



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 29, 2023

Case No. FL-2022-00076

Mr. Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD
U.S. Right to Know
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611


Dear Mr. Suryanarayanan:

As noted in our letter dated August 31, 2023, we are processing your request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Thus far, the Department of State (“Department”) has located 48 responsive records subject to the FOIA. Upon review, we have determined that 43 records may be released in part and 5 records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The records that were withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). The document identification numbers for the records withheld in full are A-00000660073, B-000002427889, B-000002427890, and B-000002427892 and B-000002427893. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00076, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jeanne Miller". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Jeanne Miller
Chief, Programs and Policies Division
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

From: "Asher, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.gov>;

CC: Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.gov>;
Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: WIV Subsidiaries, Status, and Selectors Data (h)(5)
(b)(5)

Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 20:11:54 +0000

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(5)

(b)(5) I copy our colleagues in EAP and the Secretary's office since we all are on the same page.

Happy Thanksgiving!

Dave

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>


Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2020 11:21 AM

To: Asher, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: WIV Subsidiaries, Status, and Selectors Data

(b)(5)



Sender: "Asher, David" (b)(6) @state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6) @state.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Where the Covid Origin Inquiry Goes Now (Wall Street Journal)
Date:	Tue, 14 Sep 2021 13:01:07 +0000

At the very least they could have waited until after 2:30 p.m. tomorrow to file this.

*Sigh.

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 8:38 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Where the Covid Origin Inquiry Goes Now (Wall Street Journal)

Sigh. Here we go again, methinks.

From: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 7:15 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Where the Covid Origin Inquiry Goes Now (Wall Street Journal)

Of interest:

Where the Covid Origin Inquiry Goes Now (Wall Street Journal)

Wall Street Journal [9/13/2021 6:57 PM, The Editorial Board, Neutral]

After the intelligence community submitted its muddled report last month on the origins of Covid-19, President Biden said "the world deserves answers, and I will not rest until we get them." He won't get answers from China, but that doesn't mean the U.S. can't do more at home. It's possible that Covid-19 emerged naturally, coming to humans from bats or an intermediary species. Another possibility—initially discounted because of political partisanship and scientific groupthink—is that the pandemic began with a lab accident in Wuhan, China. The more the world has learned, the more plausible the lab-leak theory has become.

The latest evidence is more than 900 pages of National Institutes of Health (NIH) documents outlining collaboration between the U.S. nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Obtained by the Intercept, a left-leaning web outlet, the documents show how American taxpayer dollars were spent on risky bat coronavirus research at the opaque Chinese institute. EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak sought to shut down debate about the lab-leak theory, and his organization understood the dangers of what was being done there.

A \$3.1 million grant in May 2014 gave the WIV nearly \$600,000 for "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence." The grant proposal warns about the "risk of exposure to pathogens or physical injury while handling bats" and other wildlife. The document says "fieldwork involves the highest risk of exposure to SARS or other CoVs." It adds that in the lab "experimental work using infectious material will be conducted under appropriate biosafety standards." Except American experts reported unsafe conditions after visiting the WIV in 2017 and 2018. The documents show several examples of the U.S. supporting "gain of function" research, despite repeated denials from top NIH Director Francis Collins and Dr. Anthony Fauci. This controversial practice, which the U.S. banned from 2014-17, can give pathogens the ability to infect a different species. The State Department reported this year that WIV researchers became sick "with symptoms consistent with" Covid-19 in autumn of 2019. The Chinese organization also took virus databases offline and refused to provide critical data to the World Health Organization. The 2014 grant states that "no funds are provided and no funds can be used to support gain-of-function research." But Rutgers University molecular biologist Richard Ebright notes that other NIH documents "definitively" show otherwise. "The research proposed, approved, and performed under the grant was gain of function research of concern, irrespective of false statements made by NIAID when and after approving the grant," he said. "A violation is a violation, even if the violator states violations are not permitted."

While the Chinese Communist Party will never allow an independent investigation within its borders, several American institutions have collaborated with the WIV. Journalists shouldn't have to file Freedom of Information Act lawsuits to get this information: Congress can use its subpoena power.

The NIH has funded dozens of projects in Wuhan, sometimes with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Defense and Energy Departments sent money as well. The WIV has deep ties with the University of North Carolina and the University of Texas Medical Branch, as well as the New York Blood Center. Academic journals that published WIV research may have useful information.

The WIV, which has ties to the People's Liberation Army, is a notably secretive member of the generally open international scientific community. But some European organizations had relationships with the institution too. The French helped build the WIV's \$44 million high-containment lab and train its staff. The European Union provided funding through the nonprofit European Virus Archive. Mr. Biden can coordinate with allies on the Continent to find more answers.

Another important question: How and why did Dr. Fauci win approval to resume support for gain-of-function research in 2017? Mike Pompeo, CIA director at the time, has said he didn't know who approved the change. Former Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, who ostensibly was Dr. Fauci's boss from 2018-21, apparently found out this year. "I was in meeting after meeting with Dr. Fauci, and that never came up," former National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien told the Times of London. "I don't know if he alerted anyone."

Republicans across several Congressional committees have asked U.S. agencies for documents, but their power is limited in the minority and Democrats have shown little interest in a real investigation. GOP candidates should promise to make this a priority if they

retake Congress in 2022. Finding out where Covid-19 came from could save lives, and it doesn't hurt that the electorate wants answers too.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (h)(6)@state.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: Proposed letter (b)(5)
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:02:16 +0000

I had not. It's a good add.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: Proposed letter (b)(5)

Thanks. Did you see the sentence (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:59 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Fw: Proposed letter (b)(5)

FYI.

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:58 PM
To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: Proposed letter (b)(5)

Dr. Ford:

EAP is seeking clearance by OOB Monday on an (b)(5)

(b)(5)

CJP

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM
Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 16:08:22 +0000

Ok - see below. (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 11:56 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

(b)(5)
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)(b)(5) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 11:53 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Here's the one (b)(6) drafted last week that we haven't submitted yet. Shall we do it now? Any changes?

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 8:19 AM
To: ISN-All-Users-DL <ISN-All-Users-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Good morning,

Please ensure all DAR entries and calendar items are submitted to the ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL by 3:00 PM.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

*Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
Teleworking | (b)(6)*

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM
Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 15:56:15 +0000

Imagining I'm an outsider: (b)(5)
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)(b)(5) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 11:53 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

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(b)(5)

(b)(6)

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To: ISN-All-Users-DL <ISN-All-Users-DL@state.gov>
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Thanks,

(b)(6)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Teleworking / (b)(6)

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Material for Note to S on AVC's virus arguments?
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 12:59:00 +0000

Will do.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 8, 2021, at 5:11 AM, Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Also, separately from the Note, please have (b)(6) and/or (b)(6) smarties quality control check my summary/assessment below so I can send a version by email today to Biegun, Stillwell, Feith, (b)(6) They need to be tracking.

From: Ford, Christopher A

Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 4:59:22 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Material for Note to S on AVC's virus arguments?

I would very much like to get a Note to S today.

Especially because it sounds like Miles has been precooking things with S for some time, however, I wonder whether there's too much to put on the record about (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Let's discuss ASAP after OOB.

Here's my quick effort to summarize things, which will need to be fact-checked and maybe reworked, but can presumably at least be raw material.


MATERIAL FOLLOWS:

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: In case you missed this last night.
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:22:09 +0000

I think I'd be in jail there no matter I what did or said! :) #rebelalliance

-----Original Message-----

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 12:20 PM
To: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: In case you missed this last night.

(b)(6) if you were a Chinese person inside the People's Paradise asking this very question in the open, you would be in jail.

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary of State
Washington, DC

(b)(6) (office)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 11:14 AM
To: Yu, Miles
Cc: Eckels-Currie, Kelley
Subject: RE: In case you missed this last night.

My question is how many people really died in China. We'll probably never know the numbers.

-----Original Message-----

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 10:45 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: In case you missed this last night.

The following was sent to me from an informed expert on this:

---When I read her paper this is what really jumped out at me: "The theory that the virus originated in nature is widely accepted, despite the lack of solid evidence, while suggestions that the disease may have come from a laboratory have been strictly censored from scientific journals, according to the report." And this "We would like to thank Daoyu Zhang for sharing with us the findings of mutations in the E proteins in different sub-groups of β coronaviruses. We also thank all the anonymous scientists and other individuals, who have contributed in uncovering various facts associated with the origin of SARS-CoV-2."

Real scientific inquiry has been completely shut down by the CCP. The CCP is responsible for a virus, at a minimum not dealing with it properly, that shut the world's economy down costing over 10 trillion dollars and has killed millions and no reputable scientific journal in the world will touch it out of fear or retribution from the CCP. Who's the real S&T superpower?!---

S should write an op-ed on the scientific community's cowardice.

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary of State
Washington, DC

(b)(6) office)
(b)(6) mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 10:35 AM
To: Yu, Miles; (b)(6) Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: In case you missed this last night.

SIGH...

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

-----Original Message-----

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 10:22 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Eckels-Currie, Kelley
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: In case you missed this last night.

https://gcc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DqFlqXPI_hZQ&data=02%7C01%7CEckelsCurrieK%40state.gov%7Cfad1e8

9b02c64b75f9c008d85a5ca92e%7C66cf50745afe48d1a691a12b2121f44b%7C0%7C0%7C6373
58701299536773&sdata=DU3vjKBGzCQvtpAd%2BVHe3y%2FBrBJFCYHPtaS%2Fq3mJ
HPc%3D&reserved=0

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary of State
Washington, DC

(b)(6) (office)
(b)(6) (mobile)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Purser III, Benjamin S (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: FYSA -- Fw: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)
Date:	Mon, 13 Apr 2020 15:02:49 +0000

There's some interesting material in this timeline, and it does a good job of documenting some failings and problematic behaviors. Unfortunately its credibility is undermined by some important errors of fact or interpretation. The one that jumps out to me: "Despite evidence of human-human transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until Jan. 20." The evidence in question, sourced back to a paper in The Lancet, is that on December 6, "five days after a man linked to Wuhan's seafood market presented pneumonia-like symptoms, his wife also presents with pneumonia and is hospitalized in an isolation ward. The wife had no connection to the market, suggesting human-human transmission." The first hospital admission of a patient covered in that paper was December 16 -- and it would not initially have been known that he or she was infected with a novel coronavirus -- so "early December" is not supported.

The bigger issue, though, is that person-to-person transmission between two people in a household, one of whom is assumed to have acquired the infection via a zoonotic transfer, is NOT evidence of "sustained" human-to-human transmission, which is what was acknowledged on January 20, and -- as we learned over about a decade of off-and-on near-panics over H5N1 -- it's not even particularly indicative.

From: Purser III, Benjamin S (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 10:03 AM
To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: FYSA -- Fw: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)

The updated timeline includes new items on Chinese history of bat research. That and some other elements are highlighted below. Thanks.

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 9:51 AM
Subject: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)

Updated timeline attached. This version notes at the top that major themes include:

--The silenced and the disappeared: E.g. Wuhan doctors Li Wenliang, Ai Fen and others; journalists Fang Bin, Chen Quishi, and Li Zehua; activist Xu Zhiyong; professor Xu Zhangrun; billionaire CCP member and Xi Jinping critic Ren Zhiqiang...

--The suppression and destruction of evidence: E.g. virus samples ordered destroyed at genomics labs, wildlife market stalls bleached, genome sequence not shared publicly, Shanghai lab closed for "rectification" after sharing genome on its own, academic articles subjected to prior review

by the Ministry of Science and Technology...

--The deadly denial of human-to-human transmission: Despite evidence of human-human transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until Jan. 20. The World Health Organization does the same. Yet officials in Taiwan raised concerns about human-human transmission as early as Dec. 31, as did experts in Hong Kong on Jan. 4...

--The endangerment of other countries: Millions of people leave Wuhan after the outbreak and before Beijing locks down the city on Jan. 23. Thousands fly overseas. When Beijing cuts off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of China, it doesn't stop travel from Hubei to the rest of the world. Throughout February, Beijing presses the U.S., Italy, India, Australia, Southeast Asian neighbors and others not to protect themselves via travel restrictions...

New timeline elements in the attached:

--2013--

Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus 96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.

--2019--

February 20: Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: "bat-animal and bat-human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks."

December 30: Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher Shi Zhengli (known as "bat-woman" for her research) is called by the Institute's director and summoned back to Wuhan from a conference in Shanghai to study samples of the novel coronavirus. "Could they have come from our lab?" Shi feared.

--2020--

January 7: Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology recalled in a March 11 interview with Scientific American that by January 7 her team found that the novel coronavirus's sequence did not match any of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. "That really took a load off my mind," she said. But the novel sequence was 96% identical to one her team had sampled previously in Yunnan.

January 13: The first coronavirus case outside of China is reported in Bangkok when a 61-year-old woman from Wuhan tests positive four days after arriving from China with a fever at the airport. The patient had begun exhibiting symptoms (fever, chills, sore throat, headache) three days before leaving Wuhan.

January 15: The patient who becomes the first confirmed U.S. case leaves Wuhan and arrives in the U.S., carrying the coronavirus.

January 22: WHO holds emergency committee meeting, decides not to declare the novel coronavirus a “public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says afterward that declaring a PHEIC is a decision he takes “extremely seriously” and is “only prepared to make with appropriate consideration of all the evidence.” The emergency committee meeting excluded Taiwan from its deliberations.

January 23: Despite locking down Wuhan and cutting off travel from the surrounding Hubei Province to the rest of China, PRC officials did not cut off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of the world.

January 24: Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas biocontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by the Wuhan lab to share these samples.

January 30: WHO declares a public-health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), after nearly 10,000 cases of the virus are confirmed, including in at least 18 countries outside of China.

February 6: Researchers from South China University of Technology publish a study concluding that “the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories.” The paper is soon withdrawn because it “was not supported by direct proofs,” according to author Botao Xiao. “No scientists have confirmed or refuted the paper’s findings,” scholar Yanzhong Huang wrote on March 5.

February 16: The Wuhan Institute of Virology issues a public denial that its former researcher Huang Yanling is “patient zero,” as speculated on Chinese social media based on changes to the Institute’s website and Huang’s unknown whereabouts. Institute researcher Shi Zhengli writes on social media that she “guaranteed with her own life” that the outbreak was unrelated to the lab. [In 2004, China suffered a SARS outbreak due to a lab leak that killed one person and infected nine. PRC authorities blamed negligence and punished five senior officials at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention.]

February 23: Xi Jinping delivers speech to PRC officials calling virus “a crisis for us and also a major test.” He stresses “social stability” and states that “the effectiveness of the prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”

March 11: WHO declares the novel coronavirus a “pandemic,” after the official worldwide case count is 118,000 people in 114 countries.

March 26: China bars entry of all foreigners in attempt to limit virus spread. This measure is harsher than the travel restrictions of other countries that Beijing had criticized just weeks

before.

April 3: While lifting lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, officials limit funerals of those who died from the coronavirus, suppress online discussions of fatalities, scrub images of funeral homes from social media, assign minders to families in mourning, and face questions from families such as why it took the government weeks to inform the public that the virus could spread among humans.

April 3: China’s Ministry of Science and Technology announces that ongoing clinical research on the coronavirus must be reported to authorities within three days or be halted.

April 7: Human rights activists report, citing public records alone, that Chinese police punished nearly 900 people for online speech or information-sharing about the virus over three months.

April 11: Chinese universities publish online—and then apparently delete—new guidelines stating that academic papers on the origin of the novel coronavirus can be published only with the approval of the Ministry of Science and Technology.

--

David Feith
Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Purser III, Benjamin S (T)(b)(6)@state.gov>; Ford, Christopher A(b)(6)@state.gov>; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
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 R_Clearances <R_Clearances@state.gov>;
 GPA Clearances <GPA_Clearances@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA' (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD' (b)(6)
 Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>

CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>

Subject: RE: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 13:14:06 +0000

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 1, 2021 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
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 <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>
Subject: RE: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

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Bartenfeld, Michael (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) (b)(6)
Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
E_Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
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GPA Clearances <GPA_Clearances@state.gov>;
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R_Clearances <R_Clearances@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
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Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6) (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD)' (h)(6)
(b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA)' (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (h)(6);
(b)(6) (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) (b)(6)
Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.gov>

CC: (h)(6)@state.gov>;
E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>

Subject: RE: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 12:59:13 +0000

(b)(5)

Cheers,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, October 4, 2021 8:54 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA Clearances <GPA_Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
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<R_Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD)' (h)(6) (h)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)' (h)(6)
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(CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD)' (b)(6); Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
 Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>
 Subject: Re: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

+ L/M's (b)(6) and L/NPA's (b)(6)

(b)(6)
 Attorney-Adviser
 Office of the Legal Adviser
 U.S. Department of State
 Mobile: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, October 4, 2021 8:32 AM
To: GPA Clearances <GPA_Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; R_Clearances <R_Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD' (h)(6); (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA' (h)(6) (h)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (h)(6) (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) (h)(6) Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>
Cc: (h)(6)@state.gov; E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>
Subject: Re: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

Hi all,

With many thanks to those who have already cleared, a kind reminder that we are seeking any edits and your clearance by 12pm today.

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

From: GPA Clearances <GPA_Clearances@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 1, 2021 4:20 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; R_Clearances <R_Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD)' (b)(6); (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)' (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) (b)(6) Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>
Cc:(h)(6)@state.gov; E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>
Subject: RE: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

Clear for GPA.

(b)(6)

Special Assistant
U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Global Public Affairs

(b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov |(b)(6)@America.gov

Please note the new GPA clearance distro: GPA_Clearances@state.gov

From:(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 1, 2021 3:50 PM
To:(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
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Cc:(b)(6)@state.gov; E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>
Subject: Re: For Your Clearance by 12PM Monday 10/4: Congressional Response Letter - Johnson

Ok for R

(b)(6)

Special Assistant

Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R)

(b)(6)@state.gov


(b)(6)

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

U.S. Department of State

Mobile (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov



Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

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Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) (b)(6)
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 Legal-OES-DL <Legal-OES-DL@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 E Clearances <E_Clearances@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: For DAS Dolliff: SFRC BCL on SIPR and Tabs Attached
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 00:43:25 +0000

Chris-

I just wanted to say thank you for your partnership today – Phil was going to try and catch you after today’s briefing, but if not (b)(6) or I am glad to give you a more detailed readout too.

But, I wanted to relay that Phil appreciated your below points, and that importantly, we were successful in not having Phil ask (b)(6) to speak to your issues extemporaneously.

I really appreciate your support on these issues, and critically, our people – Thanks, and here’s hoping there aren’t any follow-up hearings in our future!

Happy almost Friday,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 12:33 PM
To: Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Congressional-DL <ISN-Congressional-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: For DAS Dolliff: SFRC BCL on SIPR and Tabs Attached

Phil & co. – I wanted to wish you luck in your engagement with the SFRC staff today. I’m sure they will be very eager to hear about ISN’s programs, particularly in light of how you guys have very nimbly

(b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5) Phil, but to my way of thinking, it merits emphasis.)

My AVC colleagues advised that when they were briefing the SFRC staff, the minority staffers asked a LOT of questions (b)(5) I am, frankly, much less optimistic than you are that these questions (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

A couple of additional points that I think you may WANT to use:

(b)(5)

CJP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, November 3, 2021 5:19 PM

To: Dolliff, Phillip R (h)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-

DL@STATE.GOV>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)

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(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: For DAS Dolliff: SFRC BCL on SIPR and Tabs Attached

DAS Dolliff,

Please refer to SIPR for an updated BCL per the pre-brief this afternoon.

I've also attached all of your supporting attachments.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Team Chief
Biosecurity Engagement Program
U.S. Department of State, ISN/CTR-GDIT

(b)(6)@state.gov

Office: (b)(6)

Mobile: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Following up on COVID demarche cable to China

Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 02:56:20 +0000

I'm planning to discuss this with Eliot Kang (currently wielding the Mighty Powers of T) tomorrow AM to see how he wants to proceed. I'll also touch base with (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 25, 2021 9:21 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Following up on COVID demarche cable to China

Hi all,

So this is back... Have you all had discussions with (b)(6) or others about the origins issues/AVC's concerns?

Before we respond to AVC, I wanted to make sure we are coordinated with you all. Based on what we've seen from the new team, I can't imagine this being an Administration priority right now, it doesn't seem (b)(5)

(b)(5) (I'm still not sure what is it intended to achieve?).

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Before I we spend too much time on this, (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(6) and Alex Kahan; 2) (b)(5)

(b)(5) and 3) we'd be happy to review after that?


Here's what I've seen on origins from the incoming team...

From Blinken QFRs...

(b)(5)

When (b)(6) tried to clear some press guidance, D staff told us to not go beyond the QFRs (attached). Here is what got cleared.

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Ph.D.

Office of International Health and Biodefense

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@State.gov

Desk:(b)(6)

Mobile:(b)(6) Please contact me on my mobile phone since I am teleworking most of the time.

From:(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 25, 2021 5:26 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park,

Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>;(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Following up on COVID demarche cable to China

Dear colleagues – We wanted to follow up with you now that we are in a new Administration, and check in on next steps with the COVID demarche cable.

We have updated it to address earlier comments provided by your offices, and by HHS on an earlier version (through back channels). We'd like to prepare something for new Administration officials to consider that complements the current US Global Health/CDC and WHO efforts, and provides due diligence given interest in the topic.

The list of questions in the demarche remains very lengthy, and I continue to (b)(5)

(b)(5)

I have included some suggested edits to these questions, but I wanted to get your views before deleting too much.

Please send your mark-up/comments by Wednesday, 1/27, COB, and we'll then reach back out to the interagency. I am also happy to host a teleconference if it would be helpful.

We are still planning a VCAWG meeting for the week of 11 February. Please let us know if any day that week does not work for your office.

Best - (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director

Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs

Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL <ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov>
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FLASH PG input -- this is what I was able to come up with (with a little help from my friends)
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 17:44:32 +0000

I think we should stop here. But thanks, comrades.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On May 4, 2020 at 1:43:54 PM EDT, Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
We could randomly insert the word "enormous" if you think that would help.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 1:42 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL <ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FLASH PG input -- this is what I was able to come up with (with a little help from my friends)

Ok. Please copy FO staff assistants, (b)(5)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On May 4, 2020 at 1:38:57 PM EDT, Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
(b)(6) has a minor tweak, coming your way in a moment, I think.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 1:38 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FLASH PG input -- this is what I was able to come up with (with a little help from my friends)

We're all ok with this?

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On May 4, 2020 at 1:16:31 PM EDT, Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)

Sender: (b)(6) @state.gov>

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>;

Recipient: ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL <ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov>;

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	RE: Flagging house bill limiting HHS work in China
Date:	Thu, 14 Jul 2022 18:00:16 +0000

This goes beyond what Risch proposed, though. His bill would have prohibited federal funding for GOF research and required a Country Teams Assessment for other research with countries of concern, not blocked all funding altogether.

(I know this only because one of my MSU students wrote a policy memo on Risch's bill last week.)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2022 1:35 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: Flagging house bill limiting HHS work in China

Thanks for flagging. Sounds like a lift from the Risch legislation. Certainly an idea with the potential to be problematic.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2022 1:33 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Flagging house bill limiting HHS work in China

BPS - Flagging that I got a call from a colleague in OSTP asking for a gut check on the house filed Appropriations Bill for Labor, HHS, and DOE, which says:

"None of the funds made available by this 4 Act may be made available to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory located in a country determined by the Secretary of State to be a foreign adversary, including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran." <https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr8295/BILLS-117hr8295rh.pdf>

I told her my personal thoughts that I didn't think legislation was the right way to get at what they're looking for, that the language risks us making a self-imposed blindspot to disease outbreaks, and that "by country" rules like this is a much too-blunt hammer.

I don't know how likely this is to go through, gave her a couple other folks to talk to, and assume that HHS would fight it. Nonetheless - something to keep our collective eye on.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.gov>
To:	(b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject:	RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study
Date:	Tue, 30 Mar 2021 22:03:01 +0000

We could have just gone with "from the far side of various bodies of water."

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 5:57 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Oh I loved seeing this!!

(b)(6) Ph.D.
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research | U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6) @state.gov | (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 2:09 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 Price, Edward C (b)(6); Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6); Burr, Mara (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-
 HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan
 (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6)
 Caccamo, Stephanie (FDA/OC) (b)(6); Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing)
 (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6) Mattson, Megan M
 (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

"Atlantic, Pacific, and Lake Superior"?

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 12:31 PM
To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)@state.gov>; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6) Burr, Mara (b)(6) (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Caccamo, Stephanie (FDA/OC) (b)(6) Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC) (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing) (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

(b)(5)

(b)(6)
 Director
 Bureau of International Organization Affairs
 Office of Economic and Development Affairs
 Office (b)(6)
 Cell: (b)(6)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 12:22 PM
To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Burr, Mara (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)

(Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (Geneva)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA)
 (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov; Schaeffer, Alison
 (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov; Caccomo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing)
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

None from me – State??

From: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 12:19 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov; Cameron, Beth E.
 EOP/NSC (b)(6) Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6) Frisk, Megan
 L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (Geneva)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA)
 (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G.
 (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Caccomo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Megan, Ned—any update on the joint statement??

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 12:04 PM
To: Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov; Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA)

(b)(6); Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Burr, Mara
 (b)(6); (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mciff, Colin
 (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6);
 Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6); (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Caccamo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
 Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: Re: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

All - with apologies, one State redline to update a Tedros quote from today (the quote was outdated from Feb in the PG)

><https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-remarks-at-the-member-state-briefing-on-the-report-of-the-international-team-studying-the-origins-of-sars-cov-2><

	<p><u>WHO Director-General's remarks at the Member State Briefing on the report of the international team studying the origins of SARS-CoV-2</u></p>
	<p>OPENING REMARKS. Honourable Ministers, Excellencies, dear colleagues and friends, At the World Health Assembly last year, Member States requested that I, as Director-General, carry out a vital and specific task.</p>
	<p>>www.who.int<</p>

Further study will be important to identify what role farmed wild animals may have played in introducing the virus to markets in Wuhan and beyond.

The team also visited several laboratories in Wuhan and considered the possibility that the virus entered the human population as a result of a laboratory incident.

However, I do not believe that this assessment was extensive enough. Further data and studies will be needed to reach more robust conclusions.

Although the team has concluded that a laboratory leak is the least likely hypothesis, this requires further investigation, potentially with additional missions involving specialist experts, which I am ready to deploy.

We will keep you informed as plans progress, and as always, we very much welcome your input.

Let me say clearly that as far as WHO is concerned all hypotheses remain on the table.

This report is a very important beginning, but it is not the end. We have not yet found the source of the virus, and we must continue to follow the science and leave no stone unturned as we do.

From: Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 12:00 PM
To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Burr, Mara (b)(6); (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6); Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6); (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Caccamo, Stephanie (FDA/OC) (b)(6); Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC) (b)(6); Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing) (b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6); (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Adding Megan here, but should be out very soon – within the next couple minutes. Megan, pls confirm when it's out.

From: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:55 AM

To: Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA)

(b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Burr, Mara (b)(6) (Geneva)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters,

John R (Rick) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA)

(b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC)

(b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Schaeffer, Alison

(HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Caccamo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)

(b)(6); Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)

(b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing)

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Final formatted PG attached. State friends, please let us know ASAP when the joint statement is posted? Jen briefs in 30 minutes and will get this Q.

From: Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:51 AM

To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Burr, Mara (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Solomon, Howard T (Geneva)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters,

John R (Rick) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA)

(b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G.

(FDA/OC) (b)(6)@fda.hhs.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Schaeffer,

Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Caccamo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)

(b)(6); Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)

(b)(6); Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
(b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC
(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: FINAL Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Importance: High

With huge thanks to Megan and to all of you, attached is the proposed final. Also toplines for today re-pasted below. Emily: We think it's important to (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:39 AM

To: Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6); Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Burr, Mara (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6)@state.gov; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6)@state.gov; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6)@state.gov; Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Caccomo, Stephanie (FDA/OC) (b)(6) Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC) (b)(6); Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Suggested edits to the jt statement bullet (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:34 AM
To: Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6); Burr, Mara (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-
 DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mciff, Colin
 (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Caccomo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6); Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)
 (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)
Subject: Re: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

(b)(5)

From: "Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC" <(b)(6)>
Date: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 at 11:32 AM
To: (b)(6) (state.gov)" (b)(6) @state.gov>, "Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) "Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 "Burr, Mara (HHS/OS/OGA)" (b)(6), (b)(6) (Geneva)"
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, Bill Hall <(b)(6)> "Price, Edward C"
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>, "Waters,
 John R (Rick)" (b)(6) @state.gov>, "Cook, Nerissa J" (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6) @state.gov>, "Mciff, Colin
 (HHS/OS/OGA)" (b)(6) @hhs.gov>, "Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) "Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC)" (b)(6)
 (b)(6) Geneva" (b)(6) @state.gov>, "Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA)"
 (b)(6), "Caccomo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)"
 (b)(6) "Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC)"
 (b)(6) "Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC"
 (b)(6) "Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC"

(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>
(b)(6) (b)(6) (state.gov)"
(b)(6) @state.gov>, "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6)
(b)(6) @state.gov>, (b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Here are the update lines – any heartburn redlines should be sent in the next 5-7 min in red and tracked
--thanks!

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:29 AM

To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Burr, Mara (b)(6); (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Hall, Bill (HHS/ASPA)(b)(6); Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mciff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA)(b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rabin, Tara G. (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Schaeffer, Alison (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Caccomo, Stephanie (FDA/OC)(b)(6); Felberbaum, Michael (FDA/OC) (b)(6); Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6) >

Subject: Re: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

(b)(5)

From: Kahan, Alexandra L (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:25 AM
To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) HHS/ASPA (b)(6) Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) (b)(6) FDA/OC (b)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA (b)(6) (b)(6) (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) (FDA/OC) (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)
Subject: Re: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Megan - I suggested this in a comment that (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:20 AM
To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6) Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mcaff, Colin (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) (b)(6) FDA/OC (b)(6) (b)(6) Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) (b)(6) FDA/OC (b)(6) (b)(6) (FDA/OC) (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing)

(b)(6) (h)(6) @state.gov;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Emily,

Here's the latest guidance. We are working (b)(5) at 11th hour, so may be a bit delayed on the 11:30 mark, but almost there.

Thank you!
 Megan

From: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC

Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:18 AM

To: (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov; (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov; Price, Edward C (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (FDA/OC) (h)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) (b)(6) FDA/OC (b)(6) (b)(6) (FDA/OC) (b)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) state.gov (b)(6) state.gov; (b)(6) (state.gov) (b)(6) @state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Are we still on track to post joint statement at 11:30?

From: (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) @hhs.gov

Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:07 AM

To: (b)(6) Geneva (h)(6) @state.gov; Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (HHS/ASPA) (h)(6); Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (FDA/OC) (b)(6) (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA (b)(6) @hhs.gov> (b)(6) FDA/OC
 (b)(6) @fda.hhs.gov>; (b)(6) FDA/OC
 (b)(6) @fda.hhs.gov>; Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) ; (b)(6) state.gov (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) state.gov)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Ugh.

(b)(6)
 Director, Multilateral Relations
 Office of the Secretary
 Office of Global Affairs
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 Telephone: (b)(6)
 Mobile: (b)(6)



From: (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6) @state.gov>
 Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 11:05 AM
 To: 'Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC' (b)(6) Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) ; (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA (b)(6) @hhs.gov>; (b)(6) HHS/ASPA
 (b)(6) ; Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters,
 John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)
 (b)(6) ; Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) (b)(6) FDA/OC
 (b)(6) ; (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6) ; (b)(6) FDA/OC
 (b)(6) ; (b)(6) FDA/OC
 (b)(6) ; Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC
 (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) ; (b)(6) state.gov (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) state.gov)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Late breaking development is that (b)(5)
(b)(5)

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 4:18 PM
To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6)
 (HHS/ASPA) (b)(6) Price, Edward C (b)(6) @state.gov>; Pisani, Kristen L
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA
 (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) (b)(6) @fda.hhs.gov;
 (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura (Beijing)
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)
Subject: RE: (Pls clear now) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Hello again:

Good news – we have (h) countries signed on, so will not/not need the solo statement. Please focus on the press points only for today, especially IF RAISED. In addition, we have the following to add in where appropriate – just sending in body of email in interest of time. Thank you!

(b)(5)

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 2:33 AM

To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) 'Hall, (b)(6) (HHS/ASPA)' (b)(6) 'Price, Edward C' (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; 'IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL' <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Cook, Nerissa J' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) Geneva' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (Geneva)' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)' (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (h)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA' (h)(6) (b)(6) (h)(6) (b)(6) @fda.hhs.gov' (h)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) (b)(6)
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (h)(6)

Subject: (Pls clear by 10 AM Mon) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Good morning!

Please see the press guidance and statements for your comments and clearance NLT 10 AM. Assuming

(b)(5)

Many thanks!
 Megan

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC

Sent: Monday, March 29, 2021 12:33 AM

To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (h)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (HHS/ASPA)' (b)(6); 'Price, Edward C' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; 'IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL' <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; 'Waters, John R (Rick)' (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Cook, Nerissa J' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) Geneva' (b)(6) @state.gov; 'Solomon, Howard T (Geneva)' (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)' (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov' (h)(6) (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA' (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (h)(6) Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M. EOP/NSC (h)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov;

(b)(6) (h)(6)
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)

Subject: (Pls review by 11 AM Mon) Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

Good morning, all:

As you probably know, the WHO COVID origins report was finally released under embargo this afternoon. Please see the revised press points and statements that incorporate your edits from last week. As there were edits coming from several agencies, we ask that you **please review again** for accuracy and to ensure your points were adequately captured. Apologies in advance if something was inadvertently missed – we appreciate your patience as we pull together lots of pieces and continually adapt on the comms front. (On that note, as the expert group's topline are developed tomorrow, we will update these points again and re-distribute as needed.)

Thank you for your time and for reviewing quickly! We'd appreciate your response by 11 AM, as we expect to have questions at the podium on Monday.

All the best,
Megan

From: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC

Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2021 6:01 PM

To: Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
(HHS/ASPA) (b)(6); Price, Edward C. (b)(6) @state.gov (b)(6)
(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) (b)(6) @state.gov; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.gov;
(b)(6) Geneva) <(b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva)
(b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)
(b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
(b)(6); (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA
(b)(6) (b)(6)
Raymond, Kedenard M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Rosenberger, Laura M.
EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: DL NSC HealthSecBio (b)(6)
Subject: (Please clear by 11 AM tomorrow) DRAFT Press Guidance + Statements for WHO COVID Origins Study

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Dear colleagues,

Thank you for the sync call today and for all your hard work on this statement. We have news from Geneva that the EU indeed plans to go public with their statement Friday, but they have also agreed to coordinate with the United States and our co-signers on when that public release will be. We've proposed 3 PM EDT (8 PM CET). Right now, we are checking with partners – explaining the desire to speak with one voice with the EU, the need to post on Friday, and asking them to pave the way for signing a bit sooner than expected.

Please see attached for press points and three statements that we'll need on the WHO COVID origins study. A lot of this is language already used in our call sheets and BCLs, publicly by APNSA Sullivan, and also prior cleared language we had prepped for use. **We appreciate your edits and clearance by 11:00 AM EDT tomorrow (Thurs) 3/25. Thank you!**

There's a lot here. You'll see points for Thursday and Friday, with Friday (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please don't hesitate to call or email with questions. I'll be free after 8:30 tonight and then again in the morning after 8:30.

All the best,
Megan

Megan L. Frisk, PhD
Global Health Security and Biodefense
National Security Council The White House

(b)(6) (desk)
(b)(6) (cell)

SIPR: (b)(6)
JWIC: (b)(6)

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Fact Sheet on Origin of Covid
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 19:21:29 +0000

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 10:35 AM
To: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Fact Sheet on Origin of Covid

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 10:16 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fact Sheet on Origin of Covid

For more than a year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic's origin, choosing instead to devote enormous resources to deceit and disinformation. Nearly two million people have died. Their families deserve to know the truth. Only through transparency can we learn what caused this pandemic and how to prevent the next one.

The U.S. government does not know exactly where, when, or how the COVID-19 virus—known as SARS-CoV-2—was transmitted initially to humans. We have not determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan, China.

The virus could have emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals, spreading in a pattern consistent with a natural epidemic. Alternatively, a laboratory accident could resemble a natural outbreak if the initial exposure included only a few individuals and was compounded by asymptomatic infection. Scientists in China have researched animal-derived coronaviruses under conditions that increased the risk for accidental and potentially unwitting exposure.

The CCP's deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world. The previously undisclosed information in this fact sheet, combined with open-source reporting, highlights three elements about COVID-19's origin that deserve greater scrutiny:

1. Illnesses inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):

- The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was "zero infection" among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.

- Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one.
- The CCP has prevented independent journalists, investigators, and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the WIV, including those who were ill in the fall of 2019. Any credible inquiry into the origin of the virus must include interviews with these researchers and a full accounting of their previously unreported illness.

2. Research at the WIV:

- Starting in at least 2016 – and with no indication of a stop prior to the COVID-19 outbreak – WIV researchers conducted experiments involving RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). The WIV became a focal point for international coronavirus research after the 2003 SARS outbreak and has since studied animals including mice, bats, and pangolins.
- The WIV has a published record of conducting “gain-of-function” research to engineer chimeric viruses. But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including “RaTG13,” which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.
- WHO investigators must have access to the records of the WIV’s work on bat and other coronaviruses before the COVID-19 outbreak. As part of a thorough inquiry, they must have a full accounting of why the WIV altered and then removed online records of its work with RaTG13 and other viruses.

3. Secret military activity at the WIV:

- Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military.

The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

- The United States and other donors who funded or collaborated on civilian research at the WIV have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.

Today's revelations just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19's origin in China. Any credible investigation into the origin of COVID-19 demands complete, transparent access to the research labs in Wuhan, including their facilities, samples, personnel, and records.

As the world continues to battle this pandemic – and as WHO investigators begin their work, after more than a year of delays – the virus's origin remains uncertain. The United States will continue to do everything it can to support a credible and thorough investigation, including by continuing to demand transparency on the part of Chinese authorities.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Draft Toplines re origins
Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 10:41:54 +0000

Works here.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 6, 2022 6:36 AM
To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6) Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6) (Geneva) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Draft Toplines re origins

(b)(5) (b)(6) looked for the Ambassador after WEOG and again during this morning session but did not see him. (b)(5)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On April 6, 2022 at 10:14:33 AM GMT+2, Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC

(b)(6) wrote:

Hi all,

How about this starter for building blocks, if needed today. (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(5)
 (b)(5) (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

- (b)(5)
-
-
-

- (b)(5)
-
-
-

Best,
Megan

Megan L. Frisk, PhD
Global Health Security & Biodefense
National Security Council | The White House

(b)(6)

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
(b)(6) Geneva (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@dni.gov>
To:	'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE:(b)(6)+ GOF
Date:	Wed, 27 Oct 2021 19:18:43 +0000

Haha, maybe so! Compelling graph ;).

I'd love to swing by for a bitch session, but am sort of held hostage here with a pretty pointless paper making its way through our FO this week. Maybe next week or so we can catch up? I have to visit INR sometime in the few weeks anyway. I'll be in touch.

(b)(6)


Director for Global Health Security
Strategic Futures Group | National Intelligence Council

(b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 3:07 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE:(b)(6)+ GOF

It's mutual. And it's one of those days where I'd like to spend an hour or two drinking and complaining about our jobs. Grr.

Cheerful though for the day in graph form: Maybe violence IS the answer and we've just gotten the scale wrong.



From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 3:02 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: (b)(6) GOF

Oy, I guess I'll have to find a time to listen <barfingemoji>

In other news....I miss you two!

(b)(6)

Director for Global Health Security

Strategic Futures Group | National Intelligence Council

(b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:56 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: (b)(6) + GOF

Sigh.


From: Park, Christopher J
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:55 PM
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: (b)(6) + GOF

You really hate me, don't you?

From: (h)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:47 PM
To: Park, Christopher J <(h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: (b)(6) + GOF

I have not listened to this, but I'm flagging it here because I assume you'll be interested.

<https://radio.foxnews.com/2021/10/26/david-asher-nih-funded-gain-of-function-research-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/>



David Asher: NIH Funded 'Gain Of Function' Research At The Wuhan Institute Of Virology | Guy Benson

Listen To The Full Interview Below:
David Asher, a senior fellow at Hudson
Institute and former investigator into
covid-19 origins at the State
Department joined the Guy Benson
Show to discuss the ...

radio.foxnews.com

(b)(6)

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient: 'Park, Christopher J' <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@dni.gov>
To:	'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: David Asher + GOF
Date:	Wed, 27 Oct 2021 19:08:38 +0000

OK I decided to start listening...it's absolutely insane. Lie after lie and I'm just a couple minutes into it. He is also presenting himself as the Secretary's chief investigator into COVID origins, love how he inflates his role more with each passing day.

(b)(6)

Director for Global Health Security
Strategic Futures Group | National Intelligence Council

(b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:56 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: David Asher + GOF

Sigh.


From: Park, Christopher J
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:55 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: David Asher + GOF

You really hate me, don't you?

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:47 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: David Asher + GOF

I have not listened to this, but I'm flagging it here because I assume you'll be interested.

<https://radio.foxnews.com/2021/10/26/david-asher-nih-funded-gain-of-function-research-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/>



David Asher: NIH Funded
'Gain Of Function' Research
At The Wuhan Institute Of
Virology | Guy Benson

Listen To The Full Interview Below:
David Asher, a senior fellow at Hudson
Institute and former investigator into
covid-19 origins at the State
Department joined the Guy Benson
Show to discuss the ...

radio.foxnews.com

(b)(6)

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

(b)(6)

Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: David Asher + GOF
Date:	Wed, 27 Oct 2021 19:35:33 +0000

HAVE YOU MET ME?

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 3:22 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: David Asher + GOF

You never piss anyone off

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 3:20 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: David Asher + GOF

Then remind me not to piss you off.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:56 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: David Asher + GOF

Everything I do is out of love.

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:55 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: David Asher + GOF

You really hate me, don't you?

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2021 2:47 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: David Asher + GOF

I have not listened to this, but I'm flagging it here because I assume you'll be interested.

<https://radio.foxnews.com/2021/10/26/david-asher-nih-funded-gain-of-function-research-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/>



David Asher: NIH Funded 'Gain Of Function' Research At The Wuhan Institute Of Virology | Guy Benson

Listen To The Full Interview Below:
David Asher, a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and former investigator into covid-19 origins at the State Department joined the Guy Benson Show to discuss the ...

radio.foxnews.com

(b)(6)

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

(b)(6)

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum
Date:	Sun, 10 Jan 2021 03:42:16 +0000

copy

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:41 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

(b)(6)

Here...I'll host 11 pm ok?

On January 9, 2021 at 10:35:24 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
Yes but I can't find the staff call numbers. Do you have it?

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On January 9, 2021 at 10:30:39 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
Bravo

A few nits that require clean up.

Can we do a quick chat?

On January 9, 2021 at 10:15:37 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
(b)(6) has shared a OneDrive for Business file with you. To view it, click the link below.

- ☒ DRAFT Memorandum for the Record
v2.docx

(b)(6) comments:

(b)(5)

(b)(6) changes and my addition based on (b)(6) comments attached. Tracked changes follow below - (b)(6) edits in red, mine in blue:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:55 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

Have to get somebody home. I will be in my car for the next hour or so but can take calls.

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:50 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

Here are my comments with a few added in by phone from Tom. (b)(6) can you send this in a tracked changes document to Tom and include the text in the body of an e-mail. Tom can't download docs on this damned crippled GO system. I guess you should also attach for him an "all changes accepted" clean copy with comments deleted that he can send to Myles.

(b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)
From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Saturday, January 9, 2021 8:23 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
Subject: Current DRAFT Memorandum

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Clearance COB Monday: DRAFT letter to House Committee on E&C on COVID investigation 6.11.21
Date:	Mon, 14 Jun 2021 19:00:08 +0000

Agree with your edit; same recommendations re clearances as on the other letter.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 14, 2021 12:39 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Clearance COB Monday: DRAFT letter to House Committee on E&C on COVID investigation 6.11.21

(b)(6) a second letter on a similar subject: "we request that the U.S. Department of State release unclassified documents and declassify other documents for public release, as appropriate, related to the assertion in the Department's January 15, 2021 Fact Sheet that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in Wuhan, China collaborated with the Chinese military in conducting classified research, including laboratory animal experiments."

Chris (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6) **Ph.D.**
 Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
 Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
 U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 6:26 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (h)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (h)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Clearance COB Monday: DRAFT letter to House Committee on E&C on COVID investigation 6.11.21

And was told to also send this one too—so here it is for your review for House Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Due COB Monday.

Thanks again,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 6:20 PM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov;

(b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov;

(b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Clearance COB Monday: DRAFT letter to Senators Johnson and Scott on COVID investigation 6.11.21

Colleagues—

Welcome your review and clearance on the attached draft response to Senator Johnson and Scott by COB Monday.

Thanks in advance,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Physical Scientist
 Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs
 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance*

U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520
Desk: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:
Date:	Thu, 10 Jun 2021 16:55:49 +0000

Thanks.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 12:54 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: FW: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:50 AM
To: AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; AVC-VPO-DL <AVC-VPO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

!

From: Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:42 AM
To: AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>
Cc: SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>
Subject: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

<https://christopherashleyford.medium.com/the-lab-leak-inquiry-at-the-state-department-96973cff3a65>

The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:



Christopher Ashley Ford

1 hour ago · 20 min read

An Open Letter by former Assistant Secretary Christopher Ford

(June 10, 2021)

In both journalism and policymaking — if not always in politics, or in the sordid world of score-settling by unemployed, second-rate apparatchiks — facts matter, and intellectual integrity matters. In light of the remarkable quantity of errant nonsense that has been written in the last couple of weeks about squabbles inside the U.S. State Department about how to look into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in the closing weeks of the Trump Administration, I hope this open letter will help set the record straight for those who still care about things such as facts.

I write this because, to put it bluntly, I'm tired of being the butt of stupid and paranoid conspiracy theories being promulgated by those who know better. I recognize that some of these conspiracy narratives are, for any thoughtful person, self-refuting even on their face. (As someone who has been warning the policy community since at least 2007 about threats to the United States and the democratic world from the Chinese Communist Party's geopolitical ambitions — including in two scholarly books and scores of articles and speeches, including in official capacity at the

State Department — have I been “protecting” the Chinese Communist Party from accountability? Good grief.)

Nevertheless, I’ve been around politics long enough to know that an imbecility that slots into a convenient narrative beats an awkward fact any day, and manic performative outrage is much more fun than sober analysis. So perhaps offering clarity here won’t change a thing. Yet I’m still going to try.

I’m also going to try to do something unorthodox here. Rather than using this letter as an opportunity to invent and loudly dispense my own *post hoc* version of what happened — a dishonest revisionism-of-convenience that is in abundant supply, but that I will leave to others — I will try to offer you only specific claims that are supported by contemporaneous documents that enterprising journalists at Fox News and *Vanity Fair* have recently put into the public record.

Part One: A Clear Documentary Record

In particular, since the question at hand is my own particular role and position in connection with investigating the origins of the COVID-19 virus, I will refer to three unclassified documents that I myself wrote and sent to others at the State Department in early January 2021. (For the record, I did *not* retain these documents when I left the Department. Thankfully, however — at least for me — some of the lies being told on these topics have apparently caused offense among those who know what really happened and clearly *did* retain the documents.) I’m happy to see them in the

public record, because they make very clear exactly what I was doing at the time, and why.

The documents are as follows:

1. An e-mail I sent to Tom DiNanno and David Asher on January 4, 2021, which can be found [here](#) thanks to Fox News;
2. An e-mail exchange between me and DiNanno on January 5–6, which can be found [here](#) thanks to Fox News; and
3. A message I sent to a number of senior State Department officials on January 8, which can be found [here](#) thanks to *Vanity Fair*.

Part Two: Pushing for an Honest and Defensible Lab-Leak Inquiry

So let me begin with a critical point. As detailed in these documents, the squabbling at the State Department was about trying to ensure that we got our facts straight before going public with dramatic steps such as having Secretary Pompeo announce that it was “statistically” impossible for SARS-CoV-2 to be anything other than the product of Chinese government manipulation, sending “demarches” to foreign governments with this theory, or writing up China for having violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in connection with COVID-19.

The dispute had nothing whatsoever to do with trying to quash investigation into the origins of the virus, and *everything* to do

with trying to ensure the honesty and intellectual integrity of that investigation *precisely because* it was vital for us to get the bottom of the question of COVID “origins,” including the possibility that it came from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). I strongly *supported* looking into the “lab-leak” hypothesis, which clearly is a real possibility.

But I’m not just saying this now. I said it at the time, too. A lot.

Let’s look at the documents, starting with my January 4 e-mail to DiNanno and Asher. In that message, I highlight that the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau’s scientific “allegations about WIV and Chinese BW work allegedly being the source” of SARS-CoV-2 were “important” and “worrying,” and that these significant claims needed to be evaluated by real scientific experts.

(Yes, I admit that I called the virus the “WuFlu.” At a time before the World Health Organization had come up with “non-stigmatizing” designators such as “Alpha,” and people talked freely about things like the “UK variant” or “South African variant,” it didn’t seem unfair to tag the original virus as having indeed come from Wuhan. I’m afraid at another point I called it the “KungFlu,” too. None of this sounds as clever to me in retrospect as I fear it did at the time. But please remember that these were internal e-mails, not intended to see the light of day. Had I written these messages with an eye to public release, I would not have been so glib. *Mea culpa.*)

Anyway, in my e-mail, I reminded DiNanno and Asher that I had directed them, a month or so earlier, to establish an “expert vetting group or process” that would involve real scientists and intelligence experts in assessing the strength of AVC’s claims. But why, I asked them, had there been no progress in subjecting their assertions to peer review? And why were they running around the interagency spreading these allegations *before* we knew whether these claims could pass muster with objective, third-party scientists?

As I stated in that January 4 message, I wanted to “demand[] more transparency from the PRC here, especially in light of their appalling early cover-up of COVID-19 during the early weeks when honesty and resolute action could have made such a colossal difference in heading off millions of deaths and untold suffering, and in light of their grotesque history of such cover-ups.”

“An investigation of [COVID] origins is very important,” I reiterated, “and I’m delighted to press their feet to the fire for the honesty and clarity they’ve so far refused to provide.”

In the January 4 message, however, I also stressed how important it was that we get our facts straight before going public, *as the U.S. Government*, with the accusation that the Chinese government created the virus:

“[W]e need to make sure what we say is solid and passes muster from real experts *before* we risk embarrassing and discrediting ourselves in public. ... As I have repeatedly said, if it turns out that

your conclusions are right, I'll happily be first in line to scream from the rooftops about them, for it would be a colossal outrage. And you may well *be* right. But I want to be confident about where the facts really lie These issues are surpassingly important and we need to get to the bottom of them — but rigorously, defensibly, and truly.”

Hence my annoyance, expressed in that message, that DiNanno had been dragging his feet over my direction to “arrang[e] expert-level bioscience and intelligence vetting of David [Asher’s] work.” I warned DiNanno that such dithering looked bad: “Please don’t continue to feed the impression that AVC is afraid of peer review.” And I insisted that he tell me when they actually planned to get those allegations vetted by real scientists. It’s all there in the e-mail.

The next day, January 5, when I still hadn’t heard back from DiNanno about how they would ensure that their scientific assertions got evaluated by actual scientists, I e-mailed him again. (This was the message at the bottom of the January 5–6 e-mail string Fox News published.) I’ll admit I was grumpy, but I think I was also pretty clear about my focus on ensuring that we got our facts straight on this critical issue of COVID origins:

“It is ... becoming embarrassing — and, if I may say so, more than a little worrisome — that AVC seems still to be ducking an expert-level engagement to evaluate its own WIV allegations, even while

it has continued, over the last month or so, to brief its claims to non-experts across the interagency.”

DiNanno responded to my January 5 message with platitudes about how all they were doing was “investigating potential arms control violations.” (This is the middle message in the January 5–6 string.) “That Is [sic] exactly what we have done,” he declared, “and will continue to do.”

Let’s pause here for a moment. If you’re paying attention, you’ll have noticed that with this comment about “investigating potential arms control violations,” DiNanno signaled that AVC regarded itself as focusing not so much upon the origins of SARS-CoV-2, *per se*, as more specifically upon *China allegedly having violated the Biological Weapons Convention by creating the virus*. They seemed to believe that COVID-19 was a biological weapons (BW) effort gone awry — or perhaps even a BW agent *deliberately* unleashed upon the world after Beijing had secretly vaccinated its population, as Asher has rather remarkably suggested in public now that the State Department has terminated his consultancy contract. (You can see him in all his sober, cautious, and methodical glory on YouTube.) In this context, I suppose it was hardly surprising — as I memorialized in my January 4 e-mail to DiNanno — that in the December briefing when AVC first pitched me on their WIV-origins theory, Asher at one point suggested that SARS-CoV-2 might be a “genetically selective agent” (GSA) that China was using to target us, as evidenced, he said, by the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa wasn’t

reporting many COVID cases while the United States was. (Surely you don't need me to spell out how that notion was both analytically unsupportable on its face *and* contained deeply offensive implications, do you? I'll leave you to work this out on your own, but, uh, wow.)

Fortunately, however, DiNanno also informed me in his January 5 response that AVC had now indeed set up a panel of experts to discuss the scientific claims, which would occur on Thursday evening, January 7. (Finally! As noted in my January 4 e-mail, I'd been demanding expert vetting of AVC's "statistical" argument since they first came to me with this issue in my office in December.)

As this panel approached, however, I wrote DiNanno again — on January 6 — to emphasize how important it was that we get real scientists to vet AVC's allegations before we surfaced such dramatic claims in public:

"As I indicated before, having something that sounds scientific to say when making assertions to laymen is not the same thing as being correct. I do not have the scientific expertise to critique David's claims. Nor do you. Nor, in fact, does he have actual technical training in the first place. That doesn't necessarily mean he's wrong, of course, but it does have implications for how to deal with the complex and controversial claims you guys are making about weedy bioscience. ... If you're right, you should be willing to prove it, and to confront experts who — unlike all of the people

involved in building and making this argument for you — actually have training in the scientific field about which you make assertions. I really don't know how I could possibly have been more clear about this over the course of the last month. Your allegations are dramatic, and potentially very significant indeed, but it's for precisely that reason that they need to be tested and evaluated carefully. ...Your claims need to be assessed by real experts — not just waved around as bullet points on slide decks in front of non-scientists who are then dared to prove you wrong.”

It was particularly important to get real expert-level assessment of the scientific assertions AVC was making about laboratory origin because the AVC investigation appeared to have carefully *bypassed* State Department experts — both in my own bureau and in AVC itself, each of which has a whole *office* devoted to such questions — and the U.S. Intelligence Community. As I recounted in my January 8 message, “AVC ha[s] apparently been briefing this argument inside the Department and [to] some interagency partners for some weeks, apparently on instructions from a staffer at S/P [the Department's Office of Policy Planning] who told them they should not inform me or others of this work, nor involve the Intelligence Community.”

(A footnote, but perhaps a significant one: That last bit about cutting real experts out of the loop came to me directly from Tom DiNanno. When I asked him why AVC had been doing all this without telling the senior official to whom they reported — that is, me — he told me sheepishly that he had been *instructed* to do

things this way by Miles Yu, an S/P staffer at the time. According to DiNanno, Yu had represented that these specific instructions came from the Secretary. DiNanno, then in charge of the verification bureau, gave no sign of ever actually having verified that this was true, however. He appeared to have accepted Yu's representations at face value — in effect, a *de facto* Assistant Secretary of State taking marching orders from a lower-ranking staffer in another bureau, sight unseen. It would be interesting, now, to find out whether: (1) Secretary Pompeo *really* directed that AVC's lab-leak inquiry avoid engaging Departmental BW experts and U.S. intelligence officials, and that it do its work essentially in secret, without telling the official performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security; (2) Yu was, at least in this respect, dishonestly freelancing; or (3) DiNanno was just lying to me about his conversation with Yu. Perhaps a good journalist can go figure this out.)

Part Three: The Scientific Panel

Anyway, at least a first chance for scientific vetting came on January 7, when the panel of experts picked by the AVC Bureau had a chance to discuss the "statistical" proof that AVC had been relying upon in its assertions to me and others that the SARS-CoV-2 virus *had to have been* the product of Chinese government manipulation.

Unfortunately, as I memorialized the next day (January 8), despite my urging — in the last three paragraphs of my January 6 e-mail — that the other members of the panel “have ... the benefit of actually being able to read the paper beforehand,” AVC had not shared the document ahead of time. As I observed on January 8, “AVC did not provide us with the actual paper before yesterday’s discussion, so most other participants had not had the chance to study it in detail.”

Even so, it did not take the other panelists long to point out some key flaws in the “statistical” argument, which had been presented orally to the panel by the scientist upon whom AVC had apparently most relied in developing that line of argument. (His name is widely known, but I opted not to single him out in my message to Departmental colleagues. I felt that scientists should have some freedom to figure out the science amongst themselves; my concern was with what the *U.S. Government* would assert after they did. Rather than drag him personally into the fray, therefore, my memo reflected the fact that this man’s claims had effectively become *AVC’s argument* as the bureau promoted them in the interagency.)

I’ll spare you the blow-by-blow of criticisms made by other panelists about the “statistical” case AVC had been making at least since the first briefing they gave me in my office in December, though you can read the salient details in the January 8 message I sent to a number of my senior State Department colleagues the next day. (My message focused on the statistical argument, given

the prominence it had enjoyed in AVC's briefings; I did not purport to summarize the panel's discussion of all questions discussed.) As you'll see if you care to read my several-page account on January 8, the assertions AVC had been making seemed to have major problems. At the least, those assertions were clearly not *yet* ready to be the official position of the U.S. Department of State — which is why I sent that January 8 message warning my colleagues to be careful about running with that particular "statistical" claim.

I also now know, thanks to *Vanity Fair*, that DiNanno responded to my January 8 memo with one of his own a day or two later, after I had left the Department. The reader can find it [online](#), so I won't walk through it here. In light of what you now know from documentary evidence about my *actual* positions at the time, however, you'll easily be able to see what a pack of distortions and falsehoods DiNanno's memo actually was. You might want to lay our two documents side by side and read them carefully in light of the information you now have. I suspect it will be pretty clear that his memo was a dishonest mess of baseless attacks on me — an angry screed addressed to readers whom DiNanno knew did not have the benefit of knowing what I'd *actually* been saying to him for the last month, and which he sent to his readers at a time when he knew I had resigned from the Department and would have no chance to defend myself and correct the record. (Thankfully, however, our bosses were intelligent folks. One can probably infer how seriously our superiors took DiNanno's memo by the fact that

they apparently acted on my note of caution about AVC's scientific claims rather than on DiNanno's shrill and convoluted attempt to defend those assertions and paint me as the villain. More on that below.)

For purposes of this open letter, I'll leave the issues of science to any of you who are scientists. As I told DiNanno in my January 4 message, "I do not have the scientific expertise to critique David's claims. Nor do you. Nor, in fact, does he have actual technical training in the first place." That is *precisely* why I insisted that AVC set up a panel of experts, and why — after they finally got around to arranging this peer review on January 7 — it was my *duty* to convey to my colleagues some of the concerns raised by the experts AVC had put on the panel. It may in the end turn out that science *does* prove that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of human intervention at WIV. But it would have been grievously irresponsible for us to adopt that theory publicly until it was *much* more able to stand on its own two feet than the January 7 panel discussion showed it to be at the time.

Part Four: Putting Absurd Accusations to Rest

Some of my former colleagues are now — perhaps, one imagines, out of embarrassment over all of the events described above — asserting that I tried to prevent inquiry into the lab-leak hypothesis and to shut down any investigation of the question. (Thanks to Tucker Carlson making this claim at least twice on the air, by the way, I've now gotten vicious and deranged hate mail.

Here's, for instance, what I received on June 3 after Carlson first mentioned me on his show: "*Fuck you dickbag globalist shill. Why the fuck did you shut down the lab leak theory? Go lick some China communist boots.*" This person helpfully signed this missive cantcuckthetuck@gmail.com. Thanks for introducing me to new friends, Tucker.)

Yet no serious person who is actually aware of my interactions with AVC could possibly think I wanted to prevent inquiry into the laboratory hypothesis, as you will already have seen from my e-mails of January 4 and January 5–6, from which I've quoted extensively here. (You can even read them online yourself, in their entirety.) You can also see that I was always crystal clear about the importance of getting to the truth by fully investigating the laboratory-leak question, making clear that "if it turns out that [AVC's] conclusions are right," I would myself "happily be first in line to scream from the rooftops about them."

Additional proof of my commitment to looking into WIV — and indeed my focus upon *protecting* efforts to investigate the laboratory-leak question from the discredit and ridicule that might have smothered it in its crib if we had foolishly hitched Secretary Pompeo, the Department of State, and the Administration to easily-debunkable junk science — can be found in my January 8 message itself. There, I made the point yet again:

"If well-founded, AVC's findings would be extremely significant All participants [in the January 7 panel] seemed ... to agree that

China should be pressed for answers about such things as the nature of any work done at WIV on novel coronaviruses, whether any safety incidents occurred, what data is in WIV's sequencing database (which was mysteriously taken offline early in the pandemic), and when exactly the PRC realized (despite its early representations) that SARS-CoV-2 was only in its 'wet market' environmental samples — and not in its live animal samples — leading them to conclude that the market was not the source of the outbreak. These sorts of questions should indeed provide us with lots of grist for pressing China for answers and highlighting its non-transparency and history of failing to report (or even covering up) critical information.”

You'll also see from my [January 8 message](#) that I specifically directed “AVC and ISN [the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau] to collaborate on drawing up a list of questions and points that could be useful in this regard” in pressing Beijing for answers. So were these the actions of a “dickbag globalist shill” who “licks ... China communist boots”? Or of a serious steward of the honesty and intellectual integrity of U.S. State Department policymaking dedicated to ensuring we got our facts straight and pushing back against recklessness that would make it *harder* to have the lab-leak issue taken seriously? The reader can make up his or her own mind.

Part Five: A Net Assessment

So where does that leave us now?

Well, if you want to understand what I was trying to do during in this period of bickering inside the State Department, you now have my own words from internal contemporaneous records. Simply put, I felt it would be essentially *insane* to go public with AVC's scientific assertions — such as, as DiNanno and Asher had urged, making public statements, demarching foreign governments (including China), and finding China in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention over this coronavirus — before getting those scientific assertions vetted by objective, third-party scientists.

Let me be completely clear: From where I was sitting at the time, in the chair of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, I never saw *any* evidence of *any* effort at the State Department to prevent inquiry into the lab-leak idea. To the contrary — as you can now see proven by documents in the public record — I *supported* looking into the lab-leak hypothesis. I cared so much about getting to the truth about WIV, in fact, that I insisted that we do the work in a way that could stand up to scrutiny. (If you're serious about something being done, you have an obligation to ensure it's done *right*. Wanting less than that just makes you a hack.) And I am aware of *no one anywhere* in the Department who thought that the laboratory hypothesis should be ignored or ruled out.

So there was no conspiracy to quash inquiry into the lab-leak question, at least not at the State Department. But there *was* a demand for intellectual rigor and analytically defensible

conclusions in *doing* that important inquiry. For making that demand, however, I make no apologies. I was doing my duty.

What happened after that? Well, one might infer that my State Department superiors in fact *agreed* with the account in my January 8 message of the weaknesses that AVC's expert panel had pointed out in the supposed "statistical" proof that SARS-CoV-2 had to be the result of human intervention. Neither Secretary Pompeo nor any other serving U.S. official, after all, adopted and voiced the scientific assertions about WIV origin that AVC had previously been briefing to interagency stakeholders. Instead, Secretary Pompeo issued a "Fact Sheet" on January 15 that accurately recounted downgraded *intelligence reporting* we had received that seemed relevant to the question of whether COVID-19 had originated at the laboratory.

My superiors at the Department were not shy people, and I have no doubt that had they felt AVC's scientific assertions could pass muster with real scientists, they *absolutely* would have made this case in public, and loudly. They chose not to do so, however. I suspect that we should read into this their quiet endorsement of my conclusion that AVC's scientific case wasn't ready for prime time. (Perhaps someone can ask my former bosses what precisely they thought of the merit of AVC's "statistical" argument about genomic variation, and why — if it was indeed good science — they seem to have dropped those assertions. I can tell you only one thing about this with certainty: not pursuing AVC's "scientific" argument after the January 7 panel meeting wasn't *my* decision.

By the end of the day on January 8, after sending my message of caution, I had left the Department. It would be interesting to know what discussions happened thereafter.)

But I do think that what happened next is important. Instead of focusing on purported “scientific proofs” of laboratory origin, public discussion of the COVID-origins issue thereafter shifted to the questions and suspicions that had been raised about WIV by our intelligence information, as outlined in Secretary Pompeo’s “Fact Sheet.” This was, in my view, much the better way to go. Before leaving the Department, in fact, I had myself reviewed and cleared an early draft of that “Fact Sheet” as the downgraded information started to go around for interagency clearance, and I was glad to see it later emerge publicly on January 15. Tellingly, the Biden Administration has not questioned that information, and a robust debate is now underway about possible laboratory origin.

But let me be frank. Anyone who cares about ensuring that the lab-leak hypothesis is taken seriously should probably be *thanking* me, rather than vilifying me. I suspect that my push for scientific vetting of AVC’s assertions actually helped *save* the lab-leak hypothesis from being preemptively discredited. The fact that we finally now have a credible public debate on the question owes much to the fact that pursuing these issues *wasn’t* tainted by the State Department signing the U.S. Government’s name to scientific assertions that we already knew hadn’t stood up well to scrutiny.

I've been around the arms control and international security business for quite a while now, including spending 2003–06 as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in what is now the AVC Bureau. As I told someone the other day — an old and dear friend and former colleague who has now started demonizing me on the basis of the lies being spread about these issues — honesty, accuracy, and intellectual integrity are the strongest weapons that an arms control verifier has. These things need to be safeguarded carefully, for they are priceless. They are what separates the truth-teller from the ideological crank.

I am heartsick at the ugliness of the campaign against me in the press today, but I remain proud of my role in insisting upon fidelity to these values at a time when some officials seemed to be slipping. I dearly hope that we can all now put fratricidal distractions aside and get back to the *real* task: figuring out what the hell happened in Wuhan.

Part Seven: Conclusion

The actual details of all this State Department infighting are, I'll admit, somewhat boring. They certainly don't map satisfyingly onto a moralistic narrative of redoubtable heroes fighting for right against malevolent cabals and institutional corruption. Nor are they well suited for spinning up rants of performative outrage by the occasional pundit disinclined to let little things like "truth" get in the way of the good Nielsen ratings that come from spinning a sexy narrative of deceit and conspiracy.

Nevertheless, these demonstrable facts about the positions I took at the time *are* clear in the record. If that's not important to you, you're reading the wrong letter, and I apologize for wasting your time.

If you've read this far, however, my guess is that facts are indeed important to you. So thanks for listening.

.....

Dr. Ford served until January 8, 2021, as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and for the last 15 months of that period also performed the duties of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Prior to that service at the State Department, he ran the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counterproliferation Directorate at the U.S. National Security Council staff. A graduate of Harvard, Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and the Yale Law School, Dr. Ford has been a think tank scholar, U.S. Navy intelligence officer, a staff member on five different U.S. Senate Committees, and a senior American diplomat. He is the author of two books on Chinese foreign relations and scores of articles on international security topics, and his personal website may be found at <https://newparadigmsforum.com>.
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From: (b)(6)@state.gov
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 16:38:14 +0000

Wow, this is quite the read. I highly recommend reading all of it, if just for soaking up the blissful writing of Dr. Ford. He somehow manages to package name-calling, vitriolic slurs, and demonic deeds into a soothing narrative.

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 12:02 PM
To: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

From: Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:42 AM
To: AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>
Cc: SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>
Subject: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

<https://christopherashleyford.medium.com/the-lab-leak-inquiry-at-the-state-department-96973cff3a65>

The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:



[Christopher Ashley Ford](#)

[1 hour ago · 20 min read](#)

An Open Letter by former Assistant Secretary Christopher Ford

(June 10, 2021)

In both journalism and policymaking — if not always in politics, or in the sordid world of score-settling by unemployed, second-rate apparatchiks — facts matter, and intellectual integrity matters. In light of the remarkable quantity of errant nonsense that has been written in the last couple of weeks about squabbles inside the U.S. State Department about how to look into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in the closing weeks of the Trump Administration, I hope this open letter will help set the record straight for those who still care about things such as facts.

I write this because, to put it bluntly, I'm tired of being the butt of stupid and paranoid conspiracy theories being promulgated by those who know better. I recognize that some of these conspiracy narratives are, for any thoughtful person, self-refuting even on their face. (As someone who has been warning the policy community since at least 2007 about threats to the United States and the democratic world from the Chinese Communist Party's geopolitical ambitions — including in two scholarly books and scores of articles and speeches, including in official capacity at the State Department — have I been “protecting” the Chinese Communist Party from accountability? Good grief.)

Nevertheless, I've been around politics long enough to know that an imbecility that slots into a convenient narrative beats an awkward fact any day, and manic performative outrage is much

more fun than sober analysis. So perhaps offering clarity here won't change a thing. Yet I'm still going to try.

I'm also going to try to do something unorthodox here. Rather than using this letter as an opportunity to invent and loudly dispense my own *post hoc* version of what happened — a dishonest revisionism-of-convenience that is in abundant supply, but that I will leave to others — I will try to offer you only specific claims that are supported by contemporaneous documents that enterprising journalists at Fox News and *Vanity Fair* have recently put into the public record.

Part One: A Clear Documentary Record

In particular, since the question at hand is my own particular role and position in connection with investigating the origins of the COVID-19 virus, I will refer to three unclassified documents that I myself wrote and sent to others at the State Department in early January 2021. (For the record, I did *not* retain these documents when I left the Department. Thankfully, however — at least for me — some of the lies being told on these topics have apparently caused offense among those who know what really happened and clearly *did* retain the documents.) I'm happy to see them in the public record, because they make very clear exactly what I was doing at the time, and why.

The documents are as follows:

1. An e-mail I sent to Tom DiNanno and David Asher on January 4, 2021, which can be found [here](#) thanks to Fox News;
2. An e-mail exchange between me and DiNanno on January 5–6, which can be found [here](#) thanks to Fox News; and

3. A message I sent to a number of senior State Department officials on January 8, which can be found [here](#) thanks to *Vanity Fair*.

Part Two: Pushing for an Honest and Defensible Lab-Leak Inquiry

So let me begin with a critical point. As detailed in these documents, the squabbling at the State Department was about trying to ensure that we got our facts straight before going public with dramatic steps such as having Secretary Pompeo announce that it was “statistically” impossible for SARS-CoV-2 to be anything other than the product of Chinese government manipulation, sending “demarches” to foreign governments with this theory, or writing up China for having violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in connection with COVID-19.

The dispute had nothing whatsoever to do with trying to quash investigation into the origins of the virus, and *everything* to do with trying to ensure the honesty and intellectual integrity of that investigation *precisely because* it was vital for us to get the bottom of the question of COVID “origins,” including the possibility that it came from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). I strongly *supported* looking into the “lab-leak” hypothesis, which clearly is a real possibility.

But I’m not just saying this now. I said it at the time, too. A lot. Let’s look at the documents, starting with [my January 4 e-mail to DiNanno and Asher](#). In that message, I highlight that the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau’s scientific “allegations about WIV and Chinese BW work allegedly being the

source” of SARS-CoV-2 were “important” and “worrying,” and that these significant claims needed to be evaluated by real scientific experts.

(Yes, I admit that I called the virus the “WuFlu.” At a time before the World Health Organization had come up with “non-stigmatizing” designators such as “Alpha,” and people talked freely about things like the “UK variant” or “South African variant,” it didn’t seem unfair to tag the original virus as having indeed come from Wuhan. I’m afraid at another point I called it the “KungFlu,” too. None of this sounds as clever to me in retrospect as I fear it did at the time. But please remember that these were internal e-mails, not intended to see the light of day. Had I written these messages with an eye to public release, I would not have been so glib. *Mea culpa.*)

Anyway, in my e-mail, I reminded DiNanno and Asher that I had directed them, a month or so earlier, to establish an “expert vetting group or process” that would involve real scientists and intelligence experts in assessing the strength of AVC’s claims. But why, I asked them, had there been no progress in subjecting their assertions to peer review? And why were they running around the interagency spreading these allegations *before* we knew whether these claims could pass muster with objective, third-party scientists?

As I stated in that January 4 message, I wanted to “demand[] more transparency from the PRC here, especially in light of their appalling early cover-up of COVID-19 during the early weeks when honesty and resolute action could have made such a colossal

difference in heading off millions of deaths and untold suffering, and in light of their grotesque history of such cover-ups.”

“An investigation of [COVID] origins is very important,” I reiterated, “and I’m delighted to press their feet to the fire for the honesty and clarity they’ve so far refused to provide.”

In the January 4 message, however, I also stressed how important it was that we get our facts straight before going public, *as the U.S. Government*, with the accusation that the Chinese government created the virus:

“[W]e need to make sure what we say is solid and passes muster from real experts *before* we risk embarrassing and discrediting ourselves in public. ... As I have repeatedly said, if it turns out that your conclusions are right, I’ll happily be first in line to scream from the rooftops about them, for it would be a colossal outrage. And you may well *be* right. But I want to be confident about where the facts really lie These issues are surpassingly important and we need to get to the bottom of them — but rigorously, defensibly, and truly.”

Hence my annoyance, expressed in that message, that DiNanno had been dragging his feet over my direction to “arrang[e] expert-level bioscience and intelligence vetting of David [Asher’s] work.” I warned DiNanno that such dithering looked bad: “Please don’t continue to feed the impression that AVC is afraid of peer review.” And I insisted that he tell me when they actually planned to get those allegations vetted by real scientists. It’s all there in the e-mail.

The next day, January 5, when I still hadn't heard back from DiNanno about how they would ensure that their scientific assertions got evaluated by actual scientists, I e-mailed him again. (This was the message at the bottom of [the January 5–6 e-mail string Fox News published](#).) I'll admit I was grumpy, but I think I was also pretty clear about my focus on ensuring that we got our facts straight on this critical issue of COVID origins:

“It is ... becoming embarrassing — and, if I may say so, more than a little worrisome — that AVC seems still to be ducking an expert-level engagement to evaluate its own WIV allegations, even while it has continued, over the last month or so, to brief its claims to non-experts across the interagency.”

DiNanno responded to my January 5 message with platitudes about how all they were doing was “investigating potential arms control violations.” (This is the middle message in [the January 5–6 string](#).) “That Is [sic] exactly what we have done,” he declared, “and will continue to do.”

Let's pause here for a moment. If you're paying attention, you'll have noticed that with this comment about “investigating potential arms control violations,” DiNanno signaled that AVC regarded itself as focusing not so much upon the origins of SARS-CoV-2, *per se*, as more specifically upon *China allegedly having violated the Biological Weapons Convention by creating the virus*. They seemed to believe that COVID-19 was a biological weapons (BW) effort gone awry — or perhaps even a BW agent *deliberately* unleashed upon the world after Beijing had secretly vaccinated its population, as Asher has rather remarkably

suggested in public now that the State Department has terminated his consultancy contract. (You can see him in all his sober, cautious, and methodical glory on YouTube.) In this context, I suppose it was hardly surprising — as I memorialized in my January 4 e-mail to DiNanno — that in the December briefing when AVC first pitched me on their WIV-origins theory, Asher at one point suggested that SARS-CoV-2 might be a “genetically selective agent” (GSA) that China was using to target us, as evidenced, he said, by the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa wasn’t reporting many COVID cases while the United States was. (Surely you don’t need me to spell out how that notion was both analytically unsupportable on its face *and* contained deeply offensive implications, do you? I’ll leave you to work this out on your own, but, uh, wow.)

Fortunately, however, DiNanno also informed me in his January 5 response that AVC had now indeed set up a panel of experts to discuss the scientific claims, which would occur on Thursday evening, January 7. (Finally! As noted in my January 4 e-mail, I’d been demanding expert vetting of AVC’s “statistical” argument since they first came to me with this issue in my office in December.)

As this panel approached, however, I wrote DiNanno again — on January 6 — to emphasize how important it was that we get real scientists to vet AVC’s allegations before we surfaced such dramatic claims in public:

“As I indicated before, having something that sounds scientific to say when making assertions to laymen is not the same thing as

being correct. I do not have the scientific expertise to critique David's claims. Nor do you. Nor, in fact, does he have actual technical training in the first place. That doesn't necessarily mean he's wrong, of course, but it does have implications for how to deal with the complex and controversial claims you guys are making about weedy bioscience. ... If you're right, you should be willing to prove it, and to confront experts who — unlike all of the people involved in building and making this argument for you — actually have training in the scientific field about which you make assertions. I really don't know how I could possibly have been more clear about this over the course of the last month. Your allegations are dramatic, and potentially very significant indeed, but it's for precisely that reason that they need to be tested and evaluated carefully. ...Your claims need to be assessed by real experts — not just waved around as bullet points on slide decks in front of non-scientists who are then dared to prove you wrong.”

It was particularly important to get real expert-level assessment of the scientific assertions AVC was making about laboratory origin because the AVC investigation appeared to have carefully *bypassed* State Department experts — both in my own bureau and in AVC itself, each of which has a whole *office* devoted to such questions — and the U.S. Intelligence Community. As I recounted in my January 8 message, “AVC ha[s] apparently been briefing this argument inside the Department and [to] some interagency partners for some weeks, apparently on instructions from a staffer at S/P [the Department's Office of Policy Planning]

who told them they should not inform me or others of this work, nor involve the Intelligence Community.”

(A footnote, but perhaps a significant one: That last bit about cutting real experts out of the loop came to me directly from Tom DiNanno. When I asked him why AVC had been doing all this without telling the senior official to whom they reported — that is, me — he told me sheepishly that he had been *instructed* to do things this way by Miles Yu, an S/P staffer at the time. According to DiNanno, Yu had represented that these specific instructions came from the Secretary. DiNanno, then in charge of the verification bureau, gave no sign of ever actually having verified that this was true, however. He appeared to have accepted Yu’s representations at face value — in effect, a *de facto* Assistant Secretary of State taking marching orders from a lower-ranking staffer in another bureau, sight unseen. It would be interesting, now, to find out whether: (1) Secretary Pompeo *really* directed that AVC’s lab-leak inquiry avoid engaging Departmental BW experts and U.S. intelligence officials, and that it do its work essentially in secret, without telling the official performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security; (2) Yu was, at least in this respect, dishonestly freelancing; or (3) DiNanno was just lying to me about his conversation with Yu. Perhaps a good journalist can go figure this out.)

Part Three: The Scientific Panel

Anyway, at least a first chance for scientific vetting came on January 7, when the panel of experts picked by the AVC Bureau

had a chance to discuss the “statistical” proof that AVC had been relying upon in its assertions to me and others that the SARS-CoV-2 virus *had to have been* the product of Chinese government manipulation.

Unfortunately, as I memorialized the next day (January 8), despite my urging — in the last three paragraphs of my January 6 e-mail — that the other members of the panel “have ... the benefit of actually being able to read the paper beforehand,” AVC had not shared the document ahead of time. As I observed on January 8, “AVC did not provide us with the actual paper before yesterday’s discussion, so most other participants had not had the chance to study it in detail.”

Even so, it did not take the other panelists long to point out some key flaws in the “statistical” argument, which had been presented orally to the panel by the scientist upon whom AVC had apparently most relied in developing that line of argument. (His name is widely known, but I opted not to single him out in my message to Departmental colleagues. I felt that scientists should have some freedom to figure out the science amongst themselves; my concern was with what the *U.S. Government* would assert after they did. Rather than drag him personally into the fray, therefore, my memo reflected the fact that this man’s claims had effectively become *AVC’s argument* as the bureau promoted them in the interagency.)

I’ll spare you the blow-by-blow of criticisms made by other panelists about the “statistical” case AVC had been making at least since the first briefing they gave me in my office in December,

though you can read the salient details in the January 8 message I sent to a number of my senior State Department colleagues the next day. (My message focused on the statistical argument, given the prominence it had enjoyed in AVC's briefings; I did not purport to summarize the panel's discussion of all questions discussed.) As you'll see if you care to read my several-page account on January 8, the assertions AVC had been making seemed to have major problems. At the least, those assertions were clearly not *yet* ready to be the official position of the U.S. Department of State — which is why I sent that January 8 message warning my colleagues to be careful about running with that particular "statistical" claim.

I also now know, thanks to *Vanity Fair*, that DiNanno responded to my January 8 memo with one of his own a day or two later, after I had left the Department. The reader can find it online, so I won't walk through it here. In light of what you now know from documentary evidence about my *actual* positions at the time, however, you'll easily be able to see what a pack of distortions and falsehoods DiNanno's memo actually was. You might want to lay our two documents side by side and read them carefully in light of the information you now have. I suspect it will be pretty clear that his memo was a dishonest mess of baseless attacks on me — an angry screed addressed to readers whom DiNanno knew did not have the benefit of knowing what I'd *actually* been saying to him for the last month, and which he sent to his readers at a time when he knew I had resigned from the Department and would have no chance to defend myself and correct the record. (Thankfully,

however, our bosses were intelligent folks. One can probably infer how seriously our superiors took DiNanno's memo by the fact that they apparently acted on my note of caution about AVC's scientific claims rather than on DiNanno's shrill and convoluted attempt to defend those assertions and paint me as the villain. More on that below.)

For purposes of this open letter, I'll leave the issues of science to any of you who are scientists. As I told DiNanno in my January 4 message, "I do not have the scientific expertise to critique David's claims. Nor do you. Nor, in fact, does he have actual technical training in the first place." That is *precisely* why I insisted that AVC set up a panel of experts, and why — after they finally got around to arranging this peer review on January 7 — it was my *duty* to convey to my colleagues some of the concerns raised by the experts AVC had put on the panel. It may in the end turn out that science *does* prove that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of human intervention at WIV. But it would have been grievously irresponsible for us to adopt that theory publicly until it was *much* more able to stand on its own two feet than the January 7 panel discussion showed it to be at the time.

Part Four: Putting Absurd Accusations to Rest

Some of my former colleagues are now — perhaps, one imagines, out of embarrassment over all of the events described above — asserting that I tried to prevent inquiry into the lab-leak hypothesis and to shut down any investigation of the question. (Thanks to Tucker Carlson making this claim at least twice on the air, by the way, I've now gotten vicious and deranged hate mail.

Here's, for instance, what I received on June 3 after Carlson first mentioned me on his show: "*Fuck you dickbag globalist shill. Why the fuck did you shut down the lab leak theory? Go lick some China communist boots.*" This person helpfully signed this missive cantcuckthetuck@gmail.com. Thanks for introducing me to new friends, Tucker.)

Yet no serious person who is actually aware of my interactions with AVC could possibly think I wanted to prevent inquiry into the laboratory hypothesis, as you will already have seen from my e-mails of January 4 and January 5–6, from which I've quoted extensively here. (You can even read them online yourself, in their entirety.) You can also see that I was always crystal clear about the importance of getting to the truth by fully investigating the laboratory-leak question, making clear that "if it turns out that [AVC's] conclusions are right," I would myself "happily be first in line to scream from the rooftops about them."

Additional proof of my commitment to looking into WIV — and indeed my focus upon *protecting* efforts to investigate the laboratory-leak question from the discredit and ridicule that might have smothered it in its crib if we had foolishly hitched Secretary Pompeo, the Department of State, and the Administration to easily-debunkable junk science — can be found in my January 8 message itself. There, I made the point yet again:

"If well-founded, AVC's findings would be extremely significant All participants [in the January 7 panel] seemed ... to agree that China should be pressed for answers about such things as the nature of any work done at WIV on novel coronaviruses, whether

any safety incidents occurred, what data is in WIV's sequencing database (which was mysteriously taken offline early in the pandemic), and when exactly the PRC realized (despite its early representations) that SARS-CoV-2 was only in its 'wet market' environmental samples — and not in its live animal samples — leading them to conclude that the market was not the source of the outbreak. These sorts of questions should indeed provide us with lots of grist for pressing China for answers and highlighting its non-transparency and history of failing to report (or even covering up) critical information.”

You'll also see from my [January 8 message](#) that I specifically directed “AVC and ISN [the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau] to collaborate on drawing up a list of questions and points that could be useful in this regard” in pressing Beijing for answers. So were these the actions of a “dickbag globalist shill” who “licks ... China communist boots”? Or of a serious steward of the honesty and intellectual integrity of U.S. State Department policymaking dedicated to ensuring we got our facts straight and pushing back against recklessness that would make it *harder* to have the lab-leak issue taken seriously? The reader can make up his or her own mind.

Part Five: A Net Assessment

So where does that leave us now?

Well, if you want to understand what I was trying to do during in this period of bickering inside the State Department, you now have my own words from internal contemporaneous records. Simply put, I felt it would be essentially *insane* to go public with AVC's

scientific assertions — such as, as DiNanno and Asher had urged, making public statements, demarching foreign governments (including China), and finding China in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention over this coronavirus — before getting those scientific assertions vetted by objective, third-party scientists.

Let me be completely clear: From where I was sitting at the time, in the chair of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, I never saw *any* evidence of *any* effort at the State Department to prevent inquiry into the lab-leak idea. To the contrary — as you can now see proven by documents in the public record — I *supported* looking into the lab-leak hypothesis. I cared so much about getting to the truth about WIV, in fact, that I insisted that we do the work in a way that could stand up to scrutiny. (If you're serious about something being done, you have an obligation to ensure it's done *right*. Wanting less than that just makes you a hack.) And I am aware of *no one anywhere* in the Department who thought that the laboratory hypothesis should be ignored or ruled out.

So there was no conspiracy to quash inquiry into the lab-leak question, at least not at the State Department. But there *was* a demand for intellectual rigor and analytically defensible conclusions in *doing* that important inquiry. For making that demand, however, I make no apologies. I was doing my duty. What happened after that? Well, one might infer that my State Department superiors in fact *agreed* with the account in my January 8 message of the weaknesses that AVC's expert panel had pointed out in the supposed "statistical" proof that SARS-

CoV-2 had to be the result of human intervention. Neither Secretary Pompeo nor any other serving U.S. official, after all, adopted and voiced the scientific assertions about WIV origin that AVC had previously been briefing to interagency stakeholders. Instead, Secretary Pompeo issued a "Fact Sheet" on January 15 that accurately recounted downgraded *intelligence reporting* we had received that seemed relevant to the question of whether COVID-19 had originated at the laboratory.

My superiors at the Department were not shy people, and I have no doubt that had they felt AVC's scientific assertions could pass muster with real scientists, they *absolutely* would have made this case in public, and loudly. They chose not to do so, however. I suspect that we should read into this their quiet endorsement of my conclusion that AVC's scientific case wasn't ready for prime time. (Perhaps someone can ask my former bosses what precisely they thought of the merit of AVC's "statistical" argument about genomic variation, and why — if it was indeed good science — they seem to have dropped those assertions. I can tell you only one thing about this with certainty: not pursuing AVC's "scientific" argument after the January 7 panel meeting wasn't *my* decision. By the end of the day on January 8, after sending my message of caution, I had left the Department. It would be interesting to know what discussions happened thereafter.)

But I do think that what happened next is important. Instead of focusing on purported "scientific proofs" of laboratory origin, public discussion of the COVID-origins issue thereafter shifted to the questions and suspicions that had been raised about WIV by

our intelligence information, as outlined in Secretary Pompeo's "Fact Sheet." This was, in my view, much the better way to go. Before leaving the Department, in fact, I had myself reviewed and cleared an early draft of that "Fact Sheet" as the downgraded information started to go around for interagency clearance, and I was glad to see it later emerge publicly on January 15. Tellingly, the Biden Administration has not questioned that information, and a robust debate is now underway about possible laboratory origin.

But let me be frank. Anyone who cares about ensuring that the lab-leak hypothesis is taken seriously should probably be *thanking* me, rather than vilifying me. I suspect that my push for scientific vetting of AVC's assertions actually helped *save* the lab-leak hypothesis from being preemptively discredited. The fact that we finally now have a credible public debate on the question owes much to the fact that pursuing these issues *wasn't* tainted by the State Department signing the U.S. Government's name to scientific assertions that we already knew hadn't stood up well to scrutiny.

I've been around the arms control and international security business for quite a while now, including spending 2003–06 as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in what is now the AVC Bureau. As I told someone the other day — an old and dear friend and former colleague who has now started demonizing me on the basis of the lies being spread about these issues — honesty, accuracy, and intellectual integrity are the strongest weapons that an arms control verifier has. These things need to be safeguarded

carefully, for they are priceless. They are what separates the truth-teller from the ideological crank.

I am heartsick at the ugliness of the campaign against me in the press today, but I remain proud of my role in insisting upon fidelity to these values at a time when some officials seemed to be slipping. I dearly hope that we can all now put fratricidal distractions aside and get back to the *real* task: figuring out what the hell happened in Wuhan.

Part Seven: Conclusion

The actual details of all this State Department infighting are, I'll admit, somewhat boring. They certainly don't map satisfyingly onto a moralistic narrative of redoubtable heroes fighting for right against malevolent cabals and institutional corruption. Nor are they well suited for spinning up rants of performative outrage by the occasional pundit disinclined to let little things like "truth" get in the way of the good Nielsen ratings that come from spinning a sexy narrative of deceit and conspiracy.

Nevertheless, these demonstrable facts about the positions I took at the time *are* clear in the record. If that's not important to you, you're reading the wrong letter, and I apologize for wasting your time.

If you've read this far, however, my guess is that facts are indeed important to you. So thanks for listening.

.....

Dr. Ford served until January 8, 2021, as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and for the last 15 months of that period also performed the duties of the

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Prior to that service at the State Department, he ran the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counterproliferation Directorate at the U.S. National Security Council staff. A graduate of Harvard, Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and the Yale Law School, Dr. Ford has been a think tank scholar, U.S. Navy intelligence officer, a staff member on five different U.S. Senate Committees, and a senior American diplomat. He is the author of two books on Chinese foreign relations and scores of articles on international security topics, and his personal website may be found at <https://newparadigmsforum.com>.
Christopher Ashley Ford

Ned Price
Spokesperson
U.S. Department of State
Email: (b)(6)@state.gov
W: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: CBW-BPS touch base--virtual meeting
Date:	Tue, 21 Sep 2021 16:47:49 +0000

That's correct, (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2021 12:26 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: CBW-BPS touch base--virtual meeting

Thanks, (b)(6) I'm confirming that (b)(6) would prefer to meet today virtually rather than rescheduling for later in the week to discuss securely?

(b)(6)
Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2021 12:07 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: CBW-BPS touch base--virtual meeting

Sorry, (b)(6) and does not intend to go back again. So, let's meet virtually.

-----Original Appointment-----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2021 11:14 AM
To: (b)(6) Park, Christopher J; (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: CBW-BPS touch base
When: Tuesday, September 21, 2021 4:00 PM-5:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: AVC/CBW Office

BPS will come to AVC/CBW office (we can move to a secure call if that won't work). To (b)(5) and anything else we need to touch base on: Thursday IPC and Monday DC deliverables; (b)(5) (b)(5) etc.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, September 17, 2021 4:25 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Understood.

Then either Tuesday or Wednesday at 4pm?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, September 17, 2021 3:12 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Thanks, (b)(6) I'm afraid we've got conflicts at both those times. I see (b)(6) Outlook calendar is blocked from viewing, but looking across our three calendars, the below look like possibilities. (I'm blaming NSC for hosting no less than 8 hours of (b)(5) for our tight schedule – and that doesn't even include anything Megan might add!)

- Tuesday 12:30-2 or anytime after 3
- Wednesday after 4
- Thursday after 1
- Friday after Noon

Let me know; otherwise, I'll work to see if we can get our Friday AM commitment.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, September 17, 2021 2:41 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Hi (b)(6) -

Sorry for my late reply on this one. (b)(6) and back in office on Tuesday.

Would Tuesday 2-3pm or Friday 11-noon work for you and Chris?

Thanks much,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, September 13, 2021 11:30 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Hi (b)(6) Thanks again for the additional info on the ClassNet. One issue we're concerned about for the timing of a potential October meeting is UNGA overlap. I expect some of the critical folks from the PRC side would be tied up with that.

Let me know when works for you (and (b)(6) if she wants to join?) to put our heads together about this now that everyone's back from Geneva. Chris would be joining too. Stalking our calendars, I might suggest Thursday 11-Noon or Friday anytime after 1.

Welcome back!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 11:17 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Thanks, (b)(6) – Let's touch base once you return from the MXs and (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Safe travels!

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, September 3, 2021 5:52 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Hi (b)(6)

No action before the MXs are done. The agreed agenda came from PRC in mid-September 2020 and we were supposed to hold our virtual bilat in October. (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5)

Also, earlier today I sent you on the other system additional background on their thinking related to biosecurity.

I left the agenda with green markings to indicate issues we each agreed to discuss. So after the MXs, the plan (b)(5) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Enjoy your weekend!

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, September 2, 2021 1:08 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks very much for the advanced coordination. A couple specific thoughts and questions below, but I really think we should wait until the MXs are over to dive into this (when we'll be a lot smarter). Perhaps put something on the calendar early the week of Sept 13th?

- (b)(5)
- ~~(SBU)~~ **China signals desire to work constructively with U.S. in BWC:** Chinese Ambassador Li Song approached DHOD at the conclusion of the afternoon session to introduce himself and make clear his desire for constructive engagement. He commended the U.S. working papers, encouraged U.S. support for the Chinese paper on biosecurity guidelines, and said that the U.S. and China should seek to work constructively in the BWC despite differences and a strained bilateral relationship. When DHOD asked whether China intended to pursue an argument in MX5 that U.S. calls for WHO access to the Wuhan Institute of Virology undercut our arguments against a BWC protocol, Li demurred. China would continue to voice support for a return to protocol negotiations but would not raise issues related to COVID origins in the BWC unless provoked. When asked whether China would be receptive to bilateral discussions in advance of the 2022 Review Conference, Li welcomed the idea, suggesting that such consultations could take place in Geneva in conjunction with the Meeting of States Parties in November.
- Which of these agenda items did the PRC suggest last year? (It'd be helpful to have a sense for what they were interested in discussing – even though it's been a year, so might have changed)
- (b)(5)

Thanks!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 9:12 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: For action: Draft CBW Agenda - China Proposal 9-17-2020 with China updates

Hi Chris, (b)(6)

Spoke to (b)(6) on Friday and she wants to move forward with a CBW bilat for some time during the week of October 11.

Attached is the agenda we had agreed with them last October.

Welcome feedback/updates by Thursday, September 1.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Physical Scientist
Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6) @state.gov>
To:	(b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
CC:	ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	Re: Cables on Wuhan
Date:	Tue, 14 Apr 2020 16:33:36 +0000

Well, either that, or his source also provided a lot of additional contextual detail. My bet would be on the latter, but it's hard to know.

From: (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 12:29 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: Cables on Wuhan

Here's the relevant passage:

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consulate general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health.

So you're right that he mentions a visit in March (contrary to what I wrote below). But, as far as I can see, he does not refer specifically to a second visit, even though he writes of "repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats." It's also odd that he uses the specific date of March 27 for what he calls the last of these visits, which does not appear in the cables. All of this makes me still wonder whether there are other cables about such visits.

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 12:05 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: Cables on Wuhan

I thought (b)(6) referred to a January 2018 ESTH visit and a separate March 2018 visit by the ConGen.

From: (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 11:35 AM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Cables on Wuhan

(b)(6) – Thanks so much for sending these, which do appear to be the cables that (b)(6) has. However, I note a couple of discrepancies: 1) (b)(6) refers to multiple visits, whereas the cables report on only one visit; 2) (b)(6) says the visit was in January 2018, whereas the cable reports on a visit in March 2018. Do you think it's possible there were additional visits there?

By the way,

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 10:39 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Fw: Cables

FYI

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 10:28 AM

To: ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Cables

Might be worth a read given recent events

Thanks,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: !! FLASH for 8:50am Vanity Fair Interview
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2021 13:59:31 +0000

Why can't we just call all of them "furriners"? It would save a lot of time and effort, especially when trying to decide what to call people from Benin. (Beninians? Beninis? Benign?)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:54 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: !! FLASH for 8:50am Vanity Fair Interview

I thought you might have, but we don't use that term as much anymore...

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:53 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: !! FLASH for 8:50am Vanity Fair Interview

Man, I stuck that "CCP" in there just for you guys. I may never understand when you want to use what.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:51 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: !! FLASH for 8:50am Vanity Fair Interview

Good morning,

EAP clears with edits as follows:

EAP/P: (b)(6) OK
EAP/CM: (b)(6) OK
EAP/FO: (b)(6) OK

DAS Buangan asked that I include a reminder to coordinate (b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 8:37 AM

To: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: !! FLASH for 8:50am Vanity Fair Interview

Importance: High

Good morning,

Apologies for the urgent request! Vanity Fair contacted one of our Director's here in ISN to confirm information on the origins of COVID-19. There are so many different versions of information out there, and so we are trying to clarify and educate as best we can on what the Department knows and the particulars of State officials meeting last December. Appreciate if we can get something back by 8: 50 this morning. SPOX teams request this by 9am.

Thanks – (b)(6)

-

-

Vanity Fair Interview (on background) – State Department exploration of COVID-19 Origins

Key Messages

- (b)(5)
-
-

(b)(5)

Anticipated Questions

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Drafted by: CPark

ISN/PRESS: (b)(6) OK

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)

@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Please review
Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2020 14:48:44 +0000

Hi (b)(6)

As I mentioned in a separate email, enclosed please find two documents forwarded to me recently and I would be grateful if you could give me your expert opinion from a scientist perspective.

It's probably a good idea to send your feedback to me on the high side or JWICS.

Much obliged.

Miles

x

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (b)

(b)(6) (c)

Sender: "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

A-00000660073

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
To: <Ford[REDACTED]@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)
Subject: COVID-19 origin
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 16:56:41 -0400

Dear Chris,

I hope you're well. (b)(6) and I thought you'd find the attached memo interesting. Please let me know if you'd like to discuss further.

Regards,

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)
Recipient: <Ford[REDACTED]@state.gov>;
(b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Kanapathy, Ivan (h)(6);
CC: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)
 (S/NF)

Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 12:02:40 -0500

(b)(6)

Jim Shinn (b)(1); (b)(5)
 (b)(1); (b)(5)

Many thanks.

(b)(6)
 Strategic Advisor
 State AVC Bureau
 NSTS (b)(6)

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/2/2030

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6);
 Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)
 Feith, David (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
CC: Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6) (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: (b)(1)
 (b)(S/NF)
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 13:35:52 -0500

(b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Anyway, I'm in the building and am happy to come see you if you have time. Again, I'm very sorry to have missed this message. I copy (b)(6) our intrepid Chief of Staff since can always track me down.

(b)(6)

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 12/2/2030
Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 9:47 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Shinn, James J (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: (b)(1) (S/NF)

Thank you (b)(6) for reaching out (b)(1); (b)(5)
 Would tomorrow 11am, or sometime next week work for everyone?

(b)(6)

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 12/2/2030
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6) <>

Sent: Wednesday, December 2, 2020 12:03 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1) (S/NF)

(b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many thanks.

(b)(6)
 Strategic Advisor
 State AVC Bureau
 NSTS: (b)(6)

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/2/2030

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)

Recipient: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Shinn, James J (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)
 Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
CC: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Keshap, Atul (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6) (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(1)
 (b)(1) (S/NF)
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 12:32:28 -0500

(b)(6) is out today. Not sure when he would be available next week. He can be reached on his unclass email.

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 12/2/2030
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 9:47 AM
To: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(1) (S/NF)

Thank you David for reaching out. (b)(1): (b)(5)
 Would tomorrow 11am, or sometime next week work for everyone?

(b)(6)

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/2/2030

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, December 2, 2020 12:03 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan

(b)(6) Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1) S/NF

(b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many thanks.

(b)(6)
Strategic Advisor
State AVC Bureau
NSTS (b)(6)

Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Strategic Advisor, Office:AVC, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/2/2030

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)

Recipient: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Shinn, James J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>

CC: (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: For records: (b)(6)

Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2020 19:10:11 -0500

Confirming receipt for the Specials – the (b)(5) and PRC article tab. Thank you!

(b)(6)
 Special Assistant
 Office of the Secretary
 U.S. Department of State
 Secure (b)(6)
 Cell: (b)(6)

NOTE: Please always include the S_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov distro to ensure your message is received.

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: (b)(6) Special Assistant, Office:S, Agency:Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/1/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Derived per DSCG

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:26 PM
To: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: For records (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

Colleagues – per further discussion with Stephanie, please use the attached, which also adds an additional note (b)(5) on page 3.

Thanks much.

++ other EAP fysa.

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: Feith - DAS, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/31/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 3:49 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: For records: (b)(5);

PLs use this version of the (b)(6)

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/31/2030

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 3:30 PM
To: SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>; Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: For records: (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

SES colleagues – please see attached. Thanks much.

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: David Feith - DAS, Office:EAP/FO, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/31/2045

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 12:12 PM

To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: For records: [REDACTED]

Hi David,

Please see attached for your records as submitted to the Line.

Best,

(b)(6)

Official - ~~SECRET~~

This message is UNCLASSIFIED//REL TO USA, (b)(7)(C) when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: David Feith - DAS, Office:EAP/FO, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/31/2045

Reasons: OCA: 1.4 b, c, d

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>:

Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>;

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(SBU) The Secretary's Non-Secure Call with the
(b)(7)(E) Foreign Ministers on New Intelligence on COVID Origins
Monday, January 04, 2020, 4:00 p.m., 60 minutes

PURPOSE

(S//REL)(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(7)(E)
(b)(1); (b)(7)(E)

KEY OBJECTIVES

(b)(5) _____

SECRET//REL (b)(1)

(b)(5)

(b)(5); ~~(b)(7)(E)~~

(b)(5)

IF RAISED

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

Attachment:

Article on PRC Efforts to Halt Research on Covid-19 Origins

Approved: EAP – Acting A/S Atul Keshap [AK]

Drafted: EAP/FO – David Feith, ext (b)(6);

Cleared:

D: Robert Palladino (ok)
P: David Hale (ok)
EAP/FO: Jonathan Fritz (ok)
S/P: (b)(6); no response)
WHA (b)(6); (b)(7)(E) (ok)
EUR (b)(6); (b)(7)(E) (ok)
INR: (b)(6); (b)(7)(E) (info)

China clamps down in hidden hunt for coronavirus origins

By DAKE KANG, MARIA CHENG and SAM MCNEIL – December 30, 2020

MOJIANG, China (AP) — Deep in the lush mountain valleys of southern China lies the entrance to a mine shaft that once harbored bats with the closest known relative of the COVID-19 virus.

The area is of intense scientific interest because it may hold clues to the origins of the coronavirus that has killed more than 1.7 million people worldwide. Yet for scientists and journalists, it has become a black hole of no information because of political sensitivity and secrecy.

A bat research team visiting recently managed to take samples but had them confiscated, two people familiar with the matter said. Specialists in coronaviruses have been ordered not to speak to the press. And a team of Associated Press journalists was tailed by plainclothes police in multiple cars who blocked access to roads and sites in late November.

More than a year since the first known person was infected with the coronavirus, an AP investigation shows the Chinese government is strictly controlling all research into its origins, clamping down on some while actively promoting fringe theories that it could have come from outside China.

The government is handing out hundreds of thousands of dollars in grants to scientists researching the virus' origins in southern China and affiliated with the military, the AP has found. But it is monitoring their findings and mandating that the publication of any data or research must be approved by a new task force managed by China's cabinet, under direct orders from President Xi Jinping, according to internal documents obtained by the AP. A rare leak from within the government, the dozens of pages of unpublished documents confirm what many have long suspected: The clampdown comes from the top.

As a result, very little has been made public. Authorities are severely limiting information and impeding cooperation with international scientists.

"What did they find?" asked Gregory Gray, a Duke University epidemiologist who oversees a lab in China studying the transmission of infectious diseases from animals to people. "Maybe their data were not conclusive, or maybe they suppressed the data for some political reason. I don't know ... I wish I did."

The AP investigation was based on dozens of interviews with Chinese and foreign scientists and officials, along with public notices, leaked emails, internal data and the documents from China's cabinet and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. It reveals a pattern of government secrecy and top-down control that has been evident throughout the pandemic.

As the AP previously documented, this culture has delayed warnings about the pandemic, blocked the sharing of information with the World Health Organization and hampered early testing. Scientists familiar with China's public health system say the same practices apply to sensitive research.

"They only select people they can trust, those that they can control," said a public health expert who works regularly with the China CDC, declining to be identified out of fear of retribution. "Military teams and others are working hard on this, but whether it gets published all depends on the outcome."

The pandemic has crippled Beijing's reputation on the global stage, and China's leaders are wary of any findings that could suggest they were negligent in its spread. The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and the National Health Commission, which are managing research into the coronavirus' origins, did not respond to requests for comment.

"The novel coronavirus has been discovered in many parts of the world," China's foreign ministry said in a fax. "Scientists should carry out international scientific research and cooperation on a global scale."

Some Chinese scientists say little has been shared simply because nothing of significance has been discovered.

"We've been looking, but we haven't found it," said Zhang Yongzhen, a renowned Chinese virologist.

China's leaders are far from alone in politicizing research into the origins of the virus. In April, President Donald Trump shelved a U.S.-funded project to identify dangerous animal diseases in China and Southeast Asia, effectively severing ties between Chinese and American scientists and complicating the search for virus origins. Trump also has accused China of setting off the pandemic through an accident at a Wuhan lab — a theory that some experts say cannot be ruled out but as yet has no evidence behind it.

Research into COVID-19's origins is critical to the prevention of future pandemics. Although a World Health Organization international team plans to visit China in early January to investigate what started the pandemic, its members and agenda had to be approved by China.

Some public health experts warn that China's refusal to grant further access to international scientists has jeopardized the global collaboration that pinpointed the source of the SARS outbreak nearly two decades ago. Jonna Mazet, a founding executive director of the UC Davis One Health Institute, said the lack of collaboration between Chinese and U.S. scientists was "a disappointment" and the inability of American scientists to work in China "devastating."

"There's so much speculation around the origins of this virus," Mazet said. "We need to step back...and let scientists get the real answer without the finger-pointing."

The hidden hunt for the origins of COVID-19 shows how the Chinese government has tried to steer the narrative.

The search started in the Huanan Seafood market in Wuhan, a sprawling, low-slung complex where many of the first human coronavirus cases were detected. Scientists initially suspected the virus came from wild animals sold in the market, such as civet cats implicated in the spread of SARS.

In mid-December last year, Huanan vendor Jiang Dafa started noticing people were falling ill. Among the first was a part-time worker in his 60s who helped clean carcasses at a stall; soon, a friend he played chess with also fell ill. A third, a seafood monger in his 40s, was infected and later died.

Patients began trickling into nearby hospitals, triggering alarms by late December that alerted the China CDC. CDC chief Gao Fu immediately sent a team to investigate.

At first, research appeared to be moving swiftly.

Overnight on Jan. 1, the market suddenly was ordered shut, barring vendors from fetching their belongings, Jiang said. China CDC researchers collected 585 environmental samples from door handles, sewage and the floor of the market, and authorities sprayed the complex down with sanitizer. Later, they would cart out everything inside and incinerate it.

Internal China CDC data obtained by the AP shows that by Jan. 10 and 11, researchers were sequencing dozens of environmental samples from Wuhan. Gary Kobinger, a Canadian microbiologist advising WHO, emailed his colleagues to share his concerns that the virus originated at the market.

"This corona(virus) is very close to SARS," he wrote on Jan. 13. "If we put aside an accident ... then I would look at the bats in these markets (sold and 'wild')."

By late January, Chinese state media announced that 33 of the environmental samples had tested positive. In a report to WHO, officials said 11 specimens were more than 99% similar to the new coronavirus. They also told the U.N. health agency that rats and mice were common in the market, and that most of the positive samples were clustered in an area where vendors traded in wildlife.

In the meantime, Jiang avoided telling people he worked at Huanan because of the stigma. He criticized the political tussle between China and the U.S.

"It's pointless to blame anyone for this disease," Jiang said.

As the virus continued spreading rapidly into February, Chinese scientists published a burst of research papers on COVID-19. Then [a paper by two Chinese scientists](#) proposed without concrete evidence that the virus could have leaked from a Wuhan laboratory near the market. It was later taken down, but it raised the need for image control.

Internal documents show that the state soon began requiring all coronavirus studies in China to be approved by high-level government officials — a policy that critics say paralyzed research efforts.

[A China CDC lab notice](#) on Feb. 24 put in new approval processes for publication under "important instructions" from Chinese President Xi Jinping. [Other notices ordered CDC staff not to share any data, specimens or other information related to the coronavirus with outside institutions or individuals.](#)

Then on March 2, Xi emphasized "coordination" on coronavirus research, [state media reported](#).

The next day, China's cabinet, the State Council, centralized all COVID-19 publication under a special task force. [The notice, obtained by the AP and marked "not to be made public,"](#) was far more sweeping in scope than the earlier CDC notices, applying to all universities, companies and medical and research institutions.

The order said communication and publication of research had to be orchestrated like "a game of chess" under instructions from Xi, and [propaganda and public opinion teams](#) were to "guide publication." It went on to warn that those who publish without permission, "causing serious adverse social impact, shall be held accountable."

"The regulations are very strict, and they don't make any sense," said a former China CDC deputy director, who declined to be named because they were told not to speak to the media. "I think it's political, because people overseas could find things being said there that might contradict what China says, so it's all being controlled."

After the secret orders, the tide of research papers slowed to a trickle. Although China CDC researcher Liu Jun returned to the market nearly 20 times to collect some 2,000 samples over the following months, nothing was released about what they revealed.

On May 25, CDC chief Gao finally broke the silence around the market in an interview with China's Phoenix TV. He said that, unlike the environmental samples, no animal samples from the market had tested positive.

The announcement surprised scientists who didn't even know Chinese officials had taken samples from animals. It also ruled out the market as the likely source of the virus, along with further research that showed many of the first cases had no ties to it.

—

With the market proving a dead end, scientists turned more attention to hunting for the virus at its likely source: bats.

Nearly a thousand miles away from the wet market in Wuhan, bats inhabit the maze of underground limestone caves in Yunnan province. With its rich, loamy soil, fog banks and dense plant growth, this area in southern China bordering Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar is one of the most biologically diverse on earth.

At one Yunnan cave visited by the AP, with thick roots hanging over the entrance, bats fluttered out at dusk and flew over the roofs of a nearby small village. White droppings splattered the ground near an altar in the rear of the cave, and Buddhist prayer strings of red and yellow twine hung from the stalactites. Villagers said the cave had been used as a sacred place presided over by a Buddhist monk from Thailand.

Contact like this between bats and people praying, hunting or mining in caves alarms scientists. The coronavirus' genetic code is strikingly similar to that of bat coronaviruses, and most scientists suspect COVID-19 jumped into humans either directly from a bat or via an intermediary animal.

Since bats harboring coronaviruses are found in China and throughout Southeast Asia, the wild animal host of COVID-19 could be anywhere in the region, said Linfa Wang at Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

"There is a bat somewhere with a 99.9% similar virus to the coronavirus," Wang said. "Bats don't respect these borders."

COVID-19 research is proceeding in countries such as Thailand, where Dr. Supaporn Wacharapluesadee, a coronavirus expert, is leading teams of scientists deep into the countryside to collect samples from bats. During one expedition in August, Supaporn told the AP the virus could be found "anywhere" there were bats.

Chinese scientists quickly started testing potential animal hosts. Records show that Xia Xueshan, an infectious diseases expert, received a 1.4 million RMB (\$214,000) grant to screen animals in Yunnan for COVID-19. State media reported in February that his team collected hundreds of samples from bats,

snakes, bamboo rats and other animals, and ran a picture of masked scientists in white lab coats huddled around a large, caged porcupine.

Then the government restrictions kicked in. Data on the samples still has not been made public, and Xia did not respond to requests for an interview. Although Xia has co-authored more than a dozen papers this year, an AP review shows, only two were on COVID-19, and neither focused on its origins.

Today, the caves that scientists once surveyed are under close watch by the authorities. Security agents tailed the AP team in three locations across Yunnan, and stopped journalists from visiting the cave where researchers in 2017 identified the species of bats responsible for SARS. At an entrance to a second location, a massive cave teeming with tourists taking selfies, authorities shut the gate on the AP.

"We just go a call from the county," said a park official, before an armed policeman showed up.



Vehicles blocking AP journalists from visiting a mine shaft where the closest known relative of the COVID-19 virus was found.

Particularly sensitive is the mine shaft where the closest relative of the COVID-19 virus — called "RaTG13" — was found.

RaTG13 was discovered after an outbreak in 2012, when six men cleaning the bat-filled shaft fell ill with mysterious bouts of pneumonia, killing three. The Wuhan Institute of Virology and the China CDC both studied bat coronaviruses from this shaft. And although most scientists believe the COVID-19 virus had its origins in nature, some say it or a close relative could have been transported to Wuhan and leaked by mistake.

Wuhan Institute of Virology bat expert Shi Zhengli has repeatedly denied this theory, but Chinese authorities haven't yet allowed foreign scientists in to investigate.

Some state-backed scientists say research is proceeding as usual. Famed virologist Zhang, who received a 1.5 million RMB (\$230,000) grant to search for the virus' origins, said partnering scientists are sending him samples from all over, including from bats in Guizhou in southern China and rats in Henan hundreds of miles north.

"Bats, mice, are there any new coronaviruses in them? Do they have this particular coronavirus?" Zhang said. "We've been doing this work for over a decade. It's not like we just started today."

Zhang declined to confirm or comment on reports that his lab was briefly closed after publishing the virus' genetic sequence ahead of authorities. He said he hasn't heard of any special restrictions on publishing papers, and the only review his papers go through is a routine scientific one by his institution.

But scientists without state backing complain that getting approval to sample animals in southern China is now extremely difficult, and that little is known about the findings of government-sponsored teams.

—

Even as they controlled research within China, Chinese authorities promoted theories that suggested the virus came from elsewhere.

The government gave Bi Yuhai, the Chinese Academy of Sciences scientist tapped to spearhead origins research, a 1.5 million RMB grant (\$230,000), records show. A paper co-authored by Bi suggested an outbreak in a Beijing market in June could have been caused by packages of contaminated frozen fish from Europe.

China's government-controlled media used the theory to suggest the original outbreak in Wuhan could have started with seafood imported from abroad — a notion international scientists reject. WHO has said it is very unlikely that people can be infected with COVID-19 via packaged food, and that it is "highly speculative" to suggest COVID-19 did not start in China. Bi did not respond to requests for an interview, and China has not provided enough virus samples for a definitive analysis.



Posters in southern China's Yunnan province advising people not to eat wild animals.

The Chinese state press also has widely covered initial studies from Europe suggesting COVID-19 was found in wastewater samples in [Italy](#) and [Spain](#) last year. But scientists have largely dismissed these studies, and the researchers themselves acknowledged they did not find enough virus fragments to determine conclusively if it was the coronavirus.

And in the last few weeks, Chinese state media has [taken out of context](#) research from a German scientist, interpreting it to suggest that the pandemic began in Italy. The scientist, Alexander Kekule, director of the Institute for Biosecurity Research, has said repeatedly that he believes the virus first emerged in China.

Internal documents show that various government bodies also sponsored studies on the possible role of the Southeast Asian pangolin, a scaly anteater once prized in traditional Chinese medicine, as an intermediary animal host. Within the span of three days in February, Chinese scientists put out [four separate papers on coronaviruses](#) related to COVID-19 in trafficked Malayan pangolins from Southeast Asia seized by customs officials in Guangdong.

But many experts now say the theory is unlikely. Wang of the Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore said the search for the coronavirus in pangolins did not appear to be “scientifically driven.” He said blood samples would be the most conclusive evidence of COVID-19’s presence in the rare mammals, and so far, no incriminating matches have been found.

WHO has said more than 500 species of other animals, including cats, ferrets and hamsters, are being studied as possible intermediary hosts for COVID-19.

The Chinese government is also limiting and controlling the search for patient zero through the re-testing of old flu samples.

Chinese hospitals collect thousands of samples from patients with flu-like symptoms every week and store them in freezers. They could easily be tested again for COVID-19, although politics could then determine whether the results are made public, said Ray Yip, the founding director of the U.S. CDC office in China.

"They'd be crazy not to do it," Yip said. "The political leadership will wait for that information to see, does this information make China look stupid or not? ... If it makes China look stupid, they won't."

In the U.S., CDC officials long ago tested roughly 11,000 early samples collected under the flu surveillance program since Jan. 1. And in Italy, researchers recently found a boy who had fallen ill in November 2019 and later tested positive for the coronavirus.

But in China, scientists have only published retrospective testing data from two Wuhan flu surveillance hospitals — out of at least 18 in Hubei province alone and well over 500 across the country. The data includes just 520 samples out of the 330,000 collected in China last year.

These enormous gaps in the research aren't due just to a lack of testing but also to a lack of transparency. Internal data obtained by the AP shows that by Feb. 6, the Hubei CDC had tested over 100 samples in Huanggang, a city southeast of Wuhan. But the results have not been made public.

The little information that has dribbled out suggests the virus was circulating well outside Wuhan in 2019 — a finding that could raise awkward questions for Chinese officials about their early handling of the outbreak. Chinese researchers found that a child over a hundred kilometers from Wuhan had fallen ill with the virus by Jan. 2, suggesting it was spreading widely in December. But earlier samples weren't tested, according to a scientist with direct knowledge of the study.

"There was a very deliberate choice of the time period to study, because going too early could have been too sensitive," said the scientist, who declined to be named out of fear of retribution.

A WHO report written in July but published in November said Chinese authorities had identified 124 cases in December 2019, including five cases outside Wuhan. Among WHO's aims for its upcoming visit to China are reviews of hospital records before December.

Coronavirus expert Peter Daszak, a member of the WHO team, said identifying the pandemic's source should not be used to assign guilt.

"We're all part of this together," he said. "And until we realize that, we're never going to get rid of this problem."

—

Kang reported from Beijing and Cheng reported from London. Associated Press journalists Han Guan Ng and Emily Wang in Wuhan, China, Haven Daley in Stinson Beach, California, and Tassanee Vejpongsa in Kanchanaburi, Thailand, contributed to this report.

I recommend running past (b)(1); (b)(5) though.

Chris

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

Importance: High

Good morning all,

(b)(1); (b)(5)
(b)(1); (b)(5)
(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many (many!) thanks to (b)(6) (b)(5) for her initial inputs into this response. We'd like to move this today if possible - I'll flag for clearers on the low side as well.

Thanks

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Cook, Nerissa J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)>@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)>@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
CC: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 09:14:58 -0400

(b)(1);
(b)(5)

Not to my knowledge. (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

so I took a stab at it.

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Director, Office:ISN Biological Policy Staff, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/29/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 6:38 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

Thanks, I'd like to see if (b)(6) in my office can review—unless she has reviewed previously?
Best, (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 5:15 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

(b)(6) — sorry, belatedly adding you.

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Park, Christopher J
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 4:55 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: RE: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

(b)(6) (b)(5) - happy to discuss if they give rise to concern. They've been OK'd by SBO Ann Ganzer and acting T Eliot Kang.

I recommend running past (b)(1); (b)(5) though.

Chris

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2
Importance: High

Good morning all,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Many (many!) thanks to (b)(6) (b)(5) for her initial inputs into this response. We'd like to move this today if possible - I'll flag for clearers on the low side as well.

Thanks

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

Importance: High

Good morning all,

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many (many!) thanks to (b)(6) (b)(5) for her initial inputs into this response. We'd like to move this today if possible – I'll flag for clearers on the low side as well.

Thanks

Colin

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: (S//NF)(b)(1)

Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 17:35:44 -0500

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:ISN/BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/15/2045

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2020 4:52 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park,

Christopher J (T)(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: (S//NF)(b)(1)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

U.S. State Department, ISN/MBC

Tel: (b)(6)

Red Switch (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:ISN/BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/15/2045

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2020 4:33 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)

~~(SBU)~~ Hi Folks – Keeping you in the loop with another briefing from AVC FO (earlier meeting below). -

(b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:ISN/BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/15/2045
Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 12:54 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: (S//NF)(b)(1)

A suggestion for (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)
U.S. State Department, ISN/MBC
Tel: (b)(6)
Red Switch (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - FAO, Office:ISN/MBC, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 12/7/2045
Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 12:00 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (S//NF)(b)(1)

(SBU) Hi Chris, BPS (b)(6) - Please see a draft summary of the meeting with AVC on Wednesday (12/2) below. Chris, (b)(1); (b)(5) something is amiss with my ClassNet email, so if you already responded to the related message shared by (b)(6) on Friday, I will have missed it. Hence, resending now. (b)(6)

(S//NF)(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(U) *Article V: *The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and Cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.*

(U) **Article I: *Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes in armed conflict.*

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/7/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To:	ISN-AS-and DAS-DL <ISN-AS-andDAS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; ISN OD&DD plus Senior Action Offs <ISNOD&DDplusSeniorActionOffs@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-SCO-DL <ISN-SCO-DL@state.sgov.gov>
CC:	ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL <ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.sgov.gov>
Subject:	FW: Package 202005309 Hard Q & A for Podium Sessions has been forwarded on to S
Date:	Wed, 6 May 2020 13:11:18 -0400

FYI

(b)(6)

Staff Assistant

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

(ISN)

(b)(6)

From: EverestMail@state.sgov.gov [mailto:EverestMail@state.sgov.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2020 10:57 AM

To: Everest_GPA

Cc: Everest_AF; Everest_C; TTL-CGRUCU; Everest_DRL; Everest_DIPSEC; Everest_EAP; Everest_EB; Everest_EUR; Everest_F; Everest_GPA; Everest_H; Everest_INR; Everest_IO; Everest_ISN; Everest_JIRF; Everest_L; Everest_NEA; Everest_NSC; Everest_OES; Everest_P; Everest_PRM; SES_FrontOfficeOnly; SES-Line_Only; Everest_SP; Everest_SSPEHA; Everest_SCA; Everest_USAID; Everest_WHA; SES_FrontOfficeOnly; PF-EverestE-Mail@state.sgov.gov

Subject: Package 202005309 Hard Q & A for Podium Sessions has been forwarded on to S

Package 202005309 Hard Q & A for Podium Sessions has been forwarded on to S on 05-May-2020 10:57:05 AM.

FOR: S

ORGANIZATION: GPA

CO-DRAFTER BUREAU:

PACKAGE SUBJECT: Hard Q & A for Podium Sessions

DOCTYPE: Questions and Answers

LINK: [202005309 Package](#)

*Please note that the package link will expire 2 weeks after the e-mail is sent, for security reasons. If this link is expired, please use the **Advanced Search** to find the package by typing in the S/ES ID number.*

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient:	ISN-AS-and DAS-DL <ISN-AS-andDAS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; ISN OD&DD plus Senior Action Offs <ISNOD&DDplusSeniorActionOffs@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-SCO-DL <ISN-SCO-DL@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL <ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.sgov.gov>
-------------------	--

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

MASTER CLEARANCE PAGE

Approved: GPA: Morgan Ortagus [MO]

Drafter: (b)(6)

AF Hard Q&A Submission

Approved: AF/FO: (b)(6) [TN]

Drafted by: (b)(6) (b)(6)

Clearances: DAS: Elizabeth Fitzsimmons (ok)
Director: (b)(6) (ok)

ISN Hard Q&A Submission

Drafted by: ISN - Maria Dudding

Clearances: EAP/CM: (b)(6) (ok)
ISN: (b)(6) (ok)
OES: (ok)
P: (ok)
D: (ok)
S/P: Miles Yu
INR:

EUR Hard Q&A Submission

Approved: EUR/FO: A/S Philip Reeker [PR]

Drafted by: EUR/PPD: (b)(6)

Clearances: EB/TPN/BTA (b)(6) (OK)
EB/TPN/AGP (b)(6) (OK)
EB/EPPD: (b)(6) (OK)
EUR/FO: (b)(6) (OK)
EUR/WE: (b)(6) (OK)
EmbLondon: (b)(6) (OK)
EmbLondon: (b)(6) (OK)
CGBelfast: (b)(6) (OK)
EUR/ERA: (b)(6) (OK)
USTR: (b)(6) (OK)
E: (b)(6) (OK)
P: (b)(6) (OK)
S/P: (b)(6) (OK)
S/P: (b)(6) (OK)
S/P: (b)(6) (OK)

D: (b)(6) (OK)
R: (OK)
NSC: Grayson Vincent (OK)

Approved: NEA – A/S David Schenker [DKS]

Drafted: NEA/PPD Pablo A. Rodriguez, cell: 202 600-1697

Cleared: NEA/FO: (b)(6) OK
NEA/FO: OK
NEA/FO: OK
NEA/I: (b)(6) OK
LEAO: OK
Baghdad: (b)(6) OK
NEA/IR: OK
D: (b)(6) OK
P: OK
S/P: (b)(6) OK

SCA Hard Q&A Submission

Approved: SCA/FO: Alice Wells [AW]

Drafted by: Margaret Sullivan, SCA/Press

Clearances: SCA/FO: (b)(6) (ok)
SCA/FO: (ok)
SCA/FO: (ok)
SCA/FO: (ok)
SCA/A: (b)(6) (ok)
SCA/CEN: (b)(6) (ok)
SCA/INSE: (ok)
SCA/P: (b)(6) (ok)
SCA/STA: (b)(6) (ok)
F: (b)(6) (ok)
CA: (b)(6) (ok)
EB: (ok)
EAP: (info)
IRF/Press: (b)(6) (ok)
IRF/SCA: (ok)
IRF/SCA: (ok)
USAID: (b)(6) (ok)
DRL/SCA: (b)(6) (ok)
DRL/SCA: (ok)
DRL/SCA: (ok)
DRL/SCA: (ok)
DRL/Pres: (ok)

PRM/ANE	(b)(6)	(ok)
PRM/ECA		(ok)
SRAR:		(info)
S/SPEHA:	(b)(6)	(ok)
D:	(b)(6)	(ok)
P:		(info)
S/P:	(b)(6)	(ok)

WHA Hard Q&A Submission

Approved: WHA/FO (b)(6) [MK]

Drafted: WHA/Press (b)(6)

Cleared:	WHA/FO:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	WHA/FO:		(ok)
	SRVZ/FO:		(ok)
	D:	(b)(6)	(no response)
	P:		(ok)
	S/P:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	R:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	WHA/CCA:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	DRL/Press:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	WHA/VZ:		(ok)
	L/EB:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	EB/TBS/SPI:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	DS/FO:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	DSS:	(b)(6)	(ok)
	OFM:	(b)(6)	(ok)

IO Hard Q&A Submission

Approved: IO/FO: (b)(6) [PP]

Drafted by: (b)(6) IO/Press

Clearances:	IO/FO:	(b)(6)	(OK)
	S:		(OK)
	IO/EDA:		(OK)
	EAP/TC:		(OK)
	EAP/CM:		(OK)
	EAP/P:		(OK)
	L/EAP:		(OK)
	L/UNA:		(OK)
	P:		(OK)
	D:		(OK)
	S/P:		(no response)
	NSC:		(OK)

CGRCU Hard Q&A Submission

Drafted by: (b)(6) GPA/CGRCU Press

Clearances: EB/MTA: (b)(6) (ok)

EB Hard Q&A Submission

Approved: EB/TPN - DAS David Meale [DM]

Drafted: EB/EPPD: (b)(6)

Cleared:

EB/TPN/MTA:	(b)(6)	(OK)
EB/TRA:	(b)(6)	(OK)
EB/EPPD:	(b)(6)	(OK)
EAP/CM:	(b)(6)	(OK)
EAP/P:	(b)(6)	(OK)
CRGCU/Press:	(b)(6)	(OK)
OES/PPO:	(b)(6)	(OK)
E:	(b)(6)	(OK)
P:	(b)(6)	(OK)
S/P:	(b)(6)	(OK)
D:	(b)(6)	(OK)
R:	(b)(6)	(OK)
SPOX:	(b)(6)	(OK)

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
To: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Subject: FW:(b)(6) Informal Response 2 to S COVID-19
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 08:39:29 -0400

FYI (b)(5) I didn't go back to Ann (h)(5)

(b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 6/30/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2021 5:37 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Cc: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Subject: (h)(6) Informal Response 2 to S COVID-19
Importance: High

Hi (b)(6)
 ISN SBO Ganzer clears as attached (b)(5) Thanks!
 (h)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 6/30/2046
 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;
Recipient: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Response to the Secretary's Question

June XX, 2021

Mr. Secretary,

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Regards,

Kin Moy, EAP Senior Bureau Official
Ann Ganzer, ISN Senior Bureau Official

Approved: EAP SBO Kin Moy
ISN SBO Ann Ganzer

Drafted: EAP/CM: (b)(6)

Cleared: EAP/FO: JFritz
EAP/CM: (b)(6) (ok)
T: (b)(6) (ok)
D: (b)(6) (ok)
P: (b)(6) (ok)
S/P: (b)(6) (ok)
ISN/BPS: CPark (ok)
S/CRHS: (b)(6) (no response)
IO/FO: (b)(6) (ok)
IO/EDA: (b)(6) (ok)
L/OES: (b)(6) (ok)
OES: (b)(6) (ok)
INR: (b)(6) (ok)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

CC: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: FW: clearance request by COB today: (b)(5)

Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 17:02:40 -0400

(b)(5) A/PDAS Cook may have additional edits for (b)(5) Thanks, (b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 6/28/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 6/28/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:33 AM
To: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: clearance request by COB today: (b)(5)
Importance: High

Hi PDAS Cook,
 Adding you to the below per (b)(6) request. Many thanks –
 (b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: clearance request by COB today: (b)(5)

Importance: High

Good morning all,

Attached please find for your review and clearance (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many (many!) thanks to (b)(6) in (b)(5) for her initial inputs into this response. We'd like to move this today if possible – I'll flag for clearers on the low side as well.

Thanks

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Approved: EAP SBO Kin Moy
ISN SBO Ann Ganzer

Drafted: EAP/CM: (b)(6)

Cleared: EAP/FO: JFritz
EAP/CM: (b)(6)
T: (b)(6)
D:
P:
S/P: (b)(6)
ISN/BPS: CPark
ISN/BPS: (b)(6)
S/CRHS:
IO/EDA:
L/OES:

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(h)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: clearance request by COB today (b)(5)
Importance: High

Good morning all,

Attached please find for your review and clearance (h)(1); (h)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many (many!) thanks to (b)(6) in ISN/BPS for her initial inputs into this response. We'd like to move this today if possible – I'll flag for clearers on the low side as well.

Thanks

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 6/28/2046
 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
~~DELIBERATIVE~~

Approved: EAP SBO Kin Moy
ISN SBO Ann Ganzer

Drafted: EAP/CM: (b)(6)

Cleared: EAP/FO: JFritz
EAP/CM: (b)(6)
T: (b)(6)
D:
P:
S/P: (b)(6)
ISN/BPS: (b)(6)
ISN/BPS:
S/CRHS:
IO/EDA:
L/OES:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
~~DELIBERATIVE~~

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: Dolliff, Phil (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: For Phil: Final SFRC BCL
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 13:57:54 -0400

Dear DAS Dolliff,

Please see attached for your final BCL, acknowledging the requests you had this morning. We will have hard copies of all the documents for everyone attending the briefing and will see everyone outside the FO in a little bit.

Best,

(h)(6)

Official - ~~SBU~~

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By (b)(6) Office:ISN/CTR, Agency:U.S. Department of State


Declassify On: 11/4/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 Dolliff, Phil (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(U) ISN Briefing with Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Staff
On Biological Threats and Oversight of Biological Research
Thursday, November 4, 2021, 3 p.m., 60 minutes

(b)(5)



(U) PARTICIPANTS

State Department


ISN DAS Dolliff

ISN (b)(6)

ISN (b)(6)

H (b)(6)

(b)(5)



Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Approved: ISN/FO – PDolliff

Drafted: ISN/CTR – (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cleared:

- ISN/CTR – (b)(6) (ok)
- ISN/ECC – (b)(6) (ok)
- ISN/WMDT – (b)(6) (ok)
- ISN/NDF – (b)(6) (ok)
- ISN/BPS – CPark (ok)
- ISN/MBC – (b)(6) (ok)
- ISN/PC – (b)(6) (ok)
- ISN/CPA – (b)(6) (ok)
- S/CCI – (b)(6) (info by request)
- AVC/CBW – (b)(6) (ok)
- INR/SPM – (b)(6) (ok)
- OES/IHB – (b)(6) (ok)
- OES/STC – (b)(6) (ok)
- H – (b)(6) (ok)
- T – (b)(6) (ok)
- D - (b)(6) (ok)
- S/P – (b)(6) (info by request)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

To: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

CC: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: For Clearance: Readout of Congressional China Task Force Briefing

Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:58:30 -0400

Hi Miles,

Please see below the readout from today's meeting for your review. Thank you much! Best regards, (b)(6)

(S//NF) (b)(1)
(b)(1)

Beijing's Perspective

(S//NF) (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(S//NF) (b)(1)
(b)(1)

Administration's Policy Response

(S//NF) (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1)

COVID-19

~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Economics

~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Classified By: (b)(6) - China Desk, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 5/28/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.sgov.gov>