

From: "Culvahouse, Arthur B (Canberra)" [REDACTED]@state.gov>
To: Stilwell, David R [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Weekend reading—The genetic structure of SARS-CoV-2 does not rule out a laboratory origin SARS-COV-2 chimeric structure and furin cleavage site might be the result of genetic manipulation//Natl Academy of Sciences syn bio threat TF report
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2020 00:12:26 +0000

Thanks for the time and the reading.

A.B. Culvahouse

U.S. Ambassador to Australia

From: Stilwell, David R [REDACTED]@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, November 21, 2020 10:44:45 AM

To: Culvahouse, Arthur B (Canberra) [REDACTED]@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Weekend reading—The genetic structure of SARS-CoV-2 does not rule out a laboratory origin SARS-COV-2 chimeric structure and furin cleavage site might be the result of genetic manipulation//Natl Academy of Sciences syn bio threat TF report

Attached in case you have a couple extra hours to study virology this weekend. Below one of many stories early on that people chose to ignore.


<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/>

How China's 'Bat Woman' Hunted Down Viruses from SARS to the New Coronavirus

Wuhan-based virologist Shi Zhengli has identified dozens of deadly SARS-like viruses in bat caves, and she warns there are more out there

- By [Jane Qiu](#) on June 1, 2020

-
-
-
-
-
-



Editor's Note (4/24/20): This article was originally published online on March 11. It has been updated for inclusion in the June 2020 issue of Scientific American and to address rumors that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from Shi Zhengli's lab in China.

The mysterious patient samples arrived at the Wuhan Institute of Virology at 7 P.M. on December 30, 2019. Moments later Shi Zhengli's cell phone rang. It


was her boss, the institute's director. The Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention had detected a novel coronavirus in two hospital patients with atypical pneumonia, and it wanted Shi's renowned laboratory to investigate. If the finding was confirmed, the new pathogen could pose a serious public health threat—because it belonged to the same family of viruses as the one that caused severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a disease that plagued 8,100 people and killed nearly 800 of them between 2002 and 2003. “Drop whatever you are doing and deal with it now,” she recalls the director saying.

Shi, a virologist who is often called China's “bat woman” by her colleagues because of her virus-hunting expeditions in bat caves over the past 16 years, walked out of the conference she was attending in Shanghai and hopped on the next train back to Wuhan. “I wondered if [the municipal health authority] got it wrong,” she says. “I had never expected this kind of thing to happen in Wuhan, in central China.” Her studies had shown that the southern, subtropical provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan have the greatest risk of coronaviruses jumping to humans from animals—particularly bats, a known reservoir. If coronaviruses were the culprit, she remembers thinking, “Could they have come from our lab?”

While Shi's team at the Wuhan institute, an affiliate of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, raced to uncover the identity of the contagion—over the following week they connected the illness to the novel coronavirus that became known as SARS-CoV-2—the disease spread like wildfire. By April 20 more than 84,000 people in China had been infected. About 80 percent of them lived in the province of Hubei, of which Wuhan is the capital, and more than 4,600 had died. Outside of China, about 2.4 million people across 210 or so countries and territories had caught the virus, and more than 169,000 had perished from the disease it caused, COVID-19.

Scientists have long warned that the rate of emergence of new infectious diseases is accelerating—especially in developing countries where high densities of people and animals increasingly mingle and move about. “It's incredibly important to pinpoint the source of infection and the chain of cross-species transmission,” says disease ecologist Peter Daszak, president of EcoHealth Alliance, a New York City–based nonprofit research organization that collaborates with researchers, such as Shi, in 30 countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East to discover new viruses in wildlife. An equally important

task, he adds, is to hunt down other pathogens to “prevent similar incidents from happening again.”



OUTSIDE A BAT CAVE in China's Guangxi province in 2004, Shi Zhengli releases a fruit bat after taking a blood sample. Credit: Shuyi Zhang

THE CAVES

To Shi, her first virus-discovery expedition felt like a vacation. On a breezy, sunny spring day in 2004, she joined an international team of researchers to collect samples from bat colonies in caves near Nanning, the capital of Guangxi. Her inaugural cave was typical of the region: large, rich in limestone columns and—as a popular tourist destination—easily accessible. “It was spellbinding,” Shi recalls. Milky-white stalactites hung from the ceiling like icicles, glistening with moisture.

But the holidaylike atmosphere soon dissipated. Many bats—including several insect-eating species of horseshoe bats that are abundant in southern Asia—roost in deep, narrow caves on steep terrain. Often guided by tips from local villagers, Shi and her colleagues had to hike for hours to potential sites and inch through tight rock crevasses on their stomachs. And the flying mammals can be elusive. In one frustrating week, the team explored more than 30 caves and saw only a dozen bats.

These expeditions were part of the effort to catch the culprit in the SARS outbreak, the first major epidemic of the 21st century. A Hong Kong team had reported that wildlife traders in Guangdong first caught the SARS coronavirus from civets, mongooselike mammals that are native to tropical and subtropical Asia and Africa.

Before SARS, the world had only an inkling of coronaviruses—so named because their spiky surface resembles a crown when seen under a microscope, says Linfa Wang, who directs the emerging infectious diseases program at Singapore's Duke-NUS Medical School. Coronaviruses were mostly known for causing common colds. "The SARS outbreak was a game changer," Wang says. It was the first emergence of a deadly coronavirus with pandemic potential. The incident helped to jump-start a global search for animal viruses that could find their way into humans. Shi was an early recruit of that effort, and both Daszak and Wang have been her long-term collaborators.

With the SARS virus, just how the civets got it remained a mystery. Two previous incidents were telling: Australia's 1994 Hendra virus infections, in which the contagion jumped from horses to humans, and Malaysia's 1998 Nipah virus outbreak, in which it moved from pigs to people. Wang found that both diseases were caused by pathogens that originated in fruit-eating bats. Horses and pigs were merely the intermediate hosts. Bats in the Guangdong market also contained traces of the SARS virus, but many scientists dismissed this as contamination. Wang, however, thought bats might be the source.

In those first virus-hunting months in 2004, whenever Shi's team located a bat cave, it would put a net at the opening before dusk and then wait for the nocturnal creatures to venture out to feed for the night. Once the bats were trapped, the researchers took blood and saliva samples, as well as fecal swabs, often working into the small hours. After catching up on some sleep, they would return to the cave in the morning to collect urine and fecal pellets.

But sample after sample turned up no trace of genetic material from coronaviruses. It was a heavy blow. "Eight months of hard work seemed to have gone down the drain," Shi says. "We thought maybe bats had nothing to do with SARS." The scientists were about to give up when a research group in a neighboring lab handed them a diagnostic kit for testing antibodies produced by people with SARS.


There was no guarantee that the test would work for bat antibodies, but Shi gave it a go anyway. “What did we have to lose?” she says. The results exceeded her expectations. Samples from three horseshoe bat species contained antibodies to the SARS virus. “It was a turning point for the project,” Shi says. The researchers learned that the presence of the coronavirus in bats was ephemeral and seasonal—but an antibody reaction could last from weeks to years. The diagnostic kit, therefore, offered a valuable pointer as to how to hunt down viral genomic sequences.

ADVERTISEMENT

Shi’s team used the antibody test to narrow down the list of locations and bat species to pursue in the quest for genomic clues. After roaming mountainous terrain in most of China’s dozens of provinces, the researchers turned their attention to one spot: Shitou Cave, on the outskirts of Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, where they conducted intense sampling during different seasons over five consecutive years.

The efforts paid off. The pathogen hunters discovered hundreds of bat-borne coronaviruses with incredible genetic diversity. “The majority of them are harmless,” Shi says. But dozens belong to the same group as SARS. They can infect human lung cells in a petri dish and cause SARS-like diseases in mice.

In Shitou Cave—where painstaking scrutiny has yielded a natural genetic library of bat-borne viruses—the team discovered a coronavirus strain that came from horseshoe bats with a genomic sequence nearly 97 percent identical to the one found in civets in Guangdong. The finding concluded a decade-long search for the natural reservoir of the SARS coronavirus.



ON THE
SAME 2004 trip, a group of researchers prepare bat blood samples that they will screen for viruses and other pathogens. Credit: Shuyi Zhang

A DANGEROUS MIX

In many bat dwellings Shi has sampled, including Shitou Cave, “constant mixing of different viruses creates a great opportunity for dangerous new pathogens to emerge,” says Ralph Baric, a virologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In the vicinity of such viral melting pots, Shi says, “you don’t need to be a wildlife trader to be infected.”

Near Shitou Cave, for example, many villages sprawl among the lush hillsides in a region known for its roses, oranges, walnuts and hawthorn berries. In October 2015 Shi’s team collected blood samples from more than 200 residents in four of those villages. It found that six people, or nearly 3 percent, carried antibodies against SARS-like coronaviruses from bats—even though none of them had handled wildlife or reported SARS-like or other pneumonialike symptoms. Only one had traveled outside of Yunnan prior to the sampling, and all said they had seen bats flying in their village.

ADVERTISEMENT

Three years earlier Shi's team had been called in to investigate the virus profile of a mine shaft in Yunnan's mountainous Mojiang County—famous for its fermented Pu'er tea—where six miners suffered from pneumonialike diseases and two died. After sampling the cave for a year, the researchers discovered a diverse group of coronaviruses in six bat species. In many cases, multiple viral strains had infected a single animal, turning it into a flying factory for new viruses.

“The mine shaft stunk like hell,” says Shi, who, like her colleagues, went in wearing a protective mask and clothing. “Bat guano, covered in fungus, littered the cave.” Although the fungus turned out to be the pathogen that had sickened the miners, she says it would have been only a matter of time before they caught the coronaviruses if the mine had not been promptly shut.

With growing human populations increasingly encroaching on wildlife habitats, with unprecedented changes in land use, with wildlife and livestock transported across countries and their products around the world, and with sharp increases in both domestic and international travel, pandemics of new diseases are a mathematical near certainty. This had been keeping Shi and many other researchers awake at night long before the mysterious samples landed at the Wuhan Institute of Virology on that ominous evening last December.

More than a year ago Shi's team published two comprehensive reviews about coronaviruses in *Viruses* and *Nature Reviews Microbiology*. Drawing evidence from her own studies—many of which were published in top academic journals—and from others, Shi and her co-authors warned of the risk of future outbreaks of bat-borne coronaviruses.

NIGHTMARE SCENARIO


On the train back to Wuhan on December 30 last year, Shi and her colleagues discussed ways to immediately start testing the patients' samples. In the following weeks—the most intense and the most stressful time of her life—China's bat woman felt she was fighting a battle in her worst nightmare, even though it was one she had been preparing for over the past 16 years. Using a technique called polymerase chain reaction, which can detect a virus by amplifying its genetic material, the team found that samples from five of seven patients had genetic sequences present in all coronaviruses.

ADVERTISEMENT

Shi instructed her group to repeat the tests and, at the same time, sent the samples to another facility to sequence the full viral genomes. Meanwhile she frantically went through her own lab's records from the past few years to check for any mishandling of experimental materials, especially during disposal. Shi breathed a sigh of relief when the results came back: none of the sequences matched those of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. "That really took a load off my mind," she says. "I had not slept a wink for days." By January 7 the Wuhan team had determined that the new virus had indeed caused the disease those patients suffered—a conclusion based on results from analyses using polymerase chain reaction, full genome sequencing, antibody tests of blood samples and the virus's ability to infect human lung cells in a petri dish. The genomic sequence of the virus, eventually named SARS-CoV-2, was 96 percent identical to that of a coronavirus the researchers had identified in horseshoe bats in Yunnan. Their results appeared in a paper published online on February 3 in *Nature*. "It's crystal clear that bats, once again, are the natural reservoir," says Daszak, who was not involved in the study.

Since then, researchers have published more than 4,500 genomic sequences of the virus, showing that samples around the world appear to "share a common ancestor," Baric says. The data also point to a single introduction into humans followed by sustained human-to-human transmission, researchers say.

Given that the virus seems fairly stable initially and that many infected individuals appear to have mild symptoms, scientists suspect that the pathogen might have been around for weeks or even months before severe cases raised the alarm. "There might have been mini outbreaks, but the viruses either burned out or maintained low-level transmission before causing havoc," Baric says. Most animal-borne viruses reemerge periodically, he adds, so "the Wuhan outbreak is by no means incidental."



IN YUNNAN PROVINCE, CHINA, scientists from EcoHealth Alliance, an international group that searches for diseases that can jump from animals to people, hunt for pathogens in a bat cave. Credit: EcoHealth Alliance

MARKET FORCES

To many, the region's burgeoning wildlife markets—which sell a wide range of animals such as bats, civets, pangolins, badgers and crocodiles—are perfect viral melting pots. Although humans could have caught the deadly virus from bats directly (according to several studies, including [those by Shi and her colleagues](#)), independent teams have suggested that [pangolins](#) may have been an intermediate host. These teams have reportedly uncovered [SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses](#) in pangolins that were seized in antismuggling operations in southern China.

On February 24 China announced a [permanent ban](#) on wildlife consumption and trade except for research, medicinal or display purposes—which will stamp out an industry worth \$76 billion and put approximately 14 million people out of jobs, according to a 2017 report commissioned by the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Some welcome the initiative, whereas others, such as Daszak, worry that without efforts to change people's traditional beliefs or to provide alternative livelihoods, a blanket ban may simply push the business underground. This could make disease detection even more challenging.

“Eating wildlife has been part of the cultural tradition” in China for thousands of years, Daszak says. “It won’t change overnight.”

In any case, Shi says, “wildlife trade and consumption are only part of problem.” In late 2016 pigs across four farms in Qingyuan County in Guangdong—60 miles from the site where the SARS outbreak originated—suffered from acute vomiting and diarrhea, and nearly 25,000 of the animals died. Local veterinarians could not detect any known pathogen and called Shi for help. The cause of the illness—swine acute diarrhea syndrome (SADS)—turned out to be a virus whose genomic sequence was 98 percent identical to that of a coronavirus found in horseshoe bats in a nearby cave.

“This is a serious cause for concern,” says Gregory Gray, an infectious disease epidemiologist at Duke University. Pigs and humans have very similar immune systems, making it easy for viruses to cross between the two species. Moreover, a team at Zhejiang University in the Chinese city of Hangzhou found that the SADS virus could infect cells from many organisms in a petri dish, including rodents, chickens, nonhuman primates and humans. Given the scale of swine farming in many countries, such as China and the U.S., Gray says, looking for novel coronaviruses in pigs should be a top priority.

The current outbreak follows several others during the past three decades that have been caused by six different bat-borne viruses: Hendra, Nipah, Marburg, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV (Middle East respiratory syndrome) and Ebola. But “the animals [themselves] are not the problem,” Wang says. In fact, bats promote biodiversity and ecosystem health by eating insects and pollinating plants. “The problem arises when we get in contact with them,” he says.

TOWARD PREVENTION

When I spoke to Shi in late February—two months into the epidemic and one month after the government imposed severe movement restrictions in Wuhan, a megacity of 11 million—she said, laughing, that life felt almost normal. “Maybe we are getting used to it. The worst days are certainly over.” The institute staffers had a special pass to travel from home to their lab, but they could not go anywhere else. They had to subsist on instant noodles during their long hours at work because the institute’s canteen was closed.

New revelations about the coronavirus kept coming to light. The researchers discovered, for instance, that the pathogen enters human lung cells by using a receptor called angiotensin-converting enzyme 2, and they and other groups have since been screening for drugs that can block it. Scientists are also racing to develop vaccines. In the long run, the Wuhan team plans to develop broad-spectrum vaccines and drugs against coronaviruses deemed risky to humans. “The Wuhan outbreak is a wake-up call,” Shi says.

Many scientists say the world should move beyond merely responding to deadly pathogens when they arise. “The best way forward is prevention,” Daszak says. Because 70 percent of emerging infectious diseases of animal origins come from wildlife, a top priority should be identifying them and developing better diagnostic tests, he adds. Doing so would essentially mean continuing on a much larger scale what researchers such as Daszak and Shi had been doing before their funding ended this year.

Such efforts should focus on high-risk viral groups in mammals prone to coronavirus infections, such as bats, rodents, badgers, civets, pangolins and nonhuman primates, Daszak says. He adds that developing countries in the tropics, where wildlife diversity is greatest, should be the front line of this battle against viruses.

Daszak and his colleagues have analyzed approximately 500 human infectious diseases from the past century. They found that the emergence of new pathogens tends to happen in places where a dense population has been changing the landscape—by building roads and mines, cutting down forests and intensifying agriculture. “China is not the only hotspot,” he says, noting that other major emerging economies, such as India, Nigeria and Brazil, are also at great risk.

Once potential pathogens are mapped out, scientists and public health officials can regularly check for possible infections by analyzing blood and swab samples from livestock, from wild animals that are farmed and traded, and from high-risk human populations such as farmers, miners, villagers who live near bats, and people who hunt or handle wildlife, Gray says. This approach, known as “One Health,” aims to integrate the health management of wildlife, livestock and people. “Only then can we catch an outbreak before it turns into an epidemic,” he says, adding that the strategy could potentially save the hundreds of billions of dollars such an epidemic can cost.

Back in Wuhan, where the lockdown was finally lifted on April 8, China's bat woman is not in a celebratory mood. She is distressed because stories from the Internet and major media have repeated a tenuous suggestion that SARS-CoV-2 accidentally leaked from her lab—despite the fact that its genetic sequence does not match any her lab had previously studied. Other scientists are quick to dismiss the allegation. “Shi leads a world-class lab of the highest standards,” Daszak says.

Despite the disturbance, Shi is determined to continue her work. “The mission must go on,” she says. “What we have uncovered is just the tip of an iceberg.” She is planning to lead a national project to systematically sample viruses in bat caves, with much wider scope and intensity than previous attempts. Daszak's team has estimated that there are more than 5,000 coronavirus strains waiting to be discovered in bats globally.

“Bat-borne coronaviruses will cause more outbreaks,” Shi says with a tone of brooding certainty. “We must find them before they find us.”

Read more about the coronavirus outbreak from Scientific American [here](#).

And read coverage from our [international network of magazines here](#).

This article was originally published with the title "Chasing Plagues" in Scientific American 322, 6, 24-32 (June 2020)

doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0620-24

From: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 12:00 PM

To: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Weekend reading—The genetic structure of SARS-CoV-2 does not rule out a laboratory origin SARS-COV-2 chimeric structure and furin cleavage site might be the result of genetic manipulation//Natl Academy of Sciences syn bio threat TF report

From: David Asher <(b)(6)@hudson.org>

Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 11:32 AM

To: William Hallisey <(b)(6)>

Cc: Kanapathy, Ivan <(b)(6)>; Hooker, Allison M

<(b)(6)>; Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Weekend reading—The genetic structure of SARS-CoV-2 does not rule out a laboratory origin SARS-COV-2 chimeric structure and furin cleavage site might be the result of genetic manipulation//Natl Academy of Sciences syn bio threat TF report

This recently published peer reviewed paper is in line with technical analysis we are pursuing with a group world class geneticists involved in gain of function research with Coronaviruses. They are telling us a very different story than some in the Community. Good weekend reading, especially combined with the 2018 NAS report on syn bio threats and a review of USG sponsored research into GOF with WIV and others in China.....

David L. Asher, Ph.D

Senior Fellow

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, DC 20004

o. |

<https://www.hudson.org/experts/1299-david-asher>

Sender: "Culvahouse, Arthur B (Canberra)" @state.gov>

Recipient: Stilwell, David R @state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Virus origins

Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 21:05:04 +0000

I've learned that Wuhan CDC, which is a few hundred yards away from the Huanan wet market, is the primary supplier of virus-carrying animal samples (mice, mosquitoes and especially bats) for the entire national virus research system of the PRC. In the past 200 years, the entire world has discovered 2,284 viruses but China alone has "discovered" over 2,000 new viruses in the last 12 years, according to PRC official media. This sounds quite scary.

(b)(5) Would be happy to talk more on this and others with real experts.

Miles



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)

On Mar 27, 2020, at 3:55 PM, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

(b)(5)

I'm teleworking today, but can send when it's finalized, which will hopefully be on Monday or Tuesday. In the meantime let me know if there is any specific questions I can answer.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 3:47 PM
To: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Virus origins

Miles- (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(6) is the POC

(b)(6) is there a readout from the discussion? Thank you.

There are a couple of initiatives to pull groups of scientists together. We'll update as we learn more.

Regards,

(b)(6)

Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary (E/STAS)
U.S. Department of State

email: (b)(6)@state.gov

office: + (b)(6)

web: www.state.gov/e/stas

mobile: (b)(6)

twitter: @STASatState

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Goshko, Matthew E. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 DL NSC Press <DL.NSC.Press@nsc.eop.gov>
 ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: Munoz, Kevin EOP/WHO (b)(6)
 SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>;
 DiNardo, Nicholas A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Vanity Fair Interview with SPOX edits
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2021 14:18:01 +0000

The attached is what I am clearing around. Is this not current? I understand there is a hard deadline by noon.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 10:13 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; DL NSC Press <DL.NSC.Press@nsc.eop.gov>; Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Rowe, Courtney M. EOP/WHO (b)(6) Munoz, Kevin EOP/WHO (b)(6); SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>; DiNardo, Nicholas A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Vanity Fair Interview with SPOX edits

Adding a few others here. (b)(6) (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:46 AM
To: DL.NSC.Press <DL.NSC.Press@nsc.eop.gov>; Horne, Emily J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Vanity Fair Interview with SPOX edits

Emily and NSC Press colleagues,

Yesterday, the Director of ISN's Biological Policy Staff received a call from Vanity Fair saying she is running a story on the origins of Covid-19. There are so many different versions of information out there, and our goal is to clarify and educate as best we can on what the Department knows and the particulars of State officials' meeting on this issue last December. This version has been seen by SPOX, but would appreciate NSC's review and clearance. Note that Vanity Fair's deadline is at noon today. Once these lines are cleared, we will deploy off the record.

Thanks,
 (b)(6)

Sender: "Goshko, Matthew E. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

DL NSC Press <DL.NSC.Press@nsc.eop.gov>;

Recipient: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;

Park, Christopher J [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>;

Munoz, Kevin EOP/WHO [redacted] (h)(6);

SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>;

DiNardo, Nicholas A [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;

CC: (h)(6)@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: V Fund BAA - BW added task

Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 21:36:50 +0000

Tom, (b)(6)-

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

I would like to flesh out this idea more over the weekend and provide you with a new task to be added on Monday.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 6:12 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: V Fund BAA - BW added task

(b)(6)

Below is the email I sent to Tom earlier today after talking with (b)(6)

Tom had the following comment and questions.

(b)(5)

Thank you!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 3:21 PM

To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: V Fund BAA - BW added task

Tom,

Attached is the BW proposal for

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

This proposal was favorably ranked (among the BW proposals) by the mail-in reviewers back in December.

The CBW panel organized by (b)(6) and (b)(6) did not change the ranking.

This project is a lead German institution.

The task we could add to the proposal would be as follows.

(b)(5)

What do you think? Should we add this task?

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
HST Room 5950

Office:
Cell:

(b)(6)

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov
ClassNet: @state.sgov.gov
JWICS: @state.ic.gov

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Fritz, Jonathan D" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (h)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: USRTK Sues State Department for Documents about Origins of SARS-CoV-2
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 21:27:38 +0000

I'm thinking of David F's initiative. There are folks out there who would take the ball and run with it, if only we can effect the hand-off without fumbling.

From: Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 1, 2020 4:27 PM
To: Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: USRTK Sues State Department for Documents about Origins of SARS-CoV-2

Atul showed me the output of the last FOIA request—redacted into oblivion. . . Can't see how this is going to be any different.

From: Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 1, 2020 4:20 PM
To: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: USRTK Sues State Department for Documents about Origins of SARS-CoV-2

Too good to be true!

From: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 1, 2020 4:03 PM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: USRTK Sues State Department for Documents about Origins of SARS-CoV-2

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 1, 2020 3:47 PM
To: Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: USRTK Sues State Department for Documents about Origins of SARS-CoV-2

<https://usrtk.org/news-releases/u-s-right-to-know-sues-state-department-for-documents-about-origins-of-sars-cov-2/>

U.S. Right to Know Sues State Department for Documents about Origins of SARS-CoV-2

[PrintEmailShareTweet](#)

Posted on November 30, 2020 by Gary Ruskin

News Release

For Immediate Release: Monday, November 30, 2020

For More Information Contact: Gary Ruskin (415) 944-7350 or Sainath Suryanarayanan

U.S. Right to Know, a nonprofit investigative public health group, filed a lawsuit today against the U.S. Department of State for violating provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

This is the second FOIA lawsuit filed by USRTK as part of its efforts to uncover what is known about the origins of novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2; the risks of biosafety labs; and gain-of-function research, which seeks to augment the infectivity or lethality of potential pandemic pathogens.

Today's lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeks State Department documents and correspondence with or about China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and the EcoHealth Alliance, which partnered with and funded the Wuhan Institute of Virology, among other subjects.

The new lawsuit follows one filed by USRTK on November 5 against the National Institutes of Health over its failure to provide records about the origins of SARS-CoV-2.

Since July, USRTK has filed 43 state, federal, and international public records requests seeking information about the origins of SARS-CoV-2, and the risks of biosafety labs and gain-of-function research.

USRTK is represented in the State Department case by Daniel C. Snyder of the Law Offices of Charles M. Tebbutt, PC, and Laura Beaton of Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP.

U.S. Right to Know is an investigative research group focused on promoting transparency for public health. For more information, see usrtk.org.

(b)(6)
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
US Department of State
(b)(6)
NSTS: (b)(6) TS)
JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov
SIPR: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Sender: "Fritz, Jonathan D" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: [redacted]@state.gov>
 [redacted]@state.gov>;
To: [redacted]@state.gov>;
 [redacted]@state.gov>;
 ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
CC: Park, Christopher J (T) [redacted]@state.gov>;
 [redacted]@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT: clearance (OOB Monday): AM [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:22:45 +0000

[redacted] (b)(6)

Thanks for flagging [redacted] (b)(5)

Best,

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

Team Chief
 Biosecurity Engagement Program
 U.S. Department of State, ISN/CTR-GDIT
 [redacted]@state.gov
 Office [redacted] (b)(6)
 Telework [redacted] (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [redacted]@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:38 PM
To: [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) [redacted]@state.gov> [redacted] (b)(6)
 [redacted]@state.gov>
Subject: Re: URGENT: clearance (OOB Monday): AM [redacted] (b)(5)

No, I'm good. Memo felt like it needed [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted]@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:37 PM
To: [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-

DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: URGENT: clearance (OOB Monday): AM (b)(5) BY

Will do. (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:35 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: URGENT: clearance (OOB Monday): AM (b)(5) BY

We're going to clear this with the FO correct? Please make sure to include Gonzo.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:30 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: URGENT: clearance (OOB Monday): AM (b)(5)

Clear for (b)--looks good.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:14 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: URGENT: clearance (OOB Monday): AM (b)(5)

Please provide me with comments/clearance by 5:00 p.m., so I can get our response to the Front Office for their approval by the deadline.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:34 PM

To: OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; OES-STC-China <OES-STC-China@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Beijing ESTH Americans <BeijingESTHAmericans@state.gov>
 Cc: EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>
 Subject: clearance (OOB Monday): AM (b)(5)

Colleagues,

We've been tasked to draft an AM (b)(5)
 (b)(5) The draft AM and letter are linked below for your review.

- AM for (b)(5).docx
- S (b)(5).docx

I would greatly appreciate your clearance by OOB Monday.

Warm regards,

(b)(6)
 Economic Unit Chief, EAP/CM

Economic Unit: EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov
 Personal: (b)(6)@state.gov
 Mobile: (b)(6)

From: EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAP-StaffersMailbox@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 2:48 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAP-StaffersMailbox@state.gov>
Cc: EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>
Subject: RE: ACTION FOR STAFFERS - TASKER (b)(5)

Rec'd and tasked in OP: (b)(6)

T	CM,	Action Memo S:	(b)(5)	AM and request letter	05/04/2020
---	-----	----------------	--------	-----------------------	------------

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 2:29 PM
To: EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAP-StaffersMailbox@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>

Subject: ACTION FOR STAFFERS - TASKER (b)(5)

Staffers,

Please task an AM and letter to CM from the (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(6) has additional details. Due to the EAP/FO NLT COB Monday. I will ask whether Stephanie intends to task formally.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Special Assistant
Office of the Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>;

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: Urgent request

Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 17:57:17 +0000

(b)(6) — many thanks. I know that was a pain but it may be important.

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 5, 2022 7:51:32 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: Urgent request

Transcript link: [draft transcript of SRBWC statement \(5APR2022\).docx](#), in case anyone in Washington wants to double check me. Tough hearing the audio out of the side of the computer!

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6) pr

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 5, 2022 7:08 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: Urgent request

Thanks!

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 5, 2022 1:06 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: Urgent request

(b)(5) Germany has responded sharply though, asking several times in plenary why Russia didn't bother to come to the side event yesterday to speak with the experts if it had so many questions and concerns.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 5, 2022 7:04 PM
To: Park, Christopher J [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: Urgent request

Sounds good. China needs to see consequences for coddling Putin, even if it further darkens the atmosphere.

One detail for T's Quad meeting: [REDACTED] (b)(5)
[REDACTED] (b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 5, 2022 1:00 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Urgent request

I started this but need someone to finish: [REDACTED] (b)(6) has volunteered. If you go to the UN WebTV coverage of this afternoon's meeting (BWC PrepCom Sixth Session), beginning at 2:24:31, S/R Ward unloads on China in response to their repeated echoing of Russia's "concern" about overseas biomedical facilities, pointing out that if cooperation between military and civil entities is viewed as suspect, then the activities of the Wuhan Institute of Virology certainly fit this description; we don't know how the pandemic began, a lab leak is one possible explanation, and six million people have died, so it's pretty serious (very loose paraphrasing of main points, which is why I want a transcript.)

You'd have to go back 5 or 10 minutes, I think, to get to the Chinese intervention that triggered this. Afterward, the Chinese ambassador took the floor, looking shaken, announced that "we do not like this talk", and accused the U.S. of making baseless allegations.

[REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) is reaching out to give NSC press types a heads-up; I'd be surprised if this doesn't get picked up one way or another.

CJP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent question: AVC,. Wuhan, SARS-COV-2, and the BWC
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:19:18 +0000

With apologies to Bob (which he won't see), I've removed his personal e-mail address.

(b)(5)

Nothing heard from them on the subject since then.

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 10:51 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Robert
 Mikulak (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-
 BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent question: AVC,. Wuhan, SARS-COV-2, and the BWC

Thanks. All helpful. I shall look forward to the conversation (if it happens this week), and share what I learn. I have these annoying views on the need for coordination, a clear set of things we're trying to accomplish that are both achievable and in our interest, and relying on those . . . things. Can't quite

remember what they're called, but scientists and lawyers are fond of them. Fractals? Facets? No. Oh, I remember: FACTS. That's the word I'm looking for.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 10:43 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Robert Mikulak (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Urgent question: AVC,. Wuhan, SARS-COV-2, and the BWC

No specific contact, but a couple related comments:

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer (b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 10:22 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Robert Mikulak (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent question: AVC,. Wuhan, SARS-COV-2, and the BWC

I haven't heard anything more since the Yan paper line of questioning.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 10:21 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Robert Mikulak (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent question: AVC,. Wuhan, SARS-COV-2, and the BWC

I haven't heard from them about this (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 10:15 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Robert Mikulak (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Urgent question: AVC,. Wuhan, SARS-COV-2, and the BWC

(b)(5)

Chris

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 8:37 AM
To: Ford, Christopher A
Cc: (b)(6) (T)
Subject: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR

Hi Dr. Ford,

SBO DiNanno is not in the office, but in the interest of time, he wanted us to reach out to you to provide you with a briefing [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(5)

Would you have any time today to talk with us?

We'd greatly appreciate it.

Thank you!

[redacted] (b)(6)



[redacted] (b)(6)

Chief of Staff
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
HST Room S950

Office: [redacted] (b)(6)
Cell: [redacted]

OpenNet: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov
ClassNet: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
JWICS: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

Sender: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J (T) [redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>;
[redacted] (h)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;
[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT please read
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 14:48:02 +0000

I thought Miles answered this already.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 10:42 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: URGENT please read

All,

Morgan just went on CNNi and was pressed on this tweet regarding virus samples being destroyed on January 3rd (S also said this at the podium): <https://twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/1258108377701515267>

The clip begins at

10:19:33: <https://mms.tveyes.com/Transcript.asp?StationID=3645&DateTime=5%2F7%2F2020+10%3A16%3A13+AM&LineNumber=&MediaStationID=3645&playclip=True&RefPage=&pbcc=WatchlistTerm%3A1865855>

Are we sourcing this Daily Telegraph story or are there other open sources we can point to? <https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/coronavirus/bombshell-dossier-lays-case-against-chinese-bat-virus-program/news-story/55add857058731c9c71c0e96ad17da60>

Sender: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>;
 EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;
 Keshap, Atul (h)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review
Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2020 02:18:52 +0000

Many thanks (b)(6) (b)(5) Appreciate your chasing all this down.

--
 David Feith
 Deputy Assistant Secretary
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6) (o)
 (b)(6) (c)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

On December 5, 2020 at 7:27:31 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 Hi David,

(b)(5)

Best,
 (b)(6)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 5, 2020 6:15:24 PM
To: Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-

DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi (b)(6) and team — (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Many thanks.

--
David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)
(b)(6)@state.gov

On December 5, 2020 at 9:49:52 AM EST, Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

(b)(5)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Saturday, December 5, 2020 12:26:34 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Many thanks (b)(6) Standing by on HHS's timing. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks again.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

On December 4, 2020 at 9:15:34 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:
Hi David,

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 6:38:20 PM

To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L

(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul

(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi David,

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Will let you know when I hear back!

Best,

(b)(6)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 6:13:59 PM

To: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-

DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)
(b)(6)@state.gov

On December 4, 2020 at 6:03:22 PM EST, Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

(b)(5)

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 5:55 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Agree. (b)(5)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 4:40:14 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Many thanks.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 5:15 PM

To: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-
Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Urgent HHS statement for review

Please see the attached statement from HHS and the comment below.

Do you clear on this version?

(b)(6)

EAP/Press

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 5:12 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Thank you, (b)(6) (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Please see OES edits and comments in the attached.

Regards,

(b)(6)
OES/PPO

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 2:13 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(6)

Please see edits from EAP attached.

EAP/FO: David Feith

EAP/FO: David Stilwell

EAP/FO: Richard Buangan

EAP/FO: Jonathan Fritz

EAP/CM: (b)(6)

EAP/CM: (b)(6)

EAP/P: (b)(6)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:53 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Urgent HHS statement for review

Many thanks. Please see edits in track-changes attached. Also clean copied here for the traveling party:

State/EAP edits to draft HHS statement
December 4, 2020

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:28 PM

To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Standing by and waiting for your edits/comments.

(b)(6)

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:26 PM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi all - (b)(5) Thanks.

From: Feith, David

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:11 PM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Seeing this now, will send suggestions in a minute --

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:06 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Good. There's some great reporting out of Taiwan on this topic. (b)(5)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 11:30:57 AM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

A/S Stilwell,

Please see the statement below in response to the WSJ article that PRC is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. (b)(5)

Apologies for the short fuse. Would appreciate your earliest clearance so that we can get our edits in.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

DRAFT REACTIVE STATEMENT

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:13 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FOR (b)(6) CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6) (desk)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:04 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Global-DL <EAP-CM-Global-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Re: CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi (b)(6)

Some edits for (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer

Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) work)
(b)(6) telework)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 10:16 AM
To: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-Press-DL <IO-Press-DL@state.gov>
Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>
Subject: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hello, please see HHS reactive statement below in response to the WSJ article that China is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. I would appreciate your comments/clearance by 11:30.

Thank you,
 (b)(6)
 OES/PPO

The draft reactive statement below is in response to the WSJ article that China is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. Once HHS comments have been received, it will go to State Dept for review.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-likely-in-u-s-in-mid-december-2019-cdc-scientists-report-11606782449>

DRAFT REACTIVE STATEMENT

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>;

EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;

Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent HHS statement for review
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 22:02:55 +0000

(b)(6) here attached with an additional edit if possible.

Do we know who at HHS is running point on this?

Thanks.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 2:08 PM
To: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Roger.

From: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 2:00 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

We're good with Feith's edits. Stilwell is talking for about one more hour. Move it forward.

Richard L. Buangan
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State


Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

On Dec 4, 2020, at 12:53, Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Many thanks. Please see edits in track-changes attached. Also clean copied here for the traveling party:

State/EAP edits to draft HHS statement
December 4, 2020

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:28 PM

To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Standing by and waiting for your edits/comments.

(b)(6)

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:26 PM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi all (b)(5) Thanks.

From: Feith, David

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:11 PM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Seeing this now, will send suggestions in a minute --

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:06 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Good. There's some great reporting out of Taiwan on this topic. (b)(5)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 11:30:57 AM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

A/S Stilwell,

Please see the statement below in response to the WSJ article that PRC is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. (b)(5)

Apologies for the short fuse. Would appreciate your earliest clearance so that we can get our edits in.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

DRAFT REACTIVE STATEMENT

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:13 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FOR (b)(6) CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6) (desk)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:04 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Global-DL <EAP-CM-Global-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Re: CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer

Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)
(b)(6) (telework)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 10:16 AM

To: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-Press-DL <IO-Press-DL@state.gov>

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>

Subject: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hello, please see HHS reactive statement below in response to the WSJ article that China is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. I would appreciate your comments/clearance by 11:30.

Thank you,

(b)(6)
OES/PPO

The draft reactive statement below is in response to the WSJ article that China is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. Once HHS comments have been received, it will go to State Dept for review.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-likely-in-u-s-in-mid-december-2019-cdc-scientists-report-11606782449>

DRAFT REACTIVE STATEMENT

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

<HHS draft statement on COVID origins with State EAP.docx>

Sender: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Stilwell, David R"
Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent HHS statement for review
Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2020 17:35:50 +0000

(b)(5)

Maddening.

From: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 5, 2020 11:31 AM
To: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Muy interesante. Certainly worth discussing.

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 5, 2020 10:49:43 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Urgent HHS statement for review

Fyi my back and forth with Jonathan Moore below:

From: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 5, 2020 10:46 AM
To: Moore, Jonathan M
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Understood.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 5, 2020 9:02 AM
To: Keshap, Atul
Subject: Re: Fwd: Urgent HHS statement for review

Happy to discuss. (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

 Jonathan Moore
 AA/S, OES

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On December 4, 2020 at 20:42:15 EST, Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 Jonathan - (b)(5)
 (b)(5)
 (b)(5) I am out until the 10th. Best wishes, atul

From: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 6:03 PM
To: Stilwell, David R; Feith, David; (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L
Cc: (b)(6) EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL; EAP-Press; Keshap, Atul
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 5:55 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Agree (b)(5)

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 4:40:14 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

Many thanks.

--
David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)
(b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 5:15 PM
To: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Urgent HHS statement for review

Please see the attached statement from HHS and the comment below.

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

EAP/Press

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 5:12 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Urgent HHS statement for review

Thank you, (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please see (b)(5) and comments in the attached.

Regards,

(b)(6)

OES/PPO

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 2:13 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(6)

Please see edits from EAP attached.

EAP/FO: David Feith

EAP/FO: David Stilwell

EAP/FO: Richard Buangan

EAP/FO: Jonathan Fritz

EAP/CM: (b)(6)

EAP/CM: (b)(6)

EAP/P: (b)(6)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:53 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent HHS statement for review

Many thanks. Please see edits in track-changes attached. Also clean copied here for the traveling party:

State/EAP edits to draft HHS statement

December 4, 2020

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:28 PM

To: Feith, David [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

Subject: Re: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Standing by and waiting for your edits/comments.

[redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]

From: Feith, David [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:26 PM

To: Stilwell, David R [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>; EAP-Press

<EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi all - (b)(5) Thanks.

From: Feith, David
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:11 PM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Seeing this now, will send suggestions in a minute --

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 1:06 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Good. There's some great reporting out of Taiwan on this topic. (b)(5)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 11:30:57 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FOR A/S STILWELL CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

A/S Stilwell,
Please see the statement below in response to the WSJ article that PRC is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. (b)(5)

Apologies for the short fuse. Would appreciate your earliest clearance so that we can get our edits in.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

DRAFT REACTIVE STATEMENT

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:13 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: RE: FOR (b)(6) CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6) (desk)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:04 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; EAP-CM-Global-DL <EAP-CM-Global-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Subject: Re: CLEARANCE ASAP: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hi (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer

Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)
(b)(6) (telework)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Friday, December 4, 2020 10:16 AM

To: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO-Press-DL <IO-Press-DL@state.gov>

Cc: OES-PA-DG <OES-PA-DG@state.gov>

Subject: 11:30 AM: Urgent HHS statement for review

Hello, please see HHS reactive statement below in response to the WSI article that China is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. I would appreciate your comments/clearance by 11:30.

Thank you,

(b)(6)
OES/PPO

The draft reactive statement below is in response to the WSJ article that China is using to claim COVID did not start in Wuhan. Once HHS comments have been received, it will go to State Dept for review.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-likely-in-u-s-in-mid-december-2019-cdc-scientists-report-11606782449>

DRAFT REACTIVE STATEMENT

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Stilwell, David R"

Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: URGENT CLEAR BY 11:45 AM: (b)(5)
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 14:58:14 +0000

(b)(6)
From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, June 5, 2021 10:57:53 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEAR BY 11:45 AM: (b)(5)

Can I conference you into my call with (b)(6) right now? What's a good #?

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, June 5, 2021 10:56 AM
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; SP_EAP <SP_EAP@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (h)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (h)(6) LPA/LEG/SA @usaid.gov>; (h)(6) LPA/LEG/LR @usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6) ASIA/TS/OFC OF TECH SVCS @usaid.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: URGENT CLEAR BY 11:45 AM: (b)(5)

Overall, looks good. Minor points:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6) (b)(5)


(b)(5)

These should be in IP format and we recently found out that the Secretary does not like for "windows" at the end of the page—ie, sentences should not continue, para's should not break in the middle. There should be a clean break for each page. Please make sure that we're using 16 pt font and nothing is over one page.

Please respond to all from H on distribution with completed IM or if you have questions. **These are due to H no later than 2pm Saturday.**

Thanks,

(b)(6)



Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Davis, Timmy T (h)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)@state.gov>
CC: S_SpecialAssistants <S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATED Report on Circumstantial Evidence re Wuhan Institute of Virology
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 21:59:50 +0000

Thanks Miles, we'll send to him this weekend.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
 Special Assistant
 Office of the Secretary
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6)

NOTE: Please always include the S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov distro to ensure your message is received.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 5:41 PM
To: Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (S) (h)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants <S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>
Subject: UPDATED Report on Circumstantial Evidence re Wuhan Institute of Virology

All, as requested, this is the updated report on the subject matter. New information is in yellowhights.

(b)(5)
 Very respectfully
 Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
 Policy Planning Staff (S/P)
 Office of the Secretary
 Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

S_SpecialAssistants <S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Wier, Anthony D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Points on BPS and Covid-19 origins
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 23:50:46 +0000

This was the last (b)(5) finalized for SPOX on Thursday.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On June 5, 2021 at 7:46:33 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 (b)(6) for the most recent PG submitted to SPOX

(b)(6)
 Congressional Affairs Officer
 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
 Office: (h)(6)
 Cell (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

On June 5, 2021 at 7:11:02 PM EDT, Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 One additional note, one additional question:

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J
Sent: Saturday, June 5, 2021 7:00 PM
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Points on BPS and Covid-19 origins

(b)(6) (b)(5)
(b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Happy to try to get them cleared by everyone who needs to do so, but that raises two questions:

(b)(5)

OK. That’s more than two questions. Sue me.

PS – Apparently “Fox and Friends” discussed one of Chris Ford’s emails today (likely his warning note to S, or the readout that was attached to it) and then framed the question as “How much influence does the Chinese communist party have over bureaucrats in the us govt?”

Not sure which Chris was in their sights with that one; I almost wish them luck trying to make the case that Ford is under the thumb of the Chinese.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, June 5, 2021 5:54 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Updated Points on BPS and Covid-19 origins

Thanks (b)(6) I want to make sure it has (b)(5) + Chris and (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, June 5, 2021 5:51:55 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: RE: Updated Points on BPS and Covid-19 origins

Don’t want to speak out of turn, but this is the latest I saw.

SBO Ganzer and DAS Wier cleared.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Officer
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Park, Christopher J (h)(6)@state.gov>

Date: June 4, 2021 at 6:49:40 PM EDT

Subject: RE: Updated Points on BPS and Covid-19 origins

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>, Wier, Anthony D

(h)(6)@state.gov> (h)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

(h)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>, Dolliff, Phillip R

(h)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov> (h)(6)@state.gov>, T_SpecAssts

<T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

(b)(6) et al -

With thanks to my team, who drafted most of this and stuck some nice words about me in to boot, here are the suggested points. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Let me know about next steps.

Chris

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, June 4, 2021 2:24 PM

To: Wier, Anthony D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; T_SpecAssts

<T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

Subject: Updated Points on BPS and Covid-19 origins

(b)(5)

Thanks in advance!

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Wier, Anthony D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

CC: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 21:58:57 +0000

Please see my edits and comments - (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, December 28, 2020 2:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions



(b)(6)

Chief of Staff
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
HST Room 5950

Office: (b)(6)
Cell:

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov
ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.gov.gov
JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2020 1:36 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Dear (b)(6) - See attached updated cable in the proper format. Please try to insert your examples into this format.

Tom, (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5) Please take a look.

Best - (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:18 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Attached is a (b)(5)

(b)(5) Please review this and let me know ASAP if you have other edits. Per Tom's direction, I plan to circulate this today.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director, Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Currently Teleworking

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 17:05:47 +0000

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

From: (h)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 11:15 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Hi (h)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Comments attached. Best - (b)(6)

From: (h)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 10:31 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)
 (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Good Morning,

(b)(5)

Please review ASAP so that we can get this out for clearance.

Thanks,

(b)(6)



(b)(6)
Director, Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)
(b)(6) @state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2020 1:36 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Dear (b)(6) See attached updated cable in the proper format. Please try to insert your examples into this format.

Tom (b)(6) (b)(5)
(b)(5) Please take a look.

Best - (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:18 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Attached is a (b)(5)

(b)(5) Please review this and let me know ASAP if you have other edits. Per Tom's direction, I plan to circulate this today.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director, Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Currently Teleworking

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "DiNanno, Thomas G" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (h)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: (h)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 20:02:18 +0000

Thanks (b)(6) I'll look at it and make final changes. This needs to get into clearance tomorrow.
Thx
TD

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2020 1:36 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Updated draft cable to China regarding BWC questions

Dear (b)(6) - See attached updated cable in the proper format. Please try to insert your examples into this format.

Tom, (b)(6) (b)(5)
(b)(5) Please take a look.

Best - (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:18 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Draft cable to China on consultations under Article V of the BWC

Attached is a (b)(5)
(b)(5) Please review this and let me know ASAP if you have other edits.
Per Tom's direction, I plan to circulate this today.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Director, Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Currently Teleworking

Sender: "DiNanno, Thomas G" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Tracking down transcript of DNI testimony to
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2021 14:39:22 +0000

I think this should be it

(b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 10:36 AM
To: ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Tracking down transcript of DNI testimony to

CPA colleagues -- I'm trying to track down a transcript of the DNI's remarks to the Senate Intelligence Committee in April on the Annual Threat Assessment. Can you assist or advise? (link to a news article on the testimony is below).

-----Original Message-----

From: yorik <(b)(6)>
Sent: Saturday, June 19, 2021 10:35 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Avril Haines: US intel chief says spy agencies still do not know 'where, when or how' Covid-19 was initially transmitted - CNNPolitics

(b)(7)(E)

Sent from my iPhone

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>
 Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 16:42:19 +0000

Excellent tweet draft!



Dr. M. Miles Yu
 Policy Planning Staff
 Office of the Secretary
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
 (b)(6) (c)

On Aug 10, 2020, at 12:40 PM, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

If no further edits, we can put this in a memo/clean email to send forward.

From: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 12:37 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

I'm fine with (b)(6) edits and I LOVE this tweet thread.

Morgan D. Ortagus
 Spokesperson
 U.S. Dept of State

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 12:19 PM
To: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

Really delighted you're tweeting about this. (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

From: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 12:15 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

A few edits from me.

StateDeptSpox:

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 12:08 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Brown, Cale (h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

EAP colleagues (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

StateDeptSpox:

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 11:53 AM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

Got it, Morgan (b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 11:32 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Brown, Cale <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

(b)(6)—excellent work

(b)(5)

Copy?

Morgan D. Ortagus

Spokesperson

U.S. Dept of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 10:32 AM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

Here's the clip:

[https://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?StationID=2710&DateTime=8/10/2020%208:11:13%20AM&playclip=true&pbcc=search%3a%2b\(wuhan\)](https://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?StationID=2710&DateTime=8/10/2020%208:11:13%20AM&playclip=true&pbcc=search%3a%2b(wuhan))

BLUF:

(b)(5)

Transcript below with highlighted key points.

Janis mackey frayer got into the lab in wuhan where many claimed the virus started. she joins us live now. good morning.

Reporter (Frayer): good morning. for months we had been asking for access to the lab here in wuhan that is fueling a political dispute about how and where the virus started. mystery surrounds the high-security lab at the wuhan institute of virology. making it the target of conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus. (**Frayer questioning Director of lab**): I so you're 100% confident there was no leak, no accident?

(Director of Lab): i'm confident there's no leak.

reporter: 100%?

(Director of Lab):100%.

Reporter Frayer: the institute granted nbc news the first independent media access to the lab. this is the director. we haven't encountered this novel coronavirus before, he said. without having this virus, there's no way that it could be leaked from the lab. has anyone at the lab either personnel or connected to the lab, a third party contractor, tested positive for this virus?

no.

reporter Frayer: nobody?

nobody.

Reporter Frayer: while there's some skepticism about the lab's claims, five leading virologists similar with lab protocols told us improbable the virus somehow escaped. this is a rare glimpse at the lab. a box within a box with air locks on doors and separate filtration systems. technicians were trained in france and the u.s. windows to look out and see in.

President trump clip: the china virus, the china plague. kung flu.

Reporter Frayer: more months the u.s. and china have been locked in a battle over accusations.

Sec Pompeo Clip: there's evidence it came from a laboratory.

reporter: **u.s. officials have yet to offer credible proof the virus came from the wuhan lab. a theory that's also being shot down by dr. anthony fauci for lacking scientific evidence.** but scrutiny grew stronger with

the leak then we lease of a statement cable dated january. about a lack of staff. the u.s. diplomats visited only once in march 2018 for a seminar that wasn't about biosafety. at that time **the u.s. officials didn't visit any of the labs says wang yanyi. so i'm not sure what the source was for those concerns. for 15 years, virologist collaborated with wuhan scientists** like china's bat woman to catalog hundreds of back coronaviruses. but in april they cut funding because of the links to the lab.

we know that they did not have the virus that it leads to covid-19 in the lab.

Reporter Frayer: china faces intense backlash for failing to contain the virus and for a lack of transparency that has allowed speculation about blame to flourish. what do you say to somebody who says i don't believe you?

it's unfortunate that we have been targeted as the scapegoat. deep down inside, we know that we are innocent.

janis, you've been on this story from the beginning. what was it like to be in that lab that so many people had talked about?

Reporter Frayer: well, it felt like it was a long time coming. we had been asking for months making repeated requests to officials, started to make some headway recently. it felt very significant to us. this is a place that people around the world are talking about. it's the source of a dispute for politicians and pundits. and for scientist who is have worked with this punditlab, they're wondering why there's so much controversy. **we spent close to five hours there. we got the tour of the lab.** we were shown inside to where they wear the positive pressure suits attached to hoses. and it struck me then looking through the window that this is where so much controversy is being centered in this tiny box within a box in the middle of china.

it's interesting to hear the technicians there were trained here and trained in france as well. all of this, janis, coming as the world health organization -- it's against the backdrop of the w.h.o. conducting its own investigation into the origin of the virus. what do we know about that investigation and where it stands?

Reporter Frayer: we've been told the wuhan lab will join what the w.h.o. calls a scientific study. but it won't be investigated as a possible origin for the virus. a larger w.h.o. team that includes international and chinese scientists is likely to get started in the next few weeks. **but already the state department has said that it expects that the investigation will be, quote, completely whitewashed. now, overnight they sent us a statement that didn't exactly address whether u.s. diplomats had actually seen the lab in wuhan, but it did criticize china's government for its lack of transparency.** but scientists like peter say that this is why international collaboration among scientists is so important. it's so key because it allows better access to data and information sharing. especially with scientists who are in the place where the pandemic started. opposed to making policy on scientific research based on what people say on the internet.

janis, it's a fascinating look inside. thank you for your reporting. we appreciate it.

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov>;

EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;

Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

CC: Brown, Cale (h)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov>;

(h)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 16:15:25 +0000

NBC/MSNBC have been notorious in giving the CCP the benefit of the doubt at every opportunity on the E-PAI findings, the DOS 2018 cables, etc.

(b)(5)

Cheers!

Miles



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

On Aug 10, 2020, at 11:53 AM, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Got it, Morgan. (b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 11:32 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

(b)(6) -excellent work

(b)(5)

Copy?

Morgan D. Ortagus
Spokesperson
U.S. Dept of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, August 10, 2020 10:32 AM

To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Today show -- Wuhan Clinic parts

Here's the clip:

[https://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?StationID=2710&DateTime=8/10/2020%208:11:13%20AM&playclip=true&pbcs=search%3a%2b\(wuhan\)](https://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?StationID=2710&DateTime=8/10/2020%208:11:13%20AM&playclip=true&pbcs=search%3a%2b(wuhan))

BLUF:

(b)(5)

Transcript below with highlighted key points.

Janis mackey frayer got into the lab in wuhan where many claimed the virus started. she joins us live now. good morning.

Reporter (Frayer): good morning. for months we had been asking for access to the lab here in wuhan that is fueling a political dispute about how and where the virus started. mystery surrounds the high-security lab at the wuhan institute of virology. making it the target of conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus. (**Frayer questioning Director of lab**): I so you're 100% confident there was no leak, no accident?

(Director of Lab): i'm confident there's no leak.

reporter: 100%?

(Director of Lab):100%.

Reporter Frayer: the institute granted nbc news the first independent media access to the lab. this is the director. we haven't encountered this novel coronavirus before, he said. without having this virus, there's no way that it could be leaked from the lab. has anyone at the lab either personnel or connected to the lab, a third party contractor, tested positive for this virus?

no.

reporter Frayer: nobody?

nobody.

Reporter Frayer: while there's some skepticism about the lab's claims, five leading virologists similar with lab protocols told us improbable the virus somehow escaped. this is a rare glimpse at the lab. a box within a box with air locks on doors and separate filtration systems. technicians were trained in france and the u.s. windows to look out and see in.

President trump clip: the china virus, the china plague. kung flu.

Reporter Frayer: more months the u.s. and china have been locked in a battle over accusations.

Sec Pompeo Clip: there's evidence it came from a laboratory.

reporter: **u.s. officials have yet to offer credible proof the virus came from the wuhan lab. a theory that's also being shot down by dr. anthony fauci for lacking scientific evidence.** but scrutiny grew stronger with the leak then we lease of a statement cable dated january. about a lack of staff. the u.s. diplomats visited only once in march 2018 for a seminar that wasn't about biosafety. at that time **the u.s. officials didn't visit any of the labs says wang yanyi. so i'm not sure what the source was for those concerns. for 15 years, virologist collaborated with wuhan scientists** like china's bat woman to catalog hundreds of back coronaviruses. but in april they cut funding because of the links to the lab.

we know that they did not have the virus that it leads to covid-19 in the lab.

Reporter Frayer: china faces intense backlash for failing to contain the virus and for a lack of transparency that has allowed speculation about blame to flourish. what do you say to somebody who says i don't believe you?

it's unfortunate that we have been targeted as the scapegoat. deep down inside, we know that we are innocent.

janis, you've been on this story from the beginning. what was it like to be in that lab that so many people had talked about?

Reporter Frayer: well, it felt like it was a long time coming. we had been asking for months making repeated requests to officials, started to make some headway recently. it felt very significant to us. this is a place that people around the world are talking about. it's the source of a dispute for politicians and pundits. and for scientist who is have worked with this punditlab, they're wondering why there's so much controversy. **we spent close to five hours there. we got the tour of the lab.** we were shown inside to where they wear the positive pressure suits attached to hoses. and it struck me then looking through the window that this is where so much controversy is being centered in this tiny box within a box in the middle of china.

it's interesting to hear the technicians there were trained here and trained in france as well. all of this, janis, coming as the world health organization -- it's against the backdrop of the w.h.o. conducting its own investigation into the origin of the virus. what do we know about that investigation and where it stands?

Reporter Frayer: we've been told the wuhan lab will join what the w.h.o. calls a scientific study. but it won't be investigated as a possible origin for the virus. a larger w.h.o. team that includes international and chinese scientists is likely to get started in the next few weeks. **but already the state department has said that it expects that the investigation will be, quote, completely whitewashed. now, overnight they sent us a statement that didn't exactly address whether u.s. diplomats had actually seen the lab in wuhan, but it did criticize china's government for its lack of transparency.** but scientists like peter say that this is why international collaboration among scientists is so important. it's so key because it allows better access to data and information sharing. especially with scientists who are in the place where the pandemic started. opposed to making policy on scientific research based on what people say on the internet.

janis, it's a fascinating look inside. thank you for your reporting. we appreciate it.

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>;
 Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 GPA-DIG-Global Social Media <GPA-DIG-GlobalSocialMedia@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

Circumstantial Evidence against Wuhan Institute of Virology

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: "Feith, David" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
 Yu, Miles [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;
To: Stilwell, David R <[(b)(6)]@state.gov>;
 [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;
 Ortagus, Morgan D [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Timeline modification?
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2020 13:39:01 +0000

Miles, many thanks. This is interesting indeed. [(b)(5)]
 [(b)(5)]

Thanks —

--
 David Feith
 Senior Advisor
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
 U.S. Department of State
 [(b)(6)] (o)
 [(b)(6)] (c)
 [(b)(6)]@state.gov

On April 7, 2020 at 10:40:31 PM EDT, Yu, Miles <[(b)(6)]@state.gov> wrote:
 David,

[(b)(5)]

(b)(5)

Miles

<Wang Yanyi of WIV email.pdf>

Sender: "Feith, David" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>;

<(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
 (b)(6)@state.gov;
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: The Rogin article that we've been expecting
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 12:00:07 +0000

(b)(6)

I believe these were the cables, at least they're the ones I have seen sent around when discussing Rogin's article.

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
 U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)@state.gov

From: Paulopol, Andreea I (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 7:44 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Robert Mikulak <(b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: The Rogin article that we've been expecting

Does anyone have the cables and could share them?

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: Park, Christopher J

Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2020 9:47 PM

To: (b)(6) Robert Mikulak; ISN-BPS-DL; (b)(6)

Subject: Re: The Rogin article that we've been expecting

Given that they're unclassified, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2020 9:16:28 PM

To: Robert Mikulak <(b)(6) ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)


(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: The Rogin article that we've been expecting

Thanks Bob

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

On April 28, 2020 at 5:43:22 PM EDT, Robert Mikulak <(b)(6)> wrote:
[Opinion | Senators demand answers from Pompeo on Wuhan lab cables](#)



[Opinion | Senators demand answers from Pompeo on Wuhan lab cables](#)

[We're still trying to understand the origins of the outbreak. The Chinese aren't helping.](#)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 15:39:12 +0000

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 11:33 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

Chiming in to say we don't yet have the PRC CBM report for this year (due yesterday). The UN website for CBMs is down for "unscheduled maintenance," but we know that 37 States Parties have submitted CBMs so far (but not who they are).

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer (b)(6)
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 11:12 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

(b)(6) -- this is pretty interesting. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 11:07 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

Also, the reports I have seen are that new coronavirus research needs to be vetted by the Ministry of Education, not MoST.

(b)(5)

On the question of what exactly was claimed to be closed, the SCMP article (<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3052966/chinese-laboratory-first-shared-coronavirus-genome-world-ordered>) claims that a BSL-3 lab at the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre was closed by the Shanghai Health Commission. According to its website, SPHCC is an affiliated hospital of Fudan University, as the Shanghai Medical University merged with Fudan University in 2000.

Surprisingly, for an educational enterprise that would want to attract high-quality staff, it took me a lot of searching to find a single mention on the English-language websites for SPHCC or the Fudan University School of Life Sciences of a BSL-3 lab (<https://www.fudan.edu.cn/en/2020/0210/c344a103994/page.htm>). According to that 10 February article, the BSL-3 lab is newly established and it doesn't imply that the BSL-3 lab was used in the initial sequencing research.

- "In addition, a new P3 laboratory was recently approved at Fudan University. P3 laboratories are confinement facilities subjected to BSL-3 levels (biosafety), which enables the isolation and manipulation of dangerous biological materials that may cause potentially lethal disease through inhalation and contaminate the environment. The lab will soon become another robust platform for conducting experiments on animal infection, virus cultivation and isolation related to 2019-nCoV."

Here's the timeline from the SCMP article, itself:

- 5 January -
 - Lab passed annual inspection "by the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment." (Article does not make clear whether this was its first inspection or a re-inspection.)
 - Zhang's team "isolated and finished the genome sequence" of the virus
- 11 January - Zhang's team makes their findings public
- 12 January - BSL-3 lab closed for "rectification"
- 24 January - lab "obtained the required credentials to conduct research on the coronavirus"

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 6:39 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

I do and I'll forward it to you -- but since it's a OneDrive link, I don't know whether or not you'll be able to open it.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 6:10 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research | U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 5:31 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: The drumbeat continues: "Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)"

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FYSA -- Fw: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)

There's some interesting material in this timeline, and it does a good job of documenting some failings and problematic behaviors. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 10:03 AM
To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: FYSA -- Fw: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)

The updated timeline includes new items on Chinese history of bat research. That and some other elements are highlighted below. Thanks.

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 9:51 AM
Subject: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 13)

Updated timeline attached. This version notes at the top that major themes include:

--The silenced and the disappeared: E.g. Wuhan doctors Li Wenliang, Ai Fen and others; journalists Fang Bin, Chen Quishi, and Li Zehua; activist Xu Zhiyong; professor Xu Zhangrun; billionaire CCP member and Xi Jinping critic Ren Zhiqiang...

--The suppression and destruction of evidence: E.g. virus samples ordered destroyed at genomics labs, wildlife market stalls bleached, genome sequence not shared publicly, Shanghai lab closed for "rectification" after sharing genome on its own, academic articles subjected to prior review by the Ministry of Science and Technology...

--The deadly denial of human-to-human transmission: Despite evidence of human-human transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until Jan. 20. The World Health Organization does the same. Yet officials in Taiwan raised concerns about human-human transmission as early as Dec. 31, as did experts in Hong Kong on Jan. 4...

--The endangerment of other countries: Millions of people leave Wuhan after the outbreak and before Beijing locks down the city on Jan. 23. Thousands fly overseas. When Beijing cuts off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of China, it doesn't stop travel from Hubei to the rest of the world. Throughout February, Beijing presses the U.S., Italy, India, Australia, Southeast Asian neighbors and others not to protect themselves via travel restrictions...

New timeline elements in the attached:

--2013--

Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus 96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.

--2019--

February 20: Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: "bat-animal and bat-human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks."

December 30: Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher Shi Zhengli (known as "bat-woman" for her research) is called by the Institute's director and summoned back to Wuhan from a conference in Shanghai to study samples of the novel coronavirus. "Could they have come from our lab?" Shi feared.

--2020--

January 7: Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology recalled in a March 11 interview with Scientific American that by January 7 her team found that the novel coronavirus's sequence did not match any of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. "That really took a load off my mind," she said. But the novel sequence was 96% identical to one her team had sampled previously in Yunnan.

January 13: The first coronavirus case outside of China is reported in Bangkok when a 61-year-old woman from Wuhan tests positive four days after arriving from China with a fever at the airport. The patient had begun exhibiting symptoms (fever, chills, sore throat, headache) three days before leaving Wuhan.

January 15: The patient who becomes the first confirmed U.S. case leaves Wuhan and arrives in the U.S., carrying the coronavirus.

January 22: WHO holds emergency committee meeting, decides not to declare the novel coronavirus a "public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)." WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says afterward that declaring a PHEIC is a decision he takes "extremely seriously" and is "only prepared to make with appropriate consideration of all the evidence." The emergency committee meeting excluded Taiwan from its deliberations.

January 23: Despite locking down Wuhan and cutting off travel from the surrounding Hubei Province to the rest of China, PRC officials did not cut off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of the world.

January 24: Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas biocontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by the Wuhan lab to share these samples.

January 30: WHO declares a public-health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), after nearly 10,000 cases of the virus are confirmed, including in at least 18 countries outside of China.

February 6: Researchers from South China University of Technology publish a study concluding that "the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories." The paper is soon withdrawn because it "was not supported by direct proofs," according to author Botao Xiao. "No scientists have confirmed or refuted the paper's findings," scholar Yanzhong Huang wrote on March 5.

February 16: The Wuhan Institute of Virology issues a public denial that its former researcher Huang Yanling is "patient zero," as speculated on Chinese social media based on changes to the Institute's website and Huang's unknown whereabouts. Institute researcher Shi Zhengli writes on social media that she "guaranteed with her own life" that the outbreak was unrelated to the lab. [In 2004, China suffered a SARS outbreak due to a lab leak that killed one person and infected nine. PRC authorities blamed negligence and punished five senior officials at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention.]

February 23: Xi Jinping delivers speech to PRC officials calling virus "a crisis for us and also a major test." He stresses "social stability" and states that "the effectiveness of the prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics."

March 11: WHO declares the novel coronavirus a "pandemic," after the official worldwide case count is 118,000 people in 114 countries.

March 26: China bars entry of all foreigners in attempt to limit virus spread. This measure is harsher than the travel restrictions of other countries that Beijing had criticized just weeks before.

April 3: While lifting lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, officials limit funerals of those who died from the coronavirus, suppress online discussions of fatalities, scrub images of funeral homes from social media, assign minders to families in mourning, and face questions from families such as why it took the government weeks to inform the public that the virus could spread among humans.

April 3: China's Ministry of Science and Technology announces that ongoing clinical research on the coronavirus must be reported to authorities within three days or be halted.

April 7: Human rights activists report, citing public records alone, that Chinese police punished nearly 900 people for online speech or information-sharing about the virus over three months.

April 11: Chinese universities publish online—and then apparently delete—new guidelines stating that academic papers on the origin of the novel coronavirus can be published only with the approval of the Ministry of Science and Technology.

--

David Feith
Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 17:38:27 +0000

Great and thanks because [redacted] (b)(6) does want me to send it. [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)
 Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
 Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
 U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 1:36 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Honestly? [redacted] (b)(5) I'll take a quick look right now.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 1:34 PM
To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Done. I'll let you know what she says. [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)
 Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
 Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
 U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 1:29 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Why don't you email (b)(6) (b)(5)
(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 1:26 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 1:06 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; H_CCU
<H_CCU@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

OK, standing down.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 12:51 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; H_CCU <H_CCU@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
(b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

This letter has been re-assigned (b)(5) Thanks.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 12:17 PM
To: H_CCU <H_CCU@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J. (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
<(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(6) for (b)(5)

Thanks everyone,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Officer
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW; Suite 3880
Washington, DC 20520
Office: (b)(6)
OES

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 11:07 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks Chris. We're working on a similar letter from Senators Johnson and Scott. (b)(6) will send it to this group for clearance once it's ready. Best - (b)(6)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On June 11, 2021 at 11:04:17 AM EDT, Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:
 There was a lack of hands shooting up, (b)(5) My team sent me a draft; I'll get it out to everyone for review shortly.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6) who are also tracking.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:47 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Hi - I don't have strong feelings about who should be responsible for drafting the response, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6) who is tracking a number of letters that we're just becoming aware of from some time ago.

Best - (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:29 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (h)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:08 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)
(h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(h)(6)@state.gov; (h)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

Thanks (b)(6) Yes,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Happy to chat

further about it.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:48 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:45 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:40 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6) - thanks for flagging this. I'm not 100% certain who (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:53 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Chris - (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(6)
Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:41 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Fw: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks for the call (b)(6) Attaching letter here.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 10:04 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks (b)(6)

Adding (b)(6) (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 9:23 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

Yes of course, here it is. Thank you so much for your help!

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 4:54 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

(b)(6)

I haven't seen this letter. Can you please send it to this group so we can see whether we agree that (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Officer
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW; Suite 3880

Washington, DC 20520

(b)(6)

OES

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 10:58 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; OES-H <OES-H@state.gov>; OES-Staffers-DG <OES-Staffers-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; H_CCU <H_CCU@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter

Hello (b)(6) and welcome to H!

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 10:18 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Tasking a letter

Hi (b)(6)

I am a new addition to H, and (b)(6) suggested I reach out to you to get a response to the attached letter tasked. At (b)(6) request, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5) Would you be the appropriate person to create this tasking?

Thanks for your help and guidance as I figure things out here!

(b)(6)

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572828

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 15:06:22 +0000

Thank you so much!

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 11:04 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

There was a lack of hands shooting up (b)(5) My team sent me a draft; I'll get it out to everyone for review shortly.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6) who are also tracking.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:47 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Hi - I don't have strong feelings about who should be responsible for drafting the response, (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

(b)(6) who is tracking a number of letters that we're just becoming aware of from some time ago.

Best (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:29 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:08 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

Thanks (b)(6). Yes, (b)(5)

(b)(5) Happy to chat further about it.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:48 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS <SCRHS@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:45 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; SCRHS

<SCRHS@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:40 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6) - thanks for flagging this. I'm not 100% certain who (b)(5)
(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:53 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Chris - (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:41 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks for the call (b)(6) Attaching letter here.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 10:04 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks (b)(6)

Adding (b)(6) in (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 9:23 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

Yes of course, here it is. Thank you so much for your help!

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 4:54 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

(b)(6)

I haven't seen this letter. Can you please send it to this group so we can see whether we agree that (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Officer
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW; Suite 3880
Washington, DC 20520

(b)(6)

OES

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 10:58 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; OES-H
<OES-H@state.gov>; OES-Staffers-DG <OES-Staffers-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; H_CCU <H_CCU@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Tasking a letter

Hello (b)(6) and welcome to H!

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 10:18 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Tasking a letter

Hi (b)(6)

I am a new addition to H, and (b)(6) (b)(5)
attached letter tasked. At (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5) Would you be the appropriate
person to create this tasking?

Thanks for your help and guidance as I figure things out here!

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>;
[redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Re: short fuse (2:30): (b)(5)

Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 22:40:35 +0000

Thanks, (b)(6) - this version takes account of my recommendations. Personally, I think that after this past weekend (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 2:56:29 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: short fuse (2:30) (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Clear with changes in a couple of places in the attached. Copying Chris Park as I wanted his reaction.

(b)(5)

Thanks. (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 04, 2020 2:03 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Re: short fuse (2:30): (b)(5)

(b)(6) needs to clear it widely in the agency, but the deadline was pushed up from COB to 2:30 today.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 1:57 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

Subject: RE: short fuse (2:30): (b)(5)

(b)(6) have a 2pm call and can review it after that. On question for now (b)(5)

(b)(5) Thanks. (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 04, 2020 1:27 PM
To: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>
Subject: short fuse (2:30): (b)(5)

Apologies for the short fuse, but we were tasked with a letter from (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

This is due at 2:30 p.m., so if you have any input you can provide before then, I'll plug it in.

Thanks!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 1:10 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: clearance (1 p.m. today): (b)(5)

I just reviewed the revised version. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Thanks

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 12:56 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: clearance (1 p.m. today): (b)(5)

I reviewed it and included comments this morning. See my other email to that effect. Thanks

Sent from my iPhone

On May 4, 2020, at 12:55 PM, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Please note that the deadline for this (b)(5) has shifted up to 14:30 today. I would greatly appreciate your clearance before then. Thank you!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 12:36 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: clearance (1 p.m. today); (b)(5)

Thanks (b)(6) (b)(5)
 (b)(5)
 (b)(5) Please let me know if that addresses your questions/comments and I can mark you as clearing.

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 11:56 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: clearance (1 p.m. today); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Just flagging I reviewed and added comments/questions in the text.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On May 4, 2020, at 8:39 AM, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

Good morning, colleagues,

(b)(5)

x] (b)(5)
x] (b)(5)

I would greatly appreciate your clearance by 1 p.m. today.

Warm regards,

(b)(6)

Economic Unit Chief, EAP/CM

Economic Unit: EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov

Personal: (b)(6)@state.gov

Mobile: (b)(6)

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: Ford, Christopher A (h)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: SBU Timeline v7/ origins investigation

Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 17:27:13 +0000

Sir – did they send you a copy of or a link to this timeline?

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 10:46 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: SBU Timeline v7/ origins investigation

(b)(6)nd Tom:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Tom (b)(6)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, January 3, 2021 6:31 PM

To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: SBU Timeline v7/ origins investigation

Chris,

(b)(5)

Happy New Year!

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Lot to discuss at the Hudson Institute after this administration ends....

https://twitter.com/g_translators6/status/1345515712593457153?s=24



秘密翻译组 on Twitter

"CCP's military expert CHEN Hu, publicly discussed the CCP's bioweapon plan in 2016 in a Southeast China Military Watch show on Southeast Cable TV, but the Western world has been ignoring the fact either because they're naive or ignorant or profit-driven, this is a ... (1/2) <https://t.co/ogXjPuvXIR>"

twitter.com

<https://www.zerohedge.com/covid-19/top-us-official-says-growing-body-evidence-shows-covid-19-leaked-chinese-lab>



Top US Official Says
'Growing Body Of Evidence'
Shows COVID-19 Leaked
From Chinese Lab |
ZeroHedge

The most 'credible' theory about the origin of COVID-19 is that it escaped from a Chinese laboratory, according to US National Security Adviser Matthew Pottinger, who made the comment during a Zoom meeting with UK officials. "There is a growing body of evidence that the lab is likely the most credible source of the virus," said Pottinger, referring to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, according ...

www.zerohedge.com

Attached is a link to the latest version of the SBU timeline. So far I have been unable to attach the file. The best I can do from on the road is to provide a link to it. Recommend you save a copy to your computer/cloud storage in order to work with the file.

Changes since last version:

- Added the 239 new entries to bring the total to 845
- Added "Lab origin cover-up" and "Failed to follow IHR 6" breakout worksheet timelines

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, January 2, 2021 4:43 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Additional unclassified timeline entries

(b)(6)

For your reading pleasure, I have created 239 additional unclassified, tagged, and sourced timeline entries based on CRS, AP, NYT, and other reporting (see attached). Like before, I have broken out some of the entries by category and placed them in additional worksheets to the right of the first/master worksheet. I also created two new categories, "Failed to follow IHR 6" and "Cover-up". When combined with the master timeline some entries will be redundant, but they serve to provide additional sources and sometimes additional context.

I will add these new entries to the master U-SBU timeline and send it to you as a new version 7.

Best,

(b)(6)

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: SBU COVID Timeline v06
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 14:36:35 +0000

Thanks, (b)(6) Great work - very helpful.

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, December 28, 2020 7:01 PM

To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: SBU COVID Timeline v06

Attached FYI: (b)(5)

(b)(5)

VR (b)(6)

PS: As of tomorrow, I will only be reachable via this email and my cell (b)(6) until the 6th.

(b)(6)

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
US Department of State

(b)(6)

NSTS: (b)(6) (NSTS)

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

To: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 16:43:43 +0000

Thanks, Stilly.

Speaking of quack, I named my first boat (bought the day after I got tenure, which is long time ago) was Moby Duck.

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) mobile)

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 12:34 PM

To: Yu, Miles

Subject: RE: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

Impressive! It quacks like a duck. . .

-----Original Message-----

From: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 2:01 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Kenna, Lisa D <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

(b)(6) et al,

Here is something for the Secretary. Sorry for being a bit late. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Very respectfully

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)
(mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 5:49 PM
To: Stilwell, David R
Cc: Kenna, Lisa D; (b)(6) (S); Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard L
Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

Thanks for this (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Thanks.

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 25, 2020, at 4:45 PM, Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 4:29 PM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

Dave,

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant
Office of the Secretary of State

From: Stilwell, David R. <(b)(6)@state.gov><mailto:StilwellDR@state.gov>>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 11:33 AM
To: Kenna, Lisa D.; (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) (S); Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard L
Subject: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(E)

SARS escaped Beijing lab twice

Laboratory safety at the Chinese Institute of Virology under close scrutiny Robert
Walgate(walgate@scienceanalysed.com<mailto:walgate@scienceanalysed.com>)

Apr 25, 2004

262

The latest outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in China, with eight confirmed or suspected cases so far and hundreds quarantined, involves two researchers who were working with the virus in a Beijing research lab, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Monday (April 26).

"We suspect two people, a 26-year-old female postgraduate student and a 31-year-old male postdoc, were both infected, apparently in two separate incidents," Bob Dietz, WHO spokesman in Beijing, told The Scientist.

The woman was admitted to hospital on April 4, but the man apparently became infected independently 2 weeks later, being hospitalized on April 17. Both worked at the Chinese Institute of Virology in Beijing, part of China's Center for Disease Control.

At a news conference in Manila this morning, Associated Press reported, WHO Western Pacific Regional Director Shigeru Omi criticized the laboratory's safeguards and said the authorities did not know yet whether any foreigners had been carrying out medical research in the facility and had since left the country. Laboratory safety "is a serious issue that has to be addressed," he said. "We have to remain very vigilant."

China has level three research guidelines and rules in place for handling the SARS virus, which are "of acceptable quality" to WHO, Dietz told The Scientist. But "it's a question of procedures and equipment. Frankly we are going to go in now and take a very close look," he said.

"We have a team of two or three international experts that's arriving in a day or two. They are going to go into the labs with Ministry of Health people and find out what happened here," Dietz said.

"We've been told we'll have full access, be able to test all the surfaces, interview people who worked there, and look at documentation to find out what was being done," Dietz said. "We're not releasing the names of the experts yet, but once you see the names you'll recognize them. They will be international experts from the relevant disciplines."

In the meantime, the lab has been closed, and the 200 staff have been put in isolation in a hotel near another lab in Cham Ping, about 20 kilometers North of Beijing. China is rushing its own investigative teams to check lab security, according to state media.

Antoine Danchin, an epidemiologist with the Hong Kong University–Pasteur Research Center, who studied the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, told The Scientist the latest incidents were probably the result of lab accidents.

"Normally, it's not possible to contaminate people even under level two confinement, if the security rules are obeyed, with the appropriate hoods, and so on," Danchin said. SARS work requires level three. "So it suggests there has been some mishandling of something."

"The lab might have all the right rules, but the people may not comply! For example, notebooks are not supposed to be taken out, a lot of things like that. A virus doesn't jump on people!"

Danchin said. However WHO Beijing is relatively sanguine about the current threat, despite the fact that the 26-year-old infected had taken a long journey on the country's rail network. The index cases are known, and contacts had been traced, Dietz said. "We see no significant public health threat at this point."

David R. Stilwell

Ass't Secretary East Asia Pacific

(b)(6)

<WHO & SARS.pdf>

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
CC: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: S Testimony to SFRC - ISN Highlights
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 20:29:05 +0000

[redacted] (b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 12:40 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: S Testimony to SFRC - ISN Highlights

[redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 12:03 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: S Testimony to SFRC - ISN Highlights

[redacted] (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 11:47 AM

To: ISN-Office-Directors-&-Deputies-DL <ISN-Office-Directors--Deputies-DL@state.gov>; ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-CPA-DL <ISN-CPA-DL@state.gov>

Subject: S Testimony to SFRC - ISN Highlights

Good afternoon ISN colleagues.

(b)(5)

I am happy to answer any questions.

Highlights below:

Ukraine

- Chairman Menendez asked about US support aligning with requests from President Zelenskyy - S confirmed that USG is focused on provision of equipment and other assistance to GOU. S also confirmed that a supplemental request for Ukraine should be expected shortly
- Chairman Menendez asked about allied support for sanctions on Russia - S discussed the coordination with allies and partners on sanctions and other costs imposed on Russia
- Senator Johnson asked about Chinese support for Russia in Ukraine, and specifically asked about whether Russia is using Chinese Drones. S stated that he could go into more detail in a classified setting, but that the administration is not seeing significant support from China to Russia

Iran / JCPOA

- S committed to holding an open hearing on Iran before the Memorial Day recess
- Chairman Menendez pressed S on diminishing benefits of a return to compliance as time continues to pass. He mentioned Iran's ballistic missile program, destabilizing activities in the region, and its fissile material capabilities. Ranking Member Risch echoed Chairman Menendez's points, and emphasized that Israel has publicly stated that they will act in their national interest and not allow Iran to complete a nuclear weapon. Ranking Member Risch urged the administration to focus on Iran's malicious activities
- Senator Romney stated his agreement with Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch, and encouraged the administration to bring any agreement before Congress for an up or down vote
- Senators Murphy and Markey stated their support for negotiations and an eventual agreement with Iran

- Senator Cruz discussed his opposition to an agreement with Iran
- Senator Young said he was disappointed with the administration's level of communication as it relates to negotiations with Iran, and asked S to commit to making Special Envoy Malley available to appear before the committee. S said that he will continue to ensure S/E Malley is engaged with Congress and this would likely have to happen in a closed session. Senator Young also asked about the designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and whether that will be lifted in the event of an agreement. S responded that the only way it could be lifted is if Iran takes and sustains certain actions

Other

- Chairman Menendez asked for clarity on whether the administration will waive CAATSA sanctions for India's purchase of S-400 systems in his opening statement. He raised the issue again in his final round of questions and stated his desire to see the administration be more forceful in its condemnations of allies purchasing S-400s and Russian oil in violation of sanctions
- Senator Murphy asked about a proposal in the FY23 budget request to de-link human rights conditions from military aid to Egypt. S responded that Egypt is a vital partner for the US, but at the same time human rights concerns are still a central part of the administration's approach to Egypt; he pointed to a reprogramming of some foreign military financing last year because Egypt did not meet stated objectives in making progress on human rights.
- Senator Barrasso said it is dangerous to rely on Russia for energy resources, and specifically mentioned uranium
- Senator Johnson asked about a State Department report from April 2018 after an inspection of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and S said he would follow up

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Congressional Affairs Specialist
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
Email: (b)(6)@state.gov
Mobile: (b)(6)
Office: (b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;

FL-2022-00076

A-00000573001

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
[REDACTED] (h)(6) @state.gov>

From: "Stilwell, David R" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: S remarks
Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 01:09:45 +0000

Martha; she showed the POTUS comment and boxed him in. If S downplayed POTUS' characterization, then they'd go after POTUS. What ever happened to professional journalism?

-----Original Message-----

From: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:49 PM
To: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: S remarks

Set up by whom?

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(mobile)

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:20 PM
To: (b)(6) Ortagus, Morgan D; Yu, Miles
Cc: Buangan, Richard L
Subject: FW: S remarks

You can see he got set up:

Later, the President was asked if he had seen anything that gave him high confidence that the Wuhan lab was the origin of the virus. Let's listen:

QUESTION: "Have you seen anything at this point that gives you a high degree of confidence that the Wuhan Institute of Virology was the origin of this virus?"

PRESIDENT TRUMP: "Yes, I have. Yes, I have."

QUESTION: "What gives you a high degree of confidence that this originated from the Wuhan Institute of Virology?"

PRESIDENT TRUMP: "I can't tell you that. I'm not allowed to tell you that."

And Mr. Secretary, have you seen anything that gives you high confidence that it originated in that Wuhan lab?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Martha, there is enormous evidence that that's where this began.

We've said from the beginning that this was a virus that originated in Wuhan, China. We took a lot of grief for that from the outside, but I think the whole world can see now

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 5:33 PM

To: Stilwell, David R [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: Buangan, Richard L [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: Fw: S remarks

Sir,

Please see this very useful compilation of S statements on the Wuhan lab [REDACTED] (b)(6) pulled together.

thanks,

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Sender: "Stilwell, David R" [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Recipient: Yu, Miles <[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: response from CDC/NIH
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2020 16:46:24 +0000

(b)(5)

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2020 6:41 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: response from CDC/NIH

Helpful thank you

On December 11, 2020 at 6:13:20 PM EST, [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov> wrote:

There may be more from CDC on Monday, but here a few more updates (sorry for caps—they were sending from phone):

[redacted (b)(5)]

From: [redacted (b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2020 4:30 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>
Cc: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>
Subject: RE: response from CDC/NIH

Just wanted to flag that CDC colleagues are still working on my follow on questions that includes the below article.

[redacted (b)(5)]

From: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2020 8:40 PM
To: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>; [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: response from CDC

(b)(5)

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/world/who-china-coronavirus.html>

In Washington, the American health secretary, Alex M. Azar II, gathered advisers inside a conference room of the Department of Health and Human Services to hear from **two government scientists who had participated in the W.H.O. mission to China.**

The scientists, still in quarantine, described by videoconference the seemingly unimaginable lockdown that China had imposed. When questions turned to the origins of the virus, however, answers stopped. “You’d have to look at the terms of reference,” one of the scientists replied, a senior American health official recalled. The “terms of reference” was a document spelling out the mission’s rules. The Americans had never seen it.

The health organization’s public statements suggested that the animal-source investigation was well underway.

If that was true, the Americans realized that they were on the outside, **blocked from the investigation by China.**

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2020 6:37 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: response from CDC

Here's the response I received from CDC (and will pass NIH's response once I get it):

(b)(5)

Please let me know if you have further follow up questions.

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

PHI Global Health Fellow | Center for Global Health
Office of the Associate Director for Policy
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road, NE, Atlanta, GA 30333
(b)(6)@cdc.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, December 9, 2020 9:27 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: NYT 7 Feb: C.D.C. and W.H.O. Offers to Help China Have Been Ignored for Weeks

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/health/cdc-coronavirus-china.html>



C.D.C. and W.H.O. Offers to Help China Have Been Ignored for Weeks - The New York Times

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the W.H.O.'s director general, praised President Xi Jinping and the country's response, saying China would accept a

team of experts.

www.nytimes.com

By Donald G. McNeil Jr. and Zolan Kanno-Youngs

- Feb. 7, 2020

For more than a month, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has been offering to send a team of experts to China to observe its coronavirus outbreak and help if it can.

Normally, teams from the agency's Epidemic Intelligence Service can be in the air within 24 hours.

But no invitation has come — and no one can publicly explain why.

The World Health Organization, which made a similar offer about two weeks ago, appears to be facing the same cold shoulder, though a spokeswoman said it is just "sorting out arrangements." Current and former public health officials and diplomats, speaking anonymously for fear of upsetting diplomatic relations, said they believe the reluctance comes from China's top leaders, who do not want the world to think they need outside help.

In 2003, China was badly stung by criticism of its response to SARS, another coronavirus epidemic; it has also been embroiled in a trade war with the United States for more than a year. Some experts also say that outsiders could discover aspects of the outbreak that are embarrassing to China: for example, the country has not revealed how many of its doctors and nurses have died fighting the disease.

But China does need help, experts argue.

In private phone calls and texts, some Chinese colleagues have indicated that they are overwhelmed and would welcome not just extra hands, but specialized expertise in a couple of fields.

Also, C.D.C. officials have said that they hope to learn more about the new coronavirus from their Chinese counterparts to improve the American response if the virus starts to spread widely here.

On Friday, Alex M. Azar II, secretary of health and human services, said at a news briefing that he had recently reiterated the offer of a team to his Chinese counterpart, Dr. Ma Xiaowei.

Asked what the holdup was, he answered:

From: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted]@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, December 9, 2020 7:54 PM

To: [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]

[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>

Cc: [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]

[redacted]@state.gov>; [redacted]@state.gov>

Subject: Re:

Forgot [redacted]

On December 9, 2020 at 7:52:01 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6) @state.gov> wrote:

All

(b)(5)

Thank you
TD

Sender: (b)(6) @state.gov>
DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
(h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2021 18:50:04 +0000

I don't know since I haven't checked JWICS since last Thursday and they would only respond on that system

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, January 3, 2021 12:21 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(State only.) (b)(5)

--
David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)
(b)(6)@state.gov

On December 26, 2020 at 4:32:22 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(6)
(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

<https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2018/06/if-misused-synthetic-biology-could-expand-the-possibility-of-creating-new-weapons-dod-should-continue-to-monitor-advances-in-the-field-new-report-says>



[If Misused, Synthetic Biology Could Expand the Possibility of Creating New Weapons - DOD Should Continue to Monitor Advances in the Field, New Report Says | National Academies](#)

Synthetic biology expands the possibilities for creating new weapons — including making existing bacteria and viruses more harmful — while decreasing the time required to engineer such organisms, concludes a new report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

www.nationalacademies.org

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 3:07 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@lnl.gov (b)(6) (b)(6)@lnl.gov (b)(6)>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:50 PM

To: (b)(6)@ltnl.gov (b)(6) (b)(6)@ltnl.gov (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:49 PM

To: (b)(6)@lfl.gov (b)(6) (b)(6)@lfl.gov (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

<https://jonathanlatham.net/a-proposed-origin-for-sars-cov-2-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/>

A Proposed Origin for SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 Pandemic – Jonathan Latham

by Jonathan Latham, PhD and Allison Wilson, PhD. In all the discussions of the origin of the

COVID-19 pandemic, enormous scientific attention has been paid to the molecular character of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including its novel genome sequence in comparison with its near relatives.

jonathanlatham.net

Engineered COVID-19-Infected Mouse Bites Researcher Amid 'Explosion' Of Risky Coronavirus Research

August 23, 2020

By

jrj

in [Uncategorized](#)

[1 Comment](#)

by Jonathan Latham, PhD

University researchers genetically engineer a human pandemic virus. They inject the new virus into a laboratory mouse. The infected mouse then bites a researcher.....It is a plot worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster about risky coronavirus research.

But according to [newly obtained minutes of the Institutional Biosafety Committee \(IBC\)](#) of the University of North Carolina (UNC), Chapel Hill, these exact events need not be imagined. They occurred for real between April 1st and May 6th this year.

The identity of the bitten coronavirus researcher has not been revealed except that they were working in a high security BSL-3 virus lab when the accident happened.

According to [Richard Ebright](#), an epidemiologist from Rutgers University, the UNC incident underscores an important development in virus research since the pandemic began:

“There has been an explosion of research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 over the last six months. Research with infectious SARS-CoV-2 now is occurring in every, or almost every, BSL-3 facility in the US and overseas.”

This strong upsurge is affirmed by Edward Hammond of Prickly Research, Austin, TX, former Director of the Sunshine Project, an NGO that tracked the post 9/11 expansion of the US Biodefense program.

“It is evident that swarms of academic researchers with little prior experience with coronaviruses have leapt into the field in recent months.”

For Hammond, this explosion represents a hazard:

“We need to be clear headed about the risk. The first SARS virus was a notorious source of laboratory-acquired infections and there is a very real risk that modified forms of SARS-CoV-2 could infect researchers, especially inexperienced researchers, with unpredictable and potentially quite dangerous results. The biggest risk is the creation and accidental release of a novel form of SARS-CoV-2 — a variant whose altered characteristics might undermine global efforts to stop the pandemic by evading the approaches being taken to find COVID vaccines and treatments.”

And, continues Hammond: “Each additional lab that experiments with CoV-2 amplifies the risk.”

Richard Ebright concurs, telling *Independent Science News* in an email that this research is:

“in many cases being performed by researchers who have no prior experience in BSL-3 operations and pathogens research, and who therefore pose elevated risk of laboratory accidents with BSL-3 pathogens.”

Ebright is also concerned that some influential experimenters are now calling for reduced oversight :

“The UNC incident also underscores that calls by some, notably Columbia University virologist Vincent Racaniello (Podcast at 01:35mins onwards), to allow virus-culture and virus-production research with fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 at BSL-2 are egregiously irresponsible and absolutely unacceptable.”

Other researchers are also calling for restraint. In a paper titled “Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus”, researchers from China and the US critiqued the synthesis in February of a full length infectious clone (Gao et al., 2020; Thao et al., 2020). And, in concluding, these researchers asked a question that is even more pertinent now than then “Once the risks [of a lab escape] become a reality, who or which organization should take responsibility for them?”

Lack of transparency

The accident at the University of North Carolina (UNC) is now in the public domain but only thanks to a FOIA request submitted by Hammond (in line with NIH guidelines) and shared with *Independent Science News*.


Despite the FOIA request, apart from the fact that UNC classified it as an official "Reportable Incident", i.e. that must be reported to National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Washington DC, scarcely any information about the accident is available.

In part this is because the minutes of the relevant IBC meeting (May 6th, 2020, p109) are extremely brief. They do not provide any details of the fate of the bitten researcher. Nor do they state, for example, whether the researcher developed an active infection, nor whether they developed symptoms, nor if they transmitted the recombinant virus to anyone else. Neither do they reveal what kind of recombinant virus was being used or the purpose of the experiment.

To try to learn more, *Independent Science News* emailed the lab of Ralph Baric at UNC, which, based on their research history is the most likely coronavirus research group involved (Roberts et al., 2007; Menachery et al., 2015), the University Biosafety Officer, and UNC Media relations.

Only the latter replied:

"The April 2020 incident referred to in the University Institutional Biosafety Committee meeting minutes involved a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV-2 strain used in the development of a mouse model system."



Ralph Baric UNC Gillings School of Public Health-web
UNC media relations also told *Independent Science News* that:

"The researcher did not develop any symptoms and no infection occurred as a result of the incident."


Our questions in full and the full UNC reply are [available here](#).

Redactions of Biosafety Committee discussions

The second reason for this lack of information is that the UNC redacted the names of Principal Investigators (PIs) whose research required biosafety scrutiny, along with many of the experimental specifics.

Nevertheless, unredacted parts of minutes from IBC meetings held in 2020 contain descriptions of experiments that potentially encompass the accident. They include:

Application 75223:




UNC Inst Biosafety Committee Application 75223

("a full-length infectious clone" refers to a viable DNA copy of the coronavirus, which is ordinarily an RNA virus)


and

Application 73790:



UNC Inst Biosafety Committee Application 73790
and

Application 74962:



UNC Inst Biosafety Committee Application 74962

In all, any one of eight sets of different experiments approved by the UNC Chapel Hill IBC in 2020 proposed infecting mice with live infectious and mutant SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses under BSL-3 conditions and therefore could have led to the accident.

The thorny issue of transparency

According to Hammond the lack of transparency represented by the sparse minutes and especially the redactions represent a violation of science's social contract:

"At the dawn of recombinant DNA, at the request of the scientific community itself, following the fabled Asilomar conference, the United States government took the position of not regulating genetic engineering in the lab. The "deal" that big science struck with the

government was that, in return for not being directly regulated, principal investigators would take personal responsibility for lab biosafety, involve the public in decision-making, and accept public accountability for their actions.

The NIH Guidelines and Institutional Biosafety Committee system of “self-regulation” by researchers is founded upon the principal of personal responsibility of PIs and the promise of transparency. The redaction of the researchers’ identities from IBC meeting minutes, in order to hide the activities of researchers and avoid accountability for accidents, fundamentally contradicts the core principles of the US oversight system and violates the commitments that science made.”

Richard Ebright goes further:

“There is no justification for UNC’s redaction of the names of the laboratory heads and the identities of pathogens. UNC’s redactions violate conditions UNC agreed to in exchange for NIH funding of UNC’s research and, if not corrected, should result in the termination of current NIH funding, and the loss of eligibility for future NIH funding, of UNC’s research.”

Are universities doing too many risky experiments on coronaviruses?

The second concern of researchers contacted by *Independent Science News* is that unnecessary and dangerous experiments will be conducted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Richard Ebright:


“The UNC incident shows that serious laboratory accidents with SARS-CoV-2 can occur even in a lab having extremely extensive experience in BSL-3 operations and unmatched expertise in coronavirus research, and underscores the risks associated with uncontrolled proliferation of research on SARS-CoV-2, especially for labs lacking prior experience in BSL-3 operations and coronavirus research.”

For this reason Ebright argues that:

“It is essential that a national needs-assessment and biosafety assessment be performed for research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2. It also is essential that a risk-benefit review be performed before approving research projects involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2—something that currently does not occur—to ensure that potential benefits to the public outweigh the real risks to laboratory workers and the public.”

This concern over risks and benefits is shared by Edward Hammond. Using FOIA again he has further discovered that researchers at the University of Pittsburgh (whose identity is redacted) plan to make what Hammond calls Corona-thrax.

In short, according to its Institutional Biosafety Committee, Pittsburgh researchers intend put the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 (which allows the virus to gain entry into human cells) into *Bacillus anthracis* which is the causative agent of anthrax.



U

Pittsburgh Inst Biosafety Committee minutes June 2020

The anthrax strain proposed to be used for this experiment is “disarmed” but, Hammond agrees with Gao et al., (2020) that the balance of risks and benefits appears not to be receiving adequate consideration.

This experiment was nevertheless approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee of the University of Pittsburgh. But by redacting the name of the laboratory from the minutes and also every name of the members of the committee which approved it, the University has supplied

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Reframing the China cable
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 20:43:46 +0000

Boss:

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

AVC Bureau
Department of State
(b)(6) office
cell

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 2:00 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Reframing the China cable

FYI

From: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 3:53 PM

To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ruggiero, Anthony J. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Reframing the China cable

Gents:

(b)(5)

Best,

-- Chris

The Hon. Christopher A. Ford

Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation

Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security ("T")

U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C.

United States of America

Tel. (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov



Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

To: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: recap of our conversation

Date: Sat, 25 Apr 2020 15:22:29 +0000

(b)(5)

How does this sound?

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(mobile)

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 11:14 AM

To: Yu, Miles; (b)(6) (S)

Subject: RE: recap of our conversation

(b)(5)

From: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 10:36 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: recap of our conversation

FYI.

(b)(5)

[state seal]

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "(b)(6)@UTMB.EDU<mailto:ksplante@UTMB.EDU>>

Date: April 24, 2020 at 8:12:54 PM EDT

To: "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov<mailto:(b)(6)>

Subject: Re: recap of our conversation

Hello Dr. Yu,

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses
Department of Microbiology and Immunology
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd. Rte. 0609
Galveston, TX 77555

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(E)

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov<mailto:(b)(6)>

Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 5:19 PM

To: (b)(6)@UTMB.EDU<mailto:(b)(6)>

Subject: recap of our conversation

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Very respectfully

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)
(mobile)

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: Readout from INR Analytical Meeting on COVID-19
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2020 21:51:41 +0000

(b)(6) summary is perfectly accurate. By way of color commentary, I would add the following:

(b)(5)

CJP

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, March 28, 2020 5:20 PM
To: Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Readout from INR Analytical Meeting on COVID-19

All –

Please find a readout of Thursday's INR analytical meeting on the origins of COVID-19 below. I am happy to provide more extensive information and commentary if anyone is interested.

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Program Advisor | (b)(6)

Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

Mobile/Telework: (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Dolliff, Phillip R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>;

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572737

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: "Ford, Christopher A" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 14:18:53 +0000

Yep

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 9:18 AM
To: Ford, Christopher A
Subject: RE: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR

Oh boy.

From: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 8:49 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR

Quite possibly; copying the scheduling team.

But please remind Tom that it has been several days since I asked to talk to him on another topic and he has not bothered to reply.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 8:37 AM
To: Ford, Christopher A
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Wuhan-COVID-10-BWC-CR

Hi Dr. Ford,

SBO DiNanno is not in the office, but in the interest of time, he wanted us to reach out to you to provide you with (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Would you have any time today to talk with us?

We'd greatly appreciate it.

Thank you!

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

Chief of Staff
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
HST Room 5950

Office: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov
ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

Sender: "Ford, Christopher A" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: Re: Tasking List for April 14, 2020

Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 13:28:07 +0000

(b)(5)

Given Go's oxymoronic behavior, is anyone in BPS slated to be in the office this week? If not, I'll try to pull them up next time I'm in the office. Though (b)(6) may already have them handy.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:24 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: Re: Tasking List for April 14, 2020

Thoughts?

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:20 AM

To: ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL <ISN-CTR-BioSecurity-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-RA-East Asia Team-DL <ISN-RA-EastAsiaTeam-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-SCO-DL <ISN-SPC-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: Re: Tasking List for April 14, 2020

All: See here (b)(5) Let me know if you guys are fine with this or if you would like to offer points to their no comment response. Will circle back as soon as I get the PG.

(b)(6)

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Date: April 14, 2020 at 8:15:09 AM CDT

Subject: Re: Tasking List for April 14, 2020

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>,EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

Good morning (b)(6)

For the Post story, the lines will likely be (b)(5)

(b)(5) Let me know if you have concerns, I'll save your inbox from those emails unless we go in a different direction.

We will let you know about the (b)(5)

Best,
(b)(6)

EAP Press
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:28 AM
To: EAP-Press <EAP-Press@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Tasking List for April 14, 2020

Good morning EAP press,

Appreciate the chance to see the points generated for the taskings below.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5) Per today's Wash Post, can State confirm the existence of cables highlighting concerns about procedures at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab? Does the USG see any link between the labs research and safety protocols, and the emergence of Wuhan as the epicenter of the COVID-19 virus?

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

----- Forwarded message -----
From: (b)(6)
Date: April 14, 2020 at 6:32:57 AM CDT
Subject: Tasking List for April 14, 2020
To: PAO Group <PAOGroup2@state.gov>

Good Morning,

Out of an abundance of caution and to practice social distancing during the coronavirus outbreak, we will be holding guidance collection with the option to dial-in remotely until further notice.

You are welcome to brief in person if you would like (room 6837); however, if you prefer to call in, please use the following:

**** NEW CALL-IN INFORMATION **** *UBER Conference Line: 571-410-2637*

There is no access code required.

To make this work, we ask you to please join the call promptly at your assigned time per the below time list, and please submit all draft or final press guidance to GuidanceCollection@state.gov no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of guidance collection (by 10:00 am today).

For those using O365, please note that access to the POA checklist and GPA templates can be found

(b)(7)(E)

Briefing times are as follows:

10:30 IO/AF
10:40 EUR
10:50 SCA
11:00 WHA
11:10 NEA/SIAG
11:20 EAP
11:30 CA/OES/CGRCU

We will do our best to inform you if your briefing time has been delayed. For bureaus not listed on the schedule above, please let us know if you have an issue to brief.

Format: The current template for guidance is on our PA Sharepoint site

at (b)(7)(E)

The guidance template has two parts. For the Spokesperson's Book, submit guidance with BLUF, any S or senior official quotes relevant to the topic, and topline points. This should not exceed two pages. For press guidance for the Final Package, please follow the template -- including BLUF, quotes, topline points, as well as Q&A, and background as needed. If you think SPOX would benefit from extended background on the topic, you can bring the expanded guidance for her to read (not for book). Font size: Please use Times New Roman 20 point and 1.5 spacing when submitting guidance for the Book. Reduce to 14 point when sending electronic guidance for inclusion in the Final Package.

Draft guidance: Send electronic copies of all draft guidance you brief to PAPressDuty@state.gov to help us track issues and plan for the Final Package. Indicate Draft guidance in subject line. Final Guidance package: The Press Office will send out a Final Guidance package every weekday, there is no change to this process. Final guidance for inclusion in package for that day, should always be submitted to PAPressDuty@state.gov clearly labeled as FINAL FOR PACKAGE before 4:00 p.m. The formatting for guidance documents has not changed.

The Press Office will send out a Final Guidance package every weekday. Final guidance for inclusion in the package should be submitted to PAPressDuty@state.gov before 4:00 pm. The current template for guidance is on our PA Sharepoint site

at (b)(7)(E)

Please note COVID-19 tasking section below. These are representative queries received by the Press Office for which we don't yet have cleared lines. We will continue to synthesize these incoming queries and put them out in the daily tasking list going forward. Bureaus should please draft and clear the COVID guidance as you would other guidance. We will include all fully cleared FINALS that you send us in the day's package.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

COVID-19

(b)(5) Per today's Wash Post, can State confirm the existence of cables highlighting concerns about procedures at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab? Does the USG see any link between the labs research and safety protocols, and the emergence of Wuhan as the epicenter of the COVID-19 virus?

(b)(5)

No Taskings

(b)(5) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

No Taskings

(b)(5) What is the US reaction the Tripoli government's rejection of talks and its renewed offensive?

(b)(5)

No Taskings

(b)(5)

No Taskings

MISC

No Taskings

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Re: Task Force

Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 20:01:57 +0000

(b)(5)

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 8:16 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Re: Task Force

(b)(6)

Prepare under my name - (b)(5)

On November 15, 2020 at 9:14:05 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Where do we stand on sending up this memo? (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 12:41 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Re: Task Force

Recommendation

(b)(5)

Background

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 9:09 AM

To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: Re: Task Force

[redacted] (b)(6)

Please review/edit as soon as possible.

Thank you!

[redacted] (b)(6)



(b)(6)

Chief of Staff
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
HST Room 5950

Office: (b)(6)
Cell:

OpenNet: (b)(6)@state.gov
ClassNet: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>

To: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted (h)(6)]@state.gov>

CC: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>

Subject: RE: RE: [redacted (b)(6)] summary of post cables/Nature Medicine re COVID19

Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 22:43:54 +0000

Tom—

Lot was said last Thursday that also included cheap shots directed at me, which were also disappointing. However, I left that meeting with the understanding of two things of me:

[redacted (b)(5)]

I have done so and circulated to the group the unclassified version.

On Livermore, the key phrase is in the first paragraph—placing equal weight on the hypothesis—they are not saying its more (or less) likely. [redacted (b)(5)]

[redacted (b)(5)]

Thanks,

[redacted (b)(6)]

From: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>

Sent: Monday, December 14, 2020 12:08 PM

To: [redacted (h)(6)]@state.gov>

Cc: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: RE: [redacted (b)(6)] summary of post cables/Nature Medicine re COVID19

[redacted (b)(6)]

This response is disappointing. If you disagree with any hypothesis presented you are welcome to present it rather than suggesting that your colleagues and superiors don't believe in science.

(b)(5)
(b)(5) A reasoned and professional debate/dissent is welcome.

Thanks

Tom

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: December 14, 2020 at 11:04:09 AM EST
Subject: RE: (b)(6) summary of post cables/Nature Medicine re COVID19
To: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>, DiNanno, Thomas G
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>

I understand that some folks here may not be interested in the science, but the attached article from Nature Medicine may be worth reviewing.

Also, <https://sciencebusiness.net/covid-19/international-news/china-was-slammed-initial-covid-19-secrecy-its-scientists-led-way>

China was slammed for initial COVID-19 secrecy, but its scientists led the way in tackling the virus
“The Chinese have been leading the way in publishing open-access evidence on case management, genomics and numerous areas of public health and epidemiology, which has been vital in informing the response in more or less every country.”

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2020 6:30 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: (b)(6) summary of post cables

Many of you may have read this article but it remains important as reminder of several inconvenient facts. Don't underestimate cognitive dissonance and wishful disbelief in science and government. The level of groupthink on the COVID19 origins issue is ridiculous. I personally pray it came straight out of Mother Nature but, thus far, have found no objective scientific analysis to explain it. So where did it

come from—how, who, and why?

(b)(5)

(b)(5)


<https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2020/09/09/alina-chan-broad-institute-coronavirus/>

RESEARCH

Could COVID-19 Have Escaped from a Lab?

The world's preeminent scientists say a theory from the Broad Institute's Alina Chan is too wild to be believed. But when the theory is about the possibility of COVID being man-made, is this science or censorship?

by ROWAN JACOBSEN, 9/9/2020, 9:29 a.m.

• 

Get a compelling long read and must-have lifestyle tips in your inbox every Sunday morning — great with coffee!

[Subscribe]




Illustration by Benjamen Purvis

In January, as she watched the news about a novel virus spreading out of control in China, Alina Chan braced for a shutdown. The molecular biologist at the Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT started stockpiling medicine and supplies. By the time March rolled around and a quarantine seemed imminent, she'd bought hundreds of dollars' worth of fillets from her favorite fishmonger in Cambridge and packed them into her freezer. Then she began to ramp down her projects in the lab, isolating her experimental cells from their cultures and freezing them in small tubes.

As prepared as she was for the shutdown, though, she found herself unprepared for the frustration of being frozen out of work. She paced the walls of her tiny apartment feeling bored and useless. Chan has been a puzzle demon since childhood, which was precisely what she loved about her work—the chance to solve fiendishly difficult problems about how viruses operate and how, through gene therapy, they could be repurposed to help cure devastating genetic diseases. Staring out her window at the eerily

quiet streets of her Inman Square neighborhood, she groaned at the thought that it could be months before she was at it again. Her mind wandered back to 2003, when she was a teenager growing up in Singapore and the first SARS virus, a close relative of this coronavirus, appeared in Asia. It hadn't been anything like this. That one had been relatively easy to corral. *How had this virus come out of nowhere and shut down the planet? Why was it so different?* she asked herself.

Then it hit her: The world's greatest puzzle was staring her in the face. Stuck at home, all she had to work with was her brain and her laptop. Maybe they were enough. Chan fired up the kettle for the first of what would become hundreds of cups of tea, stacked four boxes on her kitchen counter to raise her laptop to the proper height, pulled back her long dark hair, and began reading all of the scientific literature she could find on the coronavirus.

It wasn't long before she came across an article about the remarkable stability of the virus, whose genome had barely changed from the earliest human cases, despite trillions of replications. This perplexed Chan. Like many emerging infectious diseases, COVID-19 was thought to be zoonotic—it originated in animals, then somehow found its way into people. At the time, the Chinese government and most scientists insisted the jump had happened at Wuhan's seafood market, but that didn't make sense to Chan. If the virus had leapt from animals to humans in the market, it should have immediately started evolving to life inside its new human hosts. But it hadn't.

On a hunch, she decided to look at the literature on the 2003 SARS virus, which had jumped from civets to people. *Bingo*. A few papers mentioned its rapid evolution in its first months of existence. Chan felt the familiar surge of puzzle endorphins. The new virus really wasn't behaving like it should. Chan knew that delving further into this puzzle would require some deep genetic analysis, and she knew just the person for the task. She opened Google Chat and fired off a message to Shing Hei Zhan. He was an old friend from her days at the University of British Columbia and, more important, he was a computational god.

"Do you want to partner on a very unusual paper?" she wrote.

Sure, he replied.

One thing Chan noticed about the original SARS was that the virus in the first human cases was subtly different—a few dozen letters of genetic code—from the one in the civets. That meant it had immediately morphed. She asked Zhan to pull up the genomes for the coronaviruses that had been found on surfaces in the Wuhan seafood market. Were they at all different from the earliest documented cases in humans?

Zhan ran the analysis. Nope, they were 100 percent the same. Definitely from humans, not animals. The seafood-market theory, which Chinese health officials and the World Health Organization espoused in the early days of the pandemic, was wrong. Chan's puzzle detectors pulsed again. "Shing," she messaged Zhan, "this paper is going to be insane."

In the coming weeks, as the spring sun chased shadows across her kitchen floor, Chan stood at her counter and pounded out her paper, barely pausing to eat or sleep. It was clear that the first SARS evolved rapidly during its first three months of existence, constantly fine-tuning its ability to infect humans, and settling down only during the later stages of the epidemic. In contrast, the new virus

looked a lot more like late-stage SARS. "It's almost as if we're missing the early phase," Chan marveled to Zhan. Or, as she put it in their paper, as if "it was already well adapted for human transmission."

That was a profoundly provocative line. Chan was implying that the virus was already familiar with human physiology when it had its coming-out party in Wuhan in late 2019. If so, there were three possible explanations.

Perhaps it was just staggeringly bad luck: The mutations had all occurred in an earlier host species, and just happened to be the perfect genetic arrangement for an invasion of humanity. But that made no sense. Those mutations would have been disadvantageous in the old host.

Maybe the virus had been circulating undetected in humans for months, working out the kinks, and nobody had noticed. Also unlikely. China's health officials would not have missed it, and even if they had, they'd be able to go back now through stored samples to find the trail of earlier versions. And they weren't coming up with anything.


That left a third possibility: The missing phase had happened in a lab, where the virus had been trained on human cells. Chan knew this was the third rail of potential explanations. At the time, conspiracy theorists were spinning bioweapon fantasies, and Chan was loath to give them any ammunition. But she also didn't want to play politics by withholding her findings. Chan is in her early thirties, still at the start of her career, and an absolute idealist about the purity of the scientific process. Facts were facts.

Or at least they used to be. Since the start of the pandemic, the Trump administration has been criticized for playing fast and loose with facts—denying, exaggerating, or spinning them to suit the president's political needs. As a result, many scientists have learned to censor themselves for fear that their words will be misrepresented. Still, Chan thought, if she were to sit on scientific research just to avoid providing ammunition to conspiracy theorists or Trump, would she be any better than them?

Chan knew she had to move forward and make her findings public. In the final draft of her paper, she torpedoed the seafood-market theory, then laid out a case that the virus seemed curiously well adapted to humans. She mentioned all three possible explanations, carefully wording the third to emphasize that if the novel coronavirus did come from a lab, it would have been the result of an accident in the course of legitimate research.

On May 2, Chan uploaded the paper to a site where as-yet-unpublished biology papers known as "preprints" are shared for open peer review. She tweeted out the news and waited. On May 16, the *Daily Mail*, a British tabloid, picked up her research. The very next day, *Newsweek* ran a story with the headline "Scientists Shouldn't Rule Out Lab as Source of Coronavirus, New Study Says."

And that, Chan says, is when "shit exploded everywhere."



Alina Chan, a molecular biologist at the Broad Institute, says we can't rule out the possibility that the novel coronavirus originated in a lab—even though she knows it's a politically radioactive thing to say. / Photo by Mona Miri

Chan had come to my attention a week before the *Newsweek* story was published through her smart and straightforward tweets, which I found refreshing at a time when most scientists were avoiding any serious discussion about the possibility that COVID-19 had escaped from a biolab. I'd written a lot about genetic engineering and so-called gain-of-function research—the fascinating, if scary, line of science in which scientists alter viruses to make them more transmissible or lethal as a way of assessing how close those viruses are to causing pandemics. I also knew that deadly pathogens escape from biolabs with surprising frequency. Most of these accidents end up being harmless, but many researchers have been infected, and people have died as a result.

For years, concerned scientists have warned that this type of pathogen research was going to trigger a pandemic. Foremost among them was Harvard epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch, who founded the Cambridge Working Group in 2014 to lobby against these experiments. In a series of policy papers, op-eds, and scientific forums, he pointed out that accidents involving deadly pathogens occurred more than twice a week in U.S. labs, and estimated that just 10 labs performing gain-of-function research over a 10-year period would run a nearly 20 percent risk of an accidental release. In 2018, he argued that such a release could “lead to global spread of a virulent virus, a biosafety incident on a scale never before seen.”

Thanks in part to the Cambridge Working Group, the federal government briefly instituted a moratorium on such research. By 2017, however, the ban was lifted and U.S. labs were at it again. Today, in the United States and across the globe, there are dozens of labs conducting experiments on a daily basis with the deadliest known pathogens. One of them is the Wuhan Institute of Virology. For more than a decade, its scientists have been discovering coronaviruses in bats in southern China and bringing them back to their lab in Wuhan. There, they mix genes from different strains of these novel viruses to test their infectivity in human cells and lab animals.

When word spread in January that a novel coronavirus had caused an outbreak in Wuhan—which is a thousand miles from where the bats that carry this lineage of viruses are naturally found—many experts were quietly alarmed. There was no proof that the lab was the source of the virus, but the pieces fit.

Despite the evidence, the scientific community quickly dismissed the idea. Peter Daszak, president of EcoHealth Alliance, which has funded the work of the Wuhan Institute of Virology and other labs searching for new viruses, called the notion “preposterous,” and many other experts echoed that sentiment.

That wasn’t necessarily what every scientist thought in private, though. “They can’t speak directly,” one scientist told me confidentially, referring to the virology community’s fear of having their comments sensationalized in today’s politically charged environment. “Many virologists don’t want to be hated by everyone in the field.”

There are other potential reasons for the pushback. There’s long been a sense that if the public and politicians really knew about the dangerous pathogen research being conducted in many laboratories, they’d be outraged. Denying the possibility of a catastrophic incident like this, then, could be seen as a form of career preservation. “For the substantial subset of virologists who perform gain-of-function research,” Richard Ebright, a Rutgers microbiologist and another founding member of the Cambridge Working Group, told me, “avoiding restrictions on research funding, avoiding implementation of appropriate biosafety standards, and avoiding implementation of appropriate research oversight are powerful motivators.” Antonio Regalado, biomedicine editor of *MIT Technology Review*, put it more bluntly. If it turned out COVID-19 came from a lab, he tweeted, “it would shatter the scientific edifice top to bottom.”

That’s a pretty good incentive to simply dismiss the whole hypothesis, but it quickly amounted to a global gaslighting of the media—and, by proxy, the public. An unhealthy absolutism set in: Either you insisted that any questions about lab involvement were absurd, or you were a tool of the Trump administration and its desperation to blame China for the virus. I was used to social media pundits ignoring inconvenient or politically toxic facts, but I’d never expected to see that from some of our best scientists.

Which is why Chan stood out on Twitter, daring to speak truth to power. "It is very difficult to do research when one hypothesis has been negatively cast as a conspiracy theory," she wrote. Then she offered some earnest advice to researchers, suggesting that most viral research should be done with neutered viruses that have had their replicating machinery removed in advance, so that even if they escaped confinement, they would be incapable of making copies of themselves. "When these precautions are not followed, risk of lab escape is exponentially higher," she explained, adding, "I hope the pandemic motivates local ethics and biosafety committees to think carefully about how they can reduce risk." She elaborated on this in another tweet several days later: "I'd also—personally—prefer if high biosafety level labs were not located in the most populous cities on earth."

How Safe Are Boston's Biolabs?

As one of the world centers of biotech, the Hub is peppered with academic and corporate labs doing research on pathogens. Foremost among them is Boston University's National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL), the only lab in the city designated as BSL-4 (the highest level of biosafety and the same level as the Wuhan Institute of Virology). It is one of just a dozen or so in the United States equipped to work with live versions of the world's most dangerous viruses, including Ebola and Marburg. Researchers there began doing so in 2018 after a decade of controversy: Many locals objected to the risks of siting such a facility in the center of a major metropolitan area.

The good news? Before opening, NEIDL undertook one of the most thorough risk assessments in history, learning from the mistakes of other facilities. Even Lynn Klotz, a senior science fellow at the Washington, DC-based Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, who advised local groups that opposed NEIDL, told the medical website Contagion that the lab likely has the best possible security protocols and measures in place.

But the reality, Klotz added, is that most lab accidents are caused by human error, and there is only so much that can be done through good design and protocols to proactively prevent such mistakes. (Or to guard against an intentional release by a disgruntled researcher, as allegedly happened in the anthrax attacks of 2001.) Rutgers molecular biologist Richard Ebright, a longtime critic of potentially dangerous pathogen research, says the risks introduced by NEIDL are not low enough and "definitely not" worth the negligible benefits.

Still, risk is relative. Klotz has estimated the chance of a pathogen escape from a BSL-4 lab at 0.3 percent per year, and NEIDL is probably significantly safer than the typical BSL-4 lab. And if catching a deadly pathogen is your fear, well, currently you run a good risk of finding one in your own neighborhood. Until that gets cleared up, the city's biolabs are probably among the safer spaces in town.

Chan had started using her Twitter account this intensely only a few days earlier, as a form of outreach for her paper. The social platform has become the way many scientists find out about one another's work, and studies have shown that attention on Twitter translates to increased citations for a paper in scientific literature. But it's a famously raw forum. Many scientists are not prepared for the digital storms that roil the Twitterverse, and they don't handle it well. Chan dreaded it at first, but quickly took to Twitter like a digital native. "Having Twitter elevates your work," she says. "And I think it's really fun to talk to nonscientists about that work."

After reading her tweets, I reviewed her preprint, which I found mind-blowing, and wrote her to say so. She thanked me and joked that she worried it might be “career suicide.”

It wasn't long before it began to look like she might be right.

Speaking her mind, it turns out—even in the face of censure—was nothing new for Chan, who is Canadian but was raised in Singapore, one of the more repressive regimes on earth. Her parents, both computer science professionals, encouraged free thinking and earnest inquiry in their daughter, but the local school system did not. Instead, it was a pressure-cooker of a system that rewarded students for falling in line, and moved quickly to silence rebels.

That was a bad fit for Chan. “You have to bow to teachers,” she says. “Sometimes teachers from other classes would show up and ask me to bow to them. And I would say, ‘No, you’re not my teacher.’ Back then they believed in corporal punishment. A teacher could just take a big stick and beat you in front of the class. I got whacked so many times.”

Still, Chan rebelled in small ways, skipping school and hanging out at the arcade. She also lost interest in her studies. “I just really didn't like school. And I didn't like all the extracurriculars they pack you with in Singapore,” she says. That changed when a teacher recruited her for math Olympiads, in which teams of students compete to solve devilishly hard arithmetic puzzles. “I really loved it,” she says. “You just sit in a room and think about problems.”

Chan might well have pursued a career in math, but then she came up against teams from China in Olympiad competitions. “They would just wipe everyone else off the board,” she says. “They were machines. They'd been trained in math since they could walk. They'd hit the buzzer before you could even comprehend the question. I thought, *I'm not going to survive in this field.*”

Chan decided to pursue biology instead, studying at the University of British Columbia. “I liked viruses from the time I was a teen,” she says. “I remember the first time I learned about HIV. I thought it was a puzzle and a challenge.” That instinct took her to Harvard Medical School as a postdoc, where the puzzle became how to build virus-like biomolecules to accomplish tasks inside cells, and then to Ben Deverman's lab at the Broad Institute. “When I see an interesting question, I want to spend 100 percent of my time working on it,” she says. “I get really fixated on answering scientific questions.”

Deverman, for his part, says he wasn't actively looking to expand his team when Chan came along, but when “opportunities to hire extraordinary people fall in my lap,” he takes them. “Alina brings a ton of value to the lab,” he explains, adding that she has an ability to pivot between different topics and cut to the chase. Nowhere was that more on display than with her coronavirus work, which Deverman was able to closely observe. In fact, Chan ran so many ideas past him that he eventually became a coauthor. “She is insightful, determined, and has the rare ability to explain complex scientific findings to other scientists and to the public,” he says.

Those skills would prove highly useful when word got out about her coronavirus paper.

If Chan had spent a lifetime learning how to pursue scientific questions, she spent most of the shutdown learning what happens when the answers you come up with are politically radioactive. After the *Newsweek* story ran, conservative-leaning publications seized on her paper as conclusive evidence that the virus had come from a lab. “Everyone focused on the one line,” Chan laments. “The tabloids just

zoomed in on it." Meanwhile, conspiracists took it as hard evidence of their wild theories that there had been an intentional leak.

Chan spent several exhausting days putting out online fires with the many people who had misconstrued her findings. "I was so naive," she tells me with a quick, self-deprecating laugh. "I just thought, *Shouldn't the world be thinking about this fairly?* I really have to kick myself now."

Even more troubling, though, were the reactions from other scientists. As soon as her paper got picked up by the media, luminaries in the field sought to censure her. Jonathan Eisen, a well-known professor at UC Davis, criticized the study in *Newsweek* and on his influential Twitter account, writing, "Personally, I do not find the analysis in this new paper remotely convincing." In a long thread, he argued that comparing the new virus to SARS was not enough to show that it was preadapted to humans. He wanted to see comparisons to the initial leap of other viruses from animals to humans.

Moments later, Daszak piled on. The NIH had recently cut its grant to his organization, EcoHealth Alliance, after the Trump administration learned that some of it had gone to fund the Wuhan Institute of Virology's work. Daszak was working hard to get it restored and trying to stamp out any suggestion of a lab connection. He didn't hold back on Chan. "This is sloppy research," he tweeted, calling it "a poorly designed phylogenetic study with too many inferences and not enough data, riding on a wave of conspiracy to drive a higher impact." Peppering his tweets with exclamation points, he attacked the wording of the paper, arguing that one experiment it cited was impossible, and told Chan she didn't understand her own data. Afterward, a Daszak supporter followed up his thread with a GIF of a mike drop.

It was an old and familiar dynamic: threatened silverback male attempts to bully a junior female member of the tribe. As a postdoc, Chan was in a vulnerable position. The world of science is still a bit medieval in its power structure, with a handful of institutions and individuals deciding who gets published, who gets positions, who gets grants. There's little room for rebels.

What happened next was neither old nor familiar: Chan didn't back down. "Sorry to disrupt mike drop," she tweeted, providing a link to a paper in the prestigious journal *Nature* that "does that exact experiment you thought was impossible." Politely but firmly, she justified each point Daszak had attacked, showing him his mistakes. In the end, Daszak was reduced to arguing that she had used the word "isolate" incorrectly. In a coup de grâce, Chan pointed out that actually the word had come from online data provided by GenBank, the NIH's genetic sequence database. She offered to change it to whatever made sense. At that point, Daszak stopped replying. He insists, however, that Chan is overinterpreting her findings.

With Eisen, Chan readily agreed to test her hypothesis by finding other examples of viruses infecting new hosts. Within days, a perfect opportunity came along when news broke that the coronavirus had jumped from humans to minks at European fur farms. Sure enough, the mink version began to rapidly mutate. "You actually see the rapid evolution happening," Chan said. "Just in the first few weeks, the changes are quite drastic."

Chan also pointed out to Eisen that the whole goal of a website such as bioRxiv (pronounced "bioarchive")—where she posted the paper—is to elicit feedback that will make papers better before publication. Good point, he replied. Eventually he conceded that there was "a lot of interesting analysis in the paper" and agreed to work with Chan on the next draft.

The Twitter duels with her powerful colleagues didn't rattle Chan. "I thought Jonathan was very reasonable," she says. "I really appreciated his expertise, even if he disagreed with me. I like that kind of feedback. It helped to make our paper better."

With Daszak, Chan is more circumspect. "Some people have trouble keeping their emotions in check," she says. "Whenever I saw his comments, I'd just think, *Is there something I can learn here? Is there something he's right about that I should be fixing?*" Ultimately, she decided, there was not.

By late May, both journalists and armchair detectives interested in the mystery of the coronavirus were discovering Chan as a kind of Holmes to our Watson. She crunched information at twice our speed, zeroing in on small details we'd overlooked, and became a go-to for anyone looking for spin-free explications of the latest science on COVID-19. It was thrilling to see her reasoning in real time, a reminder of why I've always loved science, with its pursuit of patterns that sometimes leads to exciting revelations. The website CNET featured her in a story about "a league of scientists-turned-detectives" who were using genetic sequencing technologies to uncover COVID-19's origins. After it came out, Chan added "scientist-turned-detective" to her Twitter bio.

She's lived up to her new nom de tweet. As the search for the source of the virus continued, several scientific teams published papers identifying a closely related coronavirus in pangolins—anteater-like animals that are heavily trafficked in Asia for their meat and scales. The number of different studies made it seem as though this virus was ubiquitous in pangolins. Many scientists eagerly embraced the notion that the animals might have been the intermediate hosts that had passed the novel coronavirus to humans. It fit their preexisting theories about wet markets, and it would have meant no lab had been involved.

As Chan read the pangolin papers, she grew suspicious. The first one was by a team that had analyzed a group of the animals intercepted by anti-smuggling authorities in southern China. They found the closely related virus in a few of them, and published the genomes for that virus. Some of the other papers, though, were strangely ambiguous about where their data was coming from, or how their genomes had been constructed. Had they really taken samples from actual pangolins?

Once again, Chan messaged Shing Hei Zhan. "Shing, something's weird here," she wrote. Zhan pulled up the raw data from the papers and compared the genomes they had published. Individual copies of a virus coming from different animals should have small differences, just as individuals of a species have genetic differences. Yet the genomes in all of the pangolin papers were perfect matches—the authors were all simply using the first group's data set. Far from being ubiquitous, the virus had been found only in a few pangolins who were held together, and it was unclear where they had caught it. The animals might have even caught it from their own smuggler.

Remarkably, one group of authors in *Nature* even appeared to use the same genetic sequences from the other paper as if it were confirmation of their own discovery. "These sequences appear to be from the same virus (Pangolin-CoV) that we identified in the present study."

Chan called them out on Twitter: "Of course it's the same Pangolin-CoV, you used the same dataset!" For context, she later added, "Imagine if clinical trials were playing fast and loose with their patient data; renaming patients, throwing them into different datasets without clarification, possibly even describing the same patient multiple times across different studies unintentionally."

She and Zhan posted a new preprint on bioRxiv dismantling the pangolin papers. Confirmation came in June when the results of a study of hundreds of pangolins in the wildlife trade were announced: Not a single pangolin had any sign of a coronavirus. Chan took a victory lap on Twitter: "Supports our hypothesis all this time." The pangolin theory collapsed.

Chan then turned her Holmesian powers on bigger game: Daszak and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Daszak had been pleading his case everywhere from *60 Minutes* to the *New York Times* and has been successful in rallying sympathy to his cause, even getting 77 Nobel laureates to sign a letter calling for the NIH to restore EcoHealth Alliance's funding.

In several long and detailed "tweetorials," Chan began to cast a cloud of suspicion on the WIV's work. She pointed out that scientists there had discovered a virus that is more than 96 percent identical to the COVID-19 coronavirus in 2013 in a mineshaft soon after three miners working there had died from a COVID-like illness. The WIV didn't share these findings until 2020, even though the goal of such work, Chan pointed out, was supposedly to identify viruses with the potential to cause human illnesses and warn the world about them.

Even though that virus had killed three miners, Daszak said it wasn't considered a priority to study at the time. "We were looking for SARS-related virus, and this one was 20 percent different. We thought it was interesting, but not high risk. So we didn't do anything about it and put it in the freezer," he told a reporter from *Wired*. It was only in 2020, he maintained, that they started looking into it once they realized its similarity to COVID-19. But Chan pointed to an online database showing that the WIV had been genetically sequencing the mine virus in 2017 and 2018, analyzing it in a way they had done in the past with other viruses in preparation for running experiments with them. Diplomatic yet deadpan, she wrote, "I think Daszak was misinformed."

For good measure, almost in passing, Chan pointed out a detail no one else had noticed: COVID-19 contains an uncommon genetic sequence that has been used by genetic engineers in the past to insert genes into coronaviruses without leaving a trace, and it falls at the exact point that would allow experimenters to swap out different genetic parts to change the infectivity. That same sequence can occur naturally in a coronavirus, so this was not irrefutable proof of an unnatural origin, Chan explained, "only an observation." Still, it was enough for one Twitter user to muse, "If capital punishment were as painful as what Alina Chan is doing to Daszak/WIV regarding their story, it would be illegal."

Daszak says that indeed he had been misinformed and was unaware that that virus found in the mine shaft had been sequenced before 2020. He also says that a great lab, with great scientists, is now being picked apart to search for suspicious behavior to support a preconceived theory. "If you believe, deep down, something fishy went on, then what you do is you go through all the evidence and you try to look for things that support that belief," he says, adding, "That is not how you find the truth."

Many of the points in Chan's tweetorials had also been made by others, but she was the first reputable scientist to put it all together. That same week, London's *Sunday Times* and the BBC ran stories following the same trail of breadcrumbs that Chan had laid out to suggest that there had been a coverup at the WIV. The story soon circulated around the world. In the meantime, the WIV has steadfastly denied any viral leak. Lab director Yanyi Wang went on Chinese television and described such charges as "pure fabrication," and went on to explain that the bat coronavirus from 2013 was so different than COVID that it could not have evolved into it this quickly and that the lab only sequenced it and didn't obtain a live virus from it.

To this day, there is no definitive evidence as to whether the virus occurred naturally or had its origins in a lab, but the hypothesis that the Wuhan facility was the source is increasingly mainstream and the science behind it can no longer be ignored. And Chan is largely to thank for that.

In late spring, Chan walked through the tall glass doors of the Broad Institute for the first time in months. As she made her way across the gleaming marble foyer, her sneaker squeaks echoed in the silence. It was like the zombie apocalypse version of the Broad; all the bright lights but none of the people. It felt all the weirder that she was wearing her gym clothes to work.

A few days earlier, the Broad had begun letting researchers back into their labs to restart their projects. All computer work still needed to be done remotely, but bench scientists such as Chan could pop in just long enough to move along their cell cultures, provided they got tested for the virus every four days.

In her lab, Chan donned her white lab coat and took inventory, throwing out months of expired reagents and ordering new materials. Then she rescued a few samples from the freezer, took her seat at one of the tissue-culture hoods—stainless steel, air-controlled cabinets in which cell engineers do their work—and began reviving some of her old experiments.

She had mixed emotions about being back. It felt good to free her gene-therapy projects from their stasis, and she was even more excited about the new project she and Deverman were working on: an online tool that allows vaccine developers to track changes in the virus's genome by time, location, and other characteristics. "It came out of my personal frustration at not being able to get answers fast," she says.

On the other hand, she missed being all-consuming by her detective work. "I wanted to stop after the pangolin preprint," she says, "but this mystery keeps drawing me back in." So while she waits for her cell cultures to grow, she's been sleuthing on the side—only this time she has more company: Increasingly, scientists have been quietly contacting her to share their own theories and papers about COVID-19's origins, forming something of a growing underground resistance. "There's a lot of curiosity," she says. "People are starting to think more deeply about it." And they have to, she says, if we are going to prevent future outbreaks: "It's really important to find out where this came from so it doesn't happen again."

That is what keeps Chan up at night—the possibility of new outbreaks in humans from the same source. If the virus emerged naturally from a bat cave, there could well be other strains in existence ready to spill over. If they are closely related, whatever vaccines we develop might work on them, too. But that might not be the case with manipulated viruses from a laboratory. "Someone could have been sampling viruses from different caves for a decade and just playing mix-and-match in the lab, and those viruses could be so different from one another that none of our vaccines will work on them," she says. Either way, "We need to find where this came from, and close it down."

Whatever important information she finds, we can be sure Chan will share it with the world. Far from being shaken by the controversy her paper stirred, she is more committed than ever to holding a line that could all too easily be overrun. "Scientists shouldn't be censoring themselves," she says. "We're obliged to put all the data out there. We shouldn't be deciding that it's better if the public doesn't know about this or that. If we start doing that, we lose credibility, and eventually we lose the public's trust. And that's not good for science." In fact, it would cause an epidemic of doubt, and that wouldn't be good for any of us.

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2020 2:42 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: Re: [redacted] (b)(6) summary of post cables

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)
 SSD/AVC
 c: [redacted] (b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2020 12:43 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: [redacted] (b)(6) summary of post cables

Thanks, [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(5)

(BTW, Bullets 1, 4, and 5 (especially 5) have been widely reported on Taiwan TV.)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2020 11:46 AM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: Re: response from CDC/NIH

I have found over 90 Embassy Beijing cables [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Sender: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: "Stilwell, David R" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Re: Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19's Origin; Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology
Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2021 01:27:20 +0000

He's flexing majority muscles, a bit prematurely. No reason we can't brief him, but it's going to be tough getting to the Capitol.

Have you reached out to (b)(6)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 7:51:06 PM

To: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: Re: Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19's Origin; Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology

This is surprising. (b)(5)

--

David Feith

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)

(c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Schiffer, Michael (Foreign Relations) <(b)(6)@foreign.senate.gov>

Date: January 15, 2021 at 8:42:09 PM EST

Subject: Re: Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19's Origin; Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology

To: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>

David,

We have been asking — and State has been refusing — to provide us a classified briefing for almost ten months now on COVID origins. My expectations given the release of this “fact sheet” is that you all are prepared brief, and back it up with factual evidence, on Monday morning.

Michael

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 15, 2021, at 7:43 PM, Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

<https://www.state.gov/ensuring-a-transparent-thorough-investigation-of-covid-19s-origin/>

Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19's Origin

Michael R. Pompeo

January 15, 2021

The United States has repeatedly called for a transparent and thorough investigation into the origin of COVID-19. Understanding the origin of this pandemic is essential for global public health, economic recovery, and international security.

To assist the vital work of the World Health Organization (WHO) investigative team that arrived in China this week, the United States government is today sharing new information concerning the activities inside China's government laboratories in 2019.

In particular, we urge the WHO to press the government of China to address the following:

1. **Illnesses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):** The United States government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was "zero infection" among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.
2. **WIV Research on "RaTG13" and "gain of function":** Starting in at least 2016, WIV researchers studied RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). Since the outbreak, the WIV has not been transparent nor consistent about its work with RaTG13 or other similar viruses, including possible "gain of function" experiments to enhance transmissibility or lethality.
3. **Secret WIV Links to Military Research:** Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China's military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

The COVID-19 pandemic was avoidable. Any responsible country would have invited world health investigators to Wuhan within days of an outbreak. China instead refused offers of help – including from the United States – and punished brave Chinese doctors, scientists, and journalists who tried to alert the world to the dangers of the virus. Beijing continues today to withhold vital information that scientists need to protect the world from this deadly virus, and the next one.

The United States reiterates the importance of unfettered access to virus samples, lab records and personnel, eyewitnesses, and whistleblowers to ensure the credibility of the WHO's final report. Until the CCP allows a full and thorough accounting of what happened in Wuhan, it is only a matter of time until China births another pandemic and inflicts it on the Chinese people, and the world.

--

<https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/>

Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology
Office of the Spokesperson
January 15, 2021

For more than a year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic's origin, choosing instead to devote enormous resources to deceit and disinformation. Nearly two million people have died. Their families deserve to know the truth. Only through transparency can we learn what caused this pandemic and how to prevent the next one.

The U.S. government does not know exactly where, when, or how the COVID-19 virus—known as SARS-CoV-2—was transmitted initially to humans. We have not determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan, China.

The virus could have emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals, spreading in a pattern consistent with a natural epidemic. Alternatively, a laboratory accident could resemble a natural outbreak if the initial exposure included only a few individuals and was compounded by asymptomatic infection. Scientists in China have researched animal-derived coronaviruses under conditions that increased the risk for accidental and potentially unwitting exposure.

The CCP's deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world. The previously undisclosed information in this fact sheet, combined with open-source reporting, highlights three elements about COVID-19's origin that deserve greater scrutiny:

1. Illnesses inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):

- The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was "zero infection" among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.

- Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one.
- The CCP has prevented independent journalists, investigators, and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the WIV, including those who were ill in the fall of 2019. Any credible inquiry into the origin of the virus must include interviews with these researchers and a full accounting of their previously unreported illness.

2. Research at the WIV:

- Starting in at least 2016 – and with no indication of a stop prior to the COVID-19 outbreak – WIV researchers conducted experiments involving RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). The WIV became a focal point for international coronavirus research after the 2003 SARS outbreak and has since studied animals including mice, bats, and pangolins.
- The WIV has a published record of conducting “gain-of-function” research to engineer chimeric viruses. But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including “RaTG13,” which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.
- WHO investigators must have access to the records of the WIV’s work on bat and other coronaviruses before the COVID-19 outbreak. As part of a thorough inquiry, they must have a full accounting of why the WIV altered and then removed online records of its work with RaTG13 and other viruses.

3. Secret military activity at the WIV:

- Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
- The United States and other donors who funded or collaborated on civilian research at the WIV have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.

Today's revelations just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19's origin in China. Any credible investigation into the origin of COVID-19 demands complete, transparent access to the research labs in Wuhan, including their facilities, samples, personnel, and records.

As the world continues to battle this pandemic – and as WHO investigators begin their work, after more than a year of delays – the virus's origin remains uncertain. The United States will continue to do everything it can to support a credible and thorough investigation, including by continuing to demand transparency on the part of Chinese authorities.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

(o)

(c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: RE:
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 20:47:51 +0000

This is the most current version. You should look at it.



(b)(6)
 Acting Director, Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 3:44 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: RE:

Haven't seen her comments - (b)(5) You
 can send me something more formal if you want. You should get (b)(6) view.

On December 18, 2020 at 3:41:20 PM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 (b)(5)



(b)(6)
 Acting Director, Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

From: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 3:40 PM

To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: RE:

[redacted] (b)(6) sent me a bootleg .. [redacted] (b)(5)

On December 18, 2020 at 3:16:30 PM EST, DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov> wrote:
I'm looking at it now

On December 18, 2020 at 3:15:08 PM EST, [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov> wrote:
FYI, you should have the draft demarche soon. I just sent a revised version to our group for one more review before I send it to you.

[redacted] (b)(6)



[redacted] (b)(6)
Acting Director, Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
[redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov

From: DiNanno, Thomas G <[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 3:12 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject:

[redacted] (b)(6)

Can we schedule some time next week with [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(5) Maybe a virtual meet early next week?

Thanks
Tom

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572986

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: RE : FYI; The curious case of the COVID-19 origin
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 20:03:36 +0000

OHHH, that's a good one, and cuts so many different ways . . .

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 17, 2021 4:02 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: FW: RE : FYI; The curious case of the COVID-19 origin

Key statement: As historian John M. Barry sagely said: "When you mix politics and science, you get politics."

The curious case of the COVID-19 origin (By James D. Zirin: The Hill, 5/17)

Now that unmasking time is here, perhaps it's time to explore the origin of COVID-19. The virus has killed almost 3.5 million people worldwide, and we all would like to have some answers. As Winston Churchill said of Russia, "It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma," meriting an investigation by Sherlock Holmes or Hercule Poirot. Investigation of the case began in China, where the first cases involving humans emerged in December 2019 in Wuhan City, the sprawling capital of Hubei province in the central part of the country. Unfortunately, the investigation began there, and ended there. Or maybe not. A large proportion of the initial cases apparently had a direct link to the Hunan Wholesale Seafood Market in Wuhan, but that was hardly conclusive. True, the virus could have been introduced to the human population from an animal source in the market; but equally plausible, a human being infected elsewhere could have propagated the virus among the crowd of patrons. In February 2020, a team of international scientists commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO) visited Wuhan to determine the origin of the virus. The problem is that the investigation was a non-investigation. The investigators had 28 days in China of which 14 days were spent in quarantine. Their hasty conclusion was that the virus took a tortuous route. It started with a bat, and the bat either passed it onto another animal or to humans. But humans don't regularly fraternize with bats, and most of the animals they come in contact with do not frequent bat caves. A WHO report issued last week concluded that more study is necessary. The WHO also looked into the possibility of a laboratory accident. The team briefly visited the Wuhan Institute of Virology in an effort to test the theory that the pandemic originated with a lab leak. Much research has been conducted at the Wuhan lab in recent years on, guess what, bat coronaviruses. Chinese scientists have said that the virus was never present in any China labs — the defense of alibi. But they could be lying.

The WHO issued a report in April that took the mainstream line that the virus had originated with a bat, which passed it on to an animal, which in turn passed it on to humans. It assessed the probability of this zoonotic source of COVID-19 as "likely to very likely," and the probability of a lab leak as "extremely unlikely." The WHO report, which had the advance approval of the China government, was a slam dunk for the Chinese. It permitted speculation that the virus might even have originated in another country in southeast Asia or perhaps in Europe. Dr. David A. Relman, a Stanford scientist, said that the "WHO investigation appears to be biased, skewed and insufficient." The WHO chief, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, noting calls in the scientific community for a more thorough investigation, said that, although the possibility of lab leak was "the least likely hypothesis," the WHO investigation was not "extensive enough." Groups of scientists have called for further action and a more comprehensive investigation. They claim that "critical records...remain inaccessible." Could it be that China suffers from a lack of transparency? Conspiracy theories abound about the origin of the virus. In her excellent new book entitled "Virus," Nina Burleigh tells of a retired government scientist she met in the Midwest who claimed that "dark human forces" were behind the pandemic. Big name elites had concluded that the world's population had to decrease by about 80 percent. We had to get down to a sustainable number of human beings or the earth would fry like Venus. Thankfully, no one has asked the WHO to investigate this possibility. Pandemics tend to take on xenophobic finger-pointing. President Trump, who initially praised China's response to the virus, later called it the "China virus," and blamed China for the COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, it was China on Jan. 10, 2020 that posted on Virological.org, an online site for data that might assist in public health activities and research, the announcement that it had isolated and fully sequenced the virus. Without this information, no vaccine would have been possible. The Spanish flu of 1917 did not originate in Spain. The Journal of Transnational Medicine reported in 2004 that the most likely site of origin was Kansas. As historian John M. Barry sagely said: "When you mix politics and science, you get politics. "

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" <(b)(6)>@state.gov>

Recipient: <(b)(6)>@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: David Asher (b)(6)@hudson.org>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2020 15:53:43 +0000

Chiefly IO, but also some degree of OES. Our AMB in Geneva is Andrew Bremberg, who is solid and I'm hoping to speak with today.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(b)(6) (c)
(b)(6)@state.gov

On December 21, 2020 at 10:52:01 AM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
Since it is an int'l org, probably IO Bureau but I will try to find out.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On December 20, 2020 at 11:45:58 AM EST, David Asher (b)(6)@hudson.org> wrote:
Who at State is in charge of WHO affairs? Is that Ford protege in the Oceans Bureau?
David

David L. Asher, Ph.D
Senior Fellow
Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004
o. | (b)(6)
<https://www.hudson.org/experts/1299-david-asher>

On Dec 20, 2020, at 10:05, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

(b)(5)

From: David Asher (b)(6)@hudson.org>
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2020 4:48 AM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated

I have a headache .
Begin forwarded message:

From: Steven Quay (b)(6)
Date: December 20, 2020 at 04:01:04 EST
To: David Asher (b)(6)@hudson.org>
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Question—your help will be greatly appreciated

David-
Unfortunately, Daszak and CCP are several/many steps ahead. In August Daszak, future commission member Hume Field, and the 'Bat Woman,' Dr. Shi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology published this paper together on where, in nature, CoV-2 arose <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17687-3> Within 45 days Daszak is appointed to BOTH international commissions, the only such person, to investigate the origin of CoV-2, the WHO team and the Lancet Commission. Even Kristian Andersen, a strong zoonosis proponent, thought it was unwise to appoint him. And to Baric's credit, after being asked to sign on to the letter of support and the zoonosis origin, he did not. No paper trail of his reasoning but by May he was interviewed on Italian TV saying you could make it in the lab and leave no trace of evidence and you have to get to the lab notebooks in WIV to know for sure.

Lancet Commission of CoV-2	WHO Commission on CoV-2 origin
Dr. Peter Daszak, Chair	Dr. Peter Daszak, Ph.D (EcoHealth Alliance, USA)
Dr. John Amuasi	Prof. John Watson (Public Health England, United Kingdom)
Dr. Danielle Anderson	Prof. Dr. Marion Koopmans, DVM PhD (Erasmus MC, Netherlands)
Dr. Isabella Eckerle	Prof. Dr. Dominic Dwyer, MD (Westmead Hospital, Australia)
Dr. Hume Field	Vladimir Dedkov, Ph.D (Institute Pasteur, Russia)
Dr. Gerald Keusch	Dr. Hung Nguyen, PhD (International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Vietnam)

Dr. Dato' Sai Kit (Ken) Lam	PD. Dr. med vet. Fabian Lendertz (Robert Koch-Institute, Germany)
Dr. Carlos das Neves	Prof. Dr. Thea Fisher, MD, DMSc(PhD) (Nordsjællands Hospital, Denmark)
Dr. Malik Peiris	Dr. Farag El Moubasher, Ph.D (Ministry of Public Health, Qatar)
Dr. Stanley Perlman	Prof. Dr. Ken Maeda, PhD, DVM (National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan)
Dr. Linda J. Saif	<u>WHO Commission of CoV-2 origin</u>
Dr. Supaporn Wacharapluesadee	

Lancet Commission on CoV-2

Signed Lancet letter

Regards, Steve

On Sun, 20 Dec 2020 at 08:20, David Asher <(b)(6)@hudson.org> wrote:
The emails from Baric and Daszic are deeply disturbing as is the support from DTRA and several other USG Departments and agencies to EcoHealth.

David L. Asher, Ph.D
Senior Fellow
Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004
o. | c. (b)(6)

<https://www.hudson.org/experts/1299-david-asher>

On Dec 19, 2020, at 19:13, Steven Quay <(b)(6)> wrote:

David-
I am on it! Regards, Steve

On Sun, 20 Dec 2020 at 01:36, (b)(6)@hudson.org> wrote:

David L. Asher, Ph.D
Senior Fellow
Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004
o. | c. (b)(6)
<https://www.hudson.org/experts/1299-david-asher>

Begin forwarded message:

From: [redacted] (b)(6)

Date: December 19, 2020 at 09:03:02 EST

To: David Asher [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) @hudson.org>

Subject: Question

[redacted] (b)(5)

--

Steven C Quay, MD, PhD, FCAP

T: [redacted] (b)(6)

Skype: [redacted] (b)(6)

Dr. Quay Official Website

STAY SAFE: #1 Best Seller Amazon Medical eBooks

--

Steven C Quay, MD, PhD, FCAP

T: [redacted] (b)(6)

Skype: [redacted] (b)(6)

Dr. Quay Official Website

STAY SAFE: #1 Best Seller Amazon Medical eBooks

Sender: "Feith, David" [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

Recipient: David Asher [redacted] (b)(6) @hudson.org>;

[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;

DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Question

Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 01:37:29 +0000

(b)(6)

Sorry to bother you--if you don't mind, could you give me your opinion on the attached?
Best
Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary of State
Washington, DC

(b)(6) (office)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 8:50 PM

To: Yu, Miles

Subject: Re: Question

Hi Miles,

(b)(6) What do you need help on?

Best,

(b)(6)

Get Outlook for

(b)(7)(E)

From: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 8:48:39 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Question

(b)(6)

You teleworking? I need a little help from you.
Miles

[state seal]

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)

(b)(6) (c)

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Steps to compare sequences for whole viruses

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572675

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

Go to the NCBI website for blast:

https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi?PROGRAM=blastn&PAGE_TYPE=BlastSearch&LINK_LOC=blasthome

In the “Enter accession number(s), or FASTA sequence(s)” box, enter the accession number for the first ever submitted SARS-CoV-2 sequence:

NC_045512

In the box “Organism”, copy and paste:

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (taxid:2697049)

Check “exclude”

Also, in the box “Entrez Query”, copy and paste:

2000/01/01:2020/02/10[mdat]

(This is to set the time to between Jan 1st, 2000 and Feb 10th, 2020, excluding sequences uploaded later in the pandemic)

Click “Blast”

The screenshot shows the NCBI BLASTN search interface. The "Enter Query Sequence" section has a text box containing "NC_045512". Below it, the "Job Title" field contains "NC_045512:Severe acute respiratory syndrome...". The "Choose Search Set" section is configured with "Standard databases (nr etc.)" selected, "Nucleotide collection (nr/nt)" as the database, and "Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (taxid:2697049)" as the organism with the "exclude" checkbox checked. The "Entrez Query" field contains "2000/01/01:2020/02/10[mdat]". The "Program Selection" section has "Highly similar sequences (megablast)" selected. At the bottom, the "BLAST" button is visible, and the search parameters are summarized as "Search database Nucleotide collection (nr/nt) using Megablast (Optimize for highly similar sequences)".

Steps to compare sequences for whole viruses

FL-2022-00076 A-00000572675 "UNCLASSIFIED" [06/28/2024]

The search will take a few minutes.

Once finished, scroll down to see the results.

The top two hits are ZC45 and ZXC21, sharing 89.12% and 88.65% identity with SARS-CoV-2, respectively.

Descriptions

Graphic Summary

Alignments

Taxonomy

Sequences producing significant alignments

Download

Manage Columns

Show

100



select all 100 sequences selected

[GenBank](#)

[Graphics](#)

[Distance tree of results](#)

	Description	Max Score	Total Score	Query Cover	E value	Per. Ident	Accession
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bat SARS-like coronavirus isolate bat-SL-CoVZC45, complete genome	26943	35336	95%	0.0	89.12%	MG772933.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bat SARS-like coronavirus isolate bat-SL-CoVZXC21, complete genome	22223	35276	94%	0.0	88.65%	MG772934.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SARS coronavirus ZS-C, complete genome	15213	22564	88%	0.0	82.34%	AY395003.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SARS coronavirus ZS-B, complete genome	15213	22600	88%	0.0	82.34%	AY394996.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SARS coronavirus SZ16, complete genome	15202	22531	88%	0.0	82.33%	AY304488.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SARS coronavirus SZ3, complete genome	15202	22529	88%	0.0	82.33%	AY304486.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SARS coronavirus GZ02, complete genome	15191	22548	88%	0.0	82.32%	AY390556.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SARS coronavirus BJ182-12, complete genome	15186	22483	88%	0.0	82.32%	EU371564.1

Blast for the E protein

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572675

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

Go to the blast website for protein sequences:

https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi?PROGRAM=blastp&PAGE_TYPE=BlastSearch&LINK_LOC=blasthome

Paste the sequence of the E protein into the box "Enter accession number(s), or FASTA sequence(s)":

```
MYSFVSEETGTLIVNSVLLFLAFVVFLLVTLAILTALRLCAYCC
NIVNVSLVKPSFYVYSRVKLNLSRVPDLLV
```

In the box "Organism", copy and paste:

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (taxid:2697049)

Check in "exclude"

Click "Blast"

The screenshot shows the NCBI BLAST web interface. At the top, there are tabs for different BLAST programs: blastn, **blastp**, blastx, tblastn, and tblastx. The main heading is "BLASTP programs search protein databases using a protein".

The "Enter Query Sequence" section contains a text box with the FASTA sequence:

```
MYSFVSEETGTLIVNSVLLFLAFVVFLLVTLAILTALRLCAYCC
NIVNVSLVKPSFYVYSRVKLNLSRVPDLLV
```

. There are "Clear" and "Query subrange" options to the right.

Below the text box is the "Or, upload file" section with a "Choose File" button and "No file chosen" text. There is also a "Job Title" text box with the placeholder "Enter a descriptive title for your BLAST search".

The "Choose Search Set" section includes a "Database" dropdown menu set to "Non-redundant protein sequences (nr)". The "Organism" field is set to "Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (taxid:2697049)" with a checked "exclude" checkbox. Below this are three unchecked checkboxes: "Models (XM/XP)", "Non-redundant RefSeq proteins (WP)", and "Uncultured/environmental sample sequences".

The "Program Selection" section has a radio button selected for "blastp (protein-protein BLAST)". Other options include "Quick BLASTP (Accelerated protein-protein BLAST)", "PSI-BLAST (Position-Specific Iterated BLAST)", "PHI-BLAST (Pattern Hit Initiated BLAST)", and "DELTA-BLAST (Domain Enhanced Lookup Time Accelerated BLAST)".

At the bottom, there is a "BLAST" button and a checkbox for "Search database nr using Blastp (protein-protein BLAST)". There is also a checkbox for "Show results in a new window".

Blast for the E protein

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572675

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

The search will take a few minutes.

Scroll down to see the results.

The sequences from the database is ranked based on their percent identity (under the column "Per. Iden."). The top hit with the accession number AVP78033.1 is the bat coronavirus ZC45. Click on this number to access the detailed info of this virus.

Descriptions

Graphic Summary

Alignments

Taxonomy

Sequences producing significant alignments

Download

Manage Columns

Show

100



select all 81 sequences selected

[GenPept](#)

[Graphics](#)

[Distance tree of results](#)

[Multiple alignment](#)

	Description	Max Score	Total Score	Query Cover	E value	Per. Ident	Accession
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	envelope protein [Bat SARS-like coronavirus]	144	144	100%	3e-43	100.00%	AVP78033.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	E protein [Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus]	137	137	100%	1e-40	94.74%	APO40581.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	envelope protein [Bat SARS-like coronavirus RsSHC014]	134	134	100%	2e-39	94.74%	AGZ48809.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	small envelope protein [Coronavirus BtRI-BetaCoV/SC2018]	134	134	100%	2e-39	94.74%	QDF43816.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RecName: Full=Envelope small membrane protein; Short=E protein; Short=sM protein [Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus]	134	134	100%	3e-39	94.74%	P59637.1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	small membrane protein [Bat SARS coronavirus HKU3-7]	133	133	100%	5e-39	93.42%	ADE34757.1

Blast for the E protein

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572675

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

envelope protein [Bat SARS-like coronavirus]

GenBank: AVP78033.1

[Identical Proteins](#) [FASTA](#) [Graphics](#)

[Go to:](#)

LOCUS AVP78033 75 aa linear VRL 05-FEB-2020
DEFINITION envelope protein [Bat SARS-like coronavirus].
ACCESSION AVP78033
VERSION AVP78033.1
DBSOURCE accession [MG772933.1](#)
KEYWORDS .
SOURCE Bat SARS-like coronavirus
ORGANISM [Bat SARS-like coronavirus](#)
Viruses; Riboviria; Orthornavirae; Pisuviricota; Pisoniviricetes;
Nidovirales; Cornidovirineae; Coronaviridae; Orthocoronavirinae;
Betacoronavirus; Sarbecovirus.
REFERENCE 1 (residues 1 to 75)
AUTHORS Hu,D., Zhu,C., Ai,L., He,T., Wang,Y., Ye,F., Yang,L., Ding,C.,
Zhu,X., Lv,R., Zhu,J., Hassan,B., Feng,Y., Tan,W. and Wang,C.
TITLE Genomic characterization and infectivity of a novel SARS-like
coronavirus in Chinese bats
JOURNAL Emerg Microbes Infect 7 (1), 154 (2018)
PUBMED [30209269](#)
REMARK Publication Status: Online-Only
REFERENCE 2 (residues 1 to 75)
AUTHORS Hu,D.
TITLE Direct Submission
JOURNAL Submitted (05-JAN-2018) Institute of Military Medicine Nanjing
Command, Nanjing, Institute of Military Medicine Nanjing Command,
Nanjing, NO. 293 East Zhongshan Road, Nanjing, JangSu 210002, China
FEATURES
source Location/Qualifiers
1..75
/organism="Bat SARS-like coronavirus"
/isolate="bat-SL-CoVZC45"
/host="Rhinolophus sinicus"
/db_xref="taxon:[1508227](#)"
/country="China"

Top hit is the bat-SL-CoVZC45 virus,
which is the only one being 100%
identical.

From: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@usaid.gov>;
 (b)(6)@hhs.gov>;
 Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Question
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 23:27:08 +0000

Morgan (b)(5)

(b)(5)

+ (b)(6)

--
 David Feith
 Senior Advisor
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6) (o)
 (b)(6) (c)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

On April 22, 2020 at 7:14:02 PM EDT, Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 Thanks. (b)(5) David

Sent from an iPhone

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 5:23:52 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Question

+ Feith

David,

(b)(5)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 5:00 PM

To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Question

Also + Miles

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:59 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R
(b)(6)@state.gov; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov; Brechbuhl, Thomas U
(b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@usaid.gov; (b)(6) HHS/OS/OGA
(b)(6)@hhs.gov
Subject: RE: Question

+ (b)(6) who may have answers to Margaret's question.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:52 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Biegun,

Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; Kenna, Lisa D

(b)(6)@state.gov; Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Fwd: Question

Hi All— (b)(5)

Cale— (b)(5)

Sent from an iPhone

From: Brennan, Margaret <BrennanM@cbsnews.com>

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:49:17 PM

To: Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Question

Hi -

Pompeo said the virus samples were destroyed and not shared by China. The WHO report said tissue samples were taken from a 50 year old male patient's lung, liver and heart. Did the US not get access?

Margaret

Sent from my iPhone

Sender: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@usaid.gov>;

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>;

Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (h)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Brechbuhl, Thomas U <(b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6) (AID/A) (h)(6)@usaid.gov>;
CC: (b)(6) (HHS/OS/OGA) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>;
 Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Question

Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 22:17:14 +0000

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

--
 David Feith
 Senior Advisor
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
 (b)(6) (c)
 (b)(6)@state.gov

On April 22, 2020 at 5:23:57 PM EDT, Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 + Feith

David,

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 5:00 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Question

Also + Miles

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:59 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brechbuhl, Thomas U (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Question

+ (b)(6) who may have answers to Margaret's question.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:52 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Brechbuhl, Thomas U <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: Question

Hi All— (b)(5)

Cale— (b)(5)

Sent from an iPhone

From: Brennan, Margaret <BrennanM@cbsnews.com>

Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:49:17 PM

To: Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Question

Hi -

Pompeo said the virus samples were destroyed and not shared by China. The WHO report said tissue samples were taken from a 50 year old male patient’s lung, liver and heart. Did the US not get access?

Margaret

Sent from my iPhone

Sender: "Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6) @state.gov>
Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) @state.gov>
(b)(6) @state.gov>
Brown, Cale (h)(6) @state.gov>
(b)(6) @state.gov>
Biegun, Stephen E (h)(6) @state.gov>
Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6) @state.gov>
Brechbuhl, Thomas U (h)(6) @state.gov>
(b)(6) @usaid.gov>
(b)(6) @hhs.gov>
Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Query

Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 01:35:49 +0000

(b)(6)
Here they are--as you can see, (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

Cheers!

Miles

I can also be reached at my JWICS account.

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary of State
Washington, DC

(b)(6) (office)
(b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 8:59 PM
To: Yu, Miles
Subject: Re: Query

Feel free to send them my way and I can get them to the right people. Thanks and hoping you are well too!

Get Outlook for

(b)(7)(E)

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 8:46:49 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Query

Hi (b)(6)
(b)(5)

Hope you are safe and healthy.

Miles

[state seal]

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)	(o)
	(c)

On Jul 28, 2020, at 7:36 PM, [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov> wrote:

Hi Miles, am out of town at moment back next Mon, if time sensitive I can call you Wed otherwise can reach out Mon.

Get Outlook for

(b)(7)(E)

From: Yu, Miles [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>
 Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 4:01:58 PM
 To: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov>
 Subject: Query

Hi [redacted (b)(6)]
 Do you have a minute for a quick chat either in person or on the phone?
 Thanks!
 Miles

[state seal]

Dr. M. Miles Yu

Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6) @state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@dni.gov;
(h)(6)WeandKAK@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Quay & Muller/WSJ: The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 13:36:56 +0000

I hope this new 90-day review does a better job of explaining the basis for conclusions and running through the main lines of evidence:

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 7:49 AM
To: (b)(6)@dni.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Quay & Muller/WSJ: The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak

In case you haven't seen - believe Muller is the physicist who moderated the infamous exchange back in January.

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, June 6, 2021 11:17 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Quay & Muller/WSJ: The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak

The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak

The Covid-19 pathogen has a genetic footprint that has never been observed in a natural coronavirus.

The possibility that the pandemic began with an escape from the Wuhan Institute of Virology is attracting fresh attention. President Biden has asked the national intelligence community to redouble efforts to investigate.

Much of the public discussion has focused on circumstantial evidence: mysterious illnesses in late 2019; the lab's work intentionally supercharging viruses to increase lethality (known as "gain of function" research). The Chinese Communist Party has been reluctant to release relevant information. Reports based on U.S. intelligence have suggested the lab collaborated on projects with the Chinese military.

OPINION: POTOMAC WATCH

Reading Dr. Anthony Fauci's Emails

SUBSCRIBE

But the most compelling reason to favor the lab leak hypothesis is firmly based in science. In particular, consider the genetic fingerprint of CoV-2, the novel coronavirus responsible for the disease Covid-19.

In gain-of-function research, a microbiologist can increase the lethality of a coronavirus enormously by splicing a special sequence into its genome at a prime location. Doing this leaves no trace of manipulation. But it alters the virus spike protein, rendering it easier for the virus to inject genetic material into the victim cell. Since 1992 there have been at least 11 separate experiments adding a special sequence to the same location. The end result has always been supercharged viruses.

NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP

Opinion: Morning Editorial Report

All the day's Opinion headlines.

PREVIEW
SUBSCRIBE

WSJ NEWSLETTER

Notes on the News

The news of the week in context, with Tyler Blint-Welsh.
I would also like to receive updates and special offers from Dow Jones and affiliates. I can unsubscribe at any time. I agree to the [Privacy Policy](#) and [Cookie Notice](#).

A genome is a blueprint for the factory of a cell to make proteins. The language is made up of three-letter "words," 64 in total, that represent the 20 different amino acids. For example, there are six different words for the amino acid arginine, the one that is often used in supercharging viruses. Every cell has a different preference for which word it likes to use most.

In the case of the gain-of-function supercharge, other sequences could have been spliced into this same site. Instead of a CGG-CGG (known as "double CGG") that tells the protein factory to make two arginine amino acids in a row, you'll obtain equal lethality by splicing any one of 35 of the other two-word combinations for double arginine. If the insertion takes place naturally, say through recombination, then one of those 35 other sequences is far more likely to appear; CGG is rarely used in the class of coronaviruses that can recombine with CoV-2.

In fact, in the entire class of coronaviruses that includes CoV-2, the CGG-CGG combination has never been found naturally. That means the common method of viruses picking up new skills, called recombination, cannot operate here. A virus

simply cannot pick up a sequence from another virus if that sequence isn't present in any other virus.

Although the double CGG is suppressed naturally, the opposite is true in laboratory work. The insertion sequence of choice is the double CGG. That's because it is readily available and convenient, and scientists have a great deal of experience inserting it. An additional advantage of the double CGG sequence compared with the other 35 possible choices: It creates a useful beacon that permits the scientists to track the insertion in the laboratory.

Now the damning fact. It was this exact sequence that appears in CoV-2. Proponents of zoonotic origin must explain why the novel coronavirus, when it mutated or recombined, happened to pick its least favorite combination, the double CGG. Why did it replicate the choice the lab's gain-of-function researchers would have made?

Yes, it could have happened randomly, through mutations. But do you believe that? At the minimum, this fact—that the coronavirus, with all its random possibilities, took the rare and unnatural combination used by human researchers—implies that the leading theory for the origin of the coronavirus must be laboratory escape.

When the lab's Shi Zhengli and colleagues published a paper in February 2020 with the virus's partial genome, they omitted any mention of the special sequence that supercharges the virus or the rare double CGG section. Yet the fingerprint is easily identified in the data that accompanied the paper. Was it omitted in the hope that nobody would notice this evidence of the gain-of-function origin?

But in a matter of weeks virologists Bruno Coutard and colleagues published their discovery of the sequence in CoV-2 and its novel supercharged site. Double CGG is there; you only have to look. They comment in their paper that the protein that held it "may provide a gain-of-function" capability to the virus, "for efficient spreading" to humans.


There is additional scientific evidence that points to CoV-2's gain-of-function origin. The most compelling is the dramatic differences in the genetic diversity of CoV-2, compared with the coronaviruses responsible for SARS and MERS.

Both of those were confirmed to have a natural origin; the viruses evolved rapidly as they spread through the human population, until the most contagious forms dominated. Covid-19 didn't work that way. It appeared in humans already adapted into an extremely contagious version. No serious viral "improvement" took place until a minor variation occurred many months later in England.

Such early optimization is unprecedented, and it suggests a long period of adaptation that predated its public spread. Science knows of only one way that could be achieved: simulated natural evolution, growing the virus on human cells until the optimum is achieved. That is precisely what is done in gain-of-function research. Mice that are genetically modified to have the same coronavirus receptor as humans, called "humanized mice," are repeatedly exposed to the virus to encourage adaptation.

The presence of the double CGG sequence is strong evidence of gene splicing, and the absence of diversity in the public outbreak suggests gain-of-function acceleration. The scientific evidence points to the conclusion that the virus was developed in a laboratory.

Dr. Quay is founder of Atossa Therapeutics and author of "Stay Safe: A Physician's Guide to Survive Coronavirus." Mr. Muller is an emeritus professor of physics at the University of California Berkeley and a former senior scientist at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.



Evidence that the coronavirus may have escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology catches up to Fauci and other Wuhan Covid deniers, despite suspicious facts that have been apparent from the start. Image: Johannes Eisele/AFP via Getty Images

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@dni.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM
Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 21:18:22 +0000

Yep, that works for me [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 5:05 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: FW: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

I got too busy and missed the deadline, but we can submit tomorrow. [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 12:08 PM
To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Ok - see below. [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 11:56 AM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Imagining I'm an outsider [redacted] (b)(5)
 [redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 11:53 AM
To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: FW: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Here's the one (b)(6) drafted last week that we haven't submitted yet (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 8:19 AM
To: ISN-All-Users-DL <ISN-All-Users-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Good morning,

Please ensure all DAR entries and calendar items are submitted to the ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL by 3:00 PM.

Thanks,

(b)(6)
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
Teleworking / (b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov;
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>
 EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>;
 Legal-EAP-DL <Legal-EAP-DL@state.gov>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: NO-FUSE CLEARANCE: (b)(5)
 (b)(5)
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 19:45:56 +0000

Hi, (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

Attorney-Adviser, L/OE5
 U.S. Department of State
 Mobile: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 3:19 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>; Legal-EAP-DL <Legal-EAP-DL@state.gov>

Subject: RE: NO-FUSE CLEARANCE: (b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of Chinese & Mongolian Affairs
HST Room 4318 | U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 3:09 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>

Subject: Re: NO-FUSE CLEARANCE: (b)(5)

Thanks, (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Attorney-Adviser, L/OES
U.S. Department of State

Mobile: (b)(6)



From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 2:43 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>
Subject: RE: NO-FUSE CLEARANCE: (b)(5)

+ (b)(6) (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 2:07 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>
Cc: EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>
Subject: Re: NO-FUSE CLEARANCE (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Please find comments and clearance from (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Warm regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) **Staff Assistant**
Bureau for International Organization Affairs
(b)(6)@state.gov

Status: teleworking from 11:00-20:00, available at (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 12:20 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>
Cc: EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>
Subject: NO-FUSE CLEARANCE: (b)(5)

Colleagues:

Apologies for the no-fuse request, (b)(5)
(b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Many thanks for your assistance,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Office of Chinese & Mongolian Affairs
HST Room 4318 | U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:50 AM
To: EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAP-StaffersMailbox@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Murphy/Markey WIV letter

EAP Colleagues,

H received the attached yesterday and tasked (b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5) Can you please let me know asap when a draft will be ready?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Bureau of Legislative Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@State.gov | (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 IO Special Assistants-DL <IOSpecialAssistants-DL@state.gov>;
 EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL <EAPCMBilatUnit@state.gov>;
 Legal-EAP-DL <Legal-EAP-DL@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: NO FUSE CLEARANCE DUE 7:15 AM 6/16: QFR for EAP A/S nominee on COVID origins
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 11:03:24 +0000

Hi (b)(6)

(b)(5) clears.

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 10:27 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

SP_EAP <SP_EAP@state.gov>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>

Subject: NO FUSE CLEARANCE DUE 7:15 AM 6/16: QFR for EAP A/S nominee on COVID origins

Colleagues –

Very sorry for the short fuse – please clear as soon as possible, NO LATER THAN 7:15AM, on the linked QFR for EAP A/S nominee Krittenbrink. ² [QFR_Krittenbrink_Risch5.docx](#) This is due to my leadership by 7:30AM, if I do not hear from you by then I will list you as info by request. For ease, I've also pasted the language below:

Question 5:

Do you support a thorough investigation by the U.S. government into the origins of COVID-19? Do you commit, if confirmed, that EAP will prioritize this issue and contribute to any State Department or interagency processes? Will you commit that EAP will not prevent the release of findings or outcomes of the investigation that could potentially strain our relationship with China?

Answer 5:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 8:34 PM
To: H_Tasking-EAP <H_Tasking-EAP@state.gov>
Cc: QFR_NOMS <QFR_NOMS@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Urgent Nomination QFR Tasker H20210616QFR110 Risch-Kritenbrink QFR 1-28

EAP Colleagues,

Attached are Questions for the Record from Senator Risch, following the June 16, 2021, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Nomination Hearing, submitted to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Nominee, Daniel J. Kritenbrink.

Please provide responses to the QFRs.

Please follow the attached Sample Format.

The deadline for responding is June 17, 2021, 5:00 p.m.

All QFR responses must be cleared with H (Congressional Advisor or H Nominations Director) and the Drafting Bureau. Info by Request (b)(5)

Addition clearance(s) from other bureaus may be requested, please review the incoming QFR(s) and tasker(s).

Please send fully cleared responses by e-mail to H Senate Nominations Director (b)(6)@state.gov and the "QFR NOMS" distribution list.

Requests to transfer action on Hearing QFRs/Takebacks:

Requests to transfer action on hearing QFRs or Take-backs should be made directly between respective bureaus. Once action is accepted, we will note the transfer in our files. Please include qfr_noms@state.gov and (b)(6)@state.gov on the email accepting the transfer.

My apologies in advance for this expedited deadline.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572985

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

Recipient: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: NIH says grantee failed to report experiment in Wuhan that created a bat virus that made mice sicker
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2021 21:18:47 +0000

Thanks, (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, October 22, 2021 2:19 PM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: NIH says grantee failed to report experiment in Wuhan that created a bat virus that made mice sicker

An ongoing controversy over what constitutes virology research that is too dangerous to conduct—and whether the U.S government funded studies in China that violated a policy barring funding for such risky research—has taken a new turn. While denying once again it had helped create the virus that sparked the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) revealed in a letter sent yesterday to Republicans in Congress that experiments it funded through a U.S.-based nonprofit in 2018 and 2019 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China had the “unexpected result” of creating a coronavirus that was more infectious in mice.

NIH says the organization holding the parent grant, the EcoHealth Alliance, failed to immediately report this result to the agency, as required. A newly released progress report on that grant also shows that EcoHealth and WIV conducted experiments changing the virus that causes Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), which is raising additional questions.

NIH noted in its letter that when the agency reviewed the original EcoHealth grant proposal, it determined the proposed experiments—designed to determine whether certain bat coronaviruses might infect humans—did not meet its definition of so-called gain-of-function (GOF) experiments that can make pathogens more dangerous to humans.

The letter is giving fuel to critics of NIH who say agency leaders have not been upfront with Congress about the work NIH was supporting in China, many of whom believe WIV could have created SARS-CoV-2, the virus behind the current pandemic. At the same time, NIH emphasized in a newly released analysis that any viruses being studied at WIV under the grant were too evolutionarily distant from SARS-CoV-2 to have been transformed into it.

NIH sent the 20 October letter to Representative James Comer (R-KY), ranking member of the House of Representatives oversight committee, along with a final progress report about the EcoHealth Alliance grant that NIH had funded and later canceled at then-President Donald Trump's behest. (It was later reinstated but with conditions EcoHealth said it could not comply with.) The report describes studies conducted at WIV between June 2018 and June 2019 on recently collected bat coronaviruses circulating in the wild in China. Some examined whether their spike proteins, which the viruses use to attach to and infect cells, could when expressed in a previously known bat coronavirus called WIV1, bind to the human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 cell receptor in a mouse model.

In a "limited experiment," mice infected with one of these chimeras, SHC014 WIV1, "became sicker than those infected with the WIV1 bat coronavirus. As sometimes occurs in science, this was an unexpected result ... as opposed to something that the researchers set out to do," states the letter from NIH Principal Deputy Director Lawrence Tabak.

Before the chimera work was funded, NIH had determined it was not GOF research involving what NIH calls "enhanced pathogens of pandemic potential," because neither the new bat coronaviruses nor WIV1 were known to infect humans, the letter says. But the letter says the terms of the grant stated that if the virus experiments produced certain results, such as "a one log increase in [virus] growth," EcoHealth should inform NIH "immediately" and that NIH would do a "secondary review" of the research, to see whether it should be re-evaluated or new biosafety measures imposed.

But "Ecohealth failed to report this finding right away, as was required by the terms of the grant," the letter states. It says EcoHealth now has 5 days to submit all unpublished data from the project.

EcoHealth embraced NIH's backing that it had not created SARS-CoV-2, but also challenged the agency's letter in a statement: "As the NIH states, the science is clear: none of the coronaviruses EcoHealth Alliance researched bear a close enough resemblance to the virus that causes COVID-19 to have played any role in its emergence. EcoHealth Alliance is working with the NIH to promptly address what we believe to be a misconception about the grant's reporting requirements and what the data from our research showed. These data were reported as soon

as we were made aware, in our year 4 report in April 2018. NIH reviewed those data and did not indicate that secondary review of our research was required, in fact year 5 funding was allowed to progress without delay. We are also working to answer any questions NIH has about the research on this R01 grant, which is not currently ongoing.”

Critics of NIH who claim the agency has lied about the work it funded at WIV pounced on the letter. Rutgers University, Piscataway, microbiologist Richard Ebright, a prominent critic of GOF research, commented in a tweet: “NIH corrects untruthful assertions by NIH Director [Francis] Collins and NIAID [National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases] Director [Anthony] Fauci that NIH had not funded gain-of-function research in Wuhan.”

Virologists who have reviewed the EcoHealth grant disagree on whether the chimera experiments fit the U.S. definition of GOF research of concern, according to a story last month in The Intercept. That media organization, which had sued under public records laws to force NIH to release the final progress report, today noted the report also detailed chimeric virus experiments with the MERS virus, which infects humans; the EcoHealth report describes changing the binding properties of the spike protein of the MERS virus. One virologist told The Intercept the experiment was “sort of crazy” and “definitely gain of function” research.

Along with its letter to Congress, NIH appended and also posted online a new analysis asserting that the viruses studied at WIV under the grant share no more than 96% to 97% of the SARS-CoV-2 sequence, which puts the viruses “decades” of evolution apart.

“The naturally occurring bat coronaviruses studied under the NIH grant are genetically far distant from SARS-CoV-2 and could not possibly have caused the COVID-19 pandemic. Any claims to the contrary are demonstrably false,” the agency said in a statement.

<https://www.science.org/content/article/nih-says-grantee-failed-report-experiment-wuhan-created-bat-virus-made-mice-sicker>

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: [redacted] (b)(6)@dni.gov>; Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 18:22:12 +0000

I'll be in Wednesday and free after 3:45!

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@dni.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 8, 2021 1:12 PM
To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

Hi Chris and [redacted] (b)(6) thanks for this, hadn't seen. Also, I'm planning to come by State on Wed afternoon, will hopefully have a little time later in the afternoon to come say hi if you're around!

[redacted] (b)(6)
 Director for Global Health Security
 Strategic Futures Group | National Intelligence Council
 (tel) [redacted] (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 9:41 AM
To: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@dni.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>
Subject: RE: NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

[redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 3, 2021 9:37 PM
To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@dni.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Re: NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, November 3, 2021 8:38 PM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@dni.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: FW: NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

(b)(5)

From: yorik (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, November 3, 2021 7:21 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

<https://theintercept.com/2021/11/03/coronavirus-research-ecohealth-nih-emails/>

NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

Emails show that NIH officials allowed EcoHealth Alliance to craft oversight language governing its own gain-of-function research.

November 3 2021, 2:27 p.m.

The National Institutes of Health allowed a U.S. nonprofit it funds to police its own controversial research on bat coronaviruses in China, raising new concerns about insufficient oversight at the agency.

Detailed notes on NIH communications obtained by The Intercept show that beginning in May 2016, agency staff had an unusual exchange with Peter Daszak, the head of EcoHealth Alliance, about experiments his group was planning to conduct on coronaviruses under an NIH grant called "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence." The notes were taken by congressional staff who transcribed the emails. EcoHealth was entering the third year of the five-year, \$3.1 million grant that included research with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and other partners. In a 2016 progress report, the group described to NIH its plans to carry out two planned experiments infecting humanized mice with hybrid viruses, known as "chimeras."

The plans triggered concerns at NIH. Two staff members — Jenny Greer, a grants management specialist, and Erik Stemmy, a program officer handling coronavirus research — wrote to EcoHealth Alliance to say that the experiments "appear to involve research covered under the pause," referring to a temporary moratorium on funding for gain-of-function research that would be reasonably anticipated to make MERS and SARS viruses more pathogenic or transmissible in mammals. Generally, gain-of-function research involves manipulating viruses to give them new attributes; it becomes of concern to the government when the altered viruses appear likely to cause more severe disease or spread more easily among humans.

One of the experiments proposed by EcoHealth Alliance involved making chimeras from the MERS virus. The other experiment used chimeras developed from bat viruses related to SARS. The researchers went on to infect the genetically engineered mice with the altered viruses.

Initially, NIH staff appeared intent on enforcing the funding pause. The two administrators requested additional information from EcoHealth Alliance within 15 days and noted that the next round of funding would be withheld until the information was received. They also asked the group to provide a detailed description of changes that

would allow the researchers to pursue their aims without conducting the dangerous experiments.

Agency staff adopted language that EcoHealth Alliance crafted to govern its own work.

But what happened next sets off alarm bells for biosafety advocates: Agency staff adopted language that EcoHealth Alliance crafted to govern its own work. The agency inserted several sentences into grant materials describing immediate actions the group would take if the viruses they created proved to become more transmissible or disease-causing as the result of the experiments.

Although the experiments demonstrate a lack of oversight and present dangers to public health, according to several scientists contacted by The Intercept, none of the viruses involved in the work are related closely enough to SARS-CoV-2 to have sparked the pandemic.

Serious Risks

In December 2017, the funding for some gain-of-function research was resumed under carefully constructed guidelines for “Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight,” or P3CO — but the language suggested by Daszak helped the group evade this oversight as well. In July 2018, NIAID program officers decided that the experiments on humanized mice — which had been conducted a few months earlier — would get a pass from these restrictions as long as EcoHealth Alliance immediately notified appropriate agency officials according to the circumstances that the group had laid out.

While it is not unusual for grantees to communicate with their federal program officers, the negotiation of this matter did not appropriately reflect the gravity of the situation, according to Jesse Bloom, a virologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center. “The discussions reveal that neither party is taking the risks sufficiently seriously,” said Bloom. “MERS-CoV has killed hundreds of people and is thought to pose a pandemic risk, so it’s difficult to see how chimeras of MERS-CoV with other high risk bat coronaviruses shouldn’t also be considered a pandemic risk.”

“The NIH is bending over backward to help people it’s funded.”

“It’s absolutely outrageous,” said Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris. “The NIH is bending over backward to help people it’s funded. It isn’t clear that the NIH is protecting the U.S. taxpayer.”

The NIH did not respond to questions about the communications with Daszak. EcoHealth Alliance did not immediately respond to questions.

In a written response to questions submitted in September and October, an NIH spokesperson told The Intercept that the rule that was supposed to trigger a stop to the research was added “out of an abundance of caution.” Similarly, in a letter sent to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform last month, NIH principal deputy director Lawrence Tabak called the rule “an additional layer of oversight,” implying that the agency had devised the rule itself. But the notes reviewed by The Intercept show that the language was inserted at Daszak’s suggestion and that the NIH and EcoHealth Alliance worked together to evade additional oversight.

Daszak responded to the NIH on June 8, 2016, arguing that, because EcoHealth Alliance’s proposed hybrid viruses were significantly different from the SARS virus, which was already known to infect humans, the experiments were not gain-of-function research and should not be restricted.

Daszak also pointed out that WIV1, the parent of the proposed chimeric SARS-like viruses, “has never been demonstrated to infect humans or cause human disease,” according to the transcribed emails. And he said that previous research “strongly suggests that the chimeric bat spike/bat backbone viruses should not have enhanced pathogenicity in animals.” The NIH would go on to accept these arguments.

But the group’s argument that its viral research did not pose a risk of infection appears to contradict the justification for the work: that these pathogens could potentially cause a pandemic. “The entire rationale of EcoHealth’s grant renewal on SARS-related CoVs is that viruses with spikes substantially (10-25%) diverged from SARS-CoV-1 pose a pandemic risk,” said Bloom. “Given that this is the entire rationale for the work, how can they simultaneously argue these viruses should not be regulated as potential pandemic pathogens?”

The NIH has not made the correspondence public. Instead, the agency arranged for an “in camera” review for select congressional staff. The staffers were allowed to read and take notes on printed copies of the written exchange — an unusual approach for grant communications that are in the public interest. The Intercept reviewed notes taken by congressional staff.

“Given the importance and interest in this topic, it’s important for the NIH to be fully transparent about the research they support and how they make crucial decisions about the regulation of research on potential pandemic pathogens,” said Bloom.

The Escape Clause

Regulating risky research is the NIH's role. But Daszak gave his group a way out. If the recombinant viruses grew more quickly than the original viruses on which they were based, he suggested, EcoHealth Alliance and its collaborators would immediately stop its research and inform their NIAID program officer. Specifically, he suggested a threshold beyond which his researchers would not go: If the novel SARS or MERS chimeras showed evidence of enhanced virus growth greater than 1 log (or 10 times) over the original viruses and grow more efficiently in human lung cells, the scientist would immediately stop their experiments with the mutant viruses and inform their NIAID program officer.

In a July 7 letter to EcoHealth Alliance, NIH's Greer and Stemmy formally accepted Daszak's proposed rule. The chimeric viruses were "not reasonably anticipated" to "have enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route," the administrators concluded, according to the transcribed emails.

The language that the NIH later inserted into the grant was strikingly similar to what Daszak proposed: "Should any of the MERS-like or SARS-like chimeras generated under this grant show evidence of enhanced virus growth greater than 1 log over the parental backbone strain you must stop all experiments with these viruses."

But when the scientists conducted the experiments in 2018, one of the chimeric viruses grew at a rate that produced a viral load of log 4 — or 10,000 times — greater than the parent virus. Even so, the work was allowed to proceed.

Despite the careful wording meant to assure the agency that the research would be immediately halted if it enhanced the viruses' pathogenicity or transmissibility, EcoHealth violated its own rule and did not immediately report the concerning results to NIH, according to the [letter](#) from NIH's Tabak.

In a letter [sent to NIH on October 26](#), Daszak insisted EcoHealth Alliance did comply with all the requirements of its NIH grant, pointing out that the group reported the results of its experiment in its year four progress report, which it submitted to the agency in April 2018 — and that no one at the agency responded to the description of the experiment. "At no time did program staff indicate to us that this work required further clarification or secondary review," he wrote.

Daszak also argued in the letter that the viral growth reported in the year four progress report did not correspond to the viral growth outlined in the rule he himself had devised. "The experiment we reported to NIH actually shows genome copies per gram not viral titer."

Daszak emphasized that the growth of the chimeric viruses in the genetically engineered mice was enhanced only in the early part of the experiment. "By day 6-8, there was no discernably significant difference among the different viral types," he wrote.

Yet virologists contacted by The Intercept dismissed both the distinction between viral titer and viral growth and the focus on the latter part of the mouse experiment, when the rate of growth between the viruses had evened out.

"I don't agree with their interpretation," said Wain-Hobson, of the Pasteur Institute. He described the EcoHealth Alliance's response as "hairsplitting" and said that viral growth inevitably peters out. "Every growth of a virus comes to a plateau. This has been known since time immemorial," said Wain-Hobson, who explained that the eventual cessation of viral growth is due to a lack of nutrients. "They have chosen this interpretation because it suits them."

NIH officials have previously stated unequivocally that the agency did not fund any gain-of-function research in Wuhan. "The NIH has not ever and does not now fund gain-of-function research in the Wuhan Institute of Virology," said Anthony Fauci, the head of the NIAID, during a Senate hearing in May. Fauci is scheduled to testify before the Senate health committee tomorrow morning.

In its statement to The Intercept, an NIH spokesperson wrote, "the Agency did not support the kind of 'gain of function' research warranting the additional and unique P3CO oversight identified by stakeholders during extensive prior policy development. To claim otherwise is incorrect and irresponsible." And in his letter last month, Tabak reiterated the claim that the research was not gain-of-function.

But the correspondence with Daszak makes clear that at least some at the agency were concerned that EcoHealth Alliance's proposed experiments met the criteria for gain-of-function research of concern as early as 2016.

According to Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University who has criticized the lack of federal oversight of gain-of-function research, the fact that the NIH allowed EcoHealth Alliance to write its own rules is further evidence of the NIH's regulatory failure. "This is like the teacher giving you the opportunity to write your own homework problem and grade your own homework when you turn it in. Then you decide the teacher is so lenient, there's no need to hand it in," said Ebright. "The oversight process clearly failed."

Beyond the question of oversight, others question whether these experiments should be conducted at all.

"In addition to the legalistic questions of whether EcoHealth and NIH were adhering to current guidelines," said Bloom, "we urgently need a broader discussion about whether

it's a good idea to be making novel chimeras of coronaviruses that are at this point universally acknowledged to pose a pandemic risk to humans."

Sent from my iPhone

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@dni.gov>;
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: NIH discussion
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 18:57:29 +0000

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)
From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 1:15 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: NIH discussion

(b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 1:05 PM
To: (b)(6)@nih.gov>
Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Scientific murder board

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@nih.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 9:37 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Scientific murder board

Hey (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Take care,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Date: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 at 8:21 PM

To: (b)(6)@nih.gov>

Cc: "DiNanno, Thomas G" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Scientific murder board

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



Op-Ed: COVID-19 lesson:
Diseases can be ideal
biological weapons - Los
Angeles Times

The devastation COVID-19 has wrought on the U.S. population is staggering. Yet the risks it poses to our national security are also chilling: Diseases are, in many terrible ways, ideal weapons.

www.latimes.com

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

NSRI Strategic Advisor

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)


US Department of State

(b)(6)

NSTS (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov



Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology - The National Academies Press

Copy the HTML code below to embed this book in your own blog, website, or application. An uncorrected copy, or prepublication, is an uncorrected proof of the book. We publish prepublications to facilitate timely access to the committee's findings. The final version of this book has not been ...

www.nap.edu

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@nih.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 6:44 PM

To: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Scientific murder board

Hey [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(5)

Thanks!

[redacted] (b)(6)

Sender: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G <[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Feith, David [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>;

[redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Ryan Hass (b)(6)@brookings.edu>
Subject: RE: New York Mag: The Lab Leak Hypothesis #3 of 3
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2021 02:38:54 +0000

Ryan

Good question and reminds me that we need to emphasize the key point: If we don't fix this now, it will happen again. The virologists I'm talking to estimate 3-5 years before another lab leak devastates the world, again. China has a growing biowarfare program that, much like their nuclear program, they refuse to share with the world. I'm sure you're following Marshall Billingslea's efforts to get Beijing to participate in nuke talks. Beijing says "we only have a few hundred warheads" but without any verification regime, there's no way to validate that claim which is their goal. Strategic stability requires transparency, and the opaque nature of their biowarfare program is beyond disturbing—it's responsible for nearly 2 million deaths worldwide. I can share with you a significant body of work that shows how, since SARS in 2003, there have been repeated lab accidents, like the one in 2004 in Beijing, that show China must open up to more international oversight.

The Jan and Mar '18 cables that Josh Rogin FOIA'ed tell the story well. Beijing ESTH got a tour of the Wuhan facility and noted the many safety violations as China raced to be seen as a world leader in Virology (my conclusion). If you've seen the HBO series "Chernobyl" you'll see parallels between two authoritarian systems that do not allow the free movement of information. Bad news is not allowed to move up, meaning a small issue will be allowed to get out of control until it can no longer be denied; and then action is finally taken. The Soviets managed to muster the courage to contain Chernobyl; the CCP did not. Much safer to deny the problem and then cover up than threaten the legitimacy of the Party.

I'm sick of wearing masks and avoiding human contact. The American economy is dying during the pandemic. China is crowing about how well it handled the pandemic (that it created). They see advantage in hobbling the rest of us to achieve the goal of "approaching the global center stage." 2021 is an important year for the Party; nothing will be allowed to rain on it, certainly not the WHO. And the rest of us will continue to struggle with an avoidable crisis.

Best
Stilly

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-families-should-be-sweeping-graves-now-but-thousands-still-havent-buried-their-dead/2020/04/03/5a6daa50-7234-11ea-ad9b-254ec99993bc_story.html

From: Ryan Hass (b)(6)@brookings.edu>
Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 3:59 PM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: New York Mag: The Lab Leak Hypothesis #3 of 3

Hi Stilly,

I haven't received much of a response on your comments wrt potential lab leak. Personally, I'm a bit unclear on why this administration is focused on this question. What difference does it make at this point? Will it make it easier to contain the spread of the virus? Distribute vaccines? Recover the economy?

I think China's plummeting poll numbers around the world already attest to the fact that many hold China responsible for its negligent initial response and attempted cover-up. I'm not sure how much more juice there is to squeeze on the whole question of Chinese culpability. COVID-19 became a global pandemic in large part because of China's atrocious initial reaction to it. That feels pretty well established at this point.

Perhaps there is an angle to this discussion I am missing.

To be honest, the comment that seemed to get more people cranked up – at least based on the feedback I got – was the reference to the mob violence as a “bump.” That comment struck a nerve with several folks, perhaps given the rawness of events just the day prior to our roundtable.

Everyone I have spoken with has expressed appreciation for the event, indicating that they were glad you gave the time to share your thoughts. So, overall, very good responses among participants to the event.

Good luck on the home stretch!

Best wishes,

Ryan Hass

Senior Fellow

Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies, Interim Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies

John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Ave NW

Washington, DC, 20036

Phone: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)@brookings.edu

Twitter: @ryanl_hass

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 8:29 PM

To: Ryan Hass <(b)(6)@brookings.edu>

Subject: RE: New York Mag: The Lab Leak Hypothesis #3 of 3

Sorry for the serial emails. . . Would enjoy hearing feedback from my “Lab Origins? Blasphemy!” rant this morning. You will find that the narrative will land in a more reasonable place as soon as nobody has to admit that POTUS might have been right.

How did we get to this point?

From: Ryan Hass <(b)(6)@brookings.edu>
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 9:22 AM
To: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: New York Mag: The Lab Leak Hypothesis #3 of 3

Thanks, Stilly.

Look forward to seeing you soon.

Ryan Hass

Senior Fellow

Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies, Interim Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo
Chair in Taiwan Studies

John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Ave NW

Washington, DC, 20036

Phone: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)@brookings.edu

Twitter: @ryanl_hass

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 8:57 AM
To: Ryan Hass <(b)(6)@brookings.edu>
Cc: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: New York Mag: The Lab Leak Hypothesis #3 of 3

This looks awfully interesting. The story the New Yorker wouldn't tell...

<https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/coronavirus-lab-escape-theory.html>

Jan 7, 2021, 6:00 AM.
The Lab-Leak Hypothesis

The Lab Leak Hypothesis

For decades, scientists have been hot-wiring viruses in hopes of preventing a pandemic, not causing one. But what if ...?

By *Nicholson Baker*

I.

Flask Monsters

What happened was fairly simple, I've come to believe. It was an accident. A virus spent some time in a laboratory, and eventually it got out. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, began its existence inside a bat, then it learned how to infect people in a claustrophobic mine shaft, and then it was made more infectious in one or more laboratories, perhaps as part of a scientist's well-intentioned but risky effort to create a broad-spectrum vaccine. SARS-2 was not designed as a biological weapon. But it was, I think, designed. Many thoughtful people dismiss this notion, and they may be right. They sincerely believe that the coronavirus arose naturally, "zoonotically," from animals, without having been previously studied, or hybridized, or sluiced through cell cultures, or otherwise worked on by trained professionals. They hold that a bat, carrying a coronavirus, infected some other creature, perhaps a pangolin, and that the pangolin may have already been sick with a different coronavirus disease, and out of the conjunction and commingling of those two diseases within the pangolin, a new disease, highly infectious to humans, evolved. Or they hypothesize that two coronaviruses recombined in a bat, and this new virus spread to other bats, and then the bats infected a person directly — in a rural setting, perhaps — and that this person caused a simmering undetected outbreak of respiratory disease, which over a period of months or years evolved to become virulent and highly transmissible but was not noticed until it appeared in Wuhan.

There is no direct evidence for these zoonotic possibilities, just as there is no direct evidence for an experimental mishap — no written confession, no incriminating notebook, no official accident report. Certainty craves detail, and detail requires an investigation. It has been a full year, 80 million people

have been infected, and, surprisingly, no public investigation has taken place. We still know very little about the origins of this disease.

Nevertheless, I think it's worth offering some historical context for our yearlong medical nightmare. We need to hear from the people who for years have contended that certain types of virus experimentation might lead to a disastrous pandemic like this one. And we need to stop hunting for new exotic diseases in the wild, shipping them back to laboratories, and hot-wiring their genomes to prove how dangerous to human life they might become.

Over the past few decades, scientists have developed ingenious methods of evolutionary acceleration and recombination, and they've learned how to trick viruses, coronaviruses in particular, those spiky hairballs of protein we now know so well, into moving quickly from one species of animal to another or from one type of cell culture to another. They've made machines that mix and mingle the viral code for bat diseases with the code for human diseases — diseases like SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome, for example, which arose in China in 2003, and MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome, which broke out a decade later and has to do with bats and camels. Some of the experiments — “gain of function” experiments — aimed to create new, more virulent, or more infectious strains of diseases in an effort to predict and therefore defend against threats that might conceivably arise in nature. The term *gain of function* is itself a euphemism; the Obama White House more accurately described this work as “experiments that may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to influenza, MERS, or SARS viruses such that the virus would have enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route.” The virologists who carried out these experiments have accomplished amazing feats of genetic transmutation, no question, and there have been very few publicized accidents over the years. But there have been some.

And we were warned, repeatedly. The intentional creation of new microbes that combine virulence with heightened transmissibility “poses extraordinary risks to the public,” wrote infectious-disease experts Marc Lipsitch and Thomas Inglesby in 2014. “A rigorous and transparent risk-assessment process for this work has not yet been established.” That's still true today. In 2012, in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Lynn Klotz warned that there was an 80 percent chance, given how many laboratories were then handling virulent viro-varietals, that a leak of a potential pandemic pathogen would occur sometime in the next 12 years.

A lab accident — a dropped flask, a needle prick, a mouse bite, an illegibly labeled bottle — is apolitical. Proposing that something unfortunate happened during a scientific experiment in Wuhan — where COVID-19 was first diagnosed and where there are three high-security virology labs, one of which held in its freezers the most comprehensive inventory of sampled bat viruses in the world — isn't a conspiracy theory. It's just a theory. It merits attention, I believe, alongside other reasoned attempts to explain the source of our current catastrophe.

II.

“A Reasonable Chance”

From early 2020, the world was brooding over the origins of COVID-19. People were reading research papers, talking about what kinds of live animals were or were not sold at the Wuhan seafood market — wondering where the new virus had come from.

Meanwhile, things got strange all over the world. The Chinese government shut down transportation and built hospitals at high speed. There were video clips of people who'd suddenly dropped unconscious in the street. A doctor on YouTube told us how we were supposed to scrub down our produce when we got back from the supermarket. A scientist named Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology published a paper saying that the novel coronavirus was 96 percent identical to a bat virus, RaTG13, found in Yunnan province in southern China. On March 13, I wrote in my journal that there seemed to be something oddly artificial about the disease: “It's too airborne — too catching — it's something that has been selected for infectivity. That's what I suspect. No way to know so no reason to waste time thinking about it.”

This was just a note to self — at the time, I hadn't interviewed scientists about SARS-2 or read their research papers. But I did know something about pathogens and laboratory accidents; I published a book last year, *Baseless*, that talks about some of them. The book is named after a Pentagon program, Project Baseless, whose goal, as of 1951, was to achieve “an Air Force-wide combat capability in biological and chemical warfare at the earliest possible date.”

A vast treasure was spent by the U.S. on the amplification and aerial delivery of diseases — some well known, others obscure and stealthy. America's biological-weapons program in the '50s had A1-priority status, as high as

nuclear weapons. In preparation for a total war with a numerically superior communist foe, scientists bred germs to be resistant to antibiotics and other drug therapies, and they infected lab animals with them, using a technique called “serial passaging,” in order to make the germs more virulent and more catching.

And along the way, there were laboratory accidents. By 1960, hundreds of American scientists and technicians had been hospitalized, victims of the diseases they were trying to weaponize. Charles Armstrong, of the National Institutes of Health, one of the consulting founders of the American germ-warfare program, investigated Q fever three times, and all three times, scientists and staffers got sick. In the anthrax pilot plant at Camp Detrick, Maryland, in 1951, a microbiologist, attempting to perfect the “foaming process” of high-volume production, developed a fever and died. In 1964, veterinary worker Albert Nickel fell ill after being bitten by a lab animal. His wife wasn’t told that he had Machupo virus, or Bolivian hemorrhagic fever. “I watched him die through a little window to his quarantine room at the Detrick infirmary,” she said.

In 1977, a worldwide epidemic of influenza A began in Russia and China; it was eventually traced to a sample of an American strain of flu preserved in a laboratory freezer since 1950. In 1978, a hybrid strain of smallpox killed a medical photographer at a lab in Birmingham, England; in 2007, live foot-and-mouth disease leaked from a faulty drainpipe at the Institute for Animal Health in Surrey. In the U.S., “more than 1,100 laboratory incidents involving bacteria, viruses and toxins that pose significant or bioterror risks to people and agriculture were reported to federal regulators during 2008 through 2012,” reported *USA Today* in an exposé published in 2014.

In 2015, the Department of Defense discovered that workers at a germ-warfare testing center in Utah had mistakenly sent close to 200 shipments of live anthrax to laboratories throughout the United States and also to Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and several other countries over the past 12 years. In 2019, laboratories at Fort Detrick — where “defensive” research involves the creation of potential pathogens to defend against — were shut down for several months by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for “breaches of containment.” They reopened in December 2019.

High-containment laboratories have a whispered history of near misses. Scientists are people, and people have clumsy moments and poke themselves and get bitten by the enraged animals they are trying to nasally inoculate. Machines can create invisible aerosols, and cell solutions can become

contaminated. Waste systems don't always work properly. Things can go wrong in a hundred different ways.

Hold that human fallibility in your mind. And then consider the cautious words of Alina Chan, a scientist who works at the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard. "There is a reasonable chance that what we are dealing with is the result of a lab accident," Chan told me in July of last year. There was also, she added, a reasonable chance that the disease had evolved naturally — both were scientific possibilities. "I don't know if we will ever find a smoking gun, especially if it was a lab accident. The stakes are so high now. It would be terrifying to be blamed for millions of cases of COVID-19 and possibly up to a million deaths by year end, if the pandemic continues to grow out of control. The Chinese government has also restricted their own scholars and scientists from looking into the origins of SARS-CoV-2. At this rate, the origin of SARS-CoV-2 may just be buried by the passage of time."

I asked Jonathan A. King, a molecular biologist and biosafety advocate from MIT, whether he'd thought *lab accident* when he first heard about the epidemic. "Absolutely, absolutely," King answered. Other scientists he knew were concerned as well. But scientists, he said, in general were cautious about speaking out. There were "very intense, very subtle pressures" on them not to push on issues of laboratory biohazards. Collecting lots of bat viruses, and passaging those viruses repeatedly through cell cultures, and making bat-human viral hybrids, King believes, "generates new threats and desperately needs to be reined in."

"All possibilities should be on the table, including a lab leak," a scientist from the NIH, Philip Murphy — chief of the Laboratory of Molecular Immunology — wrote me recently. Nikolai Petrovsky, a professor of endocrinology at Flinders University College of Medicine in Adelaide, Australia, said in an email, "There are indeed many unexplained features of this virus that are hard if not impossible to explain based on a completely natural origin." Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University, wrote that he'd been concerned for some years about the Wuhan laboratory and about the work being done there to create "chimeric" (i.e., hybrid) SARS-related bat coronaviruses "with enhanced human infectivity." Ebright said, "In this context, the news of a novel coronavirus in Wuhan ***screamed*** lab release."


“No Credible Evidence”

The new disease, as soon as it appeared, was intercepted — stolen and politicized by people with ulterior motives. The basic and extremely interesting scientific question of what happened was sucked up into an ideological sharknado.

Some Americans boycotted Chinese restaurants; others bullied and harassed Asian Americans. Steve Bannon, broadcasting from his living room, in a YouTube series called *War Room*, said that the Chinese Communist Party had made a biological weapon and intentionally released it. He called it the “CCP virus.” And his billionaire friend and backer, Miles Guo, a devoted Trump supporter, told a right-wing website that the communists’ goal was to “use the virus to infect selective people in Hong Kong, so that the Chinese Communist Party could use it as an excuse to impose martial law there and ultimately crush the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. But it backfired terribly.”

In *The Lancet*, in February, a powerful counterstatement appeared, signed by 27 scientists. “We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin,” the statement said. “Scientists from multiple countries have published and analyzed genomes of the causative agent, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and they overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife, as have so many other emerging pathogens.”

The behind-the-scenes organizer of this *Lancet* statement, Peter Daszak, is a zoologist and bat-virus sample collector and the head of a New York nonprofit called EcoHealth Alliance — a group that (as veteran science journalist Fred Guterl explained later in *Newsweek*) has channeled money from the National Institutes of Health to Shi Zhengli’s laboratory in Wuhan, allowing the lab to carry on recombinant research into diseases of bats and humans. “We have a choice whether to stand up and support colleagues who are being attacked and threatened daily by conspiracy theorists or to just turn a blind eye,” Daszak said in February in *Science* magazine.



How Did It Get Out? 1. The Tongguan Mine Shaft in Mojiang, Yunnan, where, in 2013, fragments of RaTG13, the closest known relative of SARSCoV-2, were recovered and transported to the Wuhan Institute of Virology; **2. The Wuhan Institute of Virology**, where Shi Zhengli's team brought the RaTG13 sample, sequenced its genome, then took it out of the freezer several times in recent years; **3. The Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention**, which first reported signs of the novel coronavirus in hospital patients; **4. The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market**, an early suspected origin of the pandemic, where the first major outbreak occurred. Illustration: Map by Jason Lee

Vincent Racaniello, a professor at Columbia and a co-host of a podcast called *This Week in Virology*, said on February 9 that the idea of an accident in Wuhan was “complete bunk.” The coronavirus was 96 percent similar to a bat virus found in 2013, Racaniello said. “It’s not a man-made virus. It wasn’t released from a lab.”

Racaniello’s dismissal was seconded by a group of scientists from Ohio State, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of North Carolina, who put out a paper in *Emerging Microbes and Infections* to quiet the “speculations, rumors, and conspiracy theories that SARS-CoV-2 is of laboratory origin.” There was “currently no credible evidence” that SARS-2 leaked from a lab, these scientists said, using a somewhat different argument from Racaniello’s. “Some people have alleged that the human SARS-CoV-2 was leaked directly from a laboratory in Wuhan where a bat CoV (RaTG13) was recently

reported,” they said. But RaTG13 could not be the source because it differed from the human SARS-2 virus by more than a thousand nucleotides. One of the paper’s authors, Susan Weiss, told the Raleigh *News & Observer*, “The conspiracy theory is ridiculous.”

The most influential natural-origin paper, “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2,” by a group of biologists that included Kristian Andersen of Scripps Research, appeared online in a preliminary version in mid-February. “We do not believe any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible,” the scientists said. Why? Because molecular-modeling software predicted that if you wanted to optimize an existing bat virus so that it would replicate well in human cells, you would arrange things a different way than how the SARS-2 virus actually does it — even though the SARS-2 virus does an extraordinarily good job of replicating in human cells. The laboratory-based scenario was implausible, the paper said, because, although it was true that the virus could conceivably have developed its unusual genetic features in a laboratory, a stronger and “more parsimonious” explanation was that the features came about through some kind of natural mutation or recombination. “What we think,” explained one of the authors, Robert F. Garry of Tulane University, on YouTube, “is that this virus is a recombinant. It probably came from a bat virus, plus perhaps one of these viruses from the pangolin.” Journalists, for the most part, echoed the authoritative pronouncements of Daszak, Racaniello, Weiss, Andersen, and other prominent natural-originists. “The balance of the scientific evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the new coronavirus emerged from nature — be it the Wuhan market or somewhere else,” said the Washington *Post*’s “Fact Checker” column. “Dr. Fauci Again Dismisses Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus,” said CBS News, posting a video interview of Anthony Fauci by *National Geographic*. “If you look at the evolution of the virus in bats, and what’s out there now,” Fauci said, “it’s very, very strongly leaning toward ‘This could not have been artificially or deliberately manipulated’ — the way the mutations have naturally evolved.”

Everyone took sides; everyone thought of the new disease as one more episode in an ongoing partisan struggle. Think of Mike Pompeo, that landmass of Cold War truculence; think of Donald Trump himself. They stood at their microphones saying, in a winking, I-know-something-you-don’t-know sort of way, that this disease escaped from a Chinese laboratory. Whatever they were saying must be wrong. It became impermissible, almost taboo, to admit that, of course, SARS-2 could have come from a lab accident. “The administration’s claim that the virus spread from a Wuhan lab has made the notion politically

toxic, even among scientists who say it could have happened,” wrote science journalist Mara Hvistendahl in the Intercept.

IV.

“Is It a Complete Coincidence?”

Even so, in January and February of 2020, there were thoughtful people who were speaking up, formulating their perplexities.

One person was Sam Hussein, who works for Consortium News. He went to a CDC press conference at the National Press Club on February 11, 2020. By then, 42,000 people had gotten sick in China and more than a thousand had died. But there were only 13 confirmed cases in the U.S. Halfway through the Q&A period, Hussein went to the microphone and asked the CDC’s representative, Anne Schuchat, where the virus had come from. His head was spinning, he told me later.

“Obviously the main concern is how to stop the virus,” Hussein said; nonetheless, he wanted to know more about its source. “Is it the CDC’s contention,” he asked, “that there’s absolutely no relation to the BSL-4 lab in Wuhan? It’s my understanding that this is the only place in China with a BSL-4 lab. We in the United States have, I think, two dozen or so, and there have been problems and incidents.” (A BSL-4 laboratory is a maximum-security biosafety-level-four facility, used to house research on the most dangerous known pathogens. *New York* has confirmed there are at least 11 BSL-4 facilities currently operating in the U.S.) Hussein hastened to say that he wasn’t implying that what happened in Wuhan was in any way intentional. “I’m just asking, Is it a complete coincidence that this outbreak happened in the one city in China with a BSL-4 lab?”

Schuchat thanked Hussein for his questions and comments. Everything she’d seen was quite consistent with a natural, zoonotic origin for the disease, she said.

That same month, a group of French scientists from Aix-Marseille University posted a paper describing their investigation of a small insertion in the genome of the new SARS-2 virus. The virus’s spike protein contained a sequence of amino acids that formed what Etienne Decroly and colleagues called a “peculiar furin-like cleavage site” — a chemically sensitive region on the lobster claw of the spike protein that would react in the presence of an enzyme called furin, which is a type of protein found everywhere within the

human body, but especially in the lungs. When the spike senses human furin, it shudders, chemically speaking, and the enzyme opens the protein, commencing the tiny morbid ballet whereby the virus burns a hole in a host cell's outer membrane and finds its way inside.

The code for this particular molecular feature — not found in SARS or any SARS-like bat viruses, but present in a slightly different form in the more lethal MERS virus — is easy to remember because it's a roar: "R-R-A-R." The letter code stands for amino acids: arginine, arginine, alanine, and arginine. Its presence, so Decroly and his colleagues observed, may heighten the "pathogenicity" — that is, the god-awfulness — of a disease.

Botao Xiao, a professor at the South China University of Technology, posted a short paper on a preprint server titled "The Possible Origins of 2019-nCoV Coronavirus." Two laboratories, the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention (WHCDC) and the Wuhan Institute of Virology, were not far from the seafood market, which was where the disease was said to have originated, Xiao wrote — in fact, the WHCDC was only a few hundred yards away from the market — whereas the horseshoe bats that hosted the disease were hundreds of miles to the south. (No bats were sold in the market, he pointed out.) It was unlikely, he wrote, that a bat would have flown to a densely populated metropolitan area of 15 million people. "The killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan," Xiao believed. He urged the relocation of "biohazardous laboratories" away from densely populated places. His article disappeared from the server.

And late in the month, a professor at National Taiwan University, Fang Chitai, gave a lecture on the coronavirus in which he described the anomalous R-R-A-R furin cleavage site. The virus was "unlikely to have four amino acids added all at once," Fang said — natural mutations were smaller and more haphazard, he argued. "From an academic point of view, it is indeed possible that the amino acids were added to COVID-19 in the lab by humans." When the *Taiwan News* published an article about Fang's talk, Fang disavowed his own comments, and the video copy of the talk disappeared from the website of the Taiwan Public Health Association. "It has been taken down for a certain reason," the association explained. "Thank you for your understanding."

“A Serious Shortage of Appropriately Trained Technicians”

In the spring, I did some reading on coronavirus history. Beginning in the 1970s, dogs, cows, and pigs were diagnosed with coronavirus infections; dog shows were canceled in 1978 after 25 collies died in Louisville, Kentucky. New varieties of coronaviruses didn't start killing humans, though, until 2003 — that's when restaurant chefs, food handlers, and people who lived near a live-animal market got sick in Guangzhou, in southern China, where the shredded meat of a short-legged raccoonlike creature, the palm civet, was served in a regional dish called “dragon-tiger-phoenix soup.” The new disease, SARS, spread alarmingly in hospitals, and it reached 30 countries and territories. More than 800 people died; the civet-borne virus was eventually traced to horseshoe bats.

Later, smaller outbreaks of SARS in Taiwan, Singapore, and China's National Institute of Virology in Beijing were all caused by laboratory accidents. Of the Beijing Virology Institute, the World Health Organization's safety investigators wrote, in May 2004, that they had “serious concerns about biosafety procedures.” By one account, a SARS storage room in the Beijing lab was so crowded that the refrigerator holding live virus was moved out to the hallway. “Scientists still do not fully understand exactly where or how SARS emerged 18 months ago,” wrote *Washington Post* reporter David Brown in June 2004. “But it is clear now that the most threatening source of the deadly virus today may be places they know intimately — their own laboratories.”

I'm just asking, Is it a complete coincidence that this outbreak happened in the one city in China with a BSL-4 lab?

MERS arose in 2012, possibly spread by camels that had contracted the disease from bats or bat guano, then passed it to human drinkers of raw camel milk and butchers of camel meat. It was an acute sickness, with a high fatality rate, mostly confined to Saudi Arabia. Like SARS, MERS ebbed quickly — it all but disappeared outside the Middle East, except for an outbreak in 2015 at the Samsung Medical Center in South Korea, where a single case of MERS led to more than 180 infections, many involving hospital workers.

In January 2015, the brand-new BSL-4 lab in Wuhan, built by a French contractor, celebrated its opening, but full safety certification came slowly. According to State Department cables from 2018 leaked to the *Washington Post*, the new BSL-4 lab had some start-up problems, including “a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.” The staff had gotten some training at a BSL-4 lab in Galveston, Texas, but they were doing potentially dangerous work with SARS-like viruses, the memo said, and they needed more help from the U.S.


In November or December of 2019, the novel coronavirus began to spread. Chinese scientists initially named it “Wuhan seafood market pneumonia virus,” but soon that idea went away. The market, closed and decontaminated by Chinese officials on January 1, 2020, was an amplifying hub, not the source of the outbreak, according to several studies by Chinese scientists. Forty-five percent of the earliest SARS-2 patients had no link with the market.

VI.

Emergence

Now let’s take a step back. AIDS, fatal and terrifying and politically charged, brought on a new era in government-guided vaccine research, under the guidance of Anthony Fauci. A virologist at Rockefeller University, Stephen S. Morse, began giving talks on “emerging viruses” — other plagues that might be in the process of coming out of nature’s woodwork. In 1992, Richard Preston wrote a horrific account of one emergent virus, Ebola, in *The New Yorker*, which became a best-selling book in 1994; Laurie Garrett’s *The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance* appeared that same year and was also a best seller. The idea seemed to be everywhere: We were on the verge of a wave of zoonotic, emergent plagues.

This new, useful term, *emerging*, began to glow in the research papers of some coronavirologists, who were out of the spotlight, working on common colds and livestock diseases. The term was useful because it was fluid. An emerging disease could be real and terrifying, as AIDS was — something that had just arrived on the medical scene and was confounding our efforts to combat it — or it could be a disease that hadn’t arrived, and might never arrive, but could be shown in a laboratory to be waiting in the wings, just a few mutations away from a human epidemic. It was real and unreal at the same time — a quality that was helpful when applying for research grants.



Where Did It Come From? This chart measures the genetic similarity of known viruses to the novel coronavirus (which appears in yellow). By far the closest is the bat virus RaTG13, which appears in blue, and which was recovered in 2013 and brought to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The first SARS, marked in red, is a much more distant relative. Graphic: Zhou, P., Yang, XL., Wang, XG. et al. A pneumonia outbreak associated with a new coronavirus of probable bat origin. *Nature* 579, 270–273 (2020)

Take, for instance, [this paper](#) from 1995: “High Recombination and Mutation Rates in Mouse Hepatitis Viruses Suggest That Coronaviruses May Be Potentially Important Emerging Viruses.” It was written by Dr. Ralph Baric and his bench scientist, Boyd Yount, at the University of North Carolina. Baric, a gravelly voiced former swim champion, described in this early paper how his lab was able to train a coronavirus, MHV, which causes hepatitis in mice, to jump species, so that it could reliably infect BHK (baby-hamster kidney) cell cultures. They did it using serial passaging: repeatedly dosing a mixed solution of mouse cells and hamster cells with mouse-hepatitis virus, while each time decreasing the number of mouse cells and upping the concentration of hamster cells. At first, predictably, the mouse-hepatitis virus couldn’t do much with the hamster cells, which were left almost free of infection, floating in

their world of fetal-calf serum. But by the end of the experiment, after dozens of passages through cell cultures, the virus had mutated: It had mastered the trick of parasitizing an unfamiliar rodent. A scourge of mice was transformed into a scourge of hamsters. And there was more: "It is clear that MHV can rapidly alter its species specificity and infect rats and primates," Baric said. "The resulting virus variants are associated with demyelinating diseases in these alternative species." (A demyelinating disease is a disease that damages nerve sheaths.) With steady prodding from laboratory science, along with some rhetorical exaggeration, a lowly mouse ailment was morphed into an emergent threat that might potentially cause nerve damage in primates. That is, nerve damage in us.

A few years later, in a further round of "interspecies transfer" experimentation, Baric's scientists introduced their mouse coronavirus into flasks that held a suspension of African-green-monkey cells, human cells, and pig-testicle cells. Then, in 2002, they announced something even more impressive: They'd found a way to create a full-length infectious clone of the entire mouse-hepatitis genome. Their "infectious construct" replicated itself just like the real thing, they wrote.

Not only that, but they'd figured out how to perform their assembly seamlessly, without any signs of human handiwork. Nobody would know if the virus had been fabricated in a laboratory or grown in nature. Baric called this the "no-see'm method," and he asserted that it had "broad and largely unappreciated molecular biology applications." The method was named, he wrote, after a "very small biting insect that is occasionally found on North Carolina beaches."

In 2006, Baric, Yount, and two other scientists were granted a patent for their invisible method of fabricating a full-length infectious clone using the seamless, no-see'm method. But this time, it wasn't a clone of the mouse-hepatitis virus — it was a clone of the entire deadly human SARS virus, the one that had emerged from Chinese bats, via civets, in 2002. The Baric Lab came to be known by some scientists as "the Wild Wild West." In 2007, Baric said that we had entered "the golden age of coronavirus genetics."

"I would be afraid to look in their freezers," one virologist told me.

Baric and Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the two top experts on the genetic interplay between bat and human coronaviruses, began collaborating in 2015.

VII.

“I Had Not Slept a Wink”

Early in the pandemic, *Scientific American* profiled Shi Zhengli, known in China as the “bat woman.” Shi trapped hundreds of bats in nets at the mouths of caves in southern China, sampled their saliva and their blood, swabbed their anuses, and gathered up their fecal pellets. Several times, she visited and sampled bats in a mine in Mojiang, in southern China, where, in 2012, six men set to work shoveling bat guano were sickened by a severe lung disease, three of them fatally. Shi’s team took the samples back to Wuhan and analyzed whatever fragments of bat virus she could find. In some cases, when she found a sequence that seemed particularly significant, she experimented with it in order to understand how it might potentially infect humans. Some of her work was funded by the National Institutes of Health and some of it by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the Department of Defense via Peter Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance.

As Shi explained to *Scientific American*, late in December 2019, she heard from the director of the Wuhan Institute that there was an outbreak of a new disease in the city. Medical samples taken from hospital patients arrived at her lab for analysis. Shi determined that the new virus was related to SARS but even more closely related to a bat disease that her own team had found on a virus-hunting trip: the now-famous RaTG13. Shi was surprised that the outbreak was local, she said: “I had never expected this kind of thing to happen in Wuhan, in central China.” The bat hiding places that she’d been visiting were, after all, as far away as Orlando, Florida, is from New York City. Could this new virus, she wondered, have come from her own laboratory? She checked her records and found no exact matches. “That really took a load off my mind,” she said. “I had not slept a wink for days.”

If one of the first thoughts that goes through the head of a lab director at the Wuhan Institute of Virology is that the new coronavirus could have come from her lab, then we are obliged to entertain the scientific possibility that it could indeed have come from her lab. Right then, there should have been a comprehensive, pockets-inside-out, fully public investigation of the Virology Institute, along with the other important virus labs in Wuhan, including the one close by the seafood market, headquarters of the Wuhan CDC. There should have been interviews with scientists, interviews with biosafety teams, close parsings of laboratory notebooks, freezer and plumbing and decontamination systems checks — everything. It didn’t happen. The Wuhan

Institute of Virology closed down its databases of viral genomes, and the Chinese Ministry of Education sent out a directive: “Any paper that traces the origin of the virus must be strictly and tightly managed.”

Shi made some WeChat posts early in 2020. “The novel 2019 coronavirus is nature punishing the human race for keeping uncivilized living habits,” she wrote. “I, Shi Zhengli, swear on my life that it has nothing to do with our laboratory.” She advised those who believed rumors, and gave credence to unreliable scientific papers, to “shut their stinking mouths.”

VIII.

“ ‘Bug to Drug’ in 24 Hours”

It wasn’t only AIDS that changed the way the NIH funded research. The War on Terror also influenced which diseases got the most attention. In the late ’90s, under Bill Clinton and then George W. Bush, biodefense specialists became interested — again — in anthrax. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency built a small anthrax factory in Nevada, using simulants, to demonstrate how easy it would be for a terrorist to build a small anthrax factory. And in the first year of the Bush presidency, the Defense Intelligence Agency wrote up plans to create a vaccine-resistant form of anthrax using state-of-the-art gene-splicery. A front-page article describing these initiatives, “U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits,” appeared in the *New York Times* on September 4, 2001, one week before 9/11. “Pentagon Says Projects Are Defense, Is Pressing Ahead,” was the subtitle.

After the 9/11 attacks, and the mysterious anthrax mailings that began a week later (which said, “TAKE PENACILIN [*sic*] NOW / DEATH TO AMERICA / DEATH TO ISRAEL / ALLAH IS GREAT”), the desire for biopreparedness became all consuming. Now there were emerging biothreats from humans as well as from the evolving natural world. Fauci’s anti-terror budget went from \$53 million in 2001 to \$1.7 billion in 2003. Setting aside his work toward an AIDS vaccine, which was taking longer than he’d foreseen, Fauci said he would be going all out to defend against a suite of known Cold War agents, all of which had been bred and perfected in American weapons programs many years before — brucellosis, anthrax, tularemia, and plague, for instance. “We are making this the highest priority,” Fauci said. “We are really marshaling all available resources.”

I would be afraid to look in their freezers.

Vaccine development had to progress much faster, Fauci believed; he wanted to set up “vaccine systems” and “vaccine platforms,” which could be quickly tailored to defend against a particular emergent strain some terrorist with an advanced biochemistry degree might have thrown together in a laboratory. “Our goal within the next 20 years is ‘bug to drug’ in 24 hours,” Fauci said. “This would specifically meet the challenge of genetically engineered bioagents.” The first Project BioShield contract Fauci awarded was to VaxGen, a California pharmaceutical company, for \$878 million worth of shots of anthrax vaccine.

By 2005, so much money was going toward bioterror reduction and preparedness that more than 750 scientists sent a protest letter to the NIH. Their claim was that grants to study canonical biowar diseases — anthrax, plague, brucellosis, and tularemia, all exceptionally rare in the U.S. — had increased by a factor of 15 since 2001, whereas funds for the study of widespread “normal” diseases, of high public-health importance, had decreased.

Fauci was firm in his reply: “The United States through its leaders made the decision that this money was going to be spent on biodefense,” he said. “We disagree with the notion that biodefense concerns are of ‘low public-health significance.’”

In 2010, by one count, there were 249 BSL-3 laboratories and seven BSL-4 laboratories in the U.S., and more than 11,000 scientists and staffers were authorized to handle the ultra-lethal germs on the government’s select pathogen list. And yet the sole bioterrorist in living memory who actually killed American citizens, according to the FBI — the man who sent the anthrax letters — turned out to be one of the government’s own researchers. Bruce Ivins, an eccentric, suicidal laboratory scientist from Ohio who worked in vaccine development at Fort Detrick, allegedly wanted to boost the fear level so as to persuade the government to buy more of the patented, genetically engineered anthrax VaxGen vaccine, of which he was a co-inventor. (See David Willman’s fascinating biography of Ivins, *Mirage Man*.) Fauci’s staff at NIH funded Ivins’s vaccine laboratory and gave \$100 million to VaxGen to accelerate vaccine production. (The NIH’s \$878 million contract with VaxGen, however, was quietly canceled in 2006; Ivins, who was never charged, killed himself in 2008.)

“The whole incident amounted to a snake eating its own tail,” wrote Wendy Orent in an August 2008 piece titled “Our Own Worst Bioenemy” in the *Los Angeles Times*. “No ingenious biowarrior from Al Qaeda sent the lethal

envelopes through the U.S. postal system. An American scientist did.” What confirmed Ivins’s guilt, according to the FBI, was that there was a genetic match between the anthrax used in the killings and the strain held at Fort Detrick.

IX.

“Weapons of Mass Disruption”

After SARS appeared in 2003, Ralph Baric’s laboratory moved up the NIH funding ladder. SARS was a “dual use” organism — a security threat and a zoonotic threat at the same time. In 2006, Baric wrote a long, fairly creepy paper on the threat of “weaponizable” viruses. Synthetic biology had made possible new kinds of viral “weapons of mass disruption,” he wrote, involving, for example, “rapid production of numerous candidate bioweapons that can be simultaneously released,” a scattershot terror tactic Baric called the “‘survival of the fittest’ approach.”

Baric hoped to find a SARS vaccine, but he couldn’t; he kept looking for it, year after year, supported by the NIH, long after the disease itself had been contained. It wasn’t really gone, Baric believed. Like other epidemics that pop up and then disappear, as he told a university audience some years later, “they don’t go extinct. They are waiting to return.” What do you do if you run a well-funded laboratory, an NIH “center of excellence,” and your emergent virus is no longer actually making people sick? You start squeezing it and twisting it into different shapes. Making it stand on its hind legs and quack like a duck, or a bat. Or breathe like a person.

Baric’s safety record is good — although there was a minor mouse-bite incident in 2016, uncovered by ProPublica — and his motives are beyond reproach: “Safe, universal, vaccine platforms are needed that can be tailored to new pathogens as they emerge, quickly tested for safety, and then strategically used to control new disease outbreaks in human populations,” he wrote in a paper on public health. But the pioneering work he did over the past 15 years — generating tiny eager single-stranded flask monsters and pitting them against human cells, or bat cells, or gene-spliced somewhat-human cells, or monkey cells, or humanized mice — was not without risk, and it may have led others astray.

In 2006, for instance, Baric and his colleagues, hoping to come up with a “vaccine strategy” for SARS, produced noninfectious virus replicon particles (or VRPs) using the Venezuelan-equine-encephalitis virus (another American

germ-warfare agent), which they fitted with various SARS spike proteins. Then, wearing Tyvek suits and two pairs of gloves each, and working in a biological safety cabinet in a BSL-3-certified laboratory, they cloned and grew recombinant versions of the original SARS virus in an incubator in a medium that held African-green-monkey cells. When they had grown enough virus, the scientists swapped out one kind of spike protein for a carefully chosen mutant, and they challenged their prototype vaccine with it in mice.

The scientists also tried their infectious SARS clones in something called an air-liquid interface, using a relatively new type of cell culture developed by Raymond Pickles of the University of North Carolina's Cystic Fibrosis Center. Pickles had perfected a method of emulating the traits of human airway tissue by cultivating cells taken from lung-disease patients — nurturing the culture over four to six weeks in such a way that the cells differentiated and developed a crop of tiny moving hairs, or cilia, on top and goblet cells within that produced real human mucus. In fact, before infecting these HAE (human airway epithelial) cells with a virus, the lab worker must sometimes rinse off some of the accumulated mucus, as if helping the lab-grown tissue to clear its throat. So Baric was exposing and adapting his engineered viruses to an extraordinarily true-to-life environment — the juicy, sticky, hairy inner surface of our breathing apparatus.

SARS-2 seems almost perfectly calibrated to grab and ransack our breathing cells and choke the life out of them. “By the time SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in late 2019, it was already pre-adapted to human transmission,” Alina Chan and her co-authors have written, whereas SARS, when it first appeared in 2003, underwent “numerous adaptive mutations” before settling down. Perhaps viral nature hit a bull’s-eye of airborne infectivity, with almost no mutational drift, no period of accommodation and adjustment, or perhaps some lab worker somewhere, inspired by Baric’s work with human airway tissue, took a spike protein that was specially groomed to colonize and thrive deep in the ciliated, mucosal tunnels of our inner core and cloned it onto some existing viral bat backbone. It could have happened in Wuhan, but — because anyone can now “print out” a fully infectious clone of any sequenced disease — it could also have happened at Fort Detrick, or in Texas, or in Italy, or in Rotterdam, or in Wisconsin, or in some other citadel of coronaviral inquiry. No conspiracy — just scientific ambition, and the urge to take exciting risks and make new things, and the fear of terrorism, and the fear of getting sick. Plus a whole lot of government money.

“Risky Areas for Spillover”

Project Bioshield began to fade by the end of the Bush administration, although the expensive high-containment laboratories, controversial preservers and incubators of past and future epidemics, remain. By 2010, some BioShield projects had dissolved into Obama’s Predict program, which paid for laboratories and staff in 60 “risky areas for spillover” around the world. Jonna Mazet, a veterinary scientist from the University of California, Davis, was in charge of Predict, which was a component of USAID’s “Emerging Pandemic Threats” program. Her far-flung teams collected samples from 164,000 animals and humans and claimed to have found “almost 1,200 potentially zoonotic viruses, among them 160 novel coronaviruses, including multiple SARS- and MERS-like coronaviruses.” The fruits of Predict’s exotic harvest were studied and circulated in laboratories worldwide, and their genetic sequences became part of GenBank, the NIH’s genome database, where any curious RNA wrangler anywhere could quickly synthesize snippets of code and test out a new disease on human cells.

Baric, Jonna Mazet, and Peter Daszak of EcoHealth worked together for years — and Daszak also routed Predict money to Shi Zhengli’s bat-surveillance team in Wuhan through his nonprofit, mingling it with NIH money and money from the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. In 2013, Mazet announced that Shi Zhengli’s virus hunters, with Predict’s support, had, for the first time, isolated and cultured a live SARS-like virus from bats and demonstrated that this virus could bind to the human ACE2, or “angiotensin-converting enzyme 2,” receptor, which Baric’s laboratory had determined to be the sine qua non of human infectivity. “This work shows that these viruses can directly infect humans and validates our assumption that we should be searching for viruses of pandemic potential before they spill over to people,” Mazet said.

Daszak, for his part, seems to have viewed his bat quests as part of an epic, quasi-religious death match. In a paper from 2008, Daszak and a co-author described Bruegel’s painting *The Fall of the Rebel Angels* and compared it to the contemporary human biological condition. The fallen angels could be seen as pathogenic organisms that had descended “through an evolutionary (not spiritual) pathway that takes them to a netherworld where they can feed only on our genes, our cells, our flesh,” Daszak wrote. “Will we succumb to the multitudinous horde? Are we to be cast downward into chthonic chaos represented here by the heaped up gibbering phantasmagory against which we rail and struggle?”

XI.

“Lab-Made?”

There are, in fact, some helpful points of agreement between zoonoticists — those who believe in a natural origin of the SARS-2 virus — and those who believe that it probably came from a laboratory. Both sides agree, when pressed, that a lab origin can’t be conclusively ruled out and a natural origin can’t be ruled out either — because nature, after all, is capable of improbable, teleological-seeming achievements. Both sides also agree, for the most part, that the spillover event that began the human outbreak probably happened only once, or a few times, quite recently, and not many times over a longer period. They agree that bat virus RaTG13 (named for the *Rinolophus affinis* bat, from Tongguan, in 2013) is the closest match to the human virus that has yet been found, and that although the two viruses are very similar, the spike protein of the bat virus lacks the features the human spike protein possesses that enable it to work efficiently with human tissue.

Zoonoticists hold that SARS-2’s crucial features — the furin cleavage site and the ACE2 receptor — are the result of a recombinant event involving a bat coronavirus (perhaps RaTG13 or a virus closely related to it) and another, unknown virus. Early on, researchers proposed that it could be a snake sold at the seafood market — a Chinese cobra or a banded krait —but no: Snakes don’t typically carry coronaviruses. Then there was a thought that the disease came from sick smuggled pangolins, because there existed a certain pangolin coronavirus that was, inexplicably, almost identical in its spike protein to the human coronavirus — but then, no: There turned out to be questions about the reliability of the genetic information in that diseased-pangolin data set, on top of which there were no pangolins for sale at the Wuhan market. Then a group from China’s government veterinary laboratory at Harbin tried infecting beagles, pigs, chickens, ducks, ferrets, and cats with SARS-2 to see if they could be carriers. (Cats and ferrets got sick; pigs, ducks, and most dogs did not.)

In September, some scientists at the University of Michigan, led by Yang Zhang, reported that they had created a “computational pipeline” to screen nearly a hundred possible intermediate hosts, including the Sumatran orangutan, the Western gorilla, the Olive baboon, the crab-eating macaque, and the bonobo. All these primates were “permissive” to the SARS-2 coronavirus and should undergo “further experimental investigation,” the scientists proposed.

Despite this wide-ranging effort, there is at the moment no animal host that zoonoticists can point to as the missing link. There's also no single, agreed-upon hypothesis to explain how the disease may have traveled from the bat reservoirs of Yunnan all the way to Wuhan, seven hours by train, without leaving any sick people behind and without infecting anyone along the way.

The zoonoticists say that we shouldn't find it troubling that virologists have been inserting and deleting furin cleavage sites and ACE2-receptor-binding domains in experimental viral spike proteins for years: The fact that virologists have been doing these things in laboratories, in advance of the pandemic, is to be taken as a sign of their prescience, not of their folly. But I keep returning to the basic, puzzling fact: This patchwork pathogen, which allegedly has evolved without human meddling, first came to notice in the only city in the world with a laboratory that was paid for years by the U.S. government to perform experiments on certain obscure and heretofore unpublicized strains of bat viruses — which bat viruses then turned out to be, out of all the organisms on the planet, the ones that are most closely related to the disease. What are the odds?

In July, I discovered a number of volunteer analysts who were doing a new kind of forensic, samizdat science, hunched over the letter code of the SARS-2 genome like scholars deciphering the cuneiform impressions in Linear B tablets. There were the anonymous authors of Project Evidence, on GitHub, who “disavow all racism and violent attacks, including those which are aimed at Asian or Chinese people,” and there was Yuri Deigin, a biotech entrepreneur from Canada, who wrote a massive, lucid paper on Medium, “Lab-Made?,” which illumined the mysteries of the spike protein. Jonathan Latham of the Bioscience Resource Project, with his co-author Allison Wilson, wrote two important papers: one a calm, unsparing overview of laboratory accidents and rash research and the other a close look at the small outbreak of an unexplained viral pneumonia in a bat-infested copper mine in 2012. I corresponded with Alina Chan (now the subject of a nicely turned piece in *Boston* magazine by Rowan Jacobsen) and with the pseudonymous Billy Bostickson, a tireless researcher whose Twitter photo is a cartoon of an injured experimental monkey, and Monali Rahalkar, of the Agharkar Research Institute in Pune, India, who wrote a paper with her husband, Rahul Bahulikar, that also sheds light on the story of the bat-guano-shoveling men whose virus was remarkably like SARS-2, except that it was not nearly as catching. I talked to Rossana Segreto, a molecular biologist at the University of Innsbruck, whose paper, “Is Considering a Genetic-Manipulation Origin for SARS-CoV-2 a Conspiracy Theory That Must Be Censored?,” co-authored with Yuri Deigin, was finally published in November under a milder title; it argued

that SARS-2's most notable features, the furin site and the human ACE2-binding domain, were unlikely to have arisen simultaneously and "might be the result of lab manipulation techniques such as site directed mutagenesis." Segreto is also the person who first established that a bat-virus fragment named BtCoV/4991, identified in 2013, was 100 percent identical to the closest known cousin to SARS-CoV-2, the bat virus RaTG13, thereby proving that the virus closest to the SARS-2-pandemic virus was linked back not to a bat cave but to a mine shaft, and that this same virus had been stored and worked on in the Wuhan Institute for years. This made possible the first big investigative piece on SARS-2's origins, in the *Times* of London, in July: "Nobody can deny the bravery of scientists who risked their lives harvesting the highly infectious virus," the *Times* authors write. "But did their courageous detective work lead inadvertently to a global disaster?"

XII.

"A New, Non-Natural Risk"

In 2011, a tall, confident Dutch scientist, Ron Fouchier, using grant money from Fauci's group at NIH, created a mutant form of highly pathogenic avian influenza, H5N1, and passaged it ten times through ferrets in order to prove that he could "force" (his word) this potentially fatal disease to infect mammals, including humans, "via aerosols or respiratory droplets." Fouchier said his findings indicated that these avian influenza viruses, thus forced, "pose a risk of becoming pandemic in humans."

This experiment was too much for some scientists: Why, out of a desire to prove that something extremely infectious could happen, would you make it happen? And why would the U.S. government feel compelled to pay for it to happen? Late in 2011, Marc Lipsitch of the Harvard School of Public Health got together with several other dismayed onlookers to ring the gong for caution. On January 8, 2012, the *New York Times* published a scorching editorial, "An Engineered Doomsday." "We cannot say there would be no benefits at all from studying the virus," the *Times* said. "But the consequences, should the virus escape, are too devastating to risk."

These gain-of-function experiments were an important part of the NIH's approach to vaccine development, and Anthony Fauci was reluctant to stop funding them. He and Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health, along with Gary Nabel, NIAID director of vaccine research, published an opinion piece in the *Washington Post* in which they contended that the ferret flu experiments, and others like them, were "a risk worth taking."

“Important information and insights can come from generating a potentially dangerous virus in the laboratory,” they wrote; the work can “help delineate the principles of virus transmission between species.” The work was safe because the viruses were stored in a high-security lab, they believed, and the work was necessary because nature was always coming up with new threats. “Nature is the worst bioterrorist,” Fauci told a reporter. “We know that through history.”

Soon afterward, there followed some distressing screwups in secure federal laboratories involving live anthrax, live smallpox, and live avian influenza. These got attention in the science press. Then Lipsitch’s activists (calling themselves the Cambridge Working Group) sent around a strong statement on the perils of research with “Potential Pandemic Pathogens,” signed by more than a hundred scientists. The work might “trigger outbreaks that would be difficult or impossible to control,” the signers said. Fauci reconsidered, and the White House in 2014 announced that there would be a “pause” in the funding of new influenza, SARS, and MERS gain-of-function research.

Baric, in North Carolina, was not happy. He had a number of gain-of-function experiments with pathogenic viruses in progress. “It took me ten seconds to realize that most of them were going to be affected,” he told NPR. Baric and a former colleague from Vanderbilt University wrote a long letter to an NIH review board expressing their “profound concerns.” “This decision will significantly inhibit our capacity to respond quickly and effectively to future outbreaks of SARS-like or MERS-like coronaviruses, which continue to circulate in bat populations and camels,” they wrote. The funding ban was itself dangerous, they argued. “Emerging coronaviruses in nature do not observe a mandated pause.”

Hoping to smooth over controversy by showing due diligence, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, founded in the BioShield era under President Bush, paid a consulting firm, Gryphon Scientific, to write a report on gain-of-function research, which by now was simply referred to as GoF. In chapter six of this thousand-page dissertation, published in April 2016, the consultants take up the question of coronaviruses. “Increasing the transmissibility of the coronaviruses could significantly increase the chance of a global pandemic due to a laboratory accident,” they wrote.

The Cambridge Working Group continued to write letters of protest and plead for restraint and sanity. Steven Salzberg, a professor of biomedical engineering at Johns Hopkins, said, “We have enough problems simply keeping up with the current flu outbreaks — and now with Ebola — without

scientists creating incredibly deadly new viruses that might accidentally escape their labs.” David Relman of Stanford Medical School said, “It is unethical to place so many members of the public at risk and then consult only scientists — or, even worse, just a small subset of scientists — and exclude others from the decision-making and oversight process.” Richard Ebright wrote that creating and evaluating new threats very seldom increases security: “Doing so in biology — where the number of potential threats is nearly infinite, and where the asymmetry between the ease of creating threats and the difficulty of addressing threats is nearly absolute — is especially counterproductive.” Lynn Klotz wrote, “Awful as a pandemic brought on by the escape of a variant H5N1 virus might be, it is SARS that now presents the greatest risk. The worry is less about recurrence of a natural SARS outbreak than of yet another escape from a laboratory researching it to help protect against a natural outbreak.” Marc Lipsitch argued that gain-of-function experiments can mislead, “resulting in worse not better decisions,” and that the entire gain-of-function debate as overseen by the NIH was heavily weighted in favor of scientific insiders and “distinctly unwelcoming of public participation.”

Nariyoshi Shinomiya, a professor of physiology and nano-medicine at the National Defense Medical College in Japan, offered this warning: “Similar to nuclear or chemical weapons there is no going back once we get a thing in our hands.”

But in the end, Baric was allowed to proceed with his experiments, and the research papers that resulted, showered with money, became a sort of *Anarchist’s Cookbook* for the rest of the scientific world. In November 2015, Baric and colleagues published a collaboration paper with Shi Zhengli titled “A SARS-like Cluster of Circulating Bat Coronaviruses Shows Potential for Human Emergence.” Into a human SARS virus that they had adapted so that it would work in mice, Baric and Shi et al. inserted the spike protein of a bat virus, SHC014, discovered by Shi in southern China. They dabbed the mice nasally with virus and waited, looking for signs of sickness: “hunching, ruffled fur.” They also infected human airway cells with the mouse-adapted bat-spike-in-a-human-virus backbone. In both mice and human airway cells, the chimeric virus caused a “robust infection.”

This proved, Baric and Shi believed, that you did not need civets or other intermediate hosts in order for bats to cause an epidemic in humans and that therefore all the SARS-like viruses circulating in bat populations “may pose a future threat.” Peter Daszak, who had used Predict funds to pay Shi for her work on the paper, was impressed by this conclusion; the findings, he said,

“move this virus from a candidate emerging pathogen to a clear and present danger.”

Richard Ebright was trenchantly unenthusiastic. “The only impact of this work,” he said, “is the creation, in a lab, of a new, non-natural risk.”

Early in 2016, Baric and Shi again collaborated. Shi sent Baric a fresh bat virus spike protein, and Baric inserted it into the backbone of a human SARS virus and then used that infectious clone to attack human airway cells. “The virus readily and efficiently replicated in cultured human airway tissues, suggesting an ability to potentially jump directly to humans,” reported the UNC’s website. This time, they also used the bat-human hybrid virus to infect transgenic humanized mice that grew human ACE2 protein. The mice, young and old, lost weight and died, proving, again, that this particular bat virus was potentially “poised to emerge in human populations.” It was “an ongoing threat,” Baric wrote. But was it? Civets and camels that are exposed to a lot of bat-guano dust may be an ongoing threat and a manageable one. But the bats themselves just want to hang in their caves and not be bothered by frowning sightseers in spacesuits who want to poke Q-tips in their bottoms. This 2016 “poised for human emergence” paper was supported by eight different NIH grants. In 2015, Baric’s lab received \$8.3 million from the NIH; in 2016, it received \$10.5 million.

Gain-of-function research came roaring back under Trump and Fauci. “The National Institutes of Health will again fund research that makes viruses more dangerous,” said an article in *Nature* in December 2017. Carrie Wolinetz of the NIH’s office of science policy defended the decision. “These experiments will help us get ahead of viruses that are already out there and pose a real and present danger to human health,” she told *The Lancet*. The NIH, Wolinetz said, was committed to a leadership role with gain-of-function research internationally. “If we are pursuing this research in an active way, we will be much better positioned to develop protection and countermeasures should something bad happen in another country.”

A reporter asked Marc Lipsitch what he thought of the resumption of NIH funding. Gain-of-function experiments “have done almost nothing to improve our preparedness for pandemics,” he said, “yet they risked creating an accidental pandemic.”

“Proximity Is a Problem”

In April, four months into the coronavirus emergency, a deputy director at the NIH wrote an email to EcoHealth Alliance. “You are instructed to cease providing any funds to Wuhan Institute of Virology,” it said. In response, Daszak and the chief scientific officer of New England Biolabs (a company that sells seamless gene-splicing products to laboratories, among other things) got 77 Nobel Prize winners to sign a statement saying that the cancellation deprived the “nation and the world of highly regarded science that could help control one of the greatest health crises in modern history and those that may arise in the future.” Later, as a condition of further funding, the NIH wrote to say it wanted Daszak to arrange an outside inspection of the Wuhan lab and to procure from Wuhan’s scientists a sample of whatever they’d used to sequence the SARS-2 virus. Daszak was outraged (“I am not trained as a private detective”), and again he fought back. He was reluctant to give up his own secrets, too. “Conspiracy-theory outlets and politically motivated organizations have made Freedom of Information Act requests on our grants and all of our letters and emails to the NIH,” he told *Nature*. “We don’t think it’s fair that we should have to reveal everything we do.”

But Daszak has survived — even prospered. Recently, *The Lancet* made him the lead investigator in its inquiry into the origins of the pandemic, and the World Health Organization named him to its ten-person origins investigation. (“We’re still close enough to the origin to really find out more details about where it has come from,” Daszak told *Nature*.)

The NIH has also set up an ambitious new international program, called CREID, which stands for Centers for Research in Emerging Infectious Diseases, and it has put Daszak’s EcoHealth in charge of trapping animals and looking for obscure bat viruses in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Baric is one of Daszak’s partners in CREID. The virus hunting and collecting, which Richard Ebright likens to “looking for a gas leak with a lighted match,” will continue and widen with U.S. funding. “We’re going to work in remote parts of Malaysia and Thailand to get to the front line of where the next pandemic is going to start,” Daszak told NPR.

In May, an interviewer from the People’s Pharmacy website asked Baric if he had any thoughts on whether the coronavirus began with a natural bat-to-human transfer. “Or was there something a little bit more, perhaps, insidious involved?”

“Well, of course the answers to those questions are in China,” Baric replied. “Exactly how they work in that facility is something that would be very difficult for a Westerner to know,” he said. “The main problems that the Institute of Virology has is that the outbreak occurred in close proximity to that Institute. That Institute has in essence the best collection of virologists in the world that have gone out and sought out, and isolated, and sampled bat species throughout Southeast Asia. So they have a very large collection of viruses in their laboratory. And so it’s — you know — proximity is a problem. It’s a problem.”

Over the course of the fall, and especially after the election muffled Donald Trump’s influence over the country’s public-health apparatus, that proximity problem — and the uncomfortable questions of origins it raised — began to grow somewhat more discussable. The BBC, *Le Monde*, and Italy’s RAI have all recently taken seriously the scientific possibility of a lab leak. In late October, the World Health Organization convened the first meeting of its second inquiry into the origins of the disease. The WHO’s effort is perhaps the world’s best chance to satisfy its curiosity about goings-on at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and at the Wuhan CDC’s virus lab near the Wuhan seafood market. But, as the *New York Times* has reported, the WHO’s information gathering has been hindered by Chinese secretiveness since February, when an initial investigative team sent to Beijing was told its members’ access to scientists would be restricted and that it couldn’t visit the seafood market, then considered a hub of the pandemic.

When a BBC video team tried to inspect the Yunnan mine shaft, they found the road to the mine blocked by a strategically parked truck that had “broken down” shortly before they arrived. Reporter John Sudworth asked Daszak, one of the ten members of the second WHO investigative team, whether he would push for access to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. “That’s not my job to do that,” Daszak replied.

In November, David Relman, the Stanford microbiologist, one of the most thoughtful of the voices warning against gain-of-function research, published a paper in *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* on the urgent need to unravel the origins of COVID-19. “If SARS-CoV-2 escaped from a lab to cause the pandemic,” he wrote, “it will become critical to understand the chain of events and prevent this from happening again.” Conflicts of interest by researchers and administrators will need to be addressed, Relman wrote; to reach the truth, the investigation must be transparent, international, and, as much as possible, unpolitical. “A more complete understanding of the

origins of COVID-19 clearly serves the interests of every person in every country on this planet.”

“The world is sitting on a precedent-setting decision right now,” wrote Alina Chan on December 8. “It is unclear if SARS2 is 100 percent natural or emerged due to lab/research activities. If we walk away from this, demonstrating that we cannot effectively investigate its origins, it will pave the way for future COVIDS.”

Just before this issue of *New York* went to press, I reached Ralph Baric by phone and asked him where he now believed SARS-2 came from. (Anthony Fauci, Shi Zhengli, and Peter Daszak didn’t respond to emails, and Kristian Andersen said he was busy with other things.) Baric said he still thought the virus came from bats in southern China, perhaps directly, or possibly via an intermediate host, although the smuggled pangolins, in his view, were a red herring. The disease evolved in humans over time without being noticed, he suspected, becoming gradually more infectious, and eventually a person carried it to Wuhan “and the pandemic took off.” Then he said, “Can you rule out a laboratory escape? The answer in this case is probably not.”

XIV.

Transmission

So how did we actually get this disease?

Here’s what I think happened. In April 2012, in a copper mine in Mojiang, China, three men were given an awful job — they were told to shovel bat guano out of a mine shaft. They went to work and shoveled guano for seven hours a day in the confined, insufficiently ventilated space of the mine shaft, and by the end of the week, they were sick with a viral pneumonia of unknown etiology. Three more, younger shovelers were hired to replace the ones who were out sick.

The viral load in their lungs was so huge, because of all the guano dust, that their lungs became a kind of accelerated laboratory passaging experiment, as Jonathan Latham and Allison Wilson have written, forcing the virus to switch its allegiance from bats to humans. SARS experts were consulted, and the disease was judged to be SARS-like but not SARS. It was something new. (Shi Zhengli told *Scientific American* that the guano shovelers had died of a fungal disease, but, as Monali Rahalkar pointed out, they were treated with antivirals,

and their symptoms were consistent with viral pneumonia with attendant secondary fungal infections.)

Although it was a severe disease, and in the end three of the shovelers died, there was no resultant epidemic. It was actually a case of industrial overexposure to an infectious substance — what we might call a massive OSHA violation. The bat disease that the men encountered wasn't necessarily all that dangerous except in an environment of immunosuppressive overload.

Peter Daszak and Shi Zhengli were interested, of course, because this unidentified coronavirus disease involved bats and people. Of the fragmentary bits of virus Shi retrieved from the mine shaft, one was SARS-like, and Shi sequenced it and called it BtCoV/4991 and published a paper about it. Several times — in 2016 and 2018 and 2019 — this most interesting sample, a portion of what we now know as RaTG13, was taken out of the freezers in Shi's lab and worked on in undisclosed ways. (Peter Daszak claims that these samples have disintegrated and can't be validated or studied.) Samples of the nameless human disease also traveled back to the Wuhan Institute of Virology — few specifics about these valuable specimens have been released by Chinese sources, however.

This is the period in the story that demands a very close investigation, when chimeric assemblages may have been created and serially passaged, using BtCoV/4991, a.k.a. RaTG13, and other bat viruses, perhaps along with forms of the human virus. It's when Shi and Baric both published papers that were about what happened when you hot-swapped mutant spike proteins between bat viruses and human viruses.

The link, via the renamed sample BtCoV/4991, to the copper mine is of exceptional importance because of the one huge difference between the unnamed guano shovelers' virus and the SARS-2 virus that is now ravaging, for example, California: transmissibility. Airborne human-to-human transmissibility — the kind of thing that gain-of-functioneers like Ron Fouchier and Ralph Baric were aiming at, in order to demonstrate what Baric called "lurking threats" — is COVID-19's crucial distinguishing feature. If six men had gotten extremely sick with COVID-19 back in 2012 in southern China, doctors and nurses in the hospital where they lay dying would likely have gotten sick as well. There might have been hundreds or thousands of cases. Instead, only the shovelers themselves, who had breathed a heavy concentration of guano dust for days, got it.

The existence of bat virus RaTG13 is therefore not necessarily evidence of a natural bat origin. In fact, it seems to me to imply the opposite: New functional components may have been overlaid onto or inserted into the RaTG13 genome, new Tinkertoy intermolecular manipulations, especially to its spike protein, which have the effect of making it unprecedentedly infectious in human airways.

This is where the uniquely peculiar furin insert and/or the human-tuned ACE2-receptor-binding domain may come in — although it's also possible that either of these elements could have evolved as part of some multistep zoonotic process. But in the climate of gonzo laboratory experimentation, at a time when all sorts of tweaked variants and amped-up substitutions were being tested on cell cultures and in the lungs of humanized mice and other experimental animals, isn't it possible that somebody in Wuhan took the virus that had been isolated from human samples, or the RaTG13 bat virus sequence, or both (or other viruses from that same mine shaft that Shi Zhengli has recently mentioned in passing), and used them to create a challenge disease for vaccine research — a chopped-and-channeled version of RaTG13 or the miners' virus that included elements that would make it thrive and even rampage in people? And then what if, during an experiment one afternoon, this new, virulent, human-infecting, furin-ready virus got out?

For more than 15 years, coronavirologists strove to prove that the threat of SARS was ever present and must be defended against, and they proved it by showing how they could doctor the viruses they stored in order to force them to jump species and go directly from bats to humans. More and more bat viruses came in from the field teams, and they were sequenced and synthesized and "rewired," to use a term that Baric likes. In this international potluck supper of genetic cookery, hundreds of new variant diseases were invented and stored. And then one day, perhaps, somebody messed up. It's at least a reasonable, "parsimonious" explanation of what might have happened.

This may be the great scientific meta-experiment of the 21st century. Could a world full of scientists do all kinds of reckless recombinant things with viral diseases for many years and successfully avoid a serious outbreak? The hypothesis was that, yes, it was doable. The risk was worth taking. There would be no pandemic.

I hope the vaccine works.

**This article appears in the January 4, 2021, issue of New York Magazine*

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender: "Stilwell, David R" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Ryan Hass (b)(6)@brookings.edu>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: (b)(6) summary on COV19 unclassified origins is a worthy read
Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2020 22:22:46 +0000

Report attached.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 4:53 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: (b)(6) summary on COV19 unclassified origins is a worthy read

(b)(5)

As we prepare for the weeks ahead, I recommend the 2018 NAS Study:
<https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2018/06/if-misused-synthetic-biology-could-expand-the-possibility-of-creating-new-weapons-dod-should-continue-to-monitor-advances-in-the-field-new-report-says>



If Misused, Synthetic Biology Could Expand the Possibility of Creating New Weapons - DOD Should Continue to Monitor Advances in the Field, New Report Says | National Academies

Synthetic biology expands the possibilities for creating new weapons — including making existing bacteria and viruses more harmful — while decreasing the time required to engineer such organisms, concludes a new report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

www.nationalacademies.org

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 3:07 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@lnl.gov (b)(6)@lnl.gov (b)(6)@lnl.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:50 PM

To: (h)(6)@lfl.gov (b)(6)@lfl.gov <(b)(6)>

Cc: (h)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, December 26, 2020 12:49 PM

To: (b)(6)@lfl.gov <(h)(6) (b)(6)@lfl.gov (b)(6)>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (h)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Request for a short option/assessment of the Latham-Wilson COV2 origins paper

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

<https://jonathanlatham.net/a-proposed-origin-for-sars-cov-2-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/>

A Proposed Origin for SARS-CoV-2
and the COVID-19 Pandemic –
Jonathan Latham

by Jonathan Latham, PhD and Allison Wilson, PhD. In all the discussions of the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, enormous scientific attention has been paid to the molecular character of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including its novel genome sequence in comparison with its near relatives.

jonathanlatham.net

Engineered COVID-19-Infected Mouse Bites Researcher Amid 'Explosion' Of Risky Coronavirus Research

August 23, 2020

By

jrl

in Uncategorized

1 Comment

by Jonathan Latham, PhD

University researchers genetically engineer a human pandemic virus. They inject the new virus into a laboratory mouse. The infected mouse then bites a researcher....It is a plot worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster about risky coronavirus research.

But according to newly obtained minutes of the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) of the University of North Carolina (UNC), Chapel Hill, these exact events need not be imagined. They occurred for real between April 1st and May 6th this year.

The identity of the bitten coronavirus researcher has not been revealed except that they were working in a high security BSL-3 virus lab when the accident happened.

According to Richard Ebright, an epidemiologist from Rutgers University, the UNC incident underscores an important development in virus research since the pandemic began:

“There has been an explosion of research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 over the last six months. Research with infectious SARS-CoV-2 now is occurring in every, or almost every, BSL-3 facility in the US and overseas.”

This strong upsurge is affirmed by Edward Hammond of Prickly Research, Austin, TX, former Director of the Sunshine Project, an NGO that tracked the post 9/11 expansion of the US Biodefense program.

“It is evident that swarms of academic researchers with little prior experience with coronaviruses have leapt into the field in recent months.”

For Hammond, this explosion represents a hazard:

“We need to be clear headed about the risk. The first SARS virus was a notorious source of laboratory-acquired infections and there is a very real risk that modified forms of SARS-CoV-2 could infect researchers, especially inexperienced researchers, with unpredictable and potentially quite dangerous results. The biggest risk is the creation and accidental release of a novel form of SARS-CoV-2 — a variant whose altered characteristics might undermine global efforts to stop the pandemic by evading the approaches being taken to find COVID vaccines and treatments.”

And, continues Hammond: “Each additional lab that experiments with CoV-2 amplifies the risk.”

Richard Ebright concurs, telling *Independent Science News* in an email that this research is:

“in many cases being performed by researchers who have no prior experience in BSL-3 operations and pathogens research, and who therefore pose elevated risk of laboratory accidents with BSL-3 pathogens.”

Ebright is also concerned that some influential experimenters are now calling for reduced oversight :

“The UNC incident also underscores that calls by some, notably Columbia University virologist Vincent Racaniello (Podcast at 01:35mins onwards), to allow virus-culture and virus-production research with fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 at BSL-2 are egregiously irresponsible and absolutely unacceptable.”

Other researchers are also calling for restraint. In a paper titled “Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus”, researchers from China and the US critiqued the synthesis in February of a full length infectious clone (Gao et al., 2020; Thao et al., 2020). And, in concluding, these researchers asked a question that is even more pertinent now than then “Once the risks [of a lab escape] become a reality, who or which organization should take responsibility for them?”

Lack of transparency

The accident at the University of North Carolina (UNC) is now in the public domain but only thanks to a FOIA request submitted by Hammond (in line with NIH guidelines) and shared with *Independent Science News*.


Despite the FOIA request, apart from the fact that UNC classified it as an official “Reportable Incident”, i.e. that must be reported to National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Washington DC, scarcely any information about the accident is available.

In part this is because the minutes of the relevant IBC meeting (May 6th, 2020, p109) are extremely brief. They do not provide any details of the fate of the bitten researcher. Nor do they state, for example, whether the researcher developed an active infection, nor whether they developed symptoms, nor if they transmitted the recombinant virus to anyone else. Neither do they reveal what kind of recombinant virus was being used or the purpose of the experiment.

To try to learn more, *Independent Science News* emailed the lab of Ralph Baric at UNC, which, based on their research history is the most likely coronavirus research group involved (Roberts et al., 2007; Menachery et al., 2015), the University Biosafety Officer, and UNC Media relations.

Only the latter replied:

“The April 2020 incident referred to in the University Institutional Biosafety Committee meeting minutes involved a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV-2 strain used in the development of a mouse model system.”



Ralph Baric UNC Gillings School of Public Health-web
UNC media relations also told *Independent Science News* that:

"The researcher did not develop any symptoms and no infection occurred as a result of the incident."


Our questions in full and the full UNC reply are [available here](#).

Redactions of Biosafety Committee discussions

The second reason for this lack of information is that the UNC redacted the names of Principal Investigators (PIs) whose research required biosafety scrutiny, along with many of the experimental specifics.

Nevertheless, unredacted parts of minutes from IBC meetings held in 2020 contain descriptions of experiments that potentially encompass the accident. They include:

Application 75223:




UNC Inst Biosafety Committee Application 75223

("a full-length infectious clone" refers to a viable DNA copy of the coronavirus, which is ordinarily an RNA virus)


and

Application 73790:



UNC Inst Biosafety Committee Application 73790
and

Application 74962:



UNC Inst Biosafety Committee Application 74962

In all, any one of eight sets of different experiments approved by the UNC Chapel Hill IBC in 2020 proposed infecting mice with live infectious and mutant SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses under BSL-3 conditions and therefore could have led to the accident.

The thorny issue of transparency

According to Hammond the lack of transparency represented by the sparse minutes and especially the redactions represent a violation of science's social contract:

"At the dawn of recombinant DNA, at the request of the scientific community itself, following the fabled Asilomar conference, the United States government took the position of not regulating genetic engineering in the lab. The "deal" that big science struck with the

government was that, in return for not being directly regulated, principal investigators would take personal responsibility for lab biosafety, involve the public in decision-making, and accept public accountability for their actions.

The NIH Guidelines and Institutional Biosafety Committee system of “self-regulation” by researchers is founded upon the principal of personal responsibility of PIs and the promise of transparency. The redaction of the researchers’ identities from IBC meeting minutes, in order to hide the activities of researchers and avoid accountability for accidents, fundamentally contradicts the core principles of the US oversight system and violates the commitments that science made.”

Richard Ebright goes further:

“There is no justification for UNC’s redaction of the names of the laboratory heads and the identities of pathogens. UNC’s redactions violate conditions UNC agreed to in exchange for NIH funding of UNC’s research and, if not corrected, should result in the termination of current NIH funding, and the loss of eligibility for future NIH funding, of UNC’s research.”

Are universities doing too many risky experiments on coronaviruses?

The second concern of researchers contacted by *Independent Science News* is that unnecessary and dangerous experiments will be conducted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Richard Ebright:


“The UNC incident shows that serious laboratory accidents with SARS-CoV-2 can occur even in a lab having extremely extensive experience in BSL-3 operations and unmatched expertise in coronavirus research, and underscores the risks associated with uncontrolled proliferation of research on SARS-CoV-2, especially for labs lacking prior experience in BSL-3 operations and coronavirus research.”

For this reason Ebright argues that:

“It is essential that a national needs-assessment and biosafety assessment be performed for research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2. It also is essential that a risk-benefit review be performed before approving research projects involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2—something that currently does not occur—to ensure that potential benefits to the public outweigh the real risks to laboratory workers and the public.”

This concern over risks and benefits is shared by Edward Hammond. Using FOIA again he has further discovered that researchers at the University of Pittsburgh (whose identity is redacted) plan to make what Hammond calls Corona-thrax.

In short, according to its Institutional Biosafety Committee, Pittsburgh researchers intend put the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 (which allows the virus to gain entry into human cells) into *Bacillus anthracis* which is the causative agent of anthrax.



U

Pittsburgh Inst Biosafety Committee minutes June 2020

The anthrax strain proposed to be used for this experiment is “disarmed” but, Hammond agrees with Gao et al., (2020) that the balance of risks and benefits appears not to be receiving adequate consideration.

This experiment was nevertheless approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee of the University of Pittsburgh. But by redacting the name of the laboratory from the minutes and also every name of the members of the committee which approved it, the University has supplied

a *de facto* response to the final question posed by Gao et al.: who will take responsibility for risky coronavirus research?

References

Gao, P., Ma, S., Lu, D., Mitcham, C., Jing, Y., & Wang, G. (2020). Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. *Synthetic and systems biotechnology*, 5(2), 59-61.

Menachery, V. D., Yount, B. L., Debbink, K., Agnihothram, S., Gralinski, L. E., Plante, J. A., ... & Randell, S. H. (2015). A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence. *Nature medicine*, 21(12), 1508-1513.

Roberts, A., Deming, D., Paddock, C. D., Cheng, A., Yount, B., Vogel, L., ... & Zaki, S. R. (2007). A mouse-adapted SARS-coronavirus causes disease and mortality in BALB/c mice. *PLoS Pathog*, 3(1), e5.

Thao, T. T. N., Labroussaa, F., Ebert, N., V'kovski, P., Stalder, H., Portmann, J., ... & Gultom, M. (2020). Rapid reconstruction of SARS-CoV-2 using a synthetic genomics platform. *BioRxiv*.

<<

ww

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Keshap, Atul <(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Media Inquiry: Study Indicating COVID-19 Not from Wuhan Market

Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 00:47:25 +0000

(b)(5) UK's tabloid is already reporting it.
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8326823/Landmark-study-Virus-didnt-come-animals-Wuhan-market.html>

(b)(5)

Miles



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

On May 18, 2020, at 8:25 PM, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Have either of you seen anything on this?

From: Frances Martel <fmartel@breitbart.com>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 6:17 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Media Inquiry: Study Indicating COVID-19 Not from Wuhan Market

Hello (b)(6)

I cover international news at Breitbart and my colleague Matt Boyle suggested you could help. I came across a study on the Chinese coronavirus recently published and was curious if the State Department was aware of it or had any comment. Here is the link: <https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.01.073262v1.full>
The study basically seems to indicate that the virus is too similar to SARS and too contagious for it to be likely that it went from animal to human at the Wuhan market. It does not outright state that the virus could be an evolved version of SARS or that it could come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology samples, but ruling out the wet market does appear to make that more

likely. It also notes how detrimental it is for science that Chinese officials destroyed early samples of the virus.

The study isn't peer-reviewed and is very new, so its status could change, but the conclusions seemed to align with Secretary Pompeo's insistence that evidence exists linking the Wuhan Institute to the pandemic, so that's why I wanted to reach out. Would you be able to help?

Thanks so much, hope you are well,

-Frances

--

Frances Martel
International Editor, Breitbart News
fmartel@breitbart.com
201-328-2010

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Kang, Eliot" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 20:24:04 +0000

As I said, I get a lot of these...

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:22 PM
To: Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Eliot, here's my immediate reaction (b)(6) may well have other, smarter ones):

(b)(5)	
EcoHealth Alliance project	(b)(5)
(b)(5)	

Argh.

Sent from my tPhone

On Nov 4, 2020, at 3:16 PM, Kang, Eliot [(b)(6)]@state.gov> wrote:

Quick views. I get a lot of these...

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:06 PM
To: Kang, Eliot [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Thanks, [(b)(5)]
 [(b)(5)]

[(b)(6)]

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer [(b)(6)]

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: [(b)(6)]

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: [(b)(6)]

From: Kang, Eliot [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 2:54 PM
To: Ganzer, Ann K [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

??

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 2:38 PM

To: DiNanno, Thomas G [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Tom, Eliot,

(b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)

From: Joe DeRisi [redacted]@ucsf.edu>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 12:37 PM

To: [redacted]@state.gov>

Cc: [redacted]@state.gov>; Fred Milanovich [redacted]; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - [redacted] to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hi [redacted]

Thanks for engaging with us yesterday - that was an enjoyable conversation.

I've attached one of our academic papers, and a PDF explainer for IDseq. Also a 1-pager from the Council on Strategic Risks, which has become interested in IDseq as well for their new "Alliance to End Biological Threats"

Let me know if you have any questions, or would like additional information.

-joe

On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 8:47 AM [redacted]@state.gov> wrote:
Joe,

Many thanks to Josh and you for valuable input last night. Means a lot.

I would like to set up an opportunity for you to brief your detection/monitoring system. Seems like a total no brainer on many levels. If you have a white paper, please share. How have the Chinese reacted to it?

Best regards,

[redacted]

[redacted]

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)

(b)(6)

NSTS: (b)(6) (NSTS)

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6)@ucsf.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 3:46 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - David Asher to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Ok, I will invite him. (unsure if he is available today, but will check).
-j

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 12:28 PM (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(6) is in a meeting, but I am sure that he would welcome Dr. Batson's inputs.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6)@ucsf.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 2:31 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello (b)(6) I would like one of my covid-genomics data scientists, Dr. Josh Batson, to also read through the document, and if possible, to join the call.

If that would be acceptable, let me know.

-joe

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 11:10 AM [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov wrote:

Joe, 630pm is fine. I likely will call from my personal cell. Sorry the attachment didn't come through. It is a much discussed anonymous deductive/detective analysis of why COVID19 might have come through an accident at one of Wuhan Labs. Appreciate your personal thoughts.

[REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED] (b)(5) No matter, I look forward to telemeeting you early this evening [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From: Joe DeRisi <[REDACTED] (b)(6) ucsf.edu>

Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 12:41 PM

To: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov

Cc: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov

Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - [REDACTED] (b)(6) o Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Can we push to 6:30 EST? I now have a conflict at 6pm EST that I can not juggle.

Was there supposed to be a document attached? I did not see one in the email.

-joe

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 9:18 AM [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov wrote:

Joe, Sorry to have been of the State net. May I call you at 6pm EST? I would like my lead analyst and data scientist, [REDACTED] (b)(6) o join. Let us know of that is okay? We all have read the

attached. If you have comments that, alone, would be invaluable. (b)(6) PS- What is your phone #? My tel # at State is (b)(6)

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

U.S. Department of State

Tel: (b)(6)

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6).ucsf.edu>

Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2020 11:03 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello (b)(6)

I have two open time slots: at 8:30-9:30am and at 3-4pm (pacific). I understand and accept the need for confidentiality.

-joe

On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 4:57 PM (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Joe,

Thanks to Fred for the kind intro and thanks to you very much for answering the call. I will reach out tomorrow—privately. How does your schedule look?

FYI- Any and all opinions, analysis, theories, hunches, etc provided to State will be kept under strict confidentiality—and we request vice versa. We run a tight ship at least in the world of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance at State.

Best regards and keep up the great stuff at the DeRisi lab.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)

(b)(6)

NSTS: (b)(6) (NSTS)

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6).ucsf.edu>

Sent: Saturday, October 17, 2020 6:23 PM

To: Fred Milanovich (b)(6)>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Electronic introduction (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello (b)(6)-

It is a pleasure to e-meet you. Let me know how I can be of assistance. I can be reached by text/voice at (b)(6)

-joe

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 10:39 AM Fred Milanovich (b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6) It is my pleasure to introduce you to Dr. Joe DeRisi. Dr. DeRisi and I have worked together in the past in a field of mutual interest to all of us. His laboratory has an international reputation for their work in the area of very rare infectious diseases. His group can bring a very competent suite of assets to the problem at hand. Best wishes, Fred

--

Joseph DeRisi

Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub

Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics

UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi

Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub

Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi
Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub
Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi
Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub
Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi
Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub
Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi
Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub
Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
UC San Francisco

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Kang, Eliot" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Labs project
Date: Sat, 25 Apr 2020 15:01:50 +0000

UNC is Shi Zhengli's main personal interlocutor in the U.S. Wuhan Institute of Virology as an organization has official joint projects with the following U.S. institutions: University of Alabama, University of North Texas, EcoHealth Alliance, Harvard University, The National Institutes of Health, and National Wildlife Federation. Each of these institutions has a specific joint projects with WIV. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
 Policy Planning Staff
 Office of the Secretary
 U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)
 (mobile)

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 8:51 AM
 To: Yu, Miles; (b)(6) (S)
 Cc: (b)(6)
 Subject: Labs project

(b)(5)

Get Outlook for

(b)(7)(E)

Sender: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>;
Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Lab leak is the 'most credible' source of the coronavirus outbreak, says top US government official | Daily Mail Online
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 17:36:46 +0000

(b)(6) Many thanks.

(b)(5)

(b)(6)
ISN/BPS

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:10 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Lab leak is the 'most credible' source of the coronavirus outbreak, says top US government official | Daily Mail Online

FYSA the PRC Embassy also called for the US to clarify whether this is official USG policy in today's PRC MFA briefing, see below:

7. Pottinger, Deputy Assistant to the US President for National Security Affairs, said that he believes that the new coronavirus is most likely to be leaked by a Chinese laboratory. There is increasing evidence that the Wuhan Institute of Virology is the source of the global spread of this deadly epidemic. What's China's response to this?

I also saw the relevant report. Frankly speaking, I couldn't believe it when I saw the report. I read it carefully several times. Indeed, relevant reports quoted Pottinger's remarks at the time. Everyone knows the fallacy about the so-called Wuhan laboratory virus production. Almost all the top scientists and disease control experts in the world, including the top disease control experts in the United States, have publicly denied it. Chinese scientists have also been interviewed by the media many times, and the American media have also been to the Wuhan Institute of Virology for interviews, introducing relevant management and research from a

professional perspective. Our Chinese media has also published a series of lies and truths about the epidemic, citing a large number of specific and informative figures and facts, and conducted in-depth criticism. As a senior official of the U.S. government, Mr. Pottinger is still spreading out such inferior lies and rumors. I hope the US can clarify whether this is Pottinger's own personal remarks or a formal statement on behalf of the U.S. government. The United States said so and asked them to present evidence to the world immediately.

(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer

Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)
(b)(6) (telework)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 11:33 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Lab leak is the 'most credible' source of the coronavirus outbreak, says top US government official | Daily Mail Online

Hi, Chris. We'll see if we can get a transcript. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation | Department of State
☎ Daytime mobile (b)(6)
☎ Evening mobile (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 11:24 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Lab leak is the 'most credible' source of the coronavirus outbreak, says top US government official | Daily Mail Online

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

Chris

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 8:34 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Lab leak is the 'most credible' source of the coronavirus outbreak, says top US government official | Daily Mail Online

Thanks. Copying the press team.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

(b)(7)(E)

Sent from my tPhone

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov;
Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov;

Recipient: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
(b)(6)@state.gov;

FL-2022-00076

A-00000572624

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>;
Ganzer, Ann K [REDACTED]@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Robert Mikulak (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Jim LeDuc's early questions about lab activities at WIV
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 14:41:35 +0000

Interesting. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Robert Mikulak (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, December 3, 2021 8:39 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Robert Mikulak (b)(6)
Subject: Jim LeDuc's early questions about lab activities at WIV

<https://usrtk.org/biohazards/biosafety-expert-close-to-wuhan-institute-of-virology-urged-associates-there-to-address-his-tough-questions-about-lab-origin-of-sars-cov-2/>

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: Robert Mikulak (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Reeker, Philip T" (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: EUR-RUS-DL <EUR-RUS-DL@state.gov>;
 EUR-PPD-DL <EUR-PPD-DL2@state.gov>
Subject: Re: It ain't just China
Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2020 16:47:06 +0000

(b)(5)

so far his focus

has been on hybrid efforts—lots of disinformation and anti-US propaganda.)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, April 4, 2020 12:43 PM

To: Ford, Christopher A; Feith, David; Reeker, Philip T; (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: It ain't just China

Let's discuss how we can use this to (b)(5)

(b)(5) there are lots of examples of small outbreaks of Corona and other viruses inside China and elsewhere—these were quickly addressed and contained. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

My guess is Russia is going to suffer mightily, something like Italy. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Saturday, April 4, 2020 12:10 PM

To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Reeker, Philip T

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

Subject: It ain't just China

Russian Doctor Detained After Challenging Virus Figures

April 3, 2020

<https://dnyuz.com/2020/04/03/russian-doctor-detained-after-challenging-virus-figures/>

MOSCOW — Russian authorities detained the leader of an independent doctors' union, an outspoken critic of the Kremlin who has dismissed as "lies" the country's low official numbers for coronavirus infections.

Anastasia Vasilieva, the head of the Alliance of Doctors, was stopped by the police on Thursday and held overnight while traveling from Moscow to an impoverished rural town to deliver masks, gloves and other supplies to a local hospital, a colleague who was traveling with her said.

The detention of Dr. Vasilieva, an eye specialist who has been highly critical of Russia's response to the pandemic, added fuel to already widespread skepticism, particularly among Kremlin critics, about the accuracy of official figures showing relatively few cases of the virus in Russia. Her detention also increased skepticism about the readiness of Russia's health care system to cope with the pandemic.

A group of doctors at a hospital in St. Petersburg, Russia's second biggest city, released [a video on Friday appealing to the public for help](#) in obtaining the protective equipment they said they needed to treat coronavirus patients.

Maria Bakhldina, the head doctor at the hospital, speaking to Fontanka, a news site in the city, dismissed the doctors complaints as "untrue."

Views on how far the virus has really spread in Russia and how prepared the country is have been largely determined by political leanings. The general public, which mostly supports President Vladimir V. Putin, has voiced little concern while many of the Kremlin's opponents suspect a cover-up.

Aleksei A. Navalny, Russia's most prominent opposition leader, recently accused the authorities of lying about the number of tests carried out and suggested that, as a result, the number of cases could be much higher than reported.

Russia has sharply stepped up testing and now says it has conducted more than 575,000 tests, but this includes cases of multiple tests on the same person, lowering the head count.

In an address to the nation on Thursday, President Putin, holed up for most of the past week in his country residence outside Moscow, praised health workers for “holding the line of defense against the advancing epidemic” but acknowledged the worst is yet to come.

Russia has been far more open in confronting the pandemic than many other former Soviet countries, some of which insist they have no cases now and can keep the virus at bay with quack remedies.

A sudden large surge in cases would likely break Russia’s rickety medical system and undermine Mr. Putin’s already declining but still robust approval ratings, especially as state-controlled media has bombarded the public for months with gushing reports about how the president is improving health care across the country.

The virus has also slowed Russia’s already sluggish economy, posing another problem for the Kremlin less than a month after it pushed through constitutional changes to allow Mr. Putin to dispense with term limits and stay in power until 2036.

Dr. Vasilieva, the detained physician, set up the Alliance of Doctors last year in part to counter the Kremlin’s claims of dramatic improvements in funding and other support for hospitals. She has treated Mr. Navalny as a patient and affiliated her group with his. The authorities arrested her last year for rallying opposition to the closure of a tuberculosis clinic in a poor region of southern Russia.

Mr. Putin’s approval rating, according to a recent survey by the Levada Center, a respected Russian polling organization, fell from 69 percent in February to 63 percent in March, near to what it was in 2014 before a surge in the president’s popularity after Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine.

In his last public outing early last week, Mr. Putin visited a new state-of-the-art infectious diseases center, Hospital No. 40 in Moscow, escorted by its head doctor, who this week tested positive for the virus. The Kremlin said that Mr. Putin has been tested regularly and that “everything is O.K.”

Russia on Friday reported 601 new infections, down from 771 new cases reported on Thursday, bringing the total number to 4,419. This is a fourfold increase over the past week but still far fewer than the more than 245,000 cases reported in the United States and nearly 118,000 in Spain and 115,000 in Italy.

Critics of the Kremlin, however, have questioned the official figures. Dr. Vasilieva, the detained doctors’ union head, said in a video late last month that authorities were lying about the true number of infections, accusing them of deliberately misclassifying people who had developed the disease as victims of ordinary pneumonia.

A few days later, she said she had been called in for questioning over her comments, declaring defiantly in another video that “You can send whomever you want to get me — the Federal Security Service, the fire service — but the truth will not change.” The real number of coronavirus cases, she said, “is much higher than the authorities say.” She provided no evidence of any cover-up.

Her medical workers' union, warning that Russian hospitals were desperately short of masks and other protective equipment, recently started a fund-raising drive online to raise money from the public to buy supplies for hospitals and clinics.

The government, too, seems worried that it may need to do more to control the virus. On Friday, it suspended the last remaining flights into the country, halting even special flights bringing Russians home from abroad, the Interfax news agency reported. All land borders have already been closed.

Moscow, St. Petersburg and many Russian regions this week ordered residents not to leave their homes except to buy food and medicine or walk their dogs close to their residence.

Dr. Vasilieva was stopped by police officers on Thursday while attempting to deliver supplies by car to a hospital in Okulovka, northwest of Moscow, according to Natalia Kolosova, a colleague who was traveling with her. "They were clearly waiting for us," Ms. Kolosova said, noting that police officers had set up a check point at the entry to Okulovka but stopped no other vehicles.

Dr. Vasilieva appeared in court on Friday charged with disobeying police orders and violating quarantine restrictions. She was released on Friday evening after being ordered to pay a small fine.

Natalia Zviagina, director for Amnesty International in Russia, condemned the detention, saying in a statement that: "It is staggering that the Russian authorities appear to fear criticism more than the deadly Covid-19 pandemic" caused by coronavirus. By detaining Dr. Vasilieva, she added, the authorities show "they are willing to punish health professionals who dare contradict the official Russian narrative and expose flaws in the public health system."

Dmitri Sokolov, a paramedic at the Okulovka hospital and the head of the regional branch of Dr. Vasilieva's Alliance of Doctors, said that the hospital had not yet admitted any patients confirmed as suffering from Covid-19 but that staff members were deeply worried because of severe shortages of masks and other equipment.

Okulovka hospital's head surgeon, Yuri I. Korvin, also a critic of the authorities, had been ordered to stay away from the hospital and self-isolate for two weeks because he had had contact with Dr. Vasilieva, Mr. Sokolov said. Police officers involved in her detention, however, were allowed to keep working, he added.

Mr. Sokolov said "nobody knows the real number of infections" and added that residents in Okulovka were alarmed by a recent flood of people arriving from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Fleeing quarantine restriction and high infection rates in their home cities, urban residents have been fleeing to rural towns like Okulovka to take shelter at country homes.

"None of us know where these people have been or whether they have been tested," he said.

Oleg Matsnev contributed reporting.

The post [Russian Doctor Detained After Challenging Virus Figures](#) appeared first on [New York Times](#).

Sender: "Reeker, Philip T" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

EUR-RUS-DL <EUR-RUS-DL@state.gov>;

EUR-PPD-DL <EUR-PPD-DL2@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Inquiry re new WHO advisory group
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 21:11:42 +0000

Excellent news! Chris, thanks for doing the outreach and sharing this welcome update. I can follow up with HHS so they can inform NSC for tracking.

Best,

(b)(6)
From: Park, Christopher (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2021 4:24 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Inquiry re new WHO advisory group

FYI.

From: (b)(6).uchicago.edu>
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2021 4:23 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Inquiry re new WHO advisory group

Dear Chris,

I just wanted to let you know that I just submitted my application materials for service on the WHO SAGO. I want to again thank you for bringing this call for applications to my attention and for considering me a potential candidate. Very much appreciated!

Be well, my friend!

(b)(6)

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: Monday, September 13, 2021 at 9:38 AM
To: (b)(6)@uchicago.edu>
Subject: Inquiry re new WHO advisory group
Resent-From: (b)(6)@uchicago.edu>
Resent-Date: Monday, September 13, 2021 at 9:38 AM

Dear (b)(6) - as you may be aware, the WHO Director-General launched an open call for membership applications for the newly established **Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO)**. The SAGO will advise the WHO Secretariat on technical and scientific considerations regarding the origins of emerging and re-emerging pathogens. Their first functions will be to develop a global framework of investigating novel pathogens, including outlining functions to support the next series of studies into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, in accordance with the previously released Joint WHO-China study report which was published on 30 March 2021.

Because they are trying to develop a capability to investigate the origin of novel pathogens that is agnostic as to cause (that is, natural, deliberate, or accidental), they need expertise in laboratory biosafety and biosecurity as part of the mix – so I thought of you. I'm wondering whether you would have any interest in applying, or any recommendations for other candidates.

Further information on the functions of the SAGO and the required qualifications can be found in the slides attached and on the WHO-SAGO website;

- Open call for experts to apply
- TORs

Regards,
Chris

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>
To: Park, Christopher J [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: Re: Fwd: The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2 | Nature Medicine
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 11:50:37 +0000

Thanks, saw it over the weekend. It does a good job going through things.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On March 20, 2020 at 7:48:02 AM EDT, Park, Christopher J <[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov> wrote:

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2020 8:17 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL
Subject: The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2 | Nature Medicine

A pretty nice line of reasoning.

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

Sent from my iPhone

Sender: [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>
Recipient: Park, Christopher J [REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
[REDACTED] (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

To: Park, Christopher J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>;
[redacted] (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: Re: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 16:36:47 +0000

We've been kept out of the whole letter process.

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(5)

Here is what I have in the book on this topic:

Origins of COVID-19 Top Lines

[redacted] (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:23 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

Actually, I've got at least a draft of that response, so probably good enough to work with.

From: Park, Christopher J
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:22 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

Thanks. I'm sorry to make your lives difficult, but (b)(6) asked me to (b)(5)
 (b)(5) (b)(5)
 (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:17 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

(b)(5) I will pull that section and send to you ASAP

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:16 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

(b)(5) Give me a few minutes. They would be on my old T drive and some of those didn't transfer, and I may have total (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:14 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:13 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

They **usually send around fully cleared QFR packages once they've gone back to the Hill, but it takes some time once they leave State because the White House has to go through all of them

before they go to final. If you can remember which nominee specifically had the QFRs, we can request those packages (if (b)(6) doesn't already have them).

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2021 12:11 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Do we have any sort of database of cleared responses to Congressional Q&A and letters?

(b)(5)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>