

is amended by striking “In conjunction with each briefing provided under section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c))” and inserting “Not later than February 1 each year”.

(3) COMMERCE WITH, AND ASSISTANCE TO, CUBA FROM OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Section 108 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–114; 22 U.S.C. 6038) is repealed.

**SEC. 6802. REVISIONS TO CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ADJUSTMENTS.**

Section 22 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3620) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “the occurrence of an intelligence collection adjustment” and inserting “that a covered intelligence collection or sharing adjustment has occurred”; and

(B) by striking “notification of the intelligence collection adjustment” and inserting “summary of such adjustment and the cause of such adjustment”; and

(2) in subsection (b), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

“(2) COVERED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OR SHARING ADJUSTMENT.—The term ‘covered intelligence collection or sharing adjustment’ means an action or inaction by the National Security Agency that results in a significant change to—

“(A) the quantity of intelligence collected by the National Security Agency with respect to a foreign country, foreign organization, or senior leader of a foreign country or foreign organization; or

“(B) policies or practices of the National Security Agency with respect to the sharing of intelligence with a foreign country, organization of foreign countries, or organization of countries of which the United States is a member.”.

**SEC. 6803. DECLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.**

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, jointly with the head of each element of the intelligence community—

(1) perform a declassification review of intelligence relating to the origins of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), including—

(A) research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other medical or scientific research center within the People’s Republic of China;

(B) information relating to Gain of Function research and the intention of this research;

(C) information relating to sources of funding or direction for research on coronaviruses, including both sources within the People’s Republic of China and foreign sources; and

(D) the possibility of zoonotic origins of COVID-19;

(2) perform a declassification review of intelligence relating to efforts by government officials of entities of the People's Republic of China—

(A) to disrupt or obstruct information sharing or investigations into the origins of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic;

(B) to disrupt the sharing of medically significant information relating to the transmissibility and potential harm of SARS-CoV-2 to humans, including—

(i) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United States Government;

(ii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the governments of allies and partners of the United States; and

(iii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United Nations and World Health Organization;

(C) to obstruct or otherwise limit the sharing of information between national, provincial, and city governments within the People's Republic of China and between subnational entities within the People's Republic of China and external researchers;

(D) to deny the sharing of information with the United States, allies and partners of the United States, or multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization;

(E) to pressure or lobby foreign governments, journalists, medical researchers, officials of the United States Government, or officials of multilateral organizations (including the United Nations and the World Health Organization) with respect to the source, scientific origins, transmissibility, or other attributes of the SARS-CoV-2 virus or the COVID-19 pandemic;

(F) to disrupt government or private-sector efforts to conduct research and development of medical interventions or countermeasures for the COVID-19 pandemic, including vaccines; and

(G) to promote alternative narratives regarding the origins of COVID-19 as well as the domestic Chinese and international response to the COVID-19 pandemic;

(3) release publicly the intelligence products described in paragraphs (1) and (2) including such redactions as the Director, with the concurrence of the head of the originating intelligence community element, determines necessary to protect sources and methods and information concerning United States persons; and

(4) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an unredacted version of the declassified intelligence products described in paragraph (3).

**SEC. 6804. CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION MATERIALS AND SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DRUG CONTROL RESOURCE SUMMARY.**

(a) **CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION MATERIALS.**—Section 506J(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a(b)) is amended by inserting “and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives” after “congressional intelligence committees”.