



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 28, 2025

Case No. FL-2022-00076

Dr. Sainath Suryanarayanan
U.S. Right to Know
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Dr. Suryanarayanan:

As we noted in our letter dated September 30, 2025, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State (“Department”) has identified an additional 20 responsive records subject to the FOIA. Upon review, we have determined that all 20 records may be released in part.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00076, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Avery Bullard

Avery Bullard
Supervisory Government Information Specialist
Litigation and Appeals Office

Enclosures: As stated.

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) and Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

Privacy Act Exemptions

- (d)(5) Information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding
- (j)(1) Information maintained by the CIA
- (j)(2) Enforcement of criminal law, including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals, except records of arrest
- (k)(1) Classified pursuant to E.O. 13526 in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
- (k)(2) Investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (k)(3) Regarding protective services to the President of the United States or other individual pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3056
- (k)(4) Required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records
- (k)(5) Investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his identity would be held in confidence
- (k)(6) Testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service, the disclosure of which would compromise the testing or examination process
- (k)(7) Evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services

From:	"Park, Christopher J" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	RE: New White Paper: Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on Covid-19 and Beyond
Date:	Thu, 22 Jul 2021 18:10:12 +0000

Thanks – good find.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, July 22, 2021 1:55 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: New White Paper: Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on Covid-19 and Beyond

Publication from CSIS, which mentions biosafety/biosecurity recommendations. Their recommendation on bs/bs includes initiating a domestic review of our own bs/bs practices and in the process encouraging other countries to conduct similar self-assessments (potentially using the BWC as a platform). (b)(5)

(b)(5) DPP

A Fresh Look at Biosafety and Biosecurity


The international debate over the origins of SARS-CoV-2 has intensified recently, with many scientific experts and political leaders at odds over the strength of the laboratory leak theory versus the natural spillover theory. At time of writing, many experts believe that both theories are plausible. Research to enhance pathogens has become increasingly common in both public and private laboratories around the world, creating more urgency for addressing the accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens from laboratories.

This creates an opportunity to reexamine the institutions, frameworks, and regulations that are currently in place to prevent the natural, accidental, and deliberate emergence of new pathogens with pandemic potential. Despite the intense geopolitical sensitivities that permeate this debate, there are concrete actions that the United States can take to achieve greater rigor and transparency in both domestic and global biosafety and biosecurity efforts.

The United States should initiate a domestic review of its biosafety and biosecurity practices. This should include an assessment of how the U.S. government funds and regulates the research of potential pandemic pathogens and what information is used to understand and weigh the relative risks and benefits of such research. This assessment should also include the review and publication of biosafety records at U.S. government-funded laboratories. This domestic review should conclude with recommendations for how the U.S. government can strengthen its own biosafety and biosecurity practices and regulations. Such an initiative would model the transparency that the United States expects other WHO-member states to practice in order to mitigate the risk of the accidental or deliberate release of potential pandemic pathogens from laboratory or research settings. The United States should also use international fora to encourage other countries to conduct similar self-

assessments and contribute to an extended international dialogue around best practices and data sharing. This should include an increased effort to build and expand biosafety workforce capacity in the United States and internationally, given the extreme demands that were placed on the biosafety workforce over the course of the pandemic. The 2021 Biological Weapons Review Conference provides one opportunity to initiate such a dialogue.

There are currently no clear established norms, protocols, guidelines, or designated institutional frameworks for the investigation of biological incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks with pandemic potential, accidental releases, and bioweapons. As seen in Wuhan, expert investigations of incidents can quickly encounter stark political barriers, and tensions surrounding the investigation can escalate steeply, casting scientific experts to the sidelines. The United States should make it a priority to form an international coalition—potentially comprised of countries, industry, international organizations, and academic institutions—to initiate a renewed dialogue over how to improve the global response investigation capacity for handling future biosecurity incidents, including how to create a neutral, protected space in which trusted international expert scientists are able to lead investigations, free of interference. The Nuclear Threat Initiative has begun exploring this issue in collaboration with key international partners and could be a valuable resource.



From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 5:22 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: New White Paper: Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on Covid-19 and Beyond

In this new white paper, the CSIS Commission on Strengthening America's Health Security urges the U.S. government to dramatically scale up its leadership in the global Covid-19 response.



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Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on COVID-19 and Beyond

[Read on CSIS.org](#)



We have entered a far more dangerous and uncertain phase of the pandemic, one that fundamentally changes the calculations of the United States. Variants and the egregious vaccine gap dominate the world's attention. It is encouraging that the U.S. government has recently taken several important steps to demonstrate leadership in addressing the global crisis. But many gaps and grave risks remain.

In a new white paper, [Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on COVID-19 and Beyond](#), the

CSIS Commission on Strengthening America's Health Security urges the U.S. government to dramatically scale up its leadership in the global Covid-19 response. The paper represents the majority consensus of the commissioners' sentiments, integrating the commission's extensive work over the past six months.

The commission calls on Congress and the administration to adopt the following recommendations to strengthen U.S. leadership in the international response and recovery efforts:

1. **White House Leadership:** The White House should establish a leadership structure that has the authority, gravitas, and mandate to bring together a coherent leadership team that spans the executive agencies.
2. **The Global Covid-19 Vaccine Crisis:** The United States should, building upon the July 1 framework, accelerate the development of a detailed strategy, with concrete milestones, to work with other countries and industry to achieve 70 percent vaccine coverage of LMICs by mid-2022.
3. **Finance for Pandemic Preparedness:** The United States should work assiduously with partners to establish an international financing mechanism that relies on existing institutions and that has a target of \$10 billion in financing per year over the next 5 to 10 years to underwrite the basic elements of pandemic preparedness in LMICs.
4. **The Economic Crisis:** The United States should systematically address the acute economic distress of LMICs.
5. **Build Long-Term Capacity:** The United States should invest in basic global health security and epidemic preparedness capacities, with special focus on primary health care and immunization; research and development; strengthening the World Health Organization; and biosafety and biosecurity.

[Read The White Paper Here](#)



CSIS | Center for Strategic & International Studies
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Washington, DC 20036

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
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Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	"Yu, Miles" (b)(6) state.gov>
To:	Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
CC:	Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19
Date:	Thu, 12 Mar 2020 15:18:09 +0000

Hi (b)(6)

The March 4 PD report is here: Screen shot:



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff (S/P)
Office of the Secretary
Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

From: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 11:07 AM
To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
(b)(6) Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Hi Miles,

Can you see if you can find this article sourcing?

Dr. Elnigar Iltebir

(b)(6)
National Security Council
The White House
Email: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

From: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 10:45 AM
To: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

In a key editorial on February 21 *People's Daily* said, "Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia, the WHO has repeatedly stated it does not recommend countries take any travel or trading restrictions and has called on countries to take convincing measures based on evidence. However, some countries still choose to ignore WHO's professional recommendations by taking excessive restrictive measures." *People's Daily* continued, "Such egoistic acts taken at the expense of others are not conducive to epidemic prevention and control. Rather, they have created panic, disrupted normal international exchanges and cooperation, and negatively affected global air transport market and the world economy."

On March 4 *People's Daily* issued a commentary titled, "The spread of coronavirus in the United States raises concern." In the commentary *People's Daily* highlights concerns over the nursing center in Washington State, public health officials' reactions in the U.S., and claims the U.S. administration acted slowing in testing potential COVID-19 cases.

From: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 7, 2020 7:49 PM

To: DL NSC Asia (b)(6)
Subject: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Dr. Elnigar Iltebir
(b)(6)
National Security Council
The White House
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Excellent cable from the Embassy Beijing team on positive, neutral, and negative narratives.

V/R,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
China Directorate, Global Engagement Center
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU



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Info Office: POL_INFO, MED_INFO, IMO_INFO, RSO_INFO, EXEC_INFO,
DAO_INFO, MGT_INFO, SCIENCE_INFO, ECON_INFO

MRN: 20 BEIJING 454
Date/DTG: Mar 06, 2020 / 060650Z MAR 20
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PROP, PGOV, PREL, ECON, KPAO, KMDR, KFLU, CN

Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) [20 Beijing 286](#)
B) [20 Beijing 442](#)
C) [20 Beijing 235](#)
Subject: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** The PRC propaganda authorities have used several different narrative approaches to news coverage, commentary, and descriptions of China's response to COVID-19. Ensuring that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PRC government are seen as responsive, in control, and winning against this fight are paramount in positive messages. These positive messages are mixed with neutral and negative messages as well. Neutral stories are more factual, sometimes feature World Health Organization (WHO) information, or describe action China has taken to address the epidemic. The negative stories and attribution of the blame outside of China is a shift as China seeks to rebrand itself as a global leader in the fight against COVID-19, rather than the country where it originated and spread. The COVID-19 virus continues to be intensely monitored and avidly discussed by China's active social media users. By countering negative and neutral PRC narratives with factual, transparent, and authentic information the U.S. Mission in China has successfully reached millions of Chinese netizens seeking information on COVID-19. **End Summary.**

Positive Narratives: China is in a Battle Against the Virus – and Will Win

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Chinese state-run media pushed out many positive narratives and messages about the PRC government and CCP response to COVID-19. These positive narratives continued from earlier in the month to focus on the PRC response to the crisis and how the CCP will win the battle against the epidemic. (Ref A). These positive narratives focused on how the CCP and PRC were responding, Xi's direct role in leading the response, how the PRC is working closely with the international community and with the WHO, and more broadly narratives that supported trust in the PRC response.

Xi Leads the Fight

3. (U) In February media outlets covered Xi's personal and direct engagement in combatting COVID-19 with photos of visits, CCTV coverage of Xi chairing leadership meetings on COVID-19 and focus on scientific research. By early March Chinese news outlets were widely amplifying Xi's direct engagement in combatting the epidemic. For example, on March 2, *Xinhua* covered Xi's visit to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and the School of Medicine at Tsinghua University in Beijing. *Xinhua* reported that Xi stressed coordination in advancing scientific research on COVID-19, and his interest in vaccines, anti-bodies, medicines and fast testing kits. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on March 2 titled, "Xi Jinping Urged Greater Efforts in Scientific Research on Novel Coronavirus Outbreak."

The CCP Cares – Leading Group for COVID 19 Response

4. (U) Media outlets have all widely amplified Premier Li Keqiang presiding over the leading group of China's COVID-19 response with multiple positive stories demonstrating how the PRC government and CCP are improving prevention and control, measures to care for staff working at the frontlines and how the central government and CCP have reacted at the most crucial moments to curb the spread of the epidemic. State-run media also pushed out daily updates with information on infection rates and new cases, with many outlets developing special landing pages or resources in online platforms to push out

real-time updates. Good news stories about the PRC response in sending medial teams, building hospitals and stable food supplies were continued.

Working Closely with International Community and Sharing Vital Information

5. (SBU) CCTV and other Chinese media outlets widely repeated praise from the WHO on China's "pragmatic and flexible anti-epidemic measures." *The Paper* reported on February 26, "After completing their nine-day inspection in China, WHO experts hailed China's unprecedented responses to COVID-19 and acknowledged China's role in protecting the international community and buying time for other countries to prepare for the outbreak. On the same day, UN General Secretary Guterres also recognized China's efforts to alleviate the negative impact of COVID-19 and its contributions to mankind. Chinese media said, these remarks from WHO and the United Nations truthfully reflect the aggressiveness, speed, and transparency with which China responded to the outbreak. *Guangming Daily* commented on February 26, "It is no exaggeration to say that China's resolute and powerful preventive and control measures, and its outstanding capabilities to lead, respond, organize, mobilize, and implement could not be achieved by other countries. The effectiveness of China's prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the CPC's leadership and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics."

China's Response Gave the Rest of the World Time

6. (U) *People's Daily* cited China's sense of responsibility in a February 22 op-ed saying, "the Chinese speed on the technical, resource, and infrastructure fronts saved precious time for the world to address the virus while limiting the number of countries affected to just 20. The Chinese practice established new benchmarks in global epidemic control, sharing information and working closely with the WHO and countries in an open, transparent, and responsible manner, inviting international experts and facilitating their visits to Wuhan and elsewhere." *Guangming Daily* opined on February 28, "the battle against COVID-19 is also a war to defend the world" and that China's response "demonstrates our major power's sense of responsibility." Many media outlets described China's response as "shrewd and courageous" and *Guangming Daily* said the lockdown of Wuhan minimized the spread of the virus to other countries. The op-ed claims China's "timely information sharing saved the world precious time to rise to the epidemic."

Neutral Narratives Still Promote PRC Goals

7. (SBU) More neutral narratives focused on the epidemic situation in Hubei and around China, as well as the complex issues surrounding the epidemic. Other topics including actions the PRC is taking on wild animals and markets, innovative and new responses to help combat COVID-19, stories about front line responders, and about other cities such as Beijing. Many of these neutral stories focused on actions that the PRC took to control the epidemic and commentary from official state-run outlets noted China's reaction and response can serve as a model for other countries.

New Innovations Help with Response

8. (SBU) Several Chinese outlets claimed the outbreak "unleashed innovation capacity." Articles cited AI, drones, big data platforms, and other new technologies as playing an important role in medical diagnosis, delivery of supplies, and meeting people's needs in maintaining a normal life during the crisis. (Ref B and C).

Beijing is Special

9. (U) The *Global Times* reported on February 27 that Beijing is facing mounting pressure in efforts to contain COVID-19 as new confirmed infections surged due to imported cases of infection and cluster outbreaks. Media reports said officials from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) confirmed that authorities made the capital the top priority of its epidemic prevention and control work, with measures matching those adopted in Hubei. A WeChat post from the CCP Party School on February 17 featured an article titled, "We Would Never Let Beijing Fail" and discussed the strict measures implemented in Beijing.

Trust PRC Information, Response, and Treatment

10. (SBU) The Chinese public has actively followed COVID-19 news, with special interest in stories from traditional and social media on what they can do to stay healthy, help their families, and learn from "trusted medical experts." The CCP leveraged medical experts with established credibility, such as Zhong Nanshan, the doctor to first publicly acknowledge SARS, to convey these messages and push official narratives (**Note:** However, many netizens continue to source information beyond the Firewall and compare statements from Chinese experts with the international community, including from U.S. CDC. In this information space, the U.S. Embassy continued to attract Chinese netizens seeking accurate and factual information with U.S. messages reaching millions. **End Note.**)

Negative Narratives – Move the Blame

11. (SBU) Negative narratives ranged from disinformation and conspiracy theories to questioning U.S. data and information on cases and transmission in the United States. Even in the midst of the crisis the official propaganda authorities, MFA spokesperson, and various state-run media organizations continued to critique the United States. Early stories talked about the U.S. "overreaction" and sending diplomats out of Wuhan, while more recent stories claimed the stock market changes in the United States were due to a panic over COVID-19 in the U.S. Other negative narratives compared COVID-19 to the flu, reacted angrily over naming conventions that linked COVID-19 to China or Wuhan, and claimed other international reactions were racist and unfair. As the epidemic spreads to more countries, these negative stories push the blame outside of China as the PRC seeks to rebrand itself as a global leader in the fight against COVID-19, rather than the country where it originated and spread.

U.S. Overreacts – Diplomatic Staff Are Safe, No Need for Bans

12. (SBU) The PRC response echoed in official media, social media, and from the MFA briefing podium negatively portrayed the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Wuhan, the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the city, and the departure of Mission China family members due to health concerns. China portrayed U.S. screening and travel restrictions as a "ban" on Chinese from traveling to the United States, calling the U.S. response "excessive." In a key editorial on February 21 *People's Daily* said, "Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia, the WHO has repeatedly stated it does not recommend countries take any travel or trading restrictions and has called on countries to take convincing measures based on evidence. However, some countries still choose to ignore WHO's professional recommendations by taking excessive restrictive measures." *People's Daily* continued, "Such egoistic acts taken at the expense of others are not conducive to epidemic prevention and control. Rather, they have created panic, disrupted normal international exchanges and cooperation, and negatively affected global air

transport market and the world economy.”

13. (U) *The Paper* on March 4 opined, “it’s worth noting that at the onset of the outbreak, the Trump administration was the first to evacuate expats from China and moved quickly to announce travel bans. As other countries followed suit, China was left hamstrung by what was effectively isolation, and its economy suffered. Had China decided to retaliate by banning all travel from and to the United States and imposing export controls on medical supplies such as masks and medicines, America would have been plunged into the hell of coronavirus.” *The Paper* concluded, “Despite the rhetoric of gloating U.S. politicians and attacks by racist U.S. media outlets, China chose not to take advantage of America’s plight. It’s ridiculous to demand an apology from China given the huge sacrifices the country has made. Instead, the United States should apologize to China for its wrong deeds, and the world is indebted to China for singlehandedly slowing the spread of the virus.

14. (SBU) Later when other countries added restrictions, *Xinhua* opined, “recently some countries have taken necessary border restrictive measures aimed at protecting the health and security of their citizens and foreigners as well as safeguarding regional and global public health security. As long as those measures are science-based, professional and appropriate, they can be understood and accepted.”

Show us the Money

15. (SBU) *The People’s Daily* in commentary on February 27 commented that while the U.S. Department of State announced it will provide \$100 million in aid to help China and other countries in their epidemic prevention efforts China has “yet to see actual actions.” The commentary said, compared to the U.S. government, U.S. businesses, friendly groups, and civil society organizations are much more active. CASS statistics show that the total aid from U.S. companies ranks first, far more than those from other countries. On Embassy accounts, many netizens continue to ask about the U.S. response to COVID-19, U.S. donations, and specifics on aid to China and to other countries to combat COVID-19.

Americans and Those that Doubt China are Doomed to Fail

16. (U) In early March, the CCP and official media outlets directly responded to critiques of China’s ability to weather the COVID-19 production impacts. American politicians that want companies to leave China are doomed to fail was one topline. While the PRC representative to the UN framed the story as “confident Beijing will meet economic goals despite virus.” The PRC argued, there is no replacement of China’s “highly refined, specialized, high-quality, and efficient supply chain.” Media outlets also linked the response to COVID-19 as another reason to trust China’s production saying China’s achievements in epidemic prevention provide confidence to resume production.” *The 21st Century Business Herald* in an editorial on February 2 said, “While it is natural for businesses to feel concerned, some American politicians and Western media that always want companies to leave China have taken this opportunity to promote a decoupling policy. But their move is doomed to fail.”

Is the U.S. Lying about COVID-19 Numbers in the United States.?

17. (SBU) Chinese media actively pushed questions about the accuracy in U.S. cases and reports of COVID-19 and the speed of the U.S. response. On March 2, the *Beijing News* featured a commentary opining the United States does not know the extent of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. The fact that

the U.S. stock market crashed indicates the market's misgivings about epidemic control outside of China, and lack of trust in the U.S. claimed Chinese media. In addition to official media coverage, Chinese netizens actively debated and discussed information on cases and response in the United States in late February and early March. On March 2, popular comments on *Weitianxia*, a prominent international news Weibo account operated by Sina discussed the CDC release of a COVID-19 patient and testing in the U.S. for COVID-19. The *Global Times* reported on February 27 that Chinese experts said the U.S. might not be able to effectively contain the outbreak of COVID-19, as the White House and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have different perspectives on the situation, and President Trump's priority is still the economic data and the presidential election.

18. (SBU) On March 4 *People's Daily* issued a commentary titled, "The spread of coronavirus in the United States raises concern." In the commentary *People's Daily* highlights concerns over the nursing center in Washington State, public health officials' reactions in the U.S., and claims the U.S. administration acted slowing in testing potential COVID-19 cases. Active debate and discussion on Weibo in February closely tracked and monitored news announcements in the U.S. on COVID-19 response and cases. On social media Chinese netizens criticized the U.S. CDC's measures, debating whether the U.S. system is up to the task of addressing the novel coronavirus outbreak, while also opining that Europe's decision to increase refugee admissions will further help the virus spread. As one Chinese netizen put it, "the 'glorified' countries, without exception, are caught in a panic."

Stock Market Decline Shows U.S. May Not Have Control

19. (U) The *Global Times* opined on February 27 that "panic driven by the possible spread of COVID-19 in the United States has sent the country's stock market plummeting for days." The *Global Times* said, "only actions to combat the virus, rather than words, can save the U.S. stock market from a meltdown and stop it from once again becoming the center of a global financial crisis." The *Global Times* claimed, the market selloff "revealed investor concerns over whether or not the U.S. can bring the situation under control, particularly as the U.S. CDC confirmed the country's first possible case of community transmission."

Debunking Conspiracy Theories with Rumors

20. (SBU) A key editorial published in *People's Daily* on February 28 claims although the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic first appeared in China, it did not necessarily originate in China. The editorial says in contrast to cautious scientists, some Western politicians and media have made rash assertions and even conjectured a so-called biochemical war to stigmatize China. *People's Daily* continues the drumbeat of "viruses know no borders" and says it is "everyone's duty to defeat ignorance with science, smash rumors with truth, resist prejudice with cooperation, and stop 'political viruses' such as conspiracy theories from causing chaos." Also in late February, Chinese media outlets all widely amplified well-known Chinese epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan saying the epidemic first appeared in China, but it may not have originated from China. This led to active discussions by netizens guessing that Zhong implied it came from the U.S. *Global Times* highlighted the origin story as well by amplifying a joint China-WHO report on February 29. Another popular online rumor that was widely circulated on Weibo and other social media platforms was that the U.S. was responsible for making the virus as either a bioweapon or a way to limit China's rise. While Chinese official media outlets debunked many of these rumors including that the CIA creating the virus, the conversations online were not quickly censored or limited which allowed many different conspiracy theories to circulate.

21. ~~(SBU)~~ **Comment:** Despite anger online and questions about who knew what when, and how the CCP and PRC central government responded, as well as what will be covered-up, the propaganda authorities have managed to maintain a decent level of control. Positive messages on China's response, neutral factual discussion, and negative rumors have all mixed together in official media and online discussions. The CCP central story line that there is a battle and the nation must mobilize to combat COVID-19 seems to continue to have wide popular support. As the virus spreads outside of China, the CCP will continue to paint a rosy picture of the PRC response and how PRC actions helped the world and are a model for China's authoritarian rule and controlled media environment. Anti-American sentiment stirred up by the CCP about U.S. actions were met with mixed results in China. Negative stories and seeking to reframe the COVID-19 story may be part of a global power competition where China is seeking to show that their model of response is effective while actively casting doubts on the U.S. and other open, democratic countries' response.

22. ~~(SBU)~~ In February, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing has posted nearly 75 times on Chinese social media platforms Weibo and WeChat about the COVID-19 virus reaching more than 34.5 million Chinese and generating more than 748,000 engagements, showing that some Chinese audiences are ready and willing to listen to fact-based, transparent reporting provided by the United States. The top post by engagement across Department of State properties the past month was the Embassy's February 8 post on Weibo about how the Department of State assisted in shipping nearly 17.8 tons of medical supplies to China.

23. ~~(SBU)~~ U.S. government messages have been effective in countering Chinese narratives – the Embassy translated and amplified information from the U.S. CDC with factual information on prevention, response, and definitions that have been widely read and discussed. The U.S. Embassy Weibo page was filled with debate between netizens about which viewpoint was right, and where information differed from official Chinese narratives. This is a chance for the U.S. to showcase transparency, admit if and when mistakes are made and lessons learned, and demonstrate that a democratic, federalist system can share information in an open and authentic way with citizens, local governments, and civil society alike to effectively prevent and respond to epidemics. **End Comment.**

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Signature: Branstad

Drafted By: BEIJING (b)(6)
Cleared By: ECON (b)(6) (Beijing)
 ESTH: (b)(6) (Beijing)
 CONS: (b)(6) (Beijing)
 PD: (b)(6) (Beijing)
 PD: (b)(6) (Beijing)
 (b)(6)
 POL (b)(6) (Beijing)
Approved By: PD: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Released By: BEIJING (b)(6) (Beijing)

Info: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*;
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; PACOM IDHS HONOLULU
 HI *ROUTINE*; DNI WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; DIA WASHINGTON

DC *ROUTINE*; CIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; DIRNSA FT GEORGE G
MEADE MD *ROUTINE*; NGA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CHINA POSTS
COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*

Action Post: NONE
Dissemination Rule: POL_INFO, MED_INFO, IMO, ECON, RSO, POL, IMO_INFO,
RSO_INFO, MGT_ACTION, PAS, SCIENCE, DAO_INFO,
SCIENCE_INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SBU~~

Sender:	"Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)> Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC < Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC

From:	"Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
CC:	Kanopathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19
Date:	Thu, 12 Mar 2020 18:31:05 +0000

No problem, Elnigar.

Here it is:

The U.S. Novel Coronavirus Outbreak Is Causing Concerns

Our correspondent in the United States, Zheng Qi

March 05, 2020 05:28 Source: People's Daily Online-People's Daily

In recent days, the number of confirmed cases and deaths of Novel Coronavirus in the United States has continued to rise, causing public concerns. According to CNN, as of midnight March 4, on the US Eastern Time, 125 cases of Novel Coronavirus and 9 deaths have been confirmed in the United States.

Currently, confirmed cases of Novel Coronavirus have occurred in 13 states in the United States, with the most severe outbreaks in the states of Washington and California on the west coast. The first case of unknown origin in the United States occurred in California. After the case appeared, US health experts analyzed that Novel Coronavirus may have spread to the communities within the United States, and public worries about the epidemic have risen.

All 9 deaths reported in the U.S. due to Novel Coronavirus have occurred in Washington state. An elderly care center in the state is considered to be at risk for cluster infections, with at least 5 deaths associated with the care center, and more than 50 staff members have developed suspected symptoms. Washington Governor Jay Inslee has declared the state of emergency on February 29, ordering state agencies to use "all necessary resources" to prevent and control the outbreak, and authorizing the use of the National Guard when necessary. To prevent the epidemic from spreading, Washington state has urgently closed at least 48 schools to disinfect the campuses. In addition to Washington state, Florida, which has three confirmed cases, has also declared a state of emergency.

The United States federal government has continued to strengthen its response to the epidemic for several days. On March 2, the White House urged pharmaceutical companies to accelerate vaccine development against the Novel Coronavirus. Prior to this, the White House had appointed Vice President Pence to coordinate the prevention and control of the Novel Coronavirus epidemic in the United States.

As the number of confirmed cases in the United States continues to increase, more public health experts have questioned the US government's earlier responses to the outbreak. Reuters recently quoted an expert's analysis as saying that the United States had not mobilized sufficient resources to improve the preparedness of the American communities to respond to the epidemic in the past few weeks in response to the epidemic.

Previously, nucleic acid testing of potentially infected cases was very slow in the United States. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed the New Coronavirus Nucleic Acid Detection Kit in early February and distributed it to local health departments urgently. However, these batches of kits were soon revealed to be defective and the results could not be read normally. Until last week, only a few states in the United States were able to carry out relevant tests, and the testing threshold was high. Most state and local health departments need to send test samples to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for processing, and wait for several days to obtain test results.

Last weekend, the US Food and Drug Administration urgently delegated authority to allow qualified hospital laboratories across the United States to develop and use their own test reagents. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has also changed the guidelines for the detection of the Novel Coronavirus and relaxed the testing standards. Many health experts worry that the current testing needs far outweigh the testing capacity, and because of the delay in the previous stage, there may already be many undetected cases of infection in the United States.

(Washington, DC, March 4th)

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff (S/P)
Office of the Secretary
Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

From: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 1:38 PM
To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Kanopathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
(b)(6); Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Thank you so much.

Sorry to keep bugging you. Is it possible to have the actual article in English? Would you be able to run what you sent in google translate and send us the article in a doc?

Rebecca was compiling it for us; I'm trying to figure out how to make it look like an article.

Dr. Elnigar Iltebir

Director for China and Mongolia
National Security Council
The White House

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 1:31 PM

To: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>

Cc: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)> Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

(b)(6)

Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Sorry, I was in a noon meeting.

Here it is:

"The Spread of Novel Coronavirus in the US Is Causing Concerns," the People's Daily, March 5, reported by Zheng Qi



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(o)

(c)

On Mar 12, 2020, at 12:51 PM, Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC <(b)(6)> wrote:

Thank you so much, Miles.

Actually it's the March 4 article, which needs to be in the footnote.

Dr. Elnigar Iltebir
Director for China and Mongolia
National Security Council
The White House

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 11:41 AM

To: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)> Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC

(b)(6)

Cc: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>; Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Ivan,

I am having problem finding the exact PD editorial for Feb 21. But here is the one for Feb. 20 that is very close to the verbiage in the cable. The title should read: "A Special Battle to Safeguard the Spirit of Civilizations—Fighting the Virus Cannot Be Separated from the Awareness of the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind"

"Fighting the Virus Cannot Be Separated from the Awareness of the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind" is a series of propaganda campaign, this is part 8 in the series.

Screen shot attached here:

<image001.png>

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff (S/P)

Office of the Secretary

Department of State

(b)(6)

(o)

(c)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) >

Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 11:26 AM

To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>

Cc: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>

Subject: RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Miles,

Could you translate the Title of the Feb 21 article for citation. Thanks!

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 11:21 AM

To: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Cc: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

(b)(6); Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

The link (not hyper) for the previous article,

<image002.png>

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff (S/P)

Office of the Secretary

Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

From: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 11:07 AM
To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
(b)(6); Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Hi Miles,

Can you see if you can find this article sourcing?

Dr. Elnigar Iltebir
Director for China and Mongolia
National Security Council
The White House
Email: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

From: Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 10:45 AM
To: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

In a key editorial on February 21 *People's Daily* said, "Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia, the WHO has repeatedly stated it does not recommend countries take any travel or trading restrictions and has called on countries to take convincing measures based on evidence. However, some countries still choose to ignore WHO's professional recommendations by taking excessive restrictive measures." *People's Daily* continued, "Such egoistic acts taken at the expense of others are not conducive to epidemic prevention and control. Rather, they have created panic, disrupted normal international exchanges and cooperation, and negatively affected global air transport market and the world economy."

On March 4 *People's Daily* issued a commentary titled, "The spread of coronavirus in the United States raises concern." In the commentary *People's Daily* highlights concerns over the nursing center in Washington State, public health officials' reactions in the U.S., and claims the U.S. administration acted slowing in testing potential COVID-19 cases.

From: Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 7, 2020 7:49 PM
To: DL NSC Asia (b)(6)
Subject: ICYM: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Dr. Elnigar Iltebir
Director for China and Mongolia
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Embassy Beijing: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

Excellent cable from the Embassy Beijing team on positive, neutral, and negative narratives.

V/R,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

China Directorate, Global Engagement Center
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)@state.gov

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UNCLASSIFIED

~SBU



Action Office: IMO, ECON, RSO, POL, MGT, PAS, SCIENCE
Info Office: POL_INFO, MED_INFO, IMO_INFO, RSO_INFO, EXEC_INFO,
DAO_INFO, MGT_INFO, SCIENCE_INFO, ECON_INFO

MRN: 20 BEIJING 454
Date/DTG: Mar 06, 2020 / 060650Z MAR 20
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PROP, PGOV, PREL, ECON, KPAO, KMDR, KFLU, CN
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 20 Beijing 286
B) 20 Beijing 442
C) 20 Beijing 235
Subject: PRC Narratives of COVID-19

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** The PRC propaganda authorities have used several different narrative approaches to news coverage, commentary, and descriptions of China's response to COVID-19. Ensuring that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PRC government are seen as responsive, in control, and winning against this fight are paramount in positive messages. These positive messages are mixed with neutral and negative messages as well. Neutral stories are more factual, sometimes feature World Health Organization (WHO) information, or describe action China has taken to address the epidemic. The negative stories and attribution of the blame outside of China is a shift as China seeks to rebrand itself as a global leader in the fight against COVID-19, rather than the country where it originated and spread. The COVID-19 virus continues to be intensely monitored and avidly discussed by China's active social media users. By countering negative and neutral PRC narratives with factual, transparent, and authentic information the U.S. Mission in China has successfully reached millions of Chinese netizens seeking information on COVID-19. **End Summary.**

Positive Narratives: China is in a Battle Against the Virus – and Will Win

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Chinese state-run media pushed out many positive narratives and messages about the PRC government and CCP response to COVID-19. These positive narratives continued from earlier in the month to focus on the PRC response to the crisis and how the CCP will win the battle against the epidemic. (Ref A). These positive narratives focused on how the CCP and PRC were responding, Xi's direct role in leading the response, how the PRC is working closely with the international community and with the WHO, and more broadly narratives that supported trust in the PRC response.

Xi Leads the Fight

3. (U) In February media outlets covered Xi's personal and direct engagement in combatting COVID-19 with photos of visits, CCTV coverage of Xi chairing leadership meetings on COVID-19 and focus on scientific research. By early March Chinese news outlets were widely amplifying Xi's direct engagement in combatting the epidemic. For example, on March 2, *Xinhua* covered Xi's visit to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and the School of Medicine at Tsinghua University in Beijing. *Xinhua* reported that Xi stressed coordination in advancing scientific research on COVID-19, and his interest in vaccines, anti-bodies, medicines and fast testing kits. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on March 2 titled, "Xi Jinping Urged Greater Efforts in Scientific Research on Novel Coronavirus Outbreak."

The CCP Cares – Leading Group for COVID 19 Response

4. (U) Media outlets have all widely amplified Premier Li Keqiang presiding over the leading group of China's COVID-19 response with multiple positive stories demonstrating how the PRC government and CCP are improving prevention and control, measures to care for staff working at the frontlines and how the central government and CCP have reacted at the most crucial moments to curb the spread of the epidemic. State-run media also pushed out daily updates with information on infection rates and new cases, with many outlets developing special landing pages or resources in online platforms to push out real-time updates. Good news stories about the PRC response in sending medical teams, building hospitals and stable food supplies were continued.

Working Closely with International Community and Sharing Vital Information

5. (SBU) CCTV and other Chinese media outlets widely repeated praise from the WHO on China's "pragmatic and flexible anti-epidemic measures." *The Paper* reported on February 26, "After completing their nine-day inspection in China, WHO experts hailed China's unprecedented responses to COVID-19 and acknowledged China's role in protecting the international community and buying time for other countries to prepare for the outbreak. On the same day, UN General Secretary Guterres also recognized China's efforts to alleviate the negative impact of COVID-19 and its contributions to mankind. Chinese media said, these remarks from WHO and the United Nations truthfully reflect the aggressiveness, speed, and transparency with which China responded to the outbreak. *Guangming Daily* commented on February 26, "It is no exaggeration to say that China's resolute and powerful preventive and control measures, and its outstanding capabilities to lead, respond, organize, mobilize, and implement could not be achieved by other countries. The effectiveness of China's prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the CPC's leadership and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics."

China's Response Gave the Rest of the World Time

6. (U) *People's Daily* cited China's sense of responsibility in a February 22 op-ed saying, "the Chinese speed on the technical, resource, and infrastructure fronts saved precious time for the world to address the virus while limiting the number of countries affected to just 20. The Chinese practice established new benchmarks in global epidemic control, sharing information and working closely with the WHO and countries in an open, transparent, and responsible manner, inviting international experts and facilitating their visits to Wuhan and elsewhere." *Guangming Daily* opined on February 28, "the battle against COVID-19 is also a war to defend the world" and that China's response "demonstrates our major power's sense of responsibility." Many media outlets described China's response as "shrewd and courageous" and *Guangming Daily* said the lockdown of Wuhan minimized the spread of the virus to other countries. The op-ed claims China's "timely information sharing saved the world precious time to rise to the epidemic."

Neutral Narratives Still Promote PRC Goals

7. (SBU) More neutral narratives focused on the epidemic situation in Hubei and around China, as well as the complex issues surrounding the epidemic. Other topics including actions the PRC is taking on wild animals and markets, innovative and new responses to help combat COVID-19, stories about front line responders, and about other cities such as Beijing. Many of these neutral stories focused on actions that the PRC took to control the epidemic and commentary from official state-run outlets noted China's reaction and response can serve as a model for other countries.

New Innovations Help with Response

8. (SBU) Several Chinese outlets claimed the outbreak "unleashed innovation capacity." Articles cited AI, drones, big data platforms, and other new technologies as playing an important role in medical diagnosis, delivery of supplies, and meeting people's needs in maintaining a normal life during the crisis. (Ref B and C).

Beijing is Special

9. (U) The *Global Times* reported on February 27 that Beijing is facing mounting pressure in efforts to contain COVID-19 as new confirmed infections surged due to imported cases of infection and cluster

outbreaks. Media reports said officials from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) confirmed that authorities made the capital the top priority of its epidemic prevention and control work, with measures matching those adopted in Hubei. A WeChat post from the CCP Party School on February 17 featured an article titled, "We Would Never Let Beijing Fail" and discussed the strict measures implemented in Beijing.

Trust PRC Information, Response, and Treatment

10. (SBU) The Chinese public has actively followed COVID-19 news, with special interest in stories from traditional and social media on what they can do to stay healthy, help their families, and learn from "trusted medical experts." The CCP leveraged medical experts with established credibility, such as Zhong Nanshan, the doctor to first publicly acknowledge SARS, to convey these messages and push official narratives (**Note:** However, many netizens continue to source information beyond the Firewall and compare statements from Chinese experts with the international community, including from U.S. CDC. In this information space, the U.S. Embassy continued to attract Chinese netizens seeking accurate and factual information with U.S. messages reaching millions. **End Note.**)

Negative Narratives – Move the Blame

11. (SBU) Negative narratives ranged from disinformation and conspiracy theories to questioning U.S. data and information on cases and transmission in the United States. Even in the midst of the crisis the official propaganda authorities, MFA spokesperson, and various state-run media organizations continued to critique the United States. Early stories talked about the U.S. "overreaction" and sending diplomats out of Wuhan, while more recent stories claimed the stock market changes in the United States were due to a panic over COVID-19 in the U.S. Other negative narratives compared COVID-19 to the flu, reacted angrily over naming conventions that linked COVID-19 to China or Wuhan, and claimed other international reactions were racist and unfair. As the epidemic spreads to more countries, these negative stories push the blame outside of China as the PRC seeks to rebrand itself as a global leader in the fight against COVID-19, rather than the country where it originated and spread.

U.S. Overreacts – Diplomatic Staff Are Safe, No Need for Bans

12. (SBU) The PRC response echoed in official media, social media, and from the MFA briefing podium negatively portrayed the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Wuhan, the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the city, and the departure of Mission China family members due to health concerns. China portrayed U.S. screening and travel restrictions as a "ban" on Chinese from traveling to the United States, calling the U.S. response "excessive." In a key editorial on February 21 *People's Daily* said, "Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia, the WHO has repeatedly stated it does not recommend countries take any travel or trading restrictions and has called on countries to take convincing measures based on evidence. However, some countries still choose to ignore WHO's professional recommendations by taking excessive restrictive measures." *People's Daily* continued, "Such egoistic acts taken at the expense of others are not conducive to epidemic prevention and control. Rather, they have created panic, disrupted normal international exchanges and cooperation, and negatively affected global air transport market and the world economy."

13. (U) *The Paper* on March 4 opined, "it's worth noting that at the onset of the outbreak, the Trump administration was the first to evacuate expats from China and moved quickly to announce travel bans. As other countries followed suit, China was left hamstrung by what was effectively isolation, and

its economy suffered. Had China decided to retaliate by banning all travel from and to the United States and imposing export controls on medical supplies such as masks and medicines, America would have been plunged into the hell of coronavirus." *The Paper* concluded, "Despite the rhetoric of gloating U.S. politicians and attacks by racist U.S. media outlets, China chose not to take advantage of America's plight. It's ridiculous to demand an apology from China given the huge sacrifices the country has made. Instead, the United States should apologize to China for its wrong deeds, and the world is indebted to China for singlehandedly slowing the spread of the virus.

14. (SBU) Later when other countries added restrictions, *Xinhua* opined, "recently some countries have taken necessary border restrictive measures aimed at protecting the health and security of their citizens and foreigners as well as safeguarding regional and global public health security. As long as those measures are science-based, professional and appropriate, they can be understood and accepted."

Show us the Money

15. (SBU) The *People's Daily* in commentary on February 27 commented that while the U.S. Department of State announced it will provide \$100 million in aid to help China and other countries in their epidemic prevention efforts China has "yet to see actual actions." The commentary said, compared to the U.S. government, U.S. businesses, friendly groups, and civil society organizations are much more active. CASS statistics show that the total aid from U.S. companies ranks first, far more than those from other countries. On Embassy accounts, many netizens continue to ask about the U.S. response to COVID-19, U.S. donations, and specifics on aid to China and to other countries to combat COVID-19.

Americans and Those that Doubt China are Doomed to Fail

16. (U) In early March, the CCP and official media outlets directly responded to critiques of China's ability to weather the COVID-19 production impacts. American politicians that want companies to leave China are doomed to fail was one topline. While the PRC representative to the UN framed the story as "confident Beijing will meet economic goals despite virus." The PRC argued, there is no replacement of China's "highly refined, specialized, high-quality, and efficient supply chain." Media outlets also linked the response to COVID-19 as another reason to trust China's production saying China's achievements in epidemic prevention provide confidence to resume production." The *21st Century Business Herald* in an editorial on February 2 said, "While it is natural for businesses to feel concerned, some American politicians and Western media that always want companies to leave China have taken this opportunity to promote a decoupling policy. But their move is doomed to fail."

Is the U.S. Lying about COVID-19 Numbers in the United States.?

17. (SBU) Chinese media actively pushed questions about the accuracy in U.S. cases and reports of COVID-19 and the speed of the U.S. response. On March 2, the *Beijing News* featured a commentary opining the United States does not know the extent of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. The fact that the U.S. stock market crashed indicates the market's misgivings about epidemic control outside of China, and lack of trust in the U.S. claimed Chinese media. In addition to official media coverage, Chinese netizens actively debated and discussed information on cases and response in the United States in late February and early March. On March 2, popular comments on *Weitianxia*, a prominent international news Weibo account operated by Sina discussed the CDC release of a COVID-19 patient

and testing in the U.S. for COVID-19. The *Global Times* reported on February 27 that Chinese experts said the U.S. might not be able to effectively contain the outbreak of COVID-19, as the White House and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have different perspectives on the situation, and President Trump's priority is still the economic data and the presidential election.

18. ~~(SBU)~~ On March 4 *People's Daily* issued a commentary titled, "The spread of coronavirus in the United States raises concern." In the commentary *People's Daily* highlights concerns over the nursing center in Washington State, public health officials' reactions in the U.S., and claims the U.S. administration acted slowing in testing potential COVID-19 cases. Active debate and discussion on Weibo in February closely tracked and monitored news announcements in the U.S. on COVID-19 response and cases. On social media Chinese netizens criticized the U.S. CDC's measures, debating whether the U.S. system is up to the task of addressing the novel coronavirus outbreak, while also opining that Europe's decision to increase refugee admissions will further help the virus spread. As one Chinese netizen put it, "the 'glorified' countries, without exception, are caught in a panic."

Stock Market Decline Shows U.S. May Not Have Control

19. (U) The *Global Times* opined on February 27 that "panic driven by the possible spread of COVID-19 in the United States has sent the country's stock market plummeting for days." The *Global Times* said, "only actions to combat the virus, rather than words, can save the U.S. stock market from a meltdown and stop it from once again becoming the center of a global financial crisis." The *Global Times* claimed, the market selloff "revealed investor concerns over whether or not the U.S. can bring the situation under control, particularly as the U.S. CDC confirmed the country's first possible case of community transmission."

Debunking Conspiracy Theories with Rumors

20. ~~(SBU)~~ A key editorial published in *People's Daily* on February 28 claims although the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic first appeared in China, it did not necessarily originate in China. The editorial says in contrast to cautious scientists, some Western politicians and media have made rash assertions and even conjectured a so-called biochemical war to stigmatize China. *People's Daily* continues the drumbeat of "viruses know no borders" and says it is "everyone's duty to defeat ignorance with science, smash rumors with truth, resist prejudice with cooperation, and stop 'political viruses' such as conspiracy theories from causing chaos." Also in late February, Chinese media outlets all widely amplified well-known Chinese epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan saying the epidemic first appeared in China, but it may not have originated from China. This led to active discussions by netizens guessing that Zhong implied it came from the U.S. *Global Times* highlighted the origin story as well by amplifying a joint China-WHO report on February 29. Another popular online rumor that was widely circulated on Weibo and other social media platforms was that the U.S. was responsible for making the virus as either a bioweapon or a way to limit China's rise. While Chinese official media outlets debunked many of these rumors including that the CIA creating the virus, the conversations online were not quickly censored or limited which allowed many different conspiracy theories to circulate.

21. ~~(SBU)~~ **Comment:** Despite anger online and questions about who knew what when, and how the CCP and PRC central government responded, as well as what will be covered-up, the propaganda authorities have managed to maintain a decent level of control. Positive messages on China's response, neutral factual discussion, and negative rumors have all mixed together in official media and online discussions. The CCP central story line that there is a battle and the nation must mobilize to

combat COVID-19 seems to continue to have wide popular support. As the virus spreads outside of China, the CCP will continue to paint a rosy picture of the PRC response and how PRC actions helped the world and are a model for China’s authoritarian rule and controlled media environment. Anti-American sentiment stirred up by the CCP about U.S. actions were met with mixed results in China. Negative stories and seeking to reframe the COVID-19 story may be part of a global power competition where China is seeking to show that their model of response is effective while actively casting doubts on the U.S. and other open, democratic countries’ response.

22. (SBU) In February, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing has posted nearly 75 times on Chinese social media platforms Weibo and WeChat about the COVID-19 virus reaching more than 34.5 million Chinese and generating more than 748,000 engagements, showing that some Chinese audiences are ready and willing to listen to fact-based, transparent reporting provided by the United States. The top post by engagement across Department of State properties the past month was the Embassy’s February 8 post on Weibo about how the Department of State assisted in shipping nearly 17.8 tons of medical supplies to China.

23. (SBU) U.S. government messages have been effective in countering Chinese narratives – the Embassy translated and amplified information from the U.S. CDC with factual information on prevention, response, and definitions that have been widely read and discussed. The U.S. Embassy Weibo page was filled with debate between netizens about which viewpoint was right, and where information differed from official Chinese narratives. This is a chance for the U.S. to showcase transparency, admit if and when mistakes are made and lessons learned, and demonstrate that a democratic, federalist system can share information in an open and authentic way with citizens, local governments, and civil society alike to effectively prevent and respond to epidemics. **End Comment.**

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Signature: Branstad

Drafted By: BEIJING (b)(6)
Cleared By: ECON: (b)(6) (Beijing)
 ESTH (b)(6) (Beijing)
 CONS (b)(6) (Beijing)
 PD (b)(6) (Beijing)
 PD (b)(6) (Beijing)
 (b)(6)
 POL: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Approved By: PD: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Released By: BEIJING (b)(6) (Beijing)
Info: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*;
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI *ROUTINE*;
 DNI WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; DIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*;
 CIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD *ROUTINE*;
 NGA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*

Action Post: NONE

Dissemination Rule: POL_INFO, MED_INFO, IMO, ECON, RSO, POL, IMO_INFO, RSO_INFO, MGT_ACTION, PAS, SCIENCE, DAO_INFO, SCIENCE_INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SBU~~

Sender:	"Yu, Miles" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Recipient:	Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC <[(b)(6)]> Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC [(b)(6)] Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC [(b)(6)] Feinberg, Rebecca P. EOP/NSC [(b)(6)]

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FW: PRC Officials and Media Continue Challenging Consensus on Chinese Origin of COVID-19
Date: Fri, 25 Dec 2020 01:09:07 +0000

Some comments.

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 24, 2020 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FW: PRC Officials and Media Continue Challenging Consensus on Chinese Origin of COVID-19

All

Ive included comments and some changes. I think this needs to get into interagency clearance asap. (b)(5) DPP
 (b)(5) DPP

Thanks

TD

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 11:50 AM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: FW: PRC Officials and Media Continue Challenging Consensus on Chinese Origin of COVID-19

Good Morning,

Attached is a revised version of the cable with updates from (b) and myself. (b)(5) DPP
 (b)(5) DPP (b)(6) (b)(5) DPP
 (b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

(b)(6) Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 8:46 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: FW: PRC Officials and Media Continue Challenging Consensus on Chinese Origin of COVID-19

Thanks (b)(6) - (b)(5) DPP We should use this to update.

Thanks

TD

On December 22, 2020 at 8:34:17 AM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

FYI, relevant cable just in from Beijing.

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

(b)(6) Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: SMART Core <svcsmartbtsewshprec2@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 6:38 AM
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: PRC Officials and Media Continue Challenging Consensus on Chinese Origin of COVID-19

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SBU~~



Info Office: STAFF

MRN: 20 BEIJING 2448
Date/DTG: Dec 22, 2020 / 221134Z DEC 20
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: TSPL, PGOV, PREL, SENV, SHLH, TBIO, TPHY, FDA, HHS, CDC, WHO, NIH, NSF, CN
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) [20 Beijing 894](#)
 B) [20 Geneva 964](#)
 C) [20 Beijing 2226](#)
 D) [20 Beijing 2206](#)
 E) [20 Beijing 1778](#)
Subject: PRC Officials and Media Continue Challenging Consensus on Chinese Origin of COVID-19


1. (~~SBU~~) Summary: PRC media coverage and statements by MFA officials continue to undermine the scientific origin of COVID-19 by highlighting scientifically questionable studies purporting to show a non-Chinese origin for the virus. Contacts add that PRC data management regulations have had a chilling effect on the willingness of Chinese researchers to share data with foreign partners, and PRC government agencies' and universities' screening of COVID-related research to ensure "quality" is limiting the release of data and research. PRC scientists studying COVID-19 origin in the field are seeking permission to conduct their research. Interlocutors also believe Chinese scientists will self-censor in their interactions with foreign investigators, for instance during a planned upcoming visit by WHO-affiliated researchers, given the sensitivity of the topic.

origin issue and the PRC government's clear promotion of a non-PRC-origin narrative. Contacts assess that PRC doubt on the origin of the virus may reduce the likelihood China will undertake reforms that could prevent future related to disease surveillance and zoonotic spillover. End Summary.

PRC Media Pushes Narrative Suggesting Foreign Origin of COVID-19

2. ~~(SBU)~~ PRC state-controlled traditional and social media continue to push a narrative questioning the origin of early as May 11, state broadcaster CCTV suggested the virus may have been circulating in the United States prior. Over the past several months, PRC authorities have attributed the majority of COVID-19 outbreaks in the country to the State Council in early-November issued guidance requiring disinfection, testing, and traceability for all imported products. State media subsequently speculated that the source of the Wuhan outbreak could have been imported (202226). (Note: To-date, there have been no internationally peer-reviewed study supporting the hypothesis that the virus spread through the cold chain. Nevertheless, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention official says it is convinced bringing COVID-19 into the PRC and causing local infections, and PRC scientific studies supporting this conclusion submitted for peer review and publication in journals including The Lancet and The New England Journal of Medicine.)

3. ~~(SBU)~~ State-run media over the past few weeks has also seized on four studies to push the narrative that while reported publicly by the PRC, it may have originated elsewhere. On November 16, Global Times – a strongly nationalistic daily – reported that the University of Barcelona may have found the virus in local sewage samples from March. State media outlet Xinhua cited a study from Italy that claimed to identify antibodies in blood samples drawn from September 2020 that were similar to antibodies found in COVID-19 patients. (Note: The global scientific community has dismissed these studies as scientifically unsound, noting for example, that antibodies found in samples could be attributable to other coronaviruses.) In a November 30 editorial, The Paper – a for-profit, high-profile, and influential domestic Chinese media outlet – cited a pre-print study from the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Neuroscience that suggests the first COVID-19 infection occurred in India. This study was subsequently withdrawn from The Lancet's pre-print website. On December 2, Global Times cited a World Health Organization (WHO) study that concluded SARS-CoV-2 infections may have occurred in Wuhan in December 2019 in order to suggest the virus originated outside of China, and the PRC may have been the "whistle-blower" of the pandemic. Meanwhile, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have echoed the state-run media narrative for months. In March, MFA Spokesperson Zhao Lijian posted on social media theorizing that COVID-19 was carried to Wuhan during the World Military Games. Most recently, on November 30, MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that "the virus may have originated in multiple places at different dates," referring to locations outside of the PRC.



On December 16, Global Times, a strongly nationalistic commercial daily published the above “outbreak time” “WHO Team to Study Virus Jump to Human” <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/121017>

4. (SBU) Across Chinese social media platforms, a number of foreign origin COVID-19 narratives gained particular traction, with some hashtags approaching nearly one billion views and 70,000 engagements on Weibo, as of December 18 (see selected examples below). Most of the hashtags are hosted by premier flagship PRC media outlets, including CCTV News and People’s Daily, which lend significant credence in the eyes of Chinese netizens to the storylines being promoted.

Table 1.

Date of Hashtag Registration	Number of Views (as of Dec. 18)	Number of Engagements (as of Dec. 18)	Hashtag (Chinese)	Hashtag (English)
June 27, 2020	420 million	36,000	<u>#西班牙从去年3月废水中检出新冠病毒#</u>	#Spain detected novel coronavirus in wastewater dating back to March 2019#
December 10, 2020	180 million	10,000	<u>#意大利一儿童去年11月已感染新冠#</u>	#Child in Italy was

				already infected with COVID-19 last November#
October 21, 2020	150 million	7,314	<u>#德特里克堡病毒#</u> <u>#外交部对美国生物实验室七连问#</u>	#Fort Detrick Virus# #Seven Questions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the U. S. Biological Laboratory#
December 04, 2020	140 million	6,430	<u>#很多美国网友称去年12月已感染新冠#</u>	#Many U. S. netizens said they were already infected with COVID-19 last December#
November 12, 2020	85 million	9,979	<u>#吴尊友称冷链进口产品或为我国疫情源头#</u>	#Wu Zunyou, China CDC' s chief epidemiologist said imported cold-chain products may have been the origin of China' s outbreak#

Restrictions on Scientists and Media Attention Reduce Chances for Thorough and Transparent Investigation

5. (SBU) A local media sector contact with ties to PRC health authorities noted the Ministry of Science and Technology screening research papers related to the COVID-19 in its role leading the PRC's own investigation into the origin. A relatively large number of domestic grants funding COVID origin work in the PRC, fewer published papers have been expected, according to our contact, and some data (including on animal sampling) was published only after months. Academic sector contacts opined that while PRC authorities say screening of papers is meant to keep bad science out, officials can also use the process to suppress "inconvenient science" and limit access to information to small, ap

and senior officials. In addition to the barriers to data access and transparency posed by screening processes for State Council's vaguely-worded 2018 Guidelines on Scientific Data Management have also had a chilling effect on Chinese scientists to share domestic PRC data with international collaborators, even when doing so does not teel

6. ~~(SBU)~~ A PRC scientist studying bat coronaviruses in southwest China, who collected SARS-CoV-2-like virus in the region in 2019, said that after an increased number of researchers arrived in the region in early 2020, "things have changed." Although the researcher is continuing to sample wild animals, now government permission is required prior to travel to conduct field research.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ With respect to the proposed WHO team that will travel to the PRC to investigate the origin of the virus on December 21 in Beijing, team members had not received PRC visas and Chinese authorities had not provided a schedule for any meetings or activities. Given the PRC's quarantine requirements and the dates of the Lunar New Year, it was expected they would be on the ground in Wuhan for as few as 10-days, assuming an early-January arrival in China. Our interlocutors on the WHO team, believed PRC researchers permitted to speak with the team will exhibit a high degree of self-censorship in China of the COVID origin issue and the PRC government's clear promotion of a non-PRC-origin narrative. While we reported recently that a WHO team would arrive in China in early-January, the Global Times published an article that COVID-19 originated outside China. Expectations for the WHO team's visit should be calibrated according to the successful outcome of the trip, they argued, would be one in which the PRC agrees to a specific series of subsequent steps to further advance the scientific inquiry into the virus's origin.

PRC's Focus on Alternate Origin Distracts from Pandemic Prevention Reforms

8. ~~(SBU)~~ NGO and academic contacts shared that while PRC officials were initially interested following the outbreak in taking action to prevent future zoonotic spillover events, attention has now shifted to calling into question the origin of the virus (Beijing 2206). One top expert from a large conservation NGO commented that "while in February and March there was a lot of zoonotic disease, now there's none" and "average Chinese now don't think that COVID-19 came from wild animals." Comments from likeminded embassies added that PRC officials have grown less receptive in recent months to reforms that would improve the approach and could prevent future pandemics. (Note: "One Health" refers to a global multidisciplinary approach to health outcomes that includes the interconnection between people, animals, and the environment. End Note.)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Signature: FORDEN

Drafted By: BEIJING: [REDACTED] (b)(6) (Beijing)

Cleared By: HHS/CDC [REDACTED] (b)(6) (Beijing)

POL [REDACTED] (b)(6) (Beijing)

PD [REDACTED] (b)(6) (Beijing)

Approved By: ESTH [REDACTED] (b)(6) (Beijing)

Released By: AMEMBASSY BEIJING: [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Info: WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; PACOM IDHS

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5) DPP

From:	[REDACTED]@state.gov>
To:	[REDACTED]@state.gov>
CC:	Park, Christopher J [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings
Date:	Tue, 16 Mar 2021 17:21:51 +0000

Thanks, [REDACTED] - these look good. [REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP
[REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP [REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP
[REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP

[REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 1:12 PM
To: [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

Hi,

I wanted you to see the changes [REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP

From: Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:56 PM
To: [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

[REDACTED] (b)(5) DPP

From: [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:52 PM
To: Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

Good catches.

(b)(5) DPP

From: Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:25 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

(b)(6)

Here is one of the two I was waiting on. Will send the other once I get it. Minor comments/edits.

Stockton

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:16 PM
To: Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

Just grateful that you have found this time for this one. Sorry to torture you on all fronts.

From: Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:12 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

Hold on. I may have sent this back too soon. Just heard from the (b)(5) DPP who may have comments. Hold tight.

From: Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:06 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; D/EUR Duty Officer 2 <DDutyOfficer2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

(b)(6)

Attached are a (b)(5) DPP

Thanks,
Stockton

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, March 15, 2021 6:47 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; D/EUR Duty Officer 2 <DDutyOfficer2@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Butler, Stockton S. EOP/NSC
(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Clearance NLT noon Tuesday: US-EU Package for March 17-18 Meetings

Hi all,

Please see attached for the AA for the March 17 meetings between ISN SBO Ann Ganzer, ISN DAS Wier, AVC DAS Alex Bell and the EEAS team as well as (b)(6) and the EC del on March 18.

We are aiming for an (b)(5) DPP
(b)(5) DPP

Thank you for your comments/clearance NLT noon Tuesday. I'm terribly sorry for the quick turn-around.

With appreciation, (b)(6)

(b)(6)
Senior Advisor for Europe and Eurasia
Office of Policy Coordination
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau
US State Department
(b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hhs.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 SCRHS_Clearance <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 19:18:37 +0000

Thanks Megan, and thanks everyone for your help and edits!

Cheers,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2021 2:30 PM
To: (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS_Clearance
 <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for the opportunity to review. Clear for (b)(5) DPP

Best,
Megan

Megan L. Frisk, PhD
Global Health Security and Biodefense
National Security Council | The White House

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2021 1:36 PM

To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov>; SCRHS Clearance <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

(b)(6) (state.gov) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) state.gov (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: RE: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins

(b)(6)

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director, Multilateral Relations
Office of the Secretary
Office of Global Affairs
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Mobile Number (b)(6)
Email: (b)(6) @HHS.gov



From: (b)(6) @state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2021 1:13 PM

To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov>; SCRHS Clearance <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (h)(6) (state.gov)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins

Thanks (b)(6) (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(6)


Acting Director, Office of Economic and Development Affairs
Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Desk: (b)(6) Mobile: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2021 12:54 PM
To: (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS_Clearance
<SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins

Adding in (b)(6)



Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins

Touching base and pushing this back up in everyone's inboxes. Appreciate everyone's contributions and clearances by 2pm today. For those who indicated clearance on Friday, I'll take it that you still clear unless I hear otherwise. (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Cheers,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Economic Officer
Economic and Development Affairs
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, August 16, 2021 4:09 PM

To: (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS_Clearance <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Clearance by Tuesday @ 2pm: TPs on COVID origins

Colleagues,

Hope all's well. Touching base on the COVID origins points for USUN Geneva: to underscore (b)(6) excellent points (below email) (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Please clear on the new draft

instruction cable by 2pm tomorrow/Tuesday, August 17, either via the below link for those of you with State Dept sharedrive access or on the attached document. (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

[Draft instruction cable - USUN Geneva tps for MS info session on COVID origins v1.docx](#)

Thanks!

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Economic Officer
Economic and Development Affairs
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, August 13, 2021 4:44 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; SCRHS_Clearance <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Clearance by 3pm: statement on COVID origins
Importance: High

(b)(6)

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Director, Multilateral Relations
Office of the Secretary
Office of Global Affairs
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Mobile Number (b)(6)
Email (b)(6) @HHS.gov



From: (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Friday, August 13, 2021 4:39 PM

☐ Draft instruction cable - USUN Geneva statement on COVID origins v1 (hjl).docx

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, August 13, 2021 2:49 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS_Clearance <SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Clearance by 3pm: statement on COVID origins

(b)(5) ACP

Thanks, (b)(6) (b)(5) ACP

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Attorney-Adviser, L/OES

Office of the Legal Adviser

U.S. Department of State

o: (b)(6)

m

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, August 13, 2021 2:10 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS_Clearance

<SCRHS_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-

DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Clearance by 3pm: statement on COVID origins

Colleagues – hope all's well. Apologies for flash clearance request my first email on the job: respectfully requesting your clearance on the below linked instruction cable (b)(5) DPP

From:	"Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: BWC Expert Meetings, day 3 (Sept. 1 — M X2)
Date:	Thu, 2 Sep 2021 12:52:50 +0000

(b)(5) DPP

Waiting for luggage. See you soon!
Megan

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 2, 2021, at 2:24 PM, Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

September 1 was the first day of MX2, which focuses on Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology. The discussion was markedly substantive, with many States Parties extolling the need for a S&T mechanism and with several useful technical expert presentations. Noteworthy developments:

(U) U.S. working papers receive positive response: del introduced four U.S. papers under two agenda items: Approaches to Governance for Scientific and Technological Advances in the Life Sciences Relevant to the BWC, A Scientific and Technological Advisory Process for the BWC, Summary of October 2020 Experts' Meeting on Strengthening Laboratory Biorisk Management, and Benefits of science and technology developments for the global COVID-19 response.

Reactions were generally favorable and the papers helped to shape debate.

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>

From:	"Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)
To:	[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	Pryor, Pamela D [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: ASAP: Sent? RE: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
Date:	Mon, 4 Jan 2021 18:10:45 +0000

+Pam Pryor

Dear [redacted] (b)(6)

See attached.

[redacted] (b)(5) DPP

Thanks,
Hugh

Hugh T. Dugan
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for International Organizations and Alliances
National Security Council | The White House

Secure: [redacted] (b)(6) Desk: [redacted] (b)(6) Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)

TS: [redacted] (b)(6) | S: [redacted] (b)(6) | U: [redacted] (b)(6)

***Human Security** (def): "An approach to assist UN Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people"
(UN General Assembly resolution 66/290)*

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:08 PM

To: Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)

Subject: Re: ASAP: Sent? RE: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Hugh,

Happy new year! Hope you and your family had a wonderful Christmas! Do you have a copy of the cable mentioned? Not sure I've seen it or have heard or seen any back and forth in state re: concerns...

Many thanks!

(b)(6)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:01:26 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Ruggiero, Anthony J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) Hooker, Allison M
(b)(6) Wilson, John M (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ASAP: Sent? RE: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

+Anthony Ruggiero #WMD, Allison Hooker #ASIA, Ivan Kanapathy #ASIA, John Mark Wilson #StratCom

Tom,

Thanks for the update. Please keep us apprised on the transmission status of your draft cable "US Questions Regarding China's Biological Research Programs".

(b)(5) DPP

We have been messaging on this topic frequently and will do so every day through various means. Today's WashPost has picked up our scent and reinforcing it in this piece today: [Opinion | We can't discover the pandemic's origins if China's thought police keep watching scientists - The Washington Post](#). Bloomberg and others are following suit.

(b)(5) DPP

Hugh

Hugh T. Dugan
Special Assistant to the President and

Senior Director for International Organizations and Alliances
National Security Council | The White House

Secure (b)(6) Desk: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6)
TS: (b)(6) S: (b)(6) U: (b)(6)

***Human Security** (def): "An approach to assist UN Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people"
(UN General Assembly resolution 66/290)*

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 11:41 AM
To: Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ASAP: Sent? RE: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Hugh

Cable has not gone out, (b)(5) DPP (b)(5) DPP
(b)(5) DPP

Thx
Tom

From: Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 10:37 AM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: ASAP: Sent? RE: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
Importance: High

Tom

Has your cable gone? Need to know asap.

Thanks
Hugh

Hugh T. Dugan
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for International Organizations and Alliances
National Security Council | The White House

Secure (b)(6) Desk: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6)
TS: (b)(6) S: (b)(6) U: (b)(6)

***Human Security** (def): "An approach to assist UN Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people"
(UN General Assembly resolution 66/290)*

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 5:44 PM
To: Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Cc: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Hugh disregard previous- I sent the wrong email forward. Apologies

----- Forwarded message -----

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: December 30, 2020 at 5:38:11 PM EST
Subject: Fwd: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
To: Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Cc: Pryor, Pamela D (b)(6)@state.gov>, Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

Hugh - this is what we're dealing with- (b)(5) DPP
(b)(5) DPP

----- Forwarded message -----

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: December 30, 2020 at 5:35:42 PM EST
Subject: Fwd: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Bizarre

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: December 30, 2020 at 5:18:56 PM EST
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>, DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)() and team,

(b)(5) DPP Haven't studied yet.

Thanks.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 5:03 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

David:

Sorry for the delay on this one – cable attached with tracked edits/comments from (b)(5) DPP
(b)() (b)(5) DPP
(b)(5) DPP (b)(5) DPP will meet next week to talk about the technical/scientific issues discussed
in the cable (b)(5) DPP (b)(5) DPP
(b)(5) DPP
(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)@state.gov
(b)(6) (desk)
(mobile)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 2:49 PM
To: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Possible to get (b)(5) DPP views by midday tomorrow?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 2:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
 (b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Good Afternoon and Happy New Year,

Clearance Request: The United States has a number of questions and concerns related to activities of the PRC government in the context of the BWC. In order to move forward on U.S. efforts to consult with the PRC on its activities related to the SARS CoV-2 outbreak, we request your comments and clearance on the attached cable by COB Wednesday, December 30, 2020.

Background: Attached is a draft cable that raises U.S. concerns regarding compliance by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC). The United States has documented such concerns for many years in the Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (the Compliance Report). In the 2005 Report, for instance, the United States assessed that the PRC “maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability

in violation of its BWC obligations.” In 2010, it was noted that the PRC “possessed an offensive BW program prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984, and . . . was obligated to eliminate this program upon acceding to the Convention.” The United States continues to note that the BWC Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) declarations submitted by the PRC have neither documented that offensive program, nor documented that the PRC has eliminated the program or any remaining biological weapons in accordance with Article II of the BWC.

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks in advance,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)
Recipient:	[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pryor, Pamela D [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Ipc due out from last week
Date:	Mon, 8 Mar 2021 16:00:49 +0000

Hi (b)(6) – Please find below ISN’s input for the (b)(5) DPP (b)(5) DPP I defer to you both on how much of the detail below belongs in first iteration of the (b)(5) DPP (we would be ok if only the top lines are included). Clearances on the roadmap needed from our end are: BPS (ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV), BEP (BEP@state.gov), ISN/FO (b)(6)@state.gov, but best to use the staffer list too: ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov), and T-staff (b)(6)@state.gov). We’d also ask that you please CC the following: ISN/PC (b)(6)@state.gov), ISN/NDF (b)(6)@state.gov), WMDT (b)(6)@state.gov), and ISN/MBC (b)(6)@state.gov).

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, March 6, 2021 11:55 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] RE: lpc due out from last week

Thanks (b)(6) for bringing in Chris and (b)(6) to this (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

We'll keep as much as possible on the low side b/c of so many people teleworking (and separately circulate a high side version), then merge with a high side version for submission to NSC. If you do have any high side material, please send to both me and (b)(6)

thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, March 6, 2021 10:15 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] RE: lpc due out from last week

Thanks for including me, (b)(6) I've added two others in who might have input for the biosecurity/biosafety topics – Chris and (b)(6) (noting the Monday morning request below). Please do include us in the clearance round (and, heads up, our front office will likely also want to see it). I'm afraid I'm not in office before next Wednesday, (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

I'm not entirely sure of the level of detail/type of input that fits with your (b)(5) DPP backbone and topical buckets, but the below gives you a quick sense for what ISN would add:

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(6) (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 5, 2021 7:46 PM

To: (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) PL/DE <(b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) OS/OGA <(b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/ID) (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) CTR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) @mail.mil>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Ipc due out from last week

Thank you (b)(6) HHS leadership would like the same ability to review the paper and have a final clearance on it before it goes to NSC as well.

Cheers.

Erika

Erika Elvander
Director, Asia and the Pacific
HHS Health Attache Designee to China
Office of Global Affairs, HHS
Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 5, 2021, at 6:58 PM, (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

Thank you, (b)(6) for this update.

I will get you DoD suggestions (I don't think we'll have a formal paper) around mid-day Monday, if not earlier. If possible, I know our OSD China Policy office would appreciate reviewing the compiled document once you've put it together, ahead of what is submitted to the NSC.

Have a nice weekend,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 5, 2021 6:30 PM

To: Elvander, Erika (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6) PPL/DE (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6) OS/OGA (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov> (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/ID (b)(6)@usaid.gov>;

(b)(6) TR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov

Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Ipc due out from last week

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.



+DHS

All-

Quick update- we've received an extension on this paper, now due next Wednesday. I will be compiling responses we've received so far over the weekend. If anyone has any additional information to send in, please get it to me by Monday morning, so that we have time to incorporate everything into a single document and circulate for clearances.

thank you,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 2:51 PM
To: Elvander, Erika (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) PPL/DE (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6) S/OGA (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) TR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Ipc due out from last week

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks so much for sending the HHS info, this is really useful material that HHS has already put together and is a great help. As (b)(6) mentioned, we just talked with Megan at NSC and got some additional clarity on the due-out. NSC would like a single consolidated paper, drafted by State. (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

We'll take on the job of consolidating input from the interagency, then share a unified paper for clearance. We will hopefully hear back from Megan soon on the question of an extension. I will take the lead on organizing SBU input. If you have high side input, please send to both me and (b)(6) and we will coordinate that portion within State.

thanks,

(b)(5)

From: Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(5) DPP@hhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 12:50 PM
To: (b)(5) DPP@state.gov>; (b)(5) DPP CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(5) DPP@state.gov>; (b)(5) DPP PPL/DE (b)(5) DPP@usaid.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) OS/OGA (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/ID (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) CTR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: lpc due out from last week

Hi everyone –

HHS has drafted an HHS focused paper that we welcome others thoughts on. If however, the desire is for State to draft a paper that is big picture with individual agencies drafting their own, we can do that too. Please advise.

Cheers,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 12:48 PM

To: (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (PPL/DE) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) OS/OGA (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) GH/ID (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) CTR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] RE: lpc due out from last week

Hi all,

State (b)(5) DPP just spoke with Megan at NSC and it sounds likely we will get an extension, but we can circle back with the group when we have confirmation. I defer to State/OES on the process of collecting inputs and circulating a unified product for clearance.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) PhD

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer

Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 12:29 PM
To: (b)(6) Elvander, Erika; Beran, (b)(6) PPL/DE)
Cc: (b)(6) OS/OGA); (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID); (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID); (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6) GH/ID); (b)(6) (b)(6) CTR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: lpc due out from last week

And adding a corrected e-mail address for (b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >) on the OSD CTR Policy team

From: (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) (b)(6) > >; Elvander, Erika (b)(6) @hhs.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) (b)(6) >; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) (b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (PPL/DE) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) (b)(6) >
Cc: (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) (b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) @usaid.gov > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) GH/ID) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: lpc due out from last week

Hi everyone –

Greetings from OSD and thank you for looping us in. We are tee'ing up input and will need a bit more time. I mentioned this in separate e-mails and to NSC as well, and my understanding is there is some wiggle room if we provide our input on Monday. I don't see Megan Frisk on the distro.

Has State and HHS gotten any clearer guidance about the suspense moving to Monday?

Best, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

DIR, CTR Policy
 OUSD(P)/HDGS/CWMD Policy

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >
Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 11:52 AM
To: Elvander, Erika (b)(6) @hhs.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) PPL/DE) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >
Cc: (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/ID)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) CIV OSD
 OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) < Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) > >
 mailto:(b)(6) >
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Ipc due out from last week

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

+ DoD colleagues

SBU - DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

From: Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >
Sent: Thursday, March 4, 2021 11:18 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (PPL/DE (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6) (GH/ID)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >
Subject: RE: Ipc due out from last week

Good morning everyone. Here is HHS' first crack at this. Its probably too long and (I will freely admit) HHS focused and will need a section for USAID. (b)(5) DPP because that's being drafted by others. Welcome your thoughts. Happy to have a call tonight or tomorrow. It would probably also be useful to share this again with Beijing tonight before we finalize this initial draft tomorrow.

Cheers,

Erika

From: Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA)
Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 4:32 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > >; (b)(6)

(PPL/DE) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>

Cc: Davis, Clara L (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:abloom@usaid.gov >>>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (GH/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>

Subject: RE: Ipc due out from last week

Hey (b)(6) - great talking to you and look forward to meeting in person.

I'll send the group our draft first thing in the morning. We can have a conversation later that day or sometime on Friday and then finalize and get to the NSC. Let me know if there's particular times tomorrow afternoon that works better than others.

Cheers,

Erika

From: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>

Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 4:15 PM

To: Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) PPL/DE (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-

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 mailto:(b)(6) >> (b)(6) GH/ID) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-
 Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %3c Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>> Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>>

Subject: RE: Ipc due out from last week

That works – I'm at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6)

(b)(6) (desk)
 (b)(6) (mobile)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>> Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>>
Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:50 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>> Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>> (b)(6) >>>
 (PPL/DE) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>> Caution-
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 mailto:(b)(6) >>>
 (OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-m(b)(6) >>> Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) >>>
 (b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>> Caution-
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 mailto:(b)(6) >>>
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 mailto:(b)(6) >>>; (b)(6) >>>
 (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6) @usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>> %3c Caution-Caution-
 mailto:cchrisman(b)(6) >>> Caution-
 Caution-mailto:(b)(6) >>> %3c Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) @state.gov < Caution-Caution-
 mailto:(b)(6) >>>
 mailto:

Subject: RE: Ipc due out from last week

Great and thanks (b)(6) I'm free at 4:15. Would that work?

Cheers,

Erika

From: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Cautio(b)(6)@state.gov > >>>
Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 1:40 PM
To: (b)(6) (PPL/DE)(b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
 Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@hhs.gov > >>>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov > >>>; (b)(6) (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@hhs.gov > >>>; (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov > >>>
 Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
 (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
 (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
 (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
 (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov > >>>
Subject: RE: Ipc due out from last week

(b)(6)

Great to hear from you – I think OES ((b)(6)) has the pen on this for State and I have not yet seen a draft, but I can give you the rough outlines of the (b)(5) DPP considerations that I passed on. I'm at my desk number today – let me know what time would work to speak.

(b)(6)

Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov > >>>
(b)(6) (desk)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov > >>>
Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 1:27 PM
To: Elvander, Erika <(b)(6)@hhs.gov > >>>
 Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6)@hhs.gov > >>>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 <(b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mail:(b)(6) ution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mail:(b)(6) mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 <(b)(6)@state.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) mailto:(b)(6) > > > (b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < (b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 (GH/HIDN/ID) (b)(6)@usaid.gov (b)(6) ution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 (GH/HIDN/ID:AAAS) (b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >

Subject: Re: Ipc due out from last week

Looping in a few colleagues from the USAID side.

On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 12:29 PM Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > >
 Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > > wrote:

Good morning (b)(6)

My apologies for being so late to the game, but I was hoping to find out what State Department's perspective was on this due out from last weeks IPC:

(b)(5) DPP

HHS has a number of equities in the space so perhaps we could get together on the phone this afternoon to talk about it?

Thanks so much!

Cheers.

Erika

Erika Elvander
 Director, Asia and the Pacific
 HHS Health Attache Designee to China
 Office of Global Affairs, HHS
 Sent from my iPhone

--

(b)(6)

Senior Multilateral Health Advisor
USAID | Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning
Office of Development Cooperation (PPL/DC)
Mobile: (b)(6)

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: PCC on WHO Messaging on Origins of COVID-19
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 22:35:36 +0000

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From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, December 9, 2020 9:36 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: PCC on WHO Messaging on Origins of COVID-19

You're welcome.

CJP

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Fakory, Ladan EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
Date: December 8, 2020 at 2:10:24 PM EST
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@cdc.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC IO
 (b)(6) DL NSC Legal <(b)(6)> DL NSC WMD (b)(6)
 "Nordquist, Nels P. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) "Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 "Baehr, James S. EOP/WHO" (b)(6), "Pinkos, Stephen M. EOP/OVP"
 (b)(6) "Krueger, Thomas G. EOP/NSC" (b)(6),
 "Fabina, Lauren C. EOP/NSC" (b)(6), DL NSC Legislative
 (b)(6) "Gammache, Nathan J. EOP/NSC" (b)(6),
 "Rault, Nick M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Gile, Robertson S. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) f@hhs.gov>, "Donnell,
 Kathryn L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Palomino, Jeffrey G.
 EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) "Rose, Jay E.
 EOP/NSC" (b)(6), (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Cook,
 Nerissa J" (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 DL NSC Asia <(b)(6)> "Schmoyer, Michael W. EOP/OSTP"
 (b)(6) DL NSC Resilience (b)(6) "Dugan, Hugh T.
 EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6),

"Music, Francesca C. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Cavanaugh, Brian J. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) , "Welch, Jennifer D. EOP/OVP" (b)(6)
 "Steel, Christopher N. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Mergy, Jennifer T. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (h)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (h)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6) "CDC CSO (CDC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 "Rissman, Tracey A. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC"
 (h)(6) "Tarre, David B. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Butler,
 Stockton S. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, "Joyce, Morgan K. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD" (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6) CDC/OOO/OSSAM" (b)(6) "Jonas, Seth
 H. EOP/NSC" (h)(6) "Kaiser, Michael R. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) "Vik, Caroline M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6) @state.gov>, (h)(6) @state.gov,
 (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6) @state.gov>,
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL EOP NEC International
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (h)(6) @hhs.gov>, (b)(6) @state.gov>,
 (h)(6) @state.gov, (b)(6) @state.gov, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, "Duffey, Michael P. EOP/OMB" (h)(6) "Paoletta,
 Mark R. EOP/OMB" (b)(6) "Fairweather, Rob S. EOP/OMB"
 (b)(6) "Pipan, Joseph G. EOP/OMB"
 (b)(6) "Lilac, Kristina E. EOP/OMB" (b)(6)
 "Liebschutz, Jennifer E. EOP/OMB" (b)(6) "Klukowski, Kenneth A.
 EOP/OMB" (h)(6) DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6),
 "Rubini, Jeffrey H. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 Cc: "Geis, John C. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Pond, Ruxandra I. EOP/OMB"
 (b)(6)

Subject: PCC on WHO Messaging on Origins of COVID-19

I've added two more RAHs to the list below (courtesy of HHS).

Colleagues:

(b)(5) DPP

Agenda:

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Thank you,
Ladan

Ladan Fakory
Director for Global Health
National Security Council

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	Fw: Origins Press Guidance Interagency Review
Date:	Fri, 11 Dec 2020 21:47:33 +0000

FYSA

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | AAAS S&T Policy Fellow
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
Office (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2020 2:51 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Origins Press Guidance Interagency Review

FYSA...

(b)(6)

Office of International Health and Biodefense
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)@State.gov

Desk: (b)(6)

Mobile: (b)(6) *please contact me on my mobile phone since I am teleworking most of the time.*

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2020 2:48 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Origins Press Guidance Interagency Review

FYI – haven't read this yet

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From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2020 2:46 PM

To: [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Origins Press Guidance Interagency Review

So, I don't think I have anything for this, but making sure CGRCU saw this.

From: Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC [redacted]
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2020 1:17 PM
To: [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted] HHS/OS/OGA
[redacted] [redacted] (b)(6) AID/A
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] DL NSC Legal [redacted] DL NSC WMD [redacted]
Nordquist, Nels P. EOP/NSC [redacted] Kanopathy, Ivan
[redacted] Wilson, John M [redacted]; Baehr, James S.
EOP/WHO [redacted] Pinkos, Stephen M. EOP/OVP
[redacted] Krueger, Thomas G. EOP/NSC [redacted]
Fabina, Lauren C. EOP/NSC [redacted] DL NSC Legislative
[redacted] Gammache, Nathan J. EOP/NSC [redacted]
Rault, Nick M. EOP/NSC [redacted] Gile, Robertson S. EOP/NSC
[redacted] Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA [redacted] Donnell, Kathryn L
[redacted] [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]
(CDC/OOO/OF [redacted]; [redacted]@state.gov> [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; Palomino, Jeffrey G. EOP/NSC
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
(LPA/AA) [redacted] Rose, Jay E. EOP/NSC [redacted] [redacted]
(Geneva) [redacted]@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; DL NSC Asia [redacted];
Schmoyer, Michael W. EOP/OSTP [redacted] DL NSC Resilience
[redacted] Dugan, Hugh T. EOP/NSC [redacted] Hanna, Cory M
[redacted]; Music, Francesca C. EOP/NSC [redacted]
Cavanaugh, Brian J. EOP/NSC [redacted] Welch, Jennifer D
[redacted] Steel, Christopher N. EOP/NSC [redacted]
Mergy, Jennifer T. EOP/NSC [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@cdc.gov>; CDC CSO (CDC <cdccso@cdc.gov>;
[redacted] [redacted]@hhs.gov>; Rissman,
Tracey A. EOP/NSC [redacted] Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC
[redacted] Tarre, David B. EOP/NSC [redacted] Butler,
Stockton S. EOP/NSC [redacted] [redacted] (Geneva)
[redacted]@state.gov>; Joyce, Morgan K. EOP/NSC [redacted] [redacted]
(CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD [redacted]@cdc.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted] CDC/OOO/OSSAM [redacted]@cdc.gov>; Jonas, Seth H.
EOP/NSC [redacted] Kaiser, Michael R. EOP/NSC [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]; Vik, Caroline M.
EOP/NSC [redacted] [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]

(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL EOP NEC International (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (USUN New York (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) USUN New York)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) USUN New York) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Duffey, Michael P.
 EOP/OMB (b)(6) Paoletta, Mark R. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Fairweather, Rob S. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Pipan, Joseph G. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Lilac, Kristina E. EOP/OMB (b)(6);
 Liebschutz, Jennifer E. (b)(6) Klukowski, Kenneth A. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6) Rubini, Jeffrey H.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Subject: Origins Press Guidance Interagency Review

Colleagues:

As discussed in today's SUB-PCC hosted by Ladan, we request a red line review of the following PG. If you have redlines, please flag them on the document along with supporting comment. Please feel free to rout comment through your comms teams, with whom I work on these documents, to streamline the effort.

Suspense for inputs in 14 December at 6:00pm EST. I will incorporate all comments and run through our process here to validate updates.

Thanks !

John Mark

John Mark Wilson
 Office of Strategic Communications
 National Security Council

(b)(6)

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Fw: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
Date:	Wed, 13 Jan 2021 16:04:58 +0000

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 10:27 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

I trust (b)(6) has promptly share with F/O, but just in case...

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 10:15 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
As I said all along....

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 10:07 AM
To: (b)(6) (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

This has likely come to your respective offices via other channels, but I wanted to make sure you were aware.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 11:04 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
Importance: High

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)(HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 8:45 PM
To: Fakory, Ladan EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R
(b)(6)@state.gov>; Harrison, Brian (HHS/IOS) <Brian.Harrison@hhs.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan

(b)(6) Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) RADM
(b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD (b)(6)@cdc.gov>

Subject: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Importance: High

Ladan and colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP



Garrett Grigsby
Director for Global Affairs
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

(b)(6)



~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>
Recipient:	Yu, Miles <(b)(6)>	@state.gov>

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
Date:	Thu, 10 Jun 2021 18:51:24 +0000

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:55 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

(Chris only)

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer

Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)

(b)(6) telework)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:53 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(6)
 Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

CJP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 10:12 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Thanks Chris - I was not aware. Further to (b)(6) email, (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP Best - (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 10:07 AM
To: (b)(6); Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

This has likely come to your respective offices via other channels, but I wanted to make sure you were aware.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 11:04 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC
Importance: High

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Grigsby, Garrett (HHS/OS/OGA) <Garrett.Grigsby@hhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 8:45 PM

To: Fakory, Ladan EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; Pryor, Pamela D <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/IOS) <(b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan <(b)(6)>; Biegun, Stephen E <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) RADM <(b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD <(b)(6)@cdc.gov>

Subject: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Importance: High

Ladan and colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Garrett Grigsby

Director for Global Affairs
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

(b)(6)



~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>

From:	"Biegun, Stephen E" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Coronavirus talking points
Date:	Wed, 19 Feb 2020 18:34:59 +0000

~~SBU~~ - HEALTH

From: Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 12:40 PM
To: Bulatao, Brian J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Hale, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Coronavirus talking points

~~SBU~~ - HEALTH

From: Nevins, Kristan K. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 11:48 AM
To: Nevins, Kristan K. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>
Subject: Coronavirus talking points

All,

Please find updated talking points on the Coronavirus. Do not hesitate if you have any questions.

All the best,
Kristan

Sender:	"Biegun, Stephen E" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	EAP-Directors-Deputy-Directors-DL <EAP-Directors-Deputy-Directors-DL@state.gov>
CC:	EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Coronavirus talking points
Date:	Wed, 19 Feb 2020 17:53:59 +0000

FYSA

(b)(6)

Special Assistant
Office of the Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SBU~~ HEALTH

From: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 12:53 PM
To: EAP-FO-Principals-DL <EAP-FO-Principals-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Coronavirus talking points

For use as appropriate. Desks/EAP-Press: Please share with posts.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 12:50:01 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pasi, Geeta (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; Reeker, Philip T (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cormack, Maureen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fisher, Julie D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Schenker, David K (b)(6)@state.gov>; Hood, Joey R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Wells, Alice (b)(6)@state.gov>; Holtz, Greta C (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kozak, Michael G (b)(6)@state.gov>; Chung, Julie J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pryor, Pamela D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; P/SCA Duty Officer <P-SCADuty@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Coronavirus talking points

Please share with your teams.

From: Nevins, Kristan K. EOP/WHO (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 11:48 AM
To: Nevins, Kristan K. EOP/WHO (b)(6)
Subject: Coronavirus talking points

All,

Please find updated talking points on the Coronavirus. Do not hesitate if you have any questions.

All the best,
Kristan

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	EAP-Directors-Deputy-Directors-DL <EAP-Directors-Deputy-Directors-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Rissman, Tracey A. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Subject: Re: CLEARANCE BY 9am MONDAY: DRAFT letter to Member McCaul on COVID and WIV employees 7.16.21

Clear for (b)(5)

thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, July 19, 2021 9:19 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Rissman, Tracey A. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Subject: Re: CLEARANCE BY 9am MONDAY: DRAFT letter to Member McCaul on COVID and WIV employees 7.16.21

Thank you to those that have responded and a reminder for others to do so, please.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On July 16, 2021 at 4:30:00 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:
 Colleagues—

Apologies for the short suspense.

Welcome your review and clearance on the attached McCaul letter by 9am Monday morning.

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520
Desk: (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov*

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

<DRAFT letter to Member McCaul on COVID and WIV employees 7.16.21.docx>

<H20210714-008_McCaul.pdf>

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)
To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
Subject: FW: (new/ & updated products) RE: May 5: Sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 14:36:37 +0000

Miles, (b)(5) DPP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 10:23 AM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6) (PPL/AA)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) DL NSC WMD
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) S)
 (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 SES OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (ASIA/AA) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; DL NSC MENA (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber
 (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA' (b)(6) DL
 NSC SouthAsia (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; DL
 NSC INTEL (b)(6) DL NSC Defense (b)(6);
 DL NSC Asia (b)(6); Wilson, John M (b)(6)
 (HHS/OS/OGA (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6); Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; marie.chalkley (b)(6)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)@treasury.gov>;
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6);
 (b)(6) DL NSC
Legal (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)

(b)(6)@treasury.gov>; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6)
 Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6) (b)(6)@bis.doc.gov;
 (b)(6)@bis.doc.gov; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (PPL/P) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hq.doe.gov; Stambaugh, Corey A.
 EOP/OSTP (b)(6)@cdc.gov; PHMIT (CDC) (b)(6)@cdc.gov>;
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) - FAS,
 Washington, DC (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@opic.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6) FAS, Washington, DC
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6); Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Welch, Jennifer D (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6) FAS, Washington, DC
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6)@treasury.gov>; Winter, Audrey S.
 EOP/USTR (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hq.doe.gov>; (b)(6) (E3/TRR)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@treasury.gov>; (b)(6)

Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)

Cc: Wilson, John M (b)(6)

Subject: (new/ & updated products) RE: May 5: Sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Good morning, colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)


Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 4:50 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Waters, John R (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (PPL/AA) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6); DL NSC WMD (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA' (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6) USN JS J5 (USA' (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) (ASIA/AA (b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC MENA (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA' (b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA' (b)(6) DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC INTEL (b)(6) DL NSC IO (b)(6) DL NSC Defense (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) @hhs.gov; Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard EOP (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV; (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) @treasury.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (LPA/AA (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @ucia.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) RADM (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6) (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) @treasury.gov; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov; (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard EOP (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6)@hq.doe.gov; Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@cdc.gov; PHMIT (CDC) (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov;
 (b)(6)@opic.gov; (b)(6)@hhs.gov; (b)(6)@hhs.gov; (b)(6)@cdc.gov;
 (b)(6)@cdc.gov; (b)(6)@cdc.gov; (b)(6)@usda.gov; (b)(6) Washington, DC
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Carter, Hillary H.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov; (b)(6) LPA'
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov; (b)(6)@usaid.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6) USAF JS J3
 (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6); (b)(6) OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6); (b)(6) Welch, Jennifer D.
 EOP/OVP (b)(6) (b)(6)@usda.gov>;
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6) EOP
 (b)(6)@treasury.gov>; Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hq.doe.gov;
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@treasury.gov>;
 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)
Cc: Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: (follow-up) RE: May 5: Sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues, thanks for attending today; (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP



Thank you and let me know if you have any questions.

Liza Tobin

LINKS TO DNSA SPEECH:

YouTube video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dp5h6n6fbUg&feature=youtu.be>

English transcript:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-deputy-national-security-advisor-matt-pottinger-miller-center-university-virginia/>

Chinese transcript:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2020-Pottinger-May-Fourth-Miller-Center-Speech.pdf>

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 5:42 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Waters, John R (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) PPL/AA
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) DL NSC WMD
 (b)(6) (b)(6) JSAF JS J3 (USA) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) Malkani, Maya N. (b)(6) DL
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 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
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 (ASIA/A (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; DL NSC MENA (b)(6)

(b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber
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 NSC SouthAsia (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; DL
 NSC INTEL (b)(6) DL NSC IO (b)(6); DL NSC Defense
 (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Arant,
 Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard EOP
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) @treasury.gov> (b)(6)
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 Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov>; (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov>;
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 Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Buangan, Richard EOP (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov>; Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; PHMIT (CDC) (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC
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 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) PA'
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6) USAF JS J3
 (USA)' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6) Welch, Jennifer D.
 EOP/OVP (b)(6) (b)(6) @usda.gov>;
 (b)(6) @usda.gov> (b)(6) EOP
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @treasury.gov>;

(b)(6) @ucia.gov; Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)

Subject: RE: May 5: Sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Let me know if you have questions or concerns.

Liza

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:59 PM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; Waters, John R (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) PPL/AA (b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC WMD (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6) OUSD POLICY (USA' (b)(6) Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (USA' (b)(6) (b)(6) USN JS J5 (USA' (b)(6) (b)(6) (ASIA/EAA (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC MENA (b)(6) (b)(6) JSARMY JS J5 (USA' (b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA' (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC INTEL (b)(6) DL NSC IO (b)(6) ; DL NSC Defense (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) @hhs.gov; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) ; Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan , Richard EOP (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV; (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) @treasury.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) (LPA/AA (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @ucia.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) RADM (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6) @fbi.gov; (b)(6) @treasury.gov>;
 Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR
 (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov; (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov;
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 Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Buangan, Richard EOP (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @cdc.gov; PHMIT (CDC) (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC
 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov;

 (b)(6) @opic.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov;

 (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov; (b)(6) @usda.gov; (b)(6) Washington, DC

 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H.

 EOP/NSC (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

 Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP

 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6) USAF JS J3

 (USA)' (b)(6);

 (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)

 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Welch, Jennifer D. EOP/OVP (b)(6) (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC

 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; (b)(6)

 S. EOP/USTR (b)(6) @usaid.gov; Walker, Scott C (Beijing)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>;

 (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; (b)(6)

Subject: May 5: Sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Agenda is as follows:

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Thank you,

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 3:53 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

(b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Waters, John R

(b)(6) @state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6) @state.gov (b)(6) (PPL/AA

(b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC WMD (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) JSAF JS J3 (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) DL

NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6) SES OSD
 OUSD POLICY (USA' (b)(6) Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Thomi, Markus A. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Yu,
 Miles (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
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 (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6)
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 (ASIA/EAA (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (USA' (b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber
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 (b)(6) ; DL NSC IO (b)(6) DL NSC Defense
 (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Lin, Merry S.
 EOP/WHO (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Kramer, Jacob M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard EOP
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
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 (b)(6) @dfc.gov>; (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD
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 (b)(6) (b)(6) Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan
 , Richard EOP (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
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 (b)(6) Washington, DC (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) USARMY JS J3 (USA)
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 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) ; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) Droegemeier, Kelvin K. EOP/OSTP
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Welch, Jennifer D. EOP/OVP (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC
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 S. EOP/USTR (b)(6) @usaid.gov (b)(6) Beijing)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; (b)(6) OS/OGA)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (follow-up from meeting) April 21: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

(b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
 Director for China
 National Security Council
 (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 12:37 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6); Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)

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(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) USARMY JS J5

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(b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC CT (b)(6) DL NSC INTEL

(b)(6) DL NSC IO (b)(6) DL NSC Defense

(b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC

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 (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6); (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) JSARMY JS J3 (USA)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @opic.gov>; (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>;
 (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>;
 (b)(6) USAF JS J3 (USA)' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CIV
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Welch, Jennifer D. EOP/OVP (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
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(b)(6)@treasury.gov>; (b)(6)

Subject: (follow-up from meeting) April 21: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

- In conjunction w/ NATO: <https://share.america.gov/u-s-works-with-nato-to-respond-to-covid-19/>
- Europe: <https://share.america.gov/u-s-and-europe-team-up-to-battle-covid-19/>
- Africa: <https://share.america.gov/u-s-provides-coronavirus-aid-across-africa/>
- New fact sheet breaking down some of the funding numbers for US assistance for COVID-19 (attached)

Thanks,

Liza

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 6:48 PM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6); Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC
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 (b)(6) @hhs.gov; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Lin, Merry S.
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC
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 (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6) Washington, DC
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Subject: RE: Next meeting April 21: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

Liza

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 1:41 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Washington, DC' (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) EOP
 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov' (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov' (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov'
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>: Carter, Hillary
 H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) EOP
 (b)(6) @treasury.gov>

Subject: Next meeting April 21: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thank you,

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 10:04 AM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6); Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Waters, John R

(b)(6) @state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC WMD (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) Malkani, Maya N. (b)(6) DL

NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6); Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Thomi, Markus A. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Yu,

Miles (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) @state.gov; Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC MENA

(b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6); DL NSC Cyber

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(b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC CT (b)(6); DL NSC INTEL

(b)(6) DL NSC IO (b)(6) DL NSC Defense

(b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Lin, Merry S.
 EOP/WHO (b)(6); Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Kramer, Jacob M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) @dfc.gov; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov; (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov; Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; Stambaugh, Corey A.
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 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @dfc.gov; (b)(6) @opic.gov; (b)(6) @hhs.gov;
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>;
 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) @usda.gov>;
 Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Vasquez,
 Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) Droegemeier, Kelvin K. EOP/OSTP
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov;

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Welch, Jennifer D. EOP/OVP (b)(6);

 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @usda.gov>; (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; Winter, Audrey

 S. EOP/USTR (b)(6) @usaid.gov (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; Elvander, Erika (OS/OGA)

 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Next meeting April 14: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Please reach out if you have questions or concerns.

Liza Tobin
 Director for China
 National Security Council
 The White House
 Mobile: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 7:41 PM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6); Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6);

 (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Waters, John R

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; DL NSC WMD (b)(6) (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC

 (b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6);

 R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov>;

 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) DL

 NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) >; Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

 (b)(6) (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)

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 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Yu,
 Miles (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
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 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Lin, Merry S.
 EOP/WHO (b)(6); Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Kramer, Jacob M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L
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 (b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6) (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov>; (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov>; Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6); (b)(6) @usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6) Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB

(b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov; Stambaugh, Corey A.
 EOP/OSTP (b)(6) @cdc.gov (b)(6) @cdc.gov>;
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov> (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usda.gov; (b)(6) @usda.gov>;
 Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez,
 Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) Droegemeier, Kelvin K. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6);
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 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Welch, Jennifer D. EOP/OVP (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Next meeting April 14: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

Liza Tobin
 Director for China
 National Security Council

(b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 8:56 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

(b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Waters, John R'
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov;
 (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC WMD (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) 'Kissel,
 Mary E (S (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 'R Special Assistants' <R SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; 'Feith, David' (b)(6) @state.gov;
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Thomi, Markus A. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Hanna, Corv M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Snyder,
 Nicholas J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Kissel, Mary E
 (S' (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) DL NSC
 Africa (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber
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 DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Grigsby, Garrett (HHS/OS/OGA'
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Lin, Merry S.
 EOP/WHO (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Kramer, Jacob M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6)
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) 'Buangan, Richard L'
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
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 (b)(6) @treasury.gov; (b)(6)

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 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@ucia.gov'
 (b)(6) Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP (b)(6);
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 (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@cdc.gov' (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; (b)(6)@cdc.gov>;
 (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov'
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 (b)(6) (b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6);
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@treasury.gov>; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
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 (b)(6); Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B.
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 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usda.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6);
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6);
 (b)(6) (b)(6)

Subject: Next meeting April 14: sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Please contact me with any questions.

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 1:04 PM

To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Waters, John R

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

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(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

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(b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC

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R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;

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(b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Snyder,

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 (b)(6); DL NSC Asia (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC
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 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Lin, Merry S.
 EOP/WHO (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Kramer, Jacob M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6);
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6); (b)(6) @dfc.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC Legal (b)(6) (b)(6);
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @treasury.gov>; Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. EOP/USTR (b)(6);
 (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov>; (b)(6) @bis.doc.gov>; Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Makin, Sarah E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.doe.gov>; Stambaugh, Corey A.
 EOP/OSTP (b)(6) (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) @cdc.gov>;
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: (SOC items) yesterday's sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)
Mobile: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 5:26 PM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) Anny L Vu (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Waters, John R
(b)(6)@state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)
(b)(6)@usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@state.gov; DL NSC WMD (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
(b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)
(b)(6) Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6) @usaid.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6) @state.gov>; Thomi, Markus
 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H (b)(6) Hanna,
 Cory M (b)(6) Snyder, Nicholas (b)(6); Yu, Miles
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC WHA (b)(6); DL NSC Cyber
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; DL NSC CT (b)(6) DL EOP NEC
 International (b)(6) DL NSC INTEL (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC Defense (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6)
 Wilson, John M (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; Lang, Jon D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Lin, Merry S.
 EOP/WHO (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6); Kramer, Jacob M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Stambaugh, Corey A. EOP/OSTP (b)(6);
 Carter, Hillary H. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov> (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov>; (b)(6) @ucia.gov; Taylor, Jake M. EOP/OSTP
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @dfc.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @cdc.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DL NSC Legal
 (b)(6)

Subject: Next Sub-PCC on PRC Pandemic Propaganda (next Tuesday)

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Please let me know if you have questions.

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)

TSVOIP: (b)(6)

SIPR: (b)(6)

High Side: (b)(6)

Subject: Sub-PCC tomorrow at 2:00 AND updated top lines on PRC COVID-19 Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Please let me know if you have questions or concerns.

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)
TSVOIP: (b)(6)
SIPR: (b)(6)
High Side: (b)(6)

From: "Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
Date: March 24, 2020 at 6:27:44 PM EDT
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov, "Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)@state.gov, "Waters, John R" (b)(6)@state.gov, "Keshap, Atul" (b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)
(b)(6)@usaid.gov, DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)@state.gov"
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)@state.gov"
(b)(6) DL NSC WMD (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov, "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov, "Fritz, Jonathan D" (b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6) "Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
"R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov" <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>, "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov,
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(b)(6) DL NSC Africa
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"Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov, (b)(6)

(b)(6)@usaid.gov>, (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Thomi, Markus A. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Keshap, Atul"
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 "Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Fritz, Jonathan D" (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, "Williams, Chike T. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) DL NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov" <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) "Waters,
 John R" (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov" (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>, DL NSC Asia
 (b)(6) "Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB" (b)(6) "Merriam,
 Jessica V. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Jonas, Matthew E. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) "Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 "Ulyot, John L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Yu, Miles"
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov"
 (b)(6) "Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>, DL NSC WMD (b)(6) DL NSC Africa
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Peterson, Drew N. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov" (b)(6) "Stilwell, David R"
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 "Iltibir, Elnigar EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov" (b)(6) "Pipan, Joseph G.
 EOP/OMB" (b)(6) "Lilac, Kristina E. EOP/OMB"
 (b)(6) "Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Ferro, Phil
 J. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Williams, Tom M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Martin,
 Michael E. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, "Linzy, Adjoa P. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) "Thomi,
 Markus A. EOP/NSC" (b)(6) DL NSC MENA (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov" (b)(6)@ucia.gov"
 (b)(6)@ucia.gov>, (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, DL NSC BATS
 (b)(6) (b)(6) DL
 NSC WHA (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>,
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>, "Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6), DL NSC SouthAsia (b)(6), (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>, DL NSC CT (b)(6), DL EOP NEC International
 (b)(6) DL NSC INTEL (b)(6) DL NSC MENA
 (b)(6) DL NSC IO (b)(6) DL NSC Defense
 (b)(6)
Cc: DL NSC Asia (b)(6) "Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
Subject: Updated Interagency Top Lines: PRC COVID-19 Propaganda

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

We will continue to update these as needed; you are welcome to send me your feedback and inputs.

Liza Tobin
 Director for China
 National Security Council
 (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2020 7:17 PM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) DL NSC Asia (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; 'Waters, John R' (b)(6)@state.gov>; 'Keshap, Atul' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6) DL NSC WMD (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; 'Stilwell, David R' (b)(6)@state.gov>; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6); Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)'R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov' <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; 'Feith, David' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Linzy, Adjoa P. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Thomi, Markus A. EOP/NSC (b)(6) 'Keshap,
 Atul' (b)(6)@state.gov>; Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6); 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.gov>; 'Glick,
 Bonnie L. (AID/A)' (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; Williams, Chike T. EOP/NSC (b)(6) DL
 NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 'R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov' <R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) 'Waters, John R'
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)@state.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DL NSC Asia (b)(6);
 Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Merriam, Jessica V. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Jonas, Matthew E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Ulliyot, John L. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Snyder, Nicholas J.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6) Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Douglas, John H.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) 'Feith, David' (b)(6)@state.gov>; DL NSC WMD
 (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Peterson, Drew N. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6); 'Stilwell,
 David R' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6) Wilson, John
 Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6);
 Pipan, Joseph G. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Lilac, Kristina E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Ferro, Phil J.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Williams, Tom M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Martin, Michael
 E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Linzy, Adjoa P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Thomi,
 Markus A. EOP/NSC (b)(6) DL NSC MENA (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) DL NSC BATS (b)(6); DL NSC WHA
 (b)(6) DL NSC Cyber (b)(6)
Cc: Williams, Chike T. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Ulliyot,
 John L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Merriam, Jessica V. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Jonas, Matthew E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC (b)(6);

Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Peterson, Drew N. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Passey, Michael S. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Decker, Matthew G. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Subject: (TOP LINES ATTACHED) RE: Small Group Meeting: Wuhan Virus Messaging

(b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
 Director for China
 National Security Council
 (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC
Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 8:52 PM
To: DL NSC EUR (b)(6) @usaid.gov; Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); DL NSC Asia (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Waters, John R (b)(6) @state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC WMD (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 POLICY (USA) (b)(6); DL NSC Africa (b)(6) (b)(6)
 SES OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Linzy, Adjoa P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Thomi, Markus A. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Keshap, Atul (b)(6) @state.gov; Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @usaid.gov; Williams, Chike T. EOP/NSC (b)(6) DL NSC EUR (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov; (b)(6) @usaid.gov; DL NSC STRATCOM (b)(6)
 Waters, John R (b)(6) @state.gov; Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) Sheives, Kevin W (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC Asia (b)(6)
 Creedon, William E. EOP/OMB (b)(6); Merriam, Jessica V. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Jonas, Matthew E. EOP/NSC

(b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Ulliyot,
 John L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Glavin, Nicholas A (b)(6)@state.gov>; Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) 'Feith, David' (b)(6)@state.gov>; DL NSC WMD
 (b)(6) DL NSC Africa (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Peterson, Drew N. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 P CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6); (b)(6)
 POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6) Stilwell,
 David R' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC (b)(6) Wilson, John
 Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6);
 Pipan, Joseph G. EOP/OMB (b)(6) Lilac, Kristina E. EOP/OMB
 (b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Ferro, Phil J.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Williams, Tom M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Martin, Michael
 E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (USA) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Linzy, Adjoa P. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Thomi, Markus A.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Cc: Williams, Chike T. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Ulliyot,
 John L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Merriam, Jessica V. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Jonas, Matthew E. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Peterson, Drew N. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Passey, Michael S. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Decker, Matthew G. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Subject: (top line points for edit) RE: Small Group Meeting: Wuhan Virus Messaging

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Thank you and I look forward to receiving your edits and inputs.

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council

(b)(6)

-----Original Appointment-----

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC

Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2020 11:42 PM

To: DL NSC EUR; (b)(6) (AID/A); Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC; DL NSC Asia; (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Waters, John R;

Keshap, Atul; (b)(6) PPL/AA); DL NSC STRATCOM; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; DL NSC WMD; (b)(6) Stilwell,

David R; Fritz, Jonathan D; (b)(6) @state.gov; Tyson, Matthew R. EOP/NSC; Douglas, John H. EOP/NSC;

R_SpecialAssistants@state.gov; Feith, David; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA); DL NSC

Africa; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA); Yu, Miles

Cc: Williams, Chike T. EOP/NSC; Iltebir, Elnigar EOP/NSC; Wilson, John Mark M. EOP/NSC; Ulliyot, John L.

EOP/NSC; Merriam, Jessica V. EOP/NSC; Jonas, Matthew E. EOP/NSC; Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC;

Monosson, Danielle H. EOP/NSC; Snyder, Nicholas J. EOP/NSC; Hanna, Cory M. EOP/NSC; Peterson, Drew

N. EOP/NSC

Subject: Small Group Meeting: Wuhan Virus Messaging

When: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 2:00 PM-3:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: EEOB 374

Colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,

Liza

Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6) Tobin, Elizabeth D. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)

From:	(b)(6)
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	DRAFT fodder for SFRC briefing
Date:	Mon, 26 Jul 2021 23:30:23 +0000

Chris – Find attached a first rough cut of stuff that might come up in the SFRC briefing. Some questions should be added based on the letter you shared and, maybe, some classnet stuff. A lot of this should be as background rather than talking points, but I didn't get to that stage of the word vomit process before signing off.

Let's go back and forth on it – I'll check in with you before I turn to this again to make sure we're not duplicating.

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Tobin, Elizabeth D." (b)(6)

#NSC-ASIA (b)(6)
 #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6)
 #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6)
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'Snyder, Nicholas JC.' (b)(6)

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Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)

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Taylor, Jacob Jake" (b)(6)

Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)

Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)

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Carter, Hillary H.

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Chafin, Kelly B. (h)(6);

Macklin, Ronita M. (b)(6)

Winter, Audrey S. <

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 22:03:34 +0000

Classification: ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
 Derived From: NSC SCG
 Declassify On: 20451231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:26 PM
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 Corey A. (b)(6);
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6);
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
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 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)
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Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
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Classification: ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
 Derived From: NSC SCG
 Declassify On: 20451231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP



(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)
TSVOIP: (b)(6)
Low Sid (b)(6)
JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 9:39 AM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6); #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6); #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6); #NSC-INTEL (b)(6); #NSC-CYBER <(b)(6)>; #NSC-DEFENSE <(b)(6)>; #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6); #NSC-BATS (b)(6); #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6); #NSC-IOA (b)(6); #NSC-WMD (b)(6); #NSC-EUR <(b)(6)>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-ASIA (b)(6); #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6); #NSC-BATS (b)(6); #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6); #NSC-IOA (b)(6); #NSC-INTECON (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'buangan' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-WMD (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Feith, David DoS' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6); (b)(6); 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-EUR (b)(6); (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T. (b)(6); 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov' <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6);

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Corey A. (b)(6); Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)

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(b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)
(b)(6) @commerce.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.
(b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)
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Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

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 (h)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CIV (USA)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6);
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 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P.
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 Corey A. <(b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
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Subject: RE (b)(5) DPP

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)
TSVOIP: (b)(6)
Low Side: (b)(6)
JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Friday, April 10, 2020 6:59 PM

To: #NSC-ASI (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6)
(b)(6); #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (b)(6)
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(b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
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 Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
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 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (h)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6) @state.gov' (h)(6)
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 (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6)
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 (h)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (h)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. <(b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (h)(6)
 (b)(6); Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6)
 Chafin, Kelly B. (h)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (h)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (h)(6)

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG
Declassify On: 20451231

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Colleagues,

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Agenda:

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)

TSVOIP: (b)(6)

Low Side: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 12:10 PM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
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(b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (h)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'(b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(h)(6) (h)(6) DSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
(b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)
(h)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.
(b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6);
(b)(6) (b)(6) aylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6)
Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
Derived From: NSC SCG
Declassify On: 20451231

=====

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House
(b)(6)
TSVOIP: (b)(6)
Low Side: (b)(6)
JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 1:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-ASIA <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (b)(6)
 (b)(6) #NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6); #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6)
 (b)(6); #NSC-BATS (b)(6) #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)
 (b)(6) #NSC-IOA (b)(6) #NSC-INTECON (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) SES OSD
 OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6); (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Waters, John R (Rick)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6) #NSC-WMD <#NSC-
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Feith, David DoS'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) SES (USA)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6); #NSC-EUR <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6); Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6)R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov
 <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Snyder,
 Nicholas JC. (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-MENA
 (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6); Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.
 (b)(6); Vasquez, Edgar J. <(b)(6)> Taylor, Jacob
 "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6);
 Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 8:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-ASIA (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (b)(6) #NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6)
 (b)(6) #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6) #NSC-BATS (b)(6)
 (b)(6); #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6) #NSC-IOA <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6) #NSC-INTECON (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Waters, John R (Rick)'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6); #NSC-WMD <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Feith, David DoS
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6) Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) ES (USA)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) #NSC-EUR (b)(6)-
 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6)'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
 <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Snyder,
 Nicholas JC. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-MENA
 (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)'
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6); Storch,
 Thomas H. (b)(6) Nordquist, Nels P. <(b)(6)>; Lin,
 Merry S. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)


Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
Derived From: NSC SCG
Declassify On: 20451231
=====

Colleagues,

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP
(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP



Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)

TSVOIP: (b)(6)

Low Side: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)

=====
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sender:	"Tobin, Elizabeth D." (b)(6)
Recipient:	#NSC-ASIA (b)(6)
	#NSC-AFRICA (b)(6)
	#NSC-LEGAL (b)(6)
	#NSC-INTEL
	#NSC-CYBER
	#NSC-DEFENSE <(b)(6)>;
	#NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6);
	#NSC-BATS (b)(6)
	#NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)
	#NSC-IOA <(b)(6)>
	#NSC-WMD (b)(6)
	#NSC-FUR <(b)(6)>
	(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;	
(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;	
#NSC-ASIA <(b)(6)>;	
#NSC-LEGISLATIVE <(b)(6)>;	

#NSC-BATS (b)(6)
 #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)
 #NSC-IOA (b)(6)
 #NSC-INTECON (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)
 'buangan (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6);
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6)
 #NSC-WMD (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Feith, David (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6);
 Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 #NSC-EUR (b)(6)
 Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6)
 Williams, Chike T. (b)(6)
 R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>;
 Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 'Snyder, Nicholas JC.' (b)(6)

(b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 #NSC-MENA (b)(6);
 (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6);
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6)
 Arant, Ryan P.
 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)
 Vasquez, Edgar J.
 Taylor, Jacob Jake (b)(6)
 Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6);

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6) ;
 #NSC-WMD <(b)(6) ;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Feith, David (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) ;
 Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) ;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (h)(6) ;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 #NSC-EUR <(b)(6) ;
 Monosson, Danielle H. (h)(6) ;
 Williams, Chike T. (b)(6) ;
 R_Special Assistants <R_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>;
 Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) ;
 (b)(6) ;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) ;
 (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6) ;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 #NSC-MENA (h)(6) ;
 (b)(6) ;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (h)(6) ;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) ;
 Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) ;
 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) ;
 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) ;
 Taylor, Jacob Jake" (h)(6) ;
 Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6) ;
 Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6) ;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) ;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)>;
 (b)(6)>;
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6);
 Winter, Audrey S. <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Arant, Ryan P. <(b)(6)>;
 Vasquez, Edgar J. <(b)(6)>;
 (b)(6);
 Taylor, Jacob Jake" <(b)(6)>
 Chafin, Kelly B. <(b)(6)>
 Carter, Hillary H. <(b)(6)>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' <(b)(6)>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@oma.sgov.gov' <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6);
 (b)(6);
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6) <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6)
 Chafin, Kelly B. <(b)(6)>
 Macklin, Ronita M. <(b)(6)>
 Winter, Audrey S. <(b)(6)>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)(1.4)(d) ; (b)(5) DPP

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
CC: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: BPS feedback - SubIPC on (b)(5) DPP
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 17:17:53 -0400

Thanks (b)(6)

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Official -~~SBU~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:ISN/BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 8/20/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Derived per DSCG

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2021 8:29 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: BPS feedback - SubIPC on (b)(5) DPP

Thanks (b)(6)

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Cheers,

(b)(6)

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~** when separated from **~~SECRET~~** attachment(s)

Classified By: SRV - Deputy Team Chief, Office:ISN/CTR, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/19/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2021 4:23 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>


Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: BPS feedback - SubIPC on (b)(5) DPP

(b)(6) - I finally got a chance to look through this and, I'm afraid, have more questions than answers:

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP



Forgive our fumble,

(b)(6)

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/18/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Derived per DSCG

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2021 1:56 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) ESTH Officer, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2021 1:35 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) ESTH Officer, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/10/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, August 10, 2021 11:50 AM

To: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) ESTH Officer, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/10/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 10, 2021 11:37 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) ESTH Officer, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/10/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: Frisk, Megan L. <(b)(6)>

Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 6:55 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Megan Frisk, Director, NSC Global Health Security & Biodefense

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20461231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d)

From: Frisk, Megan L.

Sent: Thursday, August 5, 2021 6:36 PM

To: Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz, Jonathan D'

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

<(b)(6) (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

<(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; 'Park, Christopher J'

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E.

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6) (Beijing)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) JSARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) (b)(6) USARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6) Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz,
 Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (Beijing) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov> (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'EAP-
 CM-ECON-DL' <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'ISN-BPS-DL' <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; 'BEP'
 <BEP@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL' <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) USUN Rome (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (USUN Rome)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Schmoyer, Michael W.
 (b)(6) (USUN Rome) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6),
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'ttl-usaid@state.sgov.gov' <ttl-usaid@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)
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Dear colleagues,

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All the best,
Megan

Megan L. Frisk, PhD
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