



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 19, 2026

Case No. FL-2022-00076

Dr. Sainath Suryanarayanan
U.S. Right to Know
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Dr. Suryanarayanan:

As we noted in our letter dated January 30, 2026, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State (“Department”) has identified an additional 16 responsive records subject to the FOIA. Upon review, we have determined seven records may be released in part and nine records originated with other U.S. Government agencies. We have referred the latter records to the relevant agencies with a request to respond to you directly upon making a release determination.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

This concludes the processing of your requests. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00076, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Avery Bullard

Avery Bullard
Supervisory Government Information Specialist
Litigation and Appeals Office

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; STAS-Office <STAS_Office@groups.state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Readout: OSTP Chief Science Advisers (CSA) Call 6-3-20
Date:	Sun, 7 Jun 2020 14:01:36 +0000

Good morning!

Please find below the notes taken by OES/IHB and OES/STC during the June 3rd Chief Science Advisers (CSA) call on COVID-19, hosted by OSTP Director Dr. Kelvin Droegemeier. This week focused on two topics - outstanding fundamental research questions and boosting international cooperation, and reopening the research enterprise.

In addition, there are some attachments and information shared by Japan, UK, Spain, Portugal, Singapore, and New Zealand. Reminder: the "Tracker" from OSTP is FOUO.

Portugal

§ Response to questions on reopening the science enterprise.

Singapore

§ Slides on sero-epi studies in Singapore.

§ Roadmap Ahead to Phase Two

§ End of Circuit Breaker Phased Approach to Resuming Activities Safely

§ A Safe Singapore

Japan:

§ Avoid the Three Cs

§ Japan's COVID-19 Response

§ Guideline to Balance Prevention of Spread of Infection and Research Activities (in Japanese)

§ Japan Supports for Reopening the Research Enterprise.

New Zealand:

§ A3 summary of NZ's COVID-19 process and results. As of last Wednesday, NZ had had 14 consecutive days of zero cases.

UK:

o UKRI's fundamental research question list: [research questions on Covid-19](#)

Spain

- o COVID-19 Funded Spain Projects
- o Methodology Summary
- o Preliminary Results of Seroprevalence Survey

Feel free to share notes with others in State. If you have any questions, you may contact me,

(b)(6) cc'd). Thanks!

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(5) DPP

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5) DPP

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Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov>;

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ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

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Title	Principal Investigator	Centre	ISCIII's reference	Topic Call	Description	More information	Expected funding level (€)	Clinical Trial	Unicentric vs. Multicentric
Addressing unknowns of COVID-19 transmission and infection combining pathogen genomics and epidemiology to inform public health interventions	Iñaki Comas Espadas	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00140	F) Epidemiological surveillance H) Artificial intelligence C) Therapies D) SARS-CoV-2	There is a growing pressure to understand the transmission patterns of SARS-CoV-2. As a new emergent virus, we know almost nothing about its epidemiology. Our objective is to produce an effective vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 as follows: Vaccine 1: This vaccine named MVA-COVID-19 will be used for the development of a vaccine against coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 responsible for the disease COVID-19. This objective is contained within action 2.3 of the research proposal.	1750000	No	Multicentric	
SARSCoV2 Airborne Transmission: Innovative Technologies for virus detection in hospitals	Antonio Alcami Pertejo	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00144	A) Diagnostics	Our objective is to produce an effective vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 as follows: Vaccine 1: This vaccine named MVA-COVID-19 will be used for the development of a vaccine against coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 responsible for the disease COVID-19. This objective is contained within action 2.3 of the research proposal.	479000	No	Unicentric	
Development of a vaccine, MVA-COVID-19, expressing SARS-CoV-2 antigens	Juan García Ariza	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00151	E) Vaccines	Our objective is to produce an effective vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 as follows: Vaccine 1: This vaccine named MVA-COVID-19 will be used for the development of a vaccine against coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 responsible for the disease COVID-19. This objective is contained within action 2.3 of the research proposal.	749500	No	Unicentric	
Design of molecular beacons for rapid and effective identification of SARS-CoV-2 RNA species in patient samples of COVID-19	Mario Fernández Fraga / Juan Ramón Tejedor Vaquero	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00624	A) Diagnostics	Due to the health emergency caused by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and in view of a possible scenario of resurgence, the development of a diagnostic technique that facilitates the screening of patients with symptoms of COVID-19 in a fast, accurate and easy-to-use manner is essential. Currently, COVID-19 has generated the greatest public health crisis, putting the health care system at serious risk of collapse. This is the main objective of the project.	15800	No	Unicentric	
Prognostic variables, resources consumed and cost in primary care of patients with COVID-19	Rosa Magallán Botaya	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00634	F) Epidemiological surveillance G) Socio-economic impact	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	26000	No	Unicentric	
Determinants of resistance and pathogenicity in SARS-CoV-2 infection: genomic and biochemical mechanisms	Carlos López Oñín / Alejandro López Soto	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00652	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	88000	No	Unicentric	
COVID-19, immune risk profile (attached to 00416 project)	Jordi Bas Mingual	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00654	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	90000	No	Multicentric	
Identification and characterization of the protective T-immune response to SARS-CoV-2. Guiding successful vaccine design	Julia García Prado	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00660	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	180000	No	Unicentric	
Characterization and therapeutic management of immunological hyperactivation associated with mortality in COVID-19	Rafael Correa Rocha	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00668	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	96000	No	Unicentric	
Registry of SARS-CoV-2 infection in patients with hemoglobinopathies and/or splenectomized: epidemiological surveillance and study of morbidity and Creation of the COVID19 patient cohort and samples associated with the Biobank of the Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria Galdakao Sur (IGGS)	Elena Ceta de Julían	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00675	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	35700	No	Multicentric	
Use of ozone for the reuse of personal protective equipment (PPE). OI-Covid19PPE study	EVA POVEDA LÓPEZ	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00698	B) COVID-19 disease characterization F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	23200	No	Unicentric	
TAINO-COVID-19: Mental health impact and Needs associated with COVID-19: a comprehensive national evaluation in Spain	Bernardino Clavo Varas	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00702	C) Therapies G) Socio-economic impact	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	109744	No	Unicentric	
Study of the dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic with physical-mathematical epidemiological models. Monitoring, control strategies, simulations and Design and development of peptide inhibitors of SARS-CoV-2 virus entry for human use	Jordi Alonso Caballero	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00711	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	330293	No	Multicentric	
Study of the dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic with physical-mathematical epidemiological models. Monitoring, control strategies, simulations and Design and development of peptide inhibitors of SARS-CoV-2 virus entry for human use	Antonio Guisao Piñera	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00736	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	2500	No	Unicentric	
Design and development of peptide inhibitors of SARS-CoV-2 virus entry for human use	Bruna Sainz Andring	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00749	C) Therapies	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	75000	No	Unicentric	
Diagnostic screening, chest inspection in patients with COVID19	Francisco Javier Alcalá Colomer	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00750	H) Artificial intelligence	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	130000	No	Unicentric	
Short and medium term therapies for the treatment of COVID-19: serology and vaccine development	Cayetano Von Kobbe	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00755	C) Therapies E) Vaccines	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	106500	No	Unicentric	
Structural and Dynamic Characteristics of Intrinsically Disordered Proteins of the SARS-CoV-2 Virus	Douglas Vinson Laurens, Miguel Momepán García	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00764	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	32500	No	Multicentric	
Mechanistic model based on artificial intelligence for the risk of developing SARS-CoV-2 infection	Joaquín Dopazo Blázquez	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00788	C) Therapies	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	57000	No	Unicentric	
Clinical utility of analysis of IL-6 signaling as an indicator of COVID-19 disease activity. Therapeutic opportunity with IL-6 trans signaling	Matilde Bustos de Abajo	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00792	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	160000	No	Multicentric	
Clinical and immunovirological aspects of SARS-CoV-2 infection in a cohort of pregnant women and newborns.	Maria Luisa Navarro Gómez	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00808	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	46550	No	Multicentric	
Study of the protection of BCG and MTBVAC against SARS-CoV-2 in primates	Carlos Martín Montañés	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00820	E) Vaccines	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	318000	No	Unicentric	
Rapid serological testing for combined detection of IgG and IgM against SARS-CoV-2	Clara O'Sullivan	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00823	A) Diagnostics	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	65000	No	Multicentric	
Incidence and characterization of low / high risk of complication profiles in people >60 years with COVID-19.	Ángel Vila Corrales	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00852	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	26877	No	Unicentric	
Application of AI to the immediate prediction of time series to optimize resource management in epidemics	José Luis Aznarra Mellado	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00856	G) Socio-economic impact H) Artificial intelligence	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	105000	No	Multicentric	
Dual Vaccinia MVA virus for immunization against SARS-CoV-2	Rafael Blasco Lozano	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00901	E) Vaccines	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	120000	No	Unicentric	
Seroprevalence against SARS-CoV-2 in pregnant women and newborns.	Javier Llorca Díaz / María Jesús Cabero Pérez	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00923	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	101500	No	Unicentric	
Regulation of macrophage extravasation by a2 adrenergic agonists in the STC associated with COVID-19	José Federico Díaz González	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00932	C) Therapies	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	49500	No	Unicentric	
Medium and long term forecast of the spread of COVID-19	David Expósito Singh	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00935	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	63500	No	Multicentric	
Immunological and virological factors in COVID-19 and their correlation with the evolution to severe forms of the disease.	Mercedes García Gasalla	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00943	A) Diagnostics	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	74000	No	Multicentric	
Observational multicenter registry of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection in Spanish UICs	Rafael González Cortes	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00944	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	4560	No	Multicentric	
EMCOVID-19: Multiple Sclerosis and COVID-19.	Luis Brieva Ruiz	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00948	B) COVID-19 disease characterization C) Therapies D) SARS-CoV-2	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	40640.2	No	Unicentric	
Naive T lymphocyte levels as a predictor of the efficacy of the immune response against SARS-CoV-2 and its potential vaccines	Rebeca Alonso Arias	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00968	C) Therapies	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	70465	No	Unicentric	
Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mental health of workers in health devices. International multicenter study: The COVID-19 HEROES study	María Fe Bravo Ortiz	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/00988	G) Socio-economic impact	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	39500	No	Multicentric	
Disruption of viral transport processes mediated by microtubules	José Fernando Díaz Pereira	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01007	C) Therapies	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	70000	No	Unicentric	
Determination of phenotypes predictive of complications in COVID-19 and evaluation of the efficacy of immunosuppressive treatments	Jesús Rodríguez Baño	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01031	B) COVID-19 disease characterization C) Therapies	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	8500	No	Unicentric	
SARS-CoV-2 diagnosis by phi29 polymerase amplification	Felipe Cortés Ledesma / Luis Blanco Dívila	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01036	A) Diagnostics	The clinical management of COVID-19 patients and the implementation of measures to prevent, alleviate and eradicate the disease are essential. It is currently not known whether the minority of poorly evolving cases of COVID-19 are due to an excess or defect in the immune or adaptive immune response.	20000	No	Unicentric	

Project Title	PI	Institution	Code	Category	Description	Start	End	Budget	Co-funded	Priority	Impact
Safety of Breastfeeding (BF) in SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) Confirmed Infection	Adelina Pellicer Martínez	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01046	F) Epidemiological surveillance	Currently, there are no formal studies on the efficacy of BF in the transfer of protective factors against SARS-CoV-2, and its safety, understood as the use of high-flow nasal cannulas (CNAs) in SARS-CoV-2 disease (the causative agent of COVID-19) may be limited by the risk of aerosol generation. This project aims to build an own and realistic model of society to study the transmission dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Spain. The model is based on the CovNanoVax arose from our previous experience in the development of polymeric nanosystems (loaded with genetic material) subjected to a Randomized clinical trial to evaluate the efficacy of Tenofor (TFV) (245 mg) / Emtricitabine (FTC) (200 mg) single tablet daily dose. Additionally, we have a project that tries to generate a registry of all patients diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 infection and previously diagnosed rheumatic disease. For this, data from the project consists of a prospective, observational, multicenter study that will evaluate changes in lung function (forced expiratory volume) of static lung.			63600	No	Multicentric	Within the lines proposed by the ISCIII we understand that our proposal fits within the scope of the "Epidemiological Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular epidemiology, incidence of reinfections and - The scope of the project is "Effectiveness of non-pharmacological, prophylactic and therapeutic interventions".
Study of contamination of surfaces and personal protective equipment by patients with severe respiratory infection by coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)	Oriol Roca	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01054	C) Therapies				63000	No	Multicentric	
Simulation and evaluation of the transmission dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Spain	Óscar Gálvez González	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01081	F) Epidemiological surveillance H) Artificial intelligence				24500	No	Multicentric	
CovNanoVax: Design of a mRNA vaccine based on polymeric nanoparticles targeting dendritic cells.	Salvador Borrás/ Cristina Fomagnora	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01100	E) Vaccines				193000	No	Unicentric	
Clinical trial for the Prevention of Coronavirus Infection in Healthcare professionals	Julia del Amo Valer	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01112	C) Therapies				510000	Yes	Multicentric	
Registry of patients with inflammatory and autoimmune diseases with SARS-CoV2 infection.	Ricardo Blanco Alonso / Miguel Ángel González-Gay	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01138	F) Epidemiological surveillance				5000	No	Unicentric	
Changes in lung function tests in patients with Covid-19 pneumonia	Jaime Signes-Costa Miñana	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01209	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				73500	No	Unicentric	
Mathematical modeling and prediction of incidence of COVID-19 outbreaks in Europe	Manuel de la Sen	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01215	F) Epidemiological surveillance				50000	No	Unicentric	
Structural analysis of SARS-CoV-2 membrane proteins for the design of new inhibitors of viral assembly	Marçal Vilar	Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)	COV20/01265	B) COVID-19 disease characterization C) Therapies				95000	No	Multicentric	
Clinical characterization of COVID-19 infection: Prognostic stratification and complications	Susana García Gutiérrez	Instituto de Investigación en Servicios de Salud-Asociación del	COV20/00459	F) Epidemiological surveillance H) Artificial intelligence				131500	No	Multicentric	
Retrospective cohort study to assess the effect of NSAIDs and ACE inhibitors on the prognosis of symptomatic patients with COVID-19	Raquel Cobos Campos	Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria Bioarab	COV20/00527	F) Epidemiological surveillance				22500	No	Unicentric	
Antiviral design for SARS based on polypharmacology	Victor Guallar	Barcelona Supercomputing Centre (BSC)	COV20/00505	C) Therapies				196000	No	Unicentric	
Risk factors, personalized prognosis and one-year follow-up of patients admitted to the Spanish Intensive Care Units infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus	Antoni Torre Martí	Centro de Investigación Biomédica en Red, CIBER (Hospital Ramón y Cajal)	COV20/00110	F) Epidemiological surveillance				1750000	No	Multicentric	
Decoy-ACE2: Use of catalytically inactivated soluble ACE2 as an anti-COVID-19 drug.	Alberto Marina Moreno / Vicente Rubio Zamora	Centro de Investigación Biomédica en Red, CIBER (Hospital Ramón y Cajal)	COV20/00437	C) Therapies				125000	No	Multicentric	
Real-time quantification of new unreported cases of COVID-19 in Spain	David Morilla Soler	Consorcio Centro de Investigación Biomédica en Red (CIBIR)	COV20/00115	F) Epidemiological surveillance				5484.8	No	Unicentric	
Genetic Determinants and Genomic Risk Biomarkers in Patients with SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Infection	Ángel Carracedo Álvarez (PI), Pablo Lapunzina (Co-PI)	Consorcio del Centro de Investigación Biomédica en Red (CIBIR)	COV20/00622	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				509900	No	Multicentric	
SARS-CoV-2 infection in patients with inflammatory bowel disease	Maria Esteve y Yamile Zabana	Fundació D'investigació i Recerca Mutua Terrassa	COV20/00227	F) Epidemiological surveillance				55285.28	No	Unicentric	
Characterization and management of Post Intensive Care Syndrome in COVID-19 patients	Gonzalo Sol Fernández	Fundació Parc Taulí	COV20/00595	B) COVID-19 disease characterization G) Socio-economic impact				180660	No	Unicentric	
Congenital immunity errors and predisposition to SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 severity. International coordinated action of complete exomic Study of the immune response in nested cases in a cohort to assess the effect of anti-infectious on the progression of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. Prognostic variables. Consumed resources and hospital cost of patients entered by SARS-CoV-2 infection, according to their frailty.	Rebeca Pérez de Diego	Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria del Hospital Universitario La Paz	COV20/01333	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				10000	No	Multicentric	
TH1 / TH17 / Th17 / Th17 response and TLRs / NLR receptors in clinical evolution of COVID19	Carolina Cubillos Zapata	Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria del Hospital Universitario La Paz	COV20/00207	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				84500	No	Unicentric	
Study to identify cytokine profiles capable of predicting the development of ARDS	Eva María Andrés Esteban	Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria del Hospital Universitario La Paz	COV20/00519	F) Epidemiological surveillance				39550	No	Unicentric	
Effect of drug consumption before and during SARS-CoV-2 infection on the evolution of patients with COVID-19. A population-based cohort study	Alejandro Vallejo Tiller	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica del Hospital Ramón y Cajal	COV20/01304	F) Epidemiological surveillance				47000	No	Unicentric	
COVID-19, immunologic risk profile (attached to the project presented by VMIR IP R Pujal-Borrall)	Jesús García Donas Jiménez	Fundación de Investigación HM Hospitales	COV20/00211	A) Diagnostics				167955	No	Multicentric	
Congenital immunity errors and predisposition to SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 severity. International coordinated action of complete exomic Infection, hospitalization, ICU admission, and death from SARS-CoV-2 in a population cohort	Ramón Gimeno Martínez	Fundación del Institut Mar d'Investigacions Mèdiques (FIMM)	COV20/00508	C) Therapies				138500	No	Unicentric	
Prognosis of patients infected with the new SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus	Jordi Carratalà Fernández	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00121	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				217552	No	Unicentric	
Effect of drug consumption before and during SARS-CoV-2 infection on the evolution of patients with COVID-19. A population-based cohort study	Aina Teniente Serra	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00388	F) Epidemiological surveillance				117578.59	No	Multicentric	
COVID-9 prevalence in patients with chronic inflammatory arthritis under treatment	José Carlos Rodríguez Gallego	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/01334	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				35000	No	Multicentric	
Pre-clinical mouse models for the study of COVID-19 and trial of therapeutic strategies	Jesús Castilla Catalán	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00542	F) Epidemiological surveillance				117000	No	Multicentric	
SARS-CoV-2 inhibition, Host Selection and Next-Move Prediction Through High-Performance Computing	Francisco Guede Sampedro	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00404	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				72000	No	Multicentric	
ACE2-ORIG: Development of a human cellular platform unveiling Angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) SARS-CoV-2 interactions	Adolfo Figueras Guzmán	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00470	H) Artificial intelligence				71000	No	Multicentric	
Deciphering ACE2-mediated SARS-CoV-2 lung infection	Sara Marzal Barril	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00357	C) Therapies F) Epidemiological surveillance				13510	No	Unicentric	
COVID-19, immune risk profile (attached to ODBS4 project)	Sagrario Ortega Jiménez	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00532	C) Therapies E) Vaccines				77000	No	Unicentric	
Evaluation of epidemiological scenarios of COVID-19 disease through an original model using machine computing	Modesto Orcezo	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00373	C) Therapies D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization F) Epidemiological surveillance				100000	No	Unicentric	
Exploiting protective immune responses to COVID-19 to unravel mechanisms associated with favorable clinical outcomes (PROTECTIVE STUDY)	Nuria Montserrat Pulido	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00278	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization				228000	No	Unicentric	
COVID-19, immune risk profile (attached to ODBS4 project)	BARCELO PASCUAL, CARLOS	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00571	B) COVID-19 disease characterization C) Therapies D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization				25000	No	Unicentric	
Evaluation of epidemiological scenarios of COVID-19 disease through an original model using machine computing	Ricardo Pujal Borrall	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00416	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				229000	No	Multicentric	
Exploiting protective immune responses to COVID-19 to unravel mechanisms associated with favorable clinical outcomes (PROTECTIVE STUDY)	Fernando Baquero	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00067	H) Artificial intelligence				69500	No	Unicentric	
Exploiting protective immune responses to COVID-19 to unravel mechanisms associated with favorable clinical outcomes (PROTECTIVE STUDY)	Sergio Serrano-Villar	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de la Fundación de Investigación Médica (FIMM)	COV20/00349	B) COVID-19 disease characterization				180000	No	Unicentric	

SARS-CoV-2 biosecurity vaccine development platforms	David Escors Murugarren	Fundación Miguel Servet (Nanarabimed)	COVID/00237	E) Vaccines	A SARS-CoV-2 biosecurity vaccine engineering platform will be established, which includes three production approaches. The first will use a human cell. The objective of this study is to determine the protective efficacy of melioidine against placebo in close contacts of people with COVID-19. For Molecular study using the NGS to obtain the genome sequences of the SARS-CoV-2 of the positive cases identified at the Elche General Hospital. An online platform will be created to register cases of patients with previous respiratory or family heart disease in which SARS-CoV-2 infection is confirmed.	115000	No	Uncentric
Pilot study to evaluate the efficacy and safety of melioidine as prophylaxis in people exposed to the disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus (COVID-19)	Félix Gutiérrez Rodero	Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la	COVID/00005	C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	48600	Yes	Multicentric
NGS Analysis of the SARS-CoV2 outbreak at the Elche General Hospital	Antonio Gallana Cabrera	Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la	COVID/00156	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	101060	No	Uncentric
COVID-19 in patients with heart failure and family heart disease	Juan Ramón Gimeno Blanes	Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la	COVID/00420	B) COVID-19 disease characterization F) Epidemiological surveillance H) Artificial intelligence	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	50000	No	Multicentric
The neurological component of COVID-19. Does the Neuro-COVID-19 exist?	Pedro Jesus Serrano Castro / Fernando Rodríguez de Fonseca	Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la	COVID/00157	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	122000	No	Uncentric
Prevention of COVID19 infection by administering hydroxychloroquine in elderly institutionalized people and residential care staff. Controlled, open study of the SARS-CoV-2 viral load in the respiratory tract and blood as a factor associated with the prognosis of COVID-19 in adults	José Miguel Morales Asensio	Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la	COVID/00565	C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	1024199.16	Yes	Multicentric
Multicenter study of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-2019) in Solid Organ Transplant Recipients	Maria Elisa Cordero Matia	Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Sanitaria y Biomédica de la	COVID/00370	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	182201	No	Multicentric
Residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2	José Ramón Blanco Ramos	Fundación Río Salud	COVID/00401	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	73400	No	Multicentric
Use of drugs that increase the expression of ACE2 and the risk of COVID-19: A case-pilot study	Francisco José de Abajo Iglesias	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica del Hospital Universitario	COVID/00027	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	27000	No	Uncentric
Evolution of the inflammatory profile and redox status in COVID-19 patients: Possible therapeutic targets?	Eduardo Tamayo Gómez	Universidad de Valladolid (UCV Valladolid)	COVID/00491	B) COVID-19 disease characterization C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	91000	No	Multicentric
Pilot, randomized, multicenter, open-label clinical trial of combined use of hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, and tocilizumab for the treatment of SARS-CoV-2	Pere Domingo Pedrol	Hospital Clinic de Sant Pau (HCB Sant Pau)	COVID/00070	C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	807360	Yes	Multicentric
Gestation and COVID-19: clinical and microbiological study	Anna Suy Franck	Fundación del Instituto de Investigación Vall d'Hebron (VIH)	COVID/00188	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	136478	No	Multicentric
Early diagnosis of COVID-19 by isolation of exosomes in individuals suspected of the disease	MAP del Pilar Martín Duque	Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud (IACS)	COVID/00155	A) Diagnostics	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	71500	No	Uncentric
Functional characterization of SARS-CoV-2-specific T and B cell long-lasting immunity in immunocompetent and immunosuppressed patients developing Therapeutic responsiveness directed at inhibition of ACE2 expression and viral S-trimer proteolysis	Oriol Bestard Matamoros	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00324	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	207714.35	No	Uncentric
Impact of monoclonal B lymphocytosis and the state of the immune system on the development and evolution of COVID-19 infection in adults. Nanosensor-based diagnosis and rapid isolation identification of SARS-CoV-2 virus interaction with its cellular receptor	José Alberto Orfao de Matos Correia e Vale	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Salamanca (IBSAL)	COVID/00173	A) Diagnostics	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	100000	No	Uncentric
STOP Coronavirus: clinical, immunological, genomic, virological and bioethical factors of COVID-19	José María Aguado García	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00181	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	1200000	No	Multicentric
Epidemiological study and clinical-molecular implications of angiotensin in the prognosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection	Maria Soledad Gaztambide Sáenz	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00421	B) COVID-19 disease characterization F) Epidemiological surveillance H) Artificial intelligence	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	170000	No	Uncentric
Immunosenscence as a risk factor for SARS-CoV-2 infection	David Oteaga / Alvaro Prada	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00314	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	44000	No	Uncentric
Analysis of soluble markers of immune activation and CD8 NK and T cell populations in patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection	Julián Pardo, José Ramón Paño Pardo	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00308	B) COVID-19 disease characterization D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	276000	No	Uncentric
Randomized clinical trial to evaluate the efficacy of different treatments in patients with COVID-19 who require hospitalization	José Ramón Arrbas	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00023	C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	474200	Yes	Multicentric
COVID-19 infection in HIV-infected patients included in SARS	Juan Benquerena	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00108	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	67885	No	Multicentric
Sedation With Sevoflurane Versus Propofol in Patients With Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome Caused by COVID-19 Infection	Rafaél Badenes Quilés	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00096	C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	21500	Yes	Multicentric
Quick Detection and Characterization of COVID-19 on the patient	Felipe J. Chaves Martínez	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00279	A) Diagnostics B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	175000	No	Multicentric
Derivation and validation of a prognostic scale in COVID-19 pneumonia. National multicenter study.	Rosalio Menéndez Villanueva	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00385	B) COVID-19 disease characterization H) Artificial intelligence	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	109000	No	Multicentric
Epidemiological record of pregnant women with COVID-19.	Oscar Martínez Pérez	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00021	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	43000	No	Multicentric
Multi-center, Randomized Clinical Trial of Convalescent Plasma Therapy Versus Standard of Care for the Treatment of COVID-19 in Hospitalized Patients. An international randomized trial of additional treatments for COVID-19 in hospitalized patients who are all receiving the local standard of care	Cristina Auedoño Solís & Rafael Duarte Palomino	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00072	C) Therapies	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	640279	Yes	Multicentric
Search for immunological, prognostic and therapeutic markers in patients with COVID-19	Marcos López Hoyos	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00170	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	51.252.00 €	No	Uncentric
Study of the Microbiome and Virome associated with COVID-19	Juan Carlos Rodríguez Díaz	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00236	F) Epidemiological surveillance B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	168050	No	Uncentric
Preclinical development of innovative mRNA/MVAVaccines against SARS-CoV-2	Felipe García	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00214	E) Vaccines	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	550000	No	Uncentric
Short, medium and long term effect of COVID-19 disease on the cardiovascular system.	Salvatore Brugaletta	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00040	F) Epidemiological surveillance	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	60000	No	Uncentric
Ultrasound monitoring in pregnant women with COVID-19 infection. Risks associated with severe infection and the trimester of pregnancy.	Marta López Rejano	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00310	B) COVID-19 disease characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	27375	No	Multicentric
Development of colorimetric sensors based on gold nanoparticles for the detection of SARS-CoV-2	Rodolfo Miranda Soriano	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00122	A) Diagnostics	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	340000	No	Uncentric
A prospective, multicenter, randomized, parallel, double-blind, placebo-controlled phase Ib clinical trial to evaluate intravenous infusion of role of NK cells in susceptibility and prognosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection (COVID-19)	Enrique Bernal Morell	Instituto de Investigación Biomédica de Bellvitge (IDIBELL)	COVID/00377	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, similar to other viruses in the same family, has the ability to affect the nervous system. This neurotoxicity, which has been attributed to the objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine chemoprophylaxis for healthcare personnel and address possible neurological and other sequelae in nursing. The general objective is to analyze the risk factors for COVID-19 in the low respiratory tract (epitome or invasion) in a sample of its study. No information exists regarding COVID-19 in solid organ transplant recipients (SOTR). Besides, treating a challenging after the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome due to coronavirus (SARS-CoV), many of the people who survived developed residual pulmonary fibrosis and lung capacity in survivors of SARS-CoV-2.	49900	No	Uncentric

Hydroxychloroquine efficacy in preventing SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 disease severity during pregnancy	Clara Menéndez Santos	ISGlobal (Barcelona)	COV20/00286	C) Therapies	This trial aims to assess the effect of hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) in reducing viral load and preventing SARS-CoV-2 infection in pregnant women. The objective is to carry out a clinical-epidemiological study as broad as possible in nursing homes in Albacete province to analyze the clinical... We are conducting a rapid, multi-national collaboration that aims to identify psychological and cultural factors that may be relevant to the virus spread and the pathways of a pathogen into our body is based on the breakdown of our physiological barriers. In the case of the nasotracheal tract, the epithelium is a dynamic structural analysis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus capsid in order to obtain its own frequencies and modes of vibration.	It is unclear how SARS-CoV-2 affects pregnant women and their offspring, as well as which factors may influence obstetrical disease and outcomes. This is a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled... Scopes of the call: f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular epidemiology: incidence of mortality and morbidity. Environmental and social factors of the... The objective of this urgent investigation is to develop a longitudinal and prospective approach to evaluate the psychological impact of SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 disease. The scope of the project focuses on the study of the interaction of the SARS-CoV2 coronavirus and the first cell barrier of our body for viable microorganisms, the nasotracheal epithelium of the airways. For this... Scope: This proposal is framed in section c) Development of innovative therapies, new antiviral, antibiotic and disinfectant molecules against SARS-CoV-2. Antiviral resistance studies. Effectiveness of... The project is adapted, first of all, to section f) of the call, in particular to sub-items 2 and 3, directly applied. In this case, to CoVid19: f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular...	530100	Yes	Multicentric
Clinical-epidemiological study of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in health centers: COVID-A study	Pedro Abizanda Soler	Servicio de Salud de Castilla-La Mancha (SESCAM)	COV20/00004	F) Epidemiological surveillance G) Socio-economic impact	The project aims to analyze the spatial behavior of transmission of the Covid-19 virus in urban spaces, in order to know where the main sources of infection are.	f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular epidemiology: incidence of mortality and morbidity. Environmental and social factors of the... The objective of this urgent investigation is to develop a longitudinal and prospective approach to evaluate the psychological impact of SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 disease. The scope of the project focuses on the study of the interaction of the SARS-CoV2 coronavirus and the first cell barrier of our body for viable microorganisms, the nasotracheal epithelium of the airways. For this... Scope: This proposal is framed in section c) Development of innovative therapies, new antiviral, antibiotic and disinfectant molecules against SARS-CoV-2. Antiviral resistance studies. Effectiveness of... The project is adapted, first of all, to section f) of the call, in particular to sub-items 2 and 3, directly applied. In this case, to CoVid19: f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular...	80000	No	Multicentric
PsyCorona: a multinational initiative of urgent data collection with a longitudinal and prospective approach	MANUEL MOYANO PACHECO	Universidad de Córdoba (UC)	COV20/00086	G) Socio-economic impact	We are conducting a rapid, multi-national collaboration that aims to identify psychological and cultural factors that may be relevant to the virus spread and the pathways of a pathogen into our body is based on the breakdown of our physiological barriers. In the case of the nasotracheal tract, the epithelium is a dynamic structural analysis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus capsid in order to obtain its own frequencies and modes of vibration.	The objective of this urgent investigation is to develop a longitudinal and prospective approach to evaluate the psychological impact of SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 disease. The scope of the project focuses on the study of the interaction of the SARS-CoV2 coronavirus and the first cell barrier of our body for viable microorganisms, the nasotracheal epithelium of the airways. For this... Scope: This proposal is framed in section c) Development of innovative therapies, new antiviral, antibiotic and disinfectant molecules against SARS-CoV-2. Antiviral resistance studies. Effectiveness of... The project is adapted, first of all, to section f) of the call, in particular to sub-items 2 and 3, directly applied. In this case, to CoVid19: f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular...	5000	No	Multicentric
Interaction between SARS-CoV-2 and the human respiratory epithelium: sequestration of endocytosis and exocytosis pathways	José María Carvajal González	Universidad de Extremadura	COV20/00429	D) SARS-CoV-2 characterization	The pathways of a pathogen into our body is based on the breakdown of our physiological barriers. In the case of the nasotracheal tract, the epithelium is a dynamic structural analysis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus capsid in order to obtain its own frequencies and modes of vibration.	This project focuses on the study of the interaction of the SARS-CoV2 coronavirus and the first cell barrier of our body for viable microorganisms, the nasotracheal epithelium of the airways. For this... Scope: This proposal is framed in section c) Development of innovative therapies, new antiviral, antibiotic and disinfectant molecules against SARS-CoV-2. Antiviral resistance studies. Effectiveness of... The project is adapted, first of all, to section f) of the call, in particular to sub-items 2 and 3, directly applied. In this case, to CoVid19: f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular...	110000	No	Unicentric
Dynamic calculation of the SARS-CoV-2 capsid for destruction by resonance	Fermin Luis Navarria Martínez	Universidad de la Coruña (UC)	COV20/01275	C) Therapies	The objective of the project is to carry out a dynamic structural analysis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus capsid in order to obtain its own frequencies and modes of vibration.	The objective of the project is to carry out a dynamic structural analysis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus capsid in order to obtain its own frequencies and modes of vibration.	59250	No	Multicentric
Elaboration of alert COVID-19 transmission maps in urban spaces oriented to the application of anti-propagation measures on a detailed	Mª Jesús Perles Roselló	Universidad de Málaga (UM)	COV20/00587	F) Epidemiological surveillance G) Socio-economic impact H) Artificial intelligence	The project aims to analyze the spatial behavior of transmission of the Covid-19 virus in urban spaces, in order to know where the main sources of infection are.	The project is adapted, first of all, to section f) of the call, in particular to sub-items 2 and 3, directly applied. In this case, to CoVid19: f) Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 and molecular...	40500	No	Unicentric
Dynamic prediction of COVID-19 scenarios in the short and medium term (PREDCO)	Jorge Mira Perez	Universidad de Compostela (USC)	COV20/00617	F) Epidemiological surveillance G) Socio-economic impact H) Artificial intelligence	This project aims to predict the evolution of the expansion and incidence of COVID-19, solving the main problems that the known models are facing: the distributed... We have developed and patented a methodology that allows to synthesize protein micro (MS) or nanospheres (NS) containing any protein of interest. Currently there are no methods to detect and visualize the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 on material surfaces. This project aims to design, develop and evaluate a... Although SARS-CoV-2 and other coronaviruses are primarily transmitted directly between individuals during asymptomatic phases, the transmission of the... The project aims to discover Mpro protease inhibitors of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by repositioning drugs as new antiviral agents. This will be done using... Given the speed with which we can sequence the genomes of new RNA viruses, developing therapies directed against them, rather than against viral... In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	30718	No	Unicentric	
Development of a vaccine against SARS-VOC-2 by means of mRNA-Mi micro / nanospheres	José M. Martínez Costas	Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC)	COV20/00050	E) Vaccines	We have developed and patented a methodology that allows to synthesize protein micro (MS) or nanospheres (NS) containing any protein of interest. Currently there are no methods to detect and visualize the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 on material surfaces. This project aims to design, develop and evaluate a... Although SARS-CoV-2 and other coronaviruses are primarily transmitted directly between individuals during asymptomatic phases, the transmission of the... The project aims to discover Mpro protease inhibitors of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by repositioning drugs as new antiviral agents. This will be done using... Given the speed with which we can sequence the genomes of new RNA viruses, developing therapies directed against them, rather than against viral... In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	This project contributes to the design and development of a vaccine totally new that could be taken to clinical phase in the near future. This activity is part of a development initiative of a rapid response... Expected impact: Rapid detection of SARS-CoV-2 and prevention of contagion through the use of existing optical technologies combined with artificial intelligence as a notable advance for the fast monitoring... Determining the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in the environment is essential for adequate control of the epidemic, going beyond actions aimed solely at reducing direct transmission of the virus. In this... The study will identify drugs that are currently on the market with an antiviral profile and therefore, that their use as therapeutic agents has been contrasted, with inhibitory activity of an enzyme of the virus... This project is part of the development of therapies against Covid-19. In specifically, it consists in the development of an innovative antiviral therapy based on a circular RNA molecule. In RNA that specifically... Impact: Non-viral vectors will have a great impact for the delivery of nucleic-acid based therapies, as they are easily scalable and present lower limitations regarding immunogenicity and adverse reactions. Our approach...	150000	No	Multicentric
Proof of Concept of fast detection method of SARS-CoV-2 contaminated surfaces using multispectral holographic and optical analysis with artificial	Emilio Gómez González	Universidad de Sevilla (US)	COV20/00080	F) Epidemiological surveillance	This project aims to predict the evolution of the expansion and incidence of COVID-19, solving the main problems that the known models are facing: the distributed... We have developed and patented a methodology that allows to synthesize protein micro (MS) or nanospheres (NS) containing any protein of interest. Currently there are no methods to detect and visualize the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 on material surfaces. This project aims to design, develop and evaluate a... Although SARS-CoV-2 and other coronaviruses are primarily transmitted directly between individuals during asymptomatic phases, the transmission of the... The project aims to discover Mpro protease inhibitors of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by repositioning drugs as new antiviral agents. This will be done using... Given the speed with which we can sequence the genomes of new RNA viruses, developing therapies directed against them, rather than against viral... In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	Expected impact: Rapid detection of SARS-CoV-2 and prevention of contagion through the use of existing optical technologies combined with artificial intelligence as a notable advance for the fast monitoring... Determining the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in the environment is essential for adequate control of the epidemic, going beyond actions aimed solely at reducing direct transmission of the virus. In this... The study will identify drugs that are currently on the market with an antiviral profile and therefore, that their use as therapeutic agents has been contrasted, with inhibitory activity of an enzyme of the virus... This project is part of the development of therapies against Covid-19. In specifically, it consists in the development of an innovative antiviral therapy based on a circular RNA molecule. In RNA that specifically... Impact: Non-viral vectors will have a great impact for the delivery of nucleic-acid based therapies, as they are easily scalable and present lower limitations regarding immunogenicity and adverse reactions. Our approach...	508500	No	Unicentric
Determination of the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in environmental samples and its potential indirect transmission	Pilar Domingo Calap	Universidad de Valencia (UV)	COV20/00210	F) Epidemiological surveillance	Although SARS-CoV-2 and other coronaviruses are primarily transmitted directly between individuals during asymptomatic phases, the transmission of the... The project aims to discover Mpro protease inhibitors of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by repositioning drugs as new antiviral agents. This will be done using... Given the speed with which we can sequence the genomes of new RNA viruses, developing therapies directed against them, rather than against viral... In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	Determining the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in the environment is essential for adequate control of the epidemic, going beyond actions aimed solely at reducing direct transmission of the virus. In this... The study will identify drugs that are currently on the market with an antiviral profile and therefore, that their use as therapeutic agents has been contrasted, with inhibitory activity of an enzyme of the virus... This project is part of the development of therapies against Covid-19. In specifically, it consists in the development of an innovative antiviral therapy based on a circular RNA molecule. In RNA that specifically... Impact: Non-viral vectors will have a great impact for the delivery of nucleic-acid based therapies, as they are easily scalable and present lower limitations regarding immunogenicity and adverse reactions. Our approach...	53119	No	Multicentric
Identification of Mpro protease inhibitors of the COVID-19 virus by drug repositioning	Juan Jesus Perez Gonzalez	Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña (UPC)	COV20/00052	C) Therapies	The project aims to discover Mpro protease inhibitors of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by repositioning drugs as new antiviral agents. This will be done using... Given the speed with which we can sequence the genomes of new RNA viruses, developing therapies directed against them, rather than against viral... In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	The study will identify drugs that are currently on the market with an antiviral profile and therefore, that their use as therapeutic agents has been contrasted, with inhibitory activity of an enzyme of the virus... This project is part of the development of therapies against Covid-19. In specifically, it consists in the development of an innovative antiviral therapy based on a circular RNA molecule. In RNA that specifically... Impact: Non-viral vectors will have a great impact for the delivery of nucleic-acid based therapies, as they are easily scalable and present lower limitations regarding immunogenicity and adverse reactions. Our approach...	14600	No	Unicentric
An innovative therapy against Covid-19 based on circular RNAs	Juana Díez Antón	Universidad Pompeu Fabra (UPF)	COV20/00183	C) Therapies	Given the speed with which we can sequence the genomes of new RNA viruses, developing therapies directed against them, rather than against viral... In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	This project is part of the development of therapies against Covid-19. In specifically, it consists in the development of an innovative antiviral therapy based on a circular RNA molecule. In RNA that specifically... Impact: Non-viral vectors will have a great impact for the delivery of nucleic-acid based therapies, as they are easily scalable and present lower limitations regarding immunogenicity and adverse reactions. Our approach...	152000	No	Unicentric
An Efficient Peptide Vector for mRNA Vaccination Against COVID19	Javier Montenegro García	Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC)	COV20/00297	E) Vaccines	In the race to find a COVID-19 vaccine, gene-based approaches are the leading choice with some already ongoing clinical trials. However, the main challenges of...	Impact: Non-viral vectors will have a great impact for the delivery of nucleic-acid based therapies, as they are easily scalable and present lower limitations regarding immunogenicity and adverse reactions. Our approach...	126425	No	Unicentric

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: China: HHS Attache Telephone Conversation with NHC Counterpart Regarding the Status of COVID-19 Origins Research
Date:	Mon, 23 Aug 2021 16:16:18 +0000

Thanks both, FYI I'm teleworking today, so if there's any more traffic that does come up on SIPR, I'd appreciate you keeping (b)(6) CCed. Thanks!

Best,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2021 12:07 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: China: HHS Attache Telephone Conversation with NHC Counterpart Regarding the Status of COVID-19 Origins Research

Hi all,

Sorry, got taken over by other things the moment I walked in. (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

Best,
Megan

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2021 12:01 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: China: HHS Attache Telephone Conversation with NHC Counterpart Regarding the Status of COVID-19 Origins Research

(b)(6)

I have not received anything related to this on SIPR yet.

Megan: when you do get something out (or if you already have) can you please send to me and to (b)(6) (b)(6) on the China Desk?

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary and Comment:** The PRC National Health Commission provided no substantive response to the HHS Health Attache's August 20 phone call regarding outstanding technical questions on COVID-19 origins and early days of the pandemic. The counterpart referred the Health Attaché to open source PRC briefings without adding further context. Post welcomes interagency instructions whether to provide the questions to the PRC in writing. **End Summary and Comment.**

PRC National Health Commission Response to HHS Attaché Inquiry Not Substantive

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Per refTel instructions, the HHS Health Attache called her PRC government counterpart, Han Jixiu, Deputy Director, Division of European and American Affairs, Department of International Cooperation, National Health Commission of China (NHC) on August 20 regarding outstanding technical questions on COVID-19 origins and early days of the pandemic. Han responded by quickly stating that all questions had been answered publicly in a series of MFA briefings to Beijing-based embassies and press. Han also asked whether or not the Health Attaché had read the joint China-WHO report of the Phase 1 origin study, stating that all answers were in that document. Han declaratively stated there is nothing new to report. She also asked for the questions in writing. (**Note:** Han referred to the WHO's March 20 report. Following publication of the report, the U.S. and other likeminded nations published a joint statement where they shared additional questions and concerns about the origin study. **End Note.**)

3. (U) Han subsequently stated that she would follow up in the event there was additional data to share. NHC contacts separately shared the following links with the HHS Health Attache:

State Council Information Office Press briefing on 22 July. Scripts are located at

>><http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwfbh/wqfbh/44687/46381/wz46383/Document/1709242/1709242.htm><<
:!

Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing to Embassies in Beijing news release:

>>http://new.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_673019/t1899291.shtml<<;

WHO-China joint report: >><https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-convened-global-study-of-origins-of-sars-cov-2-china-part><<;

Signature: MEALE

Drafted By: BEIJING: (b)(6)

Cleared By: AmEmbassy Beijing: (b)(6)
AmEmbassy Beijing: (b)(6)

Approved By: AmEmbassy Beijing: (b)(6)

Released By: BEIJING: (b)(6)

Info: DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE

Action Post: NONE

Dissemination Rule: DIS_HR_HUMAN_RIGHTS, DIS_HS_HEALTH, DIS_PASSLINE_NEA, DIS_USUN_W_DCS_EAS, DIS_PSC_CROSSCUT, DIS_PSC_HAITI_1, DIS_UNP_MAO_EAP, DIS_PRF_ASIA_POLECON,

DIS_USUN_W_SA_WI, DIS_PSC_PKA, DIS_UNP_DIR,
DIS_PSC_PRIN_PK_1

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SBU~~

Sender:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>
Recipient:	Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)	
	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)	@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)	@state.gov>

Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, CVIS, WHO, HK, CN
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: [REDACTED] 19-AUG-2021 EMAIL
Subject: China: HHS Attache Telephone Conversation with NHC Counterpart
Regarding the Status of COVID-19 Origins Research

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary and Comment:** The PRC National Health Commission provided no substantive response to the HHS Health Attache's August 20 phone call regarding outstanding technical questions on COVID-19 origins and early days of the pandemic. The counterpart referred the Health Attaché to open source PRC briefings without adding further context. Post welcomes interagency instructions whether to provide the questions to the PRC in writing. **End Summary and Comment.**

PRC National Health Commission Response to HHS Attaché Inquiry Not Substantive

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Per reftel instructions, the HHS Health Attache called her PRC government counterpart, Han Jixiu, Deputy Director, Division of European and American Affairs, Department of International Cooperation, National Health Commission of China (NHC) on August 20 regarding outstanding technical questions on COVID-19 origins and early days of the pandemic. Han responded by quickly stating that all questions had been answered publicly in a series of MFA briefings to Beijing-based embassies and press. Han also asked whether or not the Health Attaché had read the joint China-WHO report of the Phase 1 origin study, stating that all answers were in that document. Han declaratively stated there is nothing new to report. She also asked for the questions in writing. **(Note:** Han referred to the WHO's March 20 report. Following publication of the report, the U.S. and other likeminded nations published a joint statement where they shared additional questions and concerns about the origin study. **End Note.)**

3. (U) Han subsequently stated that she would follow up in the event there was additional data to share. NHC contacts separately shared the following links with the HHS Health Attache:

State Council Information Office Press briefing on 22 July. Scripts are located at
><http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwfbh/wqfbh/44687/46381/wz46383/Document/1709242/1709242.htm><
!

Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing to Embassies in Beijing news release:
>http://new.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_673019/t1899291.shtml<

WHO-China joint report: ><https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-convened-global-study-of-origins-of-sars-cov-2-china-part><

Signature: MEALE

Drafted By: BEIJING: [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Cleared By: AmEmbassy Beijing: [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Approved By: AmEmbassy Beijing: (b)(6)
Released By: AmEmbassy Beijing (b)(6)
Info: BEIJING (b)(6)
 DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE

Action Post: NONE
Dissemination Rule: DIS_HR_HUMAN_RIGHTS, DIS_HS_HEALTH, DIS_PASSLINE_NEA,
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 DIS_UNP_MAO_EAP, DIS_PRF_ASIA_POLECON,
 DIS_USUN_W_SA_WI, DIS_PSC_PKA, DIS_UNP_DIR,
 DIS_PSC_PRIN_PK_1

UNCLASSIFIED
 SBU

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Frisk, Megan L." (b)(6)

Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6)

'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

'Coronado, Alicia N CTR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6)

Waterman, Paige E (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

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Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6)

'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

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'EAP-CM-ECON-DL' <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

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To: 'ISN-BPS-DL' <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

'BEP' <BEP@state.sgov.gov>;

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Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6)

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Subject: RE: (Read-Aheads, part I) SubIPC on (b)(5) DPP Wednesday, August 11, 8:30 AM

Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2021 00:51:11 +0000

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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(b)(5) DPP

Best,

Megan

From: Frisk, Megan L.

Sent: Thursday, August 5, 2021 6:36 PM

To: Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz, Jonathan D'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Park, Christopher J'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E.

(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; '(b)(6) (Beijing)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) USARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) USARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz,

Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) Beijing' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'EAP-

CM-ECON-DL' <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'ISN-BPS-DL' <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; 'BEP'

<BEP@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL' <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) (USUN Rome)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (USUN Rome)'

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Subject: (Read-Aheads, part I) SubIPC on (b)(5) DPP Wednesday, August 11, 8:30 AM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Dear colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

All the best,
 Megan

Megan L. Frisk, PhD
 Global Health Security and Biodefense
 National Security Council | The White House

(b)(6) (desk)

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Sender:	"Frisk, Megan L." (b)(6)
Recipient:	Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)

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'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6)

Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6)

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Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6)

'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

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'EAP-CM-ECON-DL' <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

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Ref.: C.L.28.2021

The Director-General of the World Health Organization presents his compliments to Member States and has the honour to refer to the proposed plans for the next phase in the WHO-coordinated studies into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and to seek their continued support for these important activities. The Director-General continues to express his appreciation for the work of the WHO-joint international team and the progress in understanding the early phases of the pandemic and outlining future priorities.

In line with the request by Member States in resolution WHA73.1(2020) on COVID-19 response, the Joint Report on the WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part Joint WHO-China Study was published on 30 March 2021. The full report and appendices present the outcomes and recommendations of this first phase. WHO has analysed these findings and has received advice and suggestions for additional studies from Member States and members of the scientific community.

The next steps of the work will continue as a series of studies and activities to further explore all possible pathways of introduction of the virus into the human population. It will be scientific, transparent, and expert-led, taking into account the recommendations of the Joint Report, new scientific evidence, and recommendations of Member States.

The Director-General is pleased to share with Member States an outline of the proposed next steps to plan and implement the next series of studies for SARS-CoV-2 origins, including in China, as well as a framework to study the future emergence of novel pathogens. The proposed next steps are expected to be carried out with complete transparency and under the mandate of resolution WHA73.1 adopted by all Member States during the Seventy-third World Health Assembly.

Some of the follow-up studies identified in the Joint Report can and should be immediately conducted, while others require further planning in the short, medium and long term. These include:

- Integrated studies including humans, wildlife, captive, and farmed animals, and environment as part of a one health approach.
- Studies that prioritize geographic areas where there has been the earliest indication of circulation of SARS-CoV-2, and bordering areas where high prevalence of SARS-CoV in non-human reservoirs have been found. The prioritization of locations will be based on the available science, evidence gathered from previous studies and recommendations from Member States.

C.L.28.2021

- Studies related to animal markets in and around Wuhan, including continuing studies on animals sold at Huanan wholesale market.
- Studies related to animal trace-back activities, with additional epidemiology and molecular epidemiology work, including early sequences of the virus.
- Audits of relevant laboratories and research institutions operating in the area of the initial human cases identified in December 2019.

Specifically, the next series of studies should include, but not be limited to:

Epidemiological studies, including molecular epidemiology, serosurveys and access to and integration of data

The proposed epidemiological studies include:

1. additional analyses of morbidity and mortality surveillance data in China;
2. access to and additional investigations, analyses and review of cases and potential cases occurring in Wuhan in December 2019 and possibly earlier, including retrospective studies on the earliest confirmed or suspected cases, assessment of clinical records and archived biological materials;
3. access to and additional investigations, analyses and review of cases and potential cases from the retrospective review of the 233 Wuhan health care institutions from 1 October to 10 December 2019 and of any and all molecular data from the earliest cases;
4. detailed human serological surveys in Wuhan (including using stored sera from 2019), Hubei, surrounding areas, and elsewhere as necessary;
5. access to and further molecular studies of sequences from the earliest human cases and samples of SARS-CoV-2; and
6. continued efforts to build an integrated database, allowing linking up molecular data with metadata to facilitate more detailed analysis in support of epidemiological studies.

Animal and environmental studies

These studies include:

1. surveys of bats of relevant species for SARS-CoV-2 related viruses including sampling plans focusing on geographical areas of interest in China and in bordering countries where initial results indicate the possible circulation of relevant coronaviruses;

C.L.28.2021

2. surveys of other animals previously identified as potential host(s) or intermediary hosts for SARS-CoV-2-like viruses in relevant geographical areas informed by the Phase 1 studies and data on the trade of these species in markets in and around Wuhan;
3. follow-up traceback studies in people and animals associated with suppliers of domesticated farmed wildlife and breeding species to Wuhan markets and areas with earliest cases for SARS-CoVs;
4. Further and more targeted surveys of wildlife, livestock and other farmed fur animals and further testing of remaining animal products samples from Wuhan markets;
5. retrospective testing for SARS-CoV-2 of available products manufactured in 2019 supplied to the Huanan market and other Wuhan markets; and
6. SARS-CoV-2 persistence studies under different environmental conditions.

Laboratory audits

To further explore the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 could have resulted from a breach in laboratory protocols in China, and in response to Member States' requests, WHO has developed a laboratory biosafety and biosecurity assessment protocol, which will be reviewed and finalized with external experts, to be used in relevant laboratories to audit/review in detail biosafety, biosecurity and gain of function oversight practices relevant to SARS-CoV-2 and other coronaviruses.

The protocol will be relevant for this, and future events, and will include, but not be limited to, descriptions of personnel, physical and information security, animal and sample inventories, inventory of propagated viruses, waste management protocols, experimental records and laboratory notebooks, staff interviews and medical records, and biosafety, biosecurity, and gain of function research-related training protocols and records.

International expert teams will use this protocol to carry out audit missions to relevant laboratories where related coronavirus work has been conducted.

Immediate Next Steps

The World Health Organization will continue to develop operational plans and new terms of reference for the next series of studies in collaboration, and in consultation, with Member States and members of the scientific community. As part of activities to develop the framework WHO will:

1. Establish a permanent WHO International Scientific Advisory Group for Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO). SAGO will include broad and relevant technical expertise.

C.L.28.2021

Members of SAGO will be selected based on their technical expertise taking into consideration geographical representation and gender balance through an open call for nominations, including by Member States. As required, the Secretariat will also appoint technical advisors to SAGO. Future missions will include members and technical advisers of SAGO.

2. Develop operational plans and new terms of reference to guide and implement the next series of studies, in close consultation with the WHO Scientific Advisory Group for Origins.
3. Finalize the proposed laboratory assessment protocol in consultation with the WHO Scientific Advisory Group for Origins and other relevant external experts.
4. Develop a framework to define, guide and implement a process to study future emergence of or re-emergence of outbreak/epidemic/pandemic pathogens, in consultation with the WHO Scientific Advisory Group for Origins.
5. Further strengthen and resource the WHO Secretariat within the Emerging Diseases and Zoonoses Unit in the Health Emergencies Programme to provide effective support to virus origin activity.
6. Continue to engage, inform and consult with WHO's collaborating centers, COVID-19 technical expert networks, Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), Strategic & Technical Advisory Group for Infectious Hazards (STAG-IH), Research and Development (R&D) Blueprint for Epidemics technical partners, Biosafety and Biosecurity partners, WHO Global Laboratory Alliance for the Diagnosis of High threat Pathogens (GLAD-HP) laboratory networks. WHO will continue to work with other international organizations, and in particular Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and others.
7. Continue to engage, inform and consult with Member States on a regular basis.

WHO looks forward to working with Member States in a spirit of solidarity and collaboration. A Member State Information Session on this subject is scheduled to be held on Friday, 16 July 2021, at 13:30–14:30 CEST.

The Director-General of the World Health Organization takes this opportunity to renew to Member States the assurance of his highest consideration.

GENEVA, 14 July 2021

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5) DPP _____

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
CC: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Portions of Chinese BWC CBM Report Relevant to the Pandemic
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 17:21:18 +0000

Classified by Timothy J. Kootz,
 Deputy Assistant Secretary
 A/SKS
 Department of State
 Level: Confidential with modified
 handling
 Reason 1/4(b); 1.4(d)
 Declassify on : 6/1/2045

Hi Kelly -

I hope you and your family are healthy and holding up well in these difficult times.

Attached is a translation of a portion of China's BWC Confidence Building Measures report. You cleared on the U.S. CBM report in April, so I know you have some background on this process. Because of their relevance to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, we obtained a translation of the sections on (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP and we thought the NSC would be interested in seeing it. (b)(5) DPP

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(b)(5) DPP What do you think?

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Chafin, Kelly B. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Recipient: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;


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¹ World Health Organization

² World Organization for Animal Health

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
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


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


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
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
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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY

(b)(1)(1.4)(b); (b)(5) DPP

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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY


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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY

(b)(1)(1.4)(b); (b)(5) DPP

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
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY

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(b)(1)(1.4)(b); (b)(5) DPP

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY

(b)(1)(1.4)(b); (b)(5) DPP



From:	EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
To:	EAP-TopCables-DL <EAP-TopCables-DL@state.sgov.gov>
CC:	EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Subject:	EAP Top Cables of the Day - January 30, 2020
Date:	Thu, 30 Jan 2020 08:00:40 -0500

Top Cables of the Day January 30, 2020

EAP's Top Cables

- ~~(S/DF)~~ China Coronavirus: Mission China Prepares for Authorized Departure, Holds Town Hall (20 BEIJING 226)
- ~~(S/NT)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
(20 STATE 3645)
- ~~(S/NT)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
[REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d) (20 MANILA 45)
- ~~(S/NT)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
[REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d) (20 JAKARTA 85)
- ~~(S/DF)~~ Japan: Coronavirus Outbreak Hurting Travel and Tourism, Broader Economic Impacts Feared (20 TOKYO 108)
- ~~(C)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
[REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d) (20 JAKARTA 87)
- ~~(C)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
[REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d) (20 TOKYO 110)
- ~~(S/DF)~~ Canberra Bushfire and Smoke Sitrep No. 16; January 30, 2020 (20 CANBERRA 196)
- ~~(S/NT)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
[REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d) (20 BANGKOK 69)
- ~~(S/DF)~~ Australia: Forrest Saves the Ocean - a Market Solution to Plastic Waste (20 PERTH 10)
- ~~(C/REL EYEY)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1)(1.4)(d) (20 RANGOON 43)

Coronavirus Reporting:

- ~~(S/DF)~~ Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: Four New Cases in Japan, Including Three from Evacuation Flight; Second Plane of Evacuees from Wuhan Arrives at Haneda (20 TOKYO 112)
- ~~(S/DF)~~ Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: Eight Cases in Taiwan, 300 Taiwanese Stranded in Wuhan (20 TAIPEI 44)

- ~~(SBU)~~ Cambodia Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: One Case of Coronavirus Identified, U.S. Agencies Assisting (20 PHNOM PENH 104)
- ~~(SBU)~~ Vietnam: Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: Government Identifies Three New Coronavirus Cases (20 HO CHI MINH CITY 32)

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: David R. Stilwell - A/S, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 1/30/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender:	EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient:	EAP-TopCables-DL <EAP-TopCables-DL@state.sgov.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>

UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 11:56:21 +0000
To: svcSMARTCrossLow_SMG
Subject: Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: Eight Cases in Taiwan, 300 Taiwanese Stranded in Wuhan

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: SMART Core <svcSmartBtsEwsHPrec@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2020 4:57 AM
Cc:
Subject: Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: Eight Cases in Taiwan, 300 Taiwanese Stranded in Wuhan

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~~SBU~~



Info Office: EP_APEC, FO_STAFF, RSP_ARF, FO_CM_TC, ANP_PRIN, CM_CHINA_MONGOLIA, AITW2, RSP_CT, J_ECON, MLS_BURMA, MTS_INDONESIA, RSP_SCI_TECH, MLS_CAMBODIA, J_ECON_POLICY, AIT_ALL, MTS_PRIN, AITW, CM_TC, PD_ANP, DAS_POL_ECON, IDO, ANP_PACIFIC_ISLES, EX_ADM_GSO, EAP_EP, EX_DIR, TC_TAIWAN, DEP_DIR_JAPP

MRN: 20 TAIPEI 44
Date/DTG: Jan 30, 2020 / 300953Z JAN 20
From: AIT TAIPEI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PREL, SHLH, TBIO, CN, TW
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: Coronavirus Reporting 4PPO: Eight Cases in Taiwan, 300 Taiwanese Stranded in Wuhan

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** As of January 30, Taiwan authorities confirmed eight cases of the 2019-nCoV in Taiwan, the latest of which was the first domestic human-to-human transmission. Taiwan authorities have enacted strict control measures and responded in a quick manner, including suspending direct flights to Wuhan, all group tours to China, and applications from Chinese nationals to visit Taiwan for tourism and short-term studies. All visitors from the PRC's Hubei province, regardless of nationality, are banned from entering Taiwan. In addition to monitoring incoming travelers at airports for symptoms, Taiwan authorities are also monitoring individuals who are subject to home confinement

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and quarantine for 14 days to ensure compliance, as well as uploading National Immigration Agency data on travel histories to the national health insurance database. Media coverage has centered on the 300 Taiwanese currently stranded in Wuhan, to whom the PRC has refused to grant exit on charter flights, and the effects of Taiwan's exclusion from the World Health Organization (WHO) on the outbreak response. Taiwan CDC officials confirmed to AIT there has so far been limited contact with WHO officials, likely due to PRC interference. Taiwan's role in responding to the coronavirus and the fact that the virus directly affects its citizens in the PRC is another reason why Taiwan should be allowed to substantively participate in the WHO. **End Summary.**

Eight Confirmed Cases

2. ~~(SBU)~~ As of January 30, Taiwan authorities confirmed eight cases of 2019-nCoV. Seven of the cases were people who had been in Wuhan, and the eighth case was the first domestic transmission, involving the husband of an earlier confirmed case. All eight patients are currently in stable condition. There is a total of 621 suspected cases, with those individuals being held in quarantine until they test negative twice for the 2019-nCoV. Nearly 2,000 people, including those who have been in contact with confirmed or suspected cases and those with previous travel to Wuhan, are being asked by Taiwan's CDC to stay at home for 14 days.

Requests to Evacuate 300 Taiwanese in Wuhan Unanswered

3. ~~(SBU)~~ PRC officials have refused to allow Taiwanese living in Wuhan to return to Taiwan via charter flights and insisted they are being taken care of adequately, according to local media reports. Taiwan's quasi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) urged the PRC to be responsive to the needs of the 300 Taiwanese currently stranded in Wuhan and said it has received over 200 emergency phone calls from them, many of whom are in poor mental and physical health and are facing difficulty finding shelter. Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu requested U.S. assistance on January 26 to evacuate five Taiwan nationals in Wuhan who have urgent medical issues. Taiwan has also reached out to other foreign missions in Taipei, including the Europeans, for their assistance. Wu said Taiwan's MOFA had tried through SEF to request the PRC's assistance with these five individuals and the other Taiwanese trapped in Wuhan but had received no response.

PRC Regularly Sharing Public Information, Limited Contacts with WHO

4. ~~(SBU)~~ Taiwan CDC contacts confirmed to AIT that China's National Health Commission has been sending Taiwan regular updates, which is the same information the PRC also shares publicly. Following Taiwan's announcement of a fourth confirmed case on January 26, WHO officials contacted Taiwan CDC and subsequently convened a telephone conference with Taiwan and public health officials from several European countries to learn more about the epidemic situation in Taiwan. However, there has been no contact with the WHO since the call. Taiwan CDC speculated to AIT that the catalyst for this call was because the fourth confirmed case was a Taiwan national who had traveled to Europe with a tour group immediately following her trip to Wuhan.

Restrictions on PRC Students and Travelers

5. ~~(SBU)~~ Taiwan's travel advisory for the PRC, excluding Hong Kong and Macau, is currently at the highest level and Taiwanese are urged to avoid non-essential travel to the PRC. Group tours to the PRC from Taiwan are currently suspended, as are direct flights to Wuhan. Authorities have also tightened

restrictions on mainland Chinese visitors. All visitors from Hubei, regardless of nationality, are banned, with exceptions made only for spouses of Taiwanese. Applications from Chinese nationals from provinces other than Hubei to visit Taiwan for tourism and short-term studies are suspended indefinitely. Universities can accept returning Chinese students after February 9 if they ensure isolation and quarantine for 14 days. Business travel from provinces outside of Hubei is still permitted, with the requirement to self-monitor for 14 days. Chinese nationals are banned from visiting Taiwan’s outlying islands for any purpose.

Public Health Control Measures

6. (SBU) Health officials are monitoring incoming travelers at Taiwan’s airports. Taiwan authorities are also working to upload the travel history of Taiwanese who visited the PRC since January 13 to the national health insurance database, thereby alerting health care providers in case patients attempt to conceal their travel to mainland China. Taiwan authorities have enhanced public control measures by providing GPS-embedded mobile phones to individuals subject to home confinement and quarantine for 14 days, with health and police officials conducting follow-up calls and visits. Those found violating the quarantine will be subject to a fine and will be moved to a government-established quarantine site. The Ministry of Labor has advised companies against sending employees to infection areas in China. Both Foxconn and Pegatron announced that their Taiwanese employees in China can work from Taiwan offices for the time being.

Media Coverage

7. (SBU) Local media coverage has been generally balanced and supportive of the Taiwan authorities’ response to the outbreak. Initial outcry by some pro-PRC figures that Taiwan had temporarily banned the export of certain types of surgical face masks to ensure sufficient domestic supplies has died down, and public opinion appears to be strongly in support of the ban. Taiwan authorities continue to assure the public that the government is taking measures to guarantee the domestic supply of face masks and urged people not to hoard masks. Media reports have also focused on Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO and appeals from other countries for the WHO to include Taiwan health authorities in meetings. Several outlets highlighted Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s remarks to the press that Taiwan must be included in the WHO for better epidemic prevention.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Signature: GREENE

Drafted By: TAIPEI: (b)(6)
Cleared By: ECON: (b)(6)
 POL: (b)(6)
 PD: (b)(6)
 ECON: (b)(6)
Approved By: EXEC/LEG: (b)(6)
Released By: TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Info: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; DIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; ATLANTA GA, CDC *ROUTINE*; DEPT OF

HHS WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*

XMT: CARACAS, AMEMBASSY; ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL

Action Post: NONE

Dissemination Rule: DIS_EP_FROM_APEC, DIS_FO_STAFF, DIS_RSP_ASEAN_FORUM, DIS_FO_CM_TC, DIS_ANP_PRIN, DIS_CM_CHINA_MONGOLIA, DIS_AITW2, DIS_RSP_CT, DIS_J_ECON, DIS_MLS_BURMA, DIS_MTS_INDONESIA, DIS_RSP_PUB_HEALTH, DIS_MLS_CAMBODIA, DIS_J_ECON_POLICY, DIS_AIT_ALL, DIS_MTS_PRIN, DIS_AITW, DIS_CM_TC, DIS_PD_ANP, DAS_POL_ECON, DIS_IDO, DIS_ANP_PACIFIC_ISLES, DIS_EX_ADM_GSO, DIS_EAP_EP, DIS_EX_DIR, DIS_TC_TAIWAN, DIS_DEP_DIR_JAPP

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~~SECRET~~

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 11:57:03 +0000
To: svcSMARTCrossLow_SMG
Subject: China Coronavirus: Mission China Prepares for Authorized Departure, Holds Town Hall

From: SMART Core <svcsmartbtsewssprec1@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2020 4:47 AM
Cc:
Subject: China Coronavirus: Mission China Prepares for Authorized Departure, Holds Town Hall

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SBU



Info Office: CM_CHINA_MONGOLIA, PD_ANP, DAS_POL_ECON, IDO, RIMO, ANP_PACIFIC_ISLES, ANP_PRIN, EX_ADM_GSO, EX_RPM, EX_HRU, EAP_DEP_DIR, RSP_ARF, MLS_CAMBODIA, K_DPRK, RSP_CT, J_PRIN, AIT_ADMIN, AIT_ALL, EAP_ADMIN, MTS_PRIN, FO_STAFF, RSP_HUM_RIGHTS, P_PRESS, EAP_EP, CM_TC, EAP_FAO, J_ECON, EP_APEC, K_ROK, MTS_INDONESIA, EX_PMO, DEP_DIR_JAPP, RSP_SCI_TECH, EX_PRIN, DMC, FO_CM_TC, AITW2, MLS_BURMA, AITW, REQ_TAGS_1, REG_IMO_OFF

MRN: 20 BEIJING 226
Date/DTG: Jan 30, 2020 / 300943Z JAN 20
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, CDC, HHS, NIH, CN, PGOV, SENV, PREL, CASC, AMGT, AMED, KPAO, KMDR, ASEC
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 20 BEIJING 218
 B) 20 BEIJING 216
 C) 20 BEIJING 214
 D) 20 BEIJING 202
 E) 20 BEIJING 200
 F) 20 BEIJING 198
 G) 20 BEIJING 188
 H) 20 BEIJING 186
 I) 20 BEIJING 174
 J) 20 BEIJING 172
 K) 20 BEIJING 166
 L) 20 BEIJING 164
 M) 20 BEIJING 142
 N) 20 BEIJING 122

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Page 1 of 16

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- O) 20 BEIJING 108
- P) 20 BEIJING 74
- Q) 19 WUHAN 112

Subject: China Coronavirus: Mission China Prepares for Authorized Departure, Holds Town Hall

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** Mission China held a Town Hall January 30 led by Ambassador Branstad to discuss authorized departure and posture in response to the novel coronavirus. The PRC coronavirus response group led by Premier Li Keqiang called for the delayed return to work of some Chinese government personnel. Mission China is scheduled to reopen February 3 to focus fully on the response to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus. The Mission China Task Force will continue to meet daily and report on the 2019-nCoV outbreak. **End Summary.**

Mission China Town Hall

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Embassy Beijing held a Town Hall January 30 led by Ambassador Branstad to discuss Mission China's authorized departure of family members and all non-emergency U.S. government employees, along with Mission posture in response to the coronavirus outbreak. Staff and family member from the Consulates also participated.

Assistance to AmCits and Relief Coordination for Wuhan

3. ~~(SBU)~~ Embassy Beijing continues to coordinate with the Department on assistance to and the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens who remain in Wuhan. The Mission China Wuhan Relief Group is coordinating with the Department to place relief supplies and donations aboard any aircraft that may travel to Wuhan to evacuate U.S. citizens.

Central Government Leaders Call for Delayed Return of Some Government Personnel

4. ~~(SBU)~~ The PRC's Central Leading Group for the 2019-nCoV Response convened a meeting on January 29, chaired by Premier Li Keqiang. The group noted that "the epidemic is still in the phase of spreading" and called on public agencies and entities to allow non-critical personnel traveling from areas with "high rates of infection" to delay their return to work. With the permission of the State Council, Hubei Province and other highly affected areas may delay the reopening of public offices, businesses, and schools, "as appropriate."

Triage Procedures at Beijing Hospitals Observed; No Reported Stresses on Healthcare Systems

5. ~~(SBU)~~ Embassy Beijing received a notice January 29 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) directing diplomatic personnel in Beijing with fevers to go to one of two hospitals: Ditan Hospital and You'an Hospital. On January 30, Embassy Beijing ESTHoff and a CDC Officer visited Ditan Hospital and two other hospitals with locally designated fever clinics: Beijing United Family Hospital (BJU) and Huaxin Hospital. BJU is frequented by Embassy personnel.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ At the hospitals, the CDC Officer conducted a rapid on-the-spot assessment of: (1)

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procedures for funneling individuals entering the hospital to one entry point where a triage nurse was set up; (2) screening and triaging patients at the entry point, including through temperature checks, symptom screen, and basic risk assessment (e.g., asking about recent travel history); (3) use of personal protective equipment (PPE) by healthcare workers (HCW) and training on PPE; (4) procedures for isolating individuals with a fever from the general hospital population and directing those with fever to the fever clinic; (5) presence of functioning negative-pressure isolation rooms on site; (6) lab testing capacity for 2019-nCoV on site in the fever clinics; and (7) existing protocols for HCW who may have been exposed. The expert assessed that all three hospitals had adequate capacity and procedures in place, to varying degrees. Among the three, BJU was superior in their triage procedures.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ At BJU, ESTH was told that BJU's fever clinic had reopened at 11:00 AM on January 30. The CDC Officer observed that the triage nurse was wearing a face shield, mask, gloves, and a gown. The assigned security personnel escorting patients to the fever clinic were wearing masks and face shields. Adult patients with temperatures above 37.3°C (99.1°F) are escorted to the fever clinic; children are escorted to a pediatric fever clinic, and all accompanying family members are immediately masked (if not already) and screened by staff. A BJU triage nurse said that BJU can test for 2019-nCoV in-house, and that the fever clinic has fully functioning negative-pressure isolation rooms. Patients who test positive for the virus are sent to one of the city's designated treatment hospitals. The triage nurse further indicated that BJU has established protocols for HCW who are exposed and has conducted training with all staff on the proper use of PPE.

8. ~~(SBU)~~ At Ditan hospital, ESTHOff spoke with a hospital administrator and asked about the MFA notice directing diplomatic personnel in Beijing with fevers to its facility. The administrator said she was not aware of the MFA notice and told ESTHOff the hospital did not have any special procedures or services for the intake of diplomatic personnel. The administrator suggested that Embassy staff and family just go to the nearest locally designated fever clinic or treatment hospital. [Note: Beijing city government has a published list of 101 fever clinics and 21 designated treatment hospitals in the city. End note.]

9. ~~(SBU)~~ CGs Shanghai and Guangzhou report no visible signs of stress to the local healthcare system. In Shanghai, private hospitals that serve international clients, including the official American community, appear to be operating as normal. In Guangzhou, there have been no reported changes to hospital conditions or wait times since the ConGenOffs' January 28 survey of facilities.

10. ~~(SBU)~~ According to contacts, as of today, Sichuan province has dedicated more than 2,273 beds in hospitals across the region, in addition to 30 backup hospitals, to treat patients infected with the virus. Sichuan currently has 54 quarantine sites, with an additional 249 backup sites. As of yesterday, 2,011 fever clinics at hospitals across Sichuan have screened over 75,000 patients for the virus.

11. ~~(SBU)~~ To ease the pressure on major hospitals in Chengdu, the provincial health commission has installed a new community-based early screening and referral system. Individuals with fever and other possible symptoms are urged to first contact their community

health center for primary screenings. Symptomatic patients are then referred to fever clinics or placed under house quarantine for further monitoring. There are 197 hospitals with fever clinics in Chengdu, which are mandated to transfer confirmed cases to 17 designated treatment hospitals. Major hospitals in the city center, including Huaxi Hospital -- Sichuan's main provincial hospital and the primary hospital for CG Chengdu's community -- have not been designated as nCoV treatment hospitals. However, as noted in prior CG Chengdu reporting, Huaxi and other Chengdu hospitals have setup diagnostic and fever tents.

International Schools

12. ~~(SBU)~~ The PRC Ministry of Education January 27 suspended all classes at schools until further instructions from local authorities. International schools in Beijing said January 29 the Beijing Municipal Education Commission (BMEC) announced that the reopening of schools shall now be determined by BMEC. The Western Academy of Beijing (WAB), International School of Beijing (ISB), and the British School of Beijing (BSB) said they will implement online learning starting February 3. American International School of Guangzhou (AISG), where all ConGen children study, still plans to re-open February 17 and sent instructions for on-line classes beginning February 3. Shanghai international schools attended by Consulate EFMs continue to plan on reopening February 17.

Beijing

13. ~~(SBU)~~ In Beijing, there are no reports of road closures or traffic restrictions from Beijing's transport authority and city police. Public buses and subway lines within the city continue to operate as normal. Grocery stores appear well-stocked. The DiDi ride-hailing app (similar to Uber) was functioning again on January 30. [Note: Didi announced January 29 that it was suspending most services by private drivers in Beijing "in response to local authorities' requirement." There was no announced reason why the service had resumed. End note.]

14. ~~(SBU)~~ China's Ministry of Transport (MOT) issued a notice on January 30 forbidding local transport authorities from closing highways or inter-province roadways in response to 2019-nCoV (link). MOT also published a notice on January 30 that vehicles carrying emergency supplies should receive free passage across provinces and would be exempt from any tolls or fees (link).

15. ~~(SBU)~~ The Hilton Beijing hotel, where many TDY and official visitors to Beijing stay, told an Embassy CDC officer January 29 that their procedure following any guests identified with a fever is to call the police/ambulance to take the guest to a hospital. Hilton staff said they would ensure the guest had a mask on and was set aside until the police arrived.




Figure: Hilton Beijing staff conducting temperature checks of hotel guests

Chengdu

16. ~~(SBU)~~ As of January 30, Sichuan province reported 142 cases of individuals infected with the nCoV virus. On January 30 Chengdu reported its first death, an 86-year-old woman with a history of prior illness. In Western Sichuan's remote Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, local authorities announced that two individuals were confirmed as having the virus, bringing the total number of cases in Ganzi to five. Another 29 individuals in Ganzi suspected of suffering from the virus remain under quarantine. One contact speculated that these individuals may have been tourists from Wuhan who had chosen to spend their New Year sightseeing in the area. Tibetan contacts speculated that the number of individuals infected with the virus in Western Sichuan might be higher, with one Tibetan telling us he was forced to depart Chengdu in a hurry to take care of his parents after "several" individuals in their village fell ill.

17. ~~(SBU)~~ As of January 30, China's ride sharing application, DiDi, pushed a message to its English-speaking users, indicating the company would no longer provide "inter-city services" between Chengdu and other cities. Post confirmed all travel within Chengdu and to the local international airport remains available.

18. ~~(SBU)~~ United Airlines, Hainan Airlines, and other international airlines continue to operate flights out of Chengdu. Consulate employees transiting Chengdu's Shuangliu International Airport have reported inconsistent levels of arrival and departure health checks. Upon departure

or arrival, all travelers are required to undergo a “health check” which entails filling out a form indicating recent travel and any potential symptoms.

19. ~~(SBU)~~ Controls on movement within Chengdu extend to the lowest levels of governance, contacts say. One contact reports local police in residential areas of Chengdu checking the home registration (户口) for all individuals entering a given neighborhood, saying that authorities have been turning away anyone whose registration shows that they do not reside in that neighborhood, even if they are registered elsewhere in Chengdu. In rural areas of the province, contacts report authorities are searching all vehicles to ascertain if any passengers have recently arrived from Wuhan, while in city areas, police are stopping all cars with license plates from Hubei, of which Wuhan is the provincial capital. According to contacts, Sichuan has designated hotels to quarantine individuals with recent travel to Hubei, while some private hotels are refusing to admit any person with registration there.

20. ~~(SBU)~~ Despite February 17 being the official start date for schools, some universities have begun to hedge on when students and faculty should return, with the Southwest Minorities University in Chengdu publishing a notice that “all individuals should wait until further instructions at a later date before planning their return.”

21. ~~(SBU)~~ Likeminded diplomatic colleagues based in Chongqing believe the next 5-8 days will be crucial for the municipality to contain the virus. On January 28, the first confirmed coronavirus case was reported in the municipality’s Yuzhong district, where many of the foreign consulates are located. This appears to have triggered a more stringent set of public health measures, with mandatory temperature checks observed at residential compounds, gas stations, malls, and car routes. Contacts noted there remains a lot of concern, locally that Chongqing could become another epicentre for coronavirus infection based on the significant flow of people between Chongqing and Wuhan. On January 28, the Deputy Director of Chongqing’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention was quoted as saying that some 210,000 people had ‘recently’ travelled from Wuhan to Chongqing prior to movement controls being implemented in Hubei Province. This has triggered a widespread grid search campaign by authorities to identify people in Chongqing coming from Wuhan and those with whom they have been in contact.

22. ~~(SBU)~~ According to diplomatic contacts, Chongqing has ordered non-essential businesses to stay closed until February 9th. Schools are to remain closed until February 17. As of January 28, Chongqing’s one international hospital, Raffles Medical, still offers fever screening and blood test and directs patients to a designated public hospital if they test positive for the virus. English service at Raffles Hospital is reportedly inconsistent, and our diplomatic contacts said they have been unable to assess the availability/quality of foreign language services at the two hospitals designated for foreigners suspected of coronavirus infection.

23. ~~(SBU)~~ On January 28, Chongqing municipal government held a press conference, stating it had implemented containment measures, including setting up checkpoints at airports, train stations, highway exits, and piers to identify vehicles and passengers coming from Hubei Province. Starting on the morning of January 26, Chongqing’s municipal metro system began operating on a reduced schedule. Chongqing has also stopped all interprovincial bus services.

Our contacts reported no indication that flights and trains have or would be disrupted. In addition, Chongqing FAO has suspended all activities with foreign countries until the end of February and has requested the city's consulates general do the same.

24. ~~(SBU)~~ Contacts also reported that masks remain difficult to procure locally. Chongqing FAO has circulated an updated list of supplies that the government needs for its response, which mainly consist of personal protective equipment. Authorities are asking foreign company contacts that are cleared to sell these supplies in China to increase their imports of such products. Chongqing is also willing to accept donations from private organizations and sub-national governments.

Guangzhou

25. ~~(SBU)~~ USDH and EFMs participated in Mission China's townhall January 30, followed by a ConGen Guangzhou Q&A session on authorized departure. CG Guangzhou will conduct an EAC January 30.

26. ~~(SBU)~~ Guangdong's provincial FAO, health commission, and information bureau held a briefing January 30 for the consular corps. The officials sought to calm anxiety in the consulate community by reiterating the province's pledge not to resort to lock down measures, to maintain normal transportation, and to quickly resolve supply shortages of face masks. Guangdong FAO officials told the consular corps there was "no need to withdraw" foreign nationals from Guangdong.

27. ~~(SBU)~~ CG Guangzhou RSO issued a security notice with guidance for responding to mandatory temperature checks, instructing USDH and EFMs to contact RSO if at any point they encounter forcible attempts to bring personnel to a fever hospital for further testing. At the January 30 briefing by FAO, provincial officials told the consular corps the protocol for foreign diplomats would be at-home quarantine.

28. ~~(SBU)~~ As of January 30, all regularly scheduled flights to the United States from Guangzhou and Shenzhen are operating normally. According to the FAO, the main carrier out of Guangzhou, China Southern (code share Delta, AA), has not cancelled any international routes.

29. ~~(SBU)~~ In Guangdong, provincial and municipal governments resumed normal operations as of January 30. Banks are scheduled to re-open February 3.

30. ~~(SBU)~~ CG Guangzhou reported that as of COB January 29, the New Zealand Consulate is working with minimal staff and LES working from home if needed. Some Consulate staff, including New Zealand Police, have voluntarily left China, although a Consulate contact reported Foreign Affairs had not yet decided to repatriate non-essential staff and their dependents. The UK Consulate is running with minimal staff and has offered voluntary departure to its staff. The Canadian Consulate has drawn down to minimal staff through at least February 3 and is offering essential consular services only. The Canadian Consulate has set up a screening station outside the Consulate entrance. Canadian Consulate leadership is actively

discussing evacuating dependents from Guangzhou.

31. ~~(SBU)~~ As of January 30, grocery stores surveyed by Consulate Guangzhou staff were well stocked and appeared to be increasing the availability of meat and produce. Water deliveries to Consulate personnel remain available through the Consulate's supplier, though delivery times were constrained through the extended holiday.

32. ~~(SBU)~~ Guangzhou public transportation remains open. ConGenOffs observed metro and bus ridership seemed to be up compared to previous days. Checkpoints have been stood-up at key freeway junctures to screen all inter-provincial inbound car traffic.

33. ~~(SBU)~~ High speed rail link suspension for mainland trains to Hong Kong went into effect at 12:00 AM January 30. ConGenOff observed at one Guangzhou train station that as many as one-third of overall rail frequencies in an out of the city are cancelled the evening of January 29, while no cancellations were evident at a second station.

34. ~~(SBU)~~ Foot traffic is light at inter-city bus terminals and plenty of tickets available to most mid-range destinations, according to ConGenOff observations. Staff confirmed bus service to Hong Kong Airport was suspended.

Shanghai

35. ~~(SBU)~~ CG Shanghai reported January 30 Shanghai has not yet seen signs of significant disruption to local transportation, food distribution, or medical services. The Shanghai consular district accounts for about 11 percent of total confirmed cases, with approximately half of those in Zhejiang Province. Confirmed cases in Shanghai – currently around 100 - remain low both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the population. Members of the Consulate community continue to find grocery stores accessible and well stocked, though supplies of some products – especially fresh vegetables and pork – are in short supply in some stores some of time. The Shanghai municipal government has acknowledged that demand for these items is higher than normal, attributing the increase in demand to decreased travel outside of the city and more residents cooking at home rather than eating out. While many restaurants remain closed, meal and grocery delivery services are operating as normal.

36. ~~(SBU)~~ The Shanghai subway network and the Didi ride hailing service continue to operate as normal. The ride-hailing app Didi is requiring all passengers and drivers to wear protective masks. The airport and high-speed rail service continue to operate, although a number of airlines have reduced or discontinued service to Shanghai from overseas. Some of these airlines have explicitly cited public health reasons as the main factor in their decision while others have pointed to reduced demand as the main driver.

37. ~~(SBU)~~ Calls into CG Shanghai ACS regarding the crisis have risen steeply in the last 24 hours. The Consulate's public mailbox had over 300 inquiries with questions about evacuations and guidance on the coronavirus. More than 700 U.S. citizens have enrolled in the STEP program since Friday.

38. ~~(SBU)~~ Google's General Counsel for China told CG Shanghai's Consul General January 30 that Google is not closed and has no plans to do so. The General Counsel said the company had merely delayed post-holiday reopening by a week to comply with a request from local authorities. Google offices will reopen and function normally from February 10.

39. ~~(SBU)~~ Health inspection sites on highways between Shanghai and other cities remain in place. A Consulate EFM January 29 observed four health inspection sites on the highway between Shanghai and Kunshan. Despite light traffic on the highway, long queues were present at inspection sites, where temperatures of all drivers and passengers were being checked.




Figure: *Health inspection site on highway between Shanghai and Kunshan.*

Shenyang

40. ~~(SBU)~~ CG Shenyang reported January 30 that the situation remains stable with increased monitoring measures. Shenyang city is quiet with most residents heeding the government's call to stay home. Public transportation is operating, albeit on a reduced schedule. Taxis are available. There have been no significant changes to transportation within Shenyang since our last update. Transportation service between cities has been reduced. As reported in previous updates, intercity bus service was suspended in Liaoning province and some high-speed trains will skip Shenyang. While transportation is available, individual districts within the city have begun announcing measures to isolate neighborhoods and track residents down to the city block level. For example, Tiexi district, a district within Shenyang city, announced "isolation management" measures on January 29 that require people entering Tiexi district to have their temperatures checked. Only residents in Tiexi can enter and leave freely while visitors will

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need to register so that the local officials can maintain accountability of them. While Tiexi was the first district to announce these “isolation measures” publicly, consulate staff report that these procedures are being expanded to cover all districts in Shenyang. One Consulate staff reported residents of his neighborhood who traveled out of town for the Lunar New Year holiday were contacted and told they could not return home once the neighborhood went into “isolation management.” Within NE China, Chinese media have reported that some cities have enacted stringent measures to prevent cases of coronavirus from entering the city limits. For example, Yanji city, near the North Korean border, has reported no cases of coronavirus. The city has suspended all public transportation within the city as well long-distance transportation. Hotels in Yanji cannot accept outsiders.

41. ~~(SBU)~~ Shenyang Airport is operating normally with temperature check stations for passengers in vehicles leaving and arriving at the airport. China Southern’s direct flight from Shenyang to Los Angeles operates three times a week and remains in operation, according to contacts at the Shenyang Airport. Data shared by CG Shenyang contacts show that outbound flights to Los Angeles are at almost full capacity. Tuesday’s flight from Shenyang to Los Angeles had 20 empty seats and Thursday’s flight has 10 empty seats out of a maximum capacity of 286 seats. In comparison, contacts noted that the inbound flight from Los Angeles to Shenyang has fewer passengers but is still within an acceptable range. Thursday’s flight from Los Angeles to Shenyang had 170 passengers out of 286 seats. Contacts noted that both inbound and outbound flights are normally at full capacity during the Lunar New Year because of students studying in the United States. The China Southern flight is NE China’s only direct international flight to the United States.

42. ~~(SBU)~~ Consulate Shenyang held an EAC meeting and joined the Ambassador’s town hall meeting for AMCIT employees and family members on January 30. Shenyang will also hold an LE staff town hall meeting on the first workday after the extended holiday on February 3. Over the last 24 hours, the total number of patients with confirmed coronavirus in NE China increased by 16. Chinese media reported that two patients in Jilin and Liaoning province has recovered from the coronavirus and were released. These are the first reported cases of patients being fully cured and released from quarantine in NE China.

Media/Social Media

43. (U) People’s Daily continued to publish new stories about how China will “definitely win the battle against the epidemic.” People's Daily cited statements by international personages in support of China's efforts against the epidemic, including the tweet by U.S. President Trump which appreciated China for its efforts in preventing and controlling pneumonia caused by the new coronavirus. As well as Alex Azar, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services appreciated China's prior disclosure of gene sequence information of new coronavirus, and emphasized that this is helpful for the development of virus diagnosis methods. Xinhua and widely amplified by all media including CCTV prime time is an order from Xi Jinping to the Chinese military to “keep its mission firmly in mind and shoulder responsibility to make contributions to winning the battle against the novel coronavirus epidemic.” The military resolutely implemented the decisions and arrangements of the CPC Central Committee after the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan of Hubei Province, Xi said, adding that the armed forces

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rapidly initiated the joint prevention and control mechanism and sent elite medical teams to combat the epidemic at the frontline. Xi said the epidemic prevention and control “remained grim and complex and demanded the armed forces shoulder their responsibility, fight the hard battle and actively assist local authorities in fighting the epidemic.” Xinhua and CCTV also featured Li Keqiang and officials emphasizing the treatment of patients and the supply of medical resources. The piece said that prevention and control efforts are in full swing and have been intensified, but the epidemic keeps spreading, with a rapid rising trend in some regions. The meeting also stressed efforts of epidemic prevention and control amid the return trips of people after the Lunar New Year holiday, adding that proper postponement of return should be allowed. Delays in business operation and school opening should be applied. Chinese outlets also report over 7,700 confirmed cases of coronavirus in China, 170 deaths, and 128 recovered patients. Xinhua amplified a health official in Beijing that “early reporting, isolation, diagnosis is the best way to contain coronavirus.” Xinhua and other outlets also covered work by the Wuhan Institute of Virology to screen new coronavirus drugs that can inhibit coronavirus. Another article in Global Times praised Wuhan residents for “whistle-blowing” on virus outbreak. A top epidemiologist at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) on Wednesday commended eight residents, who were detained in early January for spreading “rumors” about the outbreak of the novel coronavirus. Zeng Guang, Chief epidemiologist at the CCDC, said those eight residents should be highly regarded as they turned out to be correct about the viral outbreak, even though the information they spread “lacked scientific evidence.” Zeng’s comment followed an article from the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) on Tuesday, in which the top court said that the eight Wuhan residents should be “tolerated” and their act of spreading the information, if taken seriously, would have done much good to the public. China Daily reports on efforts to guarantee key supply items and featured promises by various businesses including Wumart and Alibaba.

44. (U) In commentary Xinhua said China’s virus battle unites people and protects the world. Xinhua said, accusations that the massive city lockdown in Wuhan is a violation of human rights emerged, but the citizens of Wuhan disagree. Since the lockdown was put in place, they have been staying indoors and practicing quarantine measures with the utmost respect for the government’s guidance and their hallmark perseverance and optimism. They have a sober understanding that while inconveniences may emerge, the historic quarantine serves their health, safety and overall interests. Social cohesion binds the people of Wuhan at this critical moment. Xinhua concludes, time will prove that China has made wise decisions and will emerge even stronger after coming through the epidemic. Messages to CPC members continued to “stand up in time of crisis--resolutely winning the battle of prevention and control of epidemic.” Global Times comments that Provincial Governor Wang Xiaodong himself made a mistake in that press conference about the annual production capacity of masks in Hubei Province, which attracted fierce criticism from the public. But after that, the leading cadres in Hubei province did not shrink back, and Wang Xiaodong attended the press conference for the second time to communicate with the media and the public. At last night’s press conference, Governor Wang Xiaodong first expressed “understanding and appreciation” for the public’s supervision and criticism of the work of Hubei Province since the outbreak. He praised and bowed to medical staffs as a tribute at the press conference. Many people who watched last night’s press conference felt that the governor’s behavior was very sincere, says Global Times.

45. (U) Social media continued to track and monitor the virus. One of the most popular related topics is the first case confirmed in Tibet. The top story on Weibo is a 100 second [video](#) that went viral with Zhang Wenhong, the infectious disease expert tasked with managing Shanghai's response to the novel coronavirus. In the video, Mr. Zhang said he asked all CCP members of his hospital, to replace those who already has been combating the coronavirus for a long time. "You cannot bully obedient people" said Mr. Zhang. Other popular topics include the live streaming of the construction of the two field hospitals in Wuhan - every vehicle and machine has been nicknamed by netizens. Top three hashtags have received 76 million views: 1. Hubei governor responded to criticism of netizens; 2. The epidemic is still in spreading process; 3. Pets need to be isolated if they touch virus. Other popular posts showed factory production of masks and protective gear, profiles of doctors and medical providers working to protect others, and other stories on numbers of cases.

All 31 Provincial-Level Territories at Highest Level of Alert

46. (SBU) The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) decided to raise its public health alert to Level 1 on January 29, the highest level. All 31 provincial-level territories have now declared Level-1 emergencies (*People's Daily*).

Nationwide Cases: All 31 Provincial-Level Territories with Confirmed Cases

47. (SBU) China's National Health Commission (NHC) reported 1,737 newly confirmed cases on January 29 as of 24:00, as total confirmed cases rose to 7,711, including 1,370 cases in serious or critical condition ([link](#)). Among the new cases is the first confirmed case in the TAR. NHC further reported 38 new deaths on January 29, including 37 in Hubei and one in Sichuan. The number of patients treated and released rose to 124. A total of 12,167 cases are currently suspected, with 81,947 close contacts in isolation under medical observation.

Table: Confirmed Cases in Mainland China as of January 29

Province/City/Region	Total confirmed cases to date	New confirmed cases	Total deaths to date	New deaths reported
Anhui	200	48	--	--
Beijing	111	20	1	--
Chongqing	165	18	--	--
Fujian	101	17	--	--
Gansu	26	2	--	--
Guangdong	311	70	--	--
Guangxi	78	20	--	--
Guizhou	12	3	--	--
Hainan	46	3	1	--
Hebei	65	17	1	--

Heilongjiang	43	6	1	--
Henan	278	72	2	--
Hubei	4,586	1,032	162	37
Hunan	277	56	--	--
Inner Mongolia	18	2	--	--
Jiangsu	129	30	--	--
Jiangxi	162	53	--	--
Jilin	14	5	--	--
Liaoning	39	1	--	--
Ningxia	17	5	--	--
Qinghai	6	--	--	--
Shaanxi	56	10	--	--
Shandong	145	24	--	--
Shanghai	101	21	1	--
Shanxi	35	8	--	--
Sichuan	142	34	1	1
Tianjin	27	3	--	--
Tibet	1	1	--	--
Xinjiang	14	1	--	--
Yunnan	70	19	--	--
Zhejiang	428	132	--	--
TOTAL (NHC Reported)	7,711	1,737	170	38
TOTAL (From Provinces)	7,703	1,733	170	38

-- zero cases. Source: NHC,

provincial health commissions, and state media.

Table: Confirmed Cases in Other Countries and Regions as of Mid-Day January 30

Country/Region	Total Cases	New Confirmed Cases
Thailand	14	--
Hong Kong	10	2
Singapore	10	5
Japan	10	3
Taiwan	8	--
Macau	7	--
Australia	7	2

Malaysia	7	4
United States	5	--
France	5	1
South Korea	4	--
Germany	4	--
Canada	3	2
Vietnam	2	--
Nepal	1	--
Cambodia	1	--
Sri Lanka	1	--
United Arab Emirates	1	1
Finland	1	1
Total	101	21

Notes: As of 10:30 AM on January 30. Source: Ding Xiang Yuan, <http://www.dxy.cn/>

More Confirmed Cases of Third-Country Nationals in China, But No Amcits

48. ~~(SBU)~~ Guangdong authorities confirmed January 29 in a press conference that one Pakistani and two Australians had contracted the virus, the first cases involving foreigners in the province. According CG Guangzhou contacts, the Australians were students in Wuhan and have recovered. Health authorities reiterated to the Guangzhou consular corps January 30 there have been no fatalities in Guangdong and the preponderance of cases had a direct tie to Hubei, or a very close contact with someone with Hubei travel. No cases of Amcits currently in China have been confirmed and reported by PRC authorities.

Evacuation of Third-Country Nationals

49. ~~(SBU)~~ Nine of the 210 Japanese citizens evacuated from Wuhan to Tokyo on a second chartered aircraft on January 30 are reportedly symptomatic, with cough or fever. Two other Japanese passengers with fever or cough had been stopped from boarding at a pre-flight health screening in Wuhan (CCTV). Earlier, three of the 206 Japanese citizens that were evacuated from Wuhan to Tokyo on January 29 on the first chartered aircraft were diagnosed with 2019-nCoV (CCTV). Five of the passengers on the January 29 flight reportedly had fevers before they arrived in Tokyo.

Public Spending on 2019-nCoV Response

50. ~~(SBU)~~ China's national and local governments have reportedly spent RMB 27.3 billion (US\$ 3.9 billion) in public funds on the 2019-nCoV response as of 1700 on January 29 (CCTV). The Organization Department of the Communist Party announced on January 30 that it would release RMB 108 billion from CCP member dues to assist local governments (*The Paper*).

Mask Shortages – Daily Production in China Currently at 40-Percent Capacity

51. ~~(SBU)~~ Officials from China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) have estimated the country’s maximum daily production capacity for masks at around 20 million per day, about half the global total ([link](#)). According to the officials, current production is at around 8 million masks per day due to the holiday. MIIT has called on enterprises to increase shifts and resume their normal production levels, though officials noted difficulties faced by producers. As one official said, “Most workers have returned home, supplies of raw materials have stopped, and logistics are at a halt.” Officials also noted disruptions in inter-province rail service and trucking routes as a factor. Guangdong authorities told the consular corps January 30 that 27 of the 29 manufacturers in the province have resumed operation and estimated local shortages should ease within days.

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Signature: Branstad

Drafted By: BEIJING: [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

Cleared By: ESTH [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
POL [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
POL: [redacted] (b)(6) Beijing
POL-ECON: [redacted] (b)(6)
RSO: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Beijing)
CONS: [redacted] (b)(6) Beijing
POL [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
MGT/MED: [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
MGT: [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
POL-ECON: [redacted] (b)(6) (Guangzhou)
HHS/CDC/CGH [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
PD: [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
ECON: [redacted] (b)(6) Chengdu
HHS/CDC/IRD [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
INFO: [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
INFO: DHS/CBP [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
INFO: HHS/OGA [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)

Approved By: CDA: Klein, William H (Beijing)
Released By: BEIJING [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
Info: SEOUL, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; TAIPEI, AIT ROUTINE; HANOI, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; SINGAPORE, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; ULAANBAATAR, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; PHNOM PENH, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; BANGKOK, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; HONG KONG, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; MANILA, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; PARIS, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; VLADIVOSTOK, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; ATLANTA GA, CDC ROUTINE; DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; CIA

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XMT:

CARACAS, AMEMBASSY; ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL

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MRN: 20 CANBERRA 196
Date/DTG: Jan 30, 2020 / 301018Z JAN 20
From: AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, CMGT, PREL, PGOV, SOCI, KPAO, ECON, CASC, AU, AINF, KRIM, ANET
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: Canberra Bushfire and Smoke Sitrep No. 16; January 30, 2020

Summary:

1. (U) After mid-morning AQIs reaching 181, the air quality in Canberra fell to the moderate level. Post continues to monitor fires located south of Canberra as temperatures rise and dry weather continues. If the fire projections are accurate and the fire crosses the Monaro Highway, that would potentially cut one of the main land routes out of Canberra. The Ambassador visited Emergency Management Victoria (the state government agency managing emergencies in Victoria) and the National Council for Fire and Emergency Services today (see PAS below for more information). End summary.

Management:

2. (U) Post is taking initial readings from the Aeroqual air monitors. We are testing them in three homes with the single air purifier provided to each home so far working in one room. In that room, mg/m³ readings ranged from 10 mg/m³ to 24 mg/m³ in the morning. Management will continue to monitor, record, and report on home air quality. We hope to have more comprehensive home readings once we get the bulk of our air purifiers in the next 2-3 weeks. RSO and Management developed tentative staffing lists to stand up an Incident Command Center should fires gain momentum over the weekend.

RSO:

3. (U) The Orroral Fire south of Canberra was downgraded to ADVICE level yesterday and has burned 14,908 hectares. However, the fire is still rapidly advancing across several fronts. Reports from the fire line indicate the fire advanced 2 km last evening against the wind. Our sources report this is atypical and indicative of the heavy fuel loads and dangerous fire conditions in this area. RFS projections show the fire likely crossing the Monaro Highway to the fire's east on Saturday and potentially linking with larger fires to its west over the next 3-7 days. Efforts to construct containment lines or effectively water bomb are severely hampered by steep terrain across Namadgi National Park. Should the ACT receive southwesterly, southerly, or southeasterly winds, RFS projections indicate the fire would resume its advance on Canberra suburbs and likely impact residential zones. Three RFS volunteers were injured last night on the Orroral Fire when a tree fell on their tanker truck. None received life threatening injuries.

4. (U) There are currently 72 fires in NSW with 22 "not yet controlled". There are 38 fires in Victoria with

18 "not yet controlled". There are currently 2 fires in the ACT and 1 is "not yet controlled".

5. (U) The fire danger in the ACT is currently VERY HIGH. In NSW, fire districts surrounding the ACT remain VERY HIGH. Across the rest of NSW, fire danger remains LOW-MODERATE to HIGH. Fire danger in Victoria is VERY HIGH across the entire state. There is a total fire ban in the ACT through Friday. Conditions are expected to significantly worsen in the ACT and southeastern NSW beginning Friday with SEVERE to EXTREME levels anticipated.

6. (U) In Canberra Civic Centre, AQI is currently 138 (UNHEALTHY FOR SENSATIVE GROUPS). The AQI in East Sydney is currently 38 (GOOD) – the monitoring station in Sydney's CBD is still offline. The AQI in Melbourne CBD is currently 24 (GOOD). Reference - www.aqicn.org.

7. (U) Metrics

Number of fires in NSW: 72
Emergency - 0
Watch and Act - 0
Advice - 72
Fires Out of Control – 22

Closest fires in and around Greater Sydney Region:

- 1) East of Georges River, Campbelltown (Advice; Under Control; 2 ha) Greater Sydney
- 2) Prospect Reservoir (Advice; Under Control; 6 ha) Greater Sydney
- 3) Erskine Creek Fire- Blue Mountains (Advice; Under Control; 17,811 ha) 86km west of Sydney

Number of fires in ACT: 2
Emergency - 0
Watch and Act - 0
Advice - 2
Fires Out of Control - 1

Closest fires in and around Canberra:

- 1) Beard Fire (Advice; Under Control; 424 ha) – within Canberra
- 2) Orroral Fire (Watch and Act; Not Yet Controlled; 14,908 ha) – 21 km SSW from Canberra
- 3) Mary's Hill (Advice; Under Control; 2,127 ha) – 37 km from S. Canberra

Number of fires in Victoria: 38
Emergency - 0
Watch and Act - 0
Advice - 38
Fires Out of Control: 18


Closest fires in and around Melbourne:

- 1) Gellibrand (Advice; Under Control; 347 ha) 146km SW of Melbourne
- 2) Abbeyard (Advice, Not Yet Under Control; 102510 ha) 185 km NE of Melbourne
- 3) Bairnsdale (Community Information; Not Yet Under Control; 311413 ha) 235 km NE of Melbourne


Prevailing fire/wind/weather conditions:

BOM is forecasting hot, dry, and windy conditions across the ACT and NSW/Victoria border are over the next 48 hrs.

Canberra Area of Operations




Sydney Area of Operations



Eastern Victoria Area of Operations

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**Sydney:**

8. ~~(SBU)~~ The Consul General, Marine Attaché, Air Force Attaché, and ACS Chief represented the Mission at the memorial service for the deceased U.S. firefighters at RAAF Base Richmond, with the Deputy Prime Minister, NSW Premier, Canadian Consul General, NSW RFS Commissioner, and other high-level NSW officials in attendance. The Prime Minister was unable to attend due to his own father's funeral. RFS and the Australasian Fire & Emergency Services Authorities Council presented medals to the deceased firefighters' families. The firefighters' names will also be added to the National Emergency Services Memorial in Canberra in April. Photos of the memorial service are available here:

https://www.facebook.com/pg/nswrfs/photos/?tab=album&album_id=10157660346115552



Memorial service for deceased firefighters McBeth, Hudson, and DeMorgan

Consular:

9. ~~(SBU)~~ ACS continues to work with local officials, the deceased firefighters' families, and U.S. Department of Defense on repatriation of remains, as the coroner has completed identification and is preparing final documentation to release the remains. We have received no further reports of U.S.

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citizens directly affected by the fires.

PAS:

10. (U) Emergency Management Victoria (the state government agency managing emergencies in Victoria) and the National Council for Fire and Emergency Services (AFAC) both tweeted about Ambassador Culvahouse's January 30 visit to the State Control Centre and his message of solidarity:



11. (U) The NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) tweeted about the memorial service held today to honor the three American crew members who died in last week's crash:



12. (U) Ten stations aired a video of the final seconds of the crashed Coulson C-130 firefighting air tanker, showing the severity of the conditions at the time:
<http://www.mediaportal.com/mp/playnow.aspx?u=149204&p=1343927428&key=1744016123254864321925222823224322414125116>

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Signature: Culvahouse

Drafted By: CANBERRA: (b)(6) (Canberra)

Cleared By: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) RSO
 (b)(6) FAC Manager
 (b)(6) Deputy PAO
 (b)(6) SYD CG
 (b)(6) Consular Country Coordinator

Approved By: Hennessey-Niland, John A/DCM

Released By: CANBERRA: Dockery, John C (Canberra)

Info: SYDNEY, AMCONSUL *ROUTINE*; MELBOURNE, AMCONSUL *ROUTINE*; PERTH, AMCONSUL *ROUTINE*

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MRN: 20 PERTH 10
Date/DTG: Jan 30, 2020 / 300130Z JAN 20
From: AMCONSUL PERTH
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ECON, SENV, EPET, EIND, ETRD
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: 19 PERTH 140
Subject: Australia: Forrest Saves the Ocean - a Market Solution to Plastic Waste

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary and Comment:** Australian billionaire mining magnate and philanthropist Andrew Forrest is driving an industry-focused, market-based strategy to monetize recycled plastic and turn the tide on worldwide plastic waste. The Sea the Future initiative calls on major plastics producers and users to pay a voluntary levy on plastics produced from fossil fuels. The goal is to make recycled plastic a cheaper feedstock – as well as a cashable commodity – that will drive global recycling and remediation efforts. Forrest’s philanthropic arm, the Minderoo Foundation (Minderoo), aims to gain the support of 100 key plastics producers worldwide to ensure transparency in the new global supply chain. Minderoo will contribute AUD 440 million (USD 300 million) to this effort, and Forrest claims positive reactions from Coca-Cola, Walmart, Unilever, Saudi Aramco, and Reliance Industries (India’s largest plastics group), although no formal agreements have been announced yet.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ **Comment:** Persuading the fossil fuel-based plastics industry to voluntarily participate in changing the global plastics supply chain is a challenge that fits with Andrew Forrest’s experience and philosophy. He is well-known in Australia as a big thinker who has pledged to give away most of his multi-billion-dollar fortune. The Minderoo Foundation has experience applying market-based principles to global social issues, including establishing a global slavery index. This, combined with Forrest’s deep knowledge of ocean plastics – he recently completed a Ph.D in marine science – and his extensive access to world leaders and global captains of industry, suggest the Sea the Future project is worth watching as it unfolds. This market-focused effort, if successful, could complement policy work underway in multilateral fora like APEC. For their part,

affected U.S. companies will be keen to understand the details of this effort before committing, particularly to ensure that no new barriers are created to trade. End Comment.

Size of the Problem Needs Scale and Speed

3. (U) Speaking to a Perth audience (refTel) in December 2019, Forrest noted that the environmental and social damage of the 350 million metric tons of plastic produced annually costs an estimated USD 2.2 trillion per year. Stemming the flow of plastic into the environment is “like trying to hold back the tide with your foot. Only the market is big enough to fix this problem.”

Plastic as a Commodity, Not Waste

4. (U) Forrest’s proposed solution is to treat plastics as a cashable commodity, which can be done by eliminating the price differential between fossil fuel and recycled plastic. Fossil fuel, or resin-based, plastic is currently marginally cheaper, on average, to produce than recycled plastic. Under the scheme, companies will pay the Sea the Future Fund voluntary contributions to produce, sell, and purchase plastics made from fossil fuel, but not on recycled plastic. The levies, which will vary depending on the type of plastic produced or used, will drive the price of fossil fuel plastic higher and make recycled plastic a cheaper feedstock, Forrest maintains. By the time the increased cost filters through the supply chain down to the consumer, the difference will be a matter of a few cents on most items, he believes. On the other hand, the voluntary contributions paid by the producers are anticipated to be USD 20 billion annually, which will be used to fund global recycling collection and environmental mediation. The resulting supply chain will be “circular,” keeping plastic in the economy and out of the oceans and the environment. As a cashable commodity rather than “waste,” recycled plastic will enable “dignified work” and poverty alleviation opportunities, particularly in Southeast Asia where the waste problem is widespread. According to Forrest, the scheme will also save an estimated 56 billion metric tons of carbon as recycled plastic replaces fossil fuel-produced plastic.

100 Key Producer Companies Targeted

5. ~~(SBU)~~ The Sea the Future initiative has identified the 100 largest fossil fuel plastic producers out of an estimated 700 worldwide. It will focus on 55 companies that dominate the global supply chain (and “are worth talking to,” according to Forrest.) Coca-Cola, Walmart, Unilever, Saudi Aramco, and India’s Reliance Industries have expressed support for the initiative, Forrest has reported. At least two of these companies are close to a formal agreement, although not yet

ready for public announcement, contacts familiar with the initiative told CG Perth in January. In addition to high-level talks with company and government leaders, the initiative will “name and shame” companies that decline to participate, Forrest said. Minderoo’s initial contribution of AUD 440 million (USD 300 million) will be used to not only independently audit and certify the new plastics supply system to prevent fraud, but will also create a central online database accessible to anyone. In addition, the initiative’s online public campaign [#NoPlasticWaste](#) lists 14 major plastics producers (including Chevron, Dow and ExxonMobil in the United States) and asks viewers to sign a petition urging them to use recycled plastic and contribute to the Sea the Future fund. The petition had over 19,000 signatories on January 22 and grows daily. Forrest’s associated [TED Talk](#) on Sea the Future has already attracted more than 1.8 million viewers.

Forrest has the Money, Experience, and Connections to Lead

6. (U) Andrew Forrest is currently Australia’s second richest person and leading philanthropist, with a net worth of around AUD 10 billion (US 7 billion). He made his fortune in the iron ore business, founding and driving Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) in just over a decade to become Australia’s third largest iron ore producer (behind Rio Tinto and BHP). In 2011 Forrest stepped down as CEO to focus on philanthropic interests, but he remains Chairman and the company’s largest shareholder. He and his wife Nicola signed the Bill Gates/Warren Buffet “Giving Pledge” in 2017 in which they noted their preference to support long-term solutions that engage industry and communities rather than short-term answers, e.g., cash handouts. Their philanthropic arm, the Minderoo Foundation, follows this philosophy, funding initiatives that look for systemic, long-term change: ending human slavery; collaborating on cancer research; promoting early childhood education; responding to and recovering from brush fires; and eradicating ocean plastics, among others.

7. (U) Forrest also has a deep personal interest in ocean plastics. He completed a Ph.D. (entitled “Pelagic Ecology and Solutions for a Troubled Ocean”) at the University of Western Australia in 2019 under Dr. Jessica Meeuwig, a marine expert and close contact of CG Perth. He credited his academic research with opening his eyes to the scale of the oceans plastics problem. He also co-authored a scholarly [article](#) (“Eliminating Plastic Pollution: How a Voluntary Contribution From Industry Will Drive the Circular Plastics Economy”) published in *Frontiers of Marine Science* in September 2019 which provides the analytical basis for and previews the Sea the Future initiative. Similar to his foundation’s work on modern slavery, which established the [Global Slavery Index](#), the Sea of Future initiative applies Forrest’s business principles to another global social challenge.

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Signature: Gainer

Drafted By: PERTH: (b)(6) (Perth)
Cleared By: ECON: (b)(6) (Canberra)
 ECON: (b)(6) (Canberra)
 ECON: (b)(6) (Canberra)
 MGT: (b)(6) (Perth)
Approved By: EXEC/LEG: Gainer, David J (Perth)
Released By: PERTH: (b)(6) (Perth)
Info: CANBERRA, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; MELBOURNE,
 AMCONSUL *ROUTINE*; PERTH, AMCONSUL *ROUTINE*; SYDNEY,
 AMCONSUL *ROUTINE*

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MRN: 20 RANGOON 56
Date/DTG: Jan 30, 2020 / 301201Z JAN 20
From: AMEMBASSY RANGOON
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AMGT, KIPAC, KPAO, MM
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 19 RANGOON 172
 B) 19 RANGOON 820
Subject: Myanmar: Taunggyi Road Show Highlights Partnership on Investment, Health, Peace

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** Embassy Rangoon’s January 22-23 Road Show to Taunggyi, Shan State in northeastern Myanmar highlighted U.S. partnership with the people of southern Shan State on economic development, access to health, peace, democratic reform, and addressing drug dependency. This multi-agency outreach effort was the third of its kind, following the Mandalay and Myitkyina road shows in 2019 (Ref A, B), and it advanced the Embassy’s overall strategy to engage Myanmar’s ethnic minority communities and highlight intensive U.S. engagement throughout the country. A wide range of stakeholders praised the positive impact of USAID assistance in the region, and media reactions were overwhelmingly favorable. In meetings with the Ambassador, civil society and political party contacts expressed deep concerns about growing Chinese presence in northern Shan State, a lack of progress on peace, drug addiction, and potential compromise of upcoming elections due to intimidation of voters by militias and insecurity that could lead to cancellation of the polls in some areas. **End Summary.**

“American Brands” Reception Shows Enthusiasm for U.S. Investment

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Embassy Rangoon’s “American Brands Showcase” reception highlighted the growing U.S. commercial presence in Shan State, with brands including KFC, Coca Cola, Corteva, Ford, and John Deere now operating in Taunggyi. U.S. companies emphasized responsible investment through their environmental protection efforts, vocational training programs, and transparent

corporate governance. The event also showcased U.S. support for the Shan State agriculture sector, including USAID's assistance to upgrade crops through trials of California Hass avocado seeds and USDA's work with potato farmers. The Ambassador noted, "the relationship we want with the people of Shan State is a partnership in every way," including economic development, job creation, and growing commercial ties. More than 100 commercial, agricultural, government, and civil society contacts attended.



Ambassador Commends Midwives for Expanding Access to Health

3. ~~(SBU)~~ In remarks before an audience of over 150 students at the Taunggyi Midwifery Training School, the Ambassador highlighted U.S. efforts to extend health services to vulnerable populations living in conflict-affected areas of Shan State, through USAID's contribution to the \$215 million multi-donor Access to Health Fund and USAID's bilateral Maternal and Child Survival Program. Since 2017, USAID investments have led to higher quality standards for maternal, neonatal, and child health services; training for thousands of health workers; and expansion of training for Ethnic Health Organizations (EHOs) in basic emergency obstetric and newborn care that is helping extend access to lifesaving care to areas not under government control. All stakeholders stressed that, although Myanmar has made progress in expanding access to health to vulnerable populations and reducing infant and maternal fatality rates, maternal and child deaths remain unacceptably common, and the country is far from the Ministry of Health and Sports' goal of achieving universal health coverage by 2030.

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


Opportunities Fair Shows Appetite for Educational and Cultural Exchange

4. ~~(SBU)~~ Public Affairs, Management, and Consular officers partnered to host an Embassy Opportunities Fair on January 23, providing information about career options, scholarship opportunities, and visa requirements to an audience of 500 students and young professionals. The Ambassador delivered remarks that highlighted the U.S. government's commitment to the people of Shan State as part of our overall outreach to partner with the people of Myanmar. Local alumni of U.S. government programs, some of whom are well-known civil society leaders in Shan State, talked with participants about the way their U.S. exchange experiences positively impacted their careers and personal lives. One alumnus, inspired by his positive experiences at the American Center Yangon, founded a youth center in Taunggyi to offer English language and civic education courses. The Facebook live broadcast of the event elicited positive comments reaching more than 100,000 users and garnered over five times the engagement of the Embassy's average Facebook post.

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Soccer Clinic Elicits Positive Media Response

5. ~~(SBU)~~ The “Community Champions” soccer clinic, led by U.S. coaches and local athletes in coordination with the Myanmar Football Federation, generated the most media attention during the Taunggyi Road Show. At least five local outlets covered the Ambassador’s kick-off of the clinic, whose participants included 80 students from Access English Taunggyi and a local orphanage school. The event sought to promote team sports as a way to build strong communities that can overcome the challenge of drug dependency, together with USAID’s 528 Love campaign. A local organization active in drug-demand reduction and supported by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement briefed coaches before the clinic on how to address substance abuse among youth without stigma. Surveys conducted before and after the clinic demonstrated the difficult task ahead to change mindsets on substance abuse, with most coaches continuing to strongly believe that substance abuse is a moral issue, rather than a mental health issue.

Civil Society Concerned about Conflict, Drugs


6. ~~(SBU)~~ Civil society contacts described northern Shan State as temporarily stable, but said that the stagnation of the peace process, a lack of dialogue among ethnic armed groups (EAGs), and the military’s destructive role in provoking conflict among EAGs are deeply problematic trends. Life in Shan State is determined by “half a dozen dictators,” each associated with a different armed group, as one contact described. Contacts gave the example of the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO) and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which are mired in territorial clashes with no prospects for dialogue, after the military

allowed one to construct a road that crossed into the other's territory. Contacts described the formal peace process as a "merry-go-round that never ends" and opined that civil society is not given a meaningful role in advancing peace talks.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ In a conversation with the Ambassador on the devastating impacts of drug addiction, young leaders from ethnic communities in Shan State said that although opium remains prevalent in southern Shan State, younger addicts increasingly use methamphetamine pills (yaba). They highlighted how government-sponsored anti-drug programs tend to deliver "sharp messages" that are ineffective among youth because they are not paired with alternatives such as vocational training or other self-development opportunities. They viewed law enforcement as ineffective, describing prisons filled with drug users – many of them students – and minor drug dealers. The young leaders added that local police have a track record of corruption when it comes to drug seizures and opium poppy eradication, with no formal mechanisms to build trust with communities in which they serve. They described themselves as disillusioned with government responses to Myanmar's drug epidemic, noting how "people in power," including politicians and militia leaders, benefit the most from a thriving drug trade. These conversations echo the findings of a July 2019 poll conducted by the USAID-supported International Republican Institute (IRI), which indicated that respondents – including almost 80 percent of respondents in Shan State – consider illicit drug use to be the most serious problem facing the country.

Shan Communities Vulnerable to BRI

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Election Challenges: Cancellations, Intimidation, and Displacement

(b)(5) DPP

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Signature: MARCIEL

Drafted By:

RANGOON (b)(6)

Cleared By:

POL-ECON: (b)(6)

POL-ECON: (b)(6)

POL-ECON: (h)(6)

POL-ECON: (b)(6)

PD: (b)(6)

Office of Public Health: (b)(6)(Burma/OPH)

CONS: (b)(6)

MGT: (b)(6)

MGT/HRO: (b)(6)

USDA/FAS: (h)(6)

POL-ECON: (h)(6)

Approved By:

EXEC/LEG: (b)(6)

Released By:

RANGOON: (b)(6)

Info:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CIA
WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI *ROUTINE*;
DIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; TOKYO, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*;
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MRN: 20 PHNOM PENH 104
Date/DTG: Jan 30, 2020 / 301035Z JAN 20
From: AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, CDC, HHS, NIH, PGOV, PREL, CASC, AMGT, AMED, CN, KH
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: 20 Phnom Penh 84
Subject: Cambodia Coronavirus Reporting4PPO: One Case of Coronavirus Identified, U.S Agencies Assisting

1. ~~(SDU)~~ Summary: As of January 30, Cambodian authorities have identified one case of novel coronavirus, but additional cases are expected, according to the U.S. Center for Disease Control in Cambodia (U.S. CDC). Since the outbreak, over 3,000 Chinese have travelled on direct flights from Wuhan to Cambodia, prior to a government-imposed route suspension January 23; other flights between China and Cambodia continue as usual, according to the Cambodian State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA). Ministry of Health (MOH) personnel are screening passengers at points of entry, but U.S. CDC is concerned about the quality of the screening procedures. U.S. CDC is coordinating with the Cambodian government on response measures, the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit-2 (NAMRU-2) is preparing to perform laboratory tests, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) is sequencing confirmed cases to develop vaccines and treatments (Reftel). End Summary.

Only One Coronavirus Case, So Far

2. ~~(SDU)~~ Cambodia identified its first and only case of novel coronavirus on January 27. A sixty year-old Chinese man who arrived on a January 22 flight from Wuhan was confirmed positive for novel coronavirus, according to MOH.

Over 3,000 Chinese from Wuhan in Cambodia

3. ~~(SDU)~~ According to SSCA, 3,078 Chinese traveled on direct flights from Wuhan to the Cambodian cities of Siem Reap and Sihanoukville since the start of the outbreak until the suspension of direct flights January 23. However, during this time, the Cambodian government has chosen not to suspend other flights arriving from China. Prime Minister Hun Sen said he would not do so to avoid the appearance of “running away from China during their hard times,” according to media reports. On average, 250 flights from China arrive in Cambodia weekly, according to the SSCA.

Coronavirus Screening Measures

4. (SDU) Cambodian health authorities are screening passengers at Cambodia’s three international airports and two land crossings using thermal imaging cameras. However, a U.S. CDC representative who observed the screening at the Phnom Penh international airport reports that, in some cases, Cambodian health authorities are not operating the scanners properly, making it unlikely that they will pick up febrile passengers. In addition, there are no Mandarin-language speakers or screening documents available for secondary screenings, U.S. CDC reports. The Khmer-Soviet Friendship hospital in Phnom Penh is screening patients in a parking lot according to Post’s Medical Attaché, who will visit the facility on January 31 and meet with the hospital director and staff. The majority of patients are Chinese travelers concerned that they may be infected with coronavirus.

U.S. Agencies are Assisting

5. (SDU) U.S. CDC continues to coordinate with the Cambodia Department of Communicable Disease and MOH. The U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit-2 (NAMRU-2) is developing its own capacity to test for coronavirus if the Cambodian government determines additional laboratory support is needed. Through an agreement with the Institute Pasteur of Cambodia, the NIH will collect all confirmed cases of coronavirus for sequencing, a process necessary to better understand rates of mutation and develop vaccines and drug treatments.

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Signature: MURPHY

Drafted By: PHNOM PENH: (b)(6) (Phnom Penh)

Cleared By: ECON (b)(6) (Phnom Penh)

POL-ECON (b)(6) (Phnom Penh)

Approved By: EXEC (b)(6) (Phnom Penh)

Released By: PHNOM PENH (b)(6) (Phnom Penh)

Info: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; CIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI ROUTINE; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE

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From: "Tobin, Elizabeth D." (b)(6)

#NSC-ASIA (b)(6)
 #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6)
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 #NSC-INTEL (b)(6)
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 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
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 'buangar' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
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 Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6)
 Williams, Chike T. (b)(6)
 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov' <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>;

'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
'Snyder, Nicholas JC.' (b)(6)

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Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

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Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6)

Arant, Ryan P.

Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)

Vasquez, Edgar J.

Taylor, Jacob \Jake\" (b)(6)

Stambaugh, Corey A.

Stambaugh, Corey A.

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

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'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

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Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6);

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Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6);

Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)

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Taylor, Jacob \"Jake\" (b)(6)

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

#NSC-CYBER (b)(6)

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'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

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#NSC-EUR (b)(6)

Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6)

Williams, Chike T. (b)(6)

'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

'Snyder, Nicholas JC.' (b)(6)

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Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

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Taylor, Jacob \Jake\" (b)(6)

Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)

Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)

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Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6);

'Kurland, Kevin' (b)(6)

(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6)

Vasquez, Edgar J. (h)(6)

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Taylor, Jacob \Jake\" (b)(6)

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

Carter, Hillary H.;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)

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Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

Macklin, Ronita M. (b)(6)

Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 01:29:14 +0000

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)

TSVOIP (b)(6)

Low Side: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 6:04 PM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL

(b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6) #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-BATS (b)(6) #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)

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 (b)(6) #NSC-BATS (h)(6) #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)
 (h)(6) #NSC-IOA (h)(6); #NSC-INTECON (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov (h)(6)
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 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
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 (h)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (h)(6)
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 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (h)(6)
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 (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.
 (b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (h)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
 (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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(b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.

(b)(6); Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6)

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(6)

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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@jdiss.cia.sgov.gov'

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(b)(6) Chafin, Kelly B.

(b)(6) Macklin, Ronita M. (b)(6) Winter, Audrey

S. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:26 PM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL

(b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6) #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-BATS (b)(6) #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-IOA (b)(6) #NSC-WMD (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-EUR (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) SES OSD

OSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6); (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Feith, David DoS'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6); 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (USA)'

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6); #NSC-EUR (b)(6)

(b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.

(b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'

<R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; #NSC-MENA (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6)

(b)(6) (USA)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'

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(b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.

(b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6); Stambaugh,

Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov;

'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

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 (Rick)' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (h)(6) SARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (USA)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.

(b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
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 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6) ;
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Subject (b)(1)(1.4)(d)
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Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

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Colleagues,

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)

TSVOIP: (b)(6)

Low Side: (b)(6)

JWICS (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 9:39 AM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6); #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6); #NSC-LEGAL

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(b)(6); #NSC-EUR (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6); #NSC-BATS (b)(6); #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)

(b)(6); #NSC-IOA (b)(6); #NSC-INTECON (b)(6)

(b)(6); (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) SES OSD

OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6); SD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)'
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) JSA)
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 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6); Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B.
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 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6); Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.
 (b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. <(b)(6); Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Arha, Kaushalendra' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.
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 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

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 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
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 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
 Derived From: NSC SCG
 Declassify On: 20451231
 =====

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
 Director for China
 National Security Council
 The White House

(b)(6)
 TSVOIF (b)(6)
 Low Side: (b)(6)
 JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Friday, April 10, 2020 6:59 PM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL
 (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (b)(6)
 (b)(6) #NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6) #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (b)(6)
 (b)(6) #NSC-BATS (b)(6) #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) #NSC-BATS (b)(6) #NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)
 (b)(6); Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) 'Arha, Kaushalendra' (b)(6)
 OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY
 (USA)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; '(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R
 (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; 'buangan' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6) #NSC-WMD (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; 'Feith, David DoS'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (USA)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6);
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) #NSC-EUR (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
 <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B.
 (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6);
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; #NSC-MENA (b)(6)
 (b)(6) USARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6);
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.
 (b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. (b)(6) tambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; '(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6);
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
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(b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)@tsdn.treasury.sgov.gov'

(b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.

(b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6);

(b)(6); Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6)

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)
TSVOIP (b)(6)
Low Side (b)(6)
JWICS: (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 12:10 PM

To: #NSC-ASIA (b)(6) #NSC-AFRICA (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL

(b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-CYBER (h)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6) #NSC-LEGISLATIVE (h)(6)

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(b)(6) #NSC-MENA (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) ; OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Feith, David DoS'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(h)(6) ; 'Yu, Miles' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (USA)'

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(h)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.

(b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'

<R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; Chafin, Kelly B.

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Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
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(Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)
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'(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
 <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B.
 (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6) ; Vasquez, Edgar J.
 (b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh,
 Corey A. (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6) ;
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 'Fritz (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) 'Buangan (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6) Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) ; Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Taylor, Jacob "Jake" (b)(6)
 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6) ; Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ //NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20451231

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)
TSVOIP: (b)(6)
Low Side (b)(6)
JWICS (b)(6)

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.

Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 1:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-ASIA (b)(6)
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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) DSD
OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) DSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Waters, John R (Rick)'
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
(b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6) #NSC-WMD (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Feith, David DoS'
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) DSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
(b)(6) 'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; 'Werner, Reed B SES (USA)'
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (b)(6) #NSC-EUR (b)(6)
(b)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
(b)(6) R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'
<R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Snyder,
Nicholas JC. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; #NSC-MENA
(b)(6) JSARMY JS J5 (USA)'

(b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'
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 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>: Arant, Ryan P.
 (b)(6) Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J.
 (b)(6) Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6); Taylor, Jacob
 "Jake" (b)(6) Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6)
 Stambaugh, Corey A. (b)(6) (R)' <Hall-
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>: (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN

Classified By: Elizabeth D. Tobin
 Derived From: NSC SCG
 Declassify On: 20451231
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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

From: Tobin, Elizabeth D.
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 8:37 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
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 (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
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 (b)(6) @state.gov' <(b)(6)>; #NSC-WMD (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David DoS
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)
 (b)(6); Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) SES (USA)
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 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (h)(6) #NSC-EUR (b)(6)
 (h)(6) Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6) Williams, Chike T.
 (b)(6) 'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov'

<R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Snyder, Nicholas JC. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6)@state.gov>(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; #NSC-MENA (b)(6) SARMY JS J5 (USA)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov'(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6); Storch, Thomas H. (b)(6) Nordquist, Nels P. (b)(6); Lin, Merry S. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

Subject (b)(1)(1.4)(d)

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Colleagues,

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(b)(1)(1.4)(d); (b)(5) DPP

Liza Tobin
Director for China
National Security Council
The White House

(b)(6)

TSVOIP: (b)(6)

Low Side (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)

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Sender: "Tobin, Elizabeth D." (b)(6)

#NSC-ASIA (b)(6)
#NSC-AFRICA (b)(6)
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#NSC-CYBER
#NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6)
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#NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6);
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#NSC-WMD
#NSC-EUR <

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

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#NSC-BATS (b)(6)
#NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)
#NSC-IOA <(b)(6)
#NSC-INTECON (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
'Fritz, Jonathan D' <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
'buangar' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6);

#NSC-WMD (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
'Feith, David DoS' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6)
'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6);
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

#NSC-EUR (b)(6)
Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6)
Williams, Chike T. (b)(6)
'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov' <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>;

'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

'Snyder, Nicholas JC.' (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6)

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#NSC-MENA (b)(6)

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Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6)

Arant, Ryan P.

Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)

Vasquez, Edgar J.

Taylor, Jacob \"Jake\" (b)(6)

Stambaugh, Corey A.

Stambaugh, Corey A.

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

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'Fritz (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

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Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)

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(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6)

Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Taylor, Jacob \"Jake\" (b)(6)

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)

#NSC-CYBER (b)(6)

#NSC-DEFENSE (b)(6)

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#NSC-BATS (b)(6)

#NSC-STRATCOM (b)(6)

#NSC-IOA (b)(6)

#NSC-INTECON (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

'Fritz, Jonathan D' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

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#NSC-WMD (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

'Feith, David DoS' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)

'Yu, Miles' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

#NSC-EUR (b)(6)

Monosson, Danielle H. (b)(6);

Williams, Chike T. (b)(6);

'R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov' <R_specialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>;

'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

'Snyder, Nicholas JC.' <(b)(6)>

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov' (b)(6);

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

#NSC-MENA (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6) W@state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov (h)(6)
 Arant, Ryan P. (b)(6)
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 Vasquez, Edgar J. (b)(6)
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 Stambaugh, Corey A (b)(6)
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(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
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 'EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov' <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
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 Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)
 Carter, Hillary H. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov (b)(6)
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(b)(6) ;

Chafin, Kelly B. (b)(6)

Macklin, Ronita M. (b)(6)

Winter, Audrey S. (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov (b)(6) ;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov (b)(6) >

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)(1.4)(d) ; (b)(5) DPP; (b)(7)(E)