



**United States Department of State**

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

November 30, 2023

Case No. FL-2022-00076

Mr. Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD  
U.S. Right to Know  
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963  
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Suryanarayanan:

As we noted in our letter dated October 31, 2023, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State (“Department”) has identified an additional 56 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined that all 56 records may be released in part.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at [savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov](mailto:savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov). Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00076, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hickson", written in a cursive style.

Diamonece Hickson  
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch  
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

## The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

### FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
  - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
  - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
  - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
  - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
  - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
  - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
  - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP        | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)                    |
| CIA PERS/ORG   | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)      |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT         | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004                    |
| INA            | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN           | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505      |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
  - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
  - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
  - (D) disclose confidential sources
  - (E) disclose investigation techniques
  - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

### Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
 AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
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**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
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**CC:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: INR Judgment on COVID-19 Origins  
**Date:** Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:30:26 -0400

Hi (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Welcome feedback when available.  
Thanks,  
(b)(6)

**Official - Sensitive**

This message is ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ when separated from UNCLASSIFIED attachment(s)  
Classified By: (b)(6) SPM Analyst, Office:INR/SPM, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
Declassify On: 6/11/2070  
Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 11, 2020 4:08 PM  
**To:** (b)(6); ISN-BPS-DL; AVC-CBW-DL; ISN-MBC-DL; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL; ISN-RA-DL; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) Park, Christopher J; (b)(6) (T); (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) Park, Christopher J (T)

**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: INR Judgment on COVID-19 Origins

Plus Chris' current T Staff e-mail. Apologies for the double e-mail, as I made the same mistake almost two weeks ago on the first e-mail.

(b)(6)

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By (b)(6) SPM Analyst, Office:INR/SPM, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
Declassify On: 6/11/2070  
Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 11, 2020 4:06 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL; AVC-CBW-DL; ISN-MBC-DL; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL; ISN-RA-DL; (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Park, Christopher J; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: INR Judgment on COVID-19 Origins

Hi (b)(6),

Unfortunately, I can't get into all the details on this system, but a product published yesterday has some bits I can share here. (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

For more details, I will send that product and a few others on JWICS.

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By (b)(6) - SPM Analyst, Office:INR/SPM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/11/2070

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

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**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, June 10, 2020 11:36 AM

**To:** (b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL; AVC-CBW-DL; ISN-MBC-DL; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL; ISN-RA-DL; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: INR Judgment on COVID-19 Origins

(b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Physical Scientist  
Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs  
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance  
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Official

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Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

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**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, May 29, 2020 3:47 PM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL; AVC-CBW-DL; ISN-MBC-DL; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL; ISN-RA-DL; (b)(6),  
 (b)(6) Park, Christopher J; (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** INR Judgment on COVID-19 Origins

Good Afternoon Everyone,

With all the noise that is out there these days, I just wanted to make sure that everyone is still aware of  
 (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns (with the caveat that I am not scheduled to be back in the building until 11 June).

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Worldwide Chemical & Biological Warfare Analyst  
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, & Military Issues (INR/SPM)  
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 Open (b)(6)

**Official**

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Classified By: (b)(6) SPM Analyst, Office:INR/SPM, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
 Declassify On: 5/29/2045  
 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
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 ISN-MBC-DL <ISN-MBC-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
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# **Unusual Features of the SARS-CoV-2 Genome Suggesting Sophisticated Laboratory Modification Rather Than Natural Evolution and Delineation of Its Probable Synthetic Route**

Li-Meng Yan (MD, PhD)<sup>1</sup>, Shu Kang (PhD)<sup>1</sup>, Jie Guan (PhD)<sup>1</sup>, Shanchang Hu (PhD)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Rule of Law Society & Rule of Law Foundation, New York, NY, USA.

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## **Abstract**

The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has led to over 910,000 deaths worldwide and unprecedented decimation of the global economy. Despite its tremendous impact, the origin of SARS-CoV-2 has remained mysterious and controversial. The natural origin theory, although widely accepted, lacks substantial support. The alternative theory that the virus may have come from a research laboratory is, however, strictly censored on peer-reviewed scientific journals. Nonetheless, SARS-CoV-2 shows biological characteristics that are inconsistent with a naturally occurring, zoonotic virus. In this report, we describe the genomic, structural, medical, and literature evidence, which, when considered together, strongly contradicts the natural origin theory. The evidence shows that SARS-CoV-2 should be a laboratory product created by using bat coronaviruses ZC45 and/or ZXC21 as a template and/or backbone. Building upon the evidence, we further postulate a synthetic route for SARS-CoV-2, demonstrating that the laboratory-creation of this coronavirus is convenient and can be accomplished in approximately six months. Our work emphasizes the need for an independent investigation into the relevant research laboratories. It also argues for a critical look into certain recently published data, which, albeit problematic, was used to support and claim a natural origin of SARS-CoV-2. From a public health perspective, these actions are necessary as knowledge of the origin of SARS-CoV-2 and of how the virus entered the human population are of pivotal importance in the fundamental control of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as in preventing similar, future pandemics.

## Introduction

COVID-19 has caused a world-wide pandemic, the scale and severity of which are unprecedented. Despite the tremendous efforts taken by the global community, management and control of this pandemic remains difficult and challenging.

As a coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 differs significantly from other respiratory and/or zoonotic viruses: it attacks multiple organs; it is capable of undergoing a long period of asymptomatic infection; it is highly transmissible and significantly lethal in high-risk populations; it is well-adapted to humans since the very start of its emergence<sup>1</sup>; it is highly efficient in binding the human ACE2 receptor (hACE2), the affinity of which is greater than that associated with the ACE2 of any other potential host<sup>2,3</sup>.

The origin of SARS-CoV-2 is still the subject of much debate. A widely cited *Nature Medicine* publication has claimed that SARS-CoV-2 most likely came from nature<sup>4</sup>. However, the article and its central conclusion are now being challenged by scientists from all over the world<sup>5-15</sup>. In addition, authors of this *Nature Medicine* article show signs of conflict of interests<sup>16,17</sup>, raising further concerns on the credibility of this publication.

The existing scientific publications supporting a natural origin theory rely heavily on a single piece of evidence – a previously discovered bat coronavirus named RaTG13, which shares a 96% nucleotide sequence identity with SARS-CoV-2<sup>18</sup>. However, the existence of RaTG13 in nature and the truthfulness of its reported sequence are being widely questioned<sup>6-9,19-21</sup>. It is noteworthy that scientific journals have clearly censored any dissenting opinions that suggest a non-natural origin of SARS-CoV-2<sup>8,22</sup>. Because of this censorship, articles questioning either the natural origin of SARS-CoV-2 or the actual existence of RaTG13, although of high quality scientifically, can only exist as preprints<sup>5-9,19-21</sup> or other non-peer-reviewed articles published on various online platforms<sup>10-13,23</sup>. Nonetheless, analyses of these reports have repeatedly pointed to severe problems and a probable fraud associated with the reporting of RaTG13<sup>6,8,9,19-21</sup>. Therefore, the theory that fabricated scientific data has been published to mislead the world's efforts in tracing the origin of SARS-CoV-2 has become substantially convincing and is interlocked with the notion that SARS-CoV-2 is of a non-natural origin.

Consistent with this notion, genomic, structural, and literature evidence also suggest a non-natural origin of SARS-CoV-2. In addition, abundant literature indicates that gain-of-function research has long advanced to the stage where viral genomes can be precisely engineered and manipulated to enable the creation of novel coronaviruses possessing unique properties. In this report, we present such evidence and the associated analyses. Part 1 of the report describes the genomic and structural features of SARS-CoV-2, the presence of which could be consistent with the theory that the virus is a product of laboratory modification beyond what could be afforded by simple serial viral passage. Part 2 of the report describes a highly probable pathway for the laboratory creation of SARS-CoV-2, key steps of which are supported by evidence present in the viral genome. Importantly, part 2 should be viewed as a demonstration of how SARS-CoV-2 could be conveniently created in a laboratory in a short period of time using available materials and well-documented techniques. This report is produced by a team of experienced scientists using our combined expertise in virology, molecular biology, structural biology, computational biology, vaccine development, and medicine.


## 1. Has SARS-CoV-2 been subjected to *in vitro* manipulation?

We present three lines of evidence to support our contention that laboratory manipulation is part of the history of SARS-CoV-2:

- i. The genomic sequence of SARS-CoV-2 is suspiciously similar to that of a bat coronavirus discovered by military laboratories in the Third Military Medical University (Chongqing, China) and the Research Institute for Medicine of Nanjing Command (Nanjing, China).
- ii. The receptor-binding motif (RBM) within the Spike protein of SARS-CoV-2, which determines the host specificity of the virus, resembles that of SARS-CoV from the 2003 epidemic in a suspicious manner. Genomic evidence suggests that the RBM has been genetically manipulated.
- iii. SARS-CoV-2 contains a unique furin-cleavage site in its Spike protein, which is known to greatly enhance viral infectivity and cell tropism. Yet, this cleavage site is completely absent in this particular class of coronaviruses found in nature. In addition, rare codons associated with this additional sequence suggest the strong possibility that this furin-cleavage site is not the product of natural evolution and could have been inserted into the SARS-CoV-2 genome artificially by techniques other than simple serial passage or multi-strain recombination events inside co-infected tissue cultures or animals.

### 1.1 Genomic sequence analysis reveals that ZC45, or a closely related bat coronavirus, should be the backbone used for the creation of SARS-CoV-2


The structure of the ~30,000 nucleotides-long SARS-CoV-2 genome is shown in Figure 1. Searching the NCBI sequence database reveals that, among all known coronaviruses, there were two related bat coronaviruses, ZC45 and ZXC21, that share the highest sequence identity with SARS-CoV-2 (each bat coronavirus is ~89% identical to SARS-CoV-2 on the nucleotide level). Similarity between the genome of SARS-CoV-2 and those of representative  $\beta$  coronaviruses is depicted in Figure 1. ZXC21, which is 97% identical to and shares a very similar profile with ZC45, is not shown. Note that the RaTG13 virus is excluded from this analysis given the strong evidence suggesting that its sequence may have been fabricated and the virus does not exist in nature<sup>2,6-9</sup>. (A follow-up report, which summarizes the up-to-date evidence proving the spurious nature of RaTG13, will be submitted soon)



**Figure 1. Genomic sequence analysis reveals that bat coronavirus ZC45 is the closest match to SARS-CoV-2.** Top: genomic organization of SARS-CoV-2 (2019-nCoV WIV04). Bottom: similarity plot based on the full-length genome of 2019-nCoV WIV04. Full-length genomes of SARS-CoV BJ01, bat SARSr-CoV WIV1, bat SARSr-CoV HKU3-1, bat coronavirus ZC45 were used as reference sequences.

When SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 are compared on the amino acid level, a high sequence identity is observed for most of the proteins. The Nucleocapsid protein is 94% identical. The Membrane protein is 98.6% identical. The S2 portion (2nd half) of the Spike protein is 95% identical. Importantly, the Orf8 protein is 94.2% identical and the E protein is 100% identical.

Orf8 is an accessory protein, the function of which is largely unknown in most coronaviruses, although recent data suggests that Orf8 of SARS-CoV-2 mediates the evasion of host adaptive immunity by downregulating MHC-I<sup>24</sup>. Normally, Orf8 is poorly conserved in coronaviruses<sup>25</sup>. Sequence blast indicates that, while the Orf8 proteins of ZC45/ZXC21 share a 94.2% identity with SARS-CoV-2 Orf8, no other coronaviruses share more than 58% identity with SARS-CoV-2 on this particular protein. The very high homology here on the normally poorly conserved Orf8 protein is highly unusual.



**Figure 2. Sequence alignment of the E proteins from different  $\beta$  coronaviruses demonstrates the E protein's permissiveness and tendency toward amino acid mutations.** A. Mutations have been observed in different strains of SARS-CoV. GenBank accession numbers: SARS\_GD01: AY278489.2, SARS\_EnoM1: ACB69908.1, SARS\_TW\_GD1: AY451881.1, SARS\_Sino1\_11: AY485277.1. B. Alignment of E proteins from related bat coronaviruses indicates its tolerance of mutations at multiple positions. GenBank accession numbers: Bat\_AP040581.1: APO40581.1, RsSHC014: KC881005.1, SC2018: MK211374.1, Bat\_NP\_828854.1: NP\_828854.1, BtRs-BetaCoV/HuB2013: AIA62312.1, BM48-31/BGR/2008: YP\_003858586.1. C. While the early copies of SARS-CoV-2 share 100% identity on the E protein with ZC45 and ZXC21, sequencing data of SARS-CoV-2 from April 2020 indicates that mutation has occurred at multiple positions. Accession numbers of viruses: Feb\_11: MN997409, ZC45: MG772933.1, ZXC21: MG772934, Apr\_13: MT326139, Apr\_15\_A: MT263389, Apr\_15\_B: MT293206, Apr\_17: MT350246. Alignments were done using the MultAlin webserver (<http://multalin.toulouse.inra.fr/multalin/>).

The coronavirus E protein is a structural protein, which is embedded in and lines the interior of the membrane envelope of the virion<sup>26</sup>. The E protein is tolerant of mutations as evidenced in both SARS (Figure 2A) and related bat coronaviruses (Figure 2B). This tolerance to amino acid mutations of the E protein is further evidenced in the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. After only a short two-month spread of the virus since its outbreak in humans, the E proteins in SARS-CoV-2 have already undergone mutational changes. Sequence data obtained during the month of April reveals that mutations have occurred at four different locations in different strains (Figure 2C). Consistent with this finding, sequence blast analysis indicates that, with the exception of SARS-CoV-2, no known coronaviruses share 100% amino acid sequence identity on the E protein with ZC45/ZXC21 (*suspicious coronaviruses published after the start of the current pandemic are excluded*<sup>18,27-31</sup>). Although 100% identity on the E protein has been observed between SARS-CoV and certain SARS-related bat coronaviruses, none of those pairs simultaneously share over 83% identity on the Orf8 protein<sup>32</sup>. Therefore, the 94.2% identity on the Orf8 protein, 100% identity on the E protein, and the overall genomic/amino acid-level resemblance between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 are highly unusual. Such evidence, when considered together, is consistent with a hypothesis that the SARS-CoV-2 genome has an origin based on the use of ZC45/ZXC21 as a backbone and/or template for genetic gain-of-function modifications.


Importantly, ZC45 and ZXC21 are bat coronaviruses that were discovered (between July 2015 and February 2017), isolated, and characterized by military research laboratories in the Third Military Medical University (Chongqing, China) and the Research Institute for Medicine of Nanjing Command (Nanjing, China). The data and associated work were published in 2018<sup>33,34</sup>. Clearly, this backbone/template, which is essential for the creation of SARS-CoV-2, exists in these and other related research laboratories.

What strengthens our contention further is the published RaTG13 virus<sup>18</sup>, the genomic sequence of which is reportedly 96% identical to that of SARS-CoV-2. While suggesting a natural origin of SARS-CoV-2, the RaTG13 virus also diverted the attention of both the scientific field and the general public away from ZC45/ZXC21<sup>4,18</sup>. In fact, a Chinese BSL-3 lab (the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre), which published a *Nature* article reporting a conflicting close phylogenetic relationship between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 rather than with RaTG13<sup>35</sup>, was quickly shut down for “rectification”<sup>36</sup>. It is believed that the researchers of that laboratory were being punished for having disclosed the SARS-CoV-2—ZC45/ZXC21 connection. On the other hand, substantial evidence has accumulated, pointing to severe problems associated with the reported sequence of RaTG13 as well as questioning the actual existence of this bat virus in nature<sup>6,7,19-21</sup>. A very recent publication also indicated that the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the RaTG13’s Spike protein could not bind ACE2 of two different types of horseshoe bats (they closely relate to the horseshoe bat *R. affinis*, RaTG13’s alleged natural host)<sup>2</sup>, implicating the inability of RaTG13 to infect horseshoe bats. This finding further substantiates the suspicion that the reported sequence of RaTG13 could have been fabricated as the Spike protein encoded by this sequence does not seem to carry the claimed function. The fact that a virus has been fabricated to shift the attention away from ZC45/ZXC21 speaks for an actual role of ZC45/ZXC21 in the creation of SARS-CoV-2.

## **1.2 The receptor-binding motif of SARS-CoV-2 Spike cannot be born from nature and should have been created through genetic engineering**

The Spike proteins decorate the exterior of the coronavirus particles. They play an important role in infection as they mediate the interaction with host cell receptors and thereby help determine the host range and tissue tropism of the virus. The Spike protein is split into two halves (Figure 3). The front or N-terminal half is named S1, which is fully responsible for binding the host receptor. In both SARS-CoV

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 and SARS-CoV-2 infections, the host cell receptor is hACE2. Within S1, a segment of around 70 amino acids makes direct contacts with hACE2 and is correspondingly named the receptor-binding motif (RBM) (Figure 3C). In SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2, the RBM fully determines the interaction with hACE2. The C-terminal half of the Spike protein is named S2. The main function of S2 includes maintaining trimer formation and, upon successive protease cleavages at the S1/S2 junction and a downstream S2' position, mediating membrane fusion to enable cellular entry of the virus.



**Figure 3. Structure of the SARS Spike protein and how it binds to the hACE2 receptor.** Pictures were generated based on PDB ID: 6acj<sup>37</sup>. A) Three spike proteins, each consisting of a S1 half and a S2 half, form a trimer. B) The S2 halves (shades of blue) are responsible for trimer formation, while the S1 portion (shades of red) is responsible for binding hACE2 (dark gray). C) Details of the binding between S1 and hACE2. The RBM of S1, which is important and sufficient for binding, is colored in orange. Residues within the RBM that are important for either hACE2 interaction or protein folding are shown as sticks (residue numbers follow the SARS Spike sequence).




Figure 4. Sequence alignment of the spike proteins from various coronaviruses. Regions being compared include SARS-CoV-2 (Wuhan-Hu-1: NC\_045512, 2019-nCoV\_USA-AZ1: MN997409), bat coronaviruses (Bat\_CoV\_ZC45: MG772933, Bat\_CoV\_ZXC21: MG772934), and SARS coronaviruses (SARS\_GZ02: AY390556, SARS: NC\_004718.3). Region marked by two orange lines is the receptor-binding motif (RBM), which is important for interaction with the ACE2 receptor. Essential residues are additionally highlighted by red ticks on top. Region marked by two green lines is a furin-cleavage site that exists only in SARS-CoV-2 but not in any other lineage B coronavirus.

Similar to what is observed for other viral proteins, S2 of SARS-CoV-2 shares a high sequence identity (95%) with S2 of ZC45/ZXC21. In stark contrast, between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21, the S1 protein, which dictates which host (human or bat) the virus can infect, is much less conserved with the amino acid sequence identity being only 69%.

Figure 4 shows the sequence alignment of the Spike proteins from six  $\beta$  coronaviruses. Two are viruses isolated from the current pandemic (Wuhan-Hu-1, 2019-nCoV\_USA-AZ1); two are the suspected template viruses (Bat\_CoV\_ZC45, Bat\_CoV\_ZXC21); two are SARS coronaviruses (SARS\_GZ02, SARS). The RBM is highlighted in between two orange lines. Clearly, despite the high sequence identity for the overall genomes, the RBM of SARS-CoV-2 differs significantly from those of ZC45 and ZXC21. Intriguingly, the RBM of SARS-CoV-2 resembles, on a great deal, the RBM of SARS Spike. Although this is not an exact “copy and paste”, careful examination of the Spike-hACE2 structures<sup>37,38</sup> reveals that all residues essential for either hACE2 binding or protein folding (orange sticks in Figure 3C and what is highlighted by red short lines in Figure 4) are “kept”. Most of these essential residues are precisely preserved, including those involved in disulfide bond formation (C467, C474) and electrostatic interactions (R444, E452, R453, D454), which are pivotal for the structural integrity of the RBM (Figure 3C and 4). The few changes within the group of essential residues are almost exclusively hydrophobic “substitutions” (I428→L, L443→F, F460→Y, L472→F, Y484→Q), which should not affect either protein folding or the hACE2-interaction. At the same time, majority of the amino acid residues that are non-essential have “mutated” (Figure 4, RBM residues not labeled with short red lines). Judging from this sequence analysis alone, we were convinced early on that not only would the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein bind hACE2 but also the binding would resemble, precisely, that between the original SARS Spike protein and hACE2<sup>23</sup>. Recent structural work has confirmed our prediction<sup>39</sup>.

As elaborated below, the way that SARS-CoV-2 RBM resembles SARS-CoV RBM and the overall sequence conservation pattern between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 are highly unusual. Collectively, this suggests that portions of the SARS-CoV-2 genome have not been derived from natural quasi-species viral particle evolution.

If SARS-CoV-2 does indeed come from natural evolution, its RBM could have only been acquired in one of the two possible routes: 1) an ancient recombination event followed by convergent evolution or 2) a natural recombination event that occurred fairly recently.

In the first scenario, the ancestor of SARS-CoV-2, a ZC45/ZXC21-like bat coronavirus would have recombined and “swapped” its RBM with a coronavirus carrying a relatively “complete” RBM (in reference to SARS). This recombination would result in a novel ZC45/ZXC21-like coronavirus with all the gaps in its RBM “filled” (Figure 4). Subsequently, the virus would have to adapt extensively in its new host, where the ACE2 protein is highly homologous to hACE2. Random mutations across the genome would have to have occurred to eventually shape the RBM to its current form – resembling SARS-CoV RBM in a highly intelligent manner. However, this convergent evolution process would also result in the accumulation of a large amount of mutations in other parts of the genome, rendering the overall sequence identity relatively low. The high sequence identity between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 on various proteins (94-100% identity) do not support this scenario and, therefore, clearly indicates that SARS-CoV-2 carrying such an RBM cannot come from a ZC45/ZXC21-like bat coronavirus through this convergent evolutionary route.

In the second scenario, the ZC45/ZXC21-like coronavirus would have to have recently recombined and swapped its RBM with another coronavirus that had successfully adapted to bind an animal ACE2



highly homologous to hACE2. The likelihood of such an event depends, in part, on the general requirements of natural recombination: 1) that the two different viruses share significant sequence similarity; 2) that they must co-infect and be present in the same cell of the same animal; 3) that the recombinant virus would not be cleared by the host or make the host extinct; 4) that the recombinant virus eventually would have to become stable and transmissible within the host species.

In regard to this recent recombination scenario, the animal reservoir could not be bats because the ACE2 proteins in bats are not homologous enough to hACE2 and therefore the adaption would not be able to yield an RBM sequence as seen in SARS-CoV-2. This animal reservoir also could not be humans as the ZC45/ZXC21-like coronavirus would not be able to infect humans. In addition, there has been no evidence of any SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-CoV-2-like virus circulating in the human population prior to late 2019. Intriguingly, according to a recent bioinformatics study, SARS-CoV-2 was well-adapted for humans since the start of the outbreak<sup>1</sup>.

Only one other possibility of natural evolution remains, which is that the ZC45/ZXC21-like virus and a coronavirus containing a SARS-like RBM could have recombined in an intermediate host where the ACE2 protein is homologous to hACE2. Several laboratories have reported that some of the Sunda pangolins smuggled into China from Malaysia carried coronaviruses, the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of which is almost identical to that of SARS-CoV-2<sup>27-29,31</sup>. They then went on to suggest that pangolins are the likely intermediate host for SARS-CoV-2<sup>27-29,31</sup>. However, recent independent reports have found significant flaws in this data<sup>40-42</sup>. Furthermore, contrary to these reports<sup>27-29,31</sup>, no coronaviruses have been detected in Sunda pangolin samples collected for over a decade in Malaysia and Sabah between 2009 and 2019<sup>43</sup>. A recent study also showed that the RBD, which is shared between SARS-CoV-2 and the reported pangolin coronaviruses, binds to hACE2 ten times stronger than to the pangolin ACE2<sup>2</sup>, further dismissing pangolins as the possible intermediate host. Finally, an *in silico* study, while echoing the notion that pangolins are not likely an intermediate host, also indicated that none of the animal ACE2 proteins examined in their study exhibited more favorable binding potential to the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein than hACE2 did<sup>3</sup>. This last study virtually exempted all animals from their suspected roles as an intermediate host<sup>3</sup>, which is consistent with the observation that SARS-CoV-2 was well-adapted for humans from the start of the outbreak<sup>1</sup>. This is significant because these findings collectively suggest that no intermediate host seems to exist for SARS-CoV-2, which at the very least diminishes the possibility of a recombinant event occurring in an intermediate host.

Even if we ignore the above evidence that no proper host exists for the recombination to take place and instead assume that such a host does exist, it is still highly unlikely that such a recombination event could occur in nature.

As we have described above, if natural recombination event is responsible for the appearance of SARS-CoV-2, then the ZC45/ZXC21-like virus and a coronavirus containing a SARS-like RBM would have to recombine in the same cell by swapping the S1/RBM, which is a rare form of recombination. Furthermore, since SARS has occurred only once in human history, it would be at least equally rare for nature to produce a virus that resembles SARS in such an intelligent manner – having an RBM that differs from the SARS RBM only at a few non-essential sites (Figure 4). The possibility that this unique SARS-like coronavirus would reside in the same cell with the ZC45/ZXC21-like ancestor virus and the two viruses would recombine in the “RBM-swapping” fashion is extremely low. Importantly, this, and the other recombination event described below in section 1.3 (even more impossible to occur in nature), would both have to happen to produce a Spike as seen in SARS-CoV-2.



Strikingly, consistent with the RBM engineering theory, we have identified two unique restriction sites, EcoRI and BstEII, at either end of the *RBM* of the SARS-CoV-2 genome, respectively (Figure 5A). These two sites, which are popular choices of everyday molecular cloning, do not exist in the rest of this *spike* gene. This particular setting makes it extremely convenient to swap the *RBM* within *spike*, providing a quick way to test different RBMs and the corresponding Spike proteins.

Such EcoRI and BstEII sites do not exist in the *spike* genes of other  $\beta$  coronaviruses, which strongly indicates that they were unnatural and were specifically introduced into this *spike* gene of SARS-CoV-2 for the convenience of manipulating the critical RBM. Although ZC45 *spike* also does not have these two sites (Figure 5B), they can be introduced very easily as described in part 2 of this report.

It is noteworthy that introduction of the EcoRI site here would change the corresponding amino acids from *-WNT-* to *-WNS-* (Figure 5AB). As far as we know, all SARS and SARS-like bat coronaviruses exclusively carry a *T* (threonine) residue at this location. SARS-CoV-2 is the only exception in that this *T* has mutated to an *S* (serine), save the suspicious RaTG13 and pangolin coronaviruses published after the outbreak<sup>48</sup>.

Once the restriction sites were successfully introduced, the *RBM* segment could be swapped conveniently using routine restriction enzyme digestion and ligation. Although alternative cloning techniques may leave no trace of genetic manipulation (Gibson assembly as one example), this old-fashioned approach could be chosen because it offers a great level of convenience in swapping this critical *RBM*.

Given that RBM fully dictates hACE2-binding and that the SARS RBM-hACE2 binding was fully characterized by high-resolution structures (Figure 3)<sup>37,38</sup>, this RBM-only swap would not be any riskier than the full Spike swap. In fact, the feasibility of this RBM-swap strategy has been proven<sup>39,47</sup>. In 2008, Dr. Zhengli Shi's group swapped a SARS RBM into the Spike proteins of several SARS-like bat coronaviruses after introducing a restriction site into a codon-optimized *spike* gene (Figure 5C)<sup>47</sup>. They then validated the binding of the resulted chimeric Spike proteins with hACE2. Furthermore, in a recent publication, the RBM of SARS-CoV-2 was swapped into the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of SARS-CoV, resulting in a chimeric RBD fully functional in binding hACE2 (Figure 5C)<sup>39</sup>. Strikingly, in both cases, the manipulated RBM segments resemble almost exactly the RBM defined by the positions of the EcoRI and BstEII sites (Figure 5C). Although cloning details are lacking in both publications<sup>39,47</sup>, it is conceivable that the actual restriction sites may vary depending on the *spike* gene receiving the RBM insertion as well as the convenience in introducing unique restriction site(s) in regions of interest. It is noteworthy that the corresponding author of this recent publication<sup>39</sup>, Dr. Fang Li, has been an active collaborator of Dr. Zhengli Shi since 2010<sup>49-53</sup>. Dr. Li was the first person in the world to have structurally elucidated the binding between SARS-CoV RBD and hACE2<sup>38</sup> and has been the leading expert in the structural understanding of Spike-ACE2 interactions<sup>38,39,53-56</sup>. The striking finding of EcoRI and BstEII restriction sites at either end of the SARS-CoV-2 RBM, respectively, and the fact that the same RBM region has been swapped both by Dr. Shi and by her long-term collaborator, respectively, using restriction enzyme digestion methods are unlikely a coincidence. **Rather, it is the smoking gun proving that the RBM/Spike of SARS-CoV-2 is a product of genetic manipulation.**

Although it may be convenient to copy the exact sequence of SARS RBM, it would be too clear a sign of artificial design and manipulation. The more deceiving approach would be to change a few non-essential residues, while preserving the ones critical for binding. This design could be well-guided by the high-resolution structures (Figure 3)<sup>37,38</sup>. This way, when the overall sequence of the RBM would appear

to be more distinct from that of the SARS RBM, the hACE2-binding ability would be well-preserved. We believe that all of the crucial residues (residues labeled with red sticks in Figure 4, which are the same residues shown in sticks in Figure 3C) should have been “kept”. As described earlier, while some should be direct preservation, some should have been switched to residues with similar properties, which would not disrupt hACE2-binding and may even strengthen the association further. Importantly, changes might have been made intentionally at non-essential sites, making it less like a “copy and paste” of the SARS RBM.

### 1.3 An unusual furin-cleavage site is present in the Spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 and is associated with the augmented virulence of the virus

Another unique motif in the Spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 is a polybasic furin-cleavage site located at the S1/S2 junction (Figure 4, segment in between two green lines). Such a site can be recognized and cleaved by the furin protease. Within the lineage B of  $\beta$  coronaviruses and with the exception of SARS-CoV-2, no viruses contain a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction (Figure 6)<sup>57</sup>. In contrast, furin-cleavage site at this location has been observed in other groups of coronaviruses<sup>57,58</sup>. Certain selective pressure seems to be in place that prevents the lineage B of  $\beta$  coronaviruses from acquiring or maintaining such a site in nature.

Human SARS-CoV BJ01	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Human SARS-CoV CUHK-W1	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Human SARS-CoV Tor2	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Human SARS-CoV Frankfurt-1	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Human SARS-CoV Urbani	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Civet SARS-CoV civet020	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Civet SARS CoV s216	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
Raccoon dog SARS-CoV A030	655 - GICASYHTVSL----RSTS - 670
SARS-CoV-2	669 - GICASYQTQTNSFRARSVA - 688
Pangolin CoV MP789	n/a - GICASYQTQTNS----RSVS - n/a
Bat SARSr-CoV RaTG13	669 - GICASYQTQTNS----RSVA - 684
Bat SARSr-CoV LYRa11	659 - GICASYHTASLL----RNTD - 674
Bat SARSr-CoV LYRa3	659 - GICASYHTASLL----RNTG - 674
Bat SARSr-CoV RaSHC014	656 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 671
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4084	656 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 671
Bat SARSr-CoV WIV1	656 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 671
Bat SARSr-CoV Rs3367	656 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 671
Bat SARSr-CoV Rs7327	656 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 671
Bat SARSr-CoV Rs9401	656 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 671
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4231	655 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 670
Bat SARSr-CoV WIV16	655 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 670
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4874	655 - GICASYHTVSSL----RSTS - 670
Bat SARSr-CoV ZC45	646 - GICASYHTASIL----RSTS - 661
Bat SARSr-CoV ZXC21	645 - GICASYHTASIL----RSTG - 660
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4092	634 - GICASYHTASTL----RSGV - 649
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra/JL2012	636 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 651
Bat SARSr-CoV JTM15	636 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 651
Bat SARSr-CoV 16B0133	636 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 651
Bat SARSr-CoV B15-21	636 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 651
Bat SARSr-CoV YN2013	633 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 648
Bat SARSr-CoV Anlong-103	633 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 648
Bat SARSr-CoV Rp/Shaanxi12011	640 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 655
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra/HuB2013	641 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV YRLF/34C	641 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV YRLF/31C	641 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Rf1	641 - GICASYHTASHL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV 273	641 - GICASYHTASHL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Rf/SX2013	639 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 654
Bat SARSr-CoV Rf/HeB2013	641 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Cp/Yunnan2011	641 - GICASYHTASLL----RNTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra672	641 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4255	641 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV 4081	641 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Rm1	641 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV 279	641 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra/GX2013	642 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 657
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra806	641 - GICASYHTASLL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV HNU3-1	642 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 657
Bat SARSr-CoV Longquan-140	642 - GICASYHTASVL----RSTG - 657
Bat SARSr-CoV Rp3	641 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4247	642 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 657
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra4237	641 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 656
Bat SARSr-CoV Ra6526	641 - GICASYHTASTL----RSTG - 656

Figure 6. Furin-cleavage site found at the S1/S2 junction of Spike is unique to SARS-CoV-2 and absent in other lineage B  $\beta$  coronaviruses. Figure reproduced from Hoffmann, et al<sup>57</sup>.

As previously described, during the cell entry process, the Spike protein is first cleaved at the S1/S2 junction. This step, and a subsequent cleavage downstream that exposes the fusion peptide, are both mediated by host proteases. The presence or absence of these proteases in different cell types greatly affects the cell tropism and presumably the pathogenicity of the viral infection. Unlike other proteases, furin protease is widely expressed in many types of cells and is present at multiple cellular and extracellular locations. Importantly, the introduction of a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction could significantly enhance the infectivity of a virus as well as greatly expand its cell tropism — a phenomenon well-documented in both influenza viruses and other coronaviruses<sup>59-65</sup>.

If we leave aside the fact that no furin-cleavage site is found in any lineage B  $\beta$  coronavirus in nature and instead assume that this site in SARS-CoV-2 is a result of natural evolution, then only one evolutionary pathway is possible, which is that the furin-cleavage site has to be derived from a homologous recombination event. Specifically, an ancestor  $\beta$  coronavirus containing no furin-cleavage site would have to recombine with a closely related coronavirus that does contain a furin-cleavage site.

However, two facts disfavor this possibility. First, although some coronaviruses from other groups or lineages do contain polybasic furin-cleavage sites, none of them contains the exact polybasic sequence present in SARS-CoV-2 (-PRRAR/SVA-). Second, between SARS-CoV-2 and any coronavirus containing a legitimate furin-cleavage site, the sequence identity on Spike is no more than 40%<sup>66</sup>. Such a low level of sequence identity rules out the possibility of a successful homologous recombination ever occurring between the ancestors of these viruses. Therefore, the furin-cleavage site within the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein is unlikely to be of natural origin and instead should be a result of laboratory modification.

Consistent with this claim, a close examination of the nucleotide sequence of the furin-cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2 *spike* has revealed that the two consecutive Arg residues within the inserted sequence (-PRRA-) are both coded by the rare codon CGG (least used codon for Arg in SARS-CoV-2) (Figure 7)<sup>8</sup>. In fact, this CGGCGG arrangement is the only instance found in the SARS-CoV-2 genome where this rare codon is used in tandem. This observation strongly suggests that this furin-cleavage site should be a result of genetic engineering. Adding to the suspicion, a *FauI* restriction site is formulated by the codon choices here, suggesting the possibility that the *restriction fragment length polymorphism*, a technique that a WIV lab is proficient at<sup>67</sup>, could have been involved. There, the fragmentation pattern resulted from *FauI* digestion could be used to monitor the preservation of the furin-cleavage site in Spike as this furin-cleavage site is prone to deletions *in vitro*<sup>68,69</sup>. Specifically, RT-PCR on the *spike* gene of the recovered viruses from cell cultures or laboratory animals could be carried out, the product of which would be subjected to *FauI* digestion. Viruses retaining or losing the furin-cleavage site would then yield distinct patterns, allowing convenient tracking of the virus(es) of interest.

*FauI*

tat	cag	act	cag	act	aat	tct	cct	cgg	cgg	gca	cgt	agt	gta	gct	agt	caa	tcc	atc	att
Y	Q	T	Q	T	N	S	P	R	R	A	R	S	V	A	S	Q	S	I	I

**Figure 7. Two consecutive Arg residues in the -PRRA- insertion at the S1/S2 junction of SARS-CoV-2 Spike are both coded by a rare codon, CGG. A *FauI* restriction site, 5'-(N)<sub>6</sub>GCGGG-3', is embedded in the coding sequence of the "inserted" PRRA segment, which may be used as a marker to monitor the preservation of the introduced furin-cleavage site.**

In addition, although no known coronaviruses contain the exact sequence of -PRRAR/SVA- that is present in the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein, a similar -RRAR/AR- sequence has been observed at the S1/S2 junction of the Spike protein in a rodent coronavirus, AcCoV-JC34, which was published by Dr. Zhengli

Shi in 2017<sup>70</sup>. It is evident that the legitimacy of -RRAR- as a functional furin-cleavage site has been known to the WIV experts since 2017.

The evidence collectively suggests that the furin-cleavage site in the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein may not have come from nature and could be the result of genetic manipulation. The purpose of this manipulation could have been to assess any potential enhancement of the infectivity and pathogenicity of the laboratory-made coronavirus<sup>59-64</sup>. Indeed, recent studies have confirmed that the furin-cleavage site does confer significant pathogenic advantages to SARS-CoV-2<sup>57,68</sup>.

#### 1.4 Summary

Evidence presented in this part reveals that certain aspects of the SARS-CoV-2 genome are extremely difficult to reconcile to being a result of natural evolution. The alternative theory we suggest is that the virus may have been created by using ZC45/ZXC21 bat coronavirus(es) as the backbone and/or template. The Spike protein, especially the RBM within it, should have been artificially manipulated, upon which the virus has acquired the ability to bind hACE2 and infect humans. This is supported by the finding of a unique restriction enzyme digestion site at either end of the RBM. An unusual furin-cleavage site may have been introduced and inserted at the S1/S2 junction of the Spike protein, which contributes to the increased virulence and pathogenicity of the virus. These transformations have then staged the SARS-CoV-2 virus to eventually become a highly-transmissible, onset-hidden, lethal, sequelae-unclear, and massively disruptive pathogen.

Evidently, the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 could have been created through gain-of-function manipulations at the WIV is significant and should be investigated thoroughly and independently.

## 2. Delineation of a synthetic route of SARS-CoV-2

In the second part of this report, we describe a synthetic route of creating SARS-CoV-2 in a laboratory setting. It is postulated based on substantial literature support as well as genetic evidence present in the SARS-CoV-2 genome. Although steps presented herein should not be viewed as exactly those taken, we believe that key processes should not be much different. Importantly, our work here should serve as a demonstration of how SARS-CoV-2 can be designed and created conveniently in research laboratories by following proven concepts and using well-established techniques.

Importantly, research labs, both in Hong Kong and in mainland China, are leading the world in coronavirus research, both in terms of resources and on the research outputs. The latter is evidenced not only by the large number of publications that they have produced over the past two decades but also by their milestone achievements in the field: they were the first to identify civets as the intermediate host for SARS-CoV and isolated the first strain of the virus<sup>71</sup>; they were the first to uncover that SARS-CoV originated from bats<sup>72,73</sup>; they revealed for the first time the antibody-dependent enhancement (ADE) of SARS-CoV infections<sup>74</sup>; they have contributed significantly in understanding MERS in all domains (zoonosis, virology, and clinical studies)<sup>75-79</sup>; they made several breakthroughs in SARS-CoV-2 research<sup>18,35,80</sup>. Last but not least, they have the world's largest collection of coronaviruses (genomic sequences and live viruses). The knowledge, expertise, and resources are all readily available within the Hong Kong and mainland research laboratories (they collaborate extensively) to carry out and accomplish the work described below.




Figure 8. Diagram of a possible synthetic route of the laboratory-creation of SARS-CoV-2.

## 2.1 Possible scheme in designing the laboratory-creation of the novel coronavirus

In this sub-section, we outline the possible overall strategy and major considerations that may have been formulated at the designing stage of the project.

To engineer and create a human-targeting coronavirus, they would have to pick a bat coronavirus as the template/backbone. This can be conveniently done because many research labs have been actively collecting bat coronaviruses over the past two decades<sup>32,33,70,72,81-85</sup>. However, this template virus ideally should not be one from Dr. Zhengli Shi's collections, considering that she is widely known to have been engaged in gain-of-function studies on coronaviruses. Therefore, ZC45 and/or ZXC21, novel bat coronaviruses discovered and owned by military laboratories<sup>33</sup>, would be suitable as the template/backbone. It is also possible that these military laboratories had discovered other closely related viruses from the same location and kept some unpublished. Therefore, the actual template could be ZC45, or ZXC21, or a close relative of them. The postulated pathway described below would be the same regardless of which one of the three was the actual template.

Once they have chosen a template virus, they would first need to engineer, through molecular cloning, the Spike protein so that it can bind hACE2. The concept and cloning techniques involved in this manipulation have been well-documented in the literature<sup>44-46,84,86</sup>. With almost no risk of failing, the template bat virus could then be converted to a coronavirus that can bind hACE2 and infect humans<sup>44-46</sup>.

Second, they would use molecular cloning to introduce a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction of Spike. This manipulation, based on known knowledge<sup>60,61,65</sup>, would likely produce a strain of coronavirus that is a more infectious and pathogenic.

Third, they would produce an *ORF1b* gene construct. The *ORF1b* gene encodes the polyprotein Orf1b, which is processed post-translationally to produce individual viral proteins: RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp), helicase, guanidine-N7 methyltransferase, uridylyate-specific endoribonuclease, and 2'-O-methyltransferase. All of these proteins are parts of the replication machinery of the virus. Among them, the RdRp protein is the most crucial one and is highly conserved among coronaviruses. Importantly, Dr. Zhengli Shi's laboratory uses a PCR protocol, which amplifies a particular fragment of the *RdRp* gene, as their primary method to detect the presence of coronaviruses in raw samples (bat fecal swap, feces, etc). As a result of this practice, the Shi group has documented the sequence information of this short segment of *RdRp* for all coronaviruses that they have successfully detected and/or collected.

Here, the genetic manipulation is less demanding or complicated because Orf1b is conserved and likely Orf1b from any  $\beta$  coronavirus would be competent enough to do the work. However, we believe that they would want to introduce a particular Orf1b into the virus for one of the two possible reasons:

1. Since many phylogenetic analyses categorize coronaviruses based on the sequence similarity of the *RdRp* gene only<sup>18,31,35,83,87</sup>, having a different *RdRp* in the genome therefore could ensure that SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21 are separated into different groups/sub-lineages in phylogenetic studies. Choosing an *RdRp* gene, however, is convenient because the short *RdRp* segment sequence has been recorded for all coronaviruses ever collected/detected. Their final choice was the *RdRp* sequence from bat coronavirus RaBtCoV/4991, which was discovered in 2013. For RaBtCoV/4991, the only information ever published was the sequence of its short *RdRp* segment<sup>83</sup>, while neither its full genomic sequence nor virus isolation were ever reported. After amplifying the *RdRp* segment (or the whole *ORF1b* gene) of RaBatCoV/4991, they would have then used it for subsequent assembly and creation of the genome of SARS-CoV-2. Small changes in the *RdRp*



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sequence could either be introduced at the beginning (through DNA synthesis) or be generated *via* passages later on. On a separate track, when they were engaged in the fabrication of the RaTG13 sequence, they could have started with the short *RdRp* segment of RaBtCoV/4991 without introducing any changes to its sequence, resulting in a 100% nucleotide sequence identity between the two viruses on this short *RdRp* segment<sup>83</sup>. This RaTG13 virus could then be claimed to have been discovered back in 2013.

2. The RdRp protein from RaBatCoV/4991 is unique in that it is superior than RdRp from any other  $\beta$  coronavirus for developing antiviral drugs. RdRp has no homologs in human cells, which makes this essential viral enzyme a highly desirable target for antiviral development. As an example, *Remdesivir*, which is currently undergoing clinical trials, targets RdRp. When creating a novel and human-targeting virus, they would be interested in developing the antidote as well. Even though drug discovery like this may not be easily achieved, it is reasonable for them to intentionally incorporate a RdRp that is more amenable for antiviral drug development.

Fourth, they would use reverse genetics to assemble the gene fragments of *spike*, *ORF1b*, and the rest of the template ZC45 into a cDNA version of the viral genome. They would then carry out *in vitro* transcription to obtain the viral RNA genome. Transfection of the RNA genome into cells would allow the recovery of live and infectious viruses with the desired artificial genome.

Fifth, they would carry out characterization and optimization of the virus strain(s) to improve the fitness, infectivity, and overall adaptation using serial passage *in vivo*. One or several viral strains that meet certain criteria would then be obtained as the final product(s).

## 2.2 A postulated synthetic route for the creation of SARS-CoV-2

In this sub-section, we describe in more details how each step could be carried out in a laboratory setting using available materials and routine molecular, cellular, and virologic techniques. A diagram of this process is shown in Figure 8. We estimate that the whole process could be completed in approximately 6 months.

### Step 1: Engineering the RBM of the Spike for hACE2-binding (1.5 months)

The Spike protein of a bat coronavirus is either incapable of or inefficient in binding hACE2 due to the missing of important residues within its RBM. This can be exemplified by the RBM of the template virus ZC45 (Figure 4). The first and most critical step in the creation of SARS-CoV-2 is to engineer the Spike so that it acquires the ability to bind hACE2. As evidenced in the literature, such manipulations have been carried out repeatedly in research laboratories since 2008<sup>44</sup>, which successfully yielded engineered coronaviruses with the ability to infect human cells<sup>44-46,88,89</sup>. Although there are many possible ways that one can engineer the Spike protein, we believe that what was actually undertaken was that they replaced the original RBM with a designed and possibly optimized RBM using SARS' RBM as a guide. As described in part 1, this theory is supported by our observation that two unique restriction sites, EcoRI and BstEII, exist at either end of the *RBM* in the SARS-CoV-2 genome (Figure 5A) and by the fact that such RBM-swap has been successfully carried out by Dr. Zhengli Shi and by her long-term collaborator and structure biology expert, Dr. Fang Li<sup>39,47</sup>.

Although ZC45 *spike* does not contain these two restriction sites (Figure 5B), they can be introduced very easily. The original *spike* gene would be either amplified with RT-PCR or obtained through DNA synthesis (some changes could be safely introduced to certain variable regions of the sequence) followed by PCR. The gene would then be cloned into a plasmid using restriction sites other than EcoRI and BstEII.

Once in the plasmid, the *spike* gene can be modified easily. First, an EcoRI site can be introduced by converting the highlighted “gaacac” sequence (Figure 5B) to the desired “gaattc” (Figure 5A). The difference between them are two consecutive nucleotides. Using the commercially available QuikChange Site-Directed Mutagenesis kit, such a di-nucleotide mutation can be generated in no more than one week. Subsequently, the BstEII site could be similarly introduced at the other end of the *RBM*. Specifically, the “gaatacc” sequence (Figure 5B) would be converted to the desired “ggttacc” (Figure 5A), which would similarly require a week of time.

Once these restriction sites, which are unique within the *spike* gene of SARS-CoV-2, were successfully introduced, different *RBM* segments could be swapped in conveniently and the resulting Spike protein subsequently evaluated using established assays.

As described in part 1, the design of an *RBM* segment could be well-guided by the high-resolution structures (Figure 3)<sup>37,38</sup>, yielding a sequence that resembles the SARS *RBM* in an intelligent manner. When carrying out the structure-guided design of the *RBM*, they would have followed the routine and generated a few (for example a dozen) such *RBM*s with the hope that some specific variant(s) may be superior than others in binding hACE2. Once the design was finished, they could have each of the designed *RBM* genes commercially synthesized (quick and very affordable) with an EcoRI site at the 5'-end and a BstEII site at the 3'-end. These novel *RBM* genes could then be cloned into the *spike* gene, respectively. The gene synthesis and subsequent cloning, which could be done in a batch mode for the small library of designed *RBM*s, would take approximately one month.

These engineered Spike proteins might then be tested for hACE2-binding using the established pseudotype virus infection assays<sup>45,49,50</sup>. The engineered Spike with good to exceptional binding affinities would be selected. (Although not necessary, directed evolution could be involved here (error-prone PCR on the *RBM* gene), coupled with either an *in vitro* binding assay<sup>39,90</sup> or a pseudotype virus infection assay<sup>45,49,50</sup>, to obtain an *RBM* that binds hACE2 with exceptional affinity.)

Given the abundance of literature on Spike engineering<sup>44-46,84,86</sup> and the available high-resolution structures of the Spike-hACE2 complex<sup>37,38</sup>, the success of this step would be very much guaranteed. By the end of this step, as desired, a novel *spike* gene would be obtained, which encodes a novel Spike protein capable of binding hACE2 with high affinity.

#### Step 2: Engineering a furin-cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction (0.5 month)

The product from Step 1, a plasmid containing the engineered *spike*, would be further modified to include a furin-cleavage site (segment indicated by green lines in Figure 4) at the S1/S2 junction. This short stretch of gene sequence can be conveniently inserted using several routine cloning techniques, including QuikChange Site-Directed PCR<sup>60</sup>, overlap PCR followed by restriction enzyme digestion and ligation<sup>91</sup>, or Gibson assembly. None of these techniques would leave any trace in the sequence. Whichever cloning method was the choice, the inserted gene piece would be included in the primers, which would be designed, synthesized, and used in the cloning. This step, leading to a further modified Spike with the furin-cleavage site added at the S1/S2 junction, could be completed in no more than two weeks.

#### Step 3: Obtain an *ORF1b* gene that contains the sequence of the short *RdRp* segment from RaBtCoV/4991 (1 month, yet can be carried out concurrently with Steps 1 and 2)

Unlike the engineering of Spike, no complicated design is needed here, except that the *RdRp* gene segment from RaBtCoV/4991 would need to be included. Gibson assembly could have been used here. In this technique, several fragments, each adjacent pair sharing 20–40 bp overlap, are combined together in one simple reaction to assemble a long DNA product. Two or three fragments, each covering a significant section of the *ORF1b* gene, would be selected based on known bat coronavirus sequences. One of these fragments would be the *RdRp* segment of RaBtCoV/4991<sup>83</sup>. Each fragment would be PCR amplified with proper overlap regions introduced in the primers. Finally, all purified fragments would be pooled in equimolar concentrations and added to the Gibson reaction mixture, which, after a short incubation, would yield the desired *ORF1b* gene in whole.

#### Step 4: Produce the designed viral genome using reverse genetics and recover live viruses (0.5 month)

Reverse genetics have been frequently used in assembling whole viral genomes, including coronavirus genomes<sup>67,92-96</sup>. The most recent example is the reconstruction of the SARS-CoV-2 genome using the *transformation-assisted recombination in yeast*<sup>97</sup>. Using this method, the Swiss group assembled the entire viral genome and produced live viruses in just one week<sup>97</sup>. This efficient technique, which would not leave any trace of artificial manipulation in the created viral genome, has been available since 2017<sup>98,99</sup>. In addition to the engineered *spike* gene (from steps 1 and 2) and the *ORF1b* gene (from step 3), other fragments covering the rest of the genome would be obtained either through RT-PCR amplification from the template virus or through DNA synthesis by following a sequence slightly altered from that of the template virus. We believe that the latter approach was more likely as it would allow sequence changes introduced into the variable regions of less conserved proteins, the process of which could be easily guided by multiple sequence alignments. The amino acid sequences of more conserved functions, such as that of the E protein, might have been left unchanged. All DNA fragments would then be pooled together and transformed into yeast, where the cDNA version of the SARS-CoV-2 genome would be assembled *via* transformation-assisted recombination. Of course, an alternative method of reverse genetics, one of which the WIV has successfully used in the past<sup>67</sup>, could also be employed<sup>67,92-96,100</sup>. Although some earlier reverse genetics approaches may leave restriction sites at where different fragments would be joined, these traces would be hard to detect as the exact site of ligation can be anywhere in the ~30kb genome. Either way, a cDNA version of the viral genome would be obtained from the reverse genetics experiment. Subsequently, *in vitro* transcription using the cDNA as the template would yield the viral RNA genome, which upon transfection into Vero E6 cells would allow the production of live viruses bearing all of the designed properties.

#### Step 5: Optimize the virus for fitness and improve its hACE2-binding affinity *in vivo* (2.5-3 months)

Virus recovered from step 4 needs to be further adapted undergoing the classic experiment – serial passage in laboratory animals<sup>101</sup>. This final step would validate the virus' fitness and ensure its receptor-oriented adaptation toward its intended host, which, according to the analyses above, should be human. Importantly, the RBM and the furin-cleavage site, which were introduced into the Spike protein separately, would now be optimized together as one functional unit. Among various available animal models (e.g. mice, hamsters, ferrets, and monkeys) for coronaviruses, hACE2 transgenic mice (hACE2-mice) should be the most proper and convenient choice here. This animal model has been established during the study of SARS-CoV and has been available in the Jackson Laboratory for many years<sup>102-104</sup>.

The procedure of serial passage is straightforward. Briefly, the selected viral strain from step 4, a precursor of SARS-CoV-2, would be intranasally inoculated into a group of anaesthetized hACE2-mice. Around 2-3 days post infection, the virus in lungs would usually amplify to a peak titer. The mice would

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then be sacrificed and the lungs homogenized. Usually, the mouse-lung supernatant, which carries the highest viral load, would be used to extract the candidate virus for the next round of passage. After approximately 10~15 rounds of passage, the hACE2-binding affinity, the infection efficiency, and the lethality of the viral strain would be sufficiently enhanced and the viral genome stabilized<sup>101</sup>. Finally, after a series of characterization experiments (e.g. viral kinetics assay, antibodies response assay, symptom observation and pathology examination), the final product, SARS-CoV-2, would be obtained, concluding the whole creation process. From this point on, this viral pathogen could be amplified (most probably using Vero E6 cells) and produced routinely.

It is noteworthy that, based on the work done on SARS-CoV, the hACE2-mice, although suitable for SARS-CoV-2 adaptation, is not a good model to reflect the virus' transmissibility and associated clinical symptoms in humans. We believe that those scientists might not have used a proper animal model (such as the golden Syrian hamster) for testing the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 before the outbreak of COVID-19. If they had done this experiment with a proper animal model, the highly contagious nature of SARS-CoV-2 would be extremely evident and consequently SARS-CoV-2 would not have been described as "not causing human-to-human transmission" at the start of the outbreak.

We also speculate that the extensive laboratory-adaptation, which is oriented toward enhanced transmissibility and lethality, may have driven the virus too far. As a result, SARS-CoV-2 might have lost the capacity to attenuate on both transmissibility and lethality during its current adaptation in the human population. This hypothesis is consistent with the lack of apparent attenuation of SARS-CoV-2 so far despite its great prevalence and with the observation that a recently emerged, predominant variant only shows improved transmissibility<sup>105-108</sup>.

Serial passage is a quick and intensive process, where the adaptation of the virus is accelerated. Although intended to mimic natural evolution, serial passage is much more limited in both time and scale. As a result, less random mutations would be expected in serial passage than in natural evolution. This is particularly true for conserved viral proteins, such as the E protein. Critical in viral replication, the E protein is a determinant of virulence and engineering of it may render SARS-CoV-2 attenuated<sup>109-111</sup>. Therefore, at the initial assembly stage, these scientists might have decided to keep the amino acid sequence of the E protein unchanged from that of ZC45/ZXC21. Due to the conserved nature of the E protein and the limitations of serial passage, no amino acid mutation actually occurred, resulting in a 100% sequence identity on the E protein between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC21. The same could have happened to the marks of molecular cloning (restriction sites flanking the RBM). Serial passage, which should have partially naturalized the SARS-CoV-2 genome, might not have removed all signs of artificial manipulation.

### 3. Final remarks

Many questions remain unanswered about the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Prominent virologists have implicated in a *Nature Medicine* letter that laboratory escape, while not being entirely ruled out, was unlikely and that no sign of genetic manipulation is present in the SARS-CoV-2 genome<sup>4</sup>. However, here we show that genetic evidence within the *spike* gene of SARS-CoV-2 genome (restriction sites flanking the *RBM*; tandem rare codons used at the inserted furin-cleavage site) does exist and suggests that the SARS-CoV-2 genome should be a product of genetic manipulation. Furthermore, the proven concepts, well-established techniques, and knowledge and expertise are all in place for the convenient creation of this novel coronavirus in a short period of time.

1. If it was a laboratory product, the most critical element in its creation, the backbone/template virus (ZC45/ZXC21), is owned by military research laboratories.
2. The genome sequence of SARS-CoV-2 has likely undergone genetic engineering, through which the virus has gained the ability to target humans with enhanced virulence and infectivity.
3. The characteristics and pathogenic effects of SARS-CoV-2 are unprecedented. The virus is highly transmissible, onset-hidden, multi-organ targeting, sequelae-unclear, lethal, and associated with various symptoms and complications.
4. SARS-CoV-2 caused a world-wide pandemic, taking hundreds of thousands of lives and shutting down the global economy. It has a destructive power like no other.

Judging from the evidence that we and others have gathered, we believe that finding the origin of SARS-CoV-2 should involve an independent audit of the WIV P4 laboratories and the laboratories of their close collaborators. Such an investigation should have taken place long ago and should not be delayed any further.

We also note that in the publication of the chimeric virus SHC015-MA15 in 2015, the attribution of funding of Zhengli Shi by the NIAID was initially left out. It was reinstated in the publication in 2016 in a corrigendum, perhaps after the meeting in January 2016 to reinstate NIH funding for gain-of-function research on viruses. This is an unusual scientific behavior, which needs an explanation for.

What is not thoroughly described in this report is the various evidence indicating that several coronaviruses recently published (RaTG13<sup>18</sup>, RmYN02<sup>30</sup>, and several pangolin coronaviruses<sup>27-29,31</sup>) are highly suspicious and likely fraudulent. These fabrications would serve no purpose other than to deceive the scientific community and the general public so that the true identity of SARS-CoV-2 is hidden. Although exclusion of details of such evidence does not alter the conclusion of the current report, we do believe that these details would provide additional support for our contention that SARS-CoV-2 is a laboratory-enhanced virus and a product of gain-of-function research. A follow-up report focusing on such additional evidence is now being prepared and will be submitted shortly.

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**From:** "Kang, Eliot" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: For urgent review: informal response to S follow-up COVID query  
**Date:** Mon, 28 Jun 2021 16:48:31 -0400

I'm good.

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Director, Office:ISN Biological Policy Staff, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 28, 2021 4:39 PM  
**To:** Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: For urgent review: informal response to S follow-up COVID query

Roger that. Thanks.

Eliot --- any concerns on your end?

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Director, Office:ISN Biological Policy Staff, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**From:** Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 28, 2021 4:33 PM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Kang, Elliot (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: RE: For urgent review: informal response to S follow-up COVID query

A couple of nits (b)(5) Thanks.

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 12:56 PM

To: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Kang, Elliot (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: For urgent review: informal response to S follow-up COVID query

Importance: High

Ann – the attached Word document contain (b)(5)

(b)(5) Due back to EAP by COB today at latest.

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Director, Office:ISN Biological Policy Staff, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

Importance: High

Good morning all,

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Many (many!) thanks to (b)(6) (b)(5) for her initial inputs into this response. We'd like to move this today if possible – I'll flag for clearers on the low side as well.

Thanks

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**Sender:** "Kang, Eliot" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

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 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6)  
 Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)  
**CC:** EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
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 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
 BEP <BEP@state.sgov.gov>;  
 IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6) (USUN Rome) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12  
**Date:** Thu, 13 May 2021 06:57:44 -0400

Hi from (b)(5) colleagues. Understand we might be too late – paper looks good. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- (b)(5)  
 -

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Official ~~SRU~~  
 UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 12, 2021 10:43 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) Frisk, Megan L.; Kanapathy, Ivan  
**Cc:** EAP-CM-ECON-DL; (b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL; BEP; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL; (b)(6) (USUN Rome); (b)(6) (USUN Rome)  
**Subject:** RE: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

Still hoping (b)(5) can have a chance to look at this overnight, but one mini-edit in the meantime!

Best,

(b)(6)

Official -~~SBU~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 12, 2021 11:39 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6)  
 Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)  
**Cc:** EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>(b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>(b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; BEP <BEP@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6) (USUN Rome) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (USUN Rome)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

Adding in (b)(5) the CDA will take a look tomorrow when she has access to the high side.  
Thanks!

Official -~~SBU~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 12, 2021 10:19 AM  
**To:** Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan  
 (b)(6)  
**Cc:** EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
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 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL  
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**Subject:** RE: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

Good morning Megan and Ivan,

Please find attached State's edits on the Engagement Strategy and Tab 1 – which includes input from

(b)(5) (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)  
 (b)(5) (b)(5)

Best regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

ESTH Officer, China Desk

(b)(6)

Official - ~~SPU~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, May 7, 2021 6:06 PM

To: Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D  
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)  
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 (b)(6) (b)(6) @nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov'  
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 'cdcmedintel@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Park, Christopher J  
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 (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6) (b)(6)  
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 (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6) (b)(6)



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**Cc:** #NSC-HealthSecBio (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6) (b)(6) #NSC-TechNatSec (b)(6) #NSC-China (b)(6)

(b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-DevGlobalHealth (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) #NSC-HealthSecBio (b)(6) #NSC-  
 LEGAL (b)(6) #NSC-TechNatSec (b)(6) #NSC-  
 China (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-DevGlobalHealth  
 (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6) #NSC-  
 DevGlobalHealth (b)(6)

**Subject:** China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Dear China/Health Security subIPC,

Please find attached the consolidated comments on the **Engagement Strategy** and **Tab 1 – proposed engagements**. There are Tracked and Clean versions. We appreciated your many thoughtful edits and comments as we build out this strategy.

In lieu of a meeting, we ask that you please finalize Department and Agency feedback on the CLEAN documents by **OOB Wednesday, May 12**. This timeline is firm, as we will send the final out to D/As for discussion prep for the IPC, to be scheduled the week of the 17th.

Thank you for your continued work on this strategy.

All the best,  
Megan & Ivan

**Megan L. Frisk, PhD**  
Global Health Security and Biodefense  
National Security Council | The White House

(b)(6) (desk)  
 (b)(6) (secure)  
 (b)(6)

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**Sender:** (b)(6) (USUN Rome)" (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>  
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**Recipient:** Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6) />;  
 Kanapathy, Ivan <(b)(6)>  
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ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
BEP <BEP@state.sgov.gov>;  
IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)(USUN Rome)(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

**From:** "SMART Core" <svcSmartHBtsEwsHPrec@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

**CC:** (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Subject:** INDIA MEDIA ANALYSIS -- January 31, 2020

**Date:** Fri, 31 Jan 2020 06:31:57 -0500

**UNCLASSIFIED**




**Info Office:** s\_p\_main, PolMil, s\_p\_sca

---

**MRN:** 20 NEW DELHI 250  
**Date/DTG:** Jan 31, 2020 / 311129Z JAN 20  
**From:** AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
**Action:** WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
**E.O.:** 13526  
**TAGS:** PREL, PGOV, EINV, IN, PK, KPAO, KISL  
**Subject:** INDIA MEDIA ANALYSIS -- January 31, 2020

**INDIA MEDIA ANALYSIS**  
**Not for Distribution outside the USG**  
**January 31, 2020**



*PM Modi speaking before the start of the Budget Session (Hindustan Times)*

**Budget Session:** Television channels are reporting on the Parliamentary Budget Session that began this morning. “In the backdrop of India witnessing economic slowdown, it is crucial that the Parliament functions productively and both the government and the Opposition have to play a productive role,” Hindustan Times said.

**Middle East Peace Plan:** Media continued to criticize President Trump’s Middle East peace plan. Urdu daily *Munsif* saw the plan as “a dangerous conspiracy against the people of Palestine,” saying it was aimed at legitimizing Israel’s “unlawful occupation of Palestine territory.” The paper urged the Islamic world to come together to counter “Trump’s hostile thoughts and actions towards the Middle East.” Malayalam daily *Madhyamam* opined, “This plan is an ugly political exercise to help President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu achieve their political goals at the expense of Palestinians.”

**Coronavirus:** The detection of India’s first coronavirus case in the southern state of Kerala was widely reported in media today. “The patient is a student studying in Wuhan University, China and had recently returned to India,” India Today reported. Meanwhile, The Indian Express reported that India was tentatively preparing to evacuate Indian nationals from Wuhan on Friday evening. “Like China, the high population density and mobility in India make it one of the world’s hotspots for emerging infectious diseases,” an editorial in Hindustan Times said.

Lamenting the spread of misinformation regarding the coronavirus on social media, Malayalam daily *Malayala Manorama* wrote, “They cause unwanted distress, and people should only follow the government health department’s instructions and precautionary methods.” Marathi daily *Saamna* said the international community was rightly looking into whether the coronavirus was a creation of China’s biological warfare program.

**Change in Abortion Law:** Media continued to welcome the change in India’s abortion law, which extended the upper limit for permitting abortions to 24 weeks from the current 20 weeks. It will boost female reproductive rights and help young and disadvantaged women, as well as rape victims, media said. Indian Express wrote, “Amendments in abortion law are welcome, but its stated aim will depend on the fine print.” The Hindu said, “Now the government needs

to ensure that all norms and standardized protocols in clinical practice to facilitate abortions are followed in healthcare institutions across the country.”

### **TRENDING ONLINE**

- #EconomicSurvey: Budget session of Parliament opens, Economic Survey predicts 6-6.5% growth in the next financial year
- President Kovind hails the Citizenship Act, says the act fulfils Mahatma Gandhi’s dream

### **TELEVISION COMMENTARY**

#### **0. Budget Expectations: Digital Economy (“The Big Picture,” Rajya Sabha TV):**

Anchor Frank Rosen Pereira discussed the upcoming budget and said India’s digital consumer base is the world’s second largest and is core the future of the economy. He said digitization is vital to make India a \$5 trillion economy by 2025. Former World Bank Consultant Banuchandar Nagarajan said, “The choice is whether the government wants to play active role in the digital world, or do they want to just play regulatory role and keep things straight in terms of taxes? Sometimes keeping away is also good. The transactions by Uber Eats, Swiggy, and Zomato is \$1.1 billion by 2019 which is only growing, and this has happened organically.” According to digital technology expert Jiten Jain, India is no longer just an outsourcing hub but is creating innovative startups in AI and data analytics. He said, “The government knows data is the new oil of the world, so we need to use it to our benefit and not just give it away. We have 60 crore [600 million] smart phone users today and even the rules for startups are easier, which is great for not just urban but rural users as well.” He pointed out, however, that digital security is being overlooked and financial crimes must be dealt with in a stern manner. Senior journalist Surojit Gupta felt the agriculture and financial sectors have benefitted from the digitization push. Gupta said, “We do need a strong security framework for financial transactions, however we don’t need overload of rules and regulations as innovation prospers only in free spaces.”

#### **1. Teen Opens Fire at Jamia: Consequence of Hate Speech? (“Left, Right and**

**Center,” NDTV ): Nidhi Razdan took up the shooting near Jamia Islamia University**

yesterday, in which a young man opened fire during an anti-CAA protest. She said, “Two senior BJP leaders have been banned by the Election Commission for hate speeches and are these incidents of violence a direct consequence of those?” According to eyewitness Wasim Ahsan, “The police were slow to react even though the man was shouting abuses and disrespectful remarks.” BJP supporter Vineet Goenka said he condemned the incident, however traitors have to be dealt with with a stern hand. Former Election Commissioner SY Quraishi felt even a two-day ban is a good punishment. He said, “The speech by Anurag Thakur where he told the public to shoot has resulted in this action by this Bhakt, so he must be very happy.” AAP Spokesperson Jasmine Shah said, “The BJP is scared of the Delhi polls and they are inciting violence.

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## **NON-ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS COMMENTARY**

### **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PLAN**

“THE WORST DEAL OF THE CENTURY,” editorial in January 31 Urdu daily MUNSIF: “President Trump’s Middle East peace plan proposing to legitimize Israel’s unlawful occupation of Palestine territory and its illegal settlements in the West Bank is a dangerous conspiracy against the people of Palestine. Trump stating that his proposals could be the last opportunity for Palestinians is in fact an open warning to them to accept this plan otherwise Israel will continue its aggressive operations against them. In view of Trump’s hostile thoughts and actions toward the Middle East, the Islamic world needs to unite together putting aside their differences.”

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UNCLASSIFIED

---

**MRN:** 20 NEW DELHI 250  
**Date/DTG:** Jan 31, 2020 / 311129Z JAN 20  
**From:** AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
**Action:** WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*  
**E.O.:** 13526  
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**Not for Distribution outside the USG**  
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Drafted: (b)(6)

Approved: (b)(6)

**MINIMIZE CONSIDERED**

**Signature:** JUSTER

**Drafted By:** NEW DELHI (b)(6)

**Cleared By:** PD (b)(6)

**Approved By:** PD (b)(6)

**Released By:** NEW DELHI:Mahipal, X

**Info:** COLOMBO, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; CHENNAI, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; DHAKA, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; KOLKATA, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; HYDERABAD, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; MUMBAI, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; KARACHI, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; ISLAMABAD, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; KATHMANDU, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; LONDON, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; USUN NEW YORK, USMISSION ROUTINE; SECDEF WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; COMSEVENTHFLT NOC ROUTINE; HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL ROUTINE; USDOC WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE

**Dissemination Rule:** Archive Copy

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**From:** "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: AA 2020 12 30 - updated with family edits  
**Date:** Mon, 4 Jan 2021 17:59:18 -0500 (b)(5)  
 (b)(7)(E)

(b)(5)

**Official**

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from ~~SECRET~~ attachment(s)  
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
 Declassify On: 1/4/2031  
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** Feith, David  
**Sent:** Monday, January 4, 2021 2:18 PM  
**To:** Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: (b)(7)(E) AA 2020 12 30 - updated with family edits

Fysa. (b)(5) Look fine. (b)(5)

**Official**

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from ~~SECRET~~ attachment(s)  
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
 Declassify On: 1/4/2031  
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, January 4, 2021 2:11 PM  
**To:** SES\_FO Paper <SES\_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>  
**Cc:** Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** (b)(7)(E) AA 2020 12 30 - updated with family edits (b)(5)

Colleagues,

Pls see the attached updated AA for the (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

Stephanie

*Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath*  
*Deputy Executive Secretary*  
*U.S. Department of State*

(b)(6)

**Official**

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from ~~**SECRET**~~ attachment(s)

Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 1/4/2031

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**Sender:** "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(1); (b)(7)(E)  
**(SBU) The Secretary's Secure Call with the  
Foreign Ministers on New Intelligence on COVID Origins  
Monday, January 04, 2020, 4:00 p.m., 60 minutes**

**PURPOSE**

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

**KEY OBJECTIVES**

I. ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
• (b)(1); (b)(5)



- (b)(1); (b)(5)
- 

• ~~(S//REL~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)

- (b)(1); (b)(5)
- 

• ~~(S//REL~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)

- (b)(1); (b)(5)
- 
- 

• ~~(S//REL~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
 (b)(1); (b)(5)

II. ~~(S//REL~~ (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E)

(b)(1); (b)(7)(E)

(b)(5)

• ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

• ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

• ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

• ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

• ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

• ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

**IF RAISED**

I. (U) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (U) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (U) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

Approved: EAP – Acting A/S Atul Keshap []

Drafted: EAP/FO – David Feith, ext. (b)(6)

Cleared: EAP/FO: Jonathan Fritz ()  
D: (b)(6)  
P: (b)(6) ()  
S/P: (b)(6) ()  
WHA (b)(6) ()  
EUR: (b)(6) ()

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Package 202004950 Product on Virology Labs has been forwarded on to S -- From INR Everest  
**Date:** Thu, 7 May 2020 15:49:05 -0400

Here you go.

I don't know if I'm supposed to distribute, so please don't forward. At least not with my name on it!

Sensitive  
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

---

**From:** INR Special Assistants  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 05, 2020 6:18 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Package 202004950 Product on Virology Labs has been forwarded on to S -- From INR Everest

(b)(6)

Please see attached. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

**Official - SBU**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 05, 2020 5:57 PM  
**To:** INR Special Assistants (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Package 202004950 Product on Virology Labs has been forwarded on to S -- From INR Everest

(b)(5) Thanks!

~~Sensitive~~

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

**From:** INR Special Assistants

**Sent:** Tuesday, May 05, 2020 5:52 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** INR Special Assistants; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Package 202004950 Product on Virology Labs has been forwarded on to S -- From INR Everest

Sharing per DAS request.

**From:** EverestMail@state.sgov.gov [mailto:EverestMail@state.sgov.gov]

**Sent:** Friday, May 01, 2020 6:55 PM

**To:** Everest\_SP

**Cc:** Everest\_C; TTL-CGRUCU; Everest\_EAP; Everest\_GPA; Everest\_INR; Everest\_P; SES\_FrontOfficeOnly; SES-Line\_Only; Everest\_SP; SES\_FrontOfficeOnly; PF-EverestE-Mail@state.sgov.gov

**Subject:** Package 202004950 Product on Virology Labs has been forwarded on to S

Package 202004950 Product on Virology Labs has been forwarded on to S on 01-May-2020 06:54:42 PM.

**FOR:** S

**ORGANIZATION:** S/P

**CO-DRAFTER BUREAU:**

**PACKAGE SUBJECT:** Product on Virology Labs

**DOCTYPE:** Miscellaneous

**LINK:** [202004950 Package](#)

*Please note that the package link will expire 2 weeks after the e-mail is sent, for security reasons. If this link is expired, please use the **Advanced Search** to find the package by typing in the S/ES ID number.*

**Official - SBU**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

held pursuant to exemption

5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: EFOD//ASAP: (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) Annotated Agenda  
**Date:** Fri, 11 Jun 2021 20:00:40 -0400

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Senior Advisor, Office:T, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046  
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, January 4, 2021 11:11 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: EFOD//ASAP: (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) Annotated Agenda

Not great, but I think it's at least better. If either of you has quick suggestions, I can try to factor them in and then hit my head again. ☺

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Senior Advisor, Office:T, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046  
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

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**From:** Park, Christopher J (T)  
**Sent:** Monday, January 04, 2021 11:10 AM  
**To:** Ford, Christopher A; (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** EFOD//ASAP (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) Annotated Agenda

Attached are my (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Note that we do not officially have a copy of this document;

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CJP



**Official**

**~~SECRET~~**

Classified By: Christopher J. Park - Senior Advisor, Office:T, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 1/4/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(1); **(SBU) The Secretary's Secure Call with the  
Foreign Ministers on New Intelligence on COVID Origins  
Monday, January 04, 2020, 4:00 p.m., 60 minutes**

**PURPOSE**

(S//REL (b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

**KEY OBJECTIVES**

I. (SBU) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (S//REL (b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- (S//REL (b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- (SBU) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (S//REL (b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- (S//REL (b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)
- 

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)
- 

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)
- 
- 

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

II. ~~(SBU)~~(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- ~~(SBU)~~(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1); (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

- ~~(SBU)~~(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

**IF RAISED**

- I. (U)(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (U)(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (U) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

Approved: EAP – Acting A/S Atul Keshap []

Drafted: EAP/FO – David Feith, (b)(6) [redacted]

Cleared: EAP/FO: Jonathan Fritz ()  
D: (b)(6) [redacted]  
P: (b)(6) [redacted]  
S/P: (b)(6) [redacted]  
WHA (b)(6) [redacted]  
EUR: Philip Reeker or Michael Murphy ()

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**To:** Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2  
**Date:** Mon, 28 Jun 2021 17:52:18 -0400

Nerissa – just FYI, we provided (b)(5)

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** Park, Christopher J

**Sent:** Monday, June 28, 2021 4:55 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Subject:** RE: clearance request by COB today: COVID informal response 2

(b)(6) – see attached for (b)(5) happy to discuss if they give rise to concern. They've been OK'd by SBO Ann Ganzer and acting T Eliot Kang.

I recommend running pas (b)(5) though.

Chris

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;






Withheld pursuant to exemption

(X1); (b)(5)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
DELIBERATIVE

(b)(1); (b)(5)



Regards,

Kin Moy, EAP Senior Bureau Official  
Ann Ganzer, ISN Senior Bureau Official

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
DELIBERATIVE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
DELIBERATIVE

Approved: EAP/SBO Kin Moy  
ISN/SBO Ann Ganzer

Drafted: EAP/CM: (b)(6)

Cleared: EAP/FO: JFritz  
EAP/CM: (b)(6)  
T: HRobbms  
D: TATran  
P: SJannat  
S/P: (b)(6)  
ISN/BPS: CPark  
ISN/BPS: (b)(6)  
S/CRHS:  
IO/EDA:  
L/OES:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
DELIBERATIVE

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)  
**Date:** Thu, 3 Jun 2021 09:11:35 -0400

(b)(1)

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office: ISN/BPS, Agency: U.S. Department of State  
 Declassify On: 12/15/2045

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 15, 2020 4:33 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)

~~(SBU)~~ Hi Folks (b)(1)  
 (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)  
 (b)(1)

- ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1); (b)(5)  
 (b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1); (b)(5)  
 (b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~(b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:ISN/BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
Declassify On: 12/15/2045  
Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 12:54 PM

To: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: (S//NF) (b)(1)

A suggestion for how we frame the downside risk.

(b)(6)  
U.S. State Department, ISN/MBC  
Tel: (b)(6)  
Red Switch: (b)(6)  
E-mail (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - FAO, Office:ISN/MBC, Agency:U.S. Department of State  
Declassify On: 12/7/2045  
Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 12:00 PM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (S//NF) (b)(1)

(SBU) Hi Chris, BPS, (h)(6) Please see a draft summary of the meeting with AVC on Wednesday (12/2) below. Chris, please edit/adjust as needed. Something is amiss with my ClassNet email, so if you already responded to the related message shared by (b)(6) on Friday, I will have missed it. Hence, resending now. (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(6)  
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(6)

~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5); (b)(6)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

- (SBU) (b)(5)  
(b)(5); (b)(6)

(b)(5)

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/7/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**To:** IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**CC:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: (Read-Aheads, part I) SubIPC on China and Health Security | Wednesday, August 11, 8:30 AM  
**Date:** Tue, 10 Aug 2021 11:50:13 -0400

(b)(5)

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) ESTH Officer, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/10/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 10, 2021 11:37 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: (Read-Aheads, part I) SubIPC on China and Health Security | Wednesday, August 11, 8:30 AM

In case anyone else didn't receive the read-aheads for tomorrow morning's subIPC on China/health security.

**Official - Sensitive**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - ESTH Officer, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/10/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**From:** Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6) >  
**Sent:** Monday, August 9, 2021 6:55 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: (Read-Aheads, part I) SubIPC on China and Health Security | Wednesday, August 11, 8:30 AM



Classification: ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

Classified By: Megan Frisk, Director, NSC Global Health Security & Biodefense

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20461231

Just in case this didn't get to you.

From: Frisk, Megan L.

Sent: Thursday, August 5, 2021 6:36 PM

To: Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz, Jonathan D'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Park, Christopher J'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E.

(b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (Beijing)' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) USARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(b)(6) USARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'

(h)(6) Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) 'Fritz,

Jonathan D' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'Park, Christopher J' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'EAP-

CM-ECON-DL' <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'ISN-BPS-DL' <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; 'BEP'

<BEP@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; 'IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL' <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(h)(6) 'USUN Rome)' (h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) 'USUN Rome)'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; Schmoyer, Michael W.

(b)(6) (b)(6) 'USUN Rome)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (h)(6)

(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(h)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (h)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov'

(b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @fbi.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

'cdcmedintel@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @dni.sgov.gov'

(h)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov'

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (h)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov'

(b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov; (h)(6)

(h)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' <(b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov'

(b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @hq.doe.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) #NSC-HealthSecBio (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6) #NSC-INTEL (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) #NSC-TechNatSec (b)(6) #NSC-ArmsControl  
 (b)(6) #NSC-China (b)(6) #NSC-DevGlobalHealth  
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov'  
 (b)(6) @nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov;  
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Donovan, Cole  
 (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

**Subject:** (Read-Aheads, part I) SubIPC on China and Health Security | Wednesday, August 11, 8:30 AM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Dear colleagues,

Attached are the (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)  
 (b)(5) We look forward to final edits to this document by next Friday 8/13.

(b)(5)

All the best,  
 Megan

**Megan L. Frisk, PhD**  
 Global Health Security and Biodefense  
 National Security Council The White House  
 (b)(6) (desk)  
 (b)(6) (secure)  
 (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J.(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
BEP <BEP@state.sgov.gov>;  
**CC:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
OES-IHB-DL <OES-IHB-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by  
OOB WED MAY 12  
**Date:** Tue, 11 May 2021 17:34:30 -0400

(b)(6) on China desk

Thanks Chris!

(b)(6)

I'll be in before OOB tomorrow and will be available if you have any questions about ISN's input before this goes back to Megan. Since ISN remains in a limited onsite posture, it would be good to flag for Megan to be generous in including SIPR emails/distros to ensure we're all tracking these action requests. For our part, including the BPS and BEP distros on the cc line is the best place to start.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

--

(b)(6)  
Deputy Team Chief  
BEP, Iraq, CMET  
U.S. Department of State, ISN/CTR  
SIPR (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
JWICS (b)(6)@state.ic.gov  
NIPR (b)(6)@state.gov  
Office: (b)(6)  
Secure: (b)(6)

~~Official -SBU-~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2021 5:28 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
**Cc:** BEP <BEP@state.sgov.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>; OES-IHB-DL <OES-IHB-DL@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
**Subject:** FW: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

(b)(6) - very sorry for the delay. Please see the attached from ISN.

I don't know whether the IPC date has been announced yet or not, but Megan Frisk says it will be Monday.

Chris

**Official - SBU**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2021 2:57 PM  
**To:** Park, Christopher (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

BPS colleagues,

I was a little late in getting to this, but please see attached for my edits, and the additional (b)(5) (b)(5) I use the full 100 words in the rationale, but please edit at will to make sure that section represents all ISN equities.

I'm happy to transmit the consolidate ISN version to (b)(6) but am also happy for you to do it. Just let me know! I'm around all afternoon, and you can reach me at the office line below if you want to chat.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

--

(b)(6)  
Deputy Team Chief  
BEP, Iraq, CMET  
U.S. Department of State, ISN/CTR  
SIPR: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov  
NIPR: (b)(6)@state.gov  
Office: (b)(6)  
Secure: (b)(6)

**Official - SBU**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**From:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2021 11:05 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Subject:** FW: China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

Here's what Megan sent out last Friday

**Official**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**From:** Frisk, Megan L. (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 7, 2021 6:06 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; TTL-USAID <TTL-USAID@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov'  
 (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov>; Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)@dhs.sgov.gov (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@hq.doe.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov'  
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov'  
 (b)(6); (b)(6)@fbi.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) TR  
 OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD  
 POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Park, Christopher J  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@dni.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Miles, Aaron R.  
 (b)(6); Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6) (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)  
 (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Schmoyer, Michael W.  
 (b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; TTL-USAID <TTL-USAID@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov'  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>(b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;(b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Margolis,  
 Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)  
 (b)@dhs.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov' (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov'  
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@fbi.sgov.gov' (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)'  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Park, Christopher J  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@dni.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Miles, Aaron R.  
 (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6)@ostp.eop.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>(b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) Beijing (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) JSARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6) USARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) >; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; TTL-USAID <TTL-USAID@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) @fbi.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) TR OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @dni.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6) @postp.eop.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) Beijing (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Schmoyer, Michael W. (b)(6) >; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; TTL-USAID <TTL-USAID@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) @nsd.usdoj.sgov.gov' (b)(6) ; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) @fbi.sgov.gov' (b)(6) ; (b)(6) CIV OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dni.sgov.gov' (b)(6) Miles, Aaron R. (b)(6) Waterman, Paige E. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) Beijing (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @dhs.sgov.gov' (b)(6) (b)(6) JSARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA) (b)(6) JSARMY OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)' (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6); #NSC-HealthSecBio (b)(6); #NSC-LEGAL (b)(6); #NSC-TechNatSec (b)(6); #NSC-China (b)(6); #NSC-INTEL (b)(6); #NSC-DevGlobalHealth (b)(6); #NSC-INTEL (b)(6); #NSC-DevGlobalHealth (b)(6)

**Subject:** China/Health Security - Engagement Strategy Documents for final review by OOB WED MAY 12

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Dear China/Health Security subIPC,

Please find attached the consolidated comments on the **Engagement Strategy** and **Tab 1 – proposed engagements**. There are Tracked and Clean versions. We appreciated your many thoughtful edits and comments as we build out this strategy.

In lieu of a meeting, we ask that you please finalize Department and Agency feedback on the CLEAN documents by **OOB Wednesday, May 12**. This timeline is firm, as we will send the final out to D/As for discussion prep for the IPC, to be scheduled the week of the 17th.

Thank you for your continued work on this strategy.

All the best,  
Megan & Ivan

**Megan L. Frisk, PhD**  
Global Health Security and Biodefense  
National Security Council, The White House

(b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**Recipient:** BEP <BEP@state.sgov.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
OES-IHB-DL <OES-IHB-DL@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

**Tab 1- Specific Proposed Engagements with the PRC on Public Health and Health Security**

(b)(5)

A large rectangular redaction box covers the majority of the page content. The box is outlined in black and contains the text "(b)(5)" in the top-left corner. The rest of the page is blank white space within the redacted area.

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**(U) Technical Engagement Roadmap on Health and Biosecurity with the People's Republic of China**

(b)(5)



Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

**From:** "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
 Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Hale, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**CC:** Feith, David <(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>  
**Subject:** ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement  
**Date:** Mon, 4 Jan 2021 14:15:56 -0500

Colleagues,

The attached statement relates to (b)(5) which S approved last week. S staff has asked for your review as soon as possible.

This S statement will be released (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(E) (b)(5)

V/R

Dave

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

**Sender:** "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>  
 Biegun, Stephen E (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Hale, David (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Ford, Christopher A (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
**Recipient:** Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Feith, David (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
 EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

**From:** \*(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

**Subject:** <S//NF>(b)(1)

**Date:** Mon, 7 Dec 2020 12:00:16 -0500

(SBU) Hi Chris, BPS, (b)(6) – Please see a draft summary of the meeting with AVC on Wednesday (12/2) below. Chris, please edit/adjust as needed. Something is amiss with my ClassNet email, so if you already responded to the related message shared by Scott on Friday, I will have missed it. Hence, resending now. (b)(6)

<S//NF>(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(6)

(SBU) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Ford, Park, and (b)(6) posed questions, made corrections, and provided additional context when possible, but it was not possible to correct every half-truth or misleading claim. Ford encouraged (b)(6) *et al.* to develop further their ideas and analytical framework related to COVID19 origins, (b)(5)

(b)(5) and potentially useful synergistic programming areas. Highlights from the briefing included:

- <S//NF> (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

- <S//NF> (b)(1); (b)(5)  
(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - Foreign Affairs Officer, Office:BPS, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/7/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.sgov.gov>;

**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>



**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

**Date:** Tue, 28 Apr 2020 13:23:55 +0000

(b)(6) has shared a OneDrive for Business file with you. To view it, click the link below.

- USG-China zoonotic disease interactions.docx

(b)(5)

.

.

[USG-China zoonotic disease interactions.docx](#)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | AAAS S&T Policy Fellow  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State  
Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 9:04 AM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Sounds like cutting off your nose to spite your face, but I'd be interested in any comments you might have.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 8:58 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-

Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-  
 RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

one additional timely article.

<https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/27/trump-cuts-research-bat-human-virus-china-213076>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 4:10 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-  
 Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-  
 RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Here are some reports that NIH has funded some work at WIV.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 4:08 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-  
 BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Many thanks everyone!

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:56 PM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East  
 Asia Team-DL; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

We did not built it, but co-ags have supported further BSL4 technical collaborations - (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)


France did collaborate with China to build the BSL4 lab.

(b)(6)

Health Outreach Officer | Office of International Health and Biodefense  
U.S. Department of State  
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

(b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6) am teleworking full time – Best number to reach me



Kenya Trusant Group - Contractor

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:44 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Yes. Assuming that Post's information was correct, and that they were not referring specifically

(b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:40 PM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

It's accurate per 18 Wuhan 38 ("it is entirely China-funded").

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park,  
Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov  
Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

I suppose the caveat (b)(5) won't fly?

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 3:36 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park,

Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

PA wants to go with:

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Is this ok?

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 3:20 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (T); (b)(6) Pandemic-Response-OES; Park, Christopher J

Cc: OES-PA-DG

Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Thanks all! (b)(5)

(b)(5) Thank you.

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: Park, Christopher J (T)

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 3:17 PM

To: (b)(6) Pandemic-Response-OES; Park, Christopher J

Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Damn, I'm good.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 3:16 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park,

Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

The PREDICT fact sheet from a couple of years ago does say explicitly that it was working with WIV (this is from 2014). (b)(1) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:46 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-

Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(6) one other thought, given that the question seems to be about whether we helped to fund the establishment of the lab:

To the best of my knowledge, the BSL-4 was purely a French-Chinese product (I think it followed some unsuccessful efforts by the Chinese to do it solo). (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Unfortunately,

(b)(6) retired and the program was dismantled, so I don't know who might know the answer. Maybe (b)(6)

The only other potential funding link I can think of is research-related: NIH has funded a good bit of coronavirus research by Denison and Beric, and for some of that, they collaborated with a scientist at WIV.

□



From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:35 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-

Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Note that cable also highlighted (b)(5)

(b)(5) Not just the track II.

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:32 PM

To: [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov> [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Yeah -- hadn't thought of that. The UT Galveston cooperation was probably done as part of the track II engagement orchestrated by the Johns Hopkins Center. 'I believe that it's currently supported by Open Philanthropy, [redacted] (b)(5)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 2:26 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Park, Christopher J (T) [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(SBU). [redacted] (b)(5)  
 [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:58 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

+ Chris Park and [redacted] (b)(6) as they may have relevant knowledge

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:55 PM  
**To:** Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hi, do we have any info on whether [redacted] (b)(5)

Please see below.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:25 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6) EAP-CM-ECON-DL; OES-PA-DG  
**Cc:** EAP-Press  
**Subject:** Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

See below

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

EAP Press

(b)(6) (m)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:17 PM

**To:** EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

**Cc:** F-Press <F-Press@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

EAP,

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

**From:** Joseph Harriss (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 11:42 AM

**To:** PA Press Duty <PAPressDuty@state.gov>

**Subject:** Wuhan Institute of Virology

To State Department Press Service:

As the Paris correspondent of *The American Spectator*, published in Washington, I am researching an article on the Wuhan Institute of Virology. According to Wikipedia, the establishment of the laboratory was funded partially by the U.S. government. Can you please confirm that? And if so, can you please give me the amount of funding involved?

Thank you for any assistance you can provide in this matter.

Sincerely,

Joseph Harriss, Paris

--

**Books**--<http://b.link/harriss71>

**Spectator**--<https://spectator.org/author/josephaharriss/>

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**CC:** (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: WIV - urgent TPs for Gayle  
**Date:** Tue, 11 May 2021 18:40:10 +0000

Bio sections pulled from the ISN Nominee Q&A Book (freshly cleared last week).

v/r,

(b)(6)

-----  
 (b)(6)  
*Congressional Affairs Officer*  
 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
 U.S. Department of State  
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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2021 2:36 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: WIV - urgent TPs for Gayle

(b)(6) - we can get you material on WIV/origins questions that was cleared over the last two or three weeks for the T and ISN nominee hearings. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(6) (b)(5)

(h)(5)

Chris

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2021 1:29 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** WIV - urgent TPs for Gayle

Any chance we can pull the TPs on WIV funding / origins etc?

Gayle doing a SFRC hearing tomorrow, want to make sure we have whatever we the latest points on this.

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff

Office of the Coordinator for Global COVID Response and Health Security

Department of State

m: (h)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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**From:** (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)  
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**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Why researchers reject a genetic engineered evolution of COVID19—but can't seem to identify a natural evolution path  
**Date:** Mon, 9 Nov 2020 20:05:27 +0000

Bio-Chernobyl versus Bio-Pearl Harbor ... good sound-bite!

(b)(6) PhD

Research Director for Nuclear Programs  
National Strategic Research Institute

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@gmail.com>

**Sent:** Monday, November 9, 2020 11:59 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@hudson.org>

**Cc:** (b)(6) Thomas G DiNanno (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Miles Yu (b)(6)@state.gov>; David Feith (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Why researchers reject a genetic engineered evolution of COVID19—but can't seem to identify a natural evolution path

I have yet to find a document pointing to a spillover source "in the wild". Were there a credible document I would think it would be huge news around the globe.

If there truly is a zoonotic source, after almost a year, one would think the PRC would be able and keen to identify it, if only to:

- Back up their story
- Reduce their culpability
- Help prevent future outbreaks

Questions for our virologists:

- If there is a zoonotic source, wouldn't the virus from the earliest patients with COVID-19 be expected to be able to survive and multiply within at least one species of potential spillover host?
- Has this been tested?

On Mon, Nov 9, 2020 at 9:35 AM (b)(6)@hudson.org> wrote:

(b)(6) Have you found a single paper describing a likely and plausible natural evolutionary pathway? See below for some prominent analyses

(b)(6) Miles, I propose we ask AIT to schedule a discussion with (b)(6) and other leading Academia Sinica experts later this week to get the latest on their research and analysis.

We know from the work being done in 2016 with UNC and the WIV that there was significant gain of function and reverse generation work being done together. Could that alone have plausibly evolved in live animals into SARS COVID 19?

What I don't find acceptable is the trite rejection of at least a partial synthetic bio pathway when scientists have no other good explanation. Syn bio and gain of function can be done simply to test potential adverse disease vectors that could potentially evolve. Such a vector quite plausibly could be released. That would make it an "unintentional weapon." I.E. the Chernobyl of bio-disasters.

(b)(6)

<https://www.nature.com/articles/s41564-020-0771-4>

<https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2020/11/03/2021133117>

<https://medicalrepublic.com.au/how-we-know-covid-didnt-come-from-a-lab/31440>

There's another scenario though, in which scientists took a coronavirus and put it in lab conditions that sped up its evolution. This is known as **simulated natural selection**. This would create a virus without the obvious signs of human interference.....


13 JULY 2020

How do we know COVID isn't a bioweapon?

**COVID-19**

✕

*Posted by*

RUBY PROSSER SCULLY

It's a virus that has infected more than 12 million people and caused

**more than half a million deaths worldwide.**

If you have listened to US President Donald Trump and several of his colleagues, the leader of Iran, and official sources in China at various points, this threat came not from nature but was intentional.

The conspiracy theory that SARS-CoV-2 actually came from a laboratory has gained traction in recent months, with many accounts blaming the pandemic on a leak (or malicious release) from the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China near where the virus was first detected.

Whether the politicians themselves believe this conspiracy, or it is simply a political ploy, the sticking power has prompted many in the

scientific community to try to debunk such claims.

But what makes the scientists so certain?

When gene-editing technology is progressing at such a rapid rate, and there are still major questions around the origin of the virus, how can we really know that we aren't victims of a bioterrorist attack?

We'll probably never be 100% certain, says virologist Dr Megan Steain, lecturer in infectious diseases & immunology at the University of Sydney. "But I'd say we're pretty confident – 95-to-98% confident – that this is naturally occurring," she says.

This is because the genome has been sequenced by many labs around the world and pored over by scientists.

Like archaeologists looking at fossils for clues about a creature's evolution, virologists analyse the genetic code for signs of human interference. They have compared the sequence to those from other similar viruses to find out what it's most closely related to. This is used to create what's called a phylogenetic tree, which looks just like an ancestry tree, to show us the virus's closest relatives.

So far, the closest relative scientists have found to SARS-CoV-2 is one found in horseshoe bats known as Bat CoV RaTG13. Importantly, the major difference in the coronavirus affecting humans, and the part that makes it so effective at infecting humans, is its spike protein.

Dr Christian Stevens, at the Mount Sinai university in the US, explained in his blog why the receptor binding domain on the spike protein made it such a threat.

Firstly, it has tweaks that make it far better at binding to ACE2 receptors on our cells than other coronaviruses, such as the first SARS virus. It is also able to work on a range of cells and tissues in our bodies.

And lastly, it can be coated in sugar molecules, known as a glycan shield, which appears to help it hide from our body's immune systems, he says.

Conspiracy theorists believe that this perfect set of tools must be the result of human engineering.

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However, creating this virus in a lab and knowing that it could be a pandemic-inducing pathogen seems to be more in the realms of science fiction than present-day science.

If you were a scientist designing such a virus, the first thing you would need is an existing template, explains Dr Steain. “You don’t just assemble it from nothing in the lab.”

We would expect engineers to choose a virus that already causes disease, such as the first SARS-coronavirus, as the backbone for the new virus, she says.

“And if you were to do that, you can’t make sweeping changes across the whole genome,

you would generally just mutate in specific regions as you go.”

The end result would be something that looks a lot like the virus backbone that you started with, but has particular mutations in a particular region.

“Whereas when we look at the genome to this virus, it doesn’t look like it’s come from any of those existing backbones,” Dr Steain says.

Instead, the virus with the most genetic similarities, RaTG13, is unlikely to be able to efficiently infect human cells. This would make it an unlikely candidate to base your weapon on if you were a scientist aiming to make a deadly and very infectious virus.

Others have jumped on a preprint that claimed to have found HIV-like insertions on the coronavirus genome, suggesting the virus

may have been engineered in a lab. The authors wound up retracting the paper when they realised that these insertions were much more similar to mammals, insects, bacteria and other viruses, than HIV-1.

There's another scenario though, in which scientists took a coronavirus and put it in lab conditions that sped up its evolution. This is known as simulated natural selection.

This would create a virus without the obvious signs of human interference.

However, Dr Steain thinks this, too, is improbable.

For starters, the sugar molecules that help the virus avoid detection by antibodies only evolve when a virus is trying to hide from an immune system.

“When you’re culturing the virus in the lab in cells, there’s no immune system pressure there,” says Dr Steain. “So there’s no reason that the virus would evolve over time to gain that mutation.”

And the features that make this virus so good at infecting humans are things that scientists wouldn’t at all predict, either.

Computer models can help predict how mutations could affect the function of the virus. However, they aren’t accurate and it would be difficult to predict what mutation worked best in reality.

In particular, models suggest the spike protein on SARS-CoV-2 wouldn’t actually bind that well to the ACE2 receptor, giving scientists no reason to engineer a bioweapon with it. “By mutating something you might

gain a function, but you might lose another function at the same time,” Dr Steain says. Moreover, the virus doesn’t appear to have the telltale signs you would expect if it was created through rapid evolution in a lab. Each time a virus replicates, random errors are introduced. Some of these mutations will actually change how the virus functions, and others won’t do anything.

Mutations that don’t change anything should occur pretty consistently, because they have no effect on the virus’s survival. Mutations that do change the virus’s function, on the other hand, will happen more or less commonly depending on how well they suit the environment the virus lives in.

As Dr Stevens explains in his blog, if the virus was being forced to rapidly evolve in a

laboratory, you would expect to see plenty of changes that affect the virus's function in at least some part of the virus' genome.

However, an analysis by virologist Associate Professor Trevor Bedford, at the US Fred Hutch research centre, indicates the ratio of mutations found in this novel coronavirus is about the same as you would expect from a virus that arose out of natural selection, not accelerated evolution like that found in a lab. So the steps that the bioengineers would have needed to follow in order intentionally to create this virus would have been illogical from a virologist's perspective.

"Nobody in the world could have predicted that the changes that had occurred naturally would have caused this virus to be so pathogenic," says Professor Andreas

Suhrbier, head of the Inflammation Biology Laboratory at the QIMR Berghofer Medical Research Institute.

It takes scientists many years to understand what effect certain genetic changes have on the way the virus functions in the community, so there was no rational basis for choosing a bat virus or choosing to re-engineer the spike protein.

“If you’re trying to make a biological weapon, why would you re-engineer a harmless virus?” Professor Suhrbier asks.

Instead, malicious actors have a host of known pathogenic viruses and bacteria that they could, and in the past have, modified to turn them into effective warfare agents.

Ultimately, we still don’t know the exact origins of SARS-CoV-2. This means that



questions may remain until a smoking gun is found.

Some believe that this will be finding a wild animal infected with a virus that looks extremely similar to this virus, probably in the region close to the first outbreak.

But with most resources currently diverted to combating the spread of the virus, and treating its victims, we may be waiting for some years.

*This article was originally published under the headline ‘How we know COVID didn’t come from a lab’.*

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PMID: [32840850](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32840850/)

In the Shadow of Biological Warfare: Conspiracy Theories on the Origins of COVID-19 and Enhancing Global Governance of Biosafety as a Matter of Urgency



Jing-Bao Nie

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The devastating consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for individuals, families, communities, countries, and the world as a whole offers vivid proof that microbes could be just as destructive and terrifying—if not more so—than the use of nuclear weapons. And it is much less difficult to forge biological weapons than nuclear ones. As a result, driven by their hunger for power and dominion, states and terrorist groups may feel increasingly tempted to access and exercise such super-biological means of destruction. Furthermore, the safety of the

scientific laboratories where the most dangerous pathogens are researched (and sometimes created) has long been a sword of Damocles hanging over humankind.

Through examining two popular conspiracy theories on the origins of COVID-19 and the historical background of biological warfare (BW) during the mid-twentieth century, this article will demonstrate the urgency of a much higher level of global governance of biosafety and biosecurity. Moreover, the key elements of an ethical framework for such a governance will be outlined.

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### Conspiracy Theory Version 1: A P4 Lab in Wuhan

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In recent years, China has been investing heavily in strategically important sectors in science, technology, and biomedicine. A plan exists to establish half a dozen labs of the highest level of biocontainment, biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) or P4 (pathogen or protection level 4), in several cities. As a fruit of international cooperation primarily with France, the first BSL-4 lab was built at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) of the Chinese Academy of Science in 2017. When it became fully operational in 2018, authorities and scientists enthusiastically celebrated the lab as another landmark in science achieved by China, that is, in the typical spirit of patriotism or nationalism (Xinhua News 2018).

However, overseas experts were raising questions about the safety and even the necessity of such labs. Their concerns included the possible leakage of pathogens as well as the potential development of biological weapons (Cyranoski 2017). In 2018, U.S. intelligence also warned about the safety risks of the lab (Rogin 2020).

A few days after the lockdown of Wuhan in late January 2020, a U.S. newspaper prone to circulating conspiracy theories linked the origins of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2, then called 2019-nCoV) to China's covert biological weapons programme, citing an Israeli biological warfare expert (Gertz 2020). More sensationally, scientists from the Indian Institute of Technology published a preprint scientific paper where they reported their findings on four unique inserts of key structural proteins of HIV-1 in 2019-nCoV, a result which was "unlikely to be fortuitous in nature" (Pradhan et al. 2020). In other words, the novel coronavirus had been genetically engineered. Soon afterwards, the researchers withdrew their paper, citing a need for "re-analysing of the data."

Many Chinese also suspected a connection between the virus and the WIV. As a response, Shi Zhengli, an internationally known virologist at the WIV who discovered that the SARS virus originated in bats, posted in the Twitter-like Chinese social media platform Weibo—a post which was reported in many media outlets:

The 2019-nCov is nature's punishment on the human race for uncivilized behaviour [i.e., eating wild animals]. I swear on my own life that the virus has no connection with the laboratory. To those people who believe in and are spreading the rumours perpetrated by third-rate media outlets, as well as believing in the unreliable "academic analysis" of Indian scholars, I would like to give this advice: Shut your dirty mouths!

Not surprisingly, this response has hardly helped to scotch the conspiracy theory, however understandable Shi's indignation may have been. Scientific truth can never be guaranteed by swearing on one's own or anyone else's life but must be grounded on objective evidence. Asking people to "shut their mouths" can only be counterproductive when it comes to convincing them with sound theories and establishing trust and trustworthiness. Ideally, the final say on the issue should come from an independent party—in this case, Shi herself and the WIV itself have an obvious conflict of interest.

Mainstream scientific research and the more reputable mass media denounced the theory that the novel coronavirus had been genetically engineered or was a bioweapon (e.g., Andersen et al. 2020; Barclay 2020). Yet, the fact that the virus is not human-made does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the virus escaped the lab by accident (Field 2020; Guterl et al. 2020). This remains an open question; without independent and transparent investigations, it may never be either proven or disproven. The leakage of dangerous pathogens had already occurred more than once in other labs, as will be discussed in the fourth section of this paper.

China's official reaction has added fuel to the fires of suspicion. In mid-February, Chen Wei, a major general in the People's Liberation Army and a leading biological weapons expert at the Academy of Military Science, was appointed to take the helm at the WIV. In April, new rules were set in place for academic publications on COVID-19. In particular, studies of the origins of the novel coronavirus were to be subject to special scrutiny and official approval (Gan et al. 2020). Above all, supreme leader Xi Jinping, in order to "to strengthen areas of weakness and close the loopholes exposed by the epidemic," ordered the establishment of a law on biosecurity and the incorporation of biosecurity in the national security system (Xinhua News 2020). These remarks were taken by some commentators in the West as a tacit admission of the lab origins of SARS-CoV-2. Yet, in the Chinese context, they may also be interpreted as a way of lessening the risk of BW attacks by foreign countries.

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### Conspiracy Theory Version 2: The United States

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Immediately after the epidemic (initially called "Wuhan pneumonia") became public knowledge in late January, an unsettling theory started to circulate in China. Posts with certain variations—but containing exactly the same information and similar wording—spread like wildfire, particularly on Chinese social media WeChat. They tied the origins of the virus to the first China-hosted international military multi-sport event which involved the participation of nearly ten thousand athletes from over one hundred countries.

The original message is a masterpiece of conspiracy theory rhetoric. It is worthwhile citing it in full (in English translation):

Compatriots: In this time of the Wuhan pneumonia epidemic, please do not forget the Seventh World Military Games in Wuhan three months ago. Of course, some international athletes came from Africa, where infectious diseases frequently break out. Some athletes came from the United States, which has long attempted to carry out biological warfare against China. When [the authorities] investigated the source of the virus responsible for the 2003 SARS epidemic, many clues pointed to the United States and its biological warfare conspiracy against China.

So, doesn't this coronavirus pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan have something to do with the USA? This outbreak coincides with respect to the timeline, coincides with respect to the place, and coincides with respect to the gathering of people. And it also coincides in a major way with the China-US trade war, which is still raging fiercely. Shouldn't we put all these coincidences together to analyse, synthesize, theorize, and verify so as to reach a clear conclusion? While carrying out its trade war with China, the U.S. government took advantage of the Seventh World Military Games, where many American athletes had numerous personal interactions with Chinese, hiding the novel coronavirus in

their equipment with the aim of infecting the people of Wuhan. As the virus has an incubation period of two or three months, outbreaks on a massive scale would occur around the Spring Festival Holiday when vast numbers of people return home for the Chinese New Year.

In this way, the U.S. government plotted to utilize the novel coronavirus to carry out a devastating attack on the polity, economy, livelihoods, and people of New China so as to realize its evil goals of containing China's economy and thwarting the rise of New China. Do not forget: the United States is the best equipped country in BW materials, the country that most desires to contain China's development, and the country that pushes hardest for its own interests.

Kind-hearted people of China, what is stopping us from seeing that it is the U.S. government that has been plotting behind the scenes and is the evil perpetrator of this coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan? Why should we falsely put the blame on a wild animal market? Please repost this item immediately so that more Chinese will know the truth. (WeChat Post)

Designed for social media, this post, along with its variations, presents a masterclass in disinformation writing in a number of ways. It revives an earlier conspiracy theory on the origins of the SARS epidemic in 2003 which has been circulating in China for years and received new attention after the outbreak of "Wuhan pneumonia." The anonymous document is built on and reinforces a fundamental historical narrative which emphasizes how, since the early nineteenth century, China has been humiliated by the Western powers through their imperialist and colonizing endeavours. It appeals to a long-rooted xenophobia, growing anti-United States and anti-Western sentiments, and China's dominant ideology of patriotism or nationalism. The theory implicitly but deftly exploits the fear of BW embedded in the historical memory of China as a victim of BW in the mid-twentieth century (see the next section). Forceful in tone, the post nevertheless appears to invite recipients to think about the issue and decide for themselves. Its author(s) is a master at manipulating the minds of its target audience, Chinese people. Little wonder that not only people in China but also many overseas Chinese have accepted the theory it presents—or at least do not consider it to be totally baseless.

This message uses a single stone to kill many birds. It responds to people's need for an answer about the origins of the novel coronavirus. Implicitly, but cleverly, it addresses the serious issue of accountability. The first official explanation linked the origins of then mysterious SARS-like pneumonia to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, which was shut down in early January, three weeks before locking down the city of Wuhan. While the wet market theory still implies failures at the local level to prohibit the consumption and sale of wild animals, blaming a powerful foreign country for the origins of the pandemic effectively absolves China of all responsibility.

No available scientific or other trustworthy evidence supports the claims made by this theory. However, it is evident that the authorities have been orchestrating this flow of disinformation. As WeChat is controlled and closely monitored by the government, the wide circulation of the above post and its variations on the social media platform would never have been possible without official endorsement or promotion. In March, without offering any evidence, the chief public health expert in China's national leadership against the epidemic, Zhong Nanshan, declared that "the first occurrence of Covid-19 in Wuhan does not mean it originated in Wuhan." Reported by Xinhua News (2018), this bold claim has been frequently cited as a scientific statement in the Chinese mass media and social media, receiving only scant criticism.

The theory of the U.S. origins of the virus serves a crucial role in a large-scale propaganda campaign aiming to define and reshape the metanarratives on the role of China in the world. According to the official discourse, due to the "strong leadership" of the Party-government and the "huge sacrifice" made by Chinese people, China has achieved "great success" in containing COVID-19. Such success becomes even more remarkable when compared to the inept response of most Western countries, particularly the United States. Above all, China's success "evidently" shows the superiority and global applicability of China's authoritarian response to COVID-19 as well as the Chinese political system (China's State Council Information Office 2020).

While the conspiracy theory is mostly targeted at Chinese, official attempts were made to advance it in the international community. In one case, utilizing Twitter (which is banned in China), Zhao Lijian, spokesperson and deputy director of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated: "It might be the US army personnel which brought the epidemic to Wuhan." Such official remarks caused a crisis in China-U.S. relations (Myers 2020). A contextual factor is the Party-government's return to the Maoist totalitarian style of ruling in recent years, such as advancing the "philosophy of struggle" in foreign affairs and "wolf warrior diplomacy."

On the United States side, President Trump and members of his administration have called the virus "the China virus" on numerous occasions. The broader settings of the China-U.S. "fights" on the origins of COVID-19 lies in the rapidly deteriorating relations and even the looming "New Cold War" or "Cold War II" between the two nations, one existing superpower versus an emerging one.

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### The Historical Context: The BW Episodes during the Mid-Twentieth Century

How should bioethics respond to the conspiracy theories on the origins of COVID-19 or, more generally, the pandemic of disinformation and misinformation in the post-truth age? At least two tasks are involved: 1) to detect and address legitimate concerns—and differentiate them from groundless claims, and 2) to identify the sociopolitical and historical context in which certain conspiracy theories have thrived.

History often haunts the present in both predictable and unexpected ways. The wide spread of the two conspiracy theories presented above reflects a series of longstanding and damaging trends in the international scene which include deep mistrust, mutual animosities, the power of ideologies such as nationalism, and the sacrifice of truth in propaganda campaigns for political purposes. Identical or very similar political themes and ideological forces were manifested in the main episodes of BW in the mid-twentieth century.

China is so far the only nation whose people have suffered BW attacks. Prior to and during the Second World War, the Japanese Army established highly secret but extensive programmes of bacteriological warfare throughout China. The "secret of the secrets" in these "factories of death," such as the now-infamous Unit 731, was the barbaric experiments conducted by Japanese doctors and scientists upon thousands of living human beings, mostly Chinese nationals. In addition, biological weapons were deployed against both military and civilian targets in at least a dozen "large-scale field tests" throughout China. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died or suffered horribly from these human-made plagues (e.g. Harris 2002; Nie et al. 2009, 2010; Yang and Tam 2018).

After the Second World War, and with the (first) Cold War looming, the U.S. authorities made a secret deal with Japanese perpetrators, granting them immunity from war crimes prosecution. The purpose was to monopolize the scientific data gained through inhuman human experimentation so as to advance the United States' own BW programme (Harris 2002; Moreno 2001; Nie et al. 2010; Brody et al. 2014). While the Soviet Union tried to publicize internationally the overwhelming evidence from the Khabarovsk trial in the late 1940s, the public in the West was ignorant of Japan's BW crimes until the late 1980s or 1990s mainly because the U.S. authorities dismissed the trial as a "communist propaganda" (Nie 2004). For the sake or in the name of national interest and national security, the U.S. government trampled justice and morality underfoot and engaged in what the English common law tradition defines as "complicity after the fact." The U.S.

government has never issued a public statement on its cover-up of Japan's wartime medical atrocities, let alone a public apology (Nie 2006; Devolder 2015).

China–U.S. conflict intensified during the Korean War (1950–1953). China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union accused the United States of Nie et al. 2009, 2010 employing bacteriological weapons against both military and civilian targets in Korea and China. An International Scientific Commission (1952) led by Joseph Needham—a prominent biologist in the United Kingdom who later became arguably the most influential China scholar in the West—confirmed the allegations. The United States denied the allegations. Because the commission's work was under the control of the North Korean and Chinese governments, the United States demanded more impartial investigations. The International Red Cross and the World Health Organization offered to convene a special commission, a move which was rejected by China and North Korea as a disguised attempt at espionage. A resolution on the matter was submitted to the United Nations by the United States and fifteen other countries but was blocked by the Soviet Union (Lederberg 1999).

The world may never know the truth about the issue of BW in the Korean War. Historians are still heatedly debating the subject. On one side of the debate, through examining declassified U.S., Canadian, and British documents, as well as materials in the Chinese Central Archives, Canadian scholars have presented strong evidence in support of the allegations (Endicott and Hagerman 1998). On the other side, research based on recently obtained memoirs of Chinese personnel involved and declassified documents from the Soviet Union has led to the conclusion that the allegations were "false, a grand piece of political theatre" (Leitenberg 2016).

Now, one wonders whether the world will never know the truth on the origins of SARS-Cov-2. It is very likely that this will be an issue for future historians to debate.

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### Enhancing Global Governance of Biosafety and Biosecurity: A Matter of Urgency

More robust global governance of biosafety and biosecurity is long overdue. Such a governance should include these three key areas: 1) a more effective ban on offensive BW programmes, 2) much improved prevention and preparation for bioterrorism, and 3) more transparent and routine surveillance of biological research labs (particularly P4 and P3 labs) in which scientists investigate the most dangerous pathogens such as the Ebola virus and the coronavirus.

In response to the horrors of the First World War, including the use of chemical weapons, the 1925 Geneva Protocol was created to ban the use of biological and chemical weapons. More significantly, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) began taking signatures in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Signed by most countries, it established an international milieu opposed to all forms of BW. However, as is widely recognized, the BWC, like many other international declarations and agreements, lacks compliance monitoring and verification mechanisms so that it is far from effective in controlling biological armament (see, e.g., Lederberg 1999; Guillemin 2005; Sims 2009).

From the mid-twentieth century, world powers including Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union as well as other countries like Canada and South Africa have formulated clandestine, state-sponsored schemes to harvest new knowledge in bacteriology and virology with the aim of devising and manufacturing biological weapons (see, e.g., Alibek and Handelman 1999; Mangold and Goldberg 1999; Harris and Paxman 2002; Miller et al. 2002; Guillemin 2005; Wheelis et al. 2006). Compared to nuclear bombs—the ultimate weapon of the twentieth century—which changed history forever, so far BW has not proved highly effective. Nevertheless, as a result of some remarkable discoveries and innovative tools in biology in recent decades, biological agents have the potential to become the ultimate weapon of the twenty-first century.

Biological weapons are "unfortunately characterized by low visibility, high potency, substantial accessibility, and relatively easy delivery" (Lederberg 1999, 9; see also Preston 2002). This can make them very tempting choices for not only states but terrorist groups or even individual terrorists. However, neither the international community nor any individual country is well prepared for bioterrorism.

Safety issues of high-level biocontainment labs have long been raised. For instance, in August 2019, the U.S. government shut down its Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick due to safety concerns. The institute has been regarded as the top BW-related research programme in the world (where the data of Japanese wartime human experimentation are stored). While no detailed information was given for the "national security" reason, the government determined that deadly germs and toxins would have "the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health or to animal or plant products" (Grady 2019, ¶8). (In China, because the shutdown occurred just a few months before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, this event has been treated as a piece of "strong evidence" for the theory on the U.S. origins of the novel coronavirus.) Almost two decades earlier, a microbiologist employed by the U.S. army institute had been a leading suspect, albeit never charged, for the anthrax mailings in 2001—bioterrorist attacks—that killed five people (ibid.).

Infections and even small-scale outbreaks associated with the escape of pathogens have already occurred in other labs as well. In China, for example, after the SARS epidemic in 2003, there was a small-scale outbreak in Anhui Province in 2004. A joint investigation by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization linked it to problems of biosafety management in a lab where the SARS virus was being researched (China Central Television 2004). Quite a few other accidents related to other biological labs have happened in other places in China in the past decades (Field 2020). While great progress in regulations and management of biosafety has been made in China in recent years (Yuan 2019), so far no evidence from independent investigation is available to assure the world that SARS-Cov-2 was totally disconnected to the relatively new PSL-4 lab in Wuhan.

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary and urgent that the international community takes coordinated actions to prevent any human-made pandemic. However there is no international organization, in the United Nations system or elsewhere, charged with overseeing biosafety and biosecurity at the global level (The Economist 2020).

Unfortunately, "Cold War II" is approaching, one between China and the United States, with willing and compelled allies on each side. Nationalist trends and other developments in global politics threaten international cooperation in the global governance of biosafety. Nevertheless, ironically, it is precisely because of these detrimental political and ideological forces that a higher form of global governance of biosafety and biosecurity is an urgent imperative.

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### An Ethical Framework for the Common Good of Humanity

Enhancing global oversight of biosafety and biosecurity needs new ethical visions. Any new structure must move beyond the sweeping ideologies like nationalism and the current practices dominated by secrecy, mistrust, and animosities. Here, an ethical framework is

proposed, a framework that underlines the triple ethical values of transparency, trust, and trustworthiness, and the common good of humanity.

Secrecy is a salient and common feature in the history of state-sponsored BW programmes since the mid-twentieth century. But, as widely recognized, transparency and openness are essential for public health and any ethical global governance. The ethical justifications for transparency include not only people's rights to know the truth but also the social utility it promotes. Furthermore, transparency nourishes and sustains trust. Transparency and openness may appear to cause distrust, especially when betrayal of trust is disclosed. But, although secrecy may result in a kind of false trust temporarily, it can seriously undermine or destroy trust in the long run.

While being a marginal topic in global bioethics, trust constitutes an essential but extremely fragile good for interpersonal relationships, social life, and global governance. The popularity of conspiracy theories on the origins of COVID-19 shows how badly lacking trust has been in the transnational settings today. Meanwhile, well-coordinated global responses to COVID-19 or the serious lack of them shows how indispensable trust is for containing the pandemic, indeed, for any global public health effort. A higher level of global governance of biosafety must be built upon trust and should aim to promote mutual trust too. Furthermore, trust can never be forced, but has to be won. The real question is thus not so much trust per se, but how to achieve trustworthiness.

In 1902, William Osler, one of the greatest physicians of modern times, delivered an address on "Chauvinism in Medicine" to the Canadian Medical Association. For Osler, chauvinism and nationalism constitutes a vicious human sin, "the great curse of humanity." He lamented that humans, physicians included, have subordinated themselves to the nation, "forgetting the higher claims of human brotherhood." Yet, he was optimistic that, due to "the liberal and friendly relationship between different nations," "the worst aspects of nationalism in medicine are disappearing." Having witnessed massive violence sanctioned by states and supported by science in the past century, we can never be as optimistic as Osler. Nevertheless, now more than ever, we need to keep upon his general universalistic moral spirit.

Long before Osler, traditional Chinese medical ethics has advocated the principle of *yi nai renshu* (medicine as the art of humanity). It offers a counter thesis to the exaltation of nationalism in medicine and science in the modern world. It is founded upon the fundamental Confucian universalist ideal of *ren* (humaneness, universal love, humanity) as well as the Confucian moral sentiment of "all people under heaven" as brothers and sisters, an ancient Eastern version of internationalism. The old Chinese designation of medicine as a means for the great Tao (Way) and as the art of humanity defines the primary goal of medicine and science not as glorifying any particular nation-state but serving the common welfare of humanity. In the age of COVID-19, to revive such an age-old Chinese ethical vision can be vital for the cause of enhancing the global oversight of biosafety and biosecurity.

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## Conclusion

Chinese wisdom advises that one should push aside groundless worries—like the foolish man from the state of Qi in the ancient fable who worried constantly about what he would do if the sky fell down (hence the saying *Qi ren youtian*—the man of Qi fears the sky falling). At the same time, this ancient wisdom tradition also encourages us to take sensible measures to prevent possible future disaster (as in the idiom *wangyang bulao*—it is not too late to mend the fold even after the sheep has been lost). While conspiracy theories on the origins of COVID-19 are scientifically groundless, the fear behind them is not. For the sake of the common good of humanity, developing a much more robust global governance of biosafety and biosecurity than exists at present is an urgent imperative for the international community.

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## Foolnotes

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These are the same conclusions and recommendations (b)(6) laid out in his briefing to Ford in early December.

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Only Americans should be allowed to do gain-of-function research!

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
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# Wait, Natural Bat-Virus Spillover to Humans 'Is Relatively Rare'?

By JIM GERAGHTY

June 7, 2021 8:01 AM





A bat ecologist measures a bat at the University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB) in Los Banos, Philippines, February 19, 2021. *(Eloisa Lopez/Reuters)*

On the menu today: A Wuhan Institute of Virology study from 2018 examined the villagers who lived closest to the coronavirus-carrying bats in Yunnan Province and concluded that natural “spillover” from bats directly to humans is “relatively rare”; a new article and book lay out how Chinese researchers inadvertently admitted they had a supply of mice with “humanized lungs” lying around before the COVID-19 pandemic started; and a think tank offers a list of options to rebuke China and prevent the next pandemic.

### **The Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2018: Natural Bat-Virus Spillover ‘Is Relatively Rare’**

In 2015, researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology traveled to southern Yunnan Province in China to get a sense of how much natural viral infection of human beings occurred among those living closest to the virus-shedding horseshoe bats in the province. The astounding part, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, is not what they found; it’s what they didn’t find.

The study, published three years later, described its methodology as “perform[ing] serological surveillance on people who live in close proximity to caves where bats that carry diverse SARSr-CoVs roost.”

Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology had been collecting samples from bats in Yanzi and Shitou caves since 2011 and determined that the caves “are inhabited by large numbers of bats including *Rhinolophus* spp., a major reservoir of SARSr-CoVs.” These caves are a four-hour drive’s distance away from the copper mineshaft in Tongguan, Mojiang, Yunnan Province, China, where six miners grew sick with COVID-19-like symptoms in April 2012. This is a study of the same species of bat, within the same province, but a considerable distance away.

The researchers noted in their study that the region was unaffected by the 2002–2003 SARS outbreak, and none of the 218 test subjects had any signs of a viral infection during testing. Out of the 218 test subjects, the sample split 63 percent female, 37 percent male, and the median age was 48. Eighty-three percent of the test subjects were farmers, 8.7 percent were students, and the rest were not identified by profession. There was good reason to think some had been in close contact with bats or other animals that could have caught a virus from a bat: “Most (81.2 percent) kept or owned livestock or pets, and the majority (97.2 percent) had a history of exposure to or contact with livestock or wild animals. Importantly, 20 (9.1 percent) participants witnessed bats flying close to their houses, and one had handled a bat corpse.”

If any population on earth was going to have a lot of antibodies in its blood, as lingering evidence of past run-ins with bat coronaviruses, these villagers were probably the best bet.

And yet, out of 218 people, the WIV researchers found just six samples that indicated past exposure to the kind of coronavirus likely to have originated in a bat. The researchers concluded that, “The 2.7 percent seropositivity for the high-risk group of residents living in close proximity to bat colonies suggests that spillover is a relatively rare event, however this depends on how long antibodies persist in people, since other individuals may have been exposed and antibodies waned. During questioning, none of the 6 seropositive subjects could recall any clinical symptoms in the past 12 months, suggesting that their bat SARSr-CoV infection either occurred before the time of sampling, or that infections were subclinical or caused only mild symptoms.”

As part of the experiment, the WIV researchers also used a control group, collecting “240 serum samples from random blood donors in 2015 in Wuhan, Hubei Province more than 1000 km away from Jinning and where inhabitants have a much lower likelihood of contact with bats due to its urban setting. . . . None of the donors had knowledge of prior SARS infection or known contact with SARS patients.” The Wuhan residents didn’t test positive for the bat coronaviruses.

(Before we go any further, note that *the Wuhan Institute of Virology itself* is declaring that residents of the city of Wuhan have a much lower likelihood of contact with bats, and that the city is well beyond the natural habitat of the horseshoe bats.)

In other words, the Wuhan Institute of Virology studied the people living closest to the kinds of bats carrying coronaviruses — and in one case, *someone who picked up a dead bat!* — and either didn’t get infected at all, or they got infected with a virus that offered minimally dangerous health effects. It’s likely these villagers had been living near and coming in contact with bats for generations — and obviously, they had no memories of themselves or their parents or grandparents experiencing anything like COVID-19.

From this, the Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers determined “spillover is a relatively rare event.” And we shouldn’t be that surprised, as viruses that develop in the

bodies of bats are optimized to infect bats, not human beings. While bats and human beings are both mammals, their lungs aren't genetically identical.

### **So, What Made SARS-CoV-2 So Different?**

In that spectacular *Vanity Fair* article by Katherine Eban, she lays out how a May 2020 Chinese research paper referring to mice who had been genetically altered to have lungs more similar to those of human beings may represent an inadvertent admission of secret research:

As the NSC tracked these disparate clues, U.S. government virologists advising them flagged one study first submitted in April 2020. Eleven of its 23 coauthors worked for the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, the Chinese army's medical research institute. Using the gene-editing technology known as CRISPR, the researchers had engineered mice with humanized lungs, then studied their susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2. As the NSC officials worked backward from the date of publication to establish a timeline for the study, it became clear that the mice had been engineered sometime in the summer of 2019, before the pandemic even started. The NSC officials were left wondering: Had the Chinese military been running viruses through humanized mouse models, to see which might be infectious to humans?

You can find that study, published in the scientific journal *Nature*, here. Two key passages:

“Specific-pathogen-free male and female wild-type ( $n = 15$ ) or hACE2 ( $n = 19$ ) mice of 6–11 months of age were inoculated intranasally with SARS-CoV-2 strain HB-01 at a dosage of  $10^6$  50% tissue culture infectious dose (TCID<sub>50</sub>) per 50  $\mu$ l inoculum volume per mouse, after the mice were intraperitoneally anaesthetized using 2.5% avertin; mock-treated hACE2 mice ( $n = 15$ ) were used as control.”

... For the mouse experiments, specific-pathogen-free, 6–11-month-old male and female hACE2 mice were obtained from the Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Peking Union Medical College. Transgenic mice were generated by microinjection of the mouse *Ace2* promoter driving the human *ACE2* coding sequence into the pronuclei of fertilized ova from ICR mice, and then human ACE2 integrated was identified by PCR as previous described; the human ACE2 mainly expressed in the lungs, heart, kidneys and intestines of transgenic mice.”

A study published in the first week of May 2020 indicates experiments conducted no later than April 2020. An eleven-month-old mouse used in a study conducted in April 2020, that had human a ACE2 coding sequence injected into the ova, meant that ova had been injected with the genetic sequences no later than May 2019 — months before anyone had ever heard of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19. So, why did Chinese research scientists engineer a supply of mice with “humanized” lungs before the pandemic broke?

As Josh Rogin writes in *Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the 21st Century*:

After consultations with experts, some U.S. officials came to believe that this Beijing lab was likely conducting coronavirus experiments on mice fitted with ACE2 receptors well before the coronavirus outbreak — research they hadn't disclosed and continued to not admit to. That, by itself, did not help to explain how SARS-CoV-2 originated. But it did make clear to U.S. officials that there was a lot of risky coronavirus experiments going on in Chinese labs that the rest of the world was simply not aware of. “This was just a peek under a curtain of an entire galaxy of activity, including labs in Beijing and Wuhan playing around with coronaviruses in

ACE2 mice in unsafe labs,” the senior administration official said. “It suggests we’re getting a peek at a body of activity that isn’t understood in the West or even has precedent here.”

The Beijing study further reinforced the suspicions of many people inside the U.S. government that the pandemic resulted in part due to the actions of humans, specifically Chinese researchers. The virus itself may not have been engineered, but the animal hosts that were being used to test it were engineered, which could explain how the virus might have evolved over a short period of time from something found in nature to something so deadly to humans that it would cause the worst pandemic in modern history.

Advocates of the zoonotic-origin theory have emphasized that the virus likely needed an intermediary species to become so thoroughly effective at infecting human beings. If Chinese labs had a supply of mice with humanized lungs, that would be the kind of intermediary species that could take a virus optimized for infecting bats and help it transform itself into a virus better suited for infecting human beings.

Remember, we haven’t found SARS-CoV-2 in any animals in nature yet. If SARS-CoV-2 is a mutation of a naturally occurring virus that was altered within the system of a mouse that had been genetically altered to have lungs more similar to human beings . . . we’re not going to find SARS-CoV-2 in any animals in nature. Because, in that scenario, the virus *only* underwent that globally consequential transformation within a laboratory mouse whose lungs were genetically engineered to function like a human being’s.

### **How to Counter China for Unleashing the Pandemic**

At the U.S. State Department, David Asher spearheaded a task force for the office of Secretary Mike Pompeo looking into the origins of COVID-19 and the role of the Chinese government in its development. Now, Asher and four of his colleagues at Hudson Institute have just published a four-step proposal on how to respond to Beijing’s consistent hostility to international cooperation and transparency:

1. **Cease funding for dangerous research:** The Biden administration should completely reinstate the Obama administration’s ban on dangerous gain-of-function research, which was never sufficiently enforced in cases involving Chinese government labs.
2. **Enforce treaty compliance:** The secretary of state should address China’s violations of the International Health Regulations, especially its failure to respond to consultations and to share data among treaty members — a **fundamental requirement. Beijing’s military programs need to be verified as complying with the peaceful purposes clause of the Biological Weapons Convention.**
3. **Sanctions:** The secretary of the treasury and the secretary of state should begin investigating formal sanctions against the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and their networks of commercial entities for engaging in undeclared, classified biological weapons research and development for the Chinese military, in possible violation of US Presidential Executive Order 13382 on WMD proliferation.
4. **Responsible pandemic preparedness:** Rather than continuing to fund EcoHealth Alliance’s failed programs to try to predict the next pandemic, the administration should adopt a better strategy, such as establishing a public-

private partnership to develop and deploy a global network of bio-threat detection sensors, possibly centered around the Chan Zuckerberg BioHub and IDseq Initiative. China would be expected to be a founding plank holder for this international bio-sensing network, as this initiative's purpose is to share data akin to weather prediction and seismology joint detection, prediction, and coordination. At least we would get the benefit of much earlier warnings of natural or manmade disease outbreaks from this epidemiological "open skies" initiative.

This past weekend, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told *Axios* that China "has to" be more open about the origin of the virus and share more information. He was not overflowing with details about how that goal would be achieved, other than to emphasize that cooperating more "is in China's interest, too."

[https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/wait-natural-bat-virus-spillover-to-humans-is-relatively-rare/?itm\\_source=parse-api&utm\\_source=recirc-desktop&utm\\_medium=blog&utm\\_campaign=right-rail&utm\\_content=recommended&utm\\_term=first](https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/wait-natural-bat-virus-spillover-to-humans-is-relatively-rare/?itm_source=parse-api&utm_source=recirc-desktop&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=right-rail&utm_content=recommended&utm_term=first)

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**From:** "Park, Christopher J" <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Subject:** RE: USUN Rome: FAO Covid-19 Response and Recovery Effective but Underfunded  
**Date:** Fri, 14 May 2021 13:40:20 +0000

Brash of them to just charge into IAEA's turf like this.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 14, 2021 7:36 AM  
**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Subject:** Fw: USUN Rome: FAO Covid-19 Response and Recovery Effective but Underfunded

6. (U) Additionally, FAO is working to prevent the next zoonotic pandemic by strengthening and extending the One Health approach to avert animal-origin pandemics. FAO is engaging in the Tripartite partnership, with the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO, in collaboration with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), to share data and provide risk assessment, recommendations, and guidance to members on safe trade in animals and animal products, detection of SARS-CoV-2 in animals, virus evolution, as well as studies to investigate the origins of SARS-CoV-2. Should supplemental funding become available, post recommends consideration of a contribution to the COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program, which the United States could target to one of the priority areas in zoonosis and future pandemic prevention in the notional attached list.

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

---

**From:** SMART Core <svcSmartBtsEwsSPrec@state.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, May 14, 2021 6:39 AM

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** USUN Rome: FAO Covid-19 Response and Recovery Effective but Underfunded

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SBU~~

**Info Office:** DEP\_DIR, BIO\_STAFF

---

**MRN:** 21 UN ROME 56  
**Date/DTG:** May 14, 2021 / 141036Z MAY 21  
**From:** USMISSION UN ROME  
**Action:** WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*  
**E.O.:** 13526  
**TAGS:** PREL, AORC, EAID, UN, FAO, WFP, KGFS, KNCV, SD, BO  
**Captions:** SENSITIVE  
**Reference:** 20 UN Rome 54  
**Subject:** USUN Rome: FAO Covid-19 Response and Recovery Effective but Underfunded

1. (U) **Summary:** Ten months post-launch, FAO's COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program is evolving from an emergency- to a development-based approach with a focus on long-term interventions and is working to protect the most vulnerable. The program has successfully launched a big data tool to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on food chains, implemented livelihood support and aid programs, and is continuing to work to mitigate the disproportionate effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the lives of women. Still, with operational requirements totaling USD 1.32 billion, the program has only received contributions of USD 231 million, or approximately 18 percent of the target as of mid-January 2021. FAO assessed contribution resources invested in the program currently amount to USD 29 million. In terms of regional distribution, Africa has received the largest amount of assistance, both in voluntary contributions and FAO resources, and Europe and Central Asia have received the least. The effects of the global recession increased instances of acute and chronic food insecurity, hitting the most vulnerable groups through reduced incomes and fewer opportunities for employment, devastating trends underlined by the new Global Report on Food Crises (May 2021). Should supplemental funding become available, post recommends consideration of a contribution to the COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program, which the United States could target to address zoonosis and future pandemic preparedness and resilience. **End Summary.**

2. ~~(SBU)~~ **Comment:** FAO made significant progress in the last year proactively addressing the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic, in addition to reducing the negative effects of the COVID-19 economic crisis on nutrition. However, having received significantly below target contributions, the FAO COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program is relatively limited in its capabilities and scope. Additional funding is required to ensure continued success of the Program. USUN Rome will continue to monitor closely FAO's measures to tackle COVID-19, and to use the organization's platform to urge members to take the COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program's recommendations and best practices into consideration when crafting

policies relating to pandemic response. **End Comment.**

### **FAO's Pandemic Response Program Effective, Especially Addressing Impact on Women**

3. (U) Throughout the pandemic and global recession, women have been disproportionately affected given their multiple roles in the household and predominant participation in informal agri-food markets. Lockdowns and quarantines resulted in an increase in the incidence of domestic violence, and the enormous strain on health systems caused by COVID-19 has forced a diversion of resources from pre- and post-natal care programs. In response, FAO's Response and Recovery Program supported gender-sensitive value chains in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to help overcome the negative impacts of the pandemic on rural livelihoods. FAO co-organized a series of virtual dialogues on gender equality and resilient food systems in light of COVID-19. Local community clubs were used to increase access to information at the community level, promote women's leadership and participation, and facilitate changes in behavior. From March-October 2020, FAO delivered livelihoods support (in the form of cash transfers, agricultural inputs and technical assistance) to 2.7 million households (approximately 15 million people); approximately 44 percent of the beneficiaries were women.

### **FAO's Operations in Critical Areas Evolving to Longer-Term Post-Pandemic Focus**

4. (U) FAO's program is evolving from an emergency- to a development-based approach with a focus on medium- and long-term interventions. FAO established a data lab to foster the use of data science and non-conventional sources to support members in responding to the pandemic. The organization launched a big data tool in mid-April 2020, and uses daily food prices, tweets, and news to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on food chains.

5. (U) FAO continues to focus on protecting the most vulnerable, while promoting economic recovery in the places that need it most. One such place is Sudan, where a project titled, "Improving the resilience of agricultural livelihoods using Cash+ scheme for floods and COVID-19 Response" targets vulnerable households in need of humanitarian assistance. The project aims to improve agricultural production capacity through improved access to cash while strengthening livelihoods. Another project in Bolivia targets populations with high vulnerability, including indigenous people. The intervention aims at building back local communities' resilience, through articulating an early warning and information system with resilient productive systems to be able to address future shocks and threats.

6. (U) Additionally, FAO is working to prevent the next zoonotic pandemic by strengthening and extending the One Health approach to avert animal-origin pandemics. FAO is engaging in the Tripartite partnership, with the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO, in collaboration with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), to share data and provide risk assessment, recommendations, and guidance to members on safe trade in animals and animal products, detection of SARS-CoV-2 in animals, virus evolution, as well as studies to investigate the origins of SARS-CoV-2. Should supplemental funding become available, post recommends consideration of a contribution to the COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program, which the United States could target to one of the priority areas in zoonosis and future pandemic prevention in the notional attached list.



### **Program Funding Falls Far Below Target**

7. (U) Despite its early successes, the FAO COVID-19 Response and Recovery Program remains well below target in funding. With operational requirements totaling USD 1.32 billion, the program had only received confirmed and pledged contributions totaling USD 231 million, or approximately 18 percent of the target by mid-January 2021. (Note: At the outset of the COVID-19 outbreak, FAO sought \$350 million in voluntary contributions to address the humanitarian impacts of the pandemic on food insecurity; the needs increased significantly throughout 2020, accounting for the more than tripling of operational requirements for the program (ref:tel). End note.) Voluntary contributions amount to USD 202 million, of which USD 90 million is in approved contributions and USD 112 in forecasted contributions. FAO's assessed contribution resources currently invested in the program amount to USD 29 million. In terms of regional focus, Africa has received the largest amount of voluntary contributions and FAO resources – 33 percent of the total, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean region, and Asia and the Pacific region – both currently standing at 17 percent. The Near East and North Africa received 15 percent of the total funding, whereas Europe and Central Asia only received 6 percent.

### **Food Supply Chains & the Global Report on Food Crises**

8. (U) Following short-term disruptions due to restrictions to contain the spread of COVID-19, markets along national agri-food supply chains had largely stabilized in mid-2020. This is largely due to the fact that activities related to food and agriculture were considered to be essential and therefore were generally exempted from lockdown and working/mobility restrictions. Additionally, many governments actively supported local agriculture and food production through the provision of subsidies and other measures.

9. (U) The monitoring of policy responses to COVID-19 similarly demonstrated that agri-food systems proved more resilient than other sectors of the economy because of exemptions from restrictive public health measures and policies aimed at supporting the smooth functioning of the agri-food production and markets. However, acute and chronic food insecurity have increased mainly due to the effects of the global recession, which hit the most vulnerable groups hardest through reduced employment opportunities and incomes. The new 2021 Global Report on Food Crises (released May 5, 2021) underlines this point, noting 155 million people in 55 countries or territories where data was available for 2020 were in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent), an increase of about 20 million people facing these conditions in 2019. Among these, 28 million people in 38 countries faced Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and needed urgent action to save lives and livelihoods, while 133,000 people in Burkina Faso, South Sudan, and Yemen were in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) and in need of urgent action to prevent widespread death and collapse of livelihoods. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2020 similarly estimated that, as a result of COVID-19, an additional 83 to 132 million chronically undernourished people would be added to the total number of chronically undernourished globally in 2020. FAO is particularly concerned with the pandemic's impacts on already vulnerable communities, such as those grappling with disease, conflict, climate change, and economic insecurity.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Signature:** HARHIGH

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**Drafted By:** UN ROME:POLECON: (b)(6)

**Cleared By:** USAID: (b)(6)  
POLECON: (b)(6)  
POLECON: (b)(6)  
POLECON: (b)(6)

**Approved By:** EXEC: CDA (b)(6)

**Released By:** UN ROME (b)(6) (Rome)

**Info:** KHARTOUM, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; LA PAZ, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*;  
USDA FAS WASHDC *ROUTINE*; DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON  
DC *ROUTINE*; IO COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*

**Attachments:** List of Priorities\_ZoonosesCOVID\_final.docx

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**Action Post:** NONE

**Dissemination Rule:** DIS\_DEP\_DIR, DIS\_BIO\_STAFF

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SBU~~

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: URGENT YET OPTIONAL: murder board today  
**Date:** Fri, 23 Apr 2021 14:37:08 +0000

(b)(5)

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 23, 2021 10:27 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT YET OPTIONAL: murder board today

(b)(5)

(Sadly, I can just about imagine one or two currently serving senators asking that).

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 23, 2021 10:25 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) Geneva (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT YET OPTIONAL: murder board today

(b)(5); (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Sent:** Friday, April 23, 2021 9:56 AM  
**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) Geneva  
(b)(6) @state.gov  
**Subject:** URGENT YET OPTIONAL: murder board today

Friends, Romans, brain trust, lend me your brains:

Bonnie Jenkins has another murder board at noon today, (b)(5)  
(b)(5)  
(b)(5)

(For the record, in case people up the chain in other offices ask or complain, I'm not reaching out by office, but simply asking a few people that I think have good ideas and judgment to share those assets with me).

CJP

**From:** (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Sent:** Friday, April 23, 2021 9:43 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Subject:** murder board today

Just forwarded you all the invite for a virtual murder board with (b)(6) today. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Thank you!

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff  
Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control  
and International Security  
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov;  
(b)(6)@state.gov;  
**Recipient:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov;  
(b)(6)@state.gov;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**To:** [(b)(6)]@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT YACPT: Q re WIV,and alleged French "warnings"  
**Date:** Mon, 26 Jul 2021 15:42:51 +0000

Yeah, but it's ALL origins, one way or another. And it messes up "YACHT."

---

**From:** [(b)(6)]@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 26, 2021 11:31 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT YACPT: Q re WIV,and alleged French "warnings"

Haha. Good. You did forget 'origins' in there somewhere I think; I like the ring to "Yak-o-Pit" or even "Yak-Opt" better ☺

---

**From:** Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 26, 2021 11:22 AM  
**To:** [(b)(6)]@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT YACPT: Q re WIV,and alleged French "warnings"

I'm trying to shave some of the time consumed with new time- and labor-saving acronyms to save us all time in future:

- YACHT: Yet Another COVID Hill Tasking
- YACPT: Yet Another COVID Press Tasking (pronounced Yak-Pit)
- YACLT: Yet Another COVID Leadership Tasking (pronounced "Yaklett")

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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**From:** [(b)(6)]@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 26, 2021 11:16 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT YACPT: Q re WIV,and alleged French "warnings"

Oh dear. Would love to tally the government resources this person has personally been responsible for wasting over the last year as we scramble to investigate his various accusations and insinuations. (In this case maybe there's something to it – I don't know – but it's easy to be skeptical given his past performance.)

---

**From:** Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 26, 2021 10:24 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;

Cc: (b)(6)@dni.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov;

Subject: URGENT YACPT: Q re WIV, and alleged French "warnings"

(b)(6) et al:

PA received the below on Friday evening, and (b)(5) is working a response. I wonder whether you can advise on a couple of the claims made by (b)(6)

(b)(5)

We may or may not need much detail, but I for one would like to know what the hell (b)(6) is talking about and whether/how it is distorted.

CJP

From: Eleanor Bartow <ebartow@dailycallernewsfoundation.org>  
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2021 6:29 PM  
To: PA Press Duty <PAPressDuty@state.gov>  
Subject: Need State Dept. comment today ideally

Dear Press Relations:

I'm a reporter at The Daily Caller and planning to publish a story saying the following. Could you please comment? Ideally today but if you need more time can you reply by Monday at noon?

Eleanor Bartow

The U.S. federal government should have stopped funding research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2015 when China reduced its cooperation with the French in building and operating the lab, according to the leader of an investigation on COVID-19's origins by the State Department under the Trump administration.

In 2015, French intelligence officials warned the U.S. State Department and their own foreign ministry that China was cutting back on agreed collaboration at the lab, David Asher told the Daily Caller News Foundation.

By 2017, the French "were kicked out" of the lab and cooperation ceased, leading French officials to warn the State Department that they had grave concerns as to Chinese motivations, according to Asher.

The State Department alleged in January 2021, at the end of the Trump administration, that the Wuhan lab has engaged in classified research on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

...

"The Chinese basically sucked State into its honey pot operation to gain access to U.S. technology, knowledge, and material support. Classic. Just as they have done in every sector," Asher said.

...

The NIH, DOD and USAID should have stopped sending U.S. federal funding to the Wuhan lab back when the French warned the State Department in 2015, Asher said.

State Department officials "in charge of nonproliferation should have shut down all cooperation," he added.

....

In January 2018, a State Department cable warned of a lack of highly trained technicians to operate the lab, as first reported by The Washington Post.

The U.S. officials who had visited the lab and made the warning via the cable were not permitted to return, because they were asking "too many questions," according to Asher.

--

Eleanor Bartow  
Investigative Reporter  
Daily Caller News Foundation

(b)(6)

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@dni.gov>



**From:** "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: UPDATED Report on Circumstantial Evidence re Wuhan Institute of Virology  
**Date:** Sat, 9 May 2020 00:33:34 +0000

"I wonder if there's a CCP/Leninist tie here as well."---Yes!! The guy who wrote this, Yuan Zhiming, was a long-time Party Secretary of WIV, 2004-2013. He is now the boss of the BSL4 lab at WIV, truly a "Red and Expert" kind of guy.

Dr. M. Miles Yu  
Policy Planning Staff  
Office of the Secretary  
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(mobile)

---

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 7:50 PM  
To: Yu, Miles  
Subject: RE: UPDATED Report on Circumstantial Evidence re Wuhan Institute of Virology

This is fantastic. There is Enormous Evidence I this document alone.

I wonder if there's a CCP/Leninist tie here as well. When I read this section it took me back to the realization that PLAAF units have to strive for operational excellence, but hey have to appease the Party Commissar, who is wedged between the commander and the operations officer.

“Compared with high-level biosafety laboratories that possess standardized management systems in foreign countries, 80% of the relevant specification/standard of biosafety laboratories in China belong to the specification and quality standards under the macro guidance, and only a small fraction are operational method standards, making it difficult to ensure the security of the biosafety laboratory due to lack of operational technical support. Here are the main aspects:

The movie 歼十出击 plays this out in stark relief. As much as they tried to hide the J-10's operational capabilities (the best the Israeli's would sell them) they revealed the command environment, which is a dog's breakfast. Good.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZNY6->

JiEDk<<https://gcc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DVZNY6-JiEDk&data=02%7C01%7CYuMM%40state.gov%7C9298b60e78af47e42fce08d7f3aa86ad%7C66cf50745afe48d1a691a12b2121f44b%7C0%7C0%7C637245786032047732&sdata=2A1mlabp>

WdYlxfgACXTbb0tVTIRpAusd1v8i5IHe1CY%3D&reserved=0>

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 5:41 PM

To: Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun,

Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(S) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: S\_SpecialAssistants <S\_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>

Subject: UPDATED Report on Circumstantial Evidence re Wuhan Institute of Virology

All, as requested, this is the updated report on the subject matter. New information is in yellowlights. The first report was given to the Secretary last week.

Very respectfully

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff (S/P)

Office of the Secretary

Department of State

(b)(6) (o)

(c)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;

**CC:** (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

**Date:** Wed, 9 Jun 2021 16:41:30 +0000

Thanks, Chris – I agree that the dynamics of other ongoing discussions rather complicate things. Of note, the letter from the Committee predates the Vanity Fair article, but they and staff have undoubtedly read it by now.

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:29 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

I'd be a little concerned that if (b)(5) or worse yet, ME, pens a letter on this explaining (b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:08 PM  
 To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
 Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

Thanks (b)(6) (b)(5)  
 (b)(5) Happy to chat further about it.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:48 AM  
 To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>  
 Cc: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

My understanding was (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:45 AM  
 To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>  
 Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

<(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

Seems like (b)(6) might be best for lead given they were the ones who secured release authority in January.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:40 AM  
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6) thanks for flagging this. I'm not 100% certain who should have the lead on this, though I agree it's probably not (b)(5) I would think it would go to either (b)(5)

(b)(5)

The January 15 Fact Sheet was drafted by the EAP Front Office, which worked back and forth with (b)(5) including (b)(5) that one, though I think the underlying analysis came from (b)(6) team.

Given the linkage in the letter to the WHO investigation, (b)(5) shop would also need to be in the loop.

I would be surprised, however, (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:53 AM  
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

Chris – I just learned about this letter, which was tasked just now (despite the early May date) to (b)(5) I owe an answer to (b)(5) today – let me know what to say. H wants to respond in narrative form.

(b)(5)

“Accordingly, we request that the U.S. Department of State release unclassified documents and declassify other documents for public release, as appropriate, related to the assertion in the Department’s January 15, 2021 Fact Sheet that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in Wuhan,

China collaborated with the Chinese military in conducting classified research, including laboratory animal experiments"

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:41 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks for the call (b)(6) Attaching letter here.

---

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 10:04 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks (b)(6)

Adding (b)(6) in L/OES.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 9:23 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

Yes of course, here it is. Thank you so much for your help!

---

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 4:54 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

I haven't seen this letter. Can you please send it to this group so we can see whether we agree that [redacted] should lead on it?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Officer  
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)  
U.S. Department of State  
2201 C Street, NW; Suite 3880  
Washington, DC 20520  
Office: [redacted] (b)(6)  
OES

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 7, 2021 10:58 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; OES-H <OES-H@state.gov>; OES-Staffers-DG <OES-Staffers-DG@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; H\_CCU <H\_CCU@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Tasking a letter

Hello [redacted] (b)(6) and welcome to H!

I tasked this letter to H on May 7 under tasker number H20210507-000. At the time, I was awaiting further guidance on how to proceed. Our database is designed to task to bureaus so while I cannot task the letter to [redacted] (b)(5) I can task it to [redacted] and they will work directly with [redacted] (b)(5) on the response. [redacted] can then upload the response in MyData.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

---

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 7, 2021 10:18 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>  
**Subject:** Tasking a letter

Hi [redacted] (b)(6)

I am a new addition to H, and (b)(6) suggested I reach out to you to get a response to the attached letter tasked. At (b)(6) request, I spoke with the House E&C Minority staff, and explained that we are unlikely to produce documents, but that we would work on a narrative response. (b)(6) at L thinks the (b)(5) would likely be the best place to task for writing this response. Would you be the appropriate person to create this tasking?

Thanks for your help and guidance as I figure things out here!

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>;  
**Recipient:** (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>



**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (T) (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>;  
 ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**CC:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: SPOX question: Wuhan Institute of Virology  
**Date:** Tue, 28 Apr 2020 14:55:14 +0000

Hi (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Might be worth narrowing this email chain later since 3+ office distros are on

(b)(6)

**From:** (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 10:38 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES  
 <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-  
 RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** SPOX question: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Thanks (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 8:58 AM

**To:** (b)(6) Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)

(b)(6) Pandemic-Response-OES; Park, Christopher J; (b)(6) ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL

**Cc:** OES-PA-DG

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

one additional timely article.

<https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/27/trump-cuts-research-bat-human-virus-china-213076>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 4:10 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Here are some reports that NIH has funded some work at WIV.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 4:08 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Many thanks everyone!

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:56 PM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T); (b)(6)

(b)(6) Pandemic-Response-OES; Park, Christopher J; (b)(6) ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL

**Cc:** OES-PA-DG

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology



**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:37 PM  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:36 PM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

PA wants to go with:

(b)(5)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:20 PM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T); (b)(6) Pandemic-Response-OES; Park, Christopher J  
**Cc:** OES-PA-DG  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Thanks all! Yes please reach out to USAID (b)(5)  
 (b)(5) Thank you.

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:17 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) Pandemic-Response-OES; Park, Christopher J  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Damn, I'm good.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:16 PM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park,

Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(6)

The PREDICT fact sheet from a couple of years ago does say explicitly that it was working with WIV (this is from 2014).

(b)(5)

Clara

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 2:46 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-

Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

□

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 2:35 PM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-

Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(5)

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 2:32 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 2:26 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

(SBU). According to para 5 of 18 Wuhan 38, which I believe the Washington Post is suing the Department to get expedited access to through FOIA, "(Wuhan) Institute (of Virology) officials said that France provided the lab's design and much of its technology, but that it is entirely China-funded and has been completely China-run since a 'handover' ceremony in 2016." The next para says that experts with the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston have trained Wuhan lab technicians in lab management and maintenance, and that scientists from the Galveston lab would be invited to do research at WIV.

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:58 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan Institute of Virology

+ Chris Park and (b)(6) as they may have relevant knowledge

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:55 PM  
**To:** Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hi, do we have any info on whether the US provided funds the Wuhan Institute of Virology?  
Please see below.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:25 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL; OES-PA-DG  
**Cc:** EAP-Press  
**Subject:** Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

See below - (b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

EAP Press

(b)(6) (m)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:17 PM

To: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Cc: F-Press <F-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Wuhan Institute of Virology

EAP,

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: Joseph Harriss (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:42 AM

To: PA Press Duty <PAPressDuty@state.gov>

Subject: Wuhan Institute of Virology

To State Department Press Service:

As the Paris correspondent of *The American Spectator*, published in Washington, I am researching an article on the Wuhan Institute of Virology. According to Wikipedia, the establishment of the laboratory was funded partially by the U.S. government. Can you please confirm that? And if so, can you please give me the amount of funding involved?

Thank you for any assistance you can provide in this matter.

Sincerely,

Joseph Harriss, Paris

--

Books--<http://b.link/harriss71>

Spectator--<https://spectator.org/author/josephaharriss/>

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Pandemic-Response-OES <Pandemic-Response-OES@state.gov>;  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>;

ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>;  
OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>



**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Setting up a WebEx on the IDSeq initiative and other frontline bio threat detection ideas  
**Date:** Thu, 19 Nov 2020 16:58:46 +0000

<https://www.discoveridseq.com/>. Adding on to Bob's answer - It's newish (2016) and I think focused on human pathogens). I'm copying our assessment on (b)(6) interests here,

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Thread (Ann Ganzer at the top):

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

□

---

**From:** Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 4:10 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;  
Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Cc:** Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Thanks. Adding Gonzo FHSA of this thread.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:39 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Cc:** Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | AAAS S&T Policy Fellow  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State  
Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:34 PM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Amen.

(b)(5)

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:21 PM

**To:** Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Eliot, here's my immediate reaction (b)(6) may well have other, smarter ones):

(b)(5)

Argh.

Sent from my tPhone

On Nov 4, 2020, at 3:16 PM, Kang, Eliot <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Quick views. I get a lot of these...

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** <(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:06 PM

**To:** Kang, Eliot <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K <(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Cc:** <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) <(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Thanks. This is new to us, but will take a look. (+ Chris since I think he has some background on the sender that might be helpful)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | AAAS S&T Policy Fellow  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 2:54 PM  
**To:** Ganzer, Ann K (h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Cc:** (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

??

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 2:38 PM  
**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David <(h)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Tom, Eliot,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | AAAS S&T Policy Fellow  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State  
Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, November 19, 2020 11:18 AM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)

**Subject:** Fw: Setting up a WebEx on the IDSeq initiative and other frontline bio threat detection ideas

Anyone know anything about IDSeq?

**From:** Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, November 19, 2020 11:09 AM

**To:** Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Dolliff, Phillip R

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** FW: Setting up a WebEx on the IDSeq initiative and other frontline bio threat detection ideas

FYSA.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 19, 2020 11:06 AM  
**To:** Andrew Weber (b)(6); Joe DeRisi (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Christine Parthemore (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Kang, Eliot (h)(6)@state.gov  
**Subject:** Setting up a WebEx on the IDSeq initiative and other frontline bio threat detection ideas

Joe, Andy, and Christine,

Would you be able to do a Teams presentation on IDSeq and related biothreat detection initiatives and proposals the week after Thanksgiving? I want to facilitate an intra State and interagency understanding of the current IDSeq consortium, its technical approach, costs, as well as ways and means to expand it, including as a public-private partnership.

Thanks for your consideration. If anyone from Chan Zuckerberg and Gates wished to join that should be fine. Our goal is to understand how bio threat technical detection with next gen sequencing could fill a huge hole in the BWC treaty verification and compliance as well as hugely advance human health threat detection.

All the best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)

US Department of State

(b)(6)

NSTS: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** [redacted]@state.gov>  
[redacted]@state.gov>;  
**Recipient:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
[redacted]

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: response from CDC  
**Date:** Fri, 11 Dec 2020 02:24:28 +0000

I'll be in tomorrow. Happy to over our slides and get your feedback pre VCAWG next week.

Material facts — (b)(5)

(b)(5) Accurate information and evidence is more vital than "intelligence" (which can always be subject to interpretation and disinformation).

One team, one fight.

**From:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, December 10, 2020 8:39 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: response from CDC

Per the attached article 2 American scientists were denies access on the WHO delegation. Is this true?

(b)(5)

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/world/who-china-coronavirus.html>

In Washington, the American health secretary, Alex M. Azar II, gathered advisers inside a conference room of the Department of Health and Human Services to hear from **two government scientists who had participated in the W.H.O. mission to China.**

The scientists, still in quarantine, described by videoconference the seemingly unimaginable lockdown that China had imposed. When questions turned to the origins of the virus, however, answers stopped.



“You’d have to look at the terms of reference,” one of the scientists replied, a senior American health official recalled. The “terms of reference” was a document spelling out the mission’s rules. The Americans had never seen it.

The health organization’s public statements suggested that the animal-source investigation was well underway.

If that was true, the Americans realized that they were on the outside, **blocked from the investigation by China.**

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, December 10, 2020 6:37 PM

**To:** [redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>

**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>

**Subject:** response from CDC

[redacted] (b)(5)

Please let me know if you have further follow up questions.

Best,

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

PHI Global Health Fellow | Center for Global Health

Office of the Associate Director for Policy


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

1600 Clifton Road, NE, Atlanta, GA 30333

[redacted] (h)(7) [cdc.gov](https://www.cdc.gov)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 9, 2020 9:27 PM  
**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** NYT 7 Feb: C.D.C. and W.H.O. Offers to Help China Have Been Ignored for Weeks

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/health/cdc-coronavirus-china.html>



### C.D.C. and W.H.O. Offers to Help China Have Been Ignored for Weeks - The New York Times

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the W.H.O.'s director general, praised President Xi Jinping and the country's response, saying China would accept a team of experts.

[www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com)

By Donald G. McNeil Jr. and Zolan Kanno-Youngs

- Feb. 7, 2020

For more than a month, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has been offering to send a team of experts to China to observe its coronavirus outbreak and help if it can. Normally, teams from the agency's Epidemic Intelligence Service can be in the air within 24 hours.

But no invitation has come — and no one can publicly explain why.

The World Health Organization, which made a similar offer about two weeks ago, appears to be facing the same cold shoulder, though a spokeswoman said it is just "sorting out arrangements."

Current and former public health officials and diplomats, speaking anonymously for fear of upsetting diplomatic relations, said they believe the reluctance comes from China's top leaders, who do not want the world to think they need outside help.

In 2003, China was badly stung by criticism of its response to SARS, another coronavirus epidemic; it has also been embroiled in a trade war with the United States for more than a year. Some experts also say that outsiders could discover aspects of the outbreak that are embarrassing to China: for example, the country has not revealed how many of its doctors and nurses have died fighting the disease.

But China does need help, experts argue.

In private phone calls and texts, some Chinese colleagues have indicated that they are overwhelmed and would welcome not just extra hands, but specialized expertise in a couple of fields.

Also, C.D.C. officials have said that they hope to learn more about the new coronavirus from their Chinese counterparts to improve the American response if the virus starts to spread widely here.

On Friday, Alex M. Azar II, secretary of health and human services, said at a news briefing that he had recently reiterated the offer of a team to his Chinese counterpart, Dr. Ma Xiaowei.

Asked what the holdup was, he answered:

---

**From:** DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 9, 2020 7:54 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Subject:** Re:

Forgot (b)(6)

On December 9, 2020 at 7:52:01 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:  
All

By cob friday I'd like to know (b)(5)

(b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(6) (b)(5) I want complete concurrence and cooperation from everyone copied here. Everything else takes a back seat for the next two days. (b)(5)

Thank you  
TD

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)@state.gov
<b>Recipient:</b>	DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov



**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons  
**Date:** Thu, 1 Oct 2020 15:03:52 +0000

Thanks. Please keep in mind that there (b)(5)

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 11:02 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

(b)(6)

It is most likely just a reaction to reading the news. They shoot us articles frequently on a variety of issues. Once they realize we cant go into too much detail in an open setting, they'll hopefully drop it.

v/r,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 10:30 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

(b)(6)

It's interesting to me that HFAC asked for this before the hearing. Is such a request common? Do you read it as just a knee-jerk reaction to the latest news of interest?

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 10:05 AM

To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; Dolliff, Phillip R (h)(6) @state.gov; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Cc: T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov

Subject: RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

(b)(6) A couple of minor fiddles suggested below.

[redacted] (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov

Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 10:00 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (h)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; Dolliff, Phillip R (h)(6) @state.gov; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Cc: T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov

Subject: RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

Good Morning,

HFAC reached out again looking for a response before the hearing. From what you provided; I have pieced this response together. Please edit as you see fit. [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(5)

-START-

[redacted] (b)(5)

-END-

v/r,

(h)(6)

----

[redacted] (b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Officer  
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

B3 Solutions, LLC

M,W,F- Telework Phone: (b)(6)

T,Th- Office Phone: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:54 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

It's useful for context, at least.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:50 PM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

Aside from the official Pakistani and Chinese rebuttals and Chris' astute observations on the press outlet and its potentially biased sources, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

I can provide additional information on JWICS, but I don't know if that helps you all vis-à-vis the hearing.

(b)(6)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:32 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

We'll need to check with (b)(6) about what, if anything, we can say re (b)(5)

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:23 PM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nrc.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

Thanks, Chris. (b)(5)

v/r,

Nick

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:12 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nrc.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

Pakistani response reported by DevDiscourse.com – funny they should mention their CBMS . . . :




## News of Chinese lab creating 'anthrax-like pathogens' in Pakistan 'fake': FO

Pakistan and China have concluded a secret deal to expand potential bio-warfare capabilities, including running research projects related to the deadly anthrax, an Australian media report has alleged, prompting Pakistan to dismiss it as a "politically motivated and fake story." In an article published on July 23, Australia's investigative newspaper The Klaxon said China's Wuhan Institute of Virology has signed a covert three-year deal with Pakistan military's Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO) to collaborate research in "emerging infectious diseases".

PTI | Islamabad | Updated: 26-07-2020 18:00 IST | Created: 26-07-2020 18:00 IST

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Pakistan and China have concluded a secret deal to expand potential bio-warfare capabilities, including running research projects related to the deadly anthrax, an Australian media report has alleged, prompting Pakistan to dismiss it as a “politically motivated and fake story.” In an article published on

July 23, Australia's investigative newspaper The Klaxon said China's Wuhan Institute of Virology has signed a covert three-year deal with Pakistan military's Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO) to collaborate research in "emerging infectious diseases". The Wuhan Institute of Virology has drawn the international spotlight in recent months because the novel coronavirus is thought to have originated in Wuhan. There had been speculation the disease may have emerged from that laboratory, however most experts have since discounted the theory.

In a statement on Sunday, the Pakistan Foreign Office (FO) described the article as a "politically motivated and fake story" and said it was composed of "distortion of facts and fabrications that quote anonymous sources". "There is nothing secret about the Bio-Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) Laboratory of Pakistan referred to in the report. Pakistan has been sharing information about the facility with the States Parties to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) in its submission of Confidence Building Measures," the FO said.

It said the facility is meant for diagnostic and protective system improvement by Research and Development on emerging health threats, surveillance and disease outbreak investigation. Pakistan strictly abides by its BTWC obligations and has been one of the most vocal supporters for a strong verification mechanism to ensure full compliance by the states and parties to the convention, the FO said.

The BTWC is a 1975 multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of chemical and biological weapons. Quoting anonymous intelligence sources, The Klaxon said the China-funded project has conducted "successful soil sampling tests" to isolate *Bacillus Thuringiensis* (BT), which has a "striking similarity" to *Bacillus Anthracis* - or anthrax, a classified bio-warfare agent. "Considering the striking similarity between BT and *Bacillus Anthracis*, a classified bio-warfare agent, (Pakistan's) improved know-how in handling the bacteria could enrich a potential offensive biological program," one source said. The Wuhan lab was providing "extensive training on manipulation of pathogens and bio-informatics" to Pakistani scientists "to help Pakistan develop its own virus collection database", the report said. "This could help Pakistan enhance its capability of genetic identification of viruses, access to dangerous microorganisms, and use of genomic tools for research and infectious diseases," an intelligence source said. The article quoted an anonymous defence source as saying that China wants Pakistan to engage India and it wants to conduct potentially dangerous experiments on foreign soil, without subjecting its own people to risk.

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T)

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:47 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

**Cc:** T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nrc.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

Interesting. The Klaxon launched in July of this year, so it has no real track record. Appears to be a one-person show run and written by an Aussie journalist named Anthony Klan, largely reporting on other journalists' reports. He worked for *the Australian* until mid-2019 and seems to have racked up a number of awards for financial reporting, but his new venture is more ecumenical, though with a bent towards reporting on cover-ups, secret networks, and the ways in which government and corporations are selling out Australia's national interests. He reportedly left *the Australian* because "I had, and have, serious

misgivings about the direction that is now being taken. Australia faces unprecedented external threats. To do otherwise, I felt, would be treasonous."

The collaboration probably does exist. The spin being put on it by unnamed Indian officials reminds me of Russian characterizations of the Lugar Center and suggests an opportunistic disinformation campaign.

How can anybody think this is a credible source for a story like this? I feel embarrassed second hand.

CJP

**From:** [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:20 AM

**To:** Dolliff, Phillip R [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) <[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

In case the article wont open.

## EXCLUSIVE: China's Wuhan lab operating "covert operations" in Pakistan, handling "anthrax-like" pathogens

[1](#) [Politics](#), [National Security](#)

*Under the spotlight after Coronavirus savaged the globe, China's Wuhan lab has now set up operations in Pakistan as part of a broader offensive against India and Western rivals, according to intelligence experts. The secret facility is allegedly handling anthrax-like pathogens which could assist in biological warfare.*

**Anthony Klan reports.**

**ANTHONY KLAN**

**EXCLUSIVE**

Pakistan and China have entered a secret three-year deal to expand potential bio-warfare capabilities, including running several research projects related to the deadly agent anthrax, according to multiple intelligence sources.

In the wake of the Coronavirus outbreak on Chinese soil, China's now infamous Wuhan Institute of Virology has signed the covert deal with Pakistan military's Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), to collaborate research in "emerging infectious diseases" and advance studies on the biological control of transmitted diseases.

According to highly credible intelligence sources, the program is being entirely funded by China and is formally titled the "Collaboration for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Studies on Biological Control of Vector Transmitting Diseases".

Intelligence sources, including from the Indian subcontinent, have told *The Klaxon* they have serious concerns about the secret project, which involves China testing biological agents outside its borders in an apparent bid to minimize the "risk of drawing condemnation from the international community".

"DESTO has been engaged in various dual-use research projects related to anthrax under a covert biological weapons program," one senior intelligence source said.

The source said China's Wuhan Institute of Virology had "lent all financial, material and scientific support for the project".

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has drawn the international spotlight in recent months because the Coronavirus is thought to have originated in Wuhan.

There had been speculation the disease may have emerged from that laboratory, however most experts have since discounted the theory.

The covert China-Pakistan project has conducted "successful soil sampling tests" to isolate *Bacillus Thuringiensis* (BT), which has a "striking similarity" to *Bacillus Anthracis* – or anthrax – *The Klaxon* is told.

“Considering the striking similarity between BT and Bacillus Anthracis, a classified bio-warfare agent, (Pakistan’s) improved know-how in handling the bacteria could enrich a potential offensive biological program,” one source said.

Pakistan had been provided with the reagents for Bacillus Thuringiensis by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

The Wuhan lab was providing “extensive training on manipulation of pathogens and bio-informatics” to Pakistani scientists “to help Pakistan develop its own virus collection database”.

“This could help Pakistan enhance its capability of genetic identification of viruses, access to dangerous microorganisms, and use of genomic tools for research and infectious diseases,” an intelligence source told *The Klaxon*.

The secret project was “detached from supervision of civilian universities or government health departments in Pakistan” and was structured so as to allow “unspecified” future operations.

The agreement “clearly outlines that the cooperation is not necessarily limited to stated objectives” and “new thematic research to monitor potential new diseases can be added by either party”, a source said.

“DESTO has been engaged in various dual-use research projects related to anthrax under a covert biological weapons program”  
— Intelligence sources

One security expert, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told *The Klaxon* that India and key western intelligence agencies viewed China’s involvement in the project as being “driven chiefly by its agenda to engage Pakistan against India”.

“China’s keen interest in the project is driven chiefly by its agenda to engage Pakistan against India and to conduct potentially dangerous experiments on foreign soil, without subjecting its own land and people

to risk," the expert said.

The plan was part of a move by Beijing to "designate Pakistan a destination for hazardous bio chemical research" while "evading use of its own territory for such activities", which "stand the risk of drawing criticism and condemnation from the international community".

One example was a proposal to test a Coronavirus vaccine, made by Chinese state-owned company Sinopharm, on Pakistani citizens.

The China-Pakistan biological project had already undertaken experiments on the Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever Virus (CCHFV), sources said.

CCHFV is a rapid-onset fever virus that causes death in about 25% of cases and is similar to the Ebola virus.

CCHFV is categorised as a "class-4" microorganism – the highest possible risk category.

Class-4 microorganisms, which also include the Ebola, Marburg and Lassa viruses, are those which can kill humans, can easily travel from one person to another and for which there are no known treatments or vaccines.

Pakistan is allegedly carrying out tests on CCHFV in laboratories which are not equipped to handle Bio-Safety Level-4 diseases.

"Under these circumstances, concerns over manipulation of class 4 pathogens (and the associated) bio-safety issues cannot be overlooked," an intelligence expert told *The Klaxon*.

Biological weapons have traditionally been unwieldy as they spread easily and are difficult to target at specific populations.

However the threat of biological warfare has grown considerably in recent years, and experts have warned China is heavily involved in DNA research that could potentially enable a biological weapon to specifically target - or conversely to be ineffective against - people of specific races.

While theories of Coronavirus emerging from the Wuhan Institute of Virology have been largely dismissed by experts, serious concerns have been raised about the safety standards at the Wuhan lab more generally.

In particular, there are concerns the lab is not equipped to handle class-4 diseases, despite claiming to be class-4 compliant.

Intelligence sources told *The Klaxon* there were concerns the Wuhan Institute of Virology had also established the Institute of Medical Biology in Kunming, in China's southern Yunnan province.

There were concerns the Kunming facility, which is controlled by the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, was also handling class-4 diseases without proper protections, sources said.

Do you know more?

[anthonyklan@protonmail.com](mailto:anthonyklan@protonmail.com)

v/r,

(b)(6)

----

(b)(6)

*Congressional Affairs Officer*  
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State  
*B3 Solutions, LLC*  
M,W,F- Telework Phone: (b)(6)  
T,Th- Office Phone: (b)(6)  
Email: (b)(6)@state.gov



---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:18 AM  
**To:** Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-DL <ISN-PC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

All-

HFAC shared this article with State this morning. Is there anything we can send back before Friday's hearing? They will want to discuss it during the hearing as well.

<https://www.theklaxon.com.au/home/xdx17f6auh0tew0g57ubqrzxkdeux9>.

v/r,

(b)(6)

-----  
(b)(6)  
*Congressional Affairs Officer*  
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State  
*B3 Solutions, LLC*  
M,W,F- Telework Phone: (b)(6)  
T,Th- Office Phone: (b)(6)  
Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 9:44 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Fwd: Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons

FYI - Is there any info we can share before Friday's hearing? Thanks!

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** (b)(6)@mail.house.gov>  
**Date:** September 29, 2020 at 9:41:50 AM EDT  
**Subject:** Reported PRC-Pak cooperation on bioweapons  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@mail.house.gov

Hey (b)(6)

Getting questions from my Members about this article (<https://www.theklaxon.com.au/home/xdx17f6auh0tew0g57ubqrzxkdeux9>). Sources reporting it seem to be limited to the Indian sub-continent, so trying to get any info I can from State as to validity/awareness. For context, I expect it to come up at the hearing Friday, so wanted to provide a heads up to y'all and make sure I can get my Members accurate information prior.

Thanks,

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

Professional Staff Member, Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans

p: (b)(6) v [republicans-foreignaffairs.house.gov](mailto:republicans-foreignaffairs.house.gov)

e: (b)(6) @mail.house.gov t: @HouseForeignGOP

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR  
**Date:** Tue, 24 Nov 2020 13:50:13 +0000

Will do.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

✘

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff  
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance  
U.S. Department of State  
HST Room (b)(6)

Office: (b)(6)  
Cell:

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov  
ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

**From:** Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 24, 2020 8:49 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts  
<T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR

Quite possibly; copying the scheduling team.

But please remind Tom that it has been several days since I asked to talk to him on another topic and he has not bothered to reply.

---

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 24, 2020 8:37 AM  
**To:** Ford, Christopher A  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6) (T)  
**Subject:** Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR

Hi Dr. Ford,

SBO DiNanno is not in the office, but in the interest of time, he wanted us to reach out to you to provide you with a briefing on the work AVC has been doing related to the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin and implications of COVID-19 – and the implications for the BWC and the Compliance Report.

Would you have any time today to talk with us?

We'd greatly appreciate it.

Thank you!

[redacted] (b)(6)



[redacted] (b)(6)

Chief of Staff  
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance  
U.S. Department of State  
HST Room [redacted] (b)(6)

Office: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [redacted]

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov

ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)  
**To:** Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
 DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated  
**Date:** Fri, 25 Dec 2020 03:17:18 +0000

<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/05/world/soviet-defector-says-china-had-accident-at-a-germ-plant.html>

I found this interesting.

(b)(6)  
 Senior Fellow  
 Hudson Institute  
 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
 Fourth Floor  
 Washington, DC 20004  
 (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)

On Dec 21, 2020, at 16:24, Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

I spoke to (b)(6) today, can read out in a few.

--  
 David Feith  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary  
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)  
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) o)  
 (b)(6) c)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov

On December 21, 2020 at 4:07:54 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Go right to (b)(6)

On December 21, 2020 at 3:34:48 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote: Tom, he asked "who in State." L/UNA (b)(6) covers the WHO in support of IO. I don't know whether IO would have been involved but we can ask once I find the right section/person.

(b)(6)

AVC Bureau  
Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SBU~~ DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

**From:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, December 21, 2020 11:38 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated

doubtful.. (b)(5) would not do this type of due diligence

---

**From:** (b)(6) >  
**Sent:** Monday, December 21, 2020 10:54 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated

(b)(5) Truly scandalous

(b)(6)

Senior Fellow

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, DC 20004

o. | c.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Dec 21, 2020, at 10:52, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Since it is an int'l org, probably IO Bureau but I will try to find out.

---

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On December 20, 2020 at 11:45:58 AM EST, (b)(6) wrote:

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Senior Fellow

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, DC 20004

o (b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Dec 20, 2020, at 10:05, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)



Barring that, could we find an adult somewhere to at least make a rational official public statement before this farce gets underway?

---

**From:** (b)(6) >  
**Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2020 4:48 AM  
**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Fwd: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated

I have a headache .

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Steven Quay (b)(6) >  
**Date:** December 20, 2020 at 04:01:04 EST  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated

(b)(6)

Unfortunately, Daszak and CCP are several/many steps ahead. In August Daszak, future commission member Hume Field, and the 'Bat Woman,' Dr. Shi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology published this paper together on where, in nature, CoV-2 arose <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17687-3> Within 45 days Daszak is appointed to BOTH international commissions, the only such person, to investigate the origin of CoV-2, the WHO team and the Lancet Commission. Even Kristian Andersen, a strong zoonosis proponent, thought it was unwise to appoint him. And to Baric's credit, after being asked to sign on to the letter of support and the zoonosis origin, he did not. No paper trail of his reasoning but by May he was interviewed on Italian TV saying you could make it in the lab and leave no trace of evidence and you have to get to the lab notebooks in WIV to know for sure.

Lancet Commission of CoV-2	WHO Commission on CoV-2 origin
Dr. Peter Daszak, Chair	Dr. Peter Daszak, Ph.D (EcoHealth Alliance, USA)
Dr. John Amuasi	Prof. John Watson (Public Health England, United Kingdom)
Dr. Danielle Anderson	Prof. Dr. Marion Koopmans, DVM PhD (Erasmus MC, Netherlands)
Dr. Isabella Eckerle	Prof. Dr. Dominic Dwyer, MD (Westmead Hospital, Australia)
Dr. Hume Field	Vladimir Dedkov, Ph.D (Institute Pasteur, Russia)
Dr. Gerald Keusch	Dr. Hung Nguyen, PhD (International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI),

	Vietnam)
Dr. Dato' Sai Kit (Ken) Lam	PD. Dr. med vet. Fabian Lendertz (Robert Koch-Institute, Germany)
Dr. Carlos das Neves	Prof. Dr. Thea Fisher, MD, DMSc(PhD) (Nordsjællands Hospital, Denmark)
Dr. Malik Peiris	Dr. Farag El Moubasher, Ph.D (Ministry of Public Health, Qatar)
Dr. Stanley Perlman	Prof. Dr. Ken Maeda, PhD, DVM (National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan)
Dr. Linda J. Saif	<u>WHO Commission of CoV-2 origin</u>
Dr. Supaporn Wacharapluesadee	

Lancet Commission on CoV-

2

Regards, Steve

On Sun, 20 Dec 2020 at 08:20, (b)(6) wrote:  
 The emails from Baric and Daszic are deeply disturbing as is the support from DTRA and several other USG Departments and agencies to EcoHealth.

(b)(6)

Senior Fellow

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Dec 19, 2020, at 19:13, Steven Quay (b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6)

I am on it! Regards, Steve

On Sun, 20 Dec 2020 at 01:36 [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]

Senior Fellow

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, DC 20004

[redacted]

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** [redacted]

**Date:** December 19, 2020 at 09:03:02 EST

**To:** [redacted]

**Subject:** Question

I was wondering if it would be possible for Dr. Quay and his colleague who is a statistician could undertake a Bayesian analysis of two likelihood hypotheses

[redacted]

--

Steven C Quay, MD, PhD, FCAP

T: (b)(6)

Skype: (b)(6)

Dr. Quay Official Website

STAY SAFE: #1 Best Seller Amazon Medical eBooks

--

Steven C Quay, MD, PhD, FCAP

T: (b)(6)

Skype: (b)(6)

Dr. Quay Official Website

STAY SAFE: #1 Best Seller Amazon Medical eBooks

**Sender:** (b)(6) (b)(6)  
Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;  
**CC:** AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

**Date:** Mon, 15 Mar 2021 16:34:42 +0000

(b)(5)

clears w/ the attached edits.

(b)(6)

Senior Advisor  
Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security  
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 12:19 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

Thank you very much. CLEAR.

(b)(6)  
(b)(5)

Get Outlook for iOS

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 9:13:33 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

(b)(5)

Hi folks,

Clear for (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:57 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-

DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

Thanks, (b)(6)

Attached are my edits. (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)  
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:56 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-  
DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

Thanks, (b)(5); (b)(6)  
(b)(5)

Best,  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
U.S. Department of State  
Mobile: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:40 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts  
<T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-  
EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-  
DL@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

Thanks (b)(6) Nothing from me. I am also added (b)(6) from (b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:28 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-  
DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Press Guidance and Support to GPA? PLEASE REVIEW and CLEAR

Colleagues—

Please review and clear on the attached draft points re (b)(5) (b)(6) story by noon or sooner.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:17 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts



<T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Press Guidance and Support to GPA?

Adding (b)(5) press

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:16 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J <(h)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Press Guidance and Support to GPA?

Hi (b)(6) perfect timing. We just drafted something this morning, and will be sending it for clearance momentarily. Best (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2021 11:11 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov> (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Press Guidance and Support to GPA?

Good Morning Everyone,

Last week (b)(6) our Bureau leadership, and I met with the Deputy Spokesperson to help provide background, context, and analysis of the January COVID "Fact Sheet." (b)(5)

(b)(5)  
(b)(5) and

flagged the Fox story that I'm sure most of you have seen already:  
<https://www.foxnews.com/world/top-state-official-coronavirus-bioweapon-accident> (appears to be the same as the NY Post article).

As you all probably know, INR is not normally in the position of drafting press guidance, but we certainly want to be helpful to GPA on the tricky issue of accurately responding to questions on COVID origins and all the various press that is going around attempting to shape the conversation on the topic. (b)(5)

(b)(5)  
 (b)(5) Is  
 there anything (b)(6) and I can do to help?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues  
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)  
 U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
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Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-PC-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-PC-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>;  
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(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
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(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Need State Dept. comment today ideally  
**Date:** Sat, 24 Jul 2021 02:32:59 +0000

(b)(6)

Public Diplomacy-Press Officer  
 ISN/CPA

Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

Work Phone (Mobile) (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, July 23, 2021 8:24:28 PM

**To:** Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fwd: Need State Dept. comment today ideally

FYI, see the request below that (b)(5) but includes a quote from Asher trying to  
 implicate ISN (though not by name). (b)(5)

(b)(5) Daily Caller says they will publish on Monday.

Get Outlook for iOS

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, July 23, 2021 9:53 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** Fwd: Need State Dept. comment today ideally

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Date:** July 23, 2021 at 9:27:07 PM EDT

**To:** AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>,  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** FW: Need State Dept. comment today ideally

(b)(5)

From (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, July 23, 2021 6:44 PM

To: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: FW: Need State Dept. comment today ideally

Colleagues, flagging the below for you – please let me know (b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: Eleanor Bartow <[ebartow@dailycallernewsfoundation.org](mailto:ebartow@dailycallernewsfoundation.org)>

Sent: Friday, July 23, 2021 6:29 PM

To: PA Press Duty <[PAPressDuty@state.gov](mailto:PAPressDuty@state.gov)>

Subject: Need State Dept. comment today ideally

Dear Press Relations:

I'm a reporter at The Daily Caller and planning to publish a story saying the following. Could you please comment? Ideally today but if you need more time can you reply by Monday at noon?

Eleanor Bartow

The U.S. federal government should have stopped funding research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2015 when China reduced its cooperation with the French in building and operating the lab, according to the leader of an investigation on COVID-19's origins by the State Department under the Trump administration.

In 2015, French intelligence officials warned the U.S. State Department and their own foreign ministry that China was cutting back on agreed collaboration at the lab, David Asher told the Daily Caller News Foundation.

By 2017, the French "were kicked out" of the lab and cooperation ceased, leading French officials to warn the State Department that they had grave concerns as to Chinese motivations, according to Asher.

The State Department alleged in January 2021, at the end of the Trump administration, that the Wuhan lab has engaged in classified research on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

...

"The Chinese basically sucked State into its honey pot operation to gain access to U.S. technology, knowledge, and material support. Classic. Just as they have done in every sector," Asher said.

...

The NIH, DOD and USAID should have stopped sending U.S. federal funding to the Wuhan lab back when the French warned the State Department in 2015, Asher said.

State Department officials "in charge of nonproliferation should have shut down all cooperation," he added.

....

In January 2018, a State Department cable warned of a lack of highly trained technicians to operate the lab, as first reported by The Washington Post.

The U.S. officials who had visited the lab and made the warning via the cable were not permitted to return, because they were asking "too many questions," according to Asher.

--

Eleanor Bartow  
Investigative Reporter  
Daily Caller News Foundation

(b)(6)

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Kang, Eliot (h)(6)@state.gov>;

Ganzer, Ann K (h)(6)@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;

ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**To:** [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: My top five EVIL questions for Eliot  
**Date:** Tue, 14 Sep 2021 15:35:54 +0000

Yep. I cribbed/adapted from your questions (to make them harder to answer) and I'm now cribbing again on the answers, but wanted to at least get the qs in front of everyone with time to respond.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 14, 2021 11:35 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: My top five EVIL questions for Eliot

Looks good. I sent you some attempts at pithy answers separately. [(b)(5)]

[(b)(5)]

[(b)(6)]

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 14, 2021 11:27 AM  
**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Subject:** My top five EVIL questions for Eliot

Suggestions? Views on rank order? (murder board now back ON the schedule, at 11:45)-

[(b)(5)]

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6) @state.gov>



**From:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Jake out of state  
**Date:** Sat, 12 Jun 2021 16:14:13 +0000

Hey, that would be great! Where in (b)(6) are you? We just moved from there last year to the edge of (b)(6) but we really liked (b)(6)

Can't believe how much (b)(6) has grown. My standard joke about children is "that's what happens if you water them" but with a name like (b)(6) that would seem mean so I won't apply it to him.

What are you doing at the (b)(6)

I'm having a certain amount of fun right now—some Trump political appointees and their pet contractor were very unhappy that I kept on insisting on things like proper review and clearance before making allegations about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, so now i feature in a big Vanity Fair piece and a Tucker Carlson rant as a Deep State type who suppressed an investigation because I'm in the pocket of Big Virology. It's sort of annoying, but on the other hand I see it as evidence that I did my job effectively, so it's kind of a compliment.

Hope all is well with you and yours!

Chris

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 12, 2021 9:11:26 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** (b)(6) out of state

Chris. FYI I rolled out of State last week. headed to Pentagon. It was awesome working with you and sharing some Oak craziness.

If yr down, leta keep in touch, grab a coffee/drink down the road. I live in (b)(6) so just holler when you get free time.

Included a (b)(6) status pic. (b)(6)

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Recipient:** (b)(6)

**From:** [REDACTED]@state.gov>  
**To:** Stilwell, David R [REDACTED]@state.gov>  
**CC:** SES\_FO Paper <SES\_FOPaper@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: INFO: COVID-19 Origin Investigation Team to Arrive in China in January  
**Date:** Thu, 24 Dec 2020 19:26:29 +0000

Sir,  
Confirming receipt. Happy holidays!

Thanks,

[REDACTED]  
(b)(6)

Special Assistant  
Office of the Secretary  
U.S. Department of State  
Cell: [REDACTED]  
(b)(6)


*NOTE: Please always include the S\_SpecialAssistants@state.gov distro to ensure your message is received.*

**From:** Stilwell, David R [REDACTED]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 24, 2020 1:52 PM  
**To:** SES\_FO Paper <SES\_FOPaper@state.gov>  
**Subject:** INFO: COVID-19 Origin Investigation Team to Arrive in China in January

Mr Secretary

Below is an outstanding report by BBC highlighting there are many possible explanations for the origins of the pandemic—it's balanced and the theme throughout is "the CCP is hiding something". Sets up more discussion on the origins.

The report features British scientist Peter Daszak, whose claims of objectivity belie his significant financial and reputational interests. The WHO is full of similarly entangled members. Assuming no financial incentives (bribes) from Beijing, there are two categories of dupes here: those who helped China advance research on dangerous viruses (and therefore share blame), and those who fear Beijing will deny them further access if they're too critical. Daszak has elements of both. The WHO in many ways falls in the latter category—some are complicit, but it seems most fear they'll lose Beijing's "cooperation." After a year of stalling, it's amazing how they keep claiming cooperation with a straight face.



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## Covid: Wuhan scientist would 'welcome' visit probing lab leak theory

By John Sudworth  
BBC News, Yunnan

BBC team came across roadblocks as they tried to report on research into viruses that bats carry


**A Chinese scientist at the centre of unsubstantiated claims that the coronavirus leaked from her laboratory in the Chinese city of Wuhan has told the BBC she is open to "any kind of visit" to rule it out.**

The surprise statement from Prof Shi Zhengli comes as a World Health Organization team prepares to travel to Wuhan next month to begin its investigation into the origins of Covid-19.



The remote district of Tongguan, in China's south-western province of Yunnan, is hard to reach at the best of times. But when a BBC team tried to visit recently, it was impossible. Plain-clothes police officers and other officials in unmarked cars followed us for miles along the narrow, bumpy roads, stopping when we did, backtracking with us when we were forced to turn around.

We found obstacles in our way, including a "broken-down" lorry, which locals confirmed had been placed across the road a few minutes before we arrived.




And we ran into checkpoints at which unidentified men told us their job was to keep us out.

At first sight, all of this might seem like a disproportionate effort given our intended destination, a nondescript, abandoned copper mine in which, back in 2012, six workers succumbed to a mystery illness that eventually claimed the lives of three of them. But their tragedy, which would otherwise almost certainly have been largely forgotten, has been given new meaning by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Those three deaths are now at the centre of a major scientific controversy about the origins of the virus and the question of whether it came from nature, or from a laboratory. And the attempts of Chinese authorities to stop us reaching the site are a sign of how hard they're working to control the narrative.

For more than a decade, the rolling, jungle-covered hills in Yunnan - and the cave systems within - have been the focus of a giant scientific field study.

**IMAGE COPYRIGHTGETTY**

Chinese virologist Shi Zhengli is seen here inside the laboratory in Wuhan

It has been led by Prof Shi Zhengli from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Prof Shi won international acclaim for her discovery that the illness known as SARS, which killed more than 700 people in 2003, was caused by a virus that probably came from a species of bat in a Yunnan cave.

Ever since, Prof Shi - often referred to as "China's Batwoman" - has been in the vanguard of a project to try to predict and prevent further such outbreaks. By trapping bats, taking faecal samples from them, and then carrying those samples back to the lab in Wuhan, 1,600km (1,000 miles) away, the team behind the project has identified hundreds of new bat coronaviruses.

But the fact that Wuhan is now home to the world's leading coronavirus research facility, as well as the first city to be ravaged by a pandemic outbreak of a deadly new one, has fuelled suspicion that the two things are connected.


I would personally welcome any form of visit, based on an open, transparent, trusting, reliable and reasonable dialogue. But the specific plan is not decided by me.

Prof Shi Zhengli

The Chinese government, the WIV, and Prof Shi have all angrily dismissed the allegation of a virus leak from the Wuhan lab. But with scientists appointed by the World Health Organization (WHO) scheduled to visit Wuhan in January for an inquiry into the origin of the pandemic, Prof Shi - who has given few interviews since the pandemic began - answered a number of BBC questions by email.

"I have communicated with the WHO experts twice," she wrote, when asked if an investigation might help rule out a lab leak and end the speculation. "I have personally and clearly expressed that I would welcome them to visit the WIV," she said. To a follow-up question about whether that would include a formal investigation with access to the WIV's experimental data and laboratory records, Prof Shi said: "I would personally welcome any form of visit based on an open, transparent, trusting, reliable and reasonable dialogue. But the specific plan is not decided by me."

The BBC subsequently received a call from the WIV's press office, saying that Prof Shi was speaking in a personal capacity and her answers had not been approved by the WIV. The BBC denied a request to send the press office a copy of this article in advance.



Dr Peter Daszak: "I've yet to see any evidence at all of a lab leak or a lab involvement in this outbreak"


Many scientists believe that by far the most likely scenario is that Sars-Cov-2, the virus that causes Covid-19, jumped naturally from bats to humans, possibly via an intermediary species. And despite Prof Shi's offer, for now there appears to be little chance of the WHO inquiry looking into the lab-leak theory.

The terms of reference for the WHO inquiry make no mention of the theory, and some members of the 10-person team have all but ruled it out. Peter Daszak, a British zoologist, has been chosen as part of the team because of his leading role in a multimillion dollar, international project to sample wild viruses. It has involved close collaboration with Prof Shi Zhengli in her mass sampling of bats in China, and Dr Daszak previously called the lab-leak theory a "conspiracy theory" and "pure baloney".

"I've yet to see any evidence at all of a lab leak or a lab involvement in this outbreak," he said. "I have seen substantial evidence that these are naturally occurring

phenomena driven by human encroachment into wildlife habitat, which is clearly on display across south-east Asia."

Asked about seeking access to the Wuhan lab to rule the lab-leak theory out, he said: "That's not my job to do that. The WHO negotiated the terms of reference, and they say we're going to follow the evidence, and that's what we've got to do," he added.



**IMAGE COPYRIGHTGETTY**

Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan was linked to early cases of the new coronavirus


One focus of the inquiry will be a market in Wuhan which was known to be trading in wildlife and was linked to a number of early cases, though the Chinese authorities appear to have already discounted it as a source of the virus. Dr Daszak said the WHO team would "look at those clusters of cases, look at the contacts, look at where the animals in the market have come from and see where that takes us".



The deaths of the three Tongguan workers following exposure to a mineshaft full of bats raised suspicions that they'd succumbed to a bat coronavirus. It was exactly the kind of animal-to-human "spillover" that was driving the WIV to sample and test bats in Yunnan. It is no surprise then that, following those deaths, the WIV scientists began sampling bats in the Tongguan mineshaft in earnest, making multiple visits over the next three years and detecting 293 coronaviruses. **But apart from one brief paper**, very little was published about the viruses they collected on those trips.

In January this year, **Prof Shi Zhengli became one of the first people in the world to sequence Sars-Cov-2**, which was already spreading rapidly through the streets and homes of her city. She then compared the long string of letters representing the virus's unique genetic code with the extensive library of other viruses collected and stored over the years. And she discovered that her database contained the closest known relative of Sars-Cov-2.

RaTG13 is a virus whose name has been derived from the bat it was extracted from (Rhinolophus affinis, Ra), the place it was found (Tongguan, TG), and the year it was identified, 2013. Seven years after it was found in that mineshaft, RaTG13 was about to become one of the most hotly contested scientific subjects of our time.




**IMAGE COPYRIGHTGETTY** China imposed tough restrictions on Wuhan to stop the spread of the virus

There have been many well-documented cases of viruses leaking from labs. The first SARS virus, for example, leaked twice from the National Institute of Virology in Beijing in 2004, long after the outbreak had been brought under control.

The practice of genetically manipulating viruses is also not new, allowing scientists to make them more infectious or more deadly, so they can assess the threat and, perhaps, develop treatments or vaccines. And from the moment it was isolated and sequenced, scientists have been struck by the remarkable ability of Sars-Cov-2 to infect humans. The possibility that it acquired that ability as a result of manipulation in a laboratory was taken seriously enough for an influential group of international scientists to address it head on.

In what has become the definitive paper ruling out the possibility of a lab leak, RaTG13 has a starring role. Published in March in the magazine Nature Medicine, it suggests

that if there had been a leak, Prof Shi Zhengli would have found a much closer match in her database than RaTG13. While RaTG13 is the closest known relative - at 96.2% similarity - it is still too distant to have been manipulated and changed into Sars-Cov-2. Sars-Cov-2, the authors concluded, was likely to have gained its unique efficiency through a long, undetected period of circulation in humans or animals of a natural and milder precursor virus that eventually evolved into the potent, deadly form first detected in Wuhan in 2019.



**IMAGE COPYRIGHTGETTY** Medics and scientists in Wuhan battled to control the early stages of the pandemic

Where though, some scientists are beginning to wonder, are those reservoirs of earlier natural infection? Dr Daniel Lucey is a physician and infectious disease professor at the Georgetown Medical Centre in Washington DC and a veteran of many pandemics - SARS in China, Ebola in Africa, Zika in Brazil. He is certain that China has already conducted thorough searches for evidence of precursor viruses in stored human samples in hospitals and in animal populations.

"They have the capability, they have the resources and they have the motivation, so of course they've done the studies in animals and in humans," he said. Finding the origin of an outbreak was vital, he said, not just for wider scientific understanding, but also to stop it emerging again. "We should search until we find it. I think it's findable and I think it's quite possible it's already been found," he said. "But then the question arises, why hasn't it been disclosed?"

Dr Lucey still believes that Sars-Cov-2 is most likely to have a natural origin, but he does not want the alternatives to be so readily ruled out. "So here we are, 12, 13 months out since the first recognised case of Covid-19 and we haven't found the animal source," he said. "So, to me, it's all the more reason to investigate alternative explanations."

Might a Chinese laboratory have had a virus they were working on that was genetically closer to Sars-Cov-2, and would they tell us now if they did? "Not everything that's done is published," Dr Lucey said.

It's a point I put to Peter Daszak, the member of the WHO origins study team. "You know, I've worked with the WIV for a good decade or more," he said. "I know some of the people there pretty well and I have visited the labs frequently, I've met and had dinner with them over 15 years. I'm working in China with eyes wide open, and I'm racking my brain back in time for the slightest hint of something untoward. And I've never seen that."

Asked if those friendships and funding relationships with the WIV presented a conflict of interest with his role on the inquiry, he said: "We file our papers; it's all there for everyone to see."

And his collaboration with the WIV, he said, "makes me one of the people on the planet who knows the most about the origins of these bat coronaviruses in China".

The conclusion [of the Kunming Hospital University thesis] is neither based on evidence nor logic. But it's used by conspiracy theorists to doubt me

Prof Shi Zhengli

China may have provided only limited data about its hunt for the origin of Sars-Cov-2, but it has begun to promote a theory of its own. Based on a few inconclusive studies conducted by scientists in Europe that suggest Covid-19 may have been circulating earlier than previously thought, state propaganda is full of stories suggesting the virus didn't start in China at all.

In the absence of proper data, speculation is only likely to grow, much of it focused on RaTG13 and its origins in a Tongguan mineshaft. Old academic papers have been dug

up online that appear to differ from the WIV's statements about the sick mine workers - among them a thesis by a student at the Kunming Hospital University.

"I've just downloaded the Kunming Hospital University student's masters thesis and read it," Prof Shi told the BBC. "The narrative doesn't make sense," she said. "The conclusion is neither based on evidence nor logic. But it's used by conspiracy theorists to doubt me. If you were me, what you would do?"

Prof Shi has also faced questions about why the WIV's online public database of viruses was suddenly taken offline. She told the BBC that the WIV's website and the staff's work emails and personal emails had been attacked, and the database taken offline for security reasons. "All our research results are published in English journals in the form of papers," she said. "Virus sequences are saved in the [US-run] GenBank database too. It's completely transparent. We have nothing to hide."

There are important questions to be asked in the Yunnan countryside, not just by scientists, but by journalists too. After a decade of sampling and experimenting on viruses collected from bats, we now know that back in 2013 the closest known ancestor was discovered of a future threat that would claim well over a million lives and devastate the global economy. Yet the WIV, according to the published information, did nothing with it, except sequence it and enter it into a database. Ought that to call into question the very premise on which the expensive, and some would say risky, mass sampling of wild viruses is based?

"To say that we didn't do enough is absolutely correct," Peter Daszak told the BBC. "To say that we failed is not fair at all. What we should have been doing is 10 times the amount of work on these viruses." Both Dr Daszak and Prof Shi are adamant that pandemic prevention research is vital, urgent work.

"Our research is forward-looking, and it's difficult for non-professionals to understand," Prof Shi wrote by email. "In the face of countless micro-organisms that exist in nature, we humans are very small." The WHO is promising an "open-minded" inquiry into the origins of the novel coronavirus, but the Chinese government is not keen on questions, at least not from journalists.

After leaving Tongguan, the BBC team tried to drive a few hours north to the cave where Prof Shi carried out her ground-breaking research on SARS almost a decade ago.

Still being followed by several unmarked cars, we hit another roadblock, and were told there was no way through. A few hours later, we discovered that local traffic had been diverted onto a dirt track that skirted the obstruction, but as we attempted to use the same route, we met yet another "broken down" car in our path.

We were trapped in a field for over an hour, before finally being forced to head for the airport.

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Daszak interests:

<https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02473-4>


**NEWS Q&A**

21 AUGUST 2020

# **‘Heinous!’: Coronavirus researcher shut down for Wuhan-lab link slams new funding restrictions**

Peter Daszak, president of the research organization EcoHealth Alliance, describes how he has been caught in political cross-hairs over his partnership with a virology lab in China.

**Nidhi Subbaraman**



Peter Daszak and others visit a cave at Seven Star Park in Guilin, China, where visitors are likely to encounter bats. Credit: EcoHealth Alliance

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The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has reinstated a research organization's multimillion-dollar grant to study how coronaviruses move from bats to people — which it cancelled in a controversial move earlier this year. But as Peter Daszak, the head of the small non-profit organization — EcoHealth Alliance in New York City — found out in early July, the funding can't be used unless the organization meets what he says are absurd conditions. The demands, detailed in a letter from the NIH, are politically motivated, he says.

To carry out its research, EcoHealth Alliance partners with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China, which has been at the centre of unfounded rumours that the COVID-19 pandemic was caused by a coronavirus released from its laboratory. The NIH cancelled EcoHealth Alliance's grant in April, days after US President Donald Trump told a reporter that the United States would stop funding work at the WIV.

EcoHealth Alliance and Daszak have been working with Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the WIV, for more than 15 years. Since 2014, an NIH grant has funded EcoHealth's research in China, which involves collecting faeces and other samples from bats, and blood samples from people at risk of infection from bat-origin viruses. Scientific studies suggest that the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus most likely originated in bats, and research on the topic could be crucial to identifying other viruses that might cause future pandemics. The WIV is a subrecipient on the grant.


The NIH makes seven demands of EcoHealth; these were first reported by the *Wall Street Journal* this week, and have been viewed by *Nature*. The agency asks EcoHealth to obtain a vial of the SARS-CoV-2 sample that was used by the WIV to determine the virus's genetic sequence. It also requests that EcoHealth arranges an inspection of the WIV by US federal officials.

Daszak calls the demands from the NIH "heinous", and worries that the funding freeze is delaying vital work to identify and prevent the next pandemic. The NIH declined to comment, saying that the agency does not disclose internal deliberations on a specific grant.

In an e-mail to *Nature*, Shi calls the NIH's demands "outrageous" and echoes Daszak's assertions that the agency's demands are unrelated to the WIV's collaboration with EcoHealth.

*Nature* spoke with Daszak about being caught in the political cross-hairs.





Peter Daszak on the rooftop at his New York office. Credit: EcoHealth Alliance

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## **How have you been doing since your grant was suspended?**

It's just a very difficult and disappointing and worrisome time. I've lost people that I know to COVID-19. It's a bat-origin coronavirus. We should have been there trying to find out why this thing emerged. And right now I'm sat in my house, looking out the window, unable to do this work, because the NIH has told us that it's not appropriate. It's extremely frustrating.

## **What is the aim of the project that's been affected?**

We have specific aims: to go into rural regions of China to find bat-origin coronaviruses and determine which ones are high risk, then to work with local communities in rural China in five provinces. We target communities that are at high risk for viral 'spillover' and see whether they're getting infected — and then finally see whether people are getting sick from novel coronaviruses.

## **How have you responded to the NIH's letter?**

We've written to the NIH and said: we think that this is inappropriate and wrong for the following reasons. Please, allow us to continue this work. But I doubt they're going to do that right now.

## **How do you plan to continue your work?**

The NIH have told us not to work on this project. Obviously, we're not going to break any NIH rules. But we have an ongoing collaboration, we have data that we've gathered over 15 years of working in China — 5 years under a previous grant from the NIH which haven't been published yet. So we need to carry on with that work.

## **How is your work relevant to the pandemic today?**


We estimate that every single day, somebody in China or in southeast Asia gets infected with a new bat coronavirus. Right now, somebody is walking around, and they might be developing the first signs of a cough from the next COVID. We fully intend to be an organization that helps to prevent the next pandemic. That is our mission.

## **The NIH has asked you to obtain a vial of isolated SARS-CoV-2 from the WIV.**

# Did you work on the novel coronavirus during your project?

The grant isn't used to fund work on SARS-CoV-2. Our organization has not actually published any data on SARS-CoV-2. We work on bat coronaviruses that are out there in the wild and try to predict what the next one is. We don't work on sequencing SARS-CoV-2.

It's absurd because it's absolutely outside the remit of the work we do.



Daszak partners with Shi Zhengli, shown here inside a bio-safety lab at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Credit: Johannes Eisle/AFP via Getty

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# Your grant has received widespread attention in the past few months. How has that been?

Conspiracy-theory outlets and politically motivated organizations have made Freedom of Information Act requests on our grants and all of our letters and e-mails to the NIH. We don't think it's fair that we should have to reveal everything we do. When you submit a grant, you put in all your best ideas. We don't want to hand those over to conspiracy theorists for them to publish and ruin and make a mockery of.

## What are you most worried about?

We're not a political organization. We're just trying to do good work to prevent pandemics.

We're feeling the pressure of a very aggressive administration in the US picking fights with a country where we happen to be collaborating. And it turns out that they decided that this issue and our work is going to be one of the angles of attack. That's extremely unfortunate. The winner in all of this is the virus, and not just this virus — SARS-CoV-2 — but all the other viruses.

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**Subject:** Re: Hansen after Covid-19, Gertz Coronavirus origin, Gertz China crackdown on critics. Putin on rockets and space,

**Date:** Sat, 11 Apr 2020 17:06:16 -0400

P.s., For those who think I've made a politically incorrect stereotype of Chinese culture, see this paper, at page 60, et seq: .

On Apr 11, 2020, at 10:49 AM, (b)(6) wrote:

Mark - Yes; however China especially preys on corporate greed in the West, and most especially in/with corrupt regions and organizations. This has been is very effective and is likely unstoppable. Add that to the cultural deception that comes from Confucius and Sun Tsu, and one sees the reality of Kipling...Lastly, unless one has lived there and/or dealt with them, the only learning about China comes the hard way. Compared to the Chinese, the Soviets were rookies! Cheers, (b)(6) [USTDC '72-'75, SOFA].

On Apr 11, 2020, at 9:18 AM, (b)(6) wrote:

Comment:Very good article by Hansen. If you allow China to continue to destroy our industrial base it will be ruling the world.

# Will America awaken from the COVID-19 crisis as a roaring giant or crying baby?


We must ensure Americans control food, fuel, medicine and strategic industries



Illustration on America waking up in the coronavirus crisis by Alexander Hunter/The Washington Times [more >](#)

Print

By [Victor Davis Hanson](#) - - Wednesday, April 8, 2020



## **[Victor Davis Hanson | Stories - Washington Times](#)**

[The Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com)

[Read the latest stories and columns from staff writer Victor Davis Hanson in The Washington Times.](#)

Hansen,

### **ANALYSIS/OPINION:**

Marshal Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto commanded the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II until he was killed in April 1943. Despite the dialogue from the 1970 WWII film “Tora! Tora! Tora!” Yamamoto probably did not say in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”

But Yamamoto likely either wrote or said something similar: "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."

Yamamoto summed up a general feeling among the Japanese admirals that the huge industrial capacity of the United States — which had been asleep during the Great Depression — along with the righteous anger and frenzy of an aroused American democracy would ensure the destruction of the Japanese Empire in short order.

They were right.

In 1940, there were fewer than 500,000 service members in the U.S. military. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, that number had grown to nearly 2.2 million. By 1945, more than 12 million Americans were in the armed services. It was an astonishing mobilization for a nation of fewer than 140 million people.

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The United States started the war with seven fleet aircraft carriers and one escort carrier. By war's end, it was deploying 27 fleet and 72 escort carriers.

The U.S. Navy ended the war with a fleet eight times larger than it was at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The American armada would become larger in total tonnage than all the world's fleets in 1945 combined.

More incredible, by the end of 1944, the American gross domestic product exceeded the economic output of all the major belligerents on both sides of World War II put together: The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and Germany.

As we struggle to defeat the coronavirus, an aroused America is talking grandly of restructuring the U.S. economy.

Politicians promise that major industries — pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, rare earths, military technologies — will return home to create millions of new jobs and better protect the population in times of crisis.

There are other vows to recalibrate our relationship with China to ensure that when the next successor to SARS and COVID-19 hits, American lives will not be jeopardized by the duplicity of the Chinese government. At the beginning of the outbreak, Beijing hid the origins, nature and transmissibility of the virus, then lied about its supposedly brilliant control of the epidemic.

The American public is already asking tough questions.

Does the United States really need almost 15,000 people flying in from China each day? At a time when American students owe \$1.5 trillion in student loans, is it smart to have some 360,000 Chinese students enrolled in U.S. colleges? Is it safe to fund hundreds of labs on university campuses that conduct joint research with Chinese academics?



Does the United States really wish to curtail fracking, which has made it the largest producer of natural gas in the world and ensured that a quarantined America has plenty of fuel?

Is it prudent to release precious irrigation water out to the Pacific Ocean when California is the richest and most diverse producer of food in America?

Post-virus America can awake from this epidemic and economic shutdown in one of two different ways.

One, we can wake up as we did on Dec. 8, 1941, to ensure that Americans control their own fundamentals of life — food, fuel, medicine and strategic industries — without dependency on illiberal regimes. The military can refocus our defenses against nuclear missiles, cyberwarfare and biological weapons. On the home front, diversity is fine, but in a national crisis as serious as this one, the unity that arises from confidence in shared American citizenship saves lives.

Our other choice is to keep bickering and suffering amnesia, remaining as vulnerable as we were in the past.

We can scapegoat and play the blame game. We can talk not of an America in crisis, but of the virus' effects on particular groups. We can decide that it is mean or even racist and xenophobic to hold the Chinese government accountable for its swath of viral destruction — and so we will not.

We can ridicule the idea of Americans again making their own things and call it protectionism or economic chauvinism. We can conduct endless congressional inquiries about who said what and when about the virus, and perhaps reopen impeachment.

Or we can have bipartisan commissions decide how best to return key industries to the United States, prepare for the next epidemic, and pay down the enormous debt we have incurred to defeat COVID-19.

In other words, the choice is ours whether America awakens as a roaring giant or a crying baby.

• *Victor Davis Hanson, a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, is the author of "The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won" (Basic Books, 2017).*

## Coronavirus lab escape theory advances

Follow



A market in Wuhan, China, has been widely reported to be the origin of the outbreak of a bat virus that erupted into a pandemic, but the market in question does not sell bats. (Associated Press) [more >](#)

Print

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Wednesday, April 8, 2020

For weeks after the COVID-19 outbreak began, mainstream media outlets, reflecting propaganda themes voiced by the Chinese government, have sought to label public discussion about a laboratory origin of the coronavirus as an unfounded conspiracy theory.

China's government and many scientists insist that the virus resulted from a naturally occurring mutation from bats to humans, with a possible wild animal host as an intermediary carrier.

Further, critics of the lab escape theory deceptively have conflated the idea that China bioengineered the virus as a weapon together with the possible inadvertent escape of a bat coronavirus.

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As reported by The Washington Times, China has discovered some 2,000 viruses, including deadly bat coronaviruses, in the past 12 years, carrying out the research at a less secure laboratory in Wuhan some 3 miles from the suspected center of the outbreak, the Huanan Seafood Market, which traffics in wild animals. That laboratory and a key researcher, Tian Junhua, have been working on bat coronaviruses in a search for vaccines to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) that first broke out in 2003.

A March article in The Washington Post ridiculed the idea that the virus escaped from a lab as a "fringe" theory. Likewise, The New York Times labeled lab origin a "conspiracy theory."

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The Post's **David Ignatius**, however, surprised many last week with a column pointing out questions about claims that the outbreak originated at the wild animal market in Wuhan. No bats were sold at the market.

Mr. Ignatius, a frequent source of leaks from liberal U.S. intelligence analysts, reported that American intelligence agencies do not think the coronavirus outbreak is deliberate wrongdoing by the Chinese. But they have not ruled out an accidental release of a virus that had been gathered for scientific study.

The reception of the theory of an accidental leak is changing among scientists as well.

Last month, the authoritative Nature Medicine published new information from a group of top U.S. scientists who have studied virus. The authors include **Kristian G. Andersen, Andrew Rambaut, W. Ian Lipkin, Edward C. Holmes and Robert F. Garry**, who have all written on the new virus.

The scientists acknowledged in a letter that the origin of the virus is not known but said there was strong scientific evidence it was not manipulated in a laboratory. They believe the virus jumped through “natural selection in humans following zoonotic [animal] transfer.”

But there is a second theory based on China’s known work on bat coronaviruses at level two security laboratories — far lower than the high-security level four lab at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. China has experienced lab escapes of viruses in the past, including the SARS virus. Thus, the new coronavirus, known as SARS-CoV-2, could have leaked.

“We must therefore examine the possibility of an inadvertent laboratory release of SARS-CoV-2,” the scientists stated.

The Epoch Times went further in a detailed investigation of the origin of the coronavirus broadcast Tuesday in an online documentary.

The newspaper’s investigation uncovered evidence — a Chinese scientific paper published on Jan. 7 in Nature — indicating that the new coronavirus is closely related to two SARS-like virus samples from bats obtained by the People’s Liberation Army and studied at a military research center in Nanjing, China.

China’s government this week renewed calls for greater cooperation in dealing with the pandemic. Beijing, however, has not disclosed what it knows about the origin of the virus or its extensive bat coronavirus research done at the Wuhan laboratories.

### **GRAHAM: SEND PANDEMIC BILL TO CHINA**

Congress is stepping up calls for China to be held accountable for the pandemic causing mass death and global economic dislocation.

“The world should send a bill to China,” said Sen. **Lindsey Graham**, South Carolina Republican. “Without Chinese misconduct, there would be no pandemic, and they need to pay a price.”

Noting that the deadly virus spread is the third time China has caused a pandemic, Mr. Graham said China should pay “big time.”

Mr. Graham wants to end U.S. reliance on pharmaceutical supplies from China and sharply curtail trading relations by the United States and the rest of the world. He also wants China to close its “wet markets,” the wild animal markets that are suspected of being a source of the coronavirus outbreak.

“When they give us stuff, it’s like an arsonist who set a fire giving us a bucket of water. You shouldn’t be grateful because without the arsonist there would be no fire,” he said in interviews this week on Fox News Channel.

Rep. **Jim Banks**, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, this week called on the State and Justice departments to sue China for damages caused by the coronavirus in the U.N. International Court of Justice.

“If China’s leaders hadn’t become embarrassed by the outbreak and tried to cover up its spread, the world may have had a better chance to prepare for this or even contain it in Wuhan or China,” the Indiana Republican said.

“Instead, we have a pandemic. China shoulders most of that blame. Rather than succumb to the propaganda and spin of Chinese officials, the world must hold them accountable for mishandling this outbreak. If the United Nations cannot even do that, it has completely lost its purpose.”

Mr. Banks wants Beijing to pay reparations for failing to alert the world to the virus outbreak.

Sen. **Marsha Blackburn**, Tennessee Republican, also is advocating for forcing China to pay damages. Ms. Blackburn has called for China to waive some of the nearly \$1 trillion debt of the U.S. government.

## PAPER RIDICULES BEIJING’S CRITICISM

Chinese diplomats are known for going to great lengths when it comes to the work of foreign embassies, recalling English author and diplomat Sir **Henry Wotton**’s description of a foreign ambassador as a gentleman “sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.”

Critics have described Chinese diplomats as akin to mafia lawyers sent out to defend criminal clients — the leaders of the Communist Party. Around the world, China is deploying its diplomats to write articles and letters to defend Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic.

On Saturday, Australia’s Daily Telegraph did a journalistic takedown of a letter to the newspaper sent by the Chinese consulate general in Sydney, a letter that was sharply critical of the paper’s pandemic coverage.

The Chinese official, who signed the letter but was not named by the paper, characterized The Daily Telegraph’s coverage as being “full of ignorance, prejudice and arrogance.”

In response, columnist **Tim Blair** wrote, “If a state-owned newspaper in China received this kind of complaint, subsequent days would involve journalists waking up in prison with their organs harvested.”

On the origin of the virus, the consulate said that subject was an issue requiring professional, science-based assessment.

“Sure it does. How professional and science-based was the claim published on March 12 by China’s foreign ministry spokesman **Zhao Lijian** that ‘it might be U.S. Army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan?’” Mr. Blair wrote.

The consulate then asked for the real motive behind critics who link the virus to China and state the virus was made in China.

“Our motive is accuracy,” Mr. Blair said.

The people of Wuhan made a huge effort and personal sacrifice to stop the epidemic, the letter said.

Mr. Blair retorted: "Wuhan's Dr. **Li Wenliang** indeed made a huge effort to warn people about the coronavirus outbreak. Then, as The New York Times reported: 'In early January, he was called in by both medical officials and the police, and forced to sign a statement denouncing his warning as an unfounded and illegal rumor.'


"And now he's dead, so that's 'personal sacrifice' covered as well," he wrote. Dr. Li died of COVID-19 complications.

The consulate letter noted China's epidemic prevention and control was part of "the people-centered philosophy of the Communist Party of China and the strong advantages of the Chinese system."

In 2018, Amnesty International reported that China executed more citizens than the rest of the world combined, Mr. Blair noted.

"Please tell us more about your 'people-centered philosophy' and how many bullets it requires," he said.

The consulate concluded that the newspaper's articles have "wantonly attacked and smeared the CPC and the Chinese government with vicious language."



**Chinese Government - Bio, News, Photos -  
Washington Times**

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[Latest news and commentary on Chinese Government including photos, videos, quotations, and a biography.](#)

“And yet we haven’t been jailed or shot! Where’s the justice in that?” Mr. Blair said.

• *Contact Bill Gertz on Twitter at @BillGertz*

## Crack down on critic highlights growing opposition to Xi's rule



FILE - In this Dec. 3, 2012, file photo, Chinese real estate mogul Ren Zhiqiang poses for a photo in his office in Beijing. Ren, a prominent Communist party member who criticized Chinese leader Xi Jinping's handling of the coronavirus ... [more >](#)

Print

By [Bill Gertz](#) - The Washington Times - Wednesday, April 8, 2020

The investigation of a prominent Chinese Communist Party critic of President [Xi Jinping](#) is the latest sign of growing opposition to his rule in the aftermath of the deadly coronavirus pandemic.

Authorities announced in a brief statement this week that [Ren Zhiqiang](#), a property tycoon who is close to Vice President [Wang Qishan](#), is under investigation for unspecified “serious violations of law and discipline.”

Until this year, Mr. [Ren](#), a party member and “princeling,” as the offspring of the communist elite are called, was a rare public critic of Mr. Xi, one who has since 2016 avoided imprisonment or worse. Analysts attributed his survival to support for his views among some senior party leaders.

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In February, however, Mr. [Ren](#) apparently sealed his fate by writing a letter harshly critical of Mr. [Xi](#)'s handling of the coronavirus outbreak, part of a widespread albeit quiet condemnation of the president's response.

Health researchers say [China](#) covered up early indications of the disease, silenced doctors who tried to warn the public and allowed millions of people in Wuhan, the center of the outbreak, to leave the city for the Lunar New Year, thus spreading the disease. Mr. [Ren](#)'s Feb. 18 letter said the crisis validated his 2016 charges that the lack of an independent press had given the government unchecked power.

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“When there is no media to represent the people and report the real situation, we are only left with people losing their lives from the virus, and the collective harm from the seriously ill political system as the result,” Mr. Ren wrote, comparing Mr. Xi’s rule to the personality cult of Mao Zedong and ridiculing his Feb. 3 speech to party leaders on the crisis.

“Standing there was not some emperor showing us his ‘new clothes,’ but a clown with no clothes on who was still determined to play emperor,” the letter read in part.

Mr. Ren disappeared from public view March 12 and has not surfaced since. The charge of violating the law indicates he will face some type of trial in the future.

Analysts say Mr. Ren speaks for Xi opponents in the Chinese Communist Party. Wu Guoguang, a former Chinese official, said the circulation of Mr. Ren’s letter indicates “the rise of discontent among CCP elites against Xi.”

“The variety of crises the Xi regime has experienced — and, actually created — especially the Wuhan-originated global pandemic, has helped to mobilize internal resistance to Xi to a new extent Xi has never seen since coming to power,” said Mr. Wu, now a political science professor at University of Victoria, in British Columbia, Canada.

Xi in control

For now, however, the leader seems in full control. The use of a letter written by a connected party member shows the weakness of those seeking to challenge Mr. Xi through institutional channels, Mr. Wu said.

The investigation revealed this week appears to be an effort by Mr. Xi to suppress any voices of discontent and to deter further criticism.

But Mr. Xi faces opposition from party elites who are seeking a return to the reforms of former leader Deng Xiaoping. Deng blocked radicals in the party after Mao’s death and put China on the path of economic reform while retaining the communist system.

Andrew Nathan, a China expert at Columbia University, said domestic opposition to Mr. Xi is present but there are no signs of high-level dissension against him.

“Lots of people at lower levels in the party are disgruntled, but as far as I can tell Xi has surrounded himself with loyalists at the higher levels,” he said.

Mr. Nathan compared the situation to the limited opposition to President Trump within the Republican Party: “Xi is delivering for the CCP like Trump is delivering for the Republicans.”

Mr. Xi has ruled since 2012 with an iron fist and used a nationwide anti-corruption campaign to crack down on perceived rivals. Hundreds of party officials, including several in the most senior ranks of the party and the People’s Liberation Army, were felled in the campaign that consolidated the president’s power.

Targets have included Zhou Yongkang, once a member of the Politburo Standing Committee; regional Communist Party Chief Bo Xilai; and two generals on the Central Military Commission, also headed by Mr. Xi.

The Commission for Discipline Inspection in Beijing, the party's investigatory arm, said it was investigating Mr. Ren, a former senior executive of the state-controlled property developer Huayuan Real Estate Group with a huge social media following.

His 2016 social media post criticizing what he called the "complete split of two opposing camps" — the 1.4 billion people and the 87.8 million Party members — struck at a central tenet of the ruling party since taking power in 1949: that the people and party are one.

But after cyber authorities deleted his Weibo account, the official Beijing city Communist Party Propaganda Department website posted a statement that questioned whether senior party leaders were fostering Mr. Ren's "anti-Party" critiques.

That was viewed a critique of Mr. Wang, at the time a Politburo Standing Committee member and now vice president. Mr. Wang is viewed a China's financial czar who controls much of the vast Chinese economy but who has been marginalized in recent months by Mr. Xi.

Back in 2016, Mr. Wang's discipline inspection commission issued a statement supporting Mr. Ren, pointedly noting that Mr. Xi himself once suggested that it was "better for a single man to challenge conventional wisdom by speaking out than for a thousand people to nod their heads in unquestioning agreement."



**Ren Zhiqiang - Bio, News, Photos - Washington Times**

The Washington Times <http://www.washingtontimes.com>

Latest news and commentary on Ren Zhiqiang including photos, videos, quotations, and a biography.



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<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/apr/8/crack-down-ren-zhiqiang-highlights-growing-opposit/>

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
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(U.S. Navy photo/Released)

Hypersonic Weapons

COVID-19 and the Weapons of the Future

[Seth Cropsey](#)



**[Seth Cropsey - The American Interest](#)**

The coronavirus outbreak is straining U.S. deterrence and power projection abilities—and revealing our glaring vulnerabilities in the realm of hypersonic weapons.

The *USS Ronald Reagan* is tied up in the Japanese port of Yokosuka: Two of her crew have tested positive for COVID-19. *USS Theodore Roosevelt*, the other U.S. aircraft carrier in the West Pacific, is pier side at Guam with a skeletal crew aboard after 70 of her crew tested positive (this number has now grown to nearly 300). Until both ships can safely return to sea, U.S. deterrence and power projection abilities in the West Pacific are under great strain.

By coincidence, on March 19, the Navy successfully tested a major part of its hypersonic missile program, the missile's glide body which is designed to carry conventional weapons. Development of hypersonic missiles would not only provide valuable information about how to defend against the hypersonic missiles that Russia claims it possesses and China is developing. It would also be an effective instrument in convincing these and other potential foes that it would be foolish to take advantage if U.S. naval forces are, for whatever reason, unable immediately to respond to crises.

Hypersonic weapons describe a family of delivery systems that travel at between Mach 5 and Mach 10—that is, at between one and two miles per second. In comparison, the U.S. Tomahawk flies at subsonic speeds, at around Mach 0.7—some 550 miles per hour. Tomahawk missiles were used in 2017 following the Syrian government's chemical attacks and could reach a target 600 miles distant in about an hour; a hypersonic weapon could strike the same target in *ten minutes*.

These kinds of capabilities offer a strategically decisive advantage. A nation's current ground and sea-based early-warning and air-defense systems are limited in a variety of ways, including by the earth's curvature. A missile flying closer to the ground or sea can evade detection for longer than one with the high altitude of a ballistic trajectory. Detection and targeting takes time. To give you a sense of the figures involved, an Aegis Combat System responds to a threat in several seconds. A hypersonic weapon covering 20 miles in 10 seconds can scream past air defenses, evade intercepting missiles, and overcome point-defense systems.

Defenses are, of course, possible. Congress has provided the money and direction for the Defense Department to begin testing space-based sensors that can track hypersonic missiles by the end of next year. Tracking is the first and indispensable step in an effective defense. Satellites equipped with more advanced sensors, integrated with tracking and fire-control systems, could relay information to kill vehicles or directed-energy weapons that would intercept a hypersonic missile. U.S. defenses against hypersonics, however, do not exist today. Current U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems such as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense—systems that were designed to protect against ballistic missiles, including ICBMs—did not anticipate a maneuverable, hypersonic threat. Our adversaries understand this and are developing weapons to target not only our forward-deployed forces, but also the mainland.

Historically, hypersonic projectiles were first tested in the early Cold War. In 1949, the United States tested the two-stage hypersonic "Bumper" rocket, built from a WAC Corporal sounding rocket and a German V-2. It achieved Mach 6.7. A decade later, in 1959, the United States first tested the X-15, a hypersonic rocket-propelled aircraft. It also reached Mach 6.7, notably with

aeronautical engineer and test pilot William J. Knight at the controls. The speed that hypersonic weapons travel at creates similar issues to those that these earlier atmospheric re-entry vehicles encountered. Only in the early 2000s did engineering progress enough to enable large-scale hypersonic testing and production. A fully hypersonic cruise missile (which travels at these speeds throughout its flight) or a “boost-glide” vehicle (which detaches from another system for its final attack phase) is today within the United States’ reach.

Russia has been the loudest in trumpeting its hypersonic program. Since March 2018, Russia has stated openly that it is modernizing its nuclear arsenal with the development of six new weapons. Western media focused upon two of these programs: the Poseidon nuclear-tipped torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered nuclear-armed cruise missile. The systems they have ignored are far more dangerous—its three hypersonic delivery vehicles.

Closest to operational deployment is the Kinzhal medium-range ballistic missile. An upgraded version of Russia’s ground-based Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile, the Kinzhal will be deployed on MiG-31K interceptors, likely carrying a 10-50 megaton warhead. If carried on a MiG-31K, the Kinzhal’s 1,200-mile range excludes targeting U.S. territory. Rather, the Kinzhal would be used to attack American and allied installations in Eastern Europe. They would be particularly useful in a confrontation over the Baltic.

Meanwhile, both the Avangard Boost-Glide Vehicle paired with the Sarmat ICBM, and the submarine-deployed Tsirkon Hypersonic cruise missile, would be able to target the United States. Indeed, Russian state media has suggested the Pentagon and Camp David as potential targets for Tsirkon-armed nuclear submarines. While Russia has grossly exaggerated the maturity of both the Avangard/Sarmat and Tsirkon, the fact of their being in development cannot be taken lightly. Not since the Cuban Missile Crisis has a foreign power so directly threatened American territory.

China has focused on building a universal hypersonic glide vehicle mechanism that it can deploy aboard several existing missile designs, upgrading them to hypersonic status. This strategy, while less flamboyant than Russia’s, is more concerning: China may be able to field operationally *and* strategically relevant hypersonic weapons within the next few years. The DF-17 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile and DF-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile are both expected to be hypersonic-capable when upgraded using the DF-ZF glide vehicle mechanism. Both missiles, particularly if armed with a nuclear warhead, can target U.S. Carrier Strike Groups and major air bases in the Western Pacific. Even the U.S. mainland is vulnerable due to the DF-ZF’s speed and maneuverability.

Technological challenges make comprehensive hypersonic defenses difficult at this time and the Department of Defense has not demonstrated a clear intent to invest the necessary resources to protect against these systems. The United States’ best policy, therefore, in the near term, is the development of an effective offense. American strategists have recognized the utility of hypersonic weapons, particularly in the Western Pacific against Chinese anti-access defense networks. Fortunately, U.S. defense planners have not sat on their hands. Research began in the early 2000s with the Prompt Global Strike program. Currently, the United States has eight hypersonic weapons programs, divided amongst the Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA. None,

however, have produced more than an operational prototype. That said, while the real maturity of Russian and Chinese programs remains unclear, the sheer diversity of tested U.S. systems demonstrates inherent American technical capacity. Still, absent a formal DoD program and a clear deployment timeline, the United States risks falling far behind its adversaries.

Of course, the contemporary Pentagon has other priorities. The Navy must fund its *Columbia*-class ballistic missile submarines and the Air Force its B-21 Raider bomber. The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will need to develop unmanned technologies or risk ceding air dominance to a peer adversary. Furthermore, the United States has not mass produced an advanced munition arguably since the Tomahawk cruise missile in the 1980s. Throughout two decades of Middle Eastern counterinsurgency, the American munition of choice was the Joint Directed Attack Munition, a “dumb bomb” with a modified laser guidance system. It is as if the U.S. Army’s 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, one of America’s premier rapid-response and warfighting tools, deployed to Iraq with Springfield bolt-action rifles and early-20<sup>th</sup>-century fixed machine guns, but sporting modern scopes and wearing body armor. Against a lower-level threat, updated technology may be effective. But Chinese and Russian infantry divisions use modern weapons and technology.

We therefore face not simply budgetary issues, but structural choices within the U.S. defense establishment. Without a budget increase, current U.S. force structure projections are unachievable. Yet, even before imagining the vast sums that will now be spent because of the coronavirus, the U.S. defense budget was facing budget cuts in the coming years. The United States therefore risks choosing between a medium-sized fleet entirely unready for combat and a much smaller fleet fielding modern weapons, but easily overwhelmed by a numerically superior, technologically equal adversary.

Over one hundred years ago, Europe’s great commanders readied their armies for war, putting their faith in the power of an offensive first-strike. As history recounts, when titans clashed in Flanders Fields, neither side could best the other; technical, tactical, and operational parity led to bloody stalemate. These commanders understood the risks of the offensive but hoped to forestall a ruinous continental conflagration through quick victory. They failed. But similar leaders scarcely a generation later put their faith in the same offensive punch: this time German armies sped past their Anglo-French adversaries, securing a victory that led to four years of Hitlerite occupation and the deaths of millions. Fortunately, grand strategic considerations weighed against them, and the Grand Alliance between East and West liberated Europe from a barbaric tyrant.

With a similarly perceived technological, tactical, and operational advantage afforded by hypersonic weapons, perhaps America’s contemporary adversaries would calculate as her historical ones did and opt for a punishing offensive. Perhaps America would win this war, its grand strategic position weighing in its favor once again. Alternatively, our strength may deteriorate sufficiently to enable Chinese victory. We may sleep soundly for now. But we risk being awakened from our imagined security by the choice between surrender or devastation.

Published on: April 9, 2020

<https://www.the-american-interest.com/2020/04/09/covid-19-and-the-weapons-of-the-future/>

## Meeting on rocket and space sector development

The President held a videoconference meeting on the rocket and space industry's development.

April 10, 2020

15:00

Novo-Ogaryovo, Moscow Region

✕

2 of 6

Meeting on rocket and space sector development, held via videoconference.

**President of Russia Vladimir Putin:** Colleagues, good afternoon.

Yesterday we discussed the situation at the leading enterprises in the defence industry. The rocket and space industry is certainly one of the most vital sectors of the national economy as well because it deals with issues that require work that is not interrupted and is carried out constantly.

The intensity of this work has decreased for understandable reasons, due to the pandemic, and today I have gathered you together to discuss how this work is being organised in this context, what measures are being taken to protect the people who work and whose work cannot be suspended, and how you, colleagues, are planning to arrange the work of the entire industry in the medium and longer term, bearing in mind the need to revive it to full capacity – naturally, as I already mentioned, taking into account all the necessary sanitary and epidemiological precautions, both today and in the near future.

I would like to call your attention to the following.

First of all, the manned flight programme remains one of our unconditional priorities. Traditionally, it is one of the Russian cosmonautics' strong points, and leadership must be maintained here.

This programme largely depends on the creation of a new generation space transport system. Flight tests of the new manned transport ship are planned for 2023

at the Vostochny space centre. Please report to me today what measures Roscosmos is taking to make sure that the launch takes place as planned, on time.

The second point is that Russia must strengthen its foothold in the international launch services market. It is extremely important that our launch vehicles remain competitive and enjoy demand.

An infrastructure for heavy-lift and super heavy-lift launch vehicles should be created at Vostochny as planned. Test flights are scheduled to start in 2023 and 2028, respectively.

The third thing is to employ the possibilities and mechanisms of public-private partnership more intensively to achieve the industry's goals. You know, PPP is a global practice that enables quick and efficient achievement of results, including developing innovative high-tech projects and commercially successful products.

Today I would like to hear your opinions on how to stimulate such partnerships, what we need to do here, what new formats we need to use to develop them successfully, and how to attract additional investment into the industry.

Now then, let us get down to work. The first speaker is Nikolai Testoyedov, CEO of JSC Academician M. F. Reshetnev Information Satellite Systems.

**Information *Satellite Systems* CEO Nikolai Testoyedov:** Mr President,

*Reshetnev Information Satellite Systems* has organised the implementation of the 2020 state defence order under the limitations caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The necessary number of employees have been allowed to work, and all of them are provided with personal protective equipment.

The schedules of launching the manufactured spacecraft are being carried out in full. In 2020 there were plans for ten spacecraft, and two of them have already been launched, two more are at the launch site, and the remaining are either in storage or are still being manufactured.

In addition, the full scope of the state defence order for this year can also be implemented. Both in terms of the range of items (provided the research and development stages are adjusted), and the scope of work. To do that, data on the adjusted stages from the previous years, 2020 and the partially completed work for 2021 must be included.

Thus, we need the Defence Ministry's acceptance of work on the adjusted previous years' stages by the enterprises, the work for the current year and 2021. Work with allied suppliers has been well organised, and there are no problems.

This concludes my report.

**Vladimir Putin:** Fine, thank you.

Mr Baranov, *Progress Rocket Space Centre*, please.

**Rocket Space Centre General Director Dmitry Baranov:** Mr President,

The enterprise is working on fulfilling the 2020 state defence order. During the first week, when certain restrictions were introduced, we had several hundred out of 16,700 people working. We had only the most critical areas of spacecraft operating. Regarding the Defence Ministry products, the work did not stop at all.

Regarding the launch vehicles, assembly work on our main carrier, the Soyuz 2 rocket, was suspended because currently we have around 12 launch vehicles at launch sites, and about 40 launch vehicles are stored at the enterprise. Here we have a certain degree of safety. Nevertheless, we did not suspend work on the testing of already manufactured rockets and annual maintenance because we think this is critically important.

In addition, work on the Soyuz 5 launch vehicle has not been suspended. We understand that this is a head start for a super heavy vehicle, and we have a state contract on Soyuz 5 to be fulfilled by the end of 2022 when we are to manufacture and launch the first vehicle.

We somewhat increased the number of workers last week and now we are approaching about 1,500–2,000 people. We are planning to consider the matter after April 20 and to bring back the entire workforce while observing respective safety measures, of course.

Regarding interaction with the government and the governor, we have no problems. Transport issues and other questions are being settled in an orderly manner, promptly, we are in direct contact.

Concerning launches, we are ensuring work directly at the Baikonur Cosmodrome right now, including yesterday's launch and a cargo spaceship launch in late April. We are also working with the Defence Ministry at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. This is routine work, and there cannot be any failures.

We will monitor the situation and proceed with the plans. We understand what is to be done in the mid-term. In the long term, it is also clear that the 2020 benchmark must be attained. Let me repeat, we work with what we regard as maximum possible safety measures.

This is the end of my report.

**Vladimir Putin:** Thank you, Mr Baranov.

Mr Okhlopkov, please, general director of TsENKI.

**Andrei Okhlopkov, General Director of the Centre for Operation of Space Ground-Based Infrastructure (TsENKI):** Mr President,

We continue working, the company has not suspended its operations, we are continuing our work. Just yesterday, we returned from Baikonur, where a manned launch was carried out under the head of Roscosmos.

We are supporting projects at all spaceports. With due account for lockdown policies, as well as the greater goals we have, our routine work and state defence contracts, we have increased our personnel to 70 percent in production and at the launch sites to ensure the unconditional fulfillment of our objectives.

Thanks to the decisions made by the head of Roscosmos and the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, in the current difficult situation we were able to carry out two launches, and are preparing for a third launch. We have also moved a large number of people and equipment across the border. The projects are being carried out unconditionally and with proper quality.

At the moment, we are working on the Defence Ministry's assignments at the Plesetsk space centre. We are also working at the Guiana Space Centre. We have evacuated most of the Russian team because our partners there terminated some of the projects. A small group of 21 people stayed with those from NPO Lavochkin to bring the technical equipment to a safe state. From April 27 to April 30, we plan to evacuate that group too, bring them home and into quarantine.

At Vostochny, we have even slightly expanded the project to build infrastructure for the Angara heavy-lift carrier rocket due to the launch site's isolated location. Thanks to the leaders of several regions, the supply of equipment and the production of equipment for the spaceport have continued without delay or disruption.

Mr President, we will certainly be able to fulfill the assigned task as a system-forming company.

**Vladimir Putin:** Thank you.

Our colleagues who have just given their reports represent industrial enterprises and groups of enterprises. There are others here who work in this industry directly. At the beginning of our meeting, I had a question for all the representatives of industry here: are there any problems that you would like to highlight? None. Good.

Mr Rogozin, please.

**General Director of the Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities Dmitry Rogozin:** Mr President,

Allow me to begin my presentation on the issues that were outlined in the beginning of this meeting. First, I would like to summarise some of our achievements in 2019.

Last year, we carried out 25 launches of space rockets, which is 25 percent more than in 2018. All the launches were accident-free.



Combat crews of the Defence Ministry also conducted 10 successful launches of the ballistic missiles manufactured at Roscosmos plants.

Thirty-three launches are planned for 2020, including 12 satellite launches under the Federal Space Programme, nine launches of commercial spacecraft and three launches from the Guiana Space Centre.

We have already conducted five launches. The launch yesterday was rather important and complicated because for the first time, we tested a crew-supported clustering of the Soyuz-MS with the Soyuz 2.1a rocket, operating on a fully Russian digital control system. The launch went well.

Due to the coronavirus spread and OneWeb's bankruptcy, we estimate that at least nine launches are at risk. The launch of ExoMars has already been postponed until 2022. This problem is rather serious, Mr President, because the spacecraft we were supposed to launch from our cosmodromes simply cannot arrive in Russia as Roscosmos is perhaps the only space agency in the world today that continues working. All the other agencies have suspended their operations.

In 2019, Russia increased its share in the medium-lift and heavy-lift launch service market to 41 and 21 percent, respectively.

In order to expand our presence on international markets, we are currently working on cutting our launch service rates by over 30 percent by reducing our non-operating expenses and increasing the company's operating efficiency.

The pricing schedule we proposed is essentially our response to the dumping by the American companies that are funded by the US budget. If a launch by, for example, SpaceX has a market price of around \$60 million, NASA pays 50 to 300 percent more for the same service.

We would like to talk about a number of measures that need to be taken in the near future.

First, the electronic component base for our space systems is produced abroad; therefore, we cannot procure it due to the sanctions. However, Russian microelectronics is making progress, but not fast enough. For this reason, we would like to emphasise this particular industry; we need domestically produced microelectronics.

The second most important point is to introduce mandatory coordination between the Defence Ministry and the corporation on design solutions in building military space vehicles, that is, production cooperation in organising an order for the manufacturing of space vehicles and military systems, and of course, coordination on the pricing of state contracts that the Defence Ministry concludes with our plants as a customer.

Why is this important? Two customers should not order two different types of space vehicles with the same purpose from the same Roscosmos plant. This is why I suggest very close cooperation during the preorder stage. The role of general designers is very

important at this point. Together with the Defence Ministry we have started doing this with the space forces at the working level. I think we will soon be signing practical agreements.

I must mention the negative impact of the coronavirus pandemic on our plans and current activities.

First, international cooperation has come to a standstill. The Guiana Space Centre, from which we launch foreign spacecraft on the Soyuz-2 rocket, is almost completely paralysed. The French employees have left the site. Our people have remained to ensure the safe storage and deactivation of the space tugs that were fueled before the launches were cancelled.

Secondly, the suspension of some civilian production lines during the quarantine, and this is where we have the highest number of employees, will compel them to take on additional expenses to pay salaries, maintain production capacity and counter the spread of the coronavirus.

But, once again, many employees at Roscosmos companies continue working. I am referring to personnel involved in Defence Ministry work, round-the-clock operations, test stations for all our advanced rockets that we must submit to testing this year, and of course, the Mission Control Centre, and not only the main one for the International Space Station but other orbital groups as well. Our companies are moving employees using their own transport vehicles and are providing them with medical gear to avoid infection.

This concludes my report.

Thank you.

**Vladimir Putin:** Thank you.

I would like to ask Mr Kolmykov, Director General of the Lavochkin Scientific and Production Association, to comment on Mr Rogozin's report where it concerns his company.

**Director General of the Lavochkin Scientific and Production Association Vladimir Kolmykov:** Mr President,

Indeed, we are working extensively on the lunar programme. The Luna-25 spacecraft is currently in the assembly and first trial stages. Yes, there are some cooperation problems but we are working on them. I hope that the 2021 goal of launching Luna-25 will be achieved.

Work on Luna-26 and Luna-27 continues as well. We are finishing the contracting process for a government agreement. We are executing an engineering, procurement and construction contract that will be in effect through the launch. Cooperation has been

established, and overall we are fairly confident that the objectives involving Luna-26 and Luna-27 will be met in 2024 and 2025, respectively.

Our association is currently operating in all areas.

Thank you. This is the end of my report.

**Vladimir Putin:** Thank you very much.

Mr Rogozin, colleagues.

Regarding this part of our work, the situation at Roscosmos is changing. Slowly, but it is still changing for the better. We can see it.

Clearly, the fact that we have to fight the coronavirus is forcing us to make adjustments in our country, the economy in general and Roscosmos specifically.

At the same time, I would like to warn you against the temptation to blame unresolved issues and loose ends – which are still in abundance – on the coronavirus. By the way, this goes for not only Roscosmos but for all manufacturing industries and all sectors. I hope my words will reach the parties concerned.

Now, let us move on to the restricted part of our meeting.

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**From:** "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Hacked Wuhan lab records show unreported cases in wider area  
**Date:** Sat, 9 May 2020 01:02:03 +0000

Many thanks!

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 8, 2020 9:01 PM  
**To:** Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-FO-Principals-DL <EAP-FO-Principals-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Culvahouse, Arthur B (Canberra) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Goldman, Michael B (Canberra) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Hacked Wuhan lab records show unreported cases in wider area

Good evening,

Below are three articles on this issue in the Australian press.

Best,

(b)(6)

- Chris Griffith in *The Australian*: "Coronavirus: Hacked Wuhan lab records show unreported cases in wider area".
- Miranda Devine in *The Daily Telegraph*: "Mystery of the missing data — substantial changes made to Wuhan lab's bat virus files".
- Clive Hamilton in *The Sydney Morning Herald*: "It would be unwise to dismiss Donald Trump's Wuhan lab leak theory".

**Coronavirus: Hacked Wuhan lab records show unreported cases in wider area**

**EXCLUSIVE**

**CHRIS GRIFFITH**

**TECHNOLOGY REPORTER**

**12:00AM MAY 9, 2020**

COVID-19 case data allegedly hacked from China's Wuhan lab suggests the number of cases has been under-reported.

Data includes areas where cases were not reported, according to an analysis.

The dataset, seen by The Weekend Australian, contains empty records for the period February 2-18, indicating records were not kept for that period or that data was deleted. [The Australian reported on April 23](#) that data from the Wuhan Institute of Virology had been hacked.

Robert Potter, CEO and founder of online security firm Internet 2.0, then told The Australian: "I've had credible sources tell me that people have used the credentials that were leaked on Twitter and Facebook to access the lab."

The original story reported Mr Potter citing the existence of nearly 25,000 email addresses and passwords dumped online belonging to the Wuhan labs, the WHO, the US National Institute of Health, Gates Foundation and other bodies.

Mr Potter's sources have now revealed a database purportedly from the Wuhan Institute of Virology containing a daily record of coronavirus cases in apartment blocks in cities across China.

[READ MORE:US Intel investigates virus links to lab accident|PM's right to hold the line on lab 'conspiracy' Trump's 'seen' Wuhan lab evidence Much evidence for Wuhan lab theory: Pompeo|All evidence points to Wuhan labs](#)

Each record includes an ID, collection time, number of deaths and recoveries, the latitude and longitude of the building and locality. The dataset contains a series of records for each day from February 2 to April 22.

A sample of coronavirus records totalled by buildings in China that are claimed to be from the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Mr Potter on Friday told The Weekend Australian his source had sent him photos of an authenticated login and visualisations of the data that gave him "high confidence" the records were legitimate. "It was highly unlikely that the data had been fabricated," he said. "They appear to showcase tracking from what I think is probably a research project within the Wuhan lab working on coronavirus data.

"It's not data of individual cases, it's tracking buildings where there are confirmed or suspected (cases) or recoveries or people have died from coronavirus in those buildings. The metadata tab translated to English shows areas (that) correspond to apartment blocks a lot of the time.

"But I would also say that the data doesn't appear to cover every case in China, but it covers different cases to what have been publicly reported."

He said the records included cities that hadn't appeared among publicly revealed cases. He found more cases from the northern city of Harbin than reported. There were cases in Inner Mongolia and Shanxi Province not found in public data. He had done comparisons with recently released information in China.

He said there were two possibilities for the blank records in early February, one being that data was uploaded in late February or data had been deleted because there "appears to be logs for those days ... but they have no entries".

"So it appears that there could be data from before that period that may have been deleted.

There seems to be a high sensitivity around data from that period."

Records from the WHO indicate a WHO-China joint mission travelled to Wuhan around that time. The mission included experts from Canada, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore and the US. They went to Beijing, Wuhan and two other cities in that period from 16-24 February, says the WHO.

The resulting report recommended that uninfected countries prepare to immediately activate the highest level of emergency response mechanisms essential for an early containment of a COVID-19 outbreak.

Associate Professor Chris Balding, of Fulbright University, Vietnam, who also examined the data, said Mr Potter's assessment was "absolutely accurate" in his assessment of the data.

"It seems to diverge significantly from official Chinese data," he said. "It shows a higher dispersion of cases and a higher number of deaths than official data."

### Chris Griffith

TECHNOLOGY REPORTER

SYDNEY

Chris is one of Australia's most experienced technology reporters, with an involvement in the computer industry spanning almost 50 years. He learned to program in the late 1960s, studied computer science in the early 70s, worked on mainframes, taught programming, and ran a business networking PCs in the 80s. In journalism, he has worked in print, radio and television, been a columnist and commentator, and is an award winning feature writer. Apart from being The Australian's senior technology reporter, he discusses technology trends weekly on Sky Business channel's TECH.biz program.



<https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/opinion/mystery-of-the-missing-data-substantial-changes-made-to-wuhan-labs-bat-virus-files/news-story/46d5a4f7e05ed96e354b5bd5dc2b611c>

## OPINION

### **Mystery of the missing data — substantial changes made to Wuhan lab's bat virus files**

Days before the Wuhan wet market was bleached, whistleblowers punished and virus samples destroyed, someone at the high-security Wuhan Institute of Virology censored its virus database in an apparent attempt to disassociate the laboratory from a novel coronavirus outbreak that would become a global pandemic, writes Miranda Devine.

Miranda Devine, The Daily Telegraph

May 7, 2020 2:02pm

Days before the Wuhan wet market was bleached, whistleblowers punished and virus samples destroyed, someone at the high-security Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) censored its virus database in an apparent attempt to disassociate the laboratory from a novel coronavirus outbreak that would become a global pandemic.

This is what open source intelligence uncovered in the UK reveals.

Substantial alterations to the WIV database on the evening of December 30, the day before the World Health Organisation was alerted to the outbreak of a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, are just another indication that the Chinese Communist Party is hiding something when it comes to the origins of COVID-19.

The question of whether the virus came from the Wuhan wet market, as China insists, or leaked from the nearby WIV laboratory, where high-risk research into animal-to-human transmission of bat coronaviruses was being conducted, is at the centre of allegations of a cover-up and a worldwide clamour for an independent investigation into the source of the disease.

Shi Zhengli, the virologist known as China's "Bat Woman" for her work with bat coronaviruses, directs the WIV's Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and is listed as the primary database contact.

On December 30, she was in Shanghai for a conference when she was summoned back to Wuhan with the news that a novel coronavirus had been detected in two pneumonia patients.

On the overnight train from Shanghai, according to a March article in Scientific American, she was stricken with worry about the coronaviruses.

“Could they have come from our lab?” she wondered.

After all, the closest known relative of this new coronavirus, a bat virus named RaTG13, was in her lab.

Weeks later, she would post a message on WeChat saying, “I swear with my life, [the virus] has nothing to do with the lab.”

But, at some point that night, while she was on the train to Wuhan, alterations were made to her database, which contained records of bat viruses transmitted to other wild animals.

Most of the changes were to delete the keywords “wildlife” or “wild animals”. This is significant because global health researchers say the virus jumped from bats to humans via another wild animal — the crucial “missing link in the COVID-19 transmission chain.

Shi’s used to boast her bat virus database was unique because it included data on virus variants in other wild animals.

Was her database censored to keep prying eyes away from references to cross-species transmission of viruses in wild animals?

For instance, the title of the database was changed that night from “Wildlife-borne Viral Pathogen Database” to “Bat and rodent-borne viral pathogen database”.

“Wild animal” was replaced with “bat and rodent” or “bat and rat” at least 10 times in the database. A reference to “arthropod vectors” also was removed.

Keywords which might facilitate searches potentially connecting the database with the outbreak also were deleted. “Wild animal samples”, “viral pathogen data”, “emerging infectious diseases” and “cross-species infection” were keywords associated with the original version.

On December 30 they were replaced with “bat”, “rodent” and “virus”.

“It looks like a rushed, inconsistent effort to disassociate the project from the outbreak by rebranding it,” says the British open source intelligence analyst who found the alterations.

“It’s a strange thing to do within hours of being informed of a novel coronavirus outbreak”.

He surmises that: “If the WIV had found the missing link between bat virus RaTG13 and SARS-CoV-2 [the virus that causes COVID-19] from an animal vector, it would have been in Shi’s database”.

There's no conclusive evidence that any of the changes were made for sinister reasons.

But China's lies and furtive actions since the outbreak leads us to believe the worst.

"This is an enormous crisis created by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party reverted to form, reverted to the kinds of disinformation, the kinds of concealment, that authoritarian regimes do," Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo said in an interview Sunday with ABC.

"There is enormous evidence that [the Wuhan lab] is where this began ...

"These are not the first times that we've had a world exposed to viruses as a result of failures in a Chinese lab."

On Wednesday, Pompeo walked back his comments slightly at a press conference: "We don't have certainty," he said. "We're all trying to get to clarity."

China's refusal to allow an investigation of the origins of the Wuhan virus, or even to share original virus samples, impedes the search for treatments and a vaccine. As if that weren't bad enough, now it is threatening economic boycotts against countries like Australia which want an investigation.

"The CCP organisational and governmental culture is to cover up and ruthlessly control," says a retired senior Australian intelligence officer who served in China.

"The arrest of frontline health professionals in January was standard practice."

We don't know why the changes were made to the WIV database.

What we do know is they were made the same day a young ophthalmologist, Dr Li Wenliang, warned colleagues in an online chat group about a "SARS-like coronavirus" among patients in the emergency department of a Wuhan Hospital.

Li was arrested two days later, along with seven other doctors, for "spreading rumours" and forced to recant. He died a month later, of coronavirus, aged 34.

**<https://www.smh.com.au/national/it-would-be-unwise-to-dismiss-donald-trump-s-wuhan-lab-leak-theory-20200507-p54qyg.html>**

***It would be unwise to dismiss Donald Trump's Wuhan lab leak theory***

Clive Hamilton

Professor at Charles Sturt University in Canberra

May 9, 2020 — 12.00am

Donald Trump says he believes the coronavirus was accidentally leaked from a Wuhan laboratory but has provided no proof. Intelligence agencies in the United States and Australia say they have no hard evidence. The Australian government says it's most likely that the virus was transferred from an animal to humans at Wuhan's wet market. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo seems to be walking back from his previous strong statements.

Some are treating Trump's claim as without basis and we wait to see if he can back it up. In the meantime, it's unwise to dismiss the accidental lab leak hypothesis. Here's why.

Note first that it's not a conspiracy theory; it's an accident hypothesis. And we should not mix up the claim of an accidental leak of a naturally occurring virus with the claim that the virus was constructed or manipulated in a laboratory to become more potent. Genetic analysis has disproved the latter.

The main evidence pointing to a lab leak, all of it circumstantial, comes from research published by Chinese scientists before Beijing shut them down. On January 29, an article written by Chinese researchers was published in the New England Journal of Medicine. It concluded from an analysis of 425 coronavirus patients that 55 per cent of cases diagnosed before January 1 were linked to the South China Seafood Market, leaving 45 per cent who had no apparent contact with the market.

On February 6, a short paper by two scientists from Wuhan universities and titled "The possible origins of the 2019-nCoV coronavirus" appeared. Botao Xiao and Lei Xiao noted that the habitat of the bats carrying the suspected virus is 900 kilometres from the seafood market, that the bats are not eaten by Wuhan residents, and that "no bat was traded in the market".

Nor is there any evidence of an intermediate host (speculation has centred on pangolins). They point out that there are two research centres that experiment on bat viruses in Wuhan, one less than 300 metres from the seafood market and the other, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, around 12 kilometres. They concluded that "the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan". The article was quickly removed. Botao Xiao later told the Wall Street Journal he had withdrawn the paper because it lacked "direct proofs".

A more thorough study by 27 Chinese scientists published in The Lancet on February 15 found that 27 patients from a sample of 41 admitted to hospital in the early stages of the outbreak had been exposed to the market, leaving 14 who weren't. The first person diagnosed with COVID-19 (on December 1) had no contact with the market and lived a long way from it.

Richard Lucey, an infectious diseases expert at Georgetown University who had studied the early data, told Science magazine that the virus must have been circulating silently in Wuhan well before the cluster of infections broke out at the markets. The authorities, he said, "must have realised the epidemic did not originate in that Wuhan Huanan seafood market" even as they were putting this story around.

On February 14, President Xi Jinping gave a speech to party leaders declaring China must "close the loopholes exposed by the epidemic". He announced the fast-tracking of a new law for "biosecurity at laboratories" specifically targeting the use of biological agents that "may harm national security". The law had been in the pipeline for some months and some experts say tightening security measures at laboratories is to be expected after an outbreak like this one.

The next day, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology published a new directive "strengthening biosecurity management in microbiology labs that handle advanced viruses like the novel coronavirus". Again, overseas experts who have worked at the Wuhan Institute of Virology said this is normal after an outbreak.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology is the "only facility in China permitted to handle the most dangerous known pathogens, including the Ebola and Lassa viruses". It has been studying new SARS-related coronaviruses in bats for several years. The work has included manipulating coronaviruses to make them more potent. Researchers have to take stringent measures to prevent themselves from catching viruses. Around the world, leaks from labs have been known to occur.

In November, the Wuhan Institute of Virology posted a notice inviting applications for post-doctoral fellows to join a team led by Dr Peng Zhou using bats to research Ebola and SARS-associated coronaviruses. Peng Zhou has been studying how bats can carry highly pathogenic viruses without becoming sick.

In mid-January, Major General Chen Wei, the Chinese military's top epidemiologist and virologist, arrived in Wuhan with a team of military scientists. They based themselves at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. At this time, messages had been circulating on social media platforms WeChat and Weibo claiming that "patient zero", the first to be infected, was a researcher at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. It was suggested she was a graduate of the Institute, worked on coronaviruses and never visited the South China Seafood Market. The Institute released a statement saying that the person in question left Wuhan in 2015 and was quite healthy.

In early February, as the epidemic spread to other countries, Beijing became deeply worried about the damage to China's international reputation and began a campaign to deny the fact that the virus had its origins in Wuhan and spread disinformation such as the outlandish claim that the US military took the virus to Wuhan.

Beijing also moved quickly to shut down scientific research. Last month China's State Council ordered universities and research institutions to implement strict management of all scientific papers concerning the coronavirus, especially those dealing with its origin. Political vetting is now required before publication is permitted. The director of the Wuhan Institute of

Virology emailed staff on April 9 instructing them not to disclose any information about the disease, not even to China's official media or partner institutions.

Beijing does not want the truth to be known, going so far as to delete from a European Union opinion piece words noting that the outbreak originated in China. But the truth matters because prevention of a similar catastrophe depends on it. If the pandemic was due to a lab accident, then the answer is tighter lab controls. (And those in charge will have a lot of explaining to do.) If the virus arose from animal transfer in the wet market, then the answer is to shut down the trade in live animals. Or the truth may lie elsewhere.

So, will the world know the truth about the origin of the new coronavirus? Chinese scientists are some of the world's leaders in virology, genetics and epidemiology and they have much to teach us. However, Beijing, paranoid about being blamed for the pandemic, has seen fit to silence them.

If the virus did escape from a lab it now seems the world will only know if some brave souls leak documents or otherwise blow the whistle.

**Clive Hamilton is a professor at Charles Sturt University in Canberra and co-author with Mareike Ohlberg of *Hidden Hand: Exposing how the Chinese Communist Party is reshaping the world*, due out June 16.**

---

---

**From:** Keshap, Atul [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 8, 2020 7:47 PM  
**To:** EAP-FO-Principals-DL <EAP-FO-Principals-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Waters, John R [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Culvahouse, Arthur B (Canberra) [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; Goldman, Michael B (Canberra) [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Hacked Wuhan lab records show unreported cases in wider area

[(b)(6)] can we please get this article in full from behind the paywall? Thanks

<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/coronavirus-wuhan-lab-records-show-unreported-cases-in-wider-area/news-story/e033a72402e65cfb9e95472fddaff98e>

**Sender:** "Stilwell, David R" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Recipient:** [(b)(6)]@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167

**Date:** Wed, 2 Sep 2020 17:06:46 +0000

Clear for D. Sorry for delay

(b)(6)  
Office of the Deputy Secretary  
Office: (b)(6)  
Mobile:

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 2, 2020 11:49 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167

7th floor colleagues,

Please clear ASAP on the QFR in the link: [FY21 SFRC Budget Hearing Menendez 167.docx](#)

For convenience, the full text, as cleared by all laterals, is below.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer  
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)  
(b)(6) (telework)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2020 6:25 PM

To: OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; CGRCU-Clearances <CGRCU-Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; GPA-Specials <GPA-Specials@state.gov>; R\_Clearances <R\_Clearances@state.gov>

Subject: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167

Colleagues,

Apologies for the short fuse, but please find a linked QFR related to the origins of the COVID-19 virus: [FY21 SFRC Budget Hearing Menendez 167.docx](#). **Please clear by 11AM tomorrow, Wednesday, September 3.** The text of the QFR is also pasted below for convenience.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

--

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer  
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs  
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)  
(b)(6) (telework)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov



**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 R\_Clearances <R\_Clearances@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Legal-EAP-DL <Legal-EAP-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6) (Wuhan) (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: For Flash Clearance (Due 4:30 PM) : AM to S to Declassify Mission China Cables on the Wuhan Institute of Virology

**Date:** Mon, 6 Apr 2020 16:10:05 +0000

Dear (b)(6) and colleagues,

Apologies for the confusion surrounding this request (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Thanks much for taking time out of your weekend to work on this.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

**From:** (b)(6) (R)

**Sent:** Monday, April 6, 2020 11:00 AM

**To:** (b)(6) EAP-P-Office-DL; (b)(6) Yu, Miles; R\_Clearances;

(b)(6)

**Cc:** EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL; (b)(6) (Wuhan); (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: For Flash Clearance (Due 4:30 PM) : AM to S to Declassify Mission China Cables on the Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(6) I don't understand the memo or EAP's request very well. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

If you could please clarify those points for me, R will take another look to provide clearance.

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov

**Sent:** Sunday, April 5, 2020 3:44 PM

**To:** EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov; R\_Clearances

<R\_Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Cc:** EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>; (h)(6) (Wuhan)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** For Flash Clearance (Due 4:30 PM) : AM to S to Declassify Mission China Cables on the Wuhan Institute of Virology

Colleagues,

Apologies for the flash clearance request, but for your review, please see attached an AM requesting the Secretary declassify parts of two cables that Mission China drafted regarding the Wuhan Institute of Virology. This information will be provided to Josh Rogin at the Washington Post for a piece he is writing on COVID-19. Please let me know if you have any concerns. Thank you!

Best regards,

(b)(6)

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6)@state.gov;

EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov;

(b)(6)@state.gov;

**Recipient:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov;

R\_Clearances <R\_Clearances@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov;

Legal-EAP-DL <Legal-EAP-DL@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov;

EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Subject:** Re: FOR CLEARANCE BY 1000 6/22: A/S FORD BCL- House China Task Force

**Date:** Thu, 18 Jun 2020 21:59:59 +0000

Chris (b)(5)

Have a good day off, (b)(6)!

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, June 18, 2020 5:57 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Subject:** Re: FOR CLEARANCE BY 1000 6/22: A/S FORD BCL- House China Task Force

(b)(5)

---

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On June 18, 2020 at 5:46:26 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Thanks.

(b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, June 18, 2020 5:03 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Subject:** Re: FOR CLEARANCE BY 1000 6/22: A/S FORD BCL- House China Task Force

(b)(6)

Let me add onto (b)(6) comments with mine I was tracking separately. I'm including both mine and (b)(6) below.

**Research Collaboration in Governmental and Non-Governmental Sectors**

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2020 4:44 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: FOR CLEARANCE BY 1000 6/22: A/S FORD BCL- House China Task Force

Hi (b)(6) No comments from others so far, but here are a few areas where we may want to chime in or pay extra close attention to. I marked my thoughts in red below and recommend that we share our comments with (b)(6) as well. Let me know if you'd prefer me to send this in a word file.

**Research Collaboration in Governmental and Non-Governmental Sectors**

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | AAAS S&T Policy Fellow  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, June 17, 2020 1:24 PM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Subject:** Fw: FOR CLEARANCE BY 1000 6/22: A/S FORD BCL- House China Task Force

Please send any comments to (b)(6) for coordination before COB tomorrow (since she's out Friday). (b)(6)

**From:** (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, June 17, 2020 1:00 PM

**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-RA-DL <ISN-RA-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CATR-DL <ISN-CATR-DL@state.gov>; ISN-MBC-DL <ISN-MBC-DL@state.gov>; ISN-NESS-DL <ISN-NESS-DL@state.gov>; ISN-CPI-DL <ISN-CPI-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-ECC-MGMT <ISN-ECC-MGMT@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-MGR-DL <ISN-CTR-MGR-DL@state.gov>; AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; PM-CPA <PM-CPA@state.gov>; SCCI <SCCI@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; EB-CIP-MA

<EB\_CIPMA@groups.state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA-Specials <GPA-Specials@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; OES-STC-China <OES-STC-China@state.gov>

**Cc:** ISN-Congressional-DL <ISN-Congressional-DL@state.gov>

**Subject:** FOR CLEARANCE BY 1000 6/22: A/S FORD BCL- House China Task Force

All-

Please see attached BCL and related attachments for A/S Ford's briefing to the House China Task Force. Appreciate your comments and clearances by 1000 on Monday, 6/22.

v/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Congressional Affairs Officer*

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

B3 Solutions, LLC

Telework Phone: (h)(6)

Email: (h)(6)@state.gov

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>;  
 SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;  
 OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>  
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
 OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>;  
 EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>;  
**CC:** EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>;  
 EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins  
**Date:** Mon, 2 Aug 2021 14:11:47 +0000

(b)(5)  
 (b)(6)

EAP/Press

Telework: (b)(6)

**From:** Guest (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 10:10 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL  
 <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-  
 Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-  
 DL@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Thanks!

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 10:05 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Good morning,

Clear for (b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 9:04 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

(b)(6) I think this looks good subject to one suggested (b)(5) but my clearance is (b)(5)

(b)(5) if the latter, can someone alert the irony police?

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 8:48 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** Re: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

With his email this time

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---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 8:48:05 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6) (h)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

+ (b)(6)

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---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 8:38:46 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Thanks (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
Public Diplomacy Officer  
Office of International Health & Biodefense  
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental & Scientific Affairs  
Mobile: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 8:37 AM

To: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov;  
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;  
SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov;  
SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;  
(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Hi folks –

Please clear on the following PG by 9:30AM per the below tasker: (b)(6) 20210802 PG GOP report COVID origins v1.docx . Please loop in anyone I may have missed.

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov  
Sent: Monday, August 2, 2021 7:17 AM  
To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>  
Subject: AUGUST 2 EAP Press Guidance Tasking List

Good morning! There will be a Department Press Briefing at 2PM today.

Please submit voluntary press guidance to EAP-P no later than 10AM.


(b)(5)



(b)(5)

Reuters

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-military-ruler-promises-elections-says-ready-work-with-asean-2021-08-01/>



Myanmar army ruler takes prime minister role, again pledges elections | Reuters

Myanmar's military ruler Min Aung Hlaing has taken on the role of prime minister in a newly formed caretaker government, state media reported on Sunday, six months after the army seized power from ...

[www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com)

BANGKOK (AP) — Six months after seizing power from the elected government, Myanmar's military leader on Sunday declared himself prime minister and said he would lead the country under the extended state of emergency until elections are held in about two years.

"We must create conditions to hold a free and fair multiparty general election," Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said during a recorded televised address. "We have to make preparations. I pledge to hold the multiparty general election without fail."

He said the state of emergency will achieve its objectives by August 2023. In a separate announcement, the military government named itself "the caretaker government" and Min Aung Hlaing the prime minister.

The state of emergency was declared when troops moved against the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on Feb. 1, an action the generals said was permitted under the military-authored 2008 constitution. The military claimed her landslide victory in last year's national elections was achieved through massive voter fraud but offered no credible evidence.

The military government officially annulled the election results last Tuesday and appointed a new election commission to take charge of the polls.

The military takeover was met with massive public protests that has resulted in a lethal crackdown by security forces who routinely fire live ammunition into crowds.

As of Sunday, 939 people have been killed by the authorities since Feb. 1, according to a tally kept by the independent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Casualties are also rising among the military and police as armed resistance grows in both urban and rural areas.

Moves by The Association of Southeast Asian Nations to broker a dialogue between the military government and its opponents have stalled after an agreement at an April summit in Jakarta to appoint a special envoy for Myanmar.

Min Aung Hlaing said that among the three nominees, Thailand's former Deputy Foreign Minister Virasakdi Futrakul was selected as the envoy. "But for various reasons, new proposals were released and we could not keep moving onwards. I would like to say that Myanmar is ready to work on ASEAN cooperation within the ASEAN framework, including the dialogue with the ASEAN special envoy in Myanmar," he said.

ASEAN foreign ministers were expected to discuss Myanmar in virtual meetings this week hosted by Brunei, the current chair of the 10-nation bloc.


Myanmar is also struggling with its worst COVID-19 outbreak that has overwhelmed its already crippled health care system. Limitations on oxygen sales have led to widespread allegations that the military is directing supplies to government supporters and military-run hospitals.

At the same time, medical workers have been targeted by authorities after spearheading a civil disobedience movement that urged professionals and civil servants not to cooperate with the government.

Min Aung Hlaing blamed the public's mistrust in the military's efforts to control the outbreak on "fake news and misinformation via social networks," and accused those behind it of using COVID-19 "as a tool of bioterrorism."

Japan calls for greater attention to 'survival of Taiwan'  
Defence minister's remarks follow Tokyo's decision to link Taipei's security to its own  
Robin Harding and Leo Lewis in Tokyo AUGUST 1 2021

<https://www.ft.com/content/e82fe924-ba9b-4325-b8a4-0d5482ee1d24>



## Japan calls for greater attention to 'survival' of Taiwan | Financial Times

Japan's defence minister has called on the international community to pay greater attention to the "survival of Taiwan" as he warned that China's military build-up was enveloping the island.

[www.ft.com](http://www.ft.com)

Japan's defence minister has called on the international community to pay greater attention to the "survival of Taiwan" as he warned that China's military build-up was enveloping the island.

Nobuo Kishi, the younger brother of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, told the Financial Times that broad international pressure was crucial to prevent Taiwan's future being decided by military confrontation.

His comments marked a further step up in rhetoric after Japan broke with years of precedent and directly linked Taiwan's security with its own in a recent defence white paper, with an explicit reference to the need for a greater "sense of crisis".

The same report, whose cover illustration of a samurai adorns Kishi's office, warned that the overall military balance between China and Taiwan was now "tilting to China's favour" — a warning the minister repeated.

"We're seeing various moves by China that work to envelop Taiwan," said Kishi.

Chinese military aircraft have regularly entered the air defence identification zone off Taiwan's south-western coast since last year.

Beijing has also started flying around the southern tip of the island into airspace off its south-eastern coast, and Chinese military planes flew parallel to the northern half of Taiwan's east coast earlier this year. Chinese naval vessels have increasingly been spotted in waters off Taiwan's eastern coast.

Kishi is known for his close relations with politicians in Taipei and is regarded as both a conservative and a hawk on China. He was recently photographed gazing across the 110km strait that separates Taiwan from Japan's westernmost island of Yonaguni.

Japan's strong message, Kishi said, was that peace in the Taiwan Strait would only be assured if the international community demanded it. "Rather than a direct military collision between China and Taiwan, international society needs to pay greater attention to the survival of Taiwan," he said.

US and Japanese military officials have begun serious planning for a possible conflict between China and Taiwan, including top-secret tabletop war games and joint exercises, six officials told the FT at the end of June.

Taro Aso, Japan's deputy prime minister, said a crisis in Taiwan could present an existential threat to Japan, in remarks at a private fundraiser that were reported by local media. The comments were significant because that is the constitutional hurdle for use of Japan's military to support US forces.

But despite its growing concern, Tokyo does not intend to forge a direct military relationship with Taipei, Kishi said, and would maintain the status quo in which the two nations do not have formal diplomatic relations.

"While maintaining the existing framework, we want to reach a mutual understanding via various initiatives, or through the exchange of views between Japan and the United States," he said.

Although the gap in military strength between China and Taiwan is widening every year, Kishi indicated that he believed in Taipei's ability to defend itself. He said the island was combining "asymmetric military capabilities", which use cheaper weapons to offset an adversary's strength, into a "multi-layered defence system".

As part of Japan's push for greater international attention to the issue, Kishi said Tokyo welcomed a greater role for European countries in the region, including the upcoming visit by the UK's Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier strike group.

"A lot of countries have shown their sympathy with our idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific," he said. By showing their presence in the region, "we can together send a strong message on regional peace and stability".

Additional reporting by Kathrin Hille in Taipei

August 2, 2021

4:07 AM EDT

Last Updated an hour ago

Hong Kong authorities arrest pro-democracy singer for 'corrupt conduct'

Sara ChengJessie Pang

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hong-kong-authorities-arrest-pro-democracy-singer-corruption-2021-08-02/>

HONG KONG, Aug 2 (Reuters) - Hong Kong's anti-corruption watchdog on Monday charged a singer and prominent pro-democracy activist, Anthony Wong, with "corrupt conduct" at a 2018 election rally, the latest legal action against dissent by authorities in the Chinese-ruled city.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) said in a statement that Wong had provided "entertainment to induce others to vote" for pro-democracy activist Au Nok-hin in a 2018 legislative council by-election.

"At the rally, Wong performed two songs on stage. At the end of the performance, he appealed to the participants of the rally to vote for Au at the election," the ICAC wrote, adding he had breached the Elections Corrupt and Illegal Conduct Ordinance.

If convicted, he could be jailed for up to seven years and fined HK\$500,000 (\$64,000), the ordinance says.

Wong, 59, who first came into the public limelight with pop duo, Tat Ming Pair, in the 1980s, could not immediately be reached for comment.

Au, who went on to win the election, was also charged. Both are due to appear in court on Thursday to plea.

Au was not available for comment. He was jailed for 10 months jail in April for organising an unauthorised assembly.

Au was also arrested with 46 other prominent democrats this year for alleged conspiracy to commit subversion under a sweeping national security law introduced in June last year to outlaw secession, subversion, terrorism and foreign collusion.

Hong Kong's Beijing-backed government says the pro-democracy protests threatened stability in the former British colony and the action taken against various people since then is necessary to uphold the law.

A popular songwriter known for his poignant lyrics, Wong was a strong supporter of Hong Kong's 2014 pro-democracy "Umbrella" movement and the 2019 anti-China protests. He is also a vocal advocate of LGBT rights.

During the performance for Au in 2018, according to a video of it posted on Au's Facebook page, Wong had told the audience before singing "A forbidden fruit per day":

"This song is about choice, whether society has a choice."

Over the past year, many of the city's leading democrats have been detained, jailed or forced into exile.


A major pro-democracy newspaper, Apple Daily, closed in June after several of its senior editors were arrested on national security grounds.

Last Friday, Tong Ying-kit, the first person convicted under the security law was sentenced by a panel of three judges to nine years in prison for terrorism and inciting secession.

Republican report says coronavirus leaked from China lab; scientists still probing origins  
Reuters

Reporting by Jonathan Landay and Mark Hosenball; Editing by Lisa Shumaker

<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-republican-report-says-coronavirus-leaked-chinese-lab-scientists-still-2021-08-02/>



U.S. Republican report says coronavirus leaked from Chinese lab; scientists still probing origins | Reuters

A preponderance of evidence proves the virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic leaked from a Chinese research facility, said a report by U.S. Republicans released on Monday, a conclusion that U.S. ...

[www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com)

WASHINGTON, Aug 2 (Reuters) - A preponderance of evidence proves the virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic leaked from a Chinese research facility, said a report by U.S. Republicans released on Monday, a conclusion that U.S. intelligence agencies have not reached.

The report also cited "ample evidence" that Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) scientists - aided by U.S. experts and Chinese and U.S. government funds - were working to modify coronaviruses to infect humans and such manipulation could be hidden.

Representative Mike McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, released the report by the panel's Republican staff. It urged a bipartisan investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic that has killed 4.4 million people worldwide. (Graphic on global cases and deaths)

China denies a genetically modified coronavirus leaked from the facility in Wuhan - where the first COVID-19 cases were detected in 2019 - a leading but unproven theory among some experts. Beijing also denies allegations of a cover-up.

"We now believe it's time to completely dismiss the wet market as the source," said the report. "We also believe the preponderance of the evidence proves the virus did leak from the WIV and that it did so sometime before September 12, 2019."

The report cited what it called new and under-reported information about safety protocols at the lab, including a July 2019 request for a \$1.5 million overhaul of a hazardous waste treatment system for the facility, which was less than two years old.

In April, the top U.S. intelligence agency said it concurred with the scientific consensus that the virus was not man-made or genetically modified. [read more](#)

U.S. President Joe Biden in May ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to accelerate their hunt for the origins of the virus and report back in 90 days. [read more](#)

A source familiar with current intelligence assessments said the U.S. intelligence community has not reached any conclusion whether the virus came from animals or the WIV.

Reporting by Jonathan Landay and Mark Hosenball; Editing by Lisa Shumaker

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>;  
SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;  
OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>;  
EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>;  
EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>;  
EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act  
**Date:** Tue, 8 Jun 2021 15:44:03 +0000

Thanks. No particular issues from me, but (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 8, 2021 11:39 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

FYI. We don't have any comments. Per (b)(6) note below, (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 8, 2021 11:32 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

Nothing additional from me, but looping (b)(6) Best, (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
 Attorney-Adviser, L/OES  
 U.S. Department of State  
 Mobile: (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 7, 2021 3:27 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

Please let me know by 12:00pm Wednesday if you have any comments on the attached legislation purporting to require DNI declassification of information related to the Wuhan



Institute of Virology and a related report. (Note:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks!

(b)(6)

---

**From:** State-LRM <State-LRM@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, June 7, 2021 3:02 PM

**To:** H\_Tasking-L <H\_Tasking-L@state.gov>; H\_Tasking-EAP <H\_Tasking-EAP@state.gov>;

SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; H\_Tasking-OES <H\_Tasking-OES@state.gov>;

H\_Tasking-SP <H\_Tasking-SP@state.gov>; D-MR\_Clearances <D-MR\_Clearances@state.gov>; H\_Tasking-

INR <H\_Tasking-INR@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov; State-LRM <State-LRM@state.gov>; (b)(6)

M (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

OMB has requested views on the attached Sen. Hawley's S.1867 COVID-19 Origin Act of 2021 which mandates DNI to declassify information relating to potential links between Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of COVID. **Please review and provide any succinct comments/policy narratives by 12PM Wednesday, June 9 to State-LRM and cc:** (b)(6)

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Dr. Baric email to State Dept personnel in February regarding COVID-19 origin

**Date:** Thu, 17 Dec 2020 20:34:45 +0000

Well, there is also the (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

(b)(6)

AVC Bureau  
Department of State

(b)(6) office  
cell

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2020 9:16 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Dr. Baric email to State Dept personnel in February regarding COVID-19 origin

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2020 8:46 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Dr. Baric email to State Dept personnel in February regarding COVID-19 origin

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, December 16, 2020 1:32 PM

**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Subject:** Dr. Baric email to State Dept personnel in February regarding COVID-19 origin

It appears that Dr. Baric has been in previous communication with State and DHS personnel regarding the origin of COVID-19. This is based on one of Dr. Baric's emails where he assesses as of 2/27/20 that:

1. Pangolins do not appear to be the SARS-CoV-2 animal reservoir.
2. "at this moment, the most likely origins are bats"
3. "it is a mistake to assume that an intermediate species is needed."

The following three State personnel are among the many DHS, academic, and other CC addressees:

- Padget, Larry G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
  - Chief Medical Officer MED
  - Work phone [redacted] (b)(6)
  - Mobile [redacted] (b)(6)
  - Office location [redacted] (b)(6)
- Walters, William [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
  - Deputy Chief Medical Officer for Operations MED
  - Work phone [redacted] (b)(6)
  - Mobile [redacted] (b)(6)

o Office location (b)(6)

• (b)(6)@state.gov>;

o Chief, Tropical Medicine-Infectious Diseases MED/CP/CS

o Work phone (b)(6)

o Mobile (b)(6)

o Office location (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Here is the Baric email from [https://usrtk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Baric\\_intermediate\\_host\\_Baric-Files.pdf](https://usrtk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Baric_intermediate_host_Baric-Files.pdf)

From: Baric, Ralph S (b)(6)@email.unc.edu>

Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2020 6:55 PM

To: (b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@cepi.net>;

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)@westernu.edu>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@som.umaryland.edu>;

(b)(6);

(b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hq.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@associates.hq.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@mgh.harvard.edu>;

(b)(6)@UTMB.EDU;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

(b)(6)@cdph.ca.gov>;

(b)(6)@unmc.edu>;

(b)(6) @igt.org>  
 (b)(6) @igt.org>  
 (b)(6) @sdcountry.ca.gov;  
 (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @cbp.dhs.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @dshs.texas.gov;  
 (b)(6) @hq.dhs.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @med.cornell.edu>;  
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>;  
 Padget, Larry G <(b)(6) @state.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @weforum.org>;  
 (b)(6) @ky.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @hhs.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @usda.gov>;  
 (b)(6) @usda.gov>

Subject: RE: Red Dawn Breaking Bad, Start Feb 24

A comment: Pangolins are not the animal reservoir. Pangolin -CoV-2020 virus is only 90% identical to SARS-CoV2 while SARS-CoV-2 and bat-CoV-RaTG13 is 96% identical. The paper concludes its not a reservoir.. "Although this present study does not support pangolins would be an intermediate host for the emergence of the 2019-nCoV " at this moment, the most likely origins are bats, and I note that it is a mistake to assume that an intermediate species is needed. ralph

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6) @state.gov>
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6) @state.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.gov>;
	DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6) @state.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.gov>;
	(b)(6) @state.gov>

**From:** [REDACTED]@state.gov>  
DiNanno, Thomas G [REDACTED]@state.gov>;  
[REDACTED]@state.gov>;  
**To:** [REDACTED]@state.gov>;  
[REDACTED]@state.gov>;  
[REDACTED]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum  
**Date:** Sun, 10 Jan 2021 03:42:49 +0000

Ok

---

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On January 9, 2021 at 10:41:50 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G [REDACTED]@state.gov> wrote:  
[REDACTED]  
Here...I'll host 11 pm ok?

On January 9, 2021 at 10:35:24 PM EST, [REDACTED]@state.gov> wrote:  
Yes but I can't find the staff call numbers. Do you have it?

---

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On January 9, 2021 at 10:30:39 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G [REDACTED]@state.gov> wrote:  
Bravo  
A few nits that require clean up.  
Can we do a quick chat?

On January 9, 2021 at 10:15:37 PM EST, [REDACTED]@state.gov> wrote:  
[REDACTED] has shared a OneDrive for Business file with you. To view it, click the link below.

- [DRAFT Memorandum for the Record v2.docx](#)

[REDACTED] comments:

(b)(5)

(b)(6) changes and my addition based on (b)(6) comments attached. Tracked changes follow below - (b)(6) edits in red, mine in blue:

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)



(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:55 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

Have to get somebody home. I will be in my car for the next hour or so but can take calls.

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:50 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

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(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 8:23 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Current DRAFT Memorandum

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

**Date:** Sun, 10 Jan 2021 21:35:43 +0000

(b)(5)

**From:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:15 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

BWC (b)(5) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

On January 10, 2021 at 2:08:55 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 11:27 AM

**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

For some mysterious reason, most of the E-mails in this thread did not pop up (except one from (b)(6) about he was going to his car) on my cell phone until early this morning. Sorry I missed the major efforts last night. I just quickly read Ford's memo, summary, and our team's response. I

(b)(5)

V/R, (b)(6)

**From:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 11:49 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

Better send them to me- I'm about to send to miles

On January 9, 2021 at 11:13:28 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Also, send up (b)(6) slides and the note at the end from (b)(6) Quite important

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:56 PM

**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fw: Current DRAFT Memorandum

My edits in the attached.

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

U.S. Department of State

HST Room (b)(6)

Office: (b)(6)

Cell:

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov

ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:15 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno,

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

(b)(6) comments:

(b)(5)

(b)(6) changes and my addition based on (b)(6) comments attached. Tracked changes follow below - (b)(6) edits in red, mine in blue:

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)

(b)(5); (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:55 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

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(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:50 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

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(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 8:23 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Current DRAFT Memorandum

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>



**Recipient:** DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

**Date:** Mon, 11 Jan 2021 12:39:31 +0000

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (202) 320-4498

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 6:58 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

Reference the preceding remarks below, I believe a very strong unclassified case can be made that:

(b)(5)

Therefore, I would love to see this unclassified evidence (and where possible classified evidence) presented by the US to other states who are parties to the BWC or WHO, with the purpose of creating a coalition of nations to confront the PRC.

Once a large enough group of like-minded nations can be assembled, the PRC should be confronted with an ultimatum to either come clean and allow a thorough and completely open investigation of its labs, records, and personnel (outside of China), or otherwise continue the apparent cover up and face global sanctions for its refusal to respect the lives and wellbeing of humanity.

At this point the PRC's behavior has forfeited its right to call the shots regarding any international investigation.

On Sun, Jan 10, 2021 at 9:35 PM [redacted]@state.gov wrote:

If a government covers up an accidental release that spreads and kills hundreds of thousands and costs \$20 trillion then that constitutes a deliberate attack and an act of socio-economic war.

**From:** DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted]@state.gov

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:15 PM

**To:** [redacted]@state.gov; [redacted]@state.gov; [redacted]@state.gov; [redacted]@state.gov;

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

BWC [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] (b)(5)

On January 10, 2021 at 2:08:55 PM EST, [redacted]@state.gov wrote:

[redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]@state.gov

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 11:27 AM

**To:** DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted]@state.gov; [redacted]@state.gov; [redacted]@state.gov; [redacted]@state.gov;

**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

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[redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(5)

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**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

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(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fw: Current DRAFT Memorandum

My edits in the attached.

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff  
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance  
U.S. Department of State  
HST Room (b)(6)

Office: (b)(6)  
Cell: (b)(6)

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov  
ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov  
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**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
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(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

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(b)(5)

(b)(6) changes and my addition based on (b)(6) comments attached. Tracked changes follow below (b)(6) edits in red, mine in blue:

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(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)

(b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
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**Subject:** Re: Current DRAFT Memorandum

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**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:50 PM  
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**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
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**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 8:23 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Current DRAFT Memorandum



**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Bonine, David N (h)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Ganzer, Ann K (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing  
**Date:** Wed, 4 Aug 2021 18:01:53 +0000

Hi Folks – Thanks for the call. I’m attaching the PG cleared by EAP/Press on Monday on the recent House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Report.

See everybody tomorrow,

(h)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer  
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 3, 2021 9:13 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Good evening all,

It seems that principals from AVC, ISN, and H can make 1:30-2pm work for a quick sync call (unclassified). Three primary things to discuss:

- 1. Logistics.
- 2. Run of Show (and potential disruptions to the plan)
- 3. Any new considerations not covered in previous prep sessions

As I mentioned before, DAS David Bonine from H will be joining the briefing team and this will give him an opportunity to hear the overall plan. Over the past few weeks, he has been working directly with the committee on setting this briefing up and is in a better position to describe atmospheric and other angles for the benefit of the briefing team.

I will send out a calendar invite to this distro list - please join if willing and able. Forward the invite to anyone you feel would be appropriate to join. Please use the following dial in info:

**Toll-Free:** (b)(6)  
**Access Code:** 1223538

vr

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN  
 Military Advisor  
 Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)  
 (h)(6)@state.gov | (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 3, 2021 6:46 PM  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

I'll have to switch some things around but I could make 11:00 to 12:30 work, and 1:30 to 2:00 would work. I can also make 2-4 work. Happy to host a few folks to talk over a secret-level speaker phone if we do classified, but defer really to whatever H thinks is needed at this point.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 3, 2021 8:53 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Hi (b)(6) I have two back-to-back meetings in the 2-4 timeframe tomorrow (Wednesday). I'm available tomorrow 11:00-12:30 and 1:30- to 2:00, if something in that timeframe might work. I'd be happy to have a quick unclassified call, or if there is something classified we need to discuss, I can join via my TSV OIP. Best (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 3, 2021 8:47 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Goodmorning (b)(6)

I would defer to the DASs and other briefers. I know that previous sync calls were classified but not sure if the 3rd installment of these needs to be.

vr

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN  
 Military Advisor  
 Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@state.gov | (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 3, 2021 8:39 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

(b)(6) do you want an unclass or classified call?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 4:32 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Good afternoon everyone,

Right now, it appears we are tracking to conduct this briefing Thursday from 10-11am. I passed everyones clearance to State SSO last Friday to file the visit request w Senate Security.

Additionally DAS Bonine, our Senate DAS, is going to join the briefing team. Knowing that we've conducted a few pre-briefs to different extents, I'd like to offer the opportunity for a 30 minute pre-brief or catchup call to level set the team from any changes since our last attempt. DAS Bonine is free this Wednesday from 2-4pm. Please let me know if this is desirable/doable.

vr

(b)(6)

(b)(6) JSN  
 Military Advisor  
 Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)  
(h)(6) @state.gov | (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 28, 2021 10:53 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6) @state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

(b)(6) and (b)(6) can you please send me your red phone numbers? I'll get them to the Red Switch team to set up the call for 3. Thanks.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 27, 2021 11:27 PM  
**To:** (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Cc:** (h)(6) @state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov; Ganzer, Ann K (h)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

I can do 3:00.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 27, 2021 6:57 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6) @state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov; Ganzer, Ann K (h)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (h)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov  
**Subject:** Re: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Okay can this group do 3 pm?

Get Outlook for iOS

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 27, 2021 5:59 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) Park, Christopher J; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)  
 (h)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Hi Jenny - I have a conflict (another meeting I cannot move) at 2:30, but could do 3pm if it works for others. Best - (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 27, 2021 4:39 PM  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)  
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Thanks (b)(6) Could we schedule a classified call with you and (b)(6) tomorrow at 2:30 p.m.? I can set it up with the Red Switch team if this time works for everyone.

---

**From:** (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 26, 2021 5:46 PM  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Covid 19 Origins Briefing

Hi Jenny – Looping in (b)(6)

We had an extensive and lengthy prep session last week on Thursday with (b)(5) Perhaps I could just have a classified call with (b)(6) and Chris and bring them up to speed? Is (b)(6) joining the SFRC briefing?

Or, has the purpose of the briefing to the Hill changed?

Many thanks - (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, July 26, 2021 5:36 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Covid 19 Origins Briefing

In preparation for what we believe could be a Thursday/Friday SFRC briefing on Covid-19 origins, ISN staff would like to convene an informal murder board among our briefers to go through potential lines of questioning from the committee. We'd like to arrange something for Wednesday, if possible.

If this group believes we should hold this briefing in a SCIF, appreciate if (b)(6) could please suggest some times that INR space is available. Once we arrive at a convenient time, I will send around a meeting invite.

(b)(6)

Acting Director  
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs  
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

**Recipient:** [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J [redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>;

Ganzer, Ann K [redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (h)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov;  
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov;  
 ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>  
**CC:** EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Subject:** RE: COLIN: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins  
**Date:** Mon, 2 Aug 2021 14:15:13 +0000

Clear for (b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 10:10 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>  
**Cc:** EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Subject:** FW: COLIN: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

ISN/CPA colleagues, trying to drag this across the finish line by a 10am suspense (b)(6) had to step out for an outside meeting) – would appreciate your clearance ASAP. Thanks

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 9:36 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP  
 <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL  
 <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-  
 Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-  
 DL@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Chris –

Here's the GOP HFAC press release on this, which includes the link to the report. It's being referred to as an "addendum" to the Sep 2020 report: <https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaull-releases-addendum-to-origins-of-covid-19-report/>

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 9:04 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-

HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

(h)(6) think this looks good subject to one suggested minor fiddle. (b)(5)

Is this report out? Or is this a leak claiming a leak? If the latter, can someone alert the irony police?

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Sent: Monday, August 2, 2021 8:48 AM  
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
Subject: Re: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

With his email this time

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From: (h)(6)@state.gov>  
Sent: Monday, August 2, 2021 8:48:05 AM  
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>  
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>  
Subject: Re: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

(b)(6)

Get Outlook for iOS

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 8:38:46 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J <[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Thanks [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)  
 Public Diplomacy Officer  
 Office of International Health & Biodefense  
 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental & Scientific Affairs  
 Mobile: [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 8:37 AM  
**To:** IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; SP\_EAP <SP\_EAP@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FLASH CLEAR BY 9:30 AM: PG on GOP report on COVID-19 origins

Hi folks –

Please clear on the following PG by 9:30AM per the below tasker: [redacted] 20210802 PG GOP report COVID origins v1.docx . Please loop in anyone I may have missed.

**CHINA:** [redacted] (b)(5)  
 [redacted] (b)(5)

Best,  
 Neetu

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 2, 2021 7:17 AM  
**To:** EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>  
**Subject:** AUGUST 2 EAP Press Guidance Tasking List

Good morning! There will be a Department Press Briefing at 2PM today.

Please submit voluntary press guidance to EAP-P no later than 10AM.

**EAP TASKINGS:**

**BURMA:** US reaction to Myanmar's Military Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min announcing he will be PM, and elections in two years.. (Clear with DRL)


**CHINA/TAIWAN/JAPAN:** [redacted] (b)(5)

**CHINA:** [redacted] (b)(5)

**CHINA:** [redacted] (b)(5)

FYI, [redacted] has been tasking with the following:  
[redacted] (b)(5)

Reuters  
<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-military-ruler-promises-elections-says-ready-work-with-asean-2021-08-01/>



## Myanmar army ruler takes prime minister role, again pledges elections | Reuters

Myanmar's military ruler Min Aung Hlaing has taken on the role of prime minister in a newly formed caretaker government, state media reported on Sunday, six months after the army seized power from ...

[www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com)

**BANGKOK (AP) —** Six months after seizing power from the elected government, Myanmar's military leader on Sunday declared himself prime minister and said he would lead the country under the extended state of emergency until elections are held in about two years.

"We must create conditions to hold a free and fair multiparty general election," Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said during a recorded televised address. "We have to make preparations. I pledge to hold the multiparty general election without fail."

He said the state of emergency will achieve its objectives by August 2023. In a separate announcement, the military government named itself "the caretaker government" and Min Aung Hlaing the prime minister.

The state of emergency was declared when troops moved against the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on Feb. 1, an action the generals said was permitted under the military-authored 2008 constitution. The military claimed her landslide victory in last year's national elections was achieved through massive voter fraud but offered no credible evidence.

The military government officially annulled the election results last Tuesday and appointed a new election commission to take charge of the polls.

The military takeover was met with massive public protests that has resulted in a lethal crackdown by security forces who routinely fire live ammunition into crowds.

As of Sunday, 939 people have been killed by the authorities since Feb. 1, according to a tally kept by the independent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Casualties are also rising among the military and police as armed resistance grows in both urban and rural areas.

Moves by The Association of Southeast Asian Nations to broker a dialogue between the military government and its opponents have stalled after an agreement at an April summit in Jakarta to appoint a special envoy for Myanmar.

Min Aung Hlaing said that among the three nominees, Thailand's former Deputy Foreign Minister Virasakdi Futrakul was selected as the envoy. "But for various reasons, new proposals were released and we could not keep moving onwards. I would like to say that Myanmar is ready to work on ASEAN cooperation within the ASEAN framework, including the dialogue with the ASEAN special envoy in Myanmar," he said.

ASEAN foreign ministers were expected to discuss Myanmar in virtual meetings this week hosted by Brunei, the current chair of the 10-nation bloc.

Myanmar is also struggling with its worst COVID-19 outbreak that has overwhelmed its already crippled health care system. Limitations on oxygen sales have led to widespread allegations that the military is directing supplies to government supporters and military-run hospitals.

At the same time, medical workers have been targeted by authorities after spearheading a civil disobedience movement that urged professionals and civil servants not to cooperate with the government.


Min Aung Hlaing blamed the public's mistrust in the military's efforts to control the outbreak on "fake news and misinformation via social networks," and accused those behind it of using COVID-19 "as a tool of bioterrorism."

Japan calls for greater attention to 'survival of Taiwan'

Defence minister's remarks follow Tokyo's decision to link Taipei's security to its own

Robin Harding and Leo Lewis in Tokyo AUGUST 1 2021

<https://www.ft.com/content/e82fe924-ba9b-4325-b8a4-0d5482ee1d24>



### Japan calls for greater attention to 'survival' of Taiwan | Financial Times

Japan's defence minister has called on the international community to pay greater attention to the "survival of Taiwan" as he warned that China's military build-up was enveloping the island.

[www.ft.com](https://www.ft.com)

Japan's defence minister has called on the international community to pay greater attention to the "survival of Taiwan" as he warned that China's military build-up was enveloping the island.

Nobuo Kishi, the younger brother of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, told the Financial Times that broad international pressure was crucial to prevent Taiwan's future being decided by military confrontation.

His comments marked a further step up in rhetoric after Japan broke with years of precedent and directly linked Taiwan's security with its own in a recent defence white paper, with an explicit reference to the need for a greater "sense of crisis".

The same report, whose cover illustration of a samurai adorns Kishi's office, warned that the overall military balance between China and Taiwan was now "tilting to China's favour" — a warning the minister repeated.

"We're seeing various moves by China that work to envelop Taiwan," said Kishi.

Chinese military aircraft have regularly entered the air defence identification zone off Taiwan's south-western coast since last year.

Beijing has also started flying around the southern tip of the island into airspace off its south-eastern coast, and Chinese military planes flew parallel to the northern half of Taiwan's east coast earlier this year. Chinese naval vessels have increasingly been spotted in waters off Taiwan's eastern coast.

Kishi is known for his close relations with politicians in Taipei and is regarded as both a conservative and a hawk on China. He was recently photographed gazing across the 110km strait that separates Taiwan from Japan's westernmost island of Yonaguni.

Japan's strong message, Kishi said, was that peace in the Taiwan Strait would only be assured if the international community demanded it. "Rather than a direct military collision between China and Taiwan, international society needs to pay greater attention to the survival of Taiwan," he said.

US and Japanese military officials have begun serious planning for a possible conflict between China and Taiwan, including top-secret tabletop war games and joint exercises, six officials told the FT at the end of June.

Taro Aso, Japan's deputy prime minister, said a crisis in Taiwan could present an existential threat to Japan, in remarks at a private fundraiser that were reported by local media. The comments were significant because that is the constitutional hurdle for use of Japan's military to support US forces.

But despite its growing concern, Tokyo does not intend to forge a direct military relationship with Taipei, Kishi said, and would maintain the status quo in which the two nations do not have formal diplomatic relations.



"While maintaining the existing framework, we want to reach a mutual understanding via various initiatives, or through the exchange of views between Japan and the United States," he said.

Although the gap in military strength between China and Taiwan is widening every year, Kishi indicated that he believed in Taipei's ability to defend itself. He said the island was combining "asymmetric military capabilities", which use cheaper weapons to offset an adversary's strength, into a "multi-layered defence system".

As part of Japan's push for greater international attention to the issue, Kishi said Tokyo welcomed a greater role for European countries in the region, including the upcoming visit by the UK's Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier strike group.

"A lot of countries have shown their sympathy with our idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific," he said. By showing their presence in the region, "we can together send a strong message on regional peace and stability".

Additional reporting by Kathrin Hille in Taipei

August 2, 2021

4:07 AM EDT

Last Updated an hour ago

Hong Kong authorities arrest pro-democracy singer for 'corrupt conduct'

Sara ChengJessie Pang

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hong-kong-authorities-arrest-pro-democracy-singer-corruption-2021-08-02/>

HONG KONG, Aug 2 (Reuters) - Hong Kong's anti-corruption watchdog on Monday charged a singer and prominent pro-democracy activist, Anthony Wong, with "corrupt conduct" at a 2018 election rally, the latest legal action against dissent by authorities in the Chinese-ruled city.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) said in a statement that Wong had provided "entertainment to induce others to vote" for pro-democracy activist Au Nok-hin in a 2018 legislative council by-election.

"At the rally, Wong performed two songs on stage. At the end of the performance, he appealed to the participants of the rally to vote for Au at the election," the ICAC wrote, adding he had breached the Elections Corrupt and Illegal Conduct Ordinance.

If convicted, he could be jailed for up to seven years and fined HK\$500,000 (\$64,000), the ordinance says.

Wong, 59, who first came into the public limelight with pop duo, Tat Ming Pair, in the 1980s, could not immediately be reached for comment.

Au, who went on to win the election, was also charged. Both are due to appear in court on Thursday to plea.

Au was not available for comment. He was jailed for 10 months jail in April for organising an unauthorised assembly.

Au was also arrested with 46 other prominent democrats this year for alleged conspiracy to commit subversion under a sweeping national security law introduced in June last year to outlaw secession, subversion, terrorism and foreign collusion.

Hong Kong's Beijing-backed government says the pro-democracy protests threatened stability in the former British colony and the action taken against various people since then is necessary to uphold the law.

A popular songwriter known for his poignant lyrics, Wong was a strong supporter of Hong Kong's 2014 pro-democracy "Umbrella" movement and the 2019 anti-China protests. He is also a vocal advocate of LGBT rights.

During the performance for Au in 2018, according to a video of it posted on Au's Facebook page, Wong had told the audience before singing "A forbidden fruit per day":

"This song is about choice, whether society has a choice."

Over the past year, many of the city's leading democrats have been detained, jailed or forced into exile.


A major pro-democracy newspaper, Apple Daily, closed in June after several of its senior editors were arrested on national security grounds.

Last Friday, Tong Ying-kit, the first person convicted under the security law was sentenced by a panel of three judges to nine years in prison for terrorism and inciting secession.

Republican report says coronavirus leaked from China lab; scientists still probing origins  
Reuters

Reporting by Jonathan Landay and Mark Hosenball; Editing by Lisa Shumaker

<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-republican-report-says-coronavirus-leaked-chinese-lab-scientists-still-2021-08-02/>



## U.S. Republican report says coronavirus leaked from Chinese lab; scientists still probing origins | Reuters

A preponderance of evidence proves the virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic leaked from a Chinese research facility, said a report by U.S. Republicans released on Monday, a conclusion that U.S. ...

[www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com)

WASHINGTON, Aug 2 (Reuters) - A preponderance of evidence proves the virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic leaked from a Chinese research facility, said a report by U.S. Republicans released on Monday, a conclusion that U.S. intelligence agencies have not reached.

The report also cited "ample evidence" that Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) scientists - aided by U.S. experts and Chinese and U.S. government funds - were working to modify coronaviruses to infect humans and such manipulation could be hidden.

Representative Mike McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, released the report by the panel's Republican staff. It urged a bipartisan investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic that has killed 4.4 million people worldwide. (Graphic on global cases and deaths)

China denies a genetically modified coronavirus leaked from the facility in Wuhan - where the first COVID-19 cases were detected in 2019 - a leading but unproven theory among some experts. Beijing also denies allegations of a cover-up.

"We now believe it's time to completely dismiss the wet market as the source," said the report. "We also believe the preponderance of the evidence proves the virus did leak from the WIV and that it did so sometime before September 12, 2019."

The report cited what it called new and under-reported information about safety protocols at the lab, including a July 2019 request for a \$1.5 million overhaul of a hazardous waste treatment system for the facility, which was less than two years old.

In April, the top U.S. intelligence agency said it concurred with the scientific consensus that the virus was not man-made or genetically modified. [read more](#)

U.S. President Joe Biden in May ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to accelerate their hunt for the origins of the virus and report back in 90 days. [read more](#)

A source familiar with current intelligence assessments said the U.S. intelligence community has not reached any conclusion whether the virus came from animals or the WIV.

Reporting by Jonathan Landay and Mark Hosenball; Editing by Lisa Shumaker

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**Recipient:** ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>;  
EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL <EAP-CM-STRATCOM-DL@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:  
**Date:** Thu, 10 Jun 2021 15:53:23 +0000

Glad Dr. Ford is speaking out...but "Sigh" because he has to explain himself. Geeesh. Not sure why some of these folks still work here in the Department.

---

**From:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:51 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:  
**Importance:** High

Sigh!

---

**From:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:50 AM  
**To:** AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; AVC-VPO-DL <AVC-VPO-DL@state.gov>; [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov> [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

!

---

**From:** Price, Edward C <[REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:42 AM  
**To:** AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>; [REDACTED] (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>  
**Cc:** SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Chris Ford -- The "Lab-leak" inquiry at the State Department:

<https://christopherashleyford.medium.com/the-lab-leak-inquiry-at-the-state-department-96973cff3a65>

# The “Lab-leak” inquiry at the State Department:

x]

Christopher Ashley Ford

1 hour ago · 20 min read

## **An Open Letter by former Assistant Secretary Christopher Ford**

(June 10, 2021)

In both journalism and policymaking — if not always in politics, or in the sordid world of score-settling by unemployed, second-rate apparatchiks — facts matter, and intellectual integrity matters. In light of the remarkable quantity of errant nonsense that has been written in the last couple of weeks about squabbles inside the U.S. State Department about how to look into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in the closing weeks of the Trump Administration, I hope this open letter will help set the record straight for those who still care about things such as facts.

I write this because, to put it bluntly, I’m tired of being the butt of stupid and paranoid conspiracy theories being promulgated by those who know better. I recognize that some of these conspiracy narratives are, for any thoughtful person, self-refuting even on their face. (As someone who has been warning the policy community since at least 2007 about threats to the United States

and the democratic world from the Chinese Communist Party's geopolitical ambitions — including in two scholarly books and scores of articles and speeches, including in official capacity at the State Department — have I been “protecting” the Chinese Communist Party from accountability? Good grief.)

Nevertheless, I've been around politics long enough to know that an imbecility that slots into a convenient narrative beats an awkward fact any day, and manic performative outrage is much more fun than sober analysis. So perhaps offering clarity here won't change a thing. Yet I'm still going to try.

I'm also going to try to do something unorthodox here. Rather than using this letter as an opportunity to invent and loudly dispense my own *post hoc* version of what happened — a dishonest revisionism-of-convenience that is in abundant supply, but that I will leave to others — I will try to offer you only specific claims that are supported by contemporaneous documents that enterprising journalists at Fox News and *Vanity Fair* have recently put into the public record.

### ***Part One: A Clear Documentary Record***

In particular, since the question at hand is my own particular role and position in connection with investigating the origins of the COVID-19 virus, I will refer to three unclassified documents that I myself wrote and sent to others at the State Department in early January 2021. (For the record, I did *not* retain these documents when I left the Department. Thankfully, however — at least for me

— some of the lies being told on these topics have apparently caused offense among those who know what really happened and clearly *did* retain the documents.) I'm happy to see them in the public record, because they make very clear exactly what I was doing at the time, and why.

The documents are as follows:

1. An e-mail I sent to Tom DiNanno and David Asher on January 4, 2021, which can be found [here](#) thanks to Fox News;
2. An e-mail exchange between me and DiNanno on January 5–6, which can be found [here](#) thanks to Fox News; and
3. A message I sent to a number of senior State Department officials on January 8, which can be found [here](#) thanks to *Vanity Fair*.

### ***Part Two: Pushing for an Honest and Defensible Lab-Leak Inquiry***

So let me begin with a critical point. As detailed in these documents, the squabbling at the State Department was about trying to ensure that we got our facts straight before going public with dramatic steps such as having Secretary Pompeo announce that it was “statistically” impossible for SARS-CoV-2 to be anything other than the product of Chinese government manipulation, sending “demarches” to foreign governments with this theory, or writing up China for having violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in connection with COVID-19.



The dispute had nothing whatsoever to do with trying to quash investigation into the origins of the virus, and *everything* to do with trying to ensure the honesty and intellectual integrity of that investigation *precisely because* it was vital for us to get the bottom of the question of COVID “origins,” including the possibility that it came from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). I strongly *supported* looking into the “lab-leak” hypothesis, which clearly is a real possibility.

But I’m not just saying this now. I said it at the time, too. A lot.

Let’s look at the documents, starting with my January 4 e-mail to DiNanno and Asher. In that message, I highlight that the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau’s scientific “allegations about WIV and Chinese BW work allegedly being the source” of SARS-CoV-2 were “important” and “worrying,” and that these significant claims needed to be evaluated by real scientific experts.

(Yes, I admit that I called the virus the “WuFlu.” At a time before the World Health Organization had come up with “non-stigmatizing” designators such as “Alpha,” and people talked freely about things like the “UK variant” or “South African variant,” it didn’t seem unfair to tag the original virus as having indeed come from Wuhan. I’m afraid at another point I called it the “KungFlu,” too. None of this sounds as clever to me in retrospect as I fear it did at the time. But please remember that these were internal e-mails, not intended to see the light of day. Had I written these

messages with an eye to public release, I would not have been so glib. *Mea culpa.*)

Anyway, in my e-mail, I reminded DiNanno and Asher that I had directed them, a month or so earlier, to establish an “expert vetting group or process” that would involve real scientists and intelligence experts in assessing the strength of AVC’s claims. But why, I asked them, had there been no progress in subjecting their assertions to peer review? And why were they running around the interagency spreading these allegations *before* we knew whether these claims could pass muster with objective, third-party scientists?

As I stated in that January 4 message, I wanted to “demand[] more transparency from the PRC here, especially in light of their appalling early cover-up of COVID-19 during the early weeks when honesty and resolute action could have made such a colossal difference in heading off millions of deaths and untold suffering, and in light of their grotesque history of such cover-ups.”

“An investigation of [COVID] origins is very important,” I reiterated, “and I’m delighted to press their feet to the fire for the honesty and clarity they’ve so far refused to provide.”

In the January 4 message, however, I also stressed how important it was that we get our facts straight before going public, *as the U.S. Government*, with the accusation that the Chinese government created the virus:

“[W]e need to make sure what we say is solid and passes muster from real experts *before* we risk embarrassing and discrediting ourselves in public. ... As I have repeatedly said, if it turns out that your conclusions are right, I’ll happily be first in line to scream from the rooftops about them, for it would be a colossal outrage. And you may well *be* right. But I want to be confident about where the facts really lie .... These issues are surpassingly important and we need to get to the bottom of them — but rigorously, defensibly, and truly.”

Hence my annoyance, expressed in that message, that DiNanno had been dragging his feet over my direction to “arrang[e] expert-level bioscience and intelligence vetting of David [Asher’s] work.” I warned DiNanno that such dithering looked bad: “Please don’t continue to feed the impression that AVC is afraid of peer review.” And I insisted that he tell me when they actually planned to get those allegations vetted by real scientists. It’s all there in the e-mail.

The next day, January 5, when I still hadn’t heard back from DiNanno about how they would ensure that their scientific assertions got evaluated by actual scientists, I e-mailed him again. (This was the message at the bottom of the January 5–6 e-mail string Fox News published.) I’ll admit I was grumpy, but I think I was also pretty clear about my focus on ensuring that we got our facts straight on this critical issue of COVID origins:

“It is ... becoming embarrassing — and, if I may say so, more than a little worrisome — that AVC seems still to be ducking an expert-level engagement to evaluate its own WIV allegations, even while it has continued, over the last month or so, to brief its claims to non-experts across the interagency.”

DiNanno responded to my January 5 message with platitudes about how all they were doing was “investigating potential arms control violations.” (This is the middle message in the January 5–6 string.) “That Is [sic] exactly what we have done,” he declared, “and will continue to do.”

Let’s pause here for a moment. If you’re paying attention, you’ll have noticed that with this comment about “investigating potential arms control violations,” DiNanno signaled that AVC regarded itself as focusing not so much upon the origins of SARS-CoV-2, *per se*, as more specifically upon *China allegedly having violated the Biological Weapons Convention by creating the virus*. They seemed to believe that COVID-19 was a biological weapons (BW) effort gone awry — or perhaps even a BW agent *deliberately* unleashed upon the world after Beijing had secretly vaccinated its population, as Asher has rather remarkably suggested in public now that the State Department has terminated his consultancy contract. (You can see him in all his sober, cautious, and methodical glory on YouTube.) In this context, I suppose it was hardly surprising — as I memorialized in my January 4 e-mail to DiNanno — that in the December briefing when AVC first pitched me on their WIV-origins theory, Asher at

one point suggested that SARS-CoV-2 might be a “genetically selective agent” (GSA) that China was using to target us, as evidenced, he said, by the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa wasn’t reporting many COVID cases while the United States was. (Surely you don’t need me to spell out how that notion was both analytically unsupportable on its face *and* contained deeply offensive implications, do you? I’ll leave you to work this out on your own, but, uh, wow.)

Fortunately, however, DiNanno also informed me in his January 5 response that AVC had now indeed set up a panel of experts to discuss the scientific claims, which would occur on Thursday evening, January 7. (Finally! As noted in my January 4 e-mail, I’d been demanding expert vetting of AVC’s “statistical” argument since they first came to me with this issue in my office in December.)

As this panel approached, however, I wrote DiNanno again — on January 6 — to emphasize how important it was that we get real scientists to vet AVC’s allegations before we surfaced such dramatic claims in public:

“As I indicated before, having something that sounds scientific to say when making assertions to laymen is not the same thing as being correct. I do not have the scientific expertise to critique David’s claims. Nor do you. Nor, in fact, does he have actual technical training in the first place. That doesn’t necessarily mean he’s wrong, of course, but it does have implications for how to deal

with the complex and controversial claims you guys are making about weedy bioscience. ... If you're right, you should be willing to prove it, and to confront experts who — unlike all of the people involved in building and making this argument for you — actually have training in the scientific field about which you make assertions. I really don't know how I could possibly have been more clear about this over the course of the last month. Your allegations are dramatic, and potentially very significant indeed, but it's for precisely that reason that they need to be tested and evaluated carefully. ...Your claims need to be assessed by real experts — not just waved around as bullet points on slide decks in front of non-scientists who are then dared to prove you wrong.”

It was particularly important to get real expert-level assessment of the scientific assertions AVC was making about laboratory origin because the AVC investigation appeared to have carefully *bypassed* State Department experts — both in my own bureau and in AVC itself, each of which has a whole *office* devoted to such questions — and the U.S. Intelligence Community. As I recounted in my January 8 message, “AVC ha[s] apparently been briefing this argument inside the Department and [to] some interagency partners for some weeks, apparently on instructions from a staffer at S/P [the Department's Office of Policy Planning] who told them they should not inform me or others of this work, nor involve the Intelligence Community.”

(A footnote, but perhaps a significant one: That last bit about cutting real experts out of the loop came to me directly from Tom

DiNanno. When I asked him why AVC had been doing all this without telling the senior official to whom they reported — that is, me — he told me sheepishly that he had been *instructed* to do things this way by Miles Yu, an S/P staffer at the time. According to DiNanno, Yu had represented that these specific instructions came from the Secretary. DiNanno, then in charge of the verification bureau, gave no sign of ever actually having verified that this was true, however. He appeared to have accepted Yu's representations at face value — in effect, a *de facto* Assistant Secretary of State taking marching orders from a lower-ranking staffer in another bureau, sight unseen. It would be interesting, now, to find out whether: (1) Secretary Pompeo *really* directed that AVC's lab-leak inquiry avoid engaging Departmental BW experts and U.S. intelligence officials, and that it do its work essentially in secret, without telling the official performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security; (2) Yu was, at least in this respect, dishonestly freelancing; or (3) DiNanno was just lying to me about his conversation with Yu. Perhaps a good journalist can go figure this out.)

### ***Part Three: The Scientific Panel***

Anyway, at least a first chance for scientific vetting came on January 7, when the panel of experts picked by the AVC Bureau had a chance to discuss the "statistical" proof that AVC had been relying upon in its assertions to me and others that the SARS-CoV-

2 virus *had to have been* the product of Chinese government manipulation.

Unfortunately, as I memorialized the next day (January 8), despite my urging — in the last three paragraphs of my January 6 e-mail — that the other members of the panel “have ... the benefit of actually being able to read the paper beforehand,” AVC had not shared the document ahead of time. As I observed on January 8, “AVC did not provide us with the actual paper before yesterday’s discussion, so most other participants had not had the chance to study it in detail.”

Even so, it did not take the other panelists long to point out some key flaws in the “statistical” argument, which had been presented orally to the panel by the scientist upon whom AVC had apparently most relied in developing that line of argument. (His name is widely known, but I opted not to single him out in my message to Departmental colleagues. I felt that scientists should have some freedom to figure out the science amongst themselves; my concern was with what the *U.S. Government* would assert after they did. Rather than drag him personally into the fray, therefore, my memo reflected the fact that this man’s claims had effectively become *AVC’s argument* as the bureau promoted them in the interagency.)

I’ll spare you the blow-by-blow of criticisms made by other panelists about the “statistical” case AVC had been making at least since the first briefing they gave me in my office in December,



though you can read the salient details in the January 8 message I sent to a number of my senior State Department colleagues the next day. (My message focused on the statistical argument, given the prominence it had enjoyed in AVC's briefings; I did not purport to summarize the panel's discussion of all questions discussed.) As you'll see if you care to read my several-page account on January 8, the assertions AVC had been making seemed to have major problems. At the least, those assertions were clearly not *yet* ready to be the official position of the U.S. Department of State — which is why I sent that January 8 message warning my colleagues to be careful about running with that particular "statistical" claim.

I also now know, thanks to *Vanity Fair*, that DiNanno responded to my January 8 memo with one of his own a day or two later, after I had left the Department. The reader can find it online, so I won't walk through it here. In light of what you now know from documentary evidence about my *actual* positions at the time, however, you'll easily be able to see what a pack of distortions and falsehoods DiNanno's memo actually was. You might want to lay our two documents side by side and read them carefully in light of the information you now have. I suspect it will be pretty clear that his memo was a dishonest mess of baseless attacks on me — an angry screed addressed to readers whom DiNanno knew did not have the benefit of knowing what I'd *actually* been saying to him for the last month, and which he sent to his readers at a time when he knew I had resigned from the Department and would have no

chance to defend myself and correct the record. (Thankfully, however, our bosses were intelligent folks. One can probably infer how seriously our superiors took DiNanno's memo by the fact that they apparently acted on my note of caution about AVC's scientific claims rather than on DiNanno's shrill and convoluted attempt to defend those assertions and paint me as the villain. More on that below.)

For purposes of this open letter, I'll leave the issues of science to any of you who are scientists. As I told DiNanno in my January 4 message, "I do not have the scientific expertise to critique David's claims. Nor do you. Nor, in fact, does he have actual technical training in the first place." That is *precisely* why I insisted that AVC set up a panel of experts, and why — after they finally got around to arranging this peer review on January 7 — it was my *duty* to convey to my colleagues some of the concerns raised by the experts AVC had put on the panel. It may in the end turn out that science *does* prove that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of human intervention at WIV. But it would have been grievously irresponsible for us to adopt that theory publicly until it was *much* more able to stand on its own two feet than the January 7 panel discussion showed it to be at the time.

#### ***Part Four: Putting Absurd Accusations to Rest***

Some of my former colleagues are now — perhaps, one imagines, out of embarrassment over all of the events described above — asserting that I tried to prevent inquiry into the lab-leak

hypothesis and to shut down any investigation of the question. (Thanks to Tucker Carlson making this claim at least twice on the air, by the way, I've now gotten vicious and deranged hate mail. Here's, for instance, what I received on June 3 after Carlson first mentioned me on his show: "*Fuck you dickbag globalist shill. Why the fuck did you shut down the lab leak theory? Go lick some China communist boots.*" This person helpfully signed this missive [cantcuckthetuck@gmail.com](mailto:cantcuckthetuck@gmail.com). Thanks for introducing me to new friends, Tucker.)

Yet no serious person who is actually aware of my interactions with AVC could possibly think I wanted to prevent inquiry into the laboratory hypothesis, as you will already have seen from my e-mails of January 4 and January 5–6, from which I've quoted extensively here. (You can even read them online yourself, in their entirety.) You can also see that I was always crystal clear about the importance of getting to the truth by fully investigating the laboratory-leak question, making clear that "if it turns out that [AVC's] conclusions are right," I would myself "happily be first in line to scream from the rooftops about them."

Additional proof of my commitment to looking into WIV — and indeed my focus upon *protecting* efforts to investigate the laboratory-leak question from the discredit and ridicule that might have smothered it in its crib if we had foolishly hitched Secretary Pompeo, the Department of State, and the Administration to easily-debunkable junk science — can be found in my January 8 message itself. There, I made the point yet again:

“If well-founded, AVC’s findings would be extremely significant .... All participants [in the January 7 panel] seemed ... to agree that China should be pressed for answers about such things as the nature of any work done at WIV on novel coronaviruses, whether any safety incidents occurred, what data is in WIV’s sequencing database (which was mysteriously taken offline early in the pandemic), and when exactly the PRC realized (despite its early representations) that SARS-CoV-2 was only in its ‘wet market’ environmental samples — and not in its live animal samples — leading them to conclude that the market was not the source of the outbreak. These sorts of questions should indeed provide us with lots of grist for pressing China for answers and highlighting its non-transparency and history of failing to report (or even covering up) critical information.”

You’ll also see from my January 8 message that I specifically directed “AVC and ISN [the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau] to collaborate on drawing up a list of questions and points that could be useful in this regard” in pressing Beijing for answers. So were these the actions of a “dickbag globalist shill” who “licks ... China communist boots”? Or of a serious steward of the honesty and intellectual integrity of U.S. State Department policymaking dedicated to ensuring we got our facts straight and pushing back against recklessness that would make it *harder* to have the lab-leak issue taken seriously? The reader can make up his or her own mind.

### ***Part Five: A Net Assessment***

So where does that leave us now?

Well, if you want to understand what I was trying to do during in this period of bickering inside the State Department, you now have my own words from internal contemporaneous records. Simply put, I felt it would be essentially *insane* to go public with AVC's scientific assertions — such as, as DiNanno and Asher had urged, making public statements, demarching foreign governments (including China), and finding China in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention over this coronavirus — before getting those scientific assertions vetted by objective, third-party scientists.

Let me be completely clear: From where I was sitting at the time, in the chair of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, I never saw *any* evidence of *any* effort at the State Department to prevent inquiry into the lab-leak idea. To the contrary — as you can now see proven by documents in the public record — I *supported* looking into the lab-leak hypothesis. I cared so much about getting to the truth about WIV, in fact, that I insisted that we do the work in a way that could stand up to scrutiny. (If you're serious about something being done, you have an obligation to ensure it's done *right*. Wanting less than that just makes you a hack.) And I am aware of *no one anywhere* in the Department who thought that the laboratory hypothesis should be ignored or ruled out.

So there was no conspiracy to quash inquiry into the lab-leak question, at least not at the State Department. But there *was* a

demand for intellectual rigor and analytically defensible conclusions in *doing* that important inquiry. For making that demand, however, I make no apologies. I was doing my duty.

What happened after that? Well, one might infer that my State Department superiors in fact *agreed* with the account in my January 8 message of the weaknesses that AVC's expert panel had pointed out in the supposed "statistical" proof that SARS-CoV-2 had to be the result of human intervention. Neither Secretary Pompeo nor any other serving U.S. official, after all, adopted and voiced the scientific assertions about WIV origin that AVC had previously been briefing to interagency stakeholders. Instead, Secretary Pompeo issued a "Fact Sheet" on January 15 that accurately recounted downgraded *intelligence reporting* we had received that seemed relevant to the question of whether COVID-19 had originated at the laboratory.

My superiors at the Department were not shy people, and I have no doubt that had they felt AVC's scientific assertions could pass muster with real scientists, they *absolutely* would have made this case in public, and loudly. They chose not to do so, however. I suspect that we should read into this their quiet endorsement of my conclusion that AVC's scientific case wasn't ready for prime time. (Perhaps someone can ask my former bosses what precisely they thought of the merit of AVC's "statistical" argument about genomic variation, and why — if it was indeed good science — they seem to have dropped those assertions. I can tell you only one thing about this with certainty: not pursuing AVC's "scientific"

argument after the January 7 panel meeting wasn't *my* decision. By the end of the day on January 8, after sending my message of caution, I had left the Department. It would be interesting to know what discussions happened thereafter.)

But I do think that what happened next is important. Instead of focusing on purported "scientific proofs" of laboratory origin, public discussion of the COVID-origins issue thereafter shifted to the questions and suspicions that had been raised about WIV by our intelligence information, as outlined in Secretary Pompeo's "Fact Sheet." This was, in my view, much the better way to go. Before leaving the Department, in fact, I had myself reviewed and cleared an early draft of that "Fact Sheet" as the downgraded information started to go around for interagency clearance, and I was glad to see it later emerge publicly on January 15. Tellingly, the Biden Administration has not questioned that information, and a robust debate is now underway about possible laboratory origin.

But let me be frank. Anyone who cares about ensuring that the lab-leak hypothesis is taken seriously should probably be *thanking* me, rather than vilifying me. I suspect that my push for scientific vetting of AVC's assertions actually helped *save* the lab-leak hypothesis from being preemptively discredited. The fact that we finally now have a credible public debate on the question owes much to the fact that pursuing these issues *wasn't* tainted by the State Department signing the U.S. Government's name to

scientific assertions that we already knew hadn't stood up well to scrutiny.

I've been around the arms control and international security business for quite a while now, including spending 2003–06 as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in what is now the AVC Bureau. As I told someone the other day — an old and dear friend and former colleague who has now started demonizing me on the basis of the lies being spread about these issues — honesty, accuracy, and intellectual integrity are the strongest weapons that an arms control verifier has. These things need to be safeguarded carefully, for they are priceless. They are what separates the truth-teller from the ideological crank.

I am heartsick at the ugliness of the campaign against me in the press today, but I remain proud of my role in insisting upon fidelity to these values at a time when some officials seemed to be slipping. I dearly hope that we can all now put fratricidal distractions aside and get back to the *real* task: figuring out what the hell happened in Wuhan.

### ***Part Seven: Conclusion***

The actual details of all this State Department infighting are, I'll admit, somewhat boring. They certainly don't map satisfyingly onto a moralistic narrative of redoubtable heroes fighting for right against malevolent cabals and institutional corruption. Nor are they well suited for spinning up rants of performative outrage by the occasional pundit disinclined to let little things like "truth" get



in the way of the good Nielsen ratings that come from spinning a sexy narrative of deceit and conspiracy.

Nevertheless, these demonstrable facts about the positions I took at the time *are* clear in the record. If that's not important to you, you're reading the wrong letter, and I apologize for wasting your time.

If you've read this far, however, my guess is that facts are indeed important to you. So thanks for listening.

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*Dr. Ford served until January 8, 2021, as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and for the last 15 months of that period also performed the duties of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Prior to that service at the State Department, he ran the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counterproliferation Directorate at the U.S. National Security Council staff. A graduate of Harvard, Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and the Yale Law School, Dr. Ford has been a think tank scholar, U.S. Navy intelligence officer, a staff member on five different U.S. Senate Committees, and a senior American diplomat. He is the author of two books on Chinese foreign relations and scores of articles on international security topics, and his personal website may be found at <https://newparadigmsforum.com>.*  
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**From:** "Park, Christopher J" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**To:** [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Subject:** RE: China's COVID-19 Messaging: Bucking up Domestic Confidence and Shifting Blame  
**Date:** Fri, 6 Mar 2020 13:53:52 +0000

At the risk of pulling a Bernie, I have to say they have a point. In most countries, the government can't get away with physically locking residents inside their apartment complexes for prolonged periods. I'm less sure it should be a point of pride.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** [(h)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 06, 2020 7:18 AM  
**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Subject:** FW: China's COVID-19 Messaging: Bucking up Domestic Confidence and Shifting Blame

The whole thing is a rather interesting read, but highlighted particular lines below.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** SMART Core <svcSmartBtsEwsHPrec@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 6, 2020 2:59 AM  
**Cc:** [(h)(6)]@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; [(h)(6)]@state.gov>; [(h)(6)]@state.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.gov>  
**Subject:** China's COVID-19 Messaging: Bucking up Domestic Confidence and Shifting Blame

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



**Info Office:** BIO\_STAFF

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**MRN:** 20 BEIJING 458  
**Date/DTG:** Mar 06, 2020 / 060755Z MAR 20  
**From:** AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
**Action:** WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
**E.O.:** 13526  
**TAGS:** PROP, PGOV, PREL, ECON, KPAO, KMDR, KFLU, CN  
**Captions:** SENSITIVE

**Reference:** A) 20 Beijing 286  
B) 20 Beijing 442  
C) 20 Beijing 235

**Subject:** China's COVID-19 Messaging: Bucking up Domestic Confidence and Shifting Blame

1. (SBU) **Summary:** The PRC propaganda authorities use a spectrum of narrative approaches to craft news coverage, commentary, and descriptions of China's response to COVID-19. Ensuring that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PRC government are seen to be responsive, in control, and winning against this fight is paramount. In practice, these positive messages are often mixed with neutral and negative messages. Neutral stories are generally more factual and may feature data such as reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) or describe actions China has taken to address the epidemic. Recently, negative stories aimed at shifting blame outside of China comprises a new strategy as China seeks to rebrand itself as a global leader in the fight against COVID-19, rather the outbreak's epicenter. COVID-19 continues to be intensely monitored and avidly discussed by China's active social media users. The U.S. Mission in China has successfully countered false PRC narratives with factual, transparent, and authentic Chinese language information reaching millions of Chinese seeking information on COVID-19. **End Summary.**

#### **Positive Narratives: China is in a Battle Against the Virus – and Will Win**

2. (SBU) Chinese state-run media pushed out many positive narratives and messages about the PRC government and CCP response to COVID-19. These positive narratives continued from earlier in the month to focus on the PRC response to the crisis and how the CCP will win the battle against the epidemic. (Ref A). These positive narratives focused on how the CCP and PRC were responding, Xi's direct role in leading the response, how the PRC is working closely with the international community and with the WHO, and more broadly narratives that supported trust in the PRC response.

#### **Xi Leads the Fight**

3. (U) In February media outlets covered Xi's personal and direct engagement in combatting COVID-19 with photos of visits, CCTV coverage of Xi chairing leadership meetings on COVID-19 and focus on scientific research. By early March Chinese news outlets were widely amplifying Xi's direct engagement in combatting the epidemic. For example, on March 2, *Xinhua* covered Xi's visit to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and the School of Medicine at Tsinghua University in Beijing. *Xinhua* reported that Xi stressed coordination in advancing scientific research on COVID-19, and his interest in vaccines, anti-bodies, medicines and fast testing kits. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on March 2 titled, "Xi Jinping Urged Greater Efforts in Scientific Research on Novel Coronavirus Outbreak."

#### **The CCP Cares – Leading Group for COVID 19 Response**

4. (U) Media outlets have all widely amplified Premier Li Keqiang presiding over the leading group of China's COVID-19 response with multiple positive stories demonstrating how the PRC government and CCP are improving prevention and control, measures to care for staff working at the frontlines and how the central government and CCP have reacted at the most crucial moments to curb the spread of the epidemic. State-run media also pushed out daily updates with information on infection rates and new

cases, with many outlets developing special landing pages or resources in online platforms to push out real-time updates. Good news stories about the PRC response in sending medical teams, building hospitals and stable food supplies were continued.

### **Working Closely with International Community and Sharing Vital Information**

5. (SBU) *CCTV* and other Chinese media outlets widely repeated praise from the WHO on China's "pragmatic and flexible anti-epidemic measures." *The Paper* reported on February 26, "After completing their nine-day inspection in China, WHO experts hailed China's unprecedented responses to COVID-19 and acknowledged China's role in protecting the international community and buying time for other countries to prepare for the outbreak. On the same day, UN General Secretary Guterres also recognized China's efforts to alleviate the negative impact of COVID-19 and its contributions to mankind. Chinese media said, these remarks from WHO and the United Nations truthfully reflect the aggressiveness, speed, and transparency with which China responded to the outbreak. *Guangming Daily* commented on February 26, "It is no exaggeration to say that China's resolute and powerful preventive and control measures, and its outstanding capabilities to lead, respond, organize, mobilize, and implement could not be achieved by other countries. The effectiveness of China's prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the CPC's leadership and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics."

### **China's Response Gave the Rest of the World Time**

6. (U) *People's Daily* cited China's sense of responsibility in a February 22 op-ed saying, "the Chinese speed on the technical, resource, and infrastructure fronts saved precious time for the world to address the virus while limiting the number of countries affected to just 20. The Chinese practice established new benchmarks in global epidemic control, sharing information and working closely with the WHO and countries in an open, transparent, and responsible manner, inviting international experts and facilitating their visits to Wuhan and elsewhere." *Guangming Daily* opined on February 28, "the battle against COVID-19 is also a war to defend the world" and that China's response "demonstrates our major power's sense of responsibility." Many media outlets described China's response as "shrewd and courageous" and *Guangming Daily* said the lockdown of Wuhan minimized the spread of the virus to other countries. The op-ed claims China's "timely information sharing saved the world precious time to rise to the epidemic."

### **Neutral Narratives Still Promote PRC Goals**

7. (SBU) More neutral narratives focused on the epidemic situation in Hubei and around China, as well as the complex issues surrounding the epidemic. Other topics including actions the PRC is taking on wild animals and markets, innovative and new responses to help combat COVID-19, stories about front line responders, and about other cities such as Beijing. Many of these neutral stories focused on actions that the PRC took to control the epidemic and commentary from official state-run outlets noted China's reaction and response can serve as a model for other countries.

### **"We Would Never Let Beijing Fail"**

8. (U) The *Global Times* reported on February 27 that Beijing is facing mounting pressure in efforts to contain COVID-19 as new confirmed infections surged due to imported cases of infection and cluster outbreaks. Media reports said officials from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

(China CDC) confirmed that authorities made the capital the top priority of its epidemic prevention and control work, with measures matching those adopted in Hubei. A WeChat post from the CCP Party School on February 17 featured an article titled, "We Would Never Let Beijing Fail" and discussed the strict measures implemented in Beijing.

#### **Trust PRC Information, Response, and Treatment and Don't look behind the Great Firewall**

9. (SBU) The Chinese public has actively followed COVID-19 news, with special interest in stories from traditional and social media on what they can do to stay healthy, help their families, and learn from "trusted medical experts." The CCP leveraged medical experts with established credibility, such as Zhong Nanshan, the doctor to first publicly acknowledge SARS, to convey these messages and push official narratives (**Note:** However, many netizens continue to source information beyond the Firewall and compare statements from Chinese experts with the international community, including from U.S. CDC. In this information space, the U.S. Embassy continued to attract Chinese netizens seeking accurate and factual information with U.S. messages reaching millions. **End Note.**)

#### **Negative Narratives – Move the Blame**

11. (SBU) Negative narratives ranged from disinformation and conspiracy theories to questioning U.S. data and information on cases and transmission in the United States. Even in the midst of the crisis the official propaganda authorities, MFA spokesperson, and various state-run media organizations continued to critique the United States. Early stories talked about the U.S. "overreaction" and sending diplomats out of Wuhan, while more recent stories claimed the stock market changes in the United States were due to a panic over COVID-19 in the U.S. Other negative narratives compared COVID-19 to the flu, reacted angrily over naming conventions that linked COVID-19 to China or Wuhan, and claimed other international reactions were racist and unfair. As the epidemic spreads to more countries, these negative stories push the blame outside of China as the PRC seeks to rebrand itself as a global leader in the fight against COVID-19, rather than the country where it originated and spread.

#### **U.S. Overreacts – Diplomatic Staff Are Safe, No Need for Bans**

12. (SBU) The PRC response echoed in official media, social media, and from the MFA briefing podium negatively portrayed the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Wuhan, the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the city, and the departure of Mission China family members due to health concerns. China portrayed U.S. screening and travel restrictions as a "ban" on Chinese from traveling to the United States, calling the U.S. response "excessive." In a key editorial on February 21 *People's Daily* said, "Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia, the WHO has repeatedly stated it does not recommend countries take any travel or trading restrictions and has called on countries to take convincing measures based on evidence. However, some countries still choose to ignore WHO's professional recommendations by taking excessive restrictive measures." *People's Daily* continued, "Such egoistic acts taken at the expense of others are not conducive to epidemic prevention and control. Rather, they have created panic, disrupted normal international exchanges and cooperation, and negatively affected global air transport market and the world economy."

13. (U) *The Paper* on March 4 opined, "it's worth noting that at the onset of the outbreak, the Trump administration was the first to evacuate expats from China and moved quickly to announce travel bans. As other countries followed suit, China was left hamstrung by what was effectively isolation, and its economy suffered. Had China decided to retaliate by banning all travel from and to the United States

and imposing export controls on medical supplies such as masks and medicines, America would have been plunged into the hell of coronavirus." *The Paper* concluded, "Despite the rhetoric of gloating U.S. politicians and attacks by racist U.S. media outlets, China chose not to take advantage of America's plight. It's ridiculous to demand an apology from China given the huge sacrifices the country has made. Instead, the United States should apologize to China for its wrong deeds, and the world is indebted to China for singlehandedly slowing the spread of the virus."

14. (SBU) Later when other countries added restrictions, *Xinhua* opined, "recently some countries have taken necessary border restrictive measures aimed at protecting the health and security of their citizens and foreigners as well as safeguarding regional and global public health security. As long as those measures are science-based, professional and appropriate, they can be understood and accepted."

#### **Suppressing Evidence of US Assistance**

15. (SBU) *The People's Daily* in commentary on February 27 commented that while the U.S. Department of State announced it will provide \$100 million in aid to help China and other countries in their epidemic prevention efforts China has "yet to see actual actions." The commentary said, compared to the U.S. government, U.S. businesses, friendly groups, and civil society organizations are much more active. CASS statistics show that the total aid from U.S. companies ranks first, far more than those from other countries. On Embassy accounts, many netizens continue to ask about the U.S. response to COVID-19, U.S. donations, and specifics on aid to China and to other countries to combat COVID-19.

#### **"All Those who Doubt China are Doomed to Fail"**

16. (U) In early March, the CCP and official media outlets directly responded to critiques of China's ability to weather the COVID-19 production impacts. American politicians that want companies to leave China are doomed to fail was one topline. While the PRC representative to the UN framed the story as "confident Beijing will meet economic goals despite virus." The PRC argued, there is no replacement of China's "highly refined, specialized, high-quality, and efficient supply chain." Media outlets also linked the response to COVID-19 as another reason to trust China's production saying China's achievements in epidemic prevention provide confidence to resume production." *The 21st Century Business Herald* in an editorial on February 2 said, "While it is natural for businesses to feel concerned, some American politicians and Western media that always want companies to leave China have taken this opportunity to promote a decoupling policy. But their move is doomed to fail."

#### **Is the U.S. Lying about COVID-19 Numbers in the United States.?**

17. (SBU) Chinese media actively pushed questions about the accuracy in U.S. cases and reports of COVID-19 and the speed of the U.S. response. On March 2, the *Beijing News* featured a commentary opining the United States does not know the extent of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. The fact that the U.S. stock market crashed indicates the market's misgivings about epidemic control outside of China, and lack of trust in the U.S. claimed Chinese media. In addition to official media coverage, Chinese netizens actively debated and discussed information on cases and response in the United States in late February and early March. On March 2, popular comments on *Weitianxia*, a prominent international news Weibo account operated by Sina discussed the CDC release of a COVID-19 patient and testing in the U.S. for COVID-19. The *Global Times* reported on February 27 that Chinese experts said the U.S. might not be able to effectively contain the outbreak of COVID-19, as the White House and

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have different perspectives on the situation, and President Trump's priority is still the economic data and the presidential election.

18. (SBU) On March 4 *People's Daily* issued a commentary titled, "The spread of coronavirus in the United States raises concern." In the commentary *People's Daily* highlights concerns over the nursing center in Washington State, public health officials' reactions in the U.S., and claims the U.S. administration acted slowing in testing potential COVID-19 cases. Active debate and discussion on Weibo in February closely tracked and monitored news announcements in the U.S. on COVID-19 response and cases. On social media Chinese netizens criticized the U.S. CDC's measures, debating whether the U.S. system is up to the task of addressing the novel coronavirus outbreak, while also opining that Europe's decision to increase refugee admissions will further help the virus spread. As one Chinese netizen put it, "the 'glorified' countries, without exception, are caught in a panic."

#### **Stock Market Decline Shows U.S. May Not Have Control**

19. (U) The *Global Times* opined on February 27 that "panic driven by the possible spread of COVID-19 in the United States has sent the country's stock market plummeting for days." The *Global Times* said, "only actions to combat the virus, rather than words, can save the U.S. stock market from a meltdown and stop it from once again becoming the center of a global financial crisis." The *Global Times* claimed, the market selloff "revealed investor concerns over whether or not the U.S. can bring the situation under control, particularly as the U.S. CDC confirmed the country's first possible case of community transmission."

#### **Sowing Doubt on the United States with Conspiracy Theories and Rumors**

20. (SBU) A key editorial published in *People's Daily* on February 28 claims although the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic first appeared in China, it did not necessarily originate in China. The editorial says in contrast to cautious scientists, some Western politicians and media have made rash assertions and even conjectured a so-called biochemical war to stigmatize China. *People's Daily* continues the drumbeat of "viruses know no borders" and says it is "everyone's duty to defeat ignorance with science, smash rumors with truth, resist prejudice with cooperation, and stop 'political viruses' such as conspiracy theories from causing chaos." Also in late February, Chinese media outlets all widely amplified well-known Chinese epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan saying the epidemic first appeared in China, but it may not have originated from China. This led to active discussions by netizens guessing that Zhong implied it came from the U.S. *Global Times* highlighted the origin story as well by amplifying a joint China-WHO report on February 29. Another popular online rumor that was widely circulated on Weibo and other social media platforms was that the U.S. was responsible for making the virus as either a bioweapon or a way to limit China's rise. While Chinese official media outlets debunked many of these rumors including that the CIA creating the virus, the conversations online were not quickly censored or limited which allowed many different conspiracy theories to circulate.

#### **Mission China's Response: The Chinese People are Still Listening to us, Seeking the Truth**

21. (SBU) Throughout February, Mission China's Chinese language social media platforms Weibo and WeChat shared content about the COVID-19 virus reaching more than 34.5 million Chinese and generating more than 748,000 engagements, showing that some Chinese audiences are hungry for fact-based, transparent reporting provided by the United States. The top post by engagement across Department of State properties the past month was the Embassy's February 8 post on China's Weibo



about how the Department of State assisted in shipping nearly 17.8 tons of medical supplies to China.

22. (SBU) U.S. government messages have been effective in countering Chinese narratives – the Embassy translated and amplified information from the U.S. CDC with facts on prevention, response, and definitions that have been widely read and discussed. While not entirely immune from censorship, the U.S. Embassy Weibo page was filled with debate between netizens about which viewpoint was right, and where information differed from official Chinese narratives. Public exchanges on our page continue to offer unique models of transparency by showing our whole of government approach to epidemic response in near real-time.

23. (SBU) Comment: Taken together, China’s positive messages on its official COVID-19 response, neutral factual discussions, and negative rumors have been effectively combined in official media and online discussions. The CCP’s core narrative: that China must be on a war-like footing and mobilize to combat COVID-19, continues to have wide popular support. Additionally, as the virus spreads outside of China, the CCP will strain to counterbalance the COVID-19’s Chinese origins deflecting attention with a rosy picture of how PRC authoritarian control stalled the epidemic in its tracks. Anti-American sentiment stirred up by the CCP has not effectively deflected criticism of the CCP.

(b)(5)  
(b)(5)  
(b)(5) End Comment

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Signature: Branstad

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Info: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; SECDEF WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI ROUTINE; DNI WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; CIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD ROUTINE; NGA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE

Action Post: NONE  
Dissemination Rule: DIS\_BIO\_STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

SBU

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>

**Recipient:** [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;  
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased  
**Date:** Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:01:54 +0000

Seems likely. It's really a shame that terminating a contract is only a figure of speech.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:57 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

I suspect the anonymous person starts with (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer  
 Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  
 U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:53 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Robert Mikulak <(b)(6)>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

I think Gertz is referring to this report, where an "official" spoke on the condition of anonymity:

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/23/china-conducting-covert-biological-weapons-research/>

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 U.S. Department of State

**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:41 AM

To: [redacted] (b)(6); ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
Cc: [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

Sigh. Not too surprising, but a massive and unhelpful distortion. Does anybody know what "senior State Department official" made allegations about genetically selective ethnic weapons?

**From:** Robert Mikulak [redacted] (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:09 AM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Cc:** [redacted] (h)(6)

**Subject:** Fw: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

In case you haven't seen it.

## China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

Print

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Sunday, April 25, 2021

China canceled an online meeting with American officials last year to discuss mounting concerns regarding secret Chinese biological weapons work in possible violation of an international treaty, according to a new report.

The meeting between State Department arms control officials and their Chinese counterparts was planned as a video conference rather than in person because of COVID-19 travel curbs. Chinese officials, citing unspecified technical problems, failed to show for the session, according to an account published this month in the State Department's annual report on compliance with arms agreements.

It was the first time in four years that Beijing refused to meet with U.S. officials to discuss suspected Chinese violations of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, known as the BWC, fueling concerns that Beijing is working on weapons that kill with microbes or toxins.

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The latest arms compliance report also contains a slight but significant change in wording from last year's report, suggesting U.S. intelligence agencies have

clarified some questions about China's covert biological warfare work. The 2020 report said China had engaged in activities with potential military applications. The 2021 report omits the word "potential," indicating that the finding is based on new intelligence regarding the research.

One possible source for the new information is a People's Liberation Army doctor who defected to a European nation last year with details on Beijing's biowarfare program. The Washington Times reported the defection in September.

China's cancellation of the biological warfare meeting was revealed as the COVID-19 pandemic raised new questions about whether the virus behind the disease leaked from a Wuhan laboratory linked to secret Chinese military research.

The annual compliance report examines the records of the U.S. and a number of other states complying with international agreements on nuclear proliferation, chemical and biological weapons, and missile testing. This year's report had critical remarks on China, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Russia and other countries.

A virus lab leak is one of two theories about the origin of the coronavirus that causes COVID-19, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress this month. The second is a leap of the virus from a bat to a host animal and then to humans, although no animal host has been identified so far.

Many scientists have ruled out the idea that the virus was engineered as a biological weapon, but other scientists and some American officials say that prospect should not be dismissed, based on mounting evidence of a covert Chinese military biological warfare program.

Retired Israeli Lt. Col. Dany Shoham, an expert on China's biological warfare program, stated in an article published in December that the probability of human intervention in creating the coronavirus in a lab is higher than a naturally occurring, spontaneous evolutionary virus adaptation.

A Chinese Embassy spokesman did not return an email seeking comment, though Beijing has long rejected the idea that the Wuhan lab could have been the source of the virus behind the global pandemic.

The compliance report said China appears to be engaged in secret work on germ weapons while keeping details of the work secret.

According to the report, the Chinese military carried out biological activities with dual-use, military-civilian applications. The activities "raise concerns regarding [China's] compliance with Article I of the [Biological Weapons Convention]," the report said.

Article 1 of the convention binds signatories to "never in any circumstances" produce microbial or biological agents that are not for peaceful use. It also

prohibits signatories from making weapons or delivery systems for biological agents or toxins.

China signed the convention in 1984 and under its terms was to disclose all current and past germ weapons efforts.

“The United States has compliance concerns with respect to Chinese military medical institutions’ toxin research and development because of the dual-use applications and their potential as a biological threat,” the report states.

China has more than 40 military research institutes run by the People’s Liberation Army that are said to be engaged in covert biological weapons work.

A senior State Department official disclosed last year that secret Chinese biological warfare work includes engineered weapons designed to attack specific ethnic groups with pathogens. “We are looking at potential biological experiments on ethnic minorities,” the official said in May.

#### ‘Genetic attacks’

Statements by Chinese military officials have backed the intelligence on ethnic biological warfare weapons.

Retired Chinese Gen. Zhang Shibo wrote in a 2017 book that biotechnology progress had increased the danger of the use of offensive bioweapons, including those capable of “specific ethnic genetic attacks.”

At a United Nations conference in 2011, a Chinese official made a formal submission for the first time revealing Beijing’s concerns about population-specific bioweapons capable of attacking ethnic groups. The concerns were laid out in a U.N. guidebook based on a 12-nation conference on the BWC in 2011.

U.S. government analysts also do not believe that China has totally eliminated its biological warfare program as required by the convention, the report said. China’s offensive biological weapons program began in the 1950s and continued through the 1980s. Beijing, critics contend, has failed to disclose details as required by the convention.

“As part of its historical BW program, China had probably weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, plague and tularemia,” said the report, noting continued biotechnology infrastructure and cooperation with unspecified “countries of concern.”

U.S. intelligence analysts contend that the Chinese activities may run counter to the convention’s restrictions that prohibit development, production or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins that are not for peaceful purposes. The canceled online meeting would have clarified some of the questions. The U.S. had been holding annual meetings with the Chinese on the topic from 2017 to 2019.

**The State Department in January provided the first public information about Chinese military biological weapons research.**

**It included a fact sheet on the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a complex with secure laboratories that is known to be engaged in research on bat coronaviruses like the one that causes COVID-19. According to the fact sheet, China's "deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world."**

**The fact sheet revealed for the first time that several researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology became sick in the autumn of 2019 with COVID-like symptoms.**

**"This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was 'zero infection' among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses," the fact sheet said.**

**"Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one."**

**The report also revealed that Chinese researchers at the WIV had been carrying out experiments on a virus called RaTG13, a bat coronavirus that is highly similar to the COVID-19 virus, since 2016.**

**"The WIV has a published record of conducting 'gain-of-function' research to engineer chimeric viruses," the report said. "But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including RaTG13, which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness."**

**A World Health Organization-Chinese government investigation into the origin of the COVID-19 virus did not mention the State Department facts in its final report. It concluded that the lab leak theory was "highly unlikely" and not worth further scientific study for now.**

**Thorough accounting**

**China has consistently and ardently denied that the virus came from a Wuhan laboratory. Critics say China is spreading disinformation about the virus' origin. Chinese officials have suggested that the virus originated in a U.S. laboratory and was brought to China by visiting American military troops. Beijing also has claimed the virus entered China on frozen food packaging, something experts dismissed as unlikely.**

**The State Department report said a thorough inquiry into the virus must include a full accounting of why the Wuhan lab apparently altered and removed online records of work on RaTG13 and other viruses. The fact sheet also contended that significant secret military research was being carried out at the Wuhan facility,**

including laboratory animal experiments on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

“Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing,” the report said. “For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”

The National Institutes of Health in 2015 provided over \$3 million in funding to the WIV through the New York-based EcoHealth Alliance. The Trump administration cut off the funding in April 2020.

The State Department said the United States and other donors that have funded or collaborated with WIV research “have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.”

The report said the disclosures about the institute “just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19’s origin in China.”

The compliance report also dealt with other arms control issues and said China continued stepped up work at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site in western China. The activities raise concerns that Beijing is secretly conducting nuclear weapons tests contrary to a non-testing moratorium.

“In recent years, China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the U.S. zero-yield standard,” the report said. “China continued work at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site throughout 2020.”

China, the report said, also continued to sell missiles and related technology contrary to the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime, an informal anti-proliferation accord, and failed to adhere to a 2000 commitment made to the United States not to assist any country in developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons by selling missiles and equipment to Iran in 2020.

Few details were provided.

“Although the United States has asked that China investigate and put a stop to such activities, most of these cases remain unresolved,” the report said.

Sanctions were imposed last year on eight Chinese companies under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act for transferring missile technology to Iran.



**A United Nations panel of experts reported several years ago that China provided North Korea with trucks that were converted into transporter-erector launchers for Pyongyang's long-range nuclear missiles. North Korea's mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles have been showcased in military parades carried on Chinese-designed road-mobile launchers.**

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" [redacted]@state.gov>

**Recipient:** [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased  
**Date:** Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:28:47 +0000

Thanks for the offer. I'm going to go up to T because there will be at least three of us and because a couple of T staffers are likely to sit in.

Given the late read-ahead (Thursday night, on JWICS) (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 10:18 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

(b)(5)

BTW, I'll attend the bio sub-IPC with (b)(6) from 5959, otherwise I would have joined you up in T space – or you more than welcome to join us in our conference room and can also discuss this in more details.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:59 AM  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; Robert Mikulak (b)(6); ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; T\_SpecAssts <T\_SpecAssts@state.gov>; (b)(6) (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

Well, that's clear as mud:

"The Washington Times quoted a senior Trump administration official in May alleging that China is engaged in a covert biological weapons program that includes building arms capable of attacking ethnic groups with pathogens.

'We are looking at potential biological experiments on ethnic minorities,' the official said on the condition of anonymity."

---

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:53 AM

**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Robert Mikulak (b)(6); ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

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(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

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Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

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U.S. Department of State

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**From:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:41 AM

**To:** Robert Mikulak <(b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

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**Subject:** RE: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

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---

**From:** Robert Mikulak (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, April 26, 2021 9:09 AM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fw: China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

In case you haven't seen it.

## China nixed meeting on biowarfare concerns as coronavirus queries increased

Print

## By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Sunday, April 25, 2021

China canceled an online meeting with American officials last year to discuss mounting concerns regarding secret Chinese biological weapons work in possible violation of an international treaty, according to a new report.

The meeting between State Department arms control officials and their Chinese counterparts was planned as a video conference rather than in person because of COVID-19 travel curbs. Chinese officials, citing unspecified technical problems, failed to show for the session, according to an account published this month in the State Department's annual report on compliance with arms agreements.

It was the first time in four years that Beijing refused to meet with U.S. officials to discuss suspected Chinese violations of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, known as the BWC, fueling concerns that Beijing is working on weapons that kill with microbes or toxins.

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The latest arms compliance report also contains a slight but significant change in wording from last year's report, suggesting U.S. intelligence agencies have clarified some questions about China's covert biological warfare work. The 2020 report said China had engaged in activities with potential military applications. The 2021 report omits the word "potential," indicating that the finding is based on new intelligence regarding the research.

One possible source for the new information is a People's Liberation Army doctor who defected to a European nation last year with details on Beijing's biowarfare program. The Washington Times reported the defection in September.

China's cancellation of the biological warfare meeting was revealed as the COVID-19 pandemic raised new questions about whether the virus behind the disease leaked from a Wuhan laboratory linked to secret Chinese military research.

The annual compliance report examines the records of the U.S. and a number of other states complying with international agreements on nuclear proliferation, chemical and biological weapons, and missile testing. This year's report had critical remarks on China, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Russia and other countries.

A virus lab leak is one of two theories about the origin of the coronavirus that causes COVID-19, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress this month. The second is a leap of the virus from a bat to a host animal and then to humans, although no animal host has been identified so far.

Many scientists have ruled out the idea that the virus was engineered as a biological weapon, but other scientists and some American officials say that

prospect should not be dismissed, based on mounting evidence of a covert Chinese military biological warfare program.

Retired Israeli Lt. Col. Dany Shoham, an expert on China's biological warfare program, stated in an article published in December that the probability of human intervention in creating the coronavirus in a lab is higher than a naturally occurring, spontaneous evolutionary virus adaptation.

A Chinese Embassy spokesman did not return an email seeking comment, though Beijing has long rejected the idea that the Wuhan lab could have been the source of the virus behind the global pandemic.

The compliance report said China appears to be engaged in secret work on germ weapons while keeping details of the work secret.

According to the report, the Chinese military carried out biological activities with dual-use, military-civilian applications. The activities "raise concerns regarding [China's] compliance with Article I of the [Biological Weapons Convention]," the report said.

Article 1 of the convention binds signatories to "never in any circumstances" produce microbial or biological agents that are not for peaceful use. It also prohibits signatories from making weapons or delivery systems for biological agents or toxins.

China signed the convention in 1984 and under its terms was to disclose all current and past germ weapons efforts.

"The United States has compliance concerns with respect to Chinese military medical institutions' toxin research and development because of the dual-use applications and their potential as a biological threat," the report states.

China has more than 40 military research institutes run by the People's Liberation Army that are said to be engaged in covert biological weapons work.

A senior State Department official disclosed last year that secret Chinese biological warfare work includes engineered weapons designed to attack specific ethnic groups with pathogens. "We are looking at potential biological experiments on ethnic minorities," the official said in May.

'Genetic attacks'

Statements by Chinese military officials have backed the intelligence on ethnic biological warfare weapons.

Retired Chinese Gen. Zhang Shibo wrote in a 2017 book that biotechnology progress had increased the danger of the use of offensive bioweapons, including those capable of "specific ethnic genetic attacks."

At a United Nations conference in 2011, a Chinese official made a formal submission for the first time revealing Beijing's concerns about population-specific bioweapons capable of attacking ethnic groups. The concerns were laid out in a U.N. guidebook based on a 12-nation conference on the BWC in 2011.

U.S. government analysts also do not believe that China has totally eliminated its biological warfare program as required by the convention, the report said. China's offensive biological weapons program began in the 1950s and continued through the 1980s. Beijing, critics contend, has failed to disclose details as required by the convention.

"As part of its historical BW program, China had probably weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, plague and tularemia," said the report, noting continued biotechnology infrastructure and cooperation with unspecified "countries of concern."

U.S. intelligence analysts contend that the Chinese activities may run counter to the convention's restrictions that prohibit development, production or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins that are not for peaceful purposes. The canceled online meeting would have clarified some of the questions. The U.S. had been holding annual meetings with the Chinese on the topic from 2017 to 2019.

The State Department in January provided the first public information about Chinese military biological weapons research.

It included a fact sheet on the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a complex with secure laboratories that is known to be engaged in research on bat coronaviruses like the one that causes COVID-19. According to the fact sheet, China's "deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world."

The fact sheet revealed for the first time that several researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology became sick in the autumn of 2019 with COVID-like symptoms.

"This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was 'zero infection' among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses," the fact sheet said. "Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one."

The report also revealed that Chinese researchers at the WIV had been carrying out experiments on a virus called RaTG13, a bat coronavirus that is highly similar to the COVID-19 virus, since 2016.

"The WIV has a published record of conducting 'gain-of-function' research to engineer chimeric viruses," the report said. "But the WIV has not been

transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including RaTG13, which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.”

A World Health Organization-Chinese government investigation into the origin of the COVID-19 virus did not mention the State Department facts in its final report. It concluded that the lab leak theory was “highly unlikely” and not worth further scientific study for now.

### Thorough accounting

China has consistently and ardently denied that the virus came from a Wuhan laboratory. Critics say China is spreading disinformation about the virus’ origin. Chinese officials have suggested that the virus originated in a U.S. laboratory and was brought to China by visiting American military troops. Beijing also has claimed the virus entered China on frozen food packaging, something experts dismissed as unlikely.

The State Department report said a thorough inquiry into the virus must include a full accounting of why the Wuhan lab apparently altered and removed online records of work on RaTG13 and other viruses. The fact sheet also contended that significant secret military research was being carried out at the Wuhan facility, including laboratory animal experiments on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

“Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing,” the report said. “For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”

The National Institutes of Health in 2015 provided over \$3 million in funding to the WIV through the New York-based EcoHealth Alliance. The Trump administration cut off the funding in April 2020.

The State Department said the United States and other donors that have funded or collaborated with WIV research “have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.”

The report said the disclosures about the institute “just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19’s origin in China.”

The compliance report also dealt with other arms control issues and said China continued stepped up work at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site in western China. The activities raise concerns that Beijing is secretly conducting nuclear weapons tests contrary to a non-testing moratorium.

**“In recent years, China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the U.S. zero-yield standard,” the report said. “China continued work at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site throughout 2020.”**

**China, the report said, also continued to sell missiles and related technology contrary to the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime, an informal anti-proliferation accord, and failed to adhere to a 2000 commitment made to the United States not to assist any country in developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons by selling missiles and equipment to Iran in 2020.**

**Few details were provided.**

**“Although the United States has asked that China investigate and put a stop to such activities, most of these cases remain unresolved,” the report said.**

**Sanctions were imposed last year on eight Chinese companies under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act for transferring missile technology to Iran.**

**A United Nations panel of experts reported several years ago that China provided North Korea with trucks that were converted into transporter-erector launchers for Pyongyang’s long-range nuclear missiles. North Korea’s mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles have been showcased in military parades carried on Chinese-designed road-mobile launchers.**

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>



**From:** "Mikulak, Robert P" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Can We Handle the Truth of the COVID-Origin Probe?  
**Date:** Thu, 15 Jul 2021 18:45:08 +0000

This won't be the last time you've heard it, though.

**From:** Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, July 15, 2021 2:37 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@dni.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Can We Handle the Truth of the COVID-Origin Probe?

Wow, that's an incredibly bad take.

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**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, July 15, 2021 2:04 PM

**To:** ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Can We Handle the Truth of the COVID-Origin Probe?

By Jim Geraghty

July 15, 2021 9:44 AM

On the menu today: The U.S. intelligence community's investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic's origins will have long-term consequences for the world, including future scientific research; a tariff proposal that China hawks might find intriguing; and how a temporary problem is creating a new, and likely permanent, entitlement.

## The Long-Term Consequences of the Investigation into COVID-19's Origins

Today is July 15; according to administration sources speaking to the *Wall Street Journal*, President Joe Biden is due to receive a 45-day update on the U.S. intelligence community's review of the origins of COVID-19 "in mid-July."

So far, no significant information about the probe has leaked. The probe can reach one of two plausible answers, or one implausible answer.

*Plausible answer No. 1:* We cannot prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the COVID-19 pandemic was the result of a lab leak in Wuhan. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence — probably enough for prosecutors to win a case. But we don't have a smoking gun. We don't have that rumored high-level Chinese defector telling us all about China's secret virus-research programs. We don't have a recording of a phone call between panicked scientists realizing what they've done — they're too careful. We don't have any hacked memos or emails or texts that definitively declare that this was a lab accident — everyone involved knows the risks of ever typing that into a computer or phone, and everyone involved is used to living under relentless state surveillance. What's more, because of the psychological consequences of realizing that your mistakes set off a global pandemic that killed more than 4 million people, everyone involved with that lab is in the deepest denial imaginable. It is extremely unlikely that anyone who knows will ever confess. They'll take this to their graves — if they haven't already been killed to help the coverup.

*Plausible answer No. 2:* The outbreak of a novel coronavirus, closest to ones found in bats, started at the metaphorical doorstep of one of the three laboratories in the entire world conducting gain-of-function research on novel coronaviruses found in bats. Those facts have never seemed like a plausible coincidence. From the beginning of the first cases, the Chinese government has lied to the World Health Organization and the rest of the world, blocked outside investigators as long as possible, withheld requested data, hidden previously available data, and made the spectacularly implausible claim that this was an American bioweapon. The most genetically similar, previously existing virus killed three miners in Yunnan Province back in 2012, a site that is about 1,100 miles away. Samples of that deadly virus were taken to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, along with many other samples from bats in the same mineshaft. But no one has found this precise virus, SARS-CoV-2, occurring in animals in nature. No one has found animal smugglers who were sickened by or died from SARS-CoV-2 before the outbreak in December 2019. And three Wuhan Institute of Virology staffers were hospitalized in November 2019 "with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illness." Any evidence of a lab accident that we cannot find can be plausibly explained by Chinese government efforts to cover it up and destroy it.

*Implausible answer:* Everything listed under No. 2 is just a big coincidence, and we should trust the assessments of virologists who wish to continue gain-of-function research and who insist that a consequential accident is simply impossible.

There's a letter to the editor in the *San Francisco Chronicle* that inadvertently illustrates why the intelligence community is likely to pick plausible answer No. 1, and is likely to strongly resist reaching plausible answer No. 2. The writer warns:

If the American public were to believe that China caused 600,000 Americans to die, more than the World War II, Korea and Vietnam wars combined, there may well be demands for war. Such a war would be far worse than our endless wars in the Middle East and elsewhere, would devastate much of Asia including our allies, cause massive American casualties, and could even go nuclear. Remember the nuclear missile scare in Hawaii during the confrontation with North Korea? We need to tone down the anti-China rhetoric.

For what it's worth, 52 percent of American adults already believe that the pandemic is the result of a lab leak, including majorities of Republicans and Democrats; 28 percent believe it is the result of human contact with an infected animal. (I don't like the wording of that poll question, because human contact with an infected animal can occur in a laboratory *and* be an accident!)

But if you believe, as that letter-writer does, that confirming the lab-leak theory would inexorably lead to war (and possibly to nuclear war), it becomes easy to justify playing along with a Chinese cover-up. The U.S.–China relationship becomes "too big to fail." The U.S. government would have to help the Chinese government escape scrutiny and accountability — because the consequences of the truth would be catastrophic.

The problem is that what happens with this probe is going to shape how virus research works from here on out. There are almost 60 biosafety-level-4 (BSL-4) labs, which handle the most dangerous, virulent, and contagious viruses out there, located in 24 countries. These countries aren't just big ones such as China and Russia, but also Belarus, Gabon, and South Africa. (South Africa's apartheid-era biological-weapons program is the stuff of nightmares: an infertility toxin to secretly sterilize the black population, putting cholera in rivers and anthrax spores in food supplies, and unverified claims of acquiring and studying Ebola, Marburg, and Rift Valley viruses. South Africa has a different, better government now, but we should note that viruses and other pathogens aren't just studied by good and noble people.)

All of these BSL-4 laboratories are staffed by human beings, and human beings make mistakes. The lesson of the pandemic is not "never do any research on dangerous viruses." It may well be "don't do gain-of-function research in the middle of a city." I suspect it also will be "BSL-4 labs should often have outside visitors and inspectors who point out any flaws in the containment,

safety, and security protocols." You could argue that, in an unexpected way, the Wuhan Institute of Virology had such inspections, but no one acted on the warnings they produced.

Regardless of whether the virus came from a lab leak, it is indisputable that China lied to the world for weeks and has done everything possible to obstruct an independent investigation into the origins of the virus.

If the U.S. intelligence community comes back and concludes, "We just don't know where this virus came from," the lesson to the world will be that lies and obstruction work, and that there is no real consequence for responding to a crisis with them. Other regimes around the world are watching — and even the most open, free, and responsible government hates to admit that its scientists made a consequential mistake. Playing along with shameless lies and a cover-up now is a good way to ensure we get more of them in the future.

## Okay, Maybe This Tariff Isn't So Bad

If the enemy of my enemy is my friend, then maybe China hawks will find Senator Ed Markey's proposal for a "carbon tariff" on Chinese imports useful.

"This legislation will assert American leadership on the climate crisis, but we also can't be 'Uncle Sucker' where other countries, led by China, take advantage of what we are going to ask our country to undertake," Markey said.

It's nice to see Markey acknowledge that, without these tariffs, the United States would indeed be "Uncle Sucker" with self-inflicted restrictions on energy use and emissions.

ADDENDUM: You're going to want to read Dominic Pino's detailed account of how Congress used an emergency that had already ended to set up a new program to create welfare for web access.

<https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/can-we-handle-the-truth-of-the-covid-origin-probe/>

**Sender:** "Mikulak, Robert P" (b)(6) @state.gov>

**Recipient:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.gov>

**From:** "Waters, John R" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>  
 Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
**CC:** Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
 Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article  
**Date:** Mon, 9 Mar 2020 21:36:39 +0000

That's correct.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 5:36 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

Team, a note of caution here (Miles, Rick, please correct me if I'm wrong) –

Note that Xi says "outbreak" and not "origin." (b)(5)  
 (b)(5) (b)(5)

Small distinction but important.

Again, China hands, let me know if I'm misreading anything here.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 4:08 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

John do you have a link to the speech below?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 4:03 PM

**To:** Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

GOLD.

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 4:02 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)MD@state.gov>

**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

Full sentence is:

After the outbreak of a new coronavirus in Wuhan, on January 7, I presided over a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, (where) I put forward requirements for the prevention and control of the epidemic situation of new coronavirus.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:58 PM

**To:** Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

Rick that Xi quote is GOLD. Is it possible for you to translate the complete first sentence? Where did he deliver the speech? We should cite date, location.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:57 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D

(b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

It's an official source, so I don't see a problem citing it.

Btw, you can also quote the first line of Xi Jinping's February 3 speech, which reads in its first sentence, "After the outbreak of a new coronavirus in Wuhan..."

武汉新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情发生后，1月7日，我主持召开中央政治局常委会会议时，就对新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情防控工作提出了要求。1月20日，我专门就疫情防控工作作出批示，指出必须高度重视疫情，全力做好防控工作，要求各级党委和政府及有关部门把人民群众生命安全和身体健康放在第一位，采取切实有效措施，坚决遏制疫情蔓延势头。1月22日，鉴于疫情迅速蔓延、防控工作面临严峻挑战，我明确要求湖北省对人员外流实施全面严格管控。正月初一，我再次主持召开中央政治局常委会会议，对疫情防控特别是患者治疗工作进行再研究、再部署、再动员，并决定成立中央应对疫情工作领导小组。

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:33 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan,

Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Cc:** Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Waters, John R (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

+ Miles and Rick in case they have a view?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:32 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus,

Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

Can we also cite this from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission on December 31<sup>st</sup>? They hadn't yet called it coronavirus, but said it was a possibility. Instead referred to it as a "viral pneumonia."

"Recently, some medical institutions found that many of the pneumonia cases received were related to South China Seafood City. After receiving the report, the Municipal Health and Health Commission immediately launched a case search and retrospective investigation related to South China Seafood City in the city's medical health institutions. Twenty-seven cases have been found, of which 7 are in serious condition, and the remaining cases are stable and controllable. Two patients are expected to be discharged in the near future. The clinical manifestations of the cases were mainly fever, a few patients had difficulty breathing, and chest radiographs showed bilateral lung infiltrative lesions. At present, all cases have been isolated for treatment, follow-up investigations and medical observations of close contacts are ongoing, and hygiene investigations and environmental sanitation disposals for South China Seafood City are ongoing."

<http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/showDetail/2019123108989>

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:27 PM

**To:** Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:24 PM  
**To:** Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Buangan, Richard L  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:23 PM  
**To:** Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>; <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Caixin Article

Here is what I forwarded to <(b)(6)>

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Buangan, Richard L  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:20 PM  
**To:** <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Caixin Article

Here is the Caixin article. I've highlighted where I think the authors allege that the virus originated in Hubei. This article is more about how the Hubei authorities tried to cover up the emergence of the outbreak in the early stages but it's easy to assume that Chinese authorities knew they were responding to a Hubei-originated disease.

Also interesting: On Dec 31, it was China (not any other country) who notified the WHO of the emergence of an unidentified infectious disease.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Waters, John R <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:11 PM  
**To:** Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Caixin Article

Sorry for delay – literally just had to renew my subscription:



eb 29, 2020 09:19 PM  
SOCIETY & CULTURE

# In Depth: How Early Signs of a SARS-Like Virus Were Spotted, Spread, and Throttled

By Gao Yu, Peng Yanfeng, Yang Rui, Feng Yuding, Ma Danmeng, Flynn Murphy, Han Wei and Timmy Shen





Photo: Pixabay



The new coronavirus that has claimed nearly 3,000 lives and spread to almost 50 countries was sequenced in Chinese labs — and found to be similar to SARS — weeks before officials publicly identified it as the cause of a

mysterious viral pneumonia cluster in Wuhan, a Caixin investigation has found.

Test results from multiple labs in December suggested there was an outbreak of a new virus. However, the results failed to trigger a response that could have prepared the public, despite being fed into an infectious disease control system that was designed to alert China's top health officials about outbreaks. The revelations show how health officials missed early opportunities to control the virus in the initial stages of the outbreak, as questions mount about who knew what and when, and whether these actions helped the disease to spread.



As early as Dec. 27, a Guangzhou-based genomics company had sequenced most of the virus from fluid samples from the lung of a 65-year old deliveryman who worked at the seafood market where many of the first cases emerged. The results showed an alarming similarity to the deadly SARS coronavirus that killed nearly 800 people between 2002 and 2003.

Around that time, local doctors sent at least eight other patient samples from hospitals around Wuhan to multiple Chinese genomics companies, including industry heavyweight BGI, as they worked to determine what was behind a growing number of cases of unexplained respiratory disease. The results all pointed to a dangerous SARS-like virus.


That was days before China notified the World Health Organization (WHO) on Dec. 31 about the emergence of an unidentified infectious disease, two

weeks before it shared the virus's genome sequence with the world, and crucially, more than three weeks before Chinese authorities confirmed publicly that the virus was spreading between people.

Concerns about the new disease were initially kept within a small group of medical workers, researchers and officials. On Dec. 30, Dr. Li Wenliang was one of several in Wuhan who sounded the first alarms and released initial evidence online. Li, who was punished for releasing the information, would perish from the disease five weeks later, after contracting it from a patient.

On Jan. 1, after several batches of genome sequence results had been returned to hospitals and submitted to health authorities, an employee of one genomics company received a phone call from an official at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission, ordering the company to stop testing samples from Wuhan related to the new disease and destroy all existing samples. The employee spoke on condition of anonymity, saying they were told to immediately cease releasing test results and information about the tests, and report any future results to authorities.

Then on Jan. 3, China's National Health Commission (NHC), the nation's top health authority, ordered institutions not to publish any information related to the unknown disease, and ordered labs to transfer any samples they had to designated testing institutions, or to destroy them. The order, which Caixin has seen, did not specify any designated testing institutions.



WHO epidemiologist Bruce Aylward explains the process and response to the outbreak at a news conference in Beijing Tuesday. Photo: CGTN

**It was Jan. 9 when Chinese authorities finally announced that a novel coronavirus was behind Wuhan's viral pneumonia outbreak. Even then, the transmissibility of the virus was downplayed, leaving the public unaware of the imminent danger.**

**Finally, on Jan. 20, Zhong Nanshan, a leading authority on respiratory health who came to national attention in his role fighting SARS, confirmed in a TV interview that the disease was spreading from person-to-person.**

**Two days later, Wuhan, a city of 11 million, was placed in lockdown. It remains quarantined today.**

### **Social media posts provide clues**

**The earliest results, for a 65-year-old deliveryman who worked at the Wuhan seafood market, were returned on Dec. 27 by Vision Medicals, a genomics**

company based in Huangpu district in Guangzhou, South China's Guangdong province.


The patient was admitted to the Central Hospital of Wuhan on Dec. 18 with pneumonia and his condition quickly deteriorated. On Dec. 24, the doctors took fluid samples from his lungs and sent them to Vision Medicals for testing, according to Zhao Su, head of respiratory medicine at the hospital. In an unusual move, the company did not send back results, but instead called the doctor on Dec. 27. "They just called us and said it was a new coronavirus," Zhao said.

Vision Medicals confirmed the tests took place in a post it published on social media late last week. The post said the company was involved in early studies on the new coronavirus and contributed to an \_\_\_\_\_ published on the English version of the Chinese Medical Journal about its discovery. That article makes specific mention of a sample collected on Dec. 24 from a 65-year-old patient who had contact with the seafood market.

A different social media post, believed to have been made by a Vision Medicals employee, sheds more light on the company's early work. The author of the post, made on Jan. 28, said only that they worked at a private company based in Huangpu, Guangzhou, where Vision Medicals is located. The post's author said they noticed a close similarity with the SARS coronavirus in test results of a sample collected on Dec. 24, but decided to study the results more closely before returning them, due their significance. The company did, however, share the data with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, according to the article.

On Dec. 27, the lab worked had sequenced most of the virus's genome and had confirmed it was a coronavirus similar to SARS virus, the article said. In the following days, company executives paid a visit to Wuhan to discuss their findings with local hospital officials and disease control authorities, the article said. "There was an intensive and confidential investigation underway, and officials from the hospital and disease control center had acknowledged many similar patients," it said.

Little information about this early study has been officially released. The patient, who was transferred to Wuhan Jinyintang Hospital, later died.



The Wuhan Institute of Virology, part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Photo: Ding Gang/Caixin

### **Revelations triggered by ‘small mistake’**

While researchers at Vision Medicals mulled their findings, the Central Hospital of Wuhan sent swabs from another patient with the mysterious pneumonia to a Beijing-based lab, CapitalBio Medlab Co. Ltd., for study. The sample came from a 41-year-old man who had no history of contact with the seafood market, who was admitted on Dec. 27.

Test results delivered by the company showed a false positive for SARS. It was a “small mistake,” a gene sequencing expert told Caixin, which may have been down to a limited gene database or a lack of retesting.

But it was this mistake that triggered the first concerns heard by the public — recalling painful memories of the cover-up that defined the SARS outbreak 17 years before.

On the evening of Dec. 30, several doctors in Wuhan, including the late Li Wenliang, privately shared CapitalBio's results as a warning to friends and colleagues to take protective measures. Those messages then circulated widely online and sparked a public uproar demanding more information. Several people, including Li and two other doctors who sent the messages that night, were later punished by authorities for "spreading rumors." Zhang Jixian, who heads the respiratory department at Hubei Xinhua Hospital, noticed on Dec. 26 that he had received a growing number of patients with symptoms of pneumonia from the neighboring seafood market. He reported the situation to the hospital the next day, with that report passed on to city and provincial health authorities.

Following the reports, disease control authorities in Wuhan and Hubei on Dec. 30 issued an internal notice warning of the emergence of pneumonia patients with links to the seafood market and requiring hospitals to monitor similar cases.

The notice, later leaked online, offered the first glimpse to the public of officials' acknowledgement of the outbreak.

### **Silenced alarms**

Several other genomics companies also tested samples from patients in Wuhan with the then-unidentified virus in late December, Caixin learned. Industry leader BGI received a sample from a Wuhan hospital on Dec. 26. Sequencing was completed by Dec. 29, and showed while it was not the virus that causes SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, it was a previously unseen coronavirus that was about 80% similar to the virus that causes SARS.

A BGI source told Caixin that when they undertook the sequencing project in late December the company was unaware that the virus had sickened many people. "We take a lot of sequencing commissions every day," the source said.

Caixin has learned that the Wuhan hospital sent BGI at least 30 samples from different pneumonia cases for sequencing in December, and three were found to contain the new coronavirus. In addition to the Dec. 26 case, the second

and third positive samples were received on Dec. 29 and Dec. 30. They were tested together and the results were reported to the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission as early as Jan. 1.

On Jan. 1, gene sequencing companies received an order from Hubei's health commission to stop testing and destroy all samples, according to an employee at one. "If you test it in the future, be sure to report it to us," the person said they were told by phone.

Two days later on Jan. 3, the National Health Commission issued its gag order and said the Wuhan pneumonia samples needed to be treated as highly pathogenic microorganisms — and that any samples needed to be moved to approved testing facilities or destroyed.

One virologist told Caixin that even the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) under the Chinese Academy of Sciences was not qualified for the tests and told to destroy samples in its lab.

But that day, Professor Zhang Yongzhen of Fudan University in Shanghai received biological samples packed in dry ice in metal boxes and shipped by rail from Wuhan Central Hospital. By Jan. 5, Zhang's team had also identified the new, SARS-like coronavirus through using high-throughput sequencing.

Zhang reported his findings to the Shanghai Municipal Health Commission as well as China's National Health Commission, warning the new virus was like SARS, and was being transmitted through the respiratory route. This sparked a secondary emergency response within the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on Jan. 6.

On Jan. 9, an expert team led by the CDC made a preliminary conclusion that the disease was caused by a new strain of coronavirus, according to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV.

On Jan. 11, Zhang's team became the first to publish the genome sequence of the new virus on public databases Virological.org and GenBank, unveiling its structure to the world for the first time. The NHC shared the virus genomic information with the World Health Organization the next day.



Also on Jan. 11, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission resumed updating infection cases of the new virus after suspending reports for several days. But the government repeated its claim that there had been no medical worker infections and that there was no evidence of human transmission.

Meanwhile it reported that the number of confirmed cases had dropped to 41.

**Contact reporters Flynn Murphy ([flynnmurphy@caixin.com](mailto:flynnmurphy@caixin.com)), Han Wei ([weihan@caixin.com](mailto:weihan@caixin.com)) and Timmy Shen ([hongmingshen@caixin.com](mailto:hongmingshen@caixin.com), Twitter: [@timmyhmsen](https://twitter.com/timmyhmsen)), and editor Michael Bellart ([michaelbellart@caixin.com](mailto:michaelbellart@caixin.com))**

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**From:** Buangan, Richard L [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:10 PM  
**To:** Waters, John R [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov)  
**Subject:** Caixin Article

Send me the Caixin article when you have it.

Thanks

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** "Waters, John R" [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov)  
**Recipient:** [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
[\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
[\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
Buangan, Richard L [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
Ortagus, Morgan D [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
Yu, Miles [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
Feith, David [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov);  
Fritz, Jonathan D [\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Brainstorming about identifying labs in Africa for the UNSGM  
**Date:** Thu, 10 Jun 2021 15:42:29 +0000

<https://1540assistance.stimson.org/project/biological-threat-reduction-program-btrp/biological-threat-reduction-program-btrp-laboratory-network-enhancement-2/>

POC: (b)(6)

## Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP): Laboratory Network Enhancement - Assistance Support Initiative

A project of the Stimson Center and Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

1540assistance.stimson.org

(b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 10, 2021 11:39 AM  
**To:** (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (h)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Brainstorming about identifying labs in Africa for the UNSGM

(b)(6) To identify labs in Africa that might assist the UNSGM, I've been looking into labs that do high-end bioinformatics for genome sequence analysis. It strikes me that one other possibility is labs that have experience and capability in "disease discovery" (i.e., identifying unknown/emerging pathogens) - the kind of work that the EcoHealth Alliance was doing. Any thoughts on how to quietly talk with someone to see whether there are some labs in this field that we ought to consider?

(b)(6)  
**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Recipient:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** (b)(6)@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act  
**Date:** Tue, 8 Jun 2021 15:44:29 +0000

Don't say I never gave you anything.

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 8, 2021 11:39 AM  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

FYI. We don't have any comments. Per (b)(6) note below, (b)(5)  
 (b)(5)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 8, 2021 11:32 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

(b)(5) (b)(6) Best, (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
 Attorney-Adviser, L/OES  
 U.S. Department of State  
 Mobile: (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 7, 2021 3:27 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

Please let me know by 12:00pm Wednesday if you have any comments on the attached legislation purporting to require DNI declassification of information related to the Wuhan Institute of Virology and a related report. (Note: (b)(5))  
 (b)(5) ) Thanks!

(b)(6)

---

**From:** State-LRM <State-LRM@state.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, June 7, 2021 3:02 PM

**To:** H\_Tasking-L <H\_Tasking-L@state.gov>; H\_Tasking-EAP <H\_Tasking-EAP@state.gov>;  
SCRHS\_Clearance <SCRHS\_Clearance@state.gov>; H\_Tasking-OES <H\_Tasking-OES@state.gov>;  
H\_Tasking-SP <H\_Tasking-SP@state.gov>; D-MR\_Clearances <D-MR\_Clearances@state.gov>; H\_Tasking-  
INR <H\_Tasking-INR@state.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov; State-LRM <State-LRM@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

**Subject:** Due 12PM Wednesday 6/9 -- OMB Request for Views on S1867 COVID-19 Origin Act

OMB has requested views on the attached Sen. Hawley's S.1867 COVID-19 Origin Act of 2021 which mandates DNI to declassify information relating to potential links between Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of COVID. **Please review and provide any succinct comments/policy narratives by 12PM Wednesday, June 9 to State-LRM and cc:** (b)(6)

**Sender:** "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)@dni.gov>

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>;  
**To:** ISN-Office-Directors-&-Deputies-DL <ISN-Office-Directors--Deputies-DL@state.gov>;  
Park, Christopher J (T)(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**CC:** (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Fw: COVID-19 Situation Report 2/12  
**Date:** Fri, 12 Feb 2021 15:18:05 +0000

FYI

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 12, 2021 8:59 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (h)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** COVID-19 Situation Report 2/12

(SBU) COVID-19 Situation Report February 12: As of February 12 there have been more than 107 million confirmed cases and at least 2.3 million reported deaths from COVID-19 worldwide. Average global daily incidence continues to decline and is now at 428,300 newly reported cases per day. Over 159 million doses of vaccine have been administered worldwide; the current daily global vaccination rate is 5.8 million.

Zanzibar's Vice President Hamad is in critical condition with COVID-19. Pfizer announced that they will soon be able to decrease the time to produce one batch of vaccine from 110 days to just 60 days significantly increasing overall production. South Africa announced that it will use the Johnson & Johnson vaccine after the AstraZeneca vaccine was shown to be less effective at protecting against mild and moderate disease following SARS-CoV-2 exposure. [Note: the study in South Africa did not look at efficacy of preventing severe or lethal disease.] Meanwhile Africa CDC is proceeding with rolling out the AstraZeneca vaccine. The WHO panel recommended use of the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine for all individuals over the age of 18 allowing developing countries to speed up use of the vaccine. The Pakistan Army is the first foreign military to receive a COVID-19 vaccine from China. Philippines will receive 600,000 donated doses of the Chinese Sinovac vaccine; 100,000 of which will be allocated to the military. Ukraine passed a resolution to ban vaccine from "aggressor" Russia.

Preliminary results from a study in Israel found that the amount of virus in people who received the Pfizer vaccine at least 12 days prior (enough time to develop an immune response) was significantly lower than in those who were unvaccinated. These data suggest that one may still be able to get infected after vaccination, but reduced amounts of virus lead to less disease and lower ability to transmit infection. [Note: not peer-reviewed]. Researchers have determined that the UK variant of SARS-CoV-2 was likely introduced multiple times into the US occurring as

early as November 2020 and is showing increasing dominance over existing strains. The WHO has completed its first trip to investigate the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in collaboration with China; preliminary information suggests that the team believes that SARS-CoV-2 likely passed through an intermediate host species before infecting humans and this may have occurred outside of Wuhan. Widespread human-to-human transmission was reported to have been occurring by December 2019. China continues to support the theory that SARS-CoV-2 may have arrived in frozen foods, possibly including frozen farmed or wild-caught animals and has stated that accidental release from a lab has been debunked. The final report that will be written by the WHO and Chinese experts is expected in the coming weeks.

As of February 12 the US is reporting a total of more than 27.3 million confirmed cases and over 475,000 confirmed deaths from COVID-19. Over the past week, average daily incidence of COVID-19 continues to decline with an average of 103,000 cases reported daily, the total number of people hospitalized with COVID-19 continues to decrease and is now about 80,300 people per day, and average deaths reported daily has decreased and is now at 2,778 deaths per day. Conditions continue to trend in the right direction in the DMV, but the numbers are still very high. DC continues to see a decrease in average daily incidence and is currently reporting 164 new cases daily, the total number of people reportedly hospitalized with COVID-19 each day has decreased slightly and is now at about 237 people per day, the average number of reported deaths per day has increased to 8 deaths per day, and test positivity rates have decreased to 2.8%. Maryland continues to see decreasing average daily incidence with about 1,200 new cases reported daily, the total number of people reportedly hospitalized with COVID-19 each day is decreasing and is now at about 1,300 people per day, the average number of reported deaths per day remains steady at about 32 deaths per day, and test positivity rates hold steady at 4.4%. In Virginia average daily incidence remains steady at about 3,500 new cases daily, the total number of people reportedly hospitalized with COVID-19 each day continues to decrease and is now at about 2,200 people per day, the average number of reported deaths per day has increased again to 54 deaths per day, and test positivity rates are 13.2%. HST remains in maximum telework posture and M is now the approving body for all TDYs compared to A/S level previously. Over 68.2 million doses of vaccine have been distributed in the US; more than 34.7 million people have received one dose and over 11.1 million people have received both doses. President Biden announced the securing of an additional 200 million vaccine doses (100 million of Moderna and 100 million of Pfizer BioNTech) by July 2021; this brings the total to 600 million which is enough to vaccinate nearly every American by the end of summer if all goes smoothly. The US CDC announced that double masking provides greater protection against SARS-CoV-2; ensuring that your mask is tightly fitted against your face also improves the effectiveness of the masks. The US CDC released guidance this week that allows individuals who are exposed to COVID-19 to not quarantine if they meet the following qualifications: 1) received their second dose of vaccine at least 14 days ago, 2) are within 3 months of receiving their second dose of vaccine, and 3) show no symptoms.

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>;

**Recipient:** ISN-Office-Directors-&-Deputies-DL <ISN-Office-Directors--Deputies-DL@state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>;  
(h)(6)@state.gov>

**From:** "(b)(6)"@state.gov>  
**To:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**CC:** Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>;  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am  
**Date:** Sat, 12 Dec 2020 12:25:57 +0000

Yes I asked to (b)(6) to pull it together. It was shifting around but I think it's currently holding for Wednesday of next week.

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 11, 2020, at 10:28 PM, Park, Christopher J (T) <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(6) was working to get it scheduled for next week.

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 11, 2020, at 9:55 PM, Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)

We need to have an Article V meeting. (b)(5)

(b)(5) They need to be redirected to working CLRs to surface more than just "concerns" re: our favorite country. That's far more valuable and viable right now than tilting at the KungFlu windmill. Weren't we going to have an Article V meetup?

**From:** Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2020 9:40 PM

**To:** (b)(6) (T); (b)(6) (T); Ford, Christopher A

**Subject:** Fwd: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am

It looks like AVC is pushing ahead with BWC compliance report material on the outbreak.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "(b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA)" <(b)(6)@hhs.gov>

**Date:** December 11, 2020 at 6:00:30 PM EST

**To:** "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Subject:** Fwd: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am



FYI

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA)" (b)(6) @hhs.gov>  
**Date:** December 11, 2020 at 5:55:01 PM EST  
**To:** "(b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR)" (b)(6) @hhs.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR)" (b)(6) @hhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am

See if these help. Sorry about the caps

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 11, 2020, at 10:51 AM, (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR) (b)(6) @hhs.gov> wrote:

(b)(6)

Please see below. Do you have any information responsive to this request from State Department? The info is requested as relevant to the BWC chapter of the annual Compliance Report with Non-Proliferation Treaties that State is currently preparing.

Many thanks!

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2020 10:48 AM  
**To:** CGH/OD Policy Office Inbox (CDC.GOV) <cghpolicyrequests@cdc.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR) (b)(6) @hhs.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am

(b)(6) - Many thanks!

CDC Colleagues—

Can you please let me know if CDC tried to send a team to China to assess, advise, assist and they were rebuffed?

CDC DIRECTOR REDFIELD SENT A LETTER ON JANUARY 3, 2020 to C-CDC DIRECTOR GEORGE GAO OFFER TO SEND CDC EPI OFFICERS TO ASSIST IN THE OUTBREAK. DR GAO ACTUALLY REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE. AFTER BEIJING-NHC HEARD ABOUT IT, THE US NEVER RECEIVED A REPLY TO THE LETTER. IN SECRETARY AZAR'S CALL WITH MINISTER MA, AZAR OFFERED TO SEND CDC OFFICERS BUT MA DID NOT RESPOND TO HIS REQUEST.

Also, per this article 2 American scientists were denied access on the WHO delegation. Is this true? Can HHS corroborate?

CLIFF LANE FROM NIH AND WEIGONG ZHOU FROM CDC WERE MEMBERS OF THE WHO MISSION TO CHINA IN FEB 2020 BUT NEITHER WERE PERMITTED TO MAKE THE SIDE TRIP TO WUHAN THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE MISSION WENT ON. NO EXPLANATION WAS PROVIDED.

SO THE WAY THAT STATEMENT IS WORDED IS NOT COMPLETELY ACCURATE AS TWO USG SCIENTIST WERE IN CHINA OFFICIALLY ON THE MISSION BUT THEY WERE NOT PERMITTED TO GO TO WUHAN.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/world/who-china-coronavirus.html>

In Washington, the American health secretary, Alex M. Azar II, gathered advisers inside a conference room of the Department of Health and Human Services to hear from **two government scientists who had participated in the W.H.O. mission to China.**

The scientists, still in quarantine, described by videoconference the seemingly unimaginable lockdown that China had imposed. When questions turned to the origins of the virus, however, answers stopped. "You'd have to look at the terms of reference," one of the scientists replied, a senior American health official recalled. The "terms of reference" was a document spelling out the mission's rules. The Americans had never seen it.

The health organization's public statements suggested that the animal-source investigation was well underway.

If that was true, the Americans realized that they were on the outside, **blocked from the investigation by China.**

Appreciate your help!

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6) (OS/ASPR/SPPR) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 11, 2020 9:12 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am

(b)(6)

Please feel free to ask the follow up question by emailing CDC directly at [CGHPolicyRequests@cdc.gov](mailto:CGHPolicyRequests@cdc.gov)  
The message from yesterday is included below.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Senior Science Advisor

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)

Office of Strategy, Policy, Planning & Requirements (SPPR)

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS) |**

O'Neill House Office Building, Office #5306 |  
200 C Street SW | Washington, DC 20515

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<http://www.phe.gov/s3>

**From:** CGHPOLICYREQUESTS (CDC) <CGHPolicyRequests@cdc.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, December 10, 2020 5:17 PM

**To:** (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR (b)(6)@hhs.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR (b)(6)@HHS.GOV>; CDC IMS 2019 NCOV Response International Task Force <eocevent223@cdc.gov>; CDC IMS Policy Unit -2 <eocpolicy2@cdc.gov>;

(b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD (b)(6)@cdc.gov>; CDC IMS 2019 NCOV Response Policy <eocevent209@cdc.gov>; (b)(6) CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD (b)(6)@cdc.gov>

**Subject:** RE: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am

H (b)(6)

Per CDC China country office, 'we do not have a relationship nor have we with WIV or Wuhan CDC.'

Please let me know if you have further follow up questions.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

PHI Global Health Fellow | Center for Global Health  
Office of the Associate Director for Policy  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
1600 Clifton Road, NE, Atlanta, GA 30333  
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**From:** (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR (b)(6)@hhs.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, December 10, 2020 3:05 PM

**To:** CGHPOLICYREQUESTS (CDC) <CGHPolicyRequests@cdc.gov>; CDC IMS 2019 NCOV Response International Task Force <eocevent223@cdc.gov>; CDC IMS Policy Unit -2 <eocpolicy2@cdc.gov>

**Cc:** (b)(6) OS/ASPR/SPPR (b)(6)@HHS.GOV>

**Subject:** FW: URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access \_response requested by Thu 11 Dec 10 am

**Importance:** High

Dear CDC colleagues,

State Department is requesting information from CDC with regard to China’s cooperation with your organization on COVID-19, specifically “any attempts by CDC to visit WIV, communications, and impressions of the level of satisfaction with PRC cooperation compared to norms as it relates to SARS CoV-2”. Please see the request below.

I would appreciate your response by 10 am tomorrow Thursday 11 Dec (with my apologies for the short deadline).

With best regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Senior Science Advisor  
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)  
Office of Strategy, Policy, Planning & Requirements (SPPR)

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS) |**

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**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 10, 2020 2:47 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) (OS/ASPR/SPPR) <(b)(6)@hhs.gov>  
**Subject:** URGENT: Question for CDC re COVID19 access  
**Importance:** High

Dear (b)(6)

As you know, the AVC/CBW office is responsible for drafting the BWC chapter of the annual Compliance Report. The COVID19 pandemic has definitely been on our mind and we’re trying to understand its treaty implications. For example, the refusal of the PRC to release full research records, allow contact with key research scientists, or permit the acquisition of tissue samples, combined with the reactions of the PRC officials that includes the removal of previously published materials from public access, all indicate an attempt to deny to other nations critical information about the origin, initial location, and character of Covid-19, aggravating the detrimental impact on other national economies and populations.

We have a tasker from our AA/S DiNanno and need your help. Do you know of any attempts by CDC to visit WIV, communications, and impressions of the level of satisfaction with PRC cooperation compared to norms as it relates to SARS CoV-2?

Welcome feedback by 10am tomorrow, if possible.

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Physical Scientist  
Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs  
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2201 C Street, N.W.  
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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
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