321, RMR, CRR, FCRR Official Reporter

1	<u>APPEARANCES</u> : (CONTINU	JED)
2	For Plaintiffs:		
3			WEITZ & LUXENBERG PC 700 Broadway New York, New York 10003
4		BY:	·
5			THE MILLER FIRM LLC 108 Railroad Avenue
6		BY:	Orange, Virginia 22960 MICHAEL J. MILLER, ATTORNEY AT LAW
7			BRIAN BRAKE, ATTORNEY AT LAW NANCY G. MILLER, ATTORNEY AT LAW
8			LAW OFFICES OF TESFAYE W. TSADIK
9			The California Building 1736 Franklin Street - 10th Floor
10		BY:	Oakland, California 94612 TESFAYE W. TSADIK, ATTORNEY AT LAW
11			AUDET & PARTNERS LLP
12			711 Van Ness Avenue - Suite 500 San Francisco, California 94102
13		BY:	MARK E. BURTON, ATTORNEY AT LAW
14			LUNDY, LUNDY, SOILEAU & SOUTH LLP 501 Broad Street
15		BY:	Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601 RUDIE R. SOILEAU, JR., ATTORNEY AT LAW
16			BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI GOLDMAN PC
17			12100 Wilshire Blvd Suite 950 Los Angeles, California 90025
18		BY:	
19	For Plaintiff E	manuel	Richard Giglio: GOMEZ TRIAL ATTORNEYS
20			655 West Broadway - Suite 1700 San Diego, California 92101
21		BY:	JOHN H. GOMEZ, ATTORNEY AT LAW
22			KRISTEN K. BARTON, ATTORNEY AT LAW
23			
24			
25			

1	APPEARANCES: (CONTINU	ED)
2	For Defendant:	HOLLTMACHODELL LLD
3		HOLLINGSWORTH LLP 1350 I Street NW Washington, D.C. 20005
4	BY:	_
5		ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 777 S. Figueroa Street - 44th Floor
7	BY:	Los Angeles, California 90017
8		ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 250 West 55th Street
9	BY:	New York, New York 10019 ANDREW K. SOLOW, ATTORNEY AT LAW
10		WILKINSON WALSH ESKOVITZ LLP
11		2001 M Street, NW - 10th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036
12	BY:	
13		
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15		
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Wednesday - December 5, 2018 1 1:36 p.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 THE CLERK: Calling Case Numbers 16-md-2741, In Re 4 5 Roundup Products Liability Litigation and 16-cv-5658, Giglio 6 versus Monsanto Company. Counsel, please step forward and state your appearances 7 for the record. 8 MS. WAGSTAFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 9 Aimee Wagstaff on behalf of MDL plaintiffs and plaintiff 10 Giglio. 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 12 MS. GREENWALD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 13 Robin Greenwald for the plaintiffs. 14 MR. MILLER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael 15 16 Miller on behalf of the plaintiffs. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Miller. If somebody wants to introduce everyone, they're perfectly 18 19 welcome to. 20 MR. BRAKE: Good afternoon. Brian Brake for the 21 plaintiffs. Pleasure to be here. MR. WOOL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Wool on 22 behalf of plaintiffs and Mr. Giglio. 23 THE COURT: Hello. 24 25 MR. GOMEZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John Gomez

for Mr. Giglio. 1 MR. BURTON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Mark Burton, 2 liaison counsel for the plaintiffs. Brent Wisner is also here. 3 And I'll let -- sorry. I tried to --4 MR. SOILEAU: I don't know that it's necessary, but I 5 suddenly feel like the odd man out. Rudie Soileau appearing on 6 behalf of the MDL plaintiffs as well, Your Honor. Thank you 7 very much. 8 MR. GRIFFIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 9 Monsanto Kirby Griffis, Eric Lasker, Brian Stekloff, Pamela 10 11 Yates, and Andrew Solow. THE COURT: Hello. 12 MR. STEKLOFF: Good afternoon. 13 MS. YATES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So some fun stuff to talk about 15 16 today. 17 On my list of things to talk about in no particular order is we have potentially a bunch of discovery disputes, or 18 19 perhaps you've resolved them all this morning and I don't know, but I'm happy to help you with any discovery issues; this issue 20 21 of live testimony at the *Daubert* hearings; the motion for trial preference; and then a discussion about jury selection. 22 23 Is there anything that I'm missing of those? Are there any other topics we need to discuss today? 24

MS. WAGSTAFF: I don't think so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we start with a couple that hopefully will be short. Let's talk about the motion for trial preference and I want to hear, I think, probably only from the plaintiffs on this one I'm quessing.

And my main question for you is: I mean, has there ever been a case in a federal MDL where the transferee court has granted a motion for trial preference and sent a case back because somebody was dying?

Even if the answer is no, it may be that, you know, the MDL courts have been doing it wrong for all these years and there may be a reason to reconsider that, but has it ever happened before in the history of federal multidistrict litigation?

MR. WOOL: To the best of my knowledge, there's no such case that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the standard operating procedure with federal MDLs is that -- and, of course, we have many products liability cases where people are dying; right? The standard mode of operation is that we may do something within the MDL to move that person's case along more quickly, but we don't transfer that person out for trial ahead of everybody else. We don't have them jump the line, so to speak.

MR. WOOL: Right. That's understood, Your Honor. And in this case I think there are a couple of reasons why it makes sense to do so here. First, I think that the Court provided

some guidance where I believe Your Honor -- at least we interpreted it as suggesting that plaintiffs who were terminally ill might have an opportunity to have their cases remanded.

THE COURT: What I suggested or what I recall suggesting is that I'd be happy to do whatever makes sense to help ensure those cases move along the fastest, not send them back for trial -- not have them jump ahead and send them back for trial.

I mean, I would -- you know, it's not that I'm dead-set against it. I just -- I want to sort of figure out the playing field we're on right now, and the playing field we're on right now is that it never happens in federal MDLs; right?

It's just people have decided -- the people involved in MDLs have decided that's not the way it's going to work; and if you allow one person to jump the line and go back for trial, then there's going to be a big fight among who's going to die -- among the plaintiffs about who's going to die first and who gets to go have their trial first; right?

MR. WOOL: Your Honor, here I don't think that -- at least to the best of my knowledge, there are not a number of other plaintiffs who are fighting for this. This is only Mr.Giglio, who is the second case, to my knowledge, who has ever filed.

And with respect to how this kind of impacts MDLs overall,

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the charge that the panel gave your court was to facilitate the
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     just and efficient resolution of these actions.
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          Mr. Hardeman's case is a residential case. I know that
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     the Johnson trial involved an ITNO case, but I think there is
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     an efficiency to be gained here because Mr. Giglio was an ITNO
     user, he had diffuse large B-cell lymphoma, and he was
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     diagnosed with that disease when he was in his early 60s.
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     he's representative of a fairly large swath of the plaintiffs
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     in these cases.
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          So I understand that there might not be --
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11
              THE COURT: Mr. Hardeman is too; right?
              MR. WOOL: Is in his 60s?
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              THE COURT: Is fairly representative of a large swath
     of these cases --
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              MR. WOOL: Yes, but he's --
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              THE COURT: -- and residential exposure; right?
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              MR. WOOL:
                         Right, with residential exposure and
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    Mr. Giglio is ITNO exposure. He used it --
              THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you said
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    Mr. Giglio was a residential user.
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              MR. WOOL: No, no. He was predominantly landscaping
         So I think that that would provide a data point for all
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23
     of the parties that would teach us a lot about the case that we
     wouldn't learn from Hardeman alone.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. I understand your argument.
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motion is denied --

MR. WOOL: Okay.

THE COURT: -- but I'm perfectly happy, as Monsanto proposed, to adopt procedures to ensure that this case moves along particularly quickly. I think a preservation deposition is, of course, a good idea. It sounds like Monsanto will agree to that. If you have any problems getting that to happen, you know, you can let me know.

MR. WOOL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Now, the question came up about live testimony at the Daubert hearing. The answer is if Monsanto wants to cross-examine one of the plaintiffs' experts as part of its effort to get the plaintiffs' expert's testimony excluded, it can. So those witnesses need to be available.

Similarly, if Monsanto has any experts that it is using to rebut the plaintiffs' experts' testimony, and these are sort of priority experts for Monsanto -- I mean, Monsanto called some of its experts in during Phase I and it didn't call some of its experts in. Call your best experts in. You don't have to call all of them in; but if you want to attack the plaintiffs' expert testimony on the issue of specific causation, you know, you want to make sure to get your best testimony -- you want the best expert testimony to be presented to me live.

However, I do want to make one thing clear in terms of

ground rules for the Daubert hearings on specific causation. 1 Now, I assume that at trial, assuming we go to trial, there 2 will be experts who will be testifying that "I believe 3 Mr. Hardeman's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma was caused by 4 5 glyphosate, " and part of that opinion will be the general causation stuff that we spent so much time talking about before 6 and part of that opinion will be information that's specific to 7 Mr. Hardeman; right? 8 It's not like you're going to be putting up separate 9 general causation experts and specific causation experts, I 10 11 assume, or are you? Is that the plan? What are you planning on presenting at trial by way of expert testimony? 12 13 MS. WAGSTAFF: Yeah. So we were actually scheduled to discuss that this morning with Monsanto's counsel, and we 14 15 haven't really come to a consensus on that because we have our 16 general causation experts that have passed through Daubert that

you've just talked about. We'll just say Dr. Weisenburger is one example. We have proffered him as general causation and as specific causation.

If you remember, Dr. Nabhan, who did not pass through the general causation phase but your order suggested that he would be able to provide specific --

THE COURT: I said he may be able to.

MS. WAGSTAFF: Exactly.

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-- he may be able to provide specific causation testimony,

we have proffered him for specific causation testimony.

And then to complicate it, we have a third category that is a new expert, Dr. Shustov, that is offering what we believe just to be specific causation testimony.

Monsanto has a version that's similar with their own experts of what they had passed as well.

So me and Mrs. Yates were just talking about this moments ago, and we haven't really come to a consensus on how we handle the general causation portion of a new expert.

What we thought Your Honor wanted, but we would love more guidance from you, is that we were not allowed to proffer new general causation opinions from any expert. So, for example, Dr. Weisenburger would be able to testify obviously about general causation pursuant to Your Honor's order. We will proffer him for specific causation. However, the new expert, Dr. Shustov, it's our opinion would not be able to proffer general causation opinions, would rely on the general causation opinions subject to Your Honor's order. That's what we have been operating on.

THE COURT: In other words, when that expert comes and testifies -- what's their name again?

MS. WAGSTAFF: Dr. Shustov.

THE COURT: Dr. Shustoff?

MS. WAGSTAFF: Stov with a V.

THE COURT: Stov?

MS. WAGSTAFF: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Shustov.

So they will get up on the stand and they will say, "I'm adopting the assumption that glyphosate is capable of causing cancer in human -- in doses that we would expect humans to experience" --

MS. WAGSTAFF: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- "and adopting that assumption, I conclude that Mr. Hardeman's NHL was caused by glyphosate -- it's far more likely that glyphosate caused his NHL than any other potential factor out there." Something along those lines?

MS. WAGSTAFF: Yeah, something along those lines.

And just to be clear on sort of our opinion and what we're planning on doing, you know, Weisenburger is sort of a different base because he passed through your order; but with Dr. Shustov, we aren't proffering him to say that exposure to glyphosate and Roundup can cause it, but we will proffer opinions that Mr. Hardeman is within the relevant epidemiology that he is assuming has proved general causation, if that makes sense.

THE COURT: That makes sense, yeah.

MS. WAGSTAFF: So the way that we understand

Your Honor to want this procedure to go is that we will not get

up here and have Dr. Shustov go through the testimony that Ritz

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and Dr. Jameson and Dr. Weisenburger all went through.
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    be much shorter, much tighter: This is the exposure. This is
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     what happened. We're going to go through the diagnosis just
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     like you said. That's how we believe you want it, and so
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     that's how we've tailored our expert reports.
              THE COURT: And so, then, give me an overall list of
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     the experts you plan to have testify.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Okay. So the experts that we have
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     designated, and this is just in Hardeman, we have designated
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     Dr. Ritz. We have designated Dr. Weisenburger. We have
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     designated Dr. Shustov. We've designated Dr. Nabhan,
    Dr. Portier.
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              THE COURT: Doctor who?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Portier.
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              THE COURT: Oh, okay.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Dr. Sawyer and Dr. Benbrook.
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              THE COURT:
                          Ben?
                      (Conferring with co-counsel.)
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: And then Dr. Mills is an economist.
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              THE COURT: Dr., you said, Benbrook?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Benbrook, yeah.
              THE COURT: And Mills?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF:
                             And Mills, yep.
              THE COURT: Okay. So Ritz would testify only about
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     general causation?
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MS. WAGSTAFF:
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                             Yeah.
              THE COURT: And Weisenburger would testify about both?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: That's correct.
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              THE COURT: And Weisenburger, am I remembering
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     correctly, was he the one whose testimony was the subject of a
     very recent Ninth Circuit opinion where his testimony was
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     excluded and then the Ninth Circuit --
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: That's correct, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: -- reversed?
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          Okay. I remember that case.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: And Dr. Shustov was actually in that
     opinion as well.
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              THE COURT: Oh, yeah? And so Shustov is going to --
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     it's just going to be specific?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: That's correct.
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              THE COURT: And then Nabhan specific?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Correct.
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              THE COURT: And Portier both?
                             Portier is just general causation.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF:
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              THE COURT: Okay. And Sawyer and Benbrook and Mills
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     are specific?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Correct.
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          And did we designate --
                      (Conferring with co-counsel.)
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Mills is on punitive damages, company
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warnings --
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              MR. MILLER: Worth.
              MS. WAGSTAFF: -- worth, company worth.
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              THE COURT: Oh. Mills is not on the science?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Correct.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
                      (Conferring with co-counsel.)
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Benbrook is not science either.
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              THE COURT: He's damages?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: He is more liability.
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              MR. MILLER: Liability, Your Honor.
              MS. WAGSTAFF: Yeah. Regulatory liability, yeah.
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                                                                 And
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     Sawyer is exposure.
              THE COURT: What does "regulatory liability" mean?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Mr. Wisner is going to talk about
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    Dr. Benbrook.
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              THE COURT:
                          I mean, obviously we're not adjudicating
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     anything now, but I'm just curious.
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              MR. WISNER: Sure. His testimony is primarily
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    historical. He talks about the history of glyphosate, its
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     regulatory history in the United States, the science and the
     approvals and what those approvals actually mean.
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          A lot of his testimony will be subject to a lot of
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     motions in limine so we'll see what actually comes in and what
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     doesn't, but he has a lot of expertise in that area.
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THE COURT: Well, I'm glad you brought that up because I wanted to bring up a topic that is closely related to that, but I will -- let's hold off on it just a second.

Okay. And then Sawyer you said is on exposure?

MS. WAGSTAFF: Yeah. Sawyer is on exposure, yeah.

THE COURT: So which is related -- you mean on Mr. Hardeman's exposure?

MS. WAGSTAFF: Yeah. And then he also was designated as a rebuttal expert just on exposure in general.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. And so the main thing, I guess, that I wanted to say about the expert testimony regarding specific causation is that, as I said, I assume that at trial there's going to be -- you know, at least with Dr. Weisenburger, there's going to be -- you know, you're not going to be able to tell when -- you're not always going to be able to tell when he's talking about general versus specific causation. There's some overlap there.

But the point is that for purposes of the *Daubert* hearings, obviously we're not going to have any relitigation of whether glyphosate is capable of causing NHL in human relevant doses; right?

And so to the extent that Monsanto's experts are attacking the plaintiffs' experts, Monsanto's experts need to adopt for the purposes of the testimony that they're giving at the

Daubert hearings, of course they don't have to do this at 1 trial, but for the purposes of the Daubert hearings, they need 2 to buy into the assumption that glyphosate is capable of 3 causing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma at human relevant doses. 4 5 And to the extent that they are pushing back against that in their attempt to -- in Monsanto's attempt to get the 6 plaintiffs' specific causation experts excluded, that's going 7 to be a waste of time. So I just wanted to make sure everybody 8 gets that. Are we kind of on the same page on that? 9 10 MS. WAGSTAFF: (Nods head.) 11 THE COURT: I see nodding heads from the plaintiffs' I see some sort of blank stares from Monsanto's side. 12 side. 13 MS. YATES: Ms. Yates approaching the podium, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: And Ms. Yates approaching the podium. 15 So 16 what have you got? 17 MS. YATES: So, yes, in part, and I just wanted to clarify. 18 We understand that this Daubert hearing is to attack the 19 20 specific causation methodology; right? 21 THE COURT: Right. The prior hearing -- we're going to do 22 MS. YATES: battle over the general at trial so everybody understands that, 23 but we understand that the Daubert hearing will be on their 24

methodology for how it caused it in Mr. Hardeman, et cetera,

et cetera. 1 Yeah. And any testimony that questions 2 THE COURT: the assumption that glyphosate is capable of causing NHL will 3 be useless. 4 5 MS. YATES: I hear you loud and clear, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 6 I do want to clarify a couple of points, 7 MS. YATES: We do have some slightly different scenarios involving 8 case-specific experts, and I want to make sure that we are all 9 10 on the same page. 11 As you know from -- heard from Ms. Wagstaff, Dr. Weisenburger crosses general and case specific. 12 Dr. Nabhan, who did not pass muster on the general, will be 13 addressing case specific. 14 15 Our experts at Phase I, our goal was not to have our general causation experts necessarily be our case-specific 16 17 experts. We went and found clinicians; right? But as part of 18 their opinions, they have a foundation of the science in 19

general; right? So they're going to fulfill sort of the Weisenburger role addressing both. Obviously the focus is their methodology.

> Who is "they"? THE COURT:

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So, for example, Dr. Alexandra Levine, MS. YATES: who's an oncologist. We have several, but they are not -- the only reason there's general opinion is it's foundation for them to then offer their case specific. They're not new.

THE COURT: Yeah, and I just -- I don't like -- it's hard to discuss this in the abstract and say anything definitive in the abstract, but my gut is that that is not -- that we do not really want them building that kind of foundation that you're talking about; that we want them to get on the stand and just say "I'm relying on the foundation built by Dr. Mucci, and explain -- that's the general, and now I'm going to explain to you why even if it did -- you know, even if -- you know, that's part of my opinion for why it can't be that Mr. Hardeman's NHL was caused by glyphosate; but even if you reject Mucci, here are some specific reasons. Even if you adopt the assumption that it can cause NHL, here are some reasons why it didn't happen with Hardeman." That's what I was assuming it would be.

MS. YATES: I'm going to refer to the Court's distinction; right? We understand that for the *Daubert* hearing, but at trial our experts, just picking on Dr. Levine, an oncologist who's case specific for Dr. Hardeman, in concluding no causation specific to him, she also relied -- she has to have some general foundation and general science.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. YATES: I understand that's not coming in at the Daubert hearing.

THE COURT: No, but, I mean, even at trial, I mean you

didn't offer Levine -- is it Levine? 1 2 MS. YATES: Yes. -- you didn't offer Levine as a general THE COURT: 3 4 causation expert; right? 5 MS. YATES: Correct. And it was never our intention. 6 Now, I'm relatively new to this but, as I understand, our goal was never to have our general causation experts be our 7 case-specific experts. For example, Dr. Mucci, an 8 epidemiologist, I want a clinician testifying as to medical 9 10 cause, not an epidemiologist. 11 So --So you weren't planning on having 12 THE COURT: Dr. Mucci testify? 13 By the way, I'm not sure that I will --14 MS. YATES: 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MS. YATES: -- which is why we gave enough foundation 17 in these reports. They're not stand-alone general cause, and I 18 can highlight a difference, Your Honor. 19 With Dr. Sawyer, the plaintiffs' toxicologist, not 20 designated as a general expert in the MDL, case-specific in the 21 Stevick case only but designated generally in Hardeman and Gebeyehou, that, I think, is an apples and orange situation. 22 23 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I lost you. Okay. So Dr. Sawyer, who is a 24 MS. YATES: 25 toxicologist, has been designated and was identified here today

as case specific. He is case specific in the Stevick case. Не has dose latency and some other opinions. But there's a general part of his report, and plaintiffs say he will also offer those opinions in the two other cases, Hardeman and Gebeyehou. We think that crosses the line of a new general causation expert, and we're not going to object to Sawyer talking specifically about Stevick.

That seems to be -- it's not the foundation for Stevick.

It's offering general opinions. It's a new general expert two years after in two cases where he's not designated as case specific.

THE COURT: I think the reason I'm having trouble following you is because I don't have any idea what Sawyer is going to testify about.

MS. YATES: Okay.

THE COURT: I don't have any familiarity with his expert report or his deposition testimony. I don't even know if it's a he.

MS. YATES: It is.

THE COURT: So I'm having trouble following you, but why don't we focus on your expert, Levine, who we were talking about just a second ago.

MS. YATES: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay. And what you're saying is, "We want to call Levine to testify on both general causation and

specific causation"?

MS. YATES: Yes, as it relates to Mr. Hardeman, the foundation for her case-specific opinions at trial.

THE COURT: But why wouldn't the foundation for her case-specific opinions be given by the general causation experts who you put up at Phase I?

MS. YATES: Because, candidly, I'm not sure I'd like to call an epidemiologist unless I want my jurors sleeping.

That's as honest as I can be, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But the point of Phase I was for the parties to put up their experts on general causation --

MS. YATES: Right.

THE COURT: -- and give them an opportunity to have at each other to determine if any of them would be excluded.

MS. YATES: Right.

THE COURT: And there was a motion to exclude their experts and there was a motion to exclude your experts, and we adjudicated those motions and we decided whose experts general causation testimony would be allowed at trial and whose expert causation testimony would not be allowed at trial -- whose general causation testimony would not be allowed at trial.

And now you're telling me that you have somebody else who you want to come in and testify on general causation who was not put to the test at Phase I, and that's I guess what I'm not understanding.

I thought we all understood that the purpose of Phase I is to figure out who would be able to testify about general causation. So that's the assumption I was operating under. MS. YATES: And I think that's correct within certain parameters. I don't believe we ever intended for our general experts to then carry that forward at trial. We understand a Daubert hearing, Your Honor. We understand that we have to -- if we're going to put our experts on, "Dr. Levine, you understand this Court has found, now explain your methodology as to why that's not correct in Mr. Hardeman, " but how much general causation evidence and which witnesses I put on at trial is a vastly different decision. THE COURT: So who are the experts that you've designated for the Hardeman trial? MS. YATES: So there's Dr. Alexandra Levine. Hold on a second, Your Honor, because we have three cases and somewhat different experts. So we have Dr. Levine, Dr. Arbor. THE COURT: Arbor? MS. YATES: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. We have Dr. Grossbard. MS. YATES: THE COURT: Gross what? MS. YATES: Bard, B-A-R-D.

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We have -- and, I'm sorry, this is for all cases. 1 have them designated by case name. If you give me a moment, 2 Your Honor, I'll find my specifics. 3 THE COURT: Sure. 4 MS. YATES: Because there are different types of NHL. 5 So, for example, Dr. Bello is case-specific in the Stevick 6 So let me know if you would like that detail. 7 case. do --8 Sure, I would. THE COURT: 9 MS. WAGSTAFF: And, Your Honor, while she's looking 10 11 for that, I would just like to take a moment to respond to that. 12 13 And, of course, plaintiffs completely oppose new general causation experts --14 I'm sorry about that. That was my fault. 15 16 THE COURT: I think you've just got to avoid getting 17 too close. The microphones are terrible in here, but you've 18 just got to avoid getting too close or too far from them. MS. WAGSTAFF: Okay. So, you know, as you recall, 19 Monsanto asked for this bifurcation and here we are two years 20 later; and if Dr. Levine is to give general causation opinions, 21 we're going to have to put her through a full Daubert and do 22 23 this whole thing all over again. And I ask the Court:

And you're absolutely right that all the parties were

was the purpose of the last two years?

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operating under the assumption that no general causation
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     testimony would be given anew, and that's what we decided again
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     at the last hearing.
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          So I think that what Ms. Yates is trying to do is
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 5
     circumvent what we've been doing for the last couple years, and
     she's trying to get in new general causation testimony because
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     she doesn't like the testimony that her experts currently are
 7
     giving.
 8
                         No, Your Honor, that's actually simply not
 9
              MS. YATES:
     the case.
10
11
              THE COURT:
                          Yeah, I doubt that's the case. But can I
     get a list?
12
                         Yes, of course.
13
              MS. YATES:
              THE COURT:
                         So Levine, Arbor, Grossbard?
14
15
              MS. YATES:
                         Steidl, S-T-E-I-D-L; and Al-Khatib, A-L
16
    hyphen K-H-A-T-I-B.
                         Those are Hardeman.
                          So those are the only experts you've
17
              THE COURT:
18
     designated for Hardeman?
              MS. YATES: And I think there's a Dr. Sullivan as
19
20
    well.
21
              MS. WAGSTAFF:
                             Those are the only case-specific.
                                                                 They
     designated about six or seven other experts.
22
23
              THE COURT:
                          So you're saying you didn't designate
    Mucci and like the other epidemiologists who you put up at
24
25
     Phase I?
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1 MS. YATES: Yes, Your Honor. These are case specific, 2 yes. THE COURT: Those are the case-specific ones. 3 MS. YATES: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: I was asking who you designated, all the witnesses. 6 7 MS. YATES: All of them. I'm sorry. So I'm going with depositions and I don't have our designations. But, yes, 8 we designated Dr. Mucci and we may or may not call him. 9 10 MS. WAGSTAFF: So, Your Honor --11 THE COURT: Well, I think you better because I don't think there's any other way you can get in general causation 12 13 testimony. Well, let me slow this down a little bit, 14 MS. YATES: 15 Your Honor, because I feel as if we're talking a little bit in 16 a vacuum here. 17 I would like you to see the reports because I think it's 18 been a little bit out of context in terms of what they have in 19 terms of general causation, and I'm very concerned that we're 20 getting pushed into this quagmire that when you see the 21 reports, we don't need to go there. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MS. YATES: It's not starting over. It's not anew. It's the foundation for their case-specific methodology, which 24

is based on a differential diagnosis. How do you rule things

in? How do you rule things out?

And I think if we take a step back, I think you'll see that we take very seriously what went on and we take those rulings seriously. We fully understand the Court's opinion as to what our experts will say at a *Daubert* hearing. And then I think you will see -- once you see the reports, you'll understand what our goals are with them being case specific at trial.

THE COURT: Well, that statement is fine for now, but the idea that you -- I'm skeptical of the idea that you will be able to do much in the way of general causation without bringing to trial experts who testify on general causation.

If you don't bring any of the experts you used at Phase I on general causation, then I think you are going to have -- if you are operating under the assumption that you could pull that off, I'm telling you now that I think you're going to have a problem because it would seem, then, that you would be planning to bring in through other witnesses' perhaps, you know, testimony that seeks to rebut what Dr. Weisenburger testifies to on the general causation front.

MS. YATES: Your Honor, if I'm bringing in an expert to really get into the general science, I understand what the Court is saying. Why can't I put on a defense that is just one case-specific expert with the foundation for that testimony?

THE COURT: Well, you could, but -- you certainly

could, but if it's -- as long as it is not using the case-specific experts who were not put to the test at Phase I to get in testimony that is similar to the testimony we considered at Phase I.

MS. YATES: I understand, but at the same time the ruling went against us in Phase I and clearly if I call someone at trial, they're not going to abide by your Phase I ruling because they are going to say "no general cause" at trial.

THE COURT: I don't understand what you're saying.

MR. LASKER: Your Honor, I just want to make one point because I'm a bit confused.

With a differential diagnosis, let's posit it this way, there are numerous risk factors. Okay? And let's say you're selecting among risk factors and saying which is more likely, and let's say that there is one risk factor that has an arch ratio of five. A specific causation expert, for example, on the defense would have to discuss what they understand about the Actel study and the epidemiology with respect to glyphosate in order to explain how they make a differential.

So to that extent, it's impossible, frankly, to be able to testify to a differential diagnosis without providing that type of testimony, and that's the issue I think that's confusing things.

THE COURT: Right. And I was assuming that it would be impossible to have a strict delineation between the concept

of general causation and the concept of specific causation.

I suppose you could just call somebody, as they apparently plan to do, to testify only about general causation -- right? -- and just not get into Hardeman, but I understand the concept that when you're testifying about specific causation, you know, concepts from general causation are going to bleed into it; right?

But if -- and this is not something we're going to resolve now, but it's just important for me that you know the concerns that I have about this discussion. If you're going to put up a specific causation expert and they're going to testify about the different risk factors and they're going to get to the risk factor of glyphosate and as part of explaining why they don't think glyphosate caused Mr. Hardeman's cancer, they're going to do a repeat of everything that Dr. Mucci said, that's not appropriate.

MR. LASKER: Right.

THE COURT: Because you should have had that person testify to that at the Phase I proceeding.

MR. LASKER: Right. I don't think -- I think that may be where the confusion is. I don't think we have --

THE COURT: Or even half of what Dr. Mucci said.

MR. LASKER: I'm sorry. I misspoke.

THE COURT: If they spent half the time saying what Dr. Mucci said.

```
MR. LASKER: No, I understand that. I don't think we
 1
    have an expert who, for instance, is going to be talking about
 2
     all the issues of epidemiology or an expert talking about all
 3
     the issues of avenue, all that stuff. That's not the issue
 4
 5
     with our experts.
              MS. YATES: And apparently I'm just not being very
 6
     clear.
 7
              THE COURT: You're not going to bring somebody to
 8
     testify about -- what was it? The vault? Where one of your
 9
10
     experts went to, like --
11
              MR. LASKER: Yes.
                                 Right.
              THE COURT: What was that room called? It wasn't the
12
    vault.
13
              MR. LASKER: It was a glyphosate --
14
15
              MS. WAGSTAFF: The glyphosate reading room.
              MR. LASKER: The reading room in Europe, yes.
16
17
    Dr. Steidl is not going to --
              THE COURT: That's like up there with the
18
19
     Eiffel Tower.
20
              MS. YATES: Yeah. No, Your Honor. No, Your Honor.
21
          And I do think that --
              THE COURT: Glyphosate reading room. I forgot -- I
22
23
     went to Spain in the spring. I forgot to go to the glyphosate
     reading room.
24
25
              MR. LASKER: You missed that one, Your Honor.
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1
              THE COURT:
                          Sorry.
                          That's why I think the reports will make
 2
              MS. YATES:
     clear what we're doing. I am not going to have my
 3
     case-specific expert adopt, repeat, say what Dr. Mucci said.
 4
 5
     If I feel I need that part of the science, Your Honor, in front
     of a jury, we will call Dr. Mucci. There won't be. And I
 6
     think the reports will clear this up. It's part of their
 7
     differential diagnosis, their methodology.
 8
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. Well, I think, nonetheless, this
 9
     discussion was worth having so that it sort of lays a marker
10
     for what I assume will be future discussions.
11
              MS. YATES: Would you like me to continue down the
12
13
     list of experts, Your Honor?
              THE COURT: I mean, I don't know. You listed to me
14
15
     your case-specific experts.
16
              MS. YATES:
                          Yes.
                         You designated some of the general
17
              THE COURT:
18
     causation experts.
                         Yes, many of whom you'll be familiar with,
19
              MS. YATES:
20
     Your Honor.
21
              THE COURT:
                          That's probably all I need to know at this
22
     point.
23
              MS. YATES:
                          Okay.
                                 Okay.
                          Okay. But, anyway, so there will be, you
24
              THE COURT:
25
     know --
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MS. WAGSTAFF: Your Honor, before we move past this topic, could we have a little bit more guidance on the live testimony that you have on February 4th, 6th, and 11th?

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

MS. WAGSTAFF: You know, we put in our papers that we're not planning on bringing anyone. Between now and then, they are going to be -- Monsanto will be deposing every single one of these experts. They've deposed several of them before.

So if we could have a deadline of when they declare whether or not we need to bring them. Scheduling the experts is not just like a phone call. It takes a lot of coordination, and so we'd like some flexibility on if we can bring them on the 4th, the 6th, or the 11th; or we'd like some guidelines how long you're going to let each one -- Monsanto cross-examine each one, or is it going to be similar format as the last time. Or whatever Your Honor is thinking, I'd like some guidance.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I guess I would be inclined to use an approach somewhat similar to the approach we used last time where we give each side a certain number of hours. I guess it will be -- you know, we will -- it will be -- you know, it will be full days, I assume, on those three days and each side will have a certain number of hours, and you can kind of decide how to use those hours.

How many hours should we assume in a court day, Kristen, for these purposes? Like, six?

THE CLERK: Let me look back at the minutes from --

THE COURT: It will probably be, like, you know, six hours a day total of airtime, which means three hours per day per side of airtime, nine total hours of airtime. Figure out how to use it. Figure out who your most important experts are. Figure out who Monsanto really wants to challenge and who you really want to challenge.

If you need further help from me in sort of setting it up, I'm happy to provide it; but as I sit here today, I'm not sure what else to say about it.

MS. WAGSTAFF: Okay.

MS. YATES: And I assume, Your Honor, that the Daubert challenges will relate to all three cases. We're not going to do them one at a time. We do have some different experts on specific cause. The plaintiffs experts do line up the same. There will be a lot, but you do one and then you have to do another one and another one. I'm not sure that's appealing to the Court or anyone else.

THE COURT: If you-all think it makes more sense to do the challenges for all three cases at the same time, that's fine.

MS. YATES: We can meet and confer.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, speaking on behalf of Stevick, we'd like to do all three at the same time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. YATES: That's fine, Your Honor. And I can tell you where are the possible or likely challenges. The plaintiffs know.

THE COURT: I mean, it seems to me that what you should be doing for each other, and I can help you do this if you want, is maybe -- I mean, it seems like well before the Daubert hearings you guys should be paring down and announcing who you're going to call at trial so that the Daubert hearings are more efficient and so that the deposition process is more efficient.

MS. WAGSTAFF: So I haven't had a chance to talk with Monsanto's counsel about this except for briefly on a phone call a couple weeks ago, but at some point we need to get a more granular trial calendar schedule for these cases and have deadlines like exchanging witness lists and things of that nature.

So I would ask that I be afforded the opportunity to meet and confer with Ms. Yates and see if we can find a more granular trial schedule that allows us to do all this sort of stuff and maybe present it to the Court next week, if that works with her. I haven't talked to her about it yet.

MS. YATES: That works.

THE COURT: That sounds fine. That sounds fine. If you need to come back to hash things out more, hopefully we won't have to waste your time bringing you back in December,

but if you need to come back in December, let us know.

But why don't you try to hash that out, and what I would suggest is that you try to hash out a process by which you are paring down possible experts. Like, you know, agree to some process where you, you know, take turns eliminating experts from, you know, your own queue or something. I don't know.

But I know -- I'm looking at this list. I know you're not going to call all these experts. I know Monsanto is not going to call all the experts it's designated. So it certainly seems like it's in everybody's interest, including but not limited to mine, for you to narrow down the list before you file -- before the *Daubert* hearings and before you file the motions to exclude each other's experts.

MS. YATES: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So why don't you try to include a process along those lines.

MS. YATES: Okay.

MS. WAGSTAFF: Okay. And then one last question on the Daubert hearing. At the previous Daubert hearings, we were each assigned a room, sort of a prep room. Can we have the same rooms? And if so, do we talk to Ms. Mellen about scheduling that, or --

THE COURT: Is there any problem with that?

THE CLERK: No. I will work that out with the parties. I assume we're going to stay in here, or do you want

```
to go back up to Courtroom 8?
 1
                          Oh, up to the -- I don't know.
 2
              THE COURT:
              THE CLERK:
                         I think the only reason you were in there
 3
     before was --
 4
 5
              THE COURT:
                          We had a request that it be videoed;
            Didn't we have a request that it be --
     right?
 6
              THE CLERK:
 7
                          Yeah.
                         Or maybe the request came from me actually
              THE COURT:
 8
     because I wanted to refer back to it, which, by the way, it was
 9
     very useful. I went back and I watched a lot of that testimony
10
11
     as we were preparing our ruling --
              MS. WAGSTAFF: And our request --
12
13
              THE COURT: -- as you may have seen from the ruling.
              MS. WAGSTAFF: Our request would extend on through the
14
15
     trial as well.
                     If we could sort of have the same room for the
16
     Daubert hearing and then the trial.
17
              THE COURT:
                          So those rooms were up on 19; is that the
18
     deal?
                                We have two on this floor as well.
19
              THE CLERK:
                          Yes.
20
     However, I think we have a little bit more access to those
21
     rooms up there if we're going to be doing it up there, but I
22
     can still work it out with the parties and we'll figure it out.
23
     I just need to know whether it will be here or there.
24
              MS. WAGSTAFF:
                             Okay.
25
              THE COURT: Do the parties -- do you want the -- I may
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want the Daubert testimony recorded. I don't care as much
 1
     about the trial, but does anybody have any objection to the
 2
     trial being recorded?
 3
              MS. WAGSTAFF: Your Honor, we actually would prefer
 4
 5
     that parts of the trial be recorded, and in fact the whole
     thing, just simply so that we can have some
 6
     cross-examination --
 7
              THE COURT: Wait. Can you say that again? You prefer
 8
 9
     that parts of the --
              MS. WAGSTAFF: Sorry. No, we have no objection to the
10
11
     trial being recorded.
              THE COURT: Okay. You don't have to decide now if you
12
     don't want to.
13
              MR. STEKLOFF: I think we might need to get back to
14
15
     you on that, Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.
17
          Okay. So is that all we need to discuss right now
     regarding the Daubert hearings?
18
              MR. STEKLOFF: I had one additional -- good afternoon,
19
20
     Your Honor. Brian Stekloff.
21
          I had one additional question about the Daubert hearings.
     I know that they'd been teed up focusing on specific causation.
22
23
     I anticipate we will be filing motions on other experts.
     for example, Dr. Benbrook was raised, who I think was described
24
25
    more as a liability-regulatory-type expert. I feel very
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confident we will be filing a Daubert motion on him.
 1
          And my only question is whether --
 2
              THE COURT: You may decide it's not necessary to haul
 3
    him in to cross-examine him. I mean, it will be sort of up to
 4
 5
     you to use your time.
 6
              MS. YATES: Right.
 7
              MR. STEKLOFF: Okay.
              THE COURT: You may decide that's one I should decide
 8
 9
     on the papers.
10
              MR. STEKLOFF: I agree. I just wanted to understand
    we could ask to bring him in.
11
              THE COURT: Sure. Yeah.
12
13
              MR. STEKLOFF: Okay. That's all I wanted to ask.
              THE COURT: If it's important to you, yeah,
14
15
     absolutely.
              MR. STEKLOFF: Okay. Thank you.
16
17
              MS. YATES:
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Jury selection. Let's talk about
18
19
     jury selection.
20
          Is it Stekloff?
21
              MR. STEKLOFF: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT:
22
                         Is that how it's pronounced?
23
              MR. STEKLOFF: Stekloff, yes.
              THE COURT: So let's start this discussion with a
24
25
     little exercise. Let's go to your brief on the issue of jury
```

selection. Let me pull it up.

MR. WISNER: Your Honor, ours or theirs?

THE COURT: Theirs.

MR. WISNER: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. Eight pages, lots of cases cited.

Can you point me to any noncriminal case that you cited in this brief?

MR. STEKLOFF: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So every single case you cited to me was a case about jury selection in a criminal trial, and what I said to you at the last hearing was this is not a death penalty case. It's also not a criminal case.

And so I guess the first overarching question I would ask you is: Why should all of these principles that you've pulled from these cases about jury selection in criminal cases where somebody's liberty is at stake and the issue is, you know, salacious allegations in the press about somebody confessing to a crime or, you know, the DNA evidence that the police gathered or whatever, why should those principles governing jury selection apply here in this civil case?

MR. STEKLOFF: The answer to that, Your Honor, is that I think the case law comes from primarily or exclusively from criminal law because those are the instances in which there is pretrial publicity of the extent that we have seen here.

This is a unique civil case given the circumstances of the

pretrial publicity in this context, and so we conceded I think in our paper that -- I mean, this is unique. Most of these cases that both parties have cited, if not all of them, involve change of venue motions and then the Supreme Court or other courts have weighed in to say whether the change of venue was necessary given the pretrial publicity.

This is very unique in that there's only been one trial. It was in the same jurisdiction. It was very recent. There was a large verdict, and there was unique publicity that, I'm not that old, but that in my experience even in trying several mass tort litigations have never seen the type of publicity that we've seen here, particularly around a verdict.

And so I think that that's --

THE COURT: But I think the problem is that you're adopting certain assumptions. You're adopting a number of assumptions that I think are incorrect. Okay? The first assumption is that knowledge of a jury verdict is more likely to make people believe that Monsanto should be liable.

I mean, you know, I'm guessing that all of us have been involved in conversations, "Did you hear about the big jury verdict?" And all of us have heard people react differently to that. Some people have said -- some people just say, "Wow, that's a big verdict." Other people say, "Right on.

Monsanto's evil." Other people say, "That was ridiculous.

That's an out of control jury." Right? People react in

different ways to a verdict.

So the fact that a verdict -- lawyers and nonlawyers. And so the fact that a verdict was handed down in favor of a plaintiff in a case against Monsanto I think is a lot less kind of prejudicial than you think. I don't think it's categorically different from other types of publicity than you think.

And just like, for example, somebody might have learned about Judge Shubb's ruling in the Eastern District of California saying that California is not allowed to require Monsanto to put a label on its product saying that it's known by the State of California to cause cancer and you should stay away from it, or whatever the label says. Right? And somebody might have seen an article and interpreted it as there was a judge who said that Roundup is safe in California, whatever.

But it doesn't follow that that person believes that

Roundup is safe in California. It follows that the person -
the only thing that follows is that -- the only thing we know

is that the person is aware that some judge said that.

And that sort of gets me to the second assumption that I think you're incorrectly adopting, which is that people aren't capable of making their own decisions. And we have jury selections all the time in which, you know, we sit around as a group -- judge, lawyers, prospective jurors -- and we have a good healthy conversation about things you might presume,

things you might have heard, and we talk about how it's important as jurors to not decide the case based on things you might assume or things you might have heard but only on the evidence that comes on inside the four walls of the courtroom.

And the jurors who express serious reservations about being able or willing to do that are excused, and the jurors who say that they think they can do that and will try their hardest are not excused.

And then the third thing I guess I want to say about this is that after trial, in my own experience, jurors are even more serious about fidelity to that role than they are when they first come into the courtroom. By the time they're done with a trial, they've spent all this time in the sort of soaking in the gravity of the situation and spending all this time examining the evidence and deliberating with their jurors, boy, they really take their job seriously and they really take seriously the admonition that they are supposed to limit their consideration to the evidence that comes into the courtroom.

And so I think that your request to treat this like a death penalty trial -- I mean, I think -- number one, I think that a lot of the criminal -- a lot of the cases from the criminal law context adopt these incorrect assumptions about juror behavior also, but I think the assumptions are -- it's particularly important for us to avoid falling into those assumptions in a civil case when somebody's liberty is not at

stake.

And just to give you one recent example -- I brought my phone out because I was Googling it before we came out here.

Just to give you one recent example of the kind of juror I'm talking about, I'm guessing you know who I'm going to bring up, headline: "Manafort juror Paula Duncan: Manafort is guilty, but Mueller probe is a witch hunt." Next headline: "Manafort juror wanted him to be innocent, but he wasn't." Right?

This is a woman who wore a "Make America great again" hat in her car to court every day sitting on a jury on a criminal trial of Paul Manafort, and she voted guilty because -- and that sort of goes to the third point that I was making, which is that however prospective jurors might feel about it at the beginning, jurors, after going through the gravity of a trial, take their responsibility very, very seriously. And whatever knee-jerk tendencies they might have had at the beginning are usually excised by the end because of how seriously they take their jobs.

And so, frankly, I don't see anything wrong -- we might not do this, but I don't see anything wrong with just getting everybody together in a room and having a fulsome discussion about Monsanto. And if some jurors say, "Well, I heard about this verdict," and some other prospective juror hadn't heard about the verdict before the discussion, I don't think there's anything wrong with that because the discussion among all of us

would be, "Yeah, but that prior verdict is irrelevant because your job is to decide the evidence on your own, and juries come out differently across the country all the time. And your job is to consider the evidence individually and not to make any assumptions about how this case should come out based on another jury's verdict or about Judge Shubb's ruling or based on anything that the IARC said or that the EPA said. This is going to be your job. Are you comfortable doing that? Can you put aside -- can you make your best effort to put aside all that stuff and just consider the evidence that came in here?"

"Well, I really don't think I can, Your Honor." Okay.

That person's excused. And if they say, "Yes, I believe I can,
I will do my absolute best to -- we're not robots but I will do
my best to consider -- to put aside all assumptions and all
knowledge I have and consider all the evidence, absolutely,
Your Honor," then that person stays on unless you exercise a
peremptory challenge.

I don't think there's anything wrong with that. I think that is a perfectly fair jury -- even if some members of the prospective jury learn about the verdict and they didn't know about it before, I think that's a perfectly fair jury selection process.

What I would consider is some sort of mechanism where, you know, we're going to have the questionnaires -- and I've looked at the questionnaires that you-all -- the proposed jury

questions that you-all have submitted. Overall they looked pretty good. I'll put together a draft questionnaire taking the material that you've given me, and I'll circulate it and get comments from you. We'll put together a questionnaire, and we'll have an opportunity to see who has strong feelings about Monsanto and about the verdict. We can ask them a question about the verdict kind of "Have you heard about a verdict involving Monsanto," similar to the one you drafted.

And some of those people will give answers that will probably require their excusal before they even set foot in the courtroom, others we'll need to talk to them; and we'll figure out a way during jury selection maybe to have a group discussion with only the people who have heard about the verdict or have other sort of special knowledge about Monsanto.

We'll probably have everybody -- here's what I'm thinking now is we'll have everybody in. We'll do hardships. Welcome everybody. Introduce everybody. Do hardships. We will have screened people for time availability but even after doing that, there will still be some people who have something going on that they say that prevents them from serving.

And then I'll probably have the prospective jurors introduce themselves by answering a list of, you know, 10 questions like the one on our Web page, something along those lines.

And then after that, maybe we will preselect the people

who we want to stay and have a half-hour discussion with them, people who have demonstrated knowledge of the verdict or some other aspect of this case. And we'll excuse everybody else, tell them they have a half-hour break. We'll talk to the subset of people. I will explain to them that they have to --you know, if they want to be a juror, they have to be able to put that stuff aside and consider only the evidence that comes in in the case, and we'll get a sense from people whether they can do that. Excuse those who can't. Leave in the jury pool those who can. Call everybody back in, and then we'll do --you know, we'll continue with the normal jury selection process.

That's what I think we will do. I may also write an opinion on this topic because I think, you know, like I said, there are a lot of erroneous assumptions about juror behavior out there in the case law.

But, anyway, so that's what I'm very strongly inclined to do. If you want to say anything else about it, feel free.

MR. STEKLOFF: I face an uphill battle, so I'm not sure how far to go into the details. Just if I can make a few points, Your Honor.

I agree that there will be jurors who know about things other than the verdict. Some I think will probably -- we would argue would be negative toward Monsanto. Some the plaintiffs might argue would be adverse toward their position.

We are not asking -- I mean, I agree with you that the normal process applies to those people. The very core group that we are focused on is a group that would have knowledge of the Johnson verdict, as I think you've articulated.

just -- I don't have -- I don't -- I haven't yet wrapped my
brain around why you're so focused on that.

I mean, I think you've adopted this assumption that people cannot think for themselves and that somehow knowledge of a prior verdict against Monsanto means that they're not going to be able to assess the -- or means that there's a serious risk they're not going to be able to assess for themselves the evidence, and I just think that's wrong. I don't think it's -- I don't see why it's qualitatively different from any other knowledge that somebody might bring into the courtroom as a prospective juror.

MR. STEKLOFF: I was trying to think of the criminal analogy of this before the hearing, and I had a case where it was a high-profile criminal case. There were underlying predicate charges and then a series of 924(c) charges of using a firearm in furtherance of those underlying charges, and there was a verdict. The jury was hung on all of the underlying charges.

There was a question during the deliberations about the 924(c) charges, a big dispute with the judge about how to

instruct the jury. The jury came back and convicted on all of the 924(c) charges in part because we had conceded during the trial that my client, the defendant, had had a gun during the alleged events, and then media came out where the jurors explained that that was their rationale.

The judge then reversed the verdict or dismissed the verdicts, and we had a retrial from scratch. And I will concede that I don't remember the details of the jury selection process there, but I think that's more analogous to what we're dealing with here is, in that second trial, if there were -- and none of these cases, I will concede on both sides, involved those facts. They involved different types of pretrial publicity in jurisdictions where parties were aimed at seeking change of venue.

In that second trial you don't -- my position in that case would be you wouldn't want those jurors who knew about the prior verdict, maybe they didn't understand all the legal ramifications of the jury instructions, but that there was a conviction of the client who was then going back to trial.

So I sort of use that in that what we are trying to argue here is that this type of knowledge -- I don't -- I agree with you. Are there jurors who know about the Johnson verdict who can come in and be fair and put that to the side? I will concede that the answer is, yes, there are some jurors like that; but I think one of the reasons we did the survey, and we

didn't know the results beforehand, was to see if there was objective data to demonstrate that there is a serious risk.

THE COURT: But the survey is -- I mean, come on.

Like, you have to control for the possibility that people who are aware of the verdict are more likely to be predisposed against Monsanto from the beginning. I mean, that survey is not worth anything.

MR. STEKLOFF: But I think the same problem -- whether you control for that or not -- even accepting your view on the survey, if people here -- I think people here who may come in and have knowledge of the verdict may be predisposed to have bias against Monsanto. And so I guess our position -- my position is: Why introduce this into the trial?

If --

THE COURT: We're not introducing it into the trial.

It's not going to be admissible at trial.

MR. STEKLOFF: Well, why --

THE COURT: It's going to be -- again, in juries across America, every day topics come up during jury selection that are inadmissible at trial.

MR. STEKLOFF: I articulated that poorly. I think even if you subconsciously know that a group of your peers viewing similar evidence from a lot of overlapping experts -- I don't know if that will come out or not, but they might gauge by when there's impeachment that you previously testified.

They might assume that it was part of the Johnson trial if they know about the Johnson trial.

So if that -- it is different to say, "Okay. I heard about some issue with Roundup in the news. I heard about some issue with Monsanto." That, I think, we want to address through your process.

The Johnson verdict subconsciously, if you know that a prior version of your peers gauged this evidence and not only ruled against Monsanto but did so in the amount of \$289 million, I think that's -- even a potentially subconscious view, I agree with you, by the end of trial -- I mean, I have a lot of faith in the jury system so why -- I guess our point is where approximately a quarter of the jurors, at least in the survey, which you may view is worthless, but we're not talking, I don't think, about 80 percent of the jurors, if we excused the minority of the jurors who have this knowledge, I don't think it would slow down the trial at all. We would have opening at the same time.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. STEKLOFF: And we would be able to get a jury -THE COURT: And my only point is that we can explore
those issues, but I don't believe it's necessary to do
individualized questioning to explore those issues, and I don't
believe there's any harm caused if, you know, some prospective
jurors who were not aware of the verdict became aware of the

verdict during jury selection as long as everybody made clear that they're willing to make their best effort not to consider anything other than the evidence that comes in in the case.

That's my only point.

It's totally appropriate to explore that stuff, but I'm not -- I don't believe it's appropriate to waste multiple days of people's time -- and by "people" I mean members of the community -- doing individualized questioning of prospective jurors in a civil case.

Like I said, what I will be willing to do is have a separate session with the group of people who have some specific knowledge, and we can figure that out based on the questionnaires.

But I will tell you that if during the jury selection process jurors who were not aware of the Johnson verdict become aware of the Johnson verdict, I don't think that's a big deal at all as long as they make clear during jury selection that they are willing to not consider it and focus only on the evidence that comes in at trial.

I was going to make one more point, one more comment. I can't remember what it is.

So, anyway, we're not doing a multiday jury selection process. We will pick the jury in a day. It probably won't take the whole day. We will get their questionnaires and we'll go through their questionnaires, and we'll spend some time

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figuring out who should be excused just on the paper and who
 1
     needs to come in, and we'll pick a jury, I'm confident, in less
 2
     than a day.
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              MR. WISNER: Would the expectation be that we would
 4
 5
     open that day?
 6
              THE COURT:
                          No. Probably open the next morning.
 7
              MR. WISNER: Okay.
                         Just to preserve everybody's sanity.
              THE COURT:
 8
              MR. WISNER: Two comments, Your Honor. I'm waiting
 9
    because my colleague --
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11
              MS. WAGSTAFF: Just on that, you currently under
     PTO 53 have jury selection scheduled for the 20th of February
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     and then opening statements the 25th. So should --
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              THE COURT: It sounds like a good idea.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: So we're going to just keep that and
15
16
    not do opening the next day?
                          Yeah.
17
              THE COURT:
              MS. WAGSTAFF:
18
                             Okay.
                          That should -- yes.
19
              THE COURT:
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              MR. WISNER: Good catch.
21
          Your Honor, two comments. One is actually sort of
     amusing. One of my clients was actually selected for this
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23
     survey, and she sent me a link to it and I actually considered
     going into it and writing something really salacious so that I
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     can show the e-mail that I actually did it to invalidate the
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survey, but I decided not to and they didn't complete the survey either.

The second issue, Your Honor, and this is something that we'll probably have to address closer to trial, is this idea that the Johnson verdict is wholesale inadmissible, and I think there's some truth to that except for one really important fact. I'm not sure if the decision has been made to bifurcate --

THE COURT: The Neil Young and Daryl Hannah letter?

MR. WISNER: No, Your Honor. Those we're not going to be seeking any admission of.

But immediately after the Johnson verdict, the CEO for Bayer went and spoke, we have the recording of it, and said that the \$250 million in punitive damages changes nothing. And one of the primary purposes of punitive damages is actually to deter future wrongful conduct, and so this is actually a corporate admission that \$250 million is insufficient to change corporate conduct.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, we'll talk about that at the motion in limine stage --

MR. WISNER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- but it does lead directly into the next topic that I wanted to discuss, which is this is sort of an introductory discussion to help us dive into the discovery disputes, to the extent that any remain. Hopefully you're

going to tell me at some point that no discovery disputes remain.

But the general topic that I want to discuss that I think will inform the discussion on a number of discovery disputes is a topic that, you know, we've been discussing for many months, which is the relevance and admissibility of exclusions by agencies that Roundup is dangerous or is not dangerous or is potentially dangerous or whatever. Okay?

And I guess --

(Counsel conferring.)

MR. WISNER: Sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's okay.

I guess I've developed a tentative view on this, not a strong tentative view, a very tentative view. I think my very tentative view is that certainly there is at least a strong argument that what the agencies have done, what the EPA has done is relevant on the issue of punitive damages.

I mean, I would think that if I were Monsanto, on the issue of punitive damages, I would want to parade in front of the jury all of the agencies that have concluded -- have signed off on use of glyphosate or have concluded that glyphosate is safe, or whatever it is their conclusions were.

But on the issue of causation, I think that while you can't say that the EPA's decision or the IARC's decision or the European Union's decision is irrelevant, it's relevant, but I

wonder if all of that stuff should be excluded under 403 on the issue of causation because the jury's job, again, is to consider the actual evidence that is presented in the courtroom about whether glyphosate caused Mr. Hardeman's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.

And, yes, it's relevant that the EPA concluded that it's safe. It's relevant that the IARC concluded that it's a probable carcinogen, but under 403, I wonder if allowing evidence in at all about those conclusions on the issue of causation will create too much of a distraction from what is the more important inquiry, which is: What did the epidemiological studies show? You know, what are the risk factors for NHL? And how big of a risk factor was glyphosate compared to the other risk factors to which Mr. Hardeman was exposed?

I think -- and, you know, I kind of want to go back and look at how the state court trial went. I haven't done that yet. But, you know, all that stuff came in in the state court trial, am I right? IARC --

MR. WISNER: Define "come in," Your Honor.

THE COURT: What was the rule governing the state court trial about the IARC's conclusions and the EPA's decision and the European Union and all that?

MR. WISNER: So there was quite a bit of litigation about this. The IARC monograph came into evidence. The 2016

issue report by the EPA, the most recent one, did not come into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted but was admitted for the purposes of showing Monsanto's state of mind specifically to this punitive damages idea --

THE COURT: Punitive damages, uh-huh.

MR. WISNER: -- which we objected to strenuously, and I can get into that later because there's a logical fallacy in that.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. WISNER: And the reason why the IARC monograph came into evidence was because they didn't object to it at the beginning of the trial, and so that's -- I think the judge made it clear that if they had objected under hearsay grounds, it never would have come in, the document itself.

Now, the other issue is the existence of IARC's determination altogether and EPA's classifications over the years. I don't think either side ever contemplated those as being off limits completely.

For what it's worth, when I tried the case, I focused primarily on the studies because when you go down to what do the authorities say, I have IARC and they have the rest of the world. We couldn't talk about California but they were allowed to talk about the EPA, Federal EPA. So there was a lot of hands tied behind our back in that regard. And for what it's worth, a lot of their experts based a lot of their opinions on

the EPA documents and, in fact, that was the bulwark of their testimony. So it would be hard to see how it unbuckles.

The problem that I would see --

THE COURT: Why? I mean, when we did the general causation phase, it seemed to me certainly it came up. You know, certainly it was part of everybody's testimony, but the bulk of the testimony was about the studies themselves. And, you know, we didn't -- and I excluded expert testimony whose methodology was "I adopt the analysis of the IARC"; right? I'm sure you disagree with that, but I excluded it. It would, therefore, be excluded -- such testimony would, therefore, not be admissible at trial.

And so I guess I'm thinking back to the testimony that, like, Dr. Ritz provided, Dr. Portier provided, Dr. Mucci provided; and I'm thinking, well, if the EPA and the IARC were off limits to them, they would have given substantially the same testimony.

MR. WISNER: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Their testimony would not have been that different, and so that makes me wonder why we should be getting into it at all.

MR. WISNER: Because the case is not just does this cause cancer. There's a lot more involved in the liability context. And let me give you some very specific examples; right?

Monsanto's conduct following the IARC monograph or even before it came out is very clear evidence of punitive intent. It shows a desire to manipulate scientists to orchestrate -- I mean, it's our position. I'm sure they disagree. I'm just giving our pitch.

And it shows --

THE COURT: Hold on. I think I understand all those arguments.

MR. WISNER: Okay.

THE COURT: So you and I are pretty much on the same page here, but then the question is: Why not bifurcate the trial?

MR. WISNER: So --

THE COURT: And why not do a punitive damages phase, if necessary, after the jury conducts an inquiry into causation that is not muddied up by all of this stuff that you are talking about right now?

MR. WISNER: So there's a couple of important parts of this; right? So, for example, the IARC participation,

Dr. Portier is an important part of the cross-examination.

They tried to impeach his credibility saying he went there to influence IARC so he wanted to make money as a plaintiffs' lawyer -- expert; right? There's a whole bunch of sideshows that are part of it; but I think the core issue, Your Honor, is this statement.

THE COURT: Let's assume for the sake of argument that I said you can't cross-examine Dr. Portier about that.

MR. WISNER: So this is a statement that's the problem. The first words that will come out in opening statement -- and I know this because this is what happened in the Johnson case -- "Roundup has been on the market for 40 years. It has a demonstrated record of safety." And there's so much untruth about that that we have to unpack. We will do that with evidence, but a lot of it involves IARC because what IARC did is it's the change in the narrative.

Because every single juror that I've interviewed, and we've done a lot of jury science, they go, "Well, it's been on the market for 40 years. It must be safe." They said the same thing about tobacco. They said the same thing about asbestos.

The simple fact is IARC was a game changer; right? It was the first time a group of independent scientists -- this is our viewpoint; you don't have to agree -- looked at it with no dog in the fight and made a decision, and that's why -- and the way they responded to it and the way they generated junk science. Science, by the way, that their experts rely upon; for example, the Intertek manuscripts; for example, these are all sort of integrated into the case.

And if we did this sort of hermetic look at just does it generally cause cancer, I think that really creates a lot of problems. We'd have to bring back the experts afterwards. For

example, Dr. Jameson. He's one of our experts. He's also a fact witness and so is Dr. Portier; right? He was at IARC.

And part of his process of understanding the science was the science that he had to do, the discussions he had with his fellow scientists at the IARC monograph program, his in-depth analysis that he's done after the fact looking at the tumors and all the rodent studies. I mean, it's unbelievable the amount of work that he's done. And all of that really is framed around IARC. If it's not, then it looks like he's just out there just doing all this crazy stuff by himself, and he isn't. He's actually joined by hundreds of scientists that support his position.

And under California law, the jury instruction specifically contemplates whether or not the science was generally knowable at the time when the warning should have been given. And so that --

THE COURT: You're talking about on the issue of punitive damages?

MR. WISNER: No. That's just general failure to warn liability.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WISNER: And so the context and quality of the science and whether or not it is supported by an authority is part of the case, and I don't think looking at it in isolation can possibly work or be fair to us or them.

And I don't know how their opening or closing would even look like without the EPA because that was their case, and it's a strong case. You know, it's hurtful for us, but IARC is also very important to our case, and I think we would not want to bifurcate, at least that issue.

Now, the issue of bifurcating punitive damages, which is a little different because that's talking about Monsanto's conduct ratification by managing agents, et cetera, I think we would oppose that, but I think that would be something we'd need to brief more in depth.

But the issue of bifurcating just general causation I think would not be useful. I also think it would really extend the length of the trial because --

MR. WISNER: Yeah, considerably. Because, let's say, we -- and this is what we actually argued against bifurcation in discovery at the very beginning -- right? -- is when you do that, you have all this time and energy spent we bring in Portier and Ritz and whoever, they bring in Mucci or Ryder, whoever they decide to call or not call, the jury decides the issue. We have closing arguments --

THE COURT: I want to make sure we're on the same page. I'm not saying bifurcate general causation.

MR. WISNER: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm saying bifurcate causation and damages

or maybe causation and damages and then punitive damages.

MR. WISNER: Okay.

THE COURT: That's what I'm saying.

MR. WISNER: So then when it comes to the punitive issue, this is something we run into in all products liability cases, and that is a lot of the evidence that's probative to punitive damages is also probative to negligence. And so that's the argument we always make.

And then typically in California the way it's done, if there is bifurcation, it's just bifurcation on punitive damages, not punitive liability. So you ask the jury in the initial "Do you believe by clear and convincing evidence that they acted with malice as defined by these instructions," or whatever the verdict form says; and if they click "yes," then typically the bifurcation -- and this has happened in every MDL that I've participated in where punitive damages were on the table -- then there's an argument about damages. It usually goes about 10 minutes. It may be like 5, 10, 15, 20 minutes of testimony from Dr. Mills who says "Their net worth is X" and, you know, we try to get in that they said 250 wasn't enough or whatever.

THE COURT: But you're saying that typically in the first phase the jury is asked whether the conduct was malicious so most of that evidence, but why does that have to be the case? I mean, why does the jury have to answer that question

in the first phase of the case?

MR. WISNER: Because it is almost impossible to say that this is solely going to malice and not -- or solely going to negligence. Very often those things coincide. And, in fact, you know, malice is a higher standard so negligence is in many ways subsumed in the violation of the duty that is imposed upon the manufacturer. So it really becomes an intellectual exercise that will lead to just hours and hours of us arguing about whether or not that's negligence or punis or both and if it needs to be dissected, and that's just not how we typically do trials. And that's why we would oppose that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, I understand. Those are fair points, but I'm still left feeling that on the issue of whether Hardeman's cancer was caused by glyphosate, in large part whether the EPA signed off on it, whether the IARC raised concerns about it is kind of a sideshow. It's kind of, as the judges like to say, you know, a minitrial about something that is a bit peripheral to the primary inquiry, and that's the concern that I have and that's the concern I have of a lot of these discovery requests.

MR. WISNER: And I totally understand that,

Your Honor, and I appreciate that issue. I think that for us,

our viewpoint on it is really not so much about 403 but more

under hearsay rules under Rule 8 -- the 800 series. Because,

you know, for example, IARC, they're going to have the benefit

of actually having members of the IARC panel testify and cross-examine them about what they did, didn't do, et cetera, what they considered, what they didn't.

The EPA document comes in without a witness; right? We don't have the author to cross-examine and say, "Well, why didn't you follow your guidelines? And here's what the SAP said."

All of that, Your Honor, was actually part of the Johnson trial. We actually did it, and I think we navigated that complicated issue pretty well, you know, and we ended up, you know, presenting both sides and Monsanto ultimately didn't call all of their experts I think because they knew it would open doors it didn't want, and so that's sort of how it proceeded.

But, I mean, the simple fact is, you know -- like here's an example --

THE COURT: Well, it's going so well for them. I
mean --

MR. WISNER: Here is a great example. Dr. Mucci takes the stand in Johnson -- okay? -- and she has a textbook about epidemiology where she discusses examples of carcinogens that she believes are proper carcinogens where there's no insufficient epidemiology, and the basis of that list in her textbook is IARC. It's not EPA. It's IARC.

And I had the privilege of cross-examining Dr. Mucci and saying, "Well, you're saying epidemiology doesn't support

causation here, but you agree that you don't need epidemiology to prove cancer. In fact, here's a list that you created saying that, and it's based on IARC; right? And you haven't looked at tox and you haven't looked at all these other things, and so you don't know if that stuff would actually change your mind. So really you're just sitting here looking in isolation at it." So that was my cross-examination.

And I think it was --

THE COURT: It sounds like you're enjoying reliving that cross-examination.

(Laughter)

MR. WISNER: Few things do I enjoy more than cross-examining experts, Your Honor, or directing for that matter.

But all that said, at the end of the day, it's part of the case and I think that when California law specifically looks to whether or not these are generally accepted scientific -- knowable in the scientific community, what the EPA did and what IARC did, it has to be part of that. It seems like it would be very difficult. For example, on appeal it would just create -- I think it would create lots of issues on both sides if none of that stuff came in.

I mean, just I'm saying for us we're looking at this long term, not just the verdict but also, you know, getting all these cases towards resolution at some point. And so, you

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know, for example, if it went up on appeal and it was
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     overturned on that issue because both sides should have been
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     allowed, then we have to retry the case and we're back to
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     square one.
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 5
          And so -- sorry. I'll let you speak. I've been talking
     for a long time.
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                         Why don't you address this kind of general
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              THE COURT:
     topic that we've been discussing, then we'll take a little
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    break and we'll get into whatever discovery disputes. I'll
 9
10
     take a break. You get together and resolve the rest of your
11
     discovery disputes.
              MR. STEKLOFF: Yes, Your Honor.
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          So there is precedent for what you're describing, which I
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     think is known as reverse bifurcation, in which the jury --
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15
              THE COURT: Sorry. Could you say that again?
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              MR. STEKLOFF:
                             Sure.
17
              THE COURT: What bifurcation?
              MR. STEKLOFF: Reverse bifurcation.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. STEKLOFF: And that is a procedure under --
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              THE COURT: I've never heard that phrase.
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              MR. STEKLOFF: It is exactly what you, I think, are
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     contemplating, which is that causation, both general and
     specific, is addressed first --
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25
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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MR. STEKLOFF: -- and the jury makes a determination on whether or not the plaintiffs have satisfied their scientific causation requirements.

And only if the jury does so does the case then go to liability in terms of corporate conduct, corporate responsibility, all the internal e-mails and documents that the plaintiffs will want to show through their various experts or confront our witnesses with.

And so there is precedent for that, and that I think is exactly what you're contemplating. Because in the initial phase -- I understand on the margins there are arguments where Mr. Wisner has now made that IARC somehow is even relevant to the causation point. I mean, he raised Portier. I'm happy to not cross Dr. Portier about IARC in a world in which IARC is excluded.

And so I think that that's a good idea, would be to proceed in a world in which the plaintiffs have to establish both general causation under the -- you know, within what you're discussing, which is Dr. Ritz would come on and talk about the epidemiology, and Dr. Weisenburger would come on and do the same, but then also they would present their case-specific experts. We would call, you know, potentially Dr. Mucci, Dr. Ryder, and our case-specific experts. This is all assuming we get past the *Daubert* stage.

And then the jury would have to decide does -- I mean, I

don't know what the exact questions would be sitting here now,

but essentially: Roundup or glyphosate, is it capable of

causing cancer? And then if the answer is yes in

Mr. Hardeman's case, was that a substantial contributing factor

THE COURT: You don't even have to ask those two questions. You can just ask whether it caused his cancer.

to this?

MR. STEKLOFF: Sure. If the answer is no, then we're done. That actually, talk about efficiency, is much more efficient. That would be a much shorter trial if the answer is no.

If the answer is yes, then witnesses come on the stand and they talk about -- again, I am confident that there are internal e-mails or other documents that they want to show. I think we would have lots of disputes about how much beyond that we go, and even IARC and EPA I think we might debate whether those come in in the second stage; but let's assume for purposes here they do, it would be a different question that the jury was asking, which is did Monsanto -- I mean, I don't have the exact claims here, but essentially, like, failed to warn -- you know, meet their responsibilities to warn

Mr. Hardeman about -- about the -- about glyphosate and its potential to cause cancer.

THE COURT: What about the concern that sort of leaves -- by taking all of that out, it leaves the impression

that anybody who might be in charge of assessing whether glyphosate is dangerous has not done anything to -- not taken any measures with respect to glyphosate?

MR. STEKLOFF: Well, if --

THE COURT: In other words, that was a very inarticulate way of repeating Mr. Wisner's point, which is it's been there for 40 years, it must be safe.

MR. STEKLOFF: But if we are not allowed to argue what the EPA -- so what the EPA did or what another foreign regulatory agency -- governmental agency did, I don't really think it does leave that impression in the sense that -- I mean, this happens, for example, where -- I don't have a ton of examples off the top of my head, but where it's happened before you have an FDA-approved pharmaceutical that's on the market and there isn't a lot of -- the FDA regulatory experts, for example, that the plaintiffs like to bring, in those cases don't testify in this first phase about causation.

The question is: Does that medicine cause, both generally and specifically, the injury that plaintiffs are claiming? And so this is -- courts are able to resolve that issue in a reverse bifurcation context.

THE COURT: Well, I think for now -- I mean, how -for purposes of your trial planning, when should we decide
whether there is going to be a bifurcation of this? I mean, I
want to seriously entertain the possibility of doing this, but

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I understand it's a very important decision. I don't want to
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     decide it off-the-cuff now.
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          When would you need a decision on whether we're going to
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    bifurcate, you know, along these lines for your planning
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 5
    purposes?
                           That's something we really kind of needed
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              MR. WISNER:
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     to know already. I don't mean to say that coyly, Your Honor.
     It's just --
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                         So I should make a decision on that very
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              THE COURT:
     quickly?
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              MR. WISNER: Yes, and I think that we should brief it
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     immediately if that's going to be really a potential issue.
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     think that it raises a lot of serious problems for us,
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     particularly, for example, that every single juror that sits in
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     that box is going to know it's on the market and, therefore,
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     the EPA has approved it. So it's implicit in every single
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     juror's knowledge so this products approach --
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              THE COURT: You are in San Francisco so maybe half the
     jurors think that --
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              MR. WISNER: Monsanto is evil and whatever.
              THE COURT: -- the fact that EPA approved it, means
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     that it's dangerous.
              MR. WISNER: Maybe but that fact will be there if we
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     can't counter that fact that the IARC which, you know -- for
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     what it's worth, IARC in the realm of academics is like the
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Blue Bloods of scientists, you know. So it's, like, the fact that our guys have all been on panels and they were there, I mean, that's really an important part of the gravitas of their opinion.

There's a reason why when Dr. Portier took the stand in our trial, it was basically done. His opinion is so thoughtful and in depth that they have to -- I don't know.

So, anyway, that's our position. I don't want to wax emotion about it, but we'd like to brief this issue immediately because this really, really kind of goes to the core of everything and would make our trial significantly more expensive because we'd have to bring back Portier, for example, after and he's in Europe, and -- I mean, I know you shake your head, Your Honor, but this is going to be costs borne by Mr. Hardeman. It's not being borne by a thousand plaintiffs; right? And Mr. Hardeman, it's going to be reduced from his judgment.

And so it's something -- that's one of the reasons why we were so concerned about bringing live testimony is we can't ethically have another person pay for it. It has to be the person whose case is going up for trial, and so it's a lot of money.

THE COURT: Is that true? Really?

MR. WISNER: I think it's over \$200,000.

THE COURT: But, I mean, the plaintiff group, that

can't be funded by the group as a whole? 1 MR. WISNER: The general causation, absolutely, and 2 that was applied to everyone. 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 5 MR. WISNER: Specific causation is by definition not general. We can talk about this. I'm not going to say --6 MR. MILLER: We can talk about it later. 7 MR. WISNER: We can talk about it later and we can 8 work it out. I think it's a tricky issue, Your Honor. 9 10 THE COURT: I mean, I'm obviously no expert and so 11 don't quote me on anything I say, but my gut commonsense reaction is everybody in the group has a very strong interest 12 in how this trial goes, you know. 13 But, anyway, you were going to say something? And then 14 15 we'll take a break. MR. STEKLOFF: I mean, first, Dr. Portier is not 16 17 specific causation. 18 Second, I think what we're hearing here, and I would say 19 sort of regardless of where you --20 THE COURT: But he would have to come back twice. 21 MR. STEKLOFF: I agree. 22 THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEKLOFF: Regardless -- but I don't think that 23 would actually happen with a lot of people. Like, I don't 24 25 think Dr. Ritz would have to come back twice. I don't think

Dr. Weisenburger would have to come back twice. I think the second phase would be very different if we went to it, which would be Dr. Portier and then I think Dr. Benbrook, who they told you before, we're going to have challenges to him, but is sort of a liability regulatory expert. So I think the phases, with Dr. Portier being an exception, would be very different. So I will throw that out there.

I also -- I want to clarify an issue about Johnson before I forget, but I think -- the other thing I just want to point out is what we are hearing, and this came up at the last hearing, is even if you allow IARC in at any phase, you I think in your general causation *Daubert* opinion have -- I don't want -- have made comments about the relevance of IARC.

And what we are hearing now time and time and time again is that IARC needs to be held up as the Holy Grail here, and so I just want to say I don't think that the Court should be moved by that argument given what you've already said about IARC, but that can be maybe something we brief.

THE COURT: Yeah, and maybe that there needs to be a limiting instruction about IARC.

MR. STEKLOFF: Or a limit of how much we hear about IARC.

THE COURT: Or both.

MR. STEKLOFF: Yes.

And then I just want to clarify on this Johnson issue, and

I was not part of the Johnson trial, Mr. Wisner was, others were, but this is my understanding and my ultimate conclusion is that -- I don't know that it will provide much guidance for you on how to handle this from an evidentiary standpoint -- is that the defense did not move to exclude the admission of IARC and it was then admitted.

The plaintiffs moved to exclude as hearsay the various regulatory findings, so EPA but also others. The judge granted that. The judge said that those documents and exhibits did not meet the public records exception. So in limited instances she allowed some of the -- and we have red ribbons and if we have to get to this in front of Your Honor, I think we will be able to meet our burden of proving that they do meet the public records exception.

But then there were limited cross-examinations of some of the plaintiffs' experts by the defense in which they were able to read from an EPA document. That is where the limiting instruction came in that Mr. Wisner noticed, which is that the judge instructed the jury that it could come in for a limited purpose but not for the truth of the matter asserted because of her view on hearsay.

And so here whatever Your Honor rules we think we will now address this before the trial as opposed to having one ruling on IARC and then a different ruling on the regulatory documents, but I think there should be -- there will be, I

suspect, hopefully a goose/gander approach on that.

So I just wanted to give you that background so you had it as you go to look at the Johnson -- the way that these documents or exhibits or issues were handled in Johnson because I think it was very complicated and sort of a result of a nonchallenge to IARC, which, as Mr. Wisner said, the judge said after the fact had the defense moved to exclude IARC on hearsay grounds, at least the exhibit, the monograph, she would have granted that motion. And I just wanted to try to make that as clear as possible as you consider that issue.

THE COURT: Okay. So why don't we do this: I can rule on this issue of bifurcation before Christmas. Why don't we have Monsanto file a brief on bifurcation in seven days. Is that okay?

MR. STEKLOFF: Sure.

THE COURT: And then the plaintiffs can file a brief on bifurcation seven days after that. No. We better make it sooner. Let's hold on a second. Let's -- what's today? Wednesday?

MR. STEKLOFF: Wednesday the 5th.

THE COURT: So let's have Monsanto file a brief on bifurcation by the 10th and let's have the plaintiffs file a brief on bifurcation by the 12th.

Are those dates -- I mean, I know you-all have a gazillion things you have to be doing right now. Are those dates -- none

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of it's going to make sense considering all that you have to
 1
     do, but are those dates as good as any given all the things
 2
     that you have to do?
 3
                           I don't know why they would get five days
 4
              MR. WISNER:
 5
     and we'd get two. That just seems on its face unfair,
     Your Honor.
 6
              THE COURT: You can start thinking about it now.
 7
              MR. WISNER: Okay.
 8
              MR. STEKLOFF: I think I've announced our position.
 9
              THE COURT: And I think this is probably something
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11
     that you both are expert in so I'm not too worried about that.
          Okay. So those will be the deadlines, and I'll give you a
12
     decision -- I'm not going to promise definitively, but I will
13
     almost certainly give you a decision before Christmas.
14
15
          And then why don't we take a break, come back at 3:30.
16
    All right.
17
                       (Recess taken at 3:16 p.m.)
                    (Proceedings resumed at 3:31 p.m.)
18
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. All right. Any discovery disputes?
19
20
     What's so funny?
              MS. WAGSTAFF: Your Honor, I think that the discovery
21
     disputes fall into three categories: Ones that are sort of
22
23
     general to all three cases, one that relates to Hardeman, and
     some that relate to Stevick.
24
25
          With respect to the Hardeman ones that we've outlined, one
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of them was satisfied by Your Honor's order last Friday with
 1
     the depositions. Those are all -- they gave us new dates.
 2
     We've accepted every date. So that issue is taken care of.
 3
          Monsanto has served amended discovery responses two days
 4
 5
     ago, and we're going through those and the meeting and
     conferring is still happening with respect to Hardeman on
 6
     those; and to the extent we need further attention from you, we
 7
     will let you know.
 8
              THE COURT:
 9
                          Okay.
              MS. WAGSTAFF: With Stevick --
10
11
              MR. BRAKE: We have some outstanding disputes,
     Your Honor.
12
13
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
              MR. BRAKE: For the record, Brian Brake for plaintiffs
14
15
     Elaine and Christopher Stevick.
16
          Your Honor, we -- I sent actually on December 3rd a
17
     discovery letter, which I don't know if Your Honor has had an
18
     opportunity to look at or not. I've got an extra copy here if
19
     you'd like to see that.
20
              THE COURT:
                          I have it. I don't remember whether I
21
     looked at it. Let's see here.
22
                         (Pause in proceedings.)
23
              THE COURT:
                         Yeah, I started looking at this, but I
     don't believe that I've been through the whole thing so go
24
25
     ahead.
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MR. BRAKE: Yes, sir.

Here's where we are. We filed that letter on

December 3rd. There were the interrogatories that I wanted

answered more specifically and then Monsanto's responses; and

then after that letter was filed, Monsanto filed amended

responses to the interrogatories, which resolved the discovery

dispute regarding Interrogatory Number 5, 8, and 13 on net

worth. And so what that leaves us with, I'll go over those

interrogatories now and ask Your Honor to rule on them.

I only propounded 17 interrogatories, and I chose them fairly carefully based upon what I needed to prepare.

THE COURT: What are they?

MR. BRAKE: Yeah. Number 1, basically asking if you think glyphosate was not a substantial factor in causing Elaine Stevick's cancer, tell me all facts, witnesses, documents to support your contention. The answer is "See our expert reports." In my view, that's not adequate. I'd like to know who you're saying is going to say it, what they're relying upon, and what documents they're relying upon. That's Number 1.

The next one is Interrogatory Number 4, identifying people with personal knowledge. Basically the answer is "We'll tell you sometime" --

THE COURT: Personal knowledge of?

MR. BRAKE: Personal knowledge of the allegations in

the complaint --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRAKE: -- and the issues in dispute. And rather than a list of people, the response was "We'll basically tell you later and/or it's overly broad."

The next one is number -- oh, I'm sorry. I missed one.

Number 2, this is a very important one. It's asking for all people who may provide testimony at trial, and Your Honor's pretrial order does not include a date to exchange witnesses for trial; and the response to this from Monsanto is "We'll tell you when the order says we should tell you."

THE COURT: Okay. But Ms. Wagstaff just told me that they were going to negotiate --

MR. BRAKE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- still more dates, a more complicated, detailed set of deadlines between the parties. Why is that not going to take care of this?

MR. BRAKE: That may very well take care of this. The reason I'm bringing it up now is if there are people that are identified by Monsanto to testify at trial, I'd like to know that before the discovery cutoff of December -- or the next discovery cutoff, otherwise we may not be able to be prepared for trial. But I agree with what you're saying on that.

The next one is Number 6, which is "List all potential factors other than Roundup that you will assert as a potential

contributing cause." The answer is "Refer to the expert reports" rather than a specific answer.

The next one is 7, "When do you contend that Mrs. Stevick developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma?" The answer "Refer to expert reports" as opposed to a specific answer.

The answer to Number 8 and the amended responses.

And then the last two are Numbers 14 and 15. 14 is asking if any scientist, physician, or government employee basically has stated to Monsanto the belief that glyphosate products cause cancer; and if so, identify the specifics of that interaction, when it happened, who said it, et cetera. And I did not get a specific answer to that. Basically objections.

And then the last one is 15, which is basically asking for any discussions or meetings in which Monsanto's officers, agents, or contractors participated in discussions about whether the public should be warned about the potential dangers of glyphosate. I did not get a specific answer to that.

So we'd ask the Court to order answers to those specific interrogatories ASAP.

THE COURT: Okay. Does Monsanto want to briefly respond on any of these?

MR. GRIFFIS: Yes, Your Honor.

I'd like to raise a procedural point for starters and ask that Mr. Brake follow Your Honor's rules with regard to both meeting and conferring about these issues and filing discovery

letters. 1 I've had no oral communication with him about this. 2 sent me a written discovery letter and then filed that as 3 his -- he sent me a demand letter, to which I responded by 4 5 e-mail; and then he sent you that and attached my e-mail as the discovery letter rather than incorporating my responses into a 6 7 filing to Your Honor. I think it would go more smoothly and be more intelligible to you, if not to all of us, if it was filed. 8 THE COURT: Do you want me to deny it? I'll deny it 9 on that basis and let you put together a discovery letter and 10 11 tee it up for me. I think it's totally appropriate to simply deny the motion to compel on that basis. 12 MR. GRIFFIS: All right, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Do you want me to do that? 14 15 MR. GRIFFIS: Yes. 16 THE COURT: All right. When will be the deadline for 17 a discovery letter? 18 MR. GRIFFIS: Since we have all the material for it, 19 we can get that on file this week easily. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you file the discovery 21 letter by Friday --22 Okay. MR. GRIFFIS: -- and I'll address it next week. 23 THE COURT: 24 MR. GRIFFIS: Thank you. 25 THE COURT: Okay. What next?

Your Honor, late yesterday evening we 1 MR. WISNER: filed a discovery letter related to the Rule 30(b)(6) 2 deposition. I don't know if you've had a chance to review it 3 4 yet. 5 THE COURT: Let me pull it up. I probably have not reviewed it, but you never know. 6 7 (Pause in proceedings.) Feel free if you-all want to have a little THE COURT: 8 Don't feel rushed. My sense is that your chat with each 9 chat. 10 other is productive so go ahead. 11 MR. WISNER: No, it was just do I have an extra copy, Your Honor. It wasn't -- we talked about it during the break, 12 13 and we could not reach agreement on the disputes on these five topics. 14 15 Okay. No, I haven't really looked at THE COURT: 16 this. 17 MR. WISNER: Okay. Do you want to discuss it now or 18 would you like to not do that? 19 THE COURT: Sure. 20 MR. WISNER: So really there's five topics, 21 Your Honor. The first two are very related and they relate specifically to Monsanto's lobbying efforts after October of 22 23 2014, which is when we became -- we knew that IARC was going to investigate glyphosate. That's when everyone found out about 24 25 it. At least that's when Monsanto found out about it I should

say.

They relate to GBFs or glyphosate-based formulations and they relate to IARC specifically. I can give you a lot of background, but I'll just keep it very brief. These are all top -- this is -- we have a lot of documents by Monsanto to FTI Consulting. We actually describe some of those.

THE COURT: What's FTI Consulting?

MR. WISNER: It is the lobbying firm for Monsanto on Congress.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WISNER: And we have a lot of documents showing through them that Monsanto did certain things in light of IARC that I think are relevant even to general causation.

Specifically they got a congressman to write a letter threatening the NCI for not having published the HS data update and why haven't they and demanding that they do so by October 22nd. On that date, NCI submitted it for publication.

And so we want to explore exactly what communications, what conduct Monsanto's lobbyists did or did not do in sort of creating that effect. There was also a full congressional hearing aimed to defund IARC based upon a Reuters article that was -- actually we have the documents to support this -- that was largely not written but put together in a PowerPoint for Monsanto that was then published. That same Reuters article was the sole basis for the congressional hearings that accused

Dr. Blair of hiding data from its IARC panelists, and they threatened to defund it.

It actually required IARC to come and testify before

Congress, and it was stuff that actually has formed the basis

of some of our general causation briefing, specifically a

letter by Director Wild of IARC talking about what they did and

did not do vis-a-vis exposure, for example.

The conduct that Monsanto engaged in in response to the IARC monograph, both prior to its actual release and subsequent to it, goes directly to punitive damages. It goes to malicious intent and that's why we want to discover it.

Now, obviously, what testimony we get will be subject to admissibility decisions later; but for the purposes of discovery, we think we should be allowed to inquire into that.

So those are the first two topics, Your Honor. I'll just take them up -- I think you should -- it would be probably easier to respond topic by topic unless you want me to go through all of them.

THE COURT: Okay. So this would be topics 11 and 12 that we're talking about?

MR. WISNER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. STEKLOFF: Sure, Your Honor.

Just I want to give a little bit of background. We're talking about a notice that was issued of a 30(b)(6) witness.

There were 26 topics. It's Exhibit A to that in that notice.

During the meet and confer, the plaintiffs withdrew I believe five topics. So there were 21 topics left.

We have agreed to produce a corporate representative under Rule 30(b)(6) on 16 of those topics; and if you look at those topics in Exhibit A on which there's no dispute, they are very broad. I mean, they talk about the company's overall position on, you know, the science related to glyphosate and NHL. They talk about all of our regulatory interactions. So I want to give that context to try to show that this is a more narrow dispute.

With respect to these issues on Congress, I actually think that there's a lot of similarity. I know we'll talk about topics 19 and 26, but in some ways I think topics 11, 12, 19, and 26 all have a lot of overlap. They all involve plaintiffs' efforts to seek discovery about Monsanto's interactions with either government -- you know, Congress or other legislative bodies or with the media.

A few other sort of background points for Your Honor. I mean, Mr. Wisner and his colleagues are going to depose some fact witnesses before the Hardeman trial where we've agreed to produce witnesses, and I think that some of those witnesses are custodians on the documents that he's talking about. So my sense is that they will explore a lot of these topics through fact witnesses.

With respect to FTI, the third party that he referenced, he has served -- the plaintiffs have served a subpoena on FTI both seeking documents and a corporate representative from FTI to testify.

So there's a lot of other discovery going on on these issues. I mean, I think that -- you know, and so -- and absent sort of privilege issues that might come up, there is nothing precluding him from, for example, showing fact witnesses the documents that he referenced that have been produced in the litigation.

With respect to these topics, I think the danger of sort of opening -- our fundamental position really on topics 11, 12, 19, and 26 is that there have been a lot of -- there have been efforts -- and I'm not imputing anyone, but I am confident that the plaintiffs' attorneys have also had interactions with Congress, with governmental agencies, with European governmental agencies, with media, that they have been doing things. There have been promotional efforts on the Internet. If you look at topic 26, that they have been doing things in the media both through advocacy groups, through celebrities, through jurors in the Johnson case.

And I -- there's a goose/gander thing here, and I raised it with the plaintiffs during the meet and confer, which is there's no need to open up this can of worms because if they are entitled, for example, to a company witness deposition

about these topics --

THE COURT: I mean, I'll cut you off for a second to just say that I do not think -- I mean, if we were just having -- if this case was only about causation, I would probably say "No further discovery on this stuff."

But when it comes to punitive damages, it's not a goose/gander thing. I mean, there is a responsibility that Monsanto has to ensure that its product is safe and to the extent there are serious concerns about the safety of its product, Monsanto has a responsibility not to try to snuff out those concerns but to investigate them.

And it seems to me that documents or information that -- I know we're talking about a 30(b)(6) deposition -- documents or information that speak to these topics, these four topics -- you keep bracketing 18 so I guess we'll talk about that separately, but topic 11, 12, 19, and 26 -- it seems like those are potentially relevant to, you know, the question whether Monsanto should have been trying to snuff out concerns or, you know, investigate concerns in a more objective fashion.

And in saying what I'm saying I'm not casting any -- I'm not suggesting that I have an opinion either way about that, but it's an inquiry that it seems to me is relevant to the punitive damages part of the case.

So I'm going to allow topics 11, 12, 19, and 26.

What about topic 18?

MR. STEKLOFF: Can I make one comment --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STEKLOFF: -- on 11, 12, 19 and 26, which is that even punitive damages have to be relevant to the conduct associated with the plaintiffs; and certainly with respect to Mr. Hardeman but I think with respect to all three plaintiffs, they were all diagnosed with their NHL prior to the events that the plaintiffs are alleging took place.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEKLOFF: And so I think that that is a second problem, which is that, you know, for example, 26, things that were happening in the last, I don't know, six months in the San Francisco area have nothing to do even with punitive -- even -- have no bearing on punitives as it relates to these three plaintiffs, and I think that that is true with respect really actually to 11, 12, 19, and 26, because all of this conduct so far -- alleged conduct so far postdates their injury and the warnings that could have been given to them.

So I understand that if punitives are available, if it goes to the jury, that may occur, but that should be based on conduct tied to the allegations that relate to the plaintiffs' claims, and the plaintiffs' claims all predate that.

THE COURT: It strikes me that it's at least possible that they would be allowed to make an argument, "Look, they're still doing it. Even now they're still doing it." So I'm

allowing those four topics.

Obviously it's a separate issue whether anything discovered through that is admissible at trial, but I'm allowing those four topics.

Now, what about topic 18?

MR. WISNER: Topic 18, Your Honor, is a little different insofar as it involves something called "Let Nothing Go." It was a promotional scientific campaign, it's unclear exactly what it is, that was managed and supervised by people working out of St. Louis in Missouri for Monsanto; but it was, according to defense counsel's representations to me, it was limited to conduct in Europe. So that's their big objection, is that it relates to Europe and, therefore, is irrelevant to our case.

And our position is, well, no, if they're attacking IARC in Europe, that goes to the same exact issue as if it was done attacking the IARC from the U.S. And so while -- you know, I don't know what we'll learn, but it's reasonably calculated to lead to potentially admissible information. So I think asking questions about it, learning what the corporation has to say about it will give us an insight into answering this question.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I don't know anything about this "Let Nothing Go" campaign, but it seems to me that even aside from IARC, to the extent that Monsanto wants to argue, as I think it should have the right to do, "Look, how can you say

that our conduct is malicious when not only in the
United States have they approved it but in Europe, that place
where they're really careful, you know, the regulators have

You know, that even putting aside IARC, to the extent there is, you know -- there were efforts by Monsanto to sort of obtain that result in the face of evidence, you know, that that result shouldn't have been obtained, it seems to me that you would have the right to explore that.

But go ahead.

allowed glyphosate on the market?"

MR. STEKLOFF: I think this is more -- I think there is a relevance aspect to this. I also think there's just a proportionality argument here under Rule 26 --

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

MR. STEKLOFF: -- which is really -- again, my understanding is that this "Let Nothing Go," they describe it as a campaign, was taking place in Europe. They have -- one of their other topics --

THE COURT: What is the -- can you give me kind of a neutral description of what does "Let Nothing Go" mean?

MR. STEKLOFF: If I could, I would. I can give you a description -- so the topic 17, I think, was something called "Freedom to Operate," which is I think potentially -- I don't want to bind myself to this, but they asked for a 30(b)(6) representative about what they would describe as a "Freedom to

Operate" campaign.

MR. WISNER: I believe Monsanto describes it as that.

MR. STEKLOFF: Well, no, it's called "Freedom to Operate" within Monsanto, I'm not denying that, and we are producing a witness on that. That was a U.S. endeavor, and so I think it is -- I would describe it neutrally as an effort to put accurate science -- make sure that accurate science is being communicated about Monsanto's products.

Nothing precludes --

THE COURT: But "Let Nothing Go" means -- does it mean like respond to everything, don't let anything go unresponded to?

MR. STEKLOFF: I haven't talked to any company witnesses --

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. STEKLOFF: -- about "Let Nothing Go" to be able to tell you, Your Honor, so I don't want to try to be able to characterize it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEKLOFF: What I would say here is, again I have not looked at the documents myself but I've been told that there are documents of U.S.-based employees in which "Let Nothing Go" comes up. Even assuming, which I think is accurate, it is a European, to use their word, campaign, nothing precludes them from asking fact witnesses about those

documents, but we would now need to go get someone from Europe to come here potentially or have them go there.

We have a lot going on and so our position here was really under Rule 26, given that it -- even if it -- I'm not sure it's relevant to punitive damages here where they are asking lots of witnesses about what they were doing with IARC in the United States. What was happening in Europe I'm not sure is a central issue; but then when you throw in sort of I think the burden and the concept of proportionality under the Federal Rules, that was our position in asking them to consider withdrawing this and why we are raising it in front of Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WISNER: Just for the record, I will be in France for the Christmas holidays so if that makes anything easier on your end.

No, joking aside, Your Honor, I think proportionality argument sort of rings hollow when you actually listen to opposing counsel's comment. He doesn't even know what it is, and that's literally our problem. That's why we're conducting discovery, to learn what it was, to learn how it was used.

And I can't imagine this testimony would be longer than 15, 20 minutes. I have about 10, 15 documents at most that I could even conceivably use for this, and I just need to know what it is, and I need the testimony.

And it's an important distinction between a fact witness and Monsanto -- right? -- because in the Johnson case their big argument was Donna Farmer, Bill Heydens, all of the main witnesses that we've taken, none of them are managing agents, none of their conduct can be imputed to the corporation.

Okay. So give me the corporation and I'm going to ask about their conduct and let's see if you ratify it or not. And so in a "Let Nothing Go" context, I need the testimony from the corporate representative so it's binding on the corporation for trial.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll allow topic 18.

Anything else?

MR. STEKLOFF: I don't think the defense has any other agenda items, Your Honor.

MS. WAGSTAFF: Your Honor, nothing else from the plaintiffs. We will continue to meet and confer on the Hardeman discovery issues and submit a discovery letter by the end of the week if we need to.

THE COURT: Okay. Sounds good. So, good. That was fairly efficient.

You're going to get together, you're going to talk about putting together a more detailed pretrial schedule with deadlines, exchanges of this and that and the other thing. Do you want to come see us again in the month of December or would you rather be doing trial preparation?

(Counsel conferring.) 1 2 **THE COURT:** Or early January. MS. WAGSTAFF: All right. I'm told by my colleague 3 that we would like to put something on calendar and then cancel 4 5 it if we need to. THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to come --6 7 MS. WAGSTAFF: Because we only have 45 depos in the next two weeks. 8 THE COURT: 9 Right. MR. WISNER: One other request, Your Honor. 10 Wе 11 actually would request oral argument on the reverse bifurcation. 12 I'll let you know if I need it. 13 THE COURT: MR. WISNER: Okay. 14 15 MS. WAGSTAFF: So I would propose either the week 16 between Christmas and New Year's or the first week of January. 17 **THE COURT:** We can do the first week of January. 18 about --19 MS. WAGSTAFF: January 2nd? 20 THE COURT: I was going to suggest the 4th. 21 Let me see, what's that? Pretrial conference in what? 22 We could do the afternoon -- yeah, that's Morgovsky. 23 That's gone. And then, let's see here, I think we could probably do Thursday afternoon. We could do Friday. 24 25 MS. WAGSTAFF: The 3rd or 4th work for plaintiffs,

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I will note that Monsanto has their Daubert briefs
 1
     Your Honor.
     due on the 3rd so I don't know if they want to be traveling
 2
     that day.
 3
                         Oh, okay. I want to ask Gordon too.
              THE COURT:
 4
 5
                         (Pause in proceedings.)
                             The 4th works for Monsanto, Your Honor.
              MR. STEKLOFF:
 6
                          The 4th is better than the 3rd? Oh, you
 7
              THE COURT:
     said you have Daubert briefs.
 8
              MR. STEKLOFF: Our briefs are due on the 3rd and we
 9
     usually fly out the night before so there's no flight issues so
10
11
     the 4th might be safer.
              THE COURT: Okay. How about 10:30 a.m. on the 4th, or
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13
     would you prefer the afternoon?
              MR. STEKLOFF: The morning is better so we can try to
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15
     catch non-redeyes out.
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              THE COURT: All right. 10:30 a.m. on the 4th.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Great. Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. STEKLOFF: And, then, just to be clear, this is to
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19
     really focus on -- I mean, there might be other issues that
20
     come up, I recognize, but this is right now to focus on
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     pretrial scheduling and if we don't need it, we'll let
     Your Honor know?
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: Pretrial and also a lot of the
23
     discovery that Mr. Wisner was discussing is happening in
24
25
     January. So if there's any hiccups along the way, we can at
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least have a venue to bring them to your attention.
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              THE COURT: Sounds good.
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              MS. WAGSTAFF: All right.
 3
 4
              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. STEKLOFF: Thank you, Your Honor.
 5
              THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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                   (Proceedings adjourned at 3:58 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Saturday, December 8, 2018 DATE: g andergen Jo Ann Bryce, CSR No. 3321, RMR, CRR, FCRR U.S. Court Reporter