



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 28, 2024

Case No. FL-2022-00076

Mr. Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD
U.S. Right to Know
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Suryanarayanan:

As we noted in our letter dated May 31, 2024, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State (“Department”) has identified an additional 116 responsive records subject to the FOIA. Upon review, we have determined that 114 records may be released in part and 2 records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The records that were withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The document identification numbers for the records withheld in full are: B-00002633560 and B-00002633561. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00076, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sonia Pryce". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Sonia" and last name "Pryce" clearly distinguishable.

Sonia Pryce
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: WHO CL - Origins of SARS-CoV-2
Date:	Mon, 19 Jul 2021 10:39:24 +0000

Senior Advisor.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, July 18, 2021 9:31:53 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Fw: FW: WHO CL - Origins of SARS-CoV-2

Chris - what is Bob's position in ISN-BPS? Thanks!

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: July 18, 2021 at 2:52:00 PM EDT
Subject: Fw: FW: WHO CL - Origins of SARS-CoV-2
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>, Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6) - We appreciate your including Chris Park and (b)(6) in ISN/BPS on this. While they should continue to be the POCs on the origins issues, there is also broader interest in lab audits in the office, so perhaps you could use the collective address (ISN-BPS-DL@state.gov) for info messages on both subjects.

Best regards,
Bob Mikulak

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: July 14, 2021 at 12:43:51 PM EDT
Subject: FW: WHO CL - Origins of SARS-CoV-2
To: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>, Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>, Cook, Nerissa J
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

Colleagues: the WHO Origins Phase II communique to member states was released today. It calls for additional studies in China, (b)(5) The WHO will also be giving a briefing to WHO Member States on Friday. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,
 (b)(6)

[Get Outlook for iOS](#)

From: OLA@who.int <OLA@who.int>
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2021 5:48 PM
Subject: WHO: C.L.28.2021 (Origins of SARS-CoV-2)

Dear Member States of the World Health Organization,

Please find attached, in the six official languages, C.L.28.2021 regarding the origins of SARS-CoV-2.

Best regards,

Department of Governing Bodies
 World Health Organization

DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL. YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE A REPLY

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b)(6) We appreciate your including Chris Park and (b)(6) (b)(5)
 (b)(5)
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info messages on both subjects.

Best regards,
 Bob Mikulak

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----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: July 14, 2021 at 12:43:51 PM EDT
Subject: FW: WHO CL - Origins of SARS-CoV-2
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, Goodman, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>, Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Colleagues: the WHO Origins Phase II communique to member states was released today. It calls for additional studies in China, (b)(5) The WHO will also be giving a briefing to WHO Member States on Friday. (b)(5)

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Department of Governing Bodies
 World Health Organization

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 15:11:35 +0000

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 10:10 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 10:03 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(6) - everything moved quickly last night and SPOX has responded to the reporter late last night as well. They weren't particularly asking for us to clear, but simply flagging for our awareness. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:51 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Thanks. (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:50 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Ok. I will try to push this forward and copy you.

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:47 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:46 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Thanks, (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:25 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Here's what I suggest:

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:24 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On January 14, 2021 at 9:09:58 AM EST, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:
Chris (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Copying both of (b)(6) drafts here, with a little tweak.

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | (b)(6)
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:02 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:00 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

I think (b)(6) proposed wording is fine.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:55 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | (b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:53 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:51 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov <(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:49 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(6)

I like this version the best.

(b)(5) I'm writing a story that will report that an interagency group of scientists and medical experts studying the origin of the coronavirus is deadlocked over its conclusions. I'm told 70% of the experts want the conclusion to say that the virus accidentally leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, 15% want to say it was naturally occurring zoonotic virus jump, and 7% want to say its a bioweapon. The remaining 8% say they are undecided and need more info, which China so far has refused to give."

I wasn't at Monday's meeting, but for last Thursday, (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:46 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@hhs.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 7:16 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Chafin, Kelly (EOP.GOV) (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Bill Gertz contacted HHS/Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA) yesterday with the email below.

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 7:02 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Chafin, Kelly (EOP.GOV) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Fwd: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

Sent from my tPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Date: January 14, 2021 at 6:33:59 AM EST

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.gov>, "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Looping in Chris as well since it looks (b)(5)

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 8:39 PM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Date: January 13, 2021 at 8:21:37 PM EST

Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

To: (b)(6)@state.gov,AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>,AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>,Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov,ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 8:17 PM

To: AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Good evening,

Apologies for the short fuse clearance request so late in the evening. Bill Gertz is working on a story on the origins of COVID-19, his full inquiry is below. SPOX would like to respond tonight, and we are seeking your urgent clearance on the following response:

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

From: Bill Gertz <bgertz@washingtontimes.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 5:01:18 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D <[\(b\)\(6\)@state.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov)>
Subject: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Morgan,

I'm writing a story that will report that an interagency group of scientists and medical experts studying the origin of the coronavirus is deadlocked over its conclusions. I'm told 70% of the experts want the conclusion to say that the virus accidentally leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, 15% want to say it was naturally occurring zoonotic virus jump, and 7% want to say its a bioweapon. The remaining 8% say they are undecided and need more info, which China so far has refused to give.

NSC referred me to HHS, which referred me to State.

Any comment for my story? Need anything asap for my weekly Inside the Ring column.

Bill

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz | direct [\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:(b)(6))
TheGertzFile.com



3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 13:52:38 +0000

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:51 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:50 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Scott -

I like this version the best.

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(b)(5)

(b)(5)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 8:46 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: FW: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

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From: (b)(6)@hhs.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 7:16 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Chafin, Kelly

(EOP.GOV) (b)(6); (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

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To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Chafin, Kelly (EOP.GOV) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Fwd: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

Sent from my tPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Date: January 14, 2021 at 6:33:59 AM EST

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@state.gov>, "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Looping in Chris as well since it looks (b)(5)

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 8:39 PM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Cc: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Date: January 13, 2021 at 8:21:37 PM EST

Subject: RE: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>,AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>,AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>, Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.gov>, ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov

Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 8:17 PM

To: AVC-Press-DL <AVC-Press-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-P-Office-DL <EAP-P-Office-DL@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: URGENT CLEARANCE: FW: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Good evening,

Apologies for the short fuse clearance request so late in the evening. Bill Gertz is working on a story on the origins of COVID-19, his full inquiry is below. SPOX would like to respond tonight, and we are seeking your urgent clearance on the following response:

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

From: Bill Gertz <bgertz@washingtontimes.com>

Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 5:01:18 PM

To: Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Interagency deadlocked on virus origin conclusions

Morgan,

I'm writing a story that will report that an interagency group of scientists and medical experts studying the origin of the coronavirus is deadlocked over its conclusions. I'm told 70% of the experts want the conclusion to say that the virus accidentally leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, 15% want to say it was naturally occurring zoonotic virus jump, and 7% want to say its a bioweapon. The remaining 8% say they are undecided and need more info, which China so far has refused to give.

NSC referred me to HHS, which referred me to State.

Any comment for my story? Need anything asap for my weekly Inside the Ring column.

Bill

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent

@BillGertz | direct (b)(6)

TheGertzFile.com



3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 6:16 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

(b)(5)

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On March 20, 2020 at 6:14:29 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
Correct.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On March 20, 2020 at 6:10:35 PM EDT, Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 6:08 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

All-

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

On March 20, 2020 at 5:39:20 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Thanks, (b)(6) I'll tap (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | (b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 5:34 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-

BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research | U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 4:44 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

That's fine, I suppose.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On March 20, 2020 at 3:54:39 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

Thanks (b)(6) Below are the points as they now stand. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 3:47 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of State, ISN/MBC

TEL: (b)(6)

FAX: (b)(6)

Unclass e-mail: (b)(6)@state.gov

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 3:38 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-

BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

Looping (b)(6) - Comments on the issue below?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 3:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-

BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer | (b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 3:33 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Urgent - Accusations Regarding the Origin of COVID v6

All – This is what (b)(6) called me about. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6) Attached is the current draft.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: two lists for the depository
Date:	Mon, 27 Apr 2020 10:22:41 +0000

Got it

Sent from my iPhone

> On Apr 26, 2020, at 10:18 PM, Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
>
> (b)(6)
> Two more docs for the depository:
>
> The first shows what the Chinese biologists have been working on. As I read to you on the phone, pretty scary stuff, including creation of man-made pathogens, population-specific genetic markers (only killing people with certain genetic markers?), targeted transmission of pathogens.
>
> The second is the list of western partners with Wuhan Institute of Virology. It has been deleted on its website, but I saved a copy of it in Jan. (b)(5)
>
> Good night!
>
> Miles
>
>
>
>
> Dr. M. Miles Yu
> Policy Planning Staff
> Office of the Secretary
> U.S. Department of State
> (b)(6)
> (b)(6)mobile)
> <PRC Bio Research submissions.pdf>
> <Intl Cooperation Projects.docx>

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan
Date:	Mon, 27 Apr 2020 02:57:21 +0000

Sorry about that Bob...technology...

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 4:26 PM
To: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

(b)(5)

From: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 4:01:30 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

(b)(6) - I can't get into it on sharepoint. Could you send it via OneDrive?

I have no hope that the necessary political cooperation would be forthcoming from the Chinese. That's why I described it simply as a "thought experiment".

Bob

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 4:31 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

All -

Here is what I thought of. Apologies for not incorporating into (b)(6) I was already nearly done when I saw it!

(b)(5)

Best,


(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 2:06 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

Also attaching this link (I got an error saying you all might not be able to access my file):



(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer

(b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 2:03 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

Hi Bob,

It's refreshing to see this laid out in a logical way. I added a few comments in the attached, from the naive perspective of a non-expert of virology, animal or epidemiological studies, or zoonotic disease.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer |

(b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 7:39 AM

To: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Re: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

Thanks Bob! I'll take a look today and add my thoughts.

Best,

(b)(6)

From: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:42 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Subject: Thought Experiment - origins of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan

(b)(6) As foreshadowed in our Monday staff meeting, for my own interest I've tried to think like an investigator trying to track down the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak, in part because I can see the thought exercise being useful in a UNSGM context. A rather naive, but hopefully intelligent, attempt.

This is all on-the-ground stuff. I can imagine the IC is scouring all its resources for other kinds of info.

Feedback welcome.


Bob

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: The Rogin article that we've been expecting
Date:	Wed, 29 Apr 2020 13:48:39 +0000

Fysa, I believe these are the cables.

Opinion | Senators demand answers from Pompeo on Wuhan lab cables



Opinion | Senators demand answers from Pompeo on Wuhan lab cables

We're still trying to understand the origins of the outbreak.
The Chinese aren't helping.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)
Date:	Wed, 9 Jun 2021 15:51:15 +0000

Can you give me a ring when you're off the phone? (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:42 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks, Chris. (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 11:40 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

(b)(6) - thanks for flagging this. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:53 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Chris (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(6)
Foreign Affairs / Science Officer
Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 10:41 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks for the call (b)(6) Attaching letter here.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 10:04 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000 (House E&C Minority doc request - COVID-Wuhan)

Thanks (b)(6)

Adding (b)(6) (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 9:23 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

Yes of course, here it is. Thank you so much for your help!

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 4:54 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Tasking a letter H20210507-000

(b)(6)

I haven't seen this letter. Can you please send it to this group so we can see (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
 Congressional Affairs Officer
 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)
 U.S. Department of State
 2201 C Street, NW; Suite 3880
 Washington, DC 20520
 (b)(6) (b)(6)
 OES

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 10:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; OES-H
 <OES-H@state.gov>; OES-Staffers-DG <OES-Staffers-DG@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; H_CCU <H_CCU@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Tasking a letter

Hello (b)(6) and welcome to H!

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 10:18 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Tasking a letter

Hi (b)(6)

I am a new addition to H, and (b)(6) suggested I reach out to you to get a response to the attached letter tasked. At (b)(6) request, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks for your help and guidance as I figure things out here!

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
 [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;
 [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;
To: [(b)(6)]@state.gov>;
 IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>;
 [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 08:01:24 +0000

[(b)(5)]

From: [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, September 3, 2021 8:45:38 PM
To: Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Fw: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members

[(b)(5)]

Applications are due next Friday Sept 10, and WHO will take two weeks to evaluate with the goal of a first meeting in early October. Criteria are technical experience, direct experience with pathogens, field experience, gender and geographical balance, and nationality. I believe [(b)(6)] will hold an interagency process on this on Tuesday. HHS has six names already, two nominated by Fauci (including one from Galvanston lab). [(b)(5)]

[(b)(5)]

[(b)(5)] Thanks! [(b)(6)]

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

On September 2, 2021 at 11:09:20 AM GMT+2, Park, Christopher J [(b)(6)]@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, September 2, 2021 4:50 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Fw: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members

Hi all,

I'd recommend (b)(6) as my top choice. (b)(5)
(b)(5) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Cheers,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, September 2, 2021 3:10 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Fw: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members

(b)(5)

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: August 26, 2021 at 7:15:45 PM GMT+2
Subject: Fw: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>, ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>, IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>, (b)(6)@state.gov>

FYSA... The GHSA Action Package on BS/BS just shared the announcement for SAGO.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of International Health and Biodefense
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@State.gov

Desk: (b)(6)

Mobile: (b)(6)

From: Wallace-Sankarsingh, Ms. Sacha (CAR) (b)(6)@CARPHA.ORG>

Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2021 1:05 PM

To: GHSA APP3 Biosafety Biosecurity <GHSAAPP3@carpha.org>; CariPHLN Distribution <merged_CariPHLN@carpha.org>; NFP Biosafety and Biosecurity <nfpbiosafetyandbiosecurity@carpha.org>; Laboratory Directors <LABORATORY-DIRECTORS@carpha.org>; IMT-ER <imt-er@carpha.org>

Subject: FW: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members

Dear Colleagues,

Please see below a message from Dr. Kaz Kojima with an Open Call for persons to apply to become members of the Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO). Do review the documents and note the deadline for submissions is September 10, 2021.

Kind regards,

Sacha

Sacha Wallace-Sankarsingh, MSc., MPH (International Public Health)
Biorisk and CariPHLN Manager
Laboratory Services & Networks

Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)

(b)(6)
Federation Park,
Newtown 190324
Port of Spain
Trinidad and Tobago

Tel (b)(6)

Fax
www.carpha.org

From: KOJIMA, Kazunobu [(b)(6)]@who.int>
Sent: Wednesday, 25 August 2021 5:43 PM
To: Wallace-Sankarsingh, Ms. Sacha (CAR) [(b)(6)]@CARPHA.ORG>
Subject: Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Open Call for members

Dear colleagues,

As you may be aware of, the WHO Director-General launched an open call for membership applications for the newly established **Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins on Novel Pathogens (SAGO)**. The SAGO will advise the WHO Secretariat on technical and scientific considerations regarding the origins of emerging and re-emerging pathogens. Their first functions will be to develop a global framework of investigating novel pathogens, including outlining functions to support the next series of studies into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, in accordance with the previously released Joint WHO-China study report which was published on 30 March 2021.

WHO is looking for experts with a range of technical knowledge, field experience, skills and experience relevant to emerging and re-emerging pathogens to join this group, including biosafety and biosecurity.

Further information on the functions of the SAGO and the required qualifications can be found in the slides attached and on the WHO-SAGO website;

- Open call for experts to apply
- TORs

Interested applicants can submit their completed applications (expression of interest, CV, and DOI) are to be sent to SAGO@who.int by **10 September 2021**.

Please feel free to circulate this notice to your network or those who you think may be qualified and interested in.

Thank you,
Kaz

Kazunobu Kojima, MD, PhD
Scientist
Global Infectious Hazards Preparedness (GIH)
World Health Organization
20 avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
Tel : [(b)(6)]
Fax : [(b)(6)]
GPN: [(b)(6)]
E-mail : [(b)(6)]@who.int

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>

From: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov>
CC: Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 06:00:41 +0000

(b)(6) et al,

Here is something for the Secretary. Sorry for being a bit late. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Very respectfully

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
 Policy Planning Staff
 Office of the Secretary
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 5:49 PM
 To: Stilwell, David R
 Cc: Kenna, Lisa D; (b)(6) (S); Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard L
 Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

Thanks for this. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks.

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 25, 2020, at 4:45 PM, Stilwell, David R [redacted]@state.gov> wrote:

[redacted] (b)(5)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 4:29 PM
To: Stilwell, David R [redacted]@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

Dave,

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

Executive Assistant
Office of the Secretary of State

From: Stilwell, David R [redacted] (b)(6)@state.gov<mailto:[redacted] (b)(6)>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 11:33 AM
To: Kenna, Lisa D; [redacted] (b)(6)
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) (S); Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard L
Subject: SARS Leak out of the Chinese Institute of Virology, Beijing in 2004

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

SARS escaped Beijing lab twice

Laboratory safety at the Chinese Institute of Virology under close scrutiny

Robert Walgate(walgate@scienceanalysed.com<mailto:walgate@scienceanalysed.com>)

Apr 25, 2004

262

The latest outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in China, with eight confirmed or suspected cases so far and hundreds quarantined, involves two researchers who were working with the virus in a Beijing research lab, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Monday (April 26).

“We suspect two people, a 26-year-old female postgraduate student and a 31-year-old male postdoc, were both infected, apparently in two separate incidents,” Bob Dietz, WHO spokesman in Beijing, told The Scientist.

The woman was admitted to hospital on April 4, but the man apparently became infected independently 2 weeks later, being hospitalized on April 17. Both worked at the Chinese Institute of Virology in Beijing, part of China's Center for Disease Control.

At a news conference in Manila this morning, Associated Press reported, WHO Western Pacific Regional Director Shigeru Omi criticized the laboratory's safeguards and said the authorities did not know yet whether any foreigners had been carrying out medical research in the facility and had since left the country. Laboratory safety “is a serious issue that has to be addressed,” he said. “We have to remain very vigilant.”

China has level three research guidelines and rules in place for handling the SARS virus, which are “of acceptable quality” to WHO, Dietz told The Scientist. But “it's a question of procedures and equipment. Frankly we are going to go in now a take a very close look,” he said.

“We have a team of two or three international experts that's arriving in a day or two. They are going to go into the labs with Ministry of Health people and find out what happened here,” Dietz said.

“We've been told we'll have full access, be able to test all the surfaces, interview people who worked there, and look at documentation to find out what was being done,” Dietz said. “We're not releasing the names of the experts yet, but once you see the names you'll recognize them.

They will be international experts from the relevant disciplines.”

In the meantime, the lab has been closed, and the 200 staff have been put in isolation in a hotel near another lab in Cham Ping, about 20 kilometers North of Beijing. China is rushing its own investigative teams to check lab security, according to state media.

Antoine Danchin, an epidemiologist with the Hong Kong University–Pasteur Research Center, who studied the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, told The Scientist the latest incidents were probably the result of lab accidents.

“Normally, it's not possible to contaminate people even under level two confinement, if the

security rules are obeyed, with the appropriate hoods, and so on,” Danchin said. SARS work requires level three. “So it suggests there has been some mishandling of something.”
 “The lab might have all the right rules, but the people may not comply! For example, notebooks are not supposed to be taken out, a lot of things like that. A virus doesn't jump on people!”
 Danchin said. However WHO Beijing is relatively sanguine about the current threat, despite the fact that the 26-year-old infected had taken a long journey on the country's rail network. The index cases are known, and contacts had been traced, Dietz said. “We see no significant public health threat at this point.”

David R. Stilwell
 Ass't Secretary East Asia Pacific

(b)(6)

<WHO & SARS.pdf>

Sender:	"Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for guidance—press contact
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2021 13:34:46 +0000

Just stick it in with (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:32 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for guidance—press contact
Importance: High

Hey! Also, (b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:29 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for guidance—press contact

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:25 AM
To: Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park,
 Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for guidance—press contact

Thanks, Ned. On it.

(b)(6)

From: Price, Edward C (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:22 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>; SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Request for guidance—press contact

For the topline, (b)(5)
(b)(5)

This line could then be added to one of the Q&As:

(b)(5)

And pls do send the revised version to (b)(5) this morning.

In terms of engaging the reporter, (b)(5)
(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:16 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Request for guidance—press contact

Good morning (b)(6)

See here (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) I also ccd Chris here if you have further questions.

Thanks so much and apologies for the delay.

(b)(6)

**Vanity Fair Interview (on background) – State Department exploration of
COVID-19 Origins**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Drafted by: CPark

ISN/PRESS: (b)(6)

OES/IHB: (b)(6)

AVC/PRESS: (b)(6)

EAP

P: (b)(6) OK

S/P: (b)(6) Info by request

T

D

NSC/Press

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 7:22 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Request for guidance—press contact

Hi (b)(6)

Noting that Vanity Fair was looking for a response by 1200 today, what says (b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 1, 2021 5:08 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov; SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Request for guidance—press contact

(b)(6)

Hey (b)(6)

I just touched base with (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, June 1, 2021 4:51 PM
To: SPOX2 <SPOX2@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Fw: Request for guidance—press contact

Hi SPOX team,

Flagging the below on COVID origins. I've reached out to (b)(5) to see what's going on here and haven't heard back.

Let me know what you think.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, June 1, 2021 2:49 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: Request for guidance—press contact

Flagging on origins. (b)(6) heads up that this may be coming your way.

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, June 1, 2021 2:44 PM
To: ISN-Press-DL <ISN-Press-DL@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Request for guidance—press contact

Dear CPA colleagues:

I just received a call from Katherine Eban (Vanity Fair). She's doing an extended piece on The COVID origins controversy, and called because she had been told by some participants in a December 9th briefing that I had urged them not to say anything about "gain-of-function" research at WIV, on the

grounds that because the US is probably the largest funder of such research, it could make us look bad. As they described the picture, I was trying to suppress information because of concerns about political optics.

I know I'm supposed to check with CPA before saying anything to the press, but I was really taken aback at this and responded. I told her that I had made no such insinuation, but rather had told the briefers that evidence of "gain-of-function" research at WIV did not constitute evidence — or even an indication — that anything nefarious was going on, and that suggesting it was seemed problematic given the amount of gain-of-function work the USG has funded. I compared it to inferring something malign based on the involvement of military scientists at a lab, pointing to the role U.S. military scientists have played in public health, going back at least to Walter Reed.

She then stated that her perception was that there were two camps within State with very different perceptions, with Chris Ford and some others initially thinking they were dealing with a "rogue operation," while the other group understood themselves to be under political pressure to withhold important information. Did I see the January Fact Sheet as a compromise between those groups? At this point, I said I really needed to check with CPA before going into that sort of thing — but that I had a lot of trouble buying that the group in question really saw themselves as simply misunderstood, since the question was not whether information should go to leadership but whether to present them with a tendentious narrative designed to support a preconceived conclusion.

(b)(5)

(b)(5) She needs anything further by noon tomorrow.

Please advise.

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: recap of our conversation
Date: Sat, 25 Apr 2020 15:25:05 +0000

Can you call me? (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 11:22 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: recap of our conversation

(b)(5)

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 25, 2020, at 11:14 AM, Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(5)

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 10:36 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: recap of our conversation

FYI.

(b)(5)



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff

Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

Begin forwarded message:

From: '(b)(6)'@UTMB.EDU>
Date: April 24, 2020 at 8:12:54 PM EDT
To: "Yu, Miles" <YuMM@state.gov>
Subject: Re: recap of our conversation

Hello Dr. Yu,

(b)(5)

Thank you and be safe,

Ken

(b)(6)

World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses
Department of Microbiology and Immunology
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd. Rte. 0609
Galveston, TX 77555

O- (b)(6)
C-
F-

<https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva/>

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 5:19 PM
To: (b)(6)@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: recap of our conversation

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Very respectfully

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)
(mobile)

Sender:	"Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)
To:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: recap of our conversation
Date:	Sat, 25 Apr 2020 15:08:35 +0000

Got it. Thank you. (b)(5)

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 25, 2020, at 10:35 AM, Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

FYI.

(b)(5)



Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (o)
(c)

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(6)@UTMB.EDU>
Date: April 24, 2020 at 8:12:54 PM EDT
To: "Yu, Miles" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: recap of our conversation

Hello Dr. Yu,

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses
Department of Microbiology and Immunology
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd. Rte. 0609

Galveston, TX 77555

(b)(6)

<https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva/>

From: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 5:19 PM

To: (b)(6)@UTMB.EDU>

Subject: recap of our conversation

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Very respectfully

Miles

Dr. M. Miles Yu
Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)
(mobile)

Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Question [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]
Date:	Tue, 28 Jan 2020 12:52:37 +0000

Thanks, Chris, much appreciated. (b)(6)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2020 6:10:41 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Question [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2020 4:20:38 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: Question [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Chris, (b)(6) Thanks for flagging this yesterday (b)(5)

Thanks (b)(6)

From: Wood, Vanessa (b)(6)@dfat.gov.au>

Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2020 02:50

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Question [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

UNCLASSIFIED

Hi (b)(6)

Did you see this? Let's chat when you have a minute. Thanks (b)(6)

Biological Weapons: Coronavirus may have originated in lab linked to China's biowarfare program

The deadly animal-borne coronavirus spreading globally may have originated in a laboratory in the city of Wuhan linked to China's covert biological weapons program, said an Israeli biological warfare analyst. Radio Free Asia last week rebroadcast a Wuhan television report from 2015 showing China's most advanced virus research laboratory, known the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The laboratory is the only declared site in China capable of working with deadly viruses. Dany Shoham, a former Israeli military intelligence officer who has studied Chinese

biological warfare, said the institute is linked to Beijing’s covert bio-weapons program.
(Washington Times)

See also: [Coronavirus still appears to be Normal Virus – Not a Biological Weapon](#) (Armstrong Economics)

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)>@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Query on COVID origins comments
Date:	Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:02:30 +0000

Hey all –

A few additions. Attached is the most recent Lancet editorial (this is in Lancet Microbe, not the flagship, and appears to not be linked to people – or at least Sachs – on the Lancet “Origins team”). It discusses the latest SAGO report – not the Sachs flavor, but a better Lancet take for awareness.

For the Jeffrey Sachs/biotechnology piece, the only thing I can think that he is referring to is the PNAS paper he co-authored a month or so ago (attached). An Intercept article is also linked here:

<https://theintercept.com/2022/05/19/covid-lab-leak-evidence-jeffrey-sachs/>.

The argument I think he is still referring to, and the one he harps on for 50% of the PNAS paper, is the furin cleavage site being identical to the ENaC α sequence, not other known FCS sequences, and so it had to have been engineered in (especially because engineering in an FCS about in a DARPA grant with EHA, UNC, and WIV (not funded)). (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, July 6, 2022 9:41 AM
To: Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)>@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Query on COVID origins comments

Chris,

As discussed, here’s a few articles to get after the query about Jeffrey Sachs’s recent comments on COVID origins. To the extent that the story has legs, it is making its way around the usual questionable websites in several languages (including the Daily Mail) but I cannot tell that it has attracted much mainstream media attention. (b)(6) may be able to help parse out anything useful. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- The article/interview: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/474399/Covid-possibly-came-out-of-a-U-S-biotechnology-lab-says-Columbia> or <https://www.jeffsachs.org/interviewsandmedia/2wts4jr6lccy9gxy9pdg99lf2ntjn>

- He seemed to make the claim to the Gate Center, which he is part of the Advisory Council: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HbaZnSBBBVc>
- The Gate Center is a brand new Spanish “think tank”, which appears to be a pro-PRC mouthpiece (its funding is opaque): <https://gatecenter.org/en/about-us>
- He chairs the Lancet COVID-19 Commission, which he makes abundantly clear in his interview to bolster his credibility for his statements: <https://covid19commission.org/jeffrey-sachs>
- Russian Duma President picks up on this, furthering the Russian BW claims: <https://www.plenglish.com/news/2022/07/06/russia-demands-that-the-us-compensate-global-losses-from-covid-19/>
 - The chairman of the Russian State Duma also added that “the military biological developments of the Pentagon, carried out throughout the world, must be stopped and declassified.” He said regarding this that the Russian Armed Forces are studying all the evidence from over 30 research facilities deployed throughout Ukraine and financed by the United States, where components of biological weapons and new pharmaceutical products were being developed. The Russian Ministry of Defense recently stated that the Pentagon has expanded in Ukrainian laboratories the research potential not only in the field of the creation of biological weapons, but also to obtain information on resistance to antibiotics and the presence of antibodies against certain diseases in the population of specific regions.

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>;
	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)	@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)	@state.gov>

From:	"Ford, Christopher A" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Proposed letter (b)(5)
Date:	Fri, 1 May 2020 20:05:16 +0000

(b)(5)

Minor tweaks to the draft document are attached.

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 3:58 PM
To: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>
Subject: Proposed letter (b)(5)

Dr. Ford:

(b)(5)

CJP

Sender:	"Ford, Christopher A" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; T_SpecAssts <T_SpecAssts@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: Pre-Meeting on Draft Cable on China and the Coronavirus
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 13:54:53 +0000

Good Morning All,

In case you haven't seen it already, attached is an example of China's response to Pottinger's allegations on the lab leak theory.

Thank you,

(b)(6)
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)
 U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:52 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: Pre-Meeting on Draft Cable on China and the Coronavirus

(b)(6) - Good questions! (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:46 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Pre-Meeting on Draft Cable on China and the Coronavirus

Hi (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Get Outlook for iOS

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>	

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM
Date:	Tue, 17 May 2022 15:53:37 +0000

No updates on this from me.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 11:53 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Here's the one (b)(6) drafted last week that we haven't submitted yet. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2022 8:19 AM
To: ISN-All-Users-DL <ISN-All-Users-DL@state.gov>
Subject: Please send DAR items by 3:00 PM

Good morning,

Please ensure all DAR entries and calendar items are submitted to the ISN-FO-Staff-Assistants-DL by 3:00 PM.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Teleworking / (b)(6)

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Please read
Date:	Mon, 27 Apr 2020 17:23:34 +0000

Will look soon

Sent from my iPhone

> On Apr 27, 2020, at 1:16 PM, Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

>

> (b)(6)

> I put together something for S over the weekend, see the attached. If you have the time, can you take a look at it and chop it anyway you think needed?

> Much obliged.

> Miles

>

>

>

> Dr. M. Miles Yu

> Policy Planning Staff

> Office of the Secretary

> U.S. Department of State

> (b)(6)

> (mobile)

> (b)(5) Updated April 27 2020.docx>

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"McCarthy, Ellen E." (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Pangolins may not have passed coronavirus on to humans, Chinese scientists say South China Morning Post
Date:	Fri, 27 Mar 2020 16:01:49 +0000

David,

I think the event yesterday was good...but I still have many unanswered questions. (b)(5)
 (b)(5) (b)(5)
 (b)(5) Any other suggestions?

Best,

Ellen

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 8:43 AM
To: Tobin, Elizabeth (b)(6); Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6); McCarthy, Ellen E. (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Pangolins may not have passed coronavirus on to humans, Chinese scientists say | South China Morning Post

(b)(6)
 Looking forward to meeting at 1400. Should be good.
 Best
 Dave

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3076970/pangolins-may-not-have-passed-coronavirus-humans-say-chinese>

Pangolins may not have passed coronavirus on to humans, Chinese scientists say

- Although the animals, also known as scaly anteaters, carry a very similar virus to the one that causes Covid-19, researchers say the genetic relationship is not close enough
- Virologist Zhang Zhigang says the search for the intermediate host should focus on animals that share habitats with bats and pangolins, *like Pooh bears*

**William Zheng**

Published: 9:00am, 26 Mar, 2020

Updated: 11:31am, 26 Mar, 2020



Pangolins have been one of the main focuses of the search for the intermediate host of the virus.

Photo: Imaginechina

Pangolins are unlikely to have been the hosts that passed the coronavirus that causes Covid-19 on to humans, Chinese researchers said, adding that the search should focus on wild animals that share their habitats. The endangered mammals, also known as scaly anteaters, have been identified as a possible intermediate host after a series of papers highlighted the close relationship between Sars-CoV-2, as the coronavirus is known, and similar viruses found in pangolins.

But a team led by Zhang Zhigang from Yunnan University, told Chinese publication Science Daily on Wednesday that the evidence suggested that these genetic similarities did not pass the generally accepted 99 per cent threshold needed to make

the virus jump from pangolins to humans. Researchers around the world are trying to track the way the new coronavirus infected humans and to put a stop to the pandemic, which has infected more than 400,000 people and killed more than 18,000.

Zhang said animals such as bats and pangolins were known to be natural hosts of similar viruses to Sars-CoV-2, but natural hosts normally could not pass these on to humans. Instead, researchers needed to identify the intermediate host through which the coronavirus was transmitted. Bats and pangolins have been the focus of attention after scientists identified them as carriers of viruses that share much of their genetic make-up with the coronavirus.

In January, a group of Chinese scientists led by Shi Zhengli, from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, found that Sars-CoV-2 shared 96 per cent of its whole-genome identity with BatCoV RaTG13, another coronavirus found on intermediate horseshoe bats (*Rhinolophus affinis*), which live in caves in Yunnan province.

In a research paper published last week in *Current Biology*, the same team found that the coronavirus carried by Malayan pangolins, named Pangolin-CoV, was the second-closest relative of Sars-CoV-2 as the two viruses were 91.02 per cent identical at the whole-genome level. In early February, researchers from South China Agricultural University said they had found a 99 per cent similarity between the two viruses and declared the Malayan pangolin a “potential intermediate host”. But they later revised their results, lowering the figure to only 90.3 per cent. Guan Yi, a virologist from the University of Hong Kong, later also said his own research only showed 92.4 per cent similarity.

In the interview, Zhang said Shi’s research had eliminated the intermediate horseshoe bat as the species that transmitted the virus to humans, but other bat species might have done so and researchers should continue to study them.

Zhang said researchers should look into the natural habitat of intermediate horseshoe bats and Malayan pangolins to find the real immediate host. "If the horseshoe bat and Malayan pangolin can be proven to be the natural hosts, then their current natural habitat may be the place where the novel coronavirus originated," Zhang said. "What matters now is to identify the intermediate host, where did [the jump from animal to human] happen? Why did the outbreak happen in Wuhan? These [questions] should be the main direction of future scientific research," he added. Intermediate horseshoe bats are commonly found in South Asia, southern and central China and Southeast Asia. The Malayan pangolin (*Manis javanica*), also known as the Sunda or Javan pangolin, can be found throughout Southeast Asia.

-----Original Message-----

From: David Stilwell (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 8:16 AM
To: Kathy Gudgel (b)(6)@heritage.org>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Pangolins may not have passed coronavirus on to humans, Chinese scientists say | South China Morning Post

Not a pangolin? Maybe Winnie the Pooh?

[https://gcc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scmp.com%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fscience%2Farticle%2F3076970%2Fpangolins-may-not-have-passed-coronavirus-humans-say-chinese&data=02%7C01%7\(b\)\(6\)0state.gov%7Cf53a9447163f47c3874508d7d17f8fae%7C66cf50745afe48d1a691a12b2121f44b%7C0%7C0%7C637208218110354635&sdata=q7Q8SC0iYaU7%2ByRXeEb3SLR4H5c%2BZd9J34lpN7mXs%2BU%3D&reserved=0](https://gcc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scmp.com%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fscience%2Farticle%2F3076970%2Fpangolins-may-not-have-passed-coronavirus-humans-say-chinese&data=02%7C01%7(b)(6)0state.gov%7Cf53a9447163f47c3874508d7d17f8fae%7C66cf50745afe48d1a691a12b2121f44b%7C0%7C0%7C637208218110354635&sdata=q7Q8SC0iYaU7%2ByRXeEb3SLR4H5c%2BZd9J34lpN7mXs%2BU%3D&reserved=0)

Sent from my iPhone

Sender:	"McCarthy, Ellen E." (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	RE: Olympic Obfuscation: At Games, China-Russia Jab U.S. on Chemical Weapons
Date:	Wed, 9 Feb 2022 23:03:11 +0000

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 9, 2022 5:50 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Olympic Obfuscation: At Games, China-Russia Jab U.S. on Chemical Weapons

Olympic Obfuscation: At Games, China-Russia Jab U.S. on Chemical Weapons

February 09, 2022

- Fatima Tlis

"Russia and China insist that the United States, as the only state party to the Convention that has not completed the process of destroying chemical weapons, accelerate the elimination of its chemical weapons stockpiles."

On February 4, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing before the opening of the Winter Olympics in China, where the Russian team is competing under a neutral flag as a penalty for a massive state-sponsored Olympics doping scandal.

Xi and Putin reaffirmed solidarity on a wide range of global issues. Russia declared its commitment to the "One China" principle, stating that Taiwan is "an integral part of China" and that Moscow opposes "Taiwan independence in any form."

China backed Russia's resistance to NATO expansion. However, the joint statement did not specifically mention the Kremlin's ongoing military buildup around Ukraine, or its past annexation of Crimea and military machinations in the Donbass region.

Xi and Putin did, however, pointedly attack the United States' record of compliance with chemical and biological weapons agreements.

From their joint statement:

"China and Russia are deeply concerned about the politicization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and call on all its members to strengthen solidarity and cooperation and to uphold the tradition of consensus-based decision-making.

"Russia and China insist that the United States, as the only state party to the Convention that has not completed the process of destroying chemical weapons, accelerate the elimination of its chemical weapons stockpiles.

"The parties emphasize that the domestic and foreign military-biological activities of the United States and its allies cause serious concerns and questions among the international community regarding their compliance with the BTWC [Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention].

"The parties share the view that such activities pose a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and China and cause damage to the security of the respective regions."

This characterization is highly misleading.

Biological weapons

China and Russia routinely accuse the U.S. military of developing and using biological weapons both domestically and abroad. Fact-checkers repeatedly have debunked this disinformation narrative.

An example is Russia's recurring misrepresentation of the U.S.-funded Center for Public Health Research in Tbilisi, Georgia, popularly known as the "Lugar Lab" after its patron, the late U.S. Senator Richard Lugar.

Here are a few past claims with links to detailed fact checks:

False: "The Lugar Lab produced novichok" – the deadly Soviet-era family of nerve agents used to poison Alexey Navalny.

False: "COVID-19 was an act of U.S. bioterrorism, and the virus that causes the illness was created in Lugar Lab."

False: "U.S. biologists conduct secret experiments on Georgians in the Lugar Lab."

False: "The Lugar Lab spreads deadly pathogens among humans and animals."

The U.S. Embassy in Georgia told Polygraph.info in 2018 that, "Lugar Center's mission is to contribute to the protection of citizens from biological threats, promote public and animal health through infectious disease detection, epidemiological surveillance and research for the benefit of Georgia, the Caucasus region and the global community." At that time, the embassy said, the lab had never conducted any clinical trials. More on the continuing campaign against the lab can be found here.

Russia's chem-bio disinformation campaign against the U.S. has a years-long history. China's attacks multiplied after the coronavirus pandemic in China's Wuhan province raised questions about whether Chinese authorities were

slow to report the virus or withheld information, particularly because of suspicions concerning research activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

The precise origins of the SARS-2-Cov virus behind the pandemic remain a matter of scientific debate. Nonetheless, Chinese officials and state media have made numerous false accusations, particularly attacking the U.S. Army's bioresearch laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland:

False: "AIDS/HIV made in the U.S."

False: "SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, was made in the U.S. Army biolab in Fort Detrick." And other Fort Detrick-related claims...

False: "Ralph Baric, a top coronavirus researcher at the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, created the virus."

False: "The U.S. Army brought coronavirus to Wuhan."

China and Russia have targeted disinformation at the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is tasked with evaluating and eliminating challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons.

A DTRA branch called the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which focuses on biological threats, has been frequently targeted by "certain countries" that "try to falsely undermine and discredit the program's efforts," DTRA said in a recent video rebuttal.

The United States unilaterally halted its biological weapons program in 1969 and destroyed all biological warfare agents in 1971-1973. The U.S. currently conducts related research but only as part of its biodefense program, according to the independent watchdog Armscontrol.org.

Chemical weapons

Both the U.S. and Russia developed and stockpiled chemical weapons during the Cold War era. By 1968, the U.S. stockpile reached some 40,000 tons. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States has never used chemical weapons in warfare.

The United States started disposing of its chemical weapons in the late 1960s, decades before it joined the International Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty in 1997.

From 1967 to 1970, the United States loaded thousands of tons of chemical weapons on old ships and sank them in the sea. This raised environmental concerns, and in 1970 the U.S. Congress passed a law directing that the Defense Department's plans for destroying chemical weapons must be reviewed and approved by public health agencies to ensure the safety to people, animals and the environment.

In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed a law requiring that all U.S. chemical stockpiles be destroyed.

After the U.S. ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the OPCW set a deadline for the U.S. by 2007. That deadline was extended to 2012, and then to 2023. Now, the U.S. says it has eliminated about 90 percent of its chemical weapons and that those remaining are at two locations – Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky.

According to the Russian Center of Ecological Policy and other sources, at the time of its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had stockpiled some 110,000 tons of chemical warfare agents.

The OPCW initially set a deadline for Russia to destroy its stockpiles by 2007. The United States, Canada and United Kingdom contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.

In 2017, Russia declared it had destroyed all its chemical weapons. One key difference, however, is that Russia's definition of "destruction" is different than that of the United States.

For the United States, "destruction" of chemical weapons is a multistep process ending with the complete and safe elimination of all stockpiles. Here is how experts working at the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant described that process:

"Under the close supervision of trained operators, the pilot plant uses dozens of automated systems to disassemble and drain the munitions and thermally heat the drained munition bodies.

"The liquid agent is neutralized, and the product, hydrolysate, is then fed to living microorganisms in a process known as biotreatment. Water is recycled at the pilot plant and the remaining salt is shipped off-site to a permitted treatment, storage and disposal facility.

"The plant is equipped with a robust pollution abatement system made up of 12 carbon filter banks that filter out particles before air from inside the plant is released back into the atmosphere."

According to an agreement between the OPCW and Russia, Moscow can claim full disposal of its chemical weapons stockpiles after completing only the first stage of that process, which doesn't address massive amounts of toxic waste.

Paul Walker, director for Environmental Sustainability at Green Cross International, who has personally inspected chemical weapons stockpiles and U.S. and Russian disposal processes, told Polygraph.info in 2018:

"If you define the destruction process as only first-stage, then they've [Russia] completed the process. They've destroyed the whole stockpile. But if you define it as needing a second-stage process, then they far and away haven't finished the process yet. In reality, they still have a long way to go to finish the process – clean up the toxic waste they've left."

Moreover, Russia reportedly admitted using the same method of disposing of its chemical weapons that the U.S. abandoned due to environmental hazards in late 1960s. According to Russia's TASS and Interfax state news agencies, as of 1995, "at least 160,000 tons of chemical weapons" were "buried in Russian seas, posing a grave threat to ecology and the health of man."

Lev Fyodorov, a Russian scientist who is president of the Union for Chemical Safety, has compiled the most comprehensive database on Russia's chemical weapons industry, including a list of land and sea dumping sites.

According to Fyodorov, dumping was the main method Russia used to get rid of its chemical stockpiles, which created “enormous” environmental problems that would pose danger for generations.

Novichok

The activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are regulated by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which the U.S., China and Russia are signatories. Under the CWC, chemical weapons are categorized by “Schedules,” with the most dangerous identified as “Schedule 1” – the category for chemicals and their precursors that have primarily military uses.

In 2019, the CWC, for the first time since its creation, modified the list of Schedule 1 chemicals to include Russia’s “novichok” nerve agents. Russia opposed the move, claiming that the chemicals had been used for legal commercial purposes, but it lost the argument. The OPCW said novichok family chemicals have “no known uses beyond serving as chemical warfare agents and their precursors.”

The Schedule 1 modification was triggered by two alleged cases of the Russian state using novichok to poison people.

British authorities accused Russia of using novichok in the town of Salisbury in 2018 to poison a former Russian military spy, Sergey Skripal, and his daughter. Russia denied it, producing an array of false explanations for the poisoning.

Then, in August 2020, Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was poisoned and flown to Germany for treatment. Authorities there said novichok had nearly killed him.

Bellingcat, a group of investigative journalists, reported in 2020 that Russia, after announcing in 2017 that it had destroyed its CW, continued a clandestine program to further develop and weaponize chemical agents for the use by its military and intelligence services.

In a series of investigations, Bellingcat provided compelling evidence of the Russian security services’ involvement in poisoning Navalny with novichok.

“Navalny,” a documentary film based on Bellingcat’s investigations, premiered in January at the Sundance Film Festival and will be distributed by HBO MAX and CNN later this year.

On January 26, the European Union’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) said Russia must cooperate with the OPCW to investigate the “alleged development, production, stockpiling, and use of a chemical weapon.” PACE concluded that “ample medical evidence” showed that Navalny was poisoned with novichok, and that agents of Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s main state security agency, were “possibly involved.”

The United States and other countries have accused Russia at the United Nations Security Council of complicity in war crimes in Syria. The accusations were based on OPCW reports that forces of Syria’s President Bashar Assad used chemical weapons against civilians during the country’s civil war, killing and injuring thousands. Russia is allied with the Assad regime.

FL-2022-00076

A-00000573354

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

Sender:	"Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject:	Re: NO FUSE CLEARANCE DUE 7:15 AM 6/16: QFR for EAP A/S nominee on COVID origins
Date:	Thu, 17 Jun 2021 10:12:47 +0000

Looks fine. Let me know if you see any issues by 0700, otherwise I will go ahead and clear for

(b)(5)

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 10:27 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;

SP_EAP <SP_EAP@state.gov>; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL <IO-EDA-HEALTH-DL@state.gov>

Cc: EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>

Subject: NO FUSE CLEARANCE DUE 7:15 AM 6/16: QFR for EAP A/S nominee on COVID origins

Colleagues –

Very sorry for the short fuse – please clear as soon as possible, NO LATER THAN 7:15AM, on the linked QFR for EAP A/S nominee Kritenbrink. [QFR_Kritenbrink_Risch5.docx](#) This is due to my leadership by 7:30AM, if I do not hear from you by then I will list you as info by request. For ease, I’ve also pasted the language below:

Question 5:

Do you support a thorough investigation by the U.S. government into the origins of COVID-19? Do you commit, if confirmed, that EAP will prioritize this issue and contribute to any State Department or interagency processes? Will you commit that EAP will not prevent the release of findings or outcomes of the investigation that could potentially strain our relationship with China?

Answer 5:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 8:34 PM
To: H_Tasking-EAP <H_Tasking-EAP@state.gov>
Cc: QFR_NOMS <QFR_NOMS@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Bonine, David N (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Urgent Nomination QFR Tasker H20210616QFR110 Risch-Kritenbrink QFR 1-28

EAP Colleagues,

Attached are Questions for the Record from Senator Risch, following the June 16, 2021, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Nomination Hearing, submitted to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Nominee, Daniel J. Kritenbrink.

Please provide responses to the QFRs.

Please follow the attached Sample Format.

The deadline for responding is June 17, 2021, 5:00 p.m.

All QFR responses must be cleared with H (Congressional Advisor or H Nominations Director) and the Drafting Bureau. Info by Request (b)(5)

Addition clearance(s) from other bureaus may be requested, please review the incoming QFR(s) and tasker(s).

Please send fully cleared responses by e-mail to H Senate Nominations Director (b)(6)@state.gov and the "QFR NOMS" distribution list.

Requests to transfer action on Hearing QFRs/Takebacks:

Requests to transfer action on hearing QFRs or Take-backs should be made directly between respective bureaus. Once action is accepted, we will note the transfer in our files. Please include qfr_noms@state.gov and (b)(6)@state.gov on the email accepting the transfer.

My apologies in advance for this expedited deadline.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

FL-2022-00076

A-00000573025

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

Recipient: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From:	"Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC" <(b)(6)>
To:	Mikulak, Robert P <(b)(6)>@state.gov; Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>
CC:	Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)>@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: New White Paper: Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on Covid-19 and Beyond
Date:	Thu, 22 Jul 2021 21:35:51 +0000

Bob, Chris, Beth,

Not that I was contributing anything, but I had to jump off for a 5:30 meeting. Thanks so much for your time. Great brainstorming! ;)

Best,
Megan

From: Mikulak, Robert P <(b)(6)>@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, July 22, 2021 2:20 PM
To: Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)> Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>
Cc: Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)>@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P <(b)(6)>@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: New White Paper: Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on Covid-19 and Beyond

Beth and Megan - Apropos our discussion this afternoon, some useful ideas in here.

Bob

From: <(b)(6)>@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, July 22, 2021 1:55 PM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: New White Paper: Time to Escalate U.S. Leadership on Covid-19 and Beyond

Publication from CSIS, which mentions biosafety/biosecurity recommendations. Their recommendation on bs/bs includes initiating a domestic review of our own bs/bs practices and in the process encouraging other countries to conduct similar self-assessments (potentially using the BWC as a platform). (b)(5)

(b)(5)
 (b)(5) Also note call out to NII in second recommendation.

A Fresh Look at Biosafety and Biosecurity

The international debate over the origins of SARS-CoV-2 has intensified recently, with many scientific experts and political leaders at odds over the strength of the laboratory leak theory versus the natural spillover theory. At time of writing, many experts believe that both theories are plausible. Research to enhance pathogens has become increasingly common in both public and private laboratories around the

world, creating more urgency for addressing the accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens from laboratories.

This creates an opportunity to reexamine the institutions, frameworks, and regulations that are currently in place to prevent the natural, accidental, and deliberate emergence of new pathogens with pandemic potential. Despite the intense geopolitical sensitivities that permeate this debate, there are concrete actions that the United States can take to achieve greater rigor and transparency in both domestic and global biosafety and biosecurity efforts.

The United States should initiate a domestic review of its biosafety and biosecurity practices. This should include an assessment of how the U.S. government funds and regulates the research of potential pandemic pathogens and what information is used to understand and weigh the relative risks and benefits of such research. This assessment should also include the review and publication of biosafety records at U.S. government-funded laboratories. This domestic review should conclude with recommendations for how the U.S. government can strengthen its own biosafety and biosecurity practices and regulations. Such an initiative would model the transparency that the United States expects other WHO-member states to practice in order to mitigate the risk of the accidental or deliberate release of potential pandemic pathogens from laboratory or research settings. The United States should also use international fora to encourage other countries to conduct similar self-assessments and contribute to an extended international dialogue around best practices and data sharing. This should include an increased effort to build and expand biosafety workforce capacity in the United States and internationally, given the extreme demands that were placed on the biosafety workforce over the course of the pandemic. The 2021 Biological Weapons Review Conference provides one opportunity to initiate such a dialogue.

There are currently no clear established norms, protocols, guidelines, or designated institutional frameworks for the investigation of biological incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks with pandemic potential, accidental releases, and bioweapons. As seen in Wuhan, expert investigations of incidents can quickly encounter stark political barriers, and tensions surrounding the investigation can escalate steeply, casting scientific experts to the sidelines. The United States should make it a priority to form an international coalition—potentially comprised of countries, industry, international organizations, and academic institutions—to initiate a renewed dialogue over how to improve the global response investigation capacity for handling future biosecurity incidents, including how to create a neutral, protected space in which trusted international expert scientists are able to lead investigations, free of interference. The Nuclear Threat Initiative has begun exploring this issue in collaboration with key international partners and could be a valuable resource.



Sender:	"Frisk, Megan L. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)
Recipient:	Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; Cameron, Beth E. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)> Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: "Ganzer, Ann K" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Suarez, Gonzalo O (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 21:41:14 +0000

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 4:10 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Suarez, Gonzalo O (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Thanks. Adding Gonzo FHSA of this thread.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:39 PM
To: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer (b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office: (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:34 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Amen.

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:21 PM
To: Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Eliot, here's my immediate reaction (b)(6) may well have other, smarter ones):

(b)(5)

EcoHealth Alliance project (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Argh.

Sent from my tPhone

On Nov 4, 2020, at 3:16 PM, Kang, Eliot <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Quick views. I get a lot of these...

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 3:06 PM

To: Kang, Eliot <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Ganzer, Ann K <(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Thanks, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Foreign Affairs / Science Officer (b)(6)

Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Department of State

Office (b)(6)

I anticipate frequent telework - please feel free to call my cell phone: (b)(6)

From: Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 2:54 PM
To: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

??

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 2:38 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Material for discussion between you two Acting A/S's on BWC treaty related CBMs

Tom, Eliot,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

From: Joe DeRisi <(b)(6)@ucsf.edu>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 12:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Fred Milanovich <(b)(6)>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for engaging with us yesterday - that was an enjoyable conversation.

I've attached one of our academic papers, and a PDF explainer for IDseq. Also a 1-pager from the Council on Strategic Risks, which has become interested in IDseq as well for their new "Alliance to End Biological Threats"

Let me know if you have any questions, or would like additional information.

-joe

On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 8:47 AM (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
Joe,

Many thanks to Josh and you for valuable input last night. Means a lot.

I would like to set up an opportunity for you to brief your detection/monitoring system. Seems like a total no brainer on many levels. If you have a white paper, please share. How have the Chinese reacted to it?

Best regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)

(b)(6)

NSTS: (b)(6) (NSTS)

JWICS: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

SIPR: (b)(6)@state.ic.gov

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6)@ucsf.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 3:46 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Electronic introduction (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Ok, I will invite him. (unsure if he is available today, but will check).

-j

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 12:28 PM (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(6) is in a meeting, but I am sure that he would welcome Dr. Batson's inputs.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6)@ucsf.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 2:31 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello (b)(6) I would like one of my covid-genomics data scientists, Dr. Josh Batson, to also read through the document, and if possible, to join the call.

If that would be acceptable, let me know.

-joe

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 11:10 AM (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Joe, 630pm is fine. I likely will call from my personal cell. Sorry the attachment didn't come through. It is a much discussed anonymous deductive/detective analysis of why COVID19 might have come through an accident at one of Wuhan Labs. Appreciate your personal thoughts.

(b)(5)

(b)(5) No matter, I look forward to telemeeting you early this evening. (b)(6)

From: Joe DeRisi (b)(6)@ucsf.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 12:41 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello (b)(6)

Can we push to 6:30 EST? I now have a conflict at 6pm EST that I can not juggle.

Was there supposed to be a document attached? I did not see one in the email.

-joe

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 9:18 AM [REDACTED]@state.gov> wrote:

Joe, Sorry to have been off the State net. May I call you at 6pm EST? I would like my lead analyst and data scientist, [REDACTED] to join. Let us know if that is okay? We all have read the attached. If you have comments that, alone, would be invaluable. [REDACTED] PS- What is your phone #? My tel # at State is [REDACTED]

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

U.S. Department of State

Tel: [REDACTED]

SIPR: [REDACTED]@state.sgov.gov

JWICS: [REDACTED]@state.ic.gov

From: Joe DeRisi [REDACTED].ucsf.edu>

Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2020 11:03 PM

To: [REDACTED]@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - [REDACTED] to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello [REDACTED]

I have two open time slots: at 8:30-9:30am and at 3-4pm (pacific). I understand and accept the need for confidentiality.

-joe

On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 4:57 PM [redacted (b)(6)]@state.gov> wrote:

Joe,

Thanks to Fred for the kind intro and thanks to you very much for answering the call. I will reach out tomorrow—privately. How does your schedule look?

FYI- Any and all opinions, analysis, theories, hunches, etc provided to State will be kept under strict confidentiality—and we request vice versa. We run a tight ship at least in the world of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance at State.

Best regards and keep up the great stuff at the DeRisi lab.

[redacted (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)]

Strategic Advisor, NSRI

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)

[redacted (b)(6)]

NSTS: [redacted (b)(6)] (NSTS)

JWICS: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.ic.gov

SIPR: [redacted (b)(6)]@state.ic.gov

From: Joe DeRisi <(b)(6)@ucsf.edu>
Sent: Saturday, October 17, 2020 6:23 PM
To: Fred Milanovich <(b)(6)>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Electronic introduction - (b)(6) to Dr. Joseph DeRisi

Hello (b)(6)

It is a pleasure to e-meet you. Let me know how I can be of assistance. I can be reached by text/voice at (b)(6)

-joe

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 10:39 AM Fred Milanovich (b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6) it is my pleasure to introduce you to Dr. Joe DeRisi. Dr. DeRisi and I have worked together in the past in a field of mutual interest to all of us. His laboratory has an international reputation for their work in the area of very rare infectious diseases. His group can bring a very competent suite of assets to the problem at hand. Best wishes, Fred

--

Joseph DeRisi

Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub

Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics

UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi

Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub

Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics

UC San Francisco

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Joseph DeRisi

Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub

Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics

UC San Francisco

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Joseph DeRisi

Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub

Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics

UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi
 Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub
 Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
 UC San Francisco

--

Joseph DeRisi
 Co-President, Chan Zuckerberg Biohub
 Professor, Dept. of Biochemistry and Biophysics
 UC San Francisco

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Ganzer, Ann K" (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Mikulak, Robert P (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Suarez, Gonzalo O (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Mandarin-speaking news report re S statement and DOS fact sheet on COVID-19
Date:	Sun, 17 Jan 2021 20:12:41 +0000

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9153885/Mike-Pompeo-reveals-intel-implicating-Wuhan-lab-origins-COVID-19-pandemic.html>

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:33 AM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Mandarin-speaking news report re S statement and DOS fact sheet on COVID-19

David,

Thanks for forwarding the links to the latest Department statement and fact sheet re COVID-19 origin (b)(5)

Attached is a trimmed (i.e., extracted) video clip aired by New Tang People News, which is associated with the Epoch Time (i.e., Falungong related). Note the reporter calls the virus "CCP virus" (vice "China virus" or "Wuhan virus").

V/R, (b)(6)

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: House Minority Staff "addendum" to prior report on origins
Date:	Tue, 3 Aug 2021 22:05:28 +0000

Yea. (b)(5)
 (b)(5) I read the recent testimony from Relman and others too - lots of questions about risky research (risks, benefits and oversight).

(b)(5)

 Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

On August 3, 2021 at 3:57:25 PM EDT, Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:
 A lot of those sound very Asher.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, August 3, 2021 3:56 PM
To: Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: House Minority Staff "addendum" to prior report on origins

Chris - I've skimmed this. There's not much in terms of new material from previous, similar pieces (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Sent from [Workspace ONE Boxer](#)

On August 2, 2021 at 9:54:35 AM EDT, Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Attached is the 80+ page report that generated this morning's press coverage. I haven't read it yet, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

<ORIGINS-OF-COVID-19-REPORT.pdf>

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Ganzer, Ann K" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Gertz article in full - really odd
Date:	Thu, 14 Jan 2021 20:22:27 +0000

Gertz is very well connected in certain circles and gets a lot of leaked info. I always read his stuff as a form of self-defense!

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 3:19 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6) Fakory, Ladan (b)(6); Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Gertz article in full - really odd

Thanks. Quite a bit there that i did not know.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 3:15:50 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6) Fakory, Ladan (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Gertz article in full - really odd

Good Afternoon Chris et al.,

I know others know much more than I do about Bill Gertz, the author of the *Washington Times* article, but it is certainly interesting that Bill Gertz was fired by the *Washington Free Beacon* for taking \$100,000 from an associate of Guo Wengui. Guo Wengui (aka Miles Guo, Miles Kwok) happens to be the same billionaire that is working with/funding Steve Bannon and whose organization, the Rule of Law Society, funded Yan Li-Meng, the formerly Hong Kong-based post-grad that keeps claiming that SARS-CoV-2 was manmade.

- BuzzFeed – [“A Conservative Journalist Admitted To Taking \\$100,000 From A Financier Connected To A Controversial Chinese Billionaire”](#)

- Media Matters – “Steve Bannon is pushing debunked claims about the coronavirus that are linked to his billionaire benefactor”
- Snopes – “Did Chinese Virologist Dr. Li-Meng Yan Say COVID-19 Was Made in a Wuhan Lab?”

Gertz also was the author of the article that got folks all spun up all the way back in January 2020 (“Coronavirus may have originated in lab linked to China's biowarfare program”), as well as stories claiming that a USG analysis found a lab leak most likely (“Wuhan lab 'most likely' coronavirus source, U.S. government analysis finds”), that the IC downplayed the COVID outbreak (“White House: Intelligence agencies missed early signs of coronavirus pandemic”), and that there is a 2nd defector (Gertz apparently considers Yan Li-Meng to be the 1st defector) sharing info on Chinese BW activity (“Second defector's knowledge of Chinese bioweapons reaches U.S.”), among several others.

(b)(6)
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)
 U.S. Department of State

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:22 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6); Fakory, Ladan (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Gertz article in full - really odd

Note: yesterday I was informed that Amb. Billingslea’s deputy, (b)(6) (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) so consider me tapped out until the 20th if you need a formal clearance or response from T.

From: Park, Christopher J (T)
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:13 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6); Fakory, Ladan (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Gertz article in full - really odd

(b)(5)

Task force on virus origin deadlocked

(Washington Times)

Washington Times [1/13/2021 4:56 PM, Bill Gertz, 459K, Neutral]

An interagency group of scientists and medical experts formed to study the origin of the coronavirus is deadlocked over how to report their conclusions in the waning days of the Trump administration.

According to people familiar with the dispute within the task force, 70% of the experts want to report publicly that the virus behind the pandemic leaked accidentally from the high-security medical research laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. That conclusion is supported despite Chinese scientists' refusal to cooperate in studying the genetic makeup of the virus and to explain where it comes from.

China's government also has issued disinformation, including spurious claims that the U.S. Army brought the virus to China.

The behind-the-scenes debate has been underway for three weeks and includes a number of outspoken anti-Trump scientists.

At issue is whether the U.S. government can formally designate China as the cause of the COVID-19 outbreak and hold Beijing accountable. China has launched a worldwide public relations campaign to deflect criticism for its handling and deception related to the pandemic.

The task force's differences reflect the extreme politicization of the issue that many regard as an urgent national security priority that deserves bipartisan support.

Arguing against the lab escape conclusion is a group that insists the virus was a naturally occurring zoonotic event starting from a bat to an intermediate animal host and then to humans. An estimated 15% of the task force is arguing for this conclusion.

A third group, and one that has growing support from within the intelligence and arms control communities, wants the task force final report to assert that the virus, formally known as SARS-CoV-2, was produced by the Chinese military establishment as an engineered biological weapon. An estimated 7% of the task force agrees with this view.

That position was first disclosed by exiled Chinese virologist Li-Meng Yan, who worked at a Chinese laboratory and said she is certain the coronavirus was created in a Chinese laboratory. Ms. Yan has published an extensive scientific study bolstering her claims.

The remaining 8% of the task force experts are undecided and want further data, something China has refused to provide.

According to the people, the task force includes a number of anti-Trump experts and

scientific skeptics.

The deadlock within the group means that its findings are unlikely to be published before President Trump leaves office Jan. 20. That means the incoming Biden administration, expected to adopt more conciliatory policies toward China, will be reluctant to ultimately make public the task force's conclusions.

The task force's work was hampered by Chinese government stonewalling. Beijing officials have refused to cooperate in studying the virus' origin and continues to insist the virus began at an "unregulated seafood market" in Wuhan — a location that over a year ago was sanitized and scrubbed clean of all possible evidence for where the disease outbreak began.

Chinese studies conducted after the outbreak said the virus was first detected in Wuhan in December 2019 have ruled out the seafood market as a cause. Chinese scientists that tried to report the anomalies in the seafood market origin have been suppressed by the government.

The Chinese government also has begun shifting blame for the outbreak from the market to questionable claims that the virus originated in southern Europe and spread to China by overseas workers.

The World Health Organization is conducting an inquiry into the central starting point for the virus. Beijing at first blocked entry to the inspection team, but the Chinese government announced this week that the team has been allowed into China and will go to Wuhan on Thursday.

Support for the lab-leak origin theory was first disclosed by Matt Pottinger, until recently the White House deputy national security adviser.

"There is a growing body of evidence that the lab is likely the most credible source of the virus," he told British lawmakers recently. Spokesmen for the Department of Health and Human Services and National Security Council had no immediate comment.

One source said China is expected to continue the stonewalling on the virus origin with the hope that the new administration will give up the need for further investigation.

If the virus was a bioweapon, an outcome with a major national security implication, the federal government has not been able to determine that and could not identify the origin or the sponsor. As a result, the U.S. is vulnerable to a future biological weapons attack because it cannot develop the necessary infrastructure for the intelligence work needed to identify both the type and origin of the weapon, the sources said.

Sender:	"Ganzer, Ann K" [REDACTED]@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J [REDACTED]@state.gov>

From:	"Dolliff, Phillip R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)>; Fakory, Ladan (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Gertz article in full - really odd
Date:	Thu, 14 Jan 2021 20:41:04 +0000

(b)(6)

Thanks for the fascinating info -- very helpful.

Sincerely,

Phil

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 3:18 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6) Fakory, Ladan (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Gertz article in full - really odd

Thanks. Quite a bit there that i did not know.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 3:15:50 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6)>;

Fakory, Ladan (b)(6); Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Gertz article in full - really odd

Good Afternoon Chris et al.,

I know others know much more than I do about Bill Gertz, the author of the *Washington Times* article, but it is certainly interesting that Bill Gertz was fired by the *Washington Free Beacon* for taking \$100,000 from an associate of Guo Wengui. Guo Wengui (aka Miles Guo, Miles Kwok) happens to be the same billionaire that is working with/funding Steve Bannon and whose organization, the Rule of Law Society, funded Yan Li-Meng, the formerly Hong Kong-based post-grad that keeps claiming that SARS-CoV-2 was manmade.

- BuzzFeed – [“A Conservative Journalist Admitted To Taking \\$100,000 From A Financier Connected To A Controversial Chinese Billionaire”](#)
- Media Matters – [“Steve Bannon is pushing debunked claims about the coronavirus that are linked to his billionaire benefactor”](#)
- Snopes – [“Did Chinese Virologist Dr. Li-Meng Yan Say COVID-19 Was Made in a Wuhan Lab?”](#)

Gertz also was the author of the article that got folks all spun up all the way back in January 2020 ([“Coronavirus may have originated in lab linked to China's biowarfare program”](#)), as well as stories claiming that a USG analysis found a lab leak most likely ([“Wuhan lab 'most likely' coronavirus source, U.S. government analysis finds”](#)), that the IC downplayed the COVID outbreak ([“White House: Intelligence agencies missed early signs of coronavirus pandemic”](#)), and that there is a 2nd defector (Gertz apparently considers Yan Li-Meng to be the 1st defector) sharing info on Chinese BW activity ([“Second defector's knowledge of Chinese bioweapons reaches U.S.”](#)), among several others.

(b)(6)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)
U.S. Department of State

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:22 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;>
 (b)(6)@hhs.gov; (b)(6); Fakory, Ladan
 (b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Gertz article in full - really odd

Note: yesterday I was informed that Amb. Billingslea’s deputy, (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) so consider me tapped out until the 20th if you need a formal clearance or response from T.

From: Park, Christopher J (T)

Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:13 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@hhs.gov; (b)(6) Fakory, Ladan
(b)(6) Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC (b)(6)
(b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Gertz article in full - really odd

(b)(5)

Task force on virus origin deadlocked (Washington Times)

Washington Times [1/13/2021 4:56 PM, Bill Gertz, 459K, Neutral]

An interagency group of scientists and medical experts formed to study the origin of the coronavirus is deadlocked over how to report their conclusions in the waning days of the Trump administration.

According to people familiar with the dispute within the task force, 70% of the experts want to report publicly that the virus behind the pandemic leaked accidentally from the high-security medical research laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. That conclusion is supported despite Chinese scientists' refusal to cooperate in studying the genetic makeup of the virus and to explain where it comes from.

China's government also has issued disinformation, including spurious claims that the U.S. Army brought the virus to China.

The behind-the-scenes debate has been underway for three weeks and includes a number of outspoken anti-Trump scientists.

At issue is whether the U.S. government can formally designate China as the cause of the COVID-19 outbreak and hold Beijing accountable. China has launched a worldwide public relations campaign to deflect criticism for its handling and deception related to the pandemic.

The task force's differences reflect the extreme politicization of the issue that many regard as an urgent national security priority that deserves bipartisan support.

Arguing against the lab escape conclusion is a group that insists the virus was a naturally occurring zoonotic event starting from a bat to an intermediate animal host and then to humans. An estimated 15% of the task force is arguing for this conclusion.

A third group, and one that has growing support from within the intelligence and arms

control communities, wants the task force final report to assert that the virus, formally known as SARS-CoV-2, was produced by the Chinese military establishment as an engineered biological weapon. An estimated 7% of the task force agrees with this view.

That position was first disclosed by exiled Chinese virologist Li-Meng Yan, who worked at a Chinese laboratory and said she is certain the coronavirus was created in a Chinese laboratory. Ms. Yan has published an extensive scientific study bolstering her claims.

The remaining 8% of the task force experts are undecided and want further data, something China has refused to provide.

According to the people, the task force includes a number of anti-Trump experts and scientific skeptics.

The deadlock within the group means that its findings are unlikely to be published before President Trump leaves office Jan. 20. That means the incoming Biden administration, expected to adopt more conciliatory policies toward China, will be reluctant to ultimately make public the task force's conclusions.

The task force's work was hampered by Chinese government stonewalling. Beijing officials have refused to cooperate in studying the virus' origin and continues to insist the virus began at an "unregulated seafood market" in Wuhan — a location that over a year ago was sanitized and scrubbed clean of all possible evidence for where the disease outbreak began.

Chinese studies conducted after the outbreak said the virus was first detected in Wuhan in December 2019 have ruled out the seafood market as a cause. Chinese scientists that tried to report the anomalies in the seafood market origin have been suppressed by the government.

The Chinese government also has begun shifting blame for the outbreak from the market to questionable claims that the virus originated in southern Europe and spread to China by overseas workers.

The World Health Organization is conducting an inquiry into the central starting point for the virus. Beijing at first blocked entry to the inspection team, but the Chinese government announced this week that the team has been allowed into China and will go to Wuhan on Thursday.

Support for the lab-leak origin theory was first disclosed by Matt Pottinger, until recently the White House deputy national security adviser.

"There is a growing body of evidence that the lab is likely the most credible source of the virus," he told British lawmakers recently. Spokesmen for the Department of Health and Human Services and National Security Council had no immediate comment.

One source said China is expected to continue the stonewalling on the virus origin with the hope that the new administration will give up the need for further investigation.

If the virus was a bioweapon, an outcome with a major national security implication, the federal government has not been able to determine that and could not identify the origin or the sponsor. As a result, the U.S. is vulnerable to a future biological weapons attack because it cannot develop the necessary infrastructure for the intelligence work needed to identify both the type and origin of the weapon, the sources said.

Sender:	"Dolliff, Phillip R" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Park, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@hhs.gov>; (b)(6); Fakory, Ladan <(b)(6)>; Grube, Steven M. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-FO-DL <ISN-FO-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: From Fox News - Chinese virologist: China's government 'intentionally' released COVID-19
Date:	Thu, 17 Sep 2020 16:59:38 +0000

Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 12:58 PM
To: (b)(6) AVC-CBW-DL; ISN-BPS-DL
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: From Fox News - Chinese virologist: China's government 'intentionally' released COVID-19

There's not a whole lot to go on in that story and I'm not sure I would know either way, due to protection of sources. However, I would point out that the Washington Times does not seem to be a very reputable source of information.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 11:06 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: From Fox News - Chinese virologist: China's government 'intentionally' released COVID-19

Hi (b)(6) - anything here?

Second defector's knowledge of Chinese bioweapons reaches U.S.

The Washington Times, 9/16

U.S. intelligence agencies recently increased their knowledge of China's covert biological weapons program with the help of a defector from the People's Liberation Army, according to people familiar with the incident. The defector escaped from China and traveled to Europe, where he is under the protection of a European government security service, according to the sources. The PLA defector believes that Chinese intelligence has penetrated the U.S.

government and is therefore wary of cooperating with the CIA and other Western spy agencies. Still, the defector has provided some information about China's biological arms program that has reached the U.S. government. No other details of the defection could be learned. However, the defector is the second person from China to provide information about Chinese biological research with potential weapons applications. Chinese virologist Yan Li-meng fled to the United States from Hong Kong this spring and charged in news interviews that the virus behind the COVID-19 pandemic was manufactured in the Wuhan Institute of Virology and appears to be designed from two viruses stored in a PLA laboratory.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 8:48 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: From Fox News - Chinese virologist: China's government 'intentionally' released COVID-19

Good Morning (b)(6)

Additional context on this story: [Daily Beast - Steve Bannon Is Behind Bogus Study That China Created COVID](#)

(b)(6)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/SPM)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 5:57 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: From Fox News - Chinese virologist: China's government 'intentionally' released COVID-19

See my email on the other side when you can.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 10:07 AM
To: AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>
Cc: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: From Fox News - Chinese virologist: China's government 'intentionally' released COVID-19

FYSA.

The Chinese government intentionally manufactured and released the COVID-19 virus that led to mass shutdowns and deaths across the world, a top virologist and whistleblower told Fox News host Tucker Carlson.

<https://www.foxnews.com/media/chinese-virologist-government-intentionally-coronavirus>

(b)(6)

Physical Scientist

Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs

Bureau of Arms Control, Compliance and Verification

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20520

Desk: (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; AVC-CBW-DL <AVC-CBW-DL2@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: Re: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 13:32:56 +0000

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 9:17 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: RE: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167

Thanks for flagging (b)(6) (b)(5)
 we'll be on calls from 10-Noon (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 7:34 AM
To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>
Subject: FW: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167

All,

(b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Note the suspense of 11:00 today.

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Biological Policy Staff | Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
 U.S. Department of State | CORTEK Contract Support

O: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2020 6:25 PM
To: OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; CGRCU-Clearances <CGRCU-Clearances@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles
(b)(6)@state.gov>; GPA-Specials <GPA-Specials@state.gov>; R_Clearances
<R_Clearances@state.gov>

Subject: FOR WEDNESDAY 11AM CLEARANCE: Menendez QFR 167

Colleagues,

Apologies for the short fuse, but please find a linked QFR related to the origins of the COVID-19 virus: [FY21 SFRC Budget Hearing Menendez 167.docx](#). **Please clear by 11AM tomorrow, Wednesday, September 3.** The text of the QFR is also pasted below for convenience.

Best,

(b)(6)

Question:

In a May 3, 2020 interview, you claimed there was “a significant amount of evidence” pointing to the origination of the COVID-19 virus at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, directly contradicting an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) determination made four days prior that COVID-19 was not manmade or genetically modified. Do you still stand by that statement?

Answer:

(b)(5)

--
(b)(6)

Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (work)
(b)(6) (telework)

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 15:49:07 +0000

Thanks (b)(6) That should work. INR/AO should be sending (b)(6) the invite with call-in info now.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 11:04 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

(b)(6) is free to call in at 2pm in lieu of everyone else, if you could send her the call-in information.

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 11:00 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

(b)(6) is calling in and has promised a readout. (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 10:57 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

We are so sorry but the time was chosen to accommodate U/S Krach and A/S Stillwell (+D who can no longer join), as they requested that INR arrange the meeting.

(b)(6)
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research | U.S. Department of State
 (b)(6)@state.gov | (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 10:54 AM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Ok, all of T and the ISN and AVC FOs have a conflicting meeting at that time. Any chance of changing the time?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 8:36 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

I did as well.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 8:29:10 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Hi (b)(6)

It's at 2-3:30pm tomorrow.

The invite e-mail went out at 5:25pm today (apologies for the short notice, as this is being pulled together quickly compounded by these days' strange circumstances). The e-mail was a bcc, so I don't actually know who all received it, but at least Dr. Ford should have been on the e-mail.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 4:55 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Davis, Michael (Scott) <DavisMS@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Weand, Kirsten AK <WeandKAK@state.gov>; Frisk, Megan L <FriskML@state.gov>
Cc: Robbins, Hailey R (T) <RobbinsH4@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Thanks (b)(6) Do we have a time for this?

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 3:56 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Hi Chris,

(b)(5)

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 2:08 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
(T) (b)(6) @state.gov>

Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

(b)(6) – I understand the need to keep the numbers down, but I think it would be good (b)(5)
(b)(5)

From: (b)(6) @state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 12:03 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6) @state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov>
(b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6) @state.gov>
Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Bureau of Intelligence and Research | U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)@state.gov | (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 11:20 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

I hold Eddie Holmes and Ian Lipkin in high regard - though I do wish Andersen *et al.* had thought to write for an audience broader than the typical Nature Medicine one, in anticipation that they'd be cited in mainstream media.

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:40 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-

DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Pew asked about this as part of their public perceptions survey. 29% said they think it came from a lab.

<https://www.journalism.org/2020/03/18/americans-immersed-in-covid-19-news-most-think-media-are-doing-fairly-well-covering-it/>

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of State, ISN/MBC

TEL: (b)(6)

FAX:

Unclass e-mail: (b)(6)@state.gov

From: Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:08 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 9:39 AM

To: ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>; Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Reactions?

From: Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 8:42 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Experts know the new coronavirus is not a bioweapon. They disagree on whether it could have leaked from a research lab

Thought people should know this is out there in case it comes up. Article is a couple of days old, but I just saw it:

<https://thebulletin.org/2020/03/experts-know-the-new-coronavirus-is-not-a-bioweapon-they-disagree-on-whether-it-could-have-leaked-from-a-research-lab/>

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Park, Christopher J (T) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
ISN-BPS-DL <ISN-BPS-DL@STATE.GOV>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>

From: (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>
To: (b)(6)@hudson.org>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.gov>;
 Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 23:38:58 +0000

You bet! If he doesn't Signal me this evening, I'll ping him again in the morning ...

(b)(6)

National Strategic Research Institute

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@hudson.org>

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:38:03 PM

To: (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; Jih, (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, DC 20004

o. | c. (b)(6)

<https://www.hudson.org/experts/> (b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 6:37 PM, (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov> wrote:

I definitely plan to when he sends me his first Signal message.

(b)(6)

National Strategic Research Institute

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@hudson.org>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:52:00 PM
To: (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

(b)(6) Can you ask (b)(6) on SIGNAL what else is going on. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hudson Institute
 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
 Fourth Floor
 Washington, DC 20004
 o. | c. (b)(6)
<https://www.hudson.org/experts> (b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 5:45 PM, (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov> wrote:

Nicely done!

(b)(6)

National Strategic Research Institute

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 4:34:57 PM
To: (b)(6)@hudson.org>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>
Cc: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

Not the first time that the IC has underplayed an analysis or stepped on a report

A Biological Weapons Threat Worse Than
 March 10, 1998
 Center for Security Policy
 By Joseph D. Douglass Jr.
 The Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1998

What's most unfortunate about the continuing conflict with Iraq is that it diverts Western attention away from the broader problem of chemical and biological weapons world-wide—and especially in Russia. In the long run, the Russian threat is far worse than the Iraqi one. While it's

true that the current leadership in Moscow does not display Saddam's brutality, the Russian leadership could change overnight.

Adding more arms-control treaties, such as the new Chemical Weapons Convention, won't solve the problem. Existing treaties are being flagrantly violated. Antiproliferation efforts are also futile, since all that is needed to build chemical or biological weapons is the knowledge in someone's head. The one remedy that does have promise is sunlight: The best way to discourage proliferation of these horrible weapons is to focus public attention on what is happening. But such information seldom gets aired in public. Indeed, over the years Washington officials have often covered up Moscow's efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons, fearful that public disclosure would undermine arms-control efforts.

52 Biological Agents

This pattern has continued despite the end of the Cold War. Consider: Two weeks ago, ABC News's "PrimeTime Live" aired an interview with Kanatjan Alibekov, a Russian defector who had been a deputy director of Biopreparat, a massive Soviet (now Russian) biological warfare development program. Biopreparat employed more than 25,000 engineers, technicians and scientists developing biological agents, in blatant violation of arms-control treaties Moscow had signed. Mr. Alibekov told ABC the facility had developed 52 biological agents before he left in 1992 and had ballistic missile warheads loaded with plague, anthrax and smallpox intended for delivery against American cities.

The program continued, notwithstanding evident instructions from President Boris Yeltsin to shut it down. Mr. Alibekov said he had written a long report for the CIA about this program. So why was that report not printed and distributed to every member of Congress and every U.S. newspaper? The CIA cannot be trying to hide it from the Russian government, which is well aware of what Mr. Alibekov knew.

Such secrecy has typified the U.S. approach for three decades. In 1969 the CIA prepared a study on Soviet activities in developing chemical and biological weapons. According to Herb Meyer, former deputy director of the National Intelligence Council, the report was "removed" at the direction of then-National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, presumably so it would not interfere with arms-control efforts.

In 1976, officials of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency questioned a top National Security Council official about new intelligence on Soviet violations of the 1972 agreements on chemical and biological weapons. The NSC official discounted the alleged violations and advised

they be ignored, on the grounds that chemical and biological weapons had no strategic value that would warrant such violations.

That same year, Luba Markish, a Soviet émigré, testified to Congress on the Soviets' use of students as unwitting guinea pigs in testing chemical and biological weapons. Émigré David Azbel confirmed her testimony and said the research was focused "on poison gases that act on the brain and the nervous system."

In 1980 Soviet dissident Mark Popovski testified on the objectives of biological warfare programs headed by a top molecular biologist named Yuri Ovchinnikov. "If we bring to the Central Committee vaccines, nobody will pay attention," Popovski quoted Ovchinnikov as saying, "but if we bring a virus, oh, then this will be recognized by all as a great victory." No one in Congress ever pursued the matter, to my knowledge.

In 1981 one of the authors of the suppressed 1969 CIA report gave a copy to Herb Meyer and suggested he read it. He did, and was so alarmed he took it in to CIA Director William Casey, who immediately went over to the White House to tell President Reagan about it. Nothing more happened.

Members of the Army's intelligence unit, however, were gathering considerable information about the Soviet chemical and biological weapons program, and they took it upon themselves to brief appropriately cleared people. But after giving numerous such briefings, they were suddenly ordered to stop by the head of Army intelligence.

In 1984 The Wall Street Journal editorial page published an impressive series of articles entitled "Beyond Yellow Rain" on biological weapons use in Indochina. Author William Kucewicz's findings echoed those of Army intelligence. From Washington there was no serious reaction. A few years later, top Pentagon scientists said there was no cause for concern. Significant Soviet developments, they insisted, were more than a decade away.

But in 1989, when Vladimir Pasechnik, the first defector from the Biopreparat program, emerged, intelligence specialists were horrified. The Soviet effort was more than 10 times as large as even the most pessimistic of them had estimated. The Bush administration's response was to keep the whole thing quiet and send a complaint through diplomatic channels. In 1992, when Mr. Alibekov confirmed what Mr. Pasechnik had said, the response was to negotiate with the Russian government. The objective may have been to avoid upsetting the chemical and biological arms control efforts President Bush had championed.

This year's "PrimeTime Live" interview with Mr. Alibekov was important, but it left much

out. There was no hint of overall Soviet development objectives, no discussion of the technology or of Soviet efforts to use genetic engineering. This may have been how they developed a new type of anthrax, reportedly resistant to U.S. vaccines. There have also been reports of their splicing the gene responsible for the toxic component in cobra venom into common organisms, making it easy to disseminate. We have also learned that the Russians have developed a weapon based on the Ebola virus.

Other defectors have stated that experimental biological and chemical agents were tested on U.S. and South Vietnamese military bases during the Vietnam War. The experiments were so successful that the Soviets ended them prematurely, fearing that the Americans would learn what was happening. Other tests were run against U.S. military bases in Okinawa and in Europe, according to a Soviet defector.

U.S. officials have tended to think, and arms-control negotiations have tended to focus on, Lethal weapons and battlefield applications. But most of the Soviet, and now Russian, development efforts concerned other applications of chemical and biological weapons. Special institutes concentrated on the development of chemical and biological agents for assassinations. One objective was to mimic the effects of natural diseases; another was to render a person ineffective without killing him. The idea was that a disabled person would make bad decisions, which was better than killing him and having him replaced. A variety of such agents were intended for very focused military use—special nonlethal agents for use against pilots, tank drivers, command posts and field commanders. The Soviets had a major effort to determine which U.S. airplane crashes in Vietnam were the result of their chemical agents.

The Russians have stressed highly potent agents that required only trace quantities to have effect, agents and delivery techniques that would make highly selective attacks possible, and, in the case of biological agents, ones that could spread like the flu or plague and ones that the enemy would not know how to treat. There were special chemical agents for use against cities, agents that would work quickly, unlike plague or smallpox.

Unwanted Stepchild

U.S. defense planning for chemical and biological weapons has been the unwanted stepchild of the U.S. national security apparatus since 1969. Intelligence has generally been poor, since key officials did not want to find a threat that might breathe new life into U.S. offensive programs. The subject was also a no-no because it would embarrass the Russians and interfere with arms-control efforts.

ABC News performed an important service in calling attention to the seriousness of the Russian chemical and biological threat. Now it's time for other news organizations—especially

investigative journalists in Eastern Europe, Russia and the former Soviet republics—to start digging into other aspects of the problem. There is plenty more left to be discovered and no end of leads to follow.

Mr. Douglass is co-author of “America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare” (Lexington Books, 1987).

(b)(6)
AVC Bureau
Department of State
(b)(6)

~~SBU~~ DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

From: (b)(6)@hudson.org>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 6:31 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Dr. Quay’s report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

Ever (b)(6) recognizes the origins issue is TBD. He would be a good reviewer.

(b)(6)
Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004
o. | (b)(6)
<https://www.hudson.org/experts/> (b)(6)

On Dec 31, 2020, at 15:49, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Indeed, technical collection, processing, and most front-line military service intelligence analytical work, have vastly improved. However, in thirty five years of dealing and occasionally working with DIA, I have yet to see any signs of "continual improvement", let alone any

significant improvement. Fewer data points suggest a similar trend on the analytical side of CIA.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 3:10 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@hudson.org; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov
Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

Just remember that both law and medicine may be professions but they are "practiced," meaning continual improvement over long periods of time (centuries) on an imperfect process by trial-and-unfortunate-error..... And that seems to apply to the practice of intelligence as well.

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 1:02 PM
To: (b)(6)@hudson.org; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov
Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

(b)(5)

It still amazes me that the overwhelming majority of IC is completely ignorant of the existence of this fundamental branch of mathematics which measures relative likelihood as new facts are discovered.

Then again, the IC leadership and Congress steadfastly refuse to take any of the necessary steps for intelligence analysis to become an actual profession like medicine and law.

From: (b)(6)@hudson.org
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 12:23 PM
To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov

Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>

Subject: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004

o. | c (b)(6)

<https://www.hudson.org/experts/> (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: Steven Quay (b)(6)

Date: December 31, 2020 at 3:14:19 AM EST

To: (b)(6)@hudson.org, (b)(6)

Cc: "Dr. Steven Quay" (b)(6)

Subject: Confidential

Gentlemen-

Attached please find a near final draft of my analysis of the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Based on a Bayesian analysis which began with a posterior probability of lab accident (20%) and zoonotic origin (80%) the evidence presented and the adjusted probabilities conclude the likely is >99% laboratory origin and <1% zoonotic origin.

Please confirm receipt and what the next steps are.

Happy New Year!

Regards, Steve

--

Steven C Quay, MD, PhD, FCAP

T: (b)(6)

Skype: (b)(6)

[Dr. Quay Official Website](#)

[STAY SAFE: #1 Best Seller Amazon Medical eBooks](#)

Sender:	(b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@hudson.org>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@hudson.org>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>
Subject:	Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP
Date:	Thu, 31 Dec 2020 21:54:41 +0000

In light of Park's email recommend we reread this carefully. <https://www.independentsciencenews.org/news/peter-daszaks-ecohealth-alliance-has-hidden-almost-40-million-in-pentagon-funding/>

(b)(6)

Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004
o. | c. (b)(6)
<https://www.hudson.org/experts> (b)(6)

On Dec 31, 2020, at 3:49 PM, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

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From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 3:10 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@hudson.org>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>

Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

SSD/AVC

c: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 1:02 PM

To: (b)(6)@hudson.org>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Jih,

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>

Subject: Re: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

(b)(5)

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From: (b)(6)@hudson.org>

Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 12:23 PM

To: DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Feith, David

(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>

Subject: Dr. Quay's report with Bayesian odds — please review ASAP

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20004

o. | c. (b)(6)
<https://www.hudson.org/experts/> (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: Steven Quay (b)(6)
Date: December 31, 2020 at 3:14:19 AM EST
To: (b)(6)@hudson.org, (b)(6)
Cc: "Dr. Steven Quay" (b)(6)
Subject: Confidential

Gentlemen-

Attached please find a near final draft of my analysis of the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Based on a Bayesian analysis which began with a posterior probability of lab accident (20%) and zoonotic origin (80%) the evidence presented and the adjusted probabilities conclude the likely is >99% laboratory origin and <1% zoonotic origin.

Please confirm receipt and what the next steps are.

Happy New Year!

Regards, Steve

--

Steven C Quay, MD, PhD, FCAP

T: (b)(6)

Skype (b)(6)

Dr. Quay Official Website

STAY SAFE: #1 Best Seller Amazon Medical eBooks

Sender:	(b)(6)@hudson.org>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@nsri.nebraskaresearch.gov>	

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: Follow up
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:19:27 -0400

Thanks.

Official -SBU
UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 12:55 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: Follow up

Chris – I finally confirmed that the email below as received. It's a different address than the one he originally sent to us – but it's what we should use in the future.

Official - SBU
UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 12:50 PM
To: (b)(6)@oma.sgov.gov (b)(6)@oma.sgov.gov>
Subject: Follow up

Hi Folks – Following up on our chat Wednesday, please see additional info below and attached:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks

(b)(6)

Official -SBU

UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: (b)(1); (b)(5)

Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 15:48:42 -0400

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 1:47 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa

J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (T)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 12:35 PM

To: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (T)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

<(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

<(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 5:43 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (T)

<(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

<(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: FW: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) (T) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

Importance: High

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
To: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
CC: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: (b)(1); (b)(5)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:05:44 -0400

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 5:57 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Nerissa

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 5:52 PM

To: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: FW: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Park, Christopher J

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 4:55 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: cl [redacted] (b)(1); (b)(5)
Importance: High

[redacted] (b)(1); (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1); (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1); (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1); (b)(5)

Thanks

[redacted] (b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: Cook, Nerissa J [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>;
[redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>

Response to the Secretary's Question

June 21, 2021

Mr. Secretary,

(b)(5)



Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)

From: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 16:15:41 -0400

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2021 1:32 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(5)

Chris – when you get a chance, can you send the final version of this to me and (b)(7)(B) (or the BPS list serve if you feel comfortable)? Just so we know where it landed if it comes up again and you're not in the office.

Official - ~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN~~

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 1:47 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa

J <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 1:41 PM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 1:07 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 5:03 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(5) (b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:33 AM
To: Cook, Nerissa J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)
Importance: High

(b)(1)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:19 AM

To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

Importance: High

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

FL-2022-00076

B-00002427998

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[06/28/2024]

From: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
CC: Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(1)
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2020 12:36:21 -0400

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Special Assistant, Office:Office of the Counselor, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/28/2045

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 28, 2020 3:06 PM
To: Stilwell, David R; Buangan, Richard L; Fritz, Jonathan D; (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Special Assistant
Office of the Counselor (C)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - Special Assistant, Office:Office of the Counselor, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/28/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
To: Yu, Miles <[redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: [redacted] (b)(1)
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 10:34:32 -0400

Official - Sensitive

This message is ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~ when separated from ~~SECRET~~ attachment(s)
 Classified By: [redacted] (b)(6) CoS/Senior Advisor to the Counselor, Office:S/C, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 8/6/2045
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 9:02 AM
To: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Cc: [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; [redacted] (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

Chief of Staff/Senior Advisor to the Counselor
 U.S. Department of State | Office of the Counselor of the Department

Phone: [redacted] (b)(6)
NIPR: (b)(6)@state.gov | SIPR: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

Official - Sensitive

This message is ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~ when separated from ~~SECRET~~ attachment(s)

Classified By: [redacted] (b)(6) CoS/Senior Advisor to the Counselor, Office:S/C, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/6/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: [redacted] (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, August 5, 2020 8:31 AM

To: C_Policy <C_Policy@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: (b)(6) Special Assistant, Office:C, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 8/5/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: Yu, Miles <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@jdiss.cia.sgov.gov (b)(6)
CC: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: Follow up with PRC counterparts in BWC
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 17:51:56 -0400

Sorry this took so long – finally found your email in the “junk” folder!

Official -SBU-
UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 1, 2021 5:52 PM
To: Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: Follow up with PRC counterparts in BWC

Chris – Here’s some follow up from today. Feel free to forward – if you can share the right email address – I’ll send it directly.

Hi Folks –

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks

(b)(6)

Official - SBU

UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@jdiss.cia.sgov.gov (b)(6)
Park, Christopher J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1); (b)(5)

Importance: High

(b)(1); (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Official - Sensitive

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: Kin Moy - Senior Bureau Official, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 6/28/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Park, Christopher J" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Feith, David" <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
To: DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 18:31:37 -0500

FYSA, nodis please.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 2:16 PM
To: Biegun, Stephen E <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Hale, David <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ford, Christopher A <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Krach, Keith J <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Brown, Cale <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Keshap, Atul <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Buangan, Richard L <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Colleagues,

The attached statement relates to (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

V/R
Dave

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender: "Feith, David" <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Recipient: DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Park, Christopher J (T)" [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>
To: Ford, Christopher A [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 17:11:04 -0500

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: [(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2021 2:29 PM
To: Ford, Christopher A; Park, Christopher J (T); [(b)(6)]
Subject: FW: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Here's the draft S statement. Chris P [(b)(5)]

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Buangan, Richard L [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 2:25 PM
To: Palladino, Robert J [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>; Waters, John R (Rick) [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>; GPA_Clearances <GPA_Clearances@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: EAP-Staff-Assistants-DL <EAP-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>; [(b)(6)]@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Colleagues,

Please flag this for your principals below. Appreciate in advance the quick turnaround.

Thanks,

Richard

Richard Buangan

Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
SIPR voice: (b)(6)

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 2:16 PM
To: Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Hale, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Krach, Keith J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Colleagues,

The attached statement relates to (b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(E) (b)(5)

V/R
Dave

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender: "Park, Christopher J (T)" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient: Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Ford, Christopher A" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
 Park, Christopher J (T) <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Kang, Eliot (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 Ganzer, Ann K (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 18:50:22 -0500

FYSA

Official - ~~SDU~~
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Ford, Christopher A
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:49 PM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Hale, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Krach, Keith J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Thanks, David. I clear with the attached edits.

Official - ~~SDU~~
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 2:16 PM
To: Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Hale, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ford, Christopher A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Krach, Keith J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Colleagues,

The attached statement relates to (b)(5)
 (b)(5)

(b)(5)

V/R
Dave

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender: "Ford, Christopher A" <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Park, Christopher J (T) <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Recipient: <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Kang, Eliot <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Ganzer, Ann K <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: Flagging Draft S Statement
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 13:54:56 -0500

Sir,

Below is the text of an email for you to send:

To: Biegun, Stephen; Hale, David; Ford, Christopher A; Krach, Keith; (b)(6) Brown, Cale; Ortagus, Morgan

CC: Keshap, Feith, Fritz, Buangan, (b)(6) EAP-Staffer Mailbox

Subject: **Flagging Draft S Statement**

Colleagues,

(b)(5)

Thanks for your urgent read.

EAP / Dave Stilwell

Official - ~~SB~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Feith, David"

Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

To: Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

CC: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)

Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 15:57:08 +0000

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

EAP / Dave Stilwell

Official

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: Feith - DAS, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 1/4/2046

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender: "Feith, David"

Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Fritz, Jonathan D (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Recipient: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From: "Waters, John R (Rick)" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Cardno, Gwendolyn J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Feith, David (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

To: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
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(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Moore, Jonathan M (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: (b)(1)
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 08:12:09 -0400

(b)(1)

Sensitivity: Sensitive

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (h)(6) ESTH Counselor, Embassy Beijing, Department of State
20 BEIJING 365 dated Apr 30, 2020, Subject: (b)(1)

Derived From: (b)(1)

Declassify On: 2045/05/04

From: SMART Core

Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 6:57 PM

To: (h)(6) (Beijing)

Subject: (h)(1)
(b)(1)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sensitive



Action Office: ECON, POL, MED, ESC, SCIENCE, RSO, DAO, PAS, MGT, TSA
Info Office: MGT_INFO

MRN: 20 BEIJING 365
Date/DTG: Apr 30, 2020 / 301004Z APR 20
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, CDC, HHS, NIH, PGOV, CN, SENV, AMED, KPAO, KMDR, KHIV, KFLU, KGHI, KHLS, KSCA, KTBT, AMGT, ASEC, AID, KFPC, KNCV
Captions: SENSITIVE, ~~NOFORN~~
Reference: A) 18 BEIJING 138
B) 18 WUHAN 38
Pass Line: DOM WHA PASS TO AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PASS TO AMCONSUL AUCKLAND

Correction Reason: CORRECTED COPY: Message Corrected

Subject: (b)(1)

1. (S) **Summary and Comment:** Since 2003, the PRC has undertaken a wide range of measures to strengthen the biosafety and biosecurity of its public health laboratory system, often with the support of the United States and other international donors. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

End summary and

Comment.

PRC Efforts to Improve Biosafety

2. ~~(SBU)~~ In 2003, the PRC dedicated \$250 million (2 billion RMB) towards SARS prevention and control efforts, and subsequently an additional \$850 million (6.8 billion RMB) to further develop laboratory facilities throughout China. The State Council issued over 14 biosafety measures from 2003 to 2006, including its "Management Regulations on Laboratory Biosafety of Pathogenic Microorganisms," setting clear guidelines for the handling of infectious or pathogenic diseases in biomedical laboratories. Nevertheless, PRC efforts were unable to prevent the leak of SARS-CoV in 2004 at the National Institute of Virology Laboratory (NIVL) in Beijing. Two graduate students researching the virus and seven of their close contacts were infected, hundreds of Chinese citizens were forced into quarantine, and major concerns were raised about Chinese biosafety regulations.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ In response, the PRC devoted massive funding to develop a secure biocontainment laboratory system to prevent future infectious disease incidents. With this strong financial support and legal framework, the former Ministry of Health (now the National Health Commission) swiftly launched a national biosafety program in 2004, establishing thousands of biocontainment laboratories with biosafety levels (BSLs) ranging from 1 to 4 depending on the pathogenicity of microbes being studied.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ The PRC also collaborated with the United States and other international partners to develop its laboratory network system through a series of the technical exchanges, training programs, and other collaborative efforts, which included biosafety and quality assurance. For over 20 years, the U.S. CDC has provided financial and technical support to the Chinese Center for Disease Prevention and Control (China CDC) to improve its influenza surveillance system. Additionally, the U.S. CDC's Global Disease Detection Program supported virology and epidemiology training in the United States and China for more than 2,500 China CDC specialists and supported annual laboratory quality assessments to strengthen quality assurance of PRC laboratory networks from 2004 to 2014. At a cost of \$44 million (300 million RMB), the PRC collaborated with France in 2015 to construct a BSL-4 laboratory, the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, at the Wuhan Institute of Virology as part of a global research collaboration effort to develop countermeasures against the world's most dangerous public health threats. [Note: BSL-4 laboratories possess maximum biocontainment equipment designed for handling the most dangerous biological agents and lethal human diseases with high risk of transmission among individuals and communities for which no treatment exists, such as the Ebola virus and the Nipah virus. End Note].

5. ~~(SBU)~~ From 2013 to 2017, the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL) of the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), part of the NIH Biodefense Laboratory Network, provided DoD-funded laboratory safety and security training for high-level biocontainment facilities in China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology (Ref 18 BEIJING 138, 18 WUHAN 38). This training has been facilitated since 2015 through ongoing dialogue and regular collaboration

meetings cosponsored by the Chinese Academies of Science and the U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine with cooperation from China CDC and others. According to GNL leadership, the relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology included the provision of training to scientists and biosafety and engineering professionals from Wuhan, as well as from other biocontainment labs in China and the China CDC. The UTMB National Biocontainment Training Program included operations training as the Wuhan Institute of Virology prepared to open their BSL-4 facility. This UTMB training engagement ended in 2016 when DoD funding was exhausted and not replenished. Nevertheless, U.S. CDC continues to provide technical assistance in tuberculosis laboratories in six provinces in the PRC, focusing on laboratory quality management, including biosafety, through helping China CDC implement the Strengthening Laboratory Management Towards Accreditation (SLMTA) program.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ Publishing his assessment in the *Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity* in 2019, CCP Secretary for the Wuhan Institute of Virology and lab director Yuan Zhiming provided a general overview of PRC biocontainment facilities. He wrote that the majority of PRC biomedical facilities are basic BSL-1 and 2 laboratories attached to China CDC branches, scientific research institutions, and public health universities with biocontainment equipment appropriate only for handling non-lethal pathogenic agents and human disease. According to Director Yuan, China has 42 accredited BSL-3 laboratories designed to contain lethal pathogens and diseases with high individual risk for which treatment is often available. The Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory remains China's first and only BSL-4 laboratory. In late 2019, China CDC announced the PRC's intention to construct 5 to 7 new BSL-4 laboratories by 2025.

Using History as a Mirror: Assessing the PRC Biosafety Laboratory System

7. ~~(SBU)~~ In a joint U.S. - China CDC publication in *Health Affairs* from 2011 during the PRC expansion of its laboratory system, China CDC Disease Control and Emergency Response Office Director Feng Zijian praised municipal and provincial level laboratories for their ability to meet "high-level biosafety standards." He acknowledged, however, that China CDC and clinical hospital laboratories lacked highly skilled staff and basic laboratory quality management procedures. China CDC also faced a shortage of infectious disease specialists, observed Feng, whose salaries were sometimes lower than the average income in China.

8. ~~(S)~~ Looking back at the years leading up to COVID-19, public health scholars in China, along with Post, highlighted shortcomings in the country's biosafety laboratory system. Post reported in 2018 that the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory faced a shortage of highly trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate a BSL-4 laboratory and that the laboratory requested additional U.S. training assistance on safety and security. In addition, Post noted that nation-wide BSL research decision-making processes needed to be more transparent to instill confidence that the PRC government was providing informed oversight to meet the highest global standards (Ref 18 BEIJING 138, 18 WUHAN 38).

9. ~~(S)~~ In 2019, prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, China CDC, with technical support from U.S. CDC, conducted an assessment of laboratory system capacity in China after conducting inspections of 28 public health and clinical laboratories in two resource-limited provinces. Using the WHO Laboratory Assessment Tool, China CDC concluded that county level

laboratories suffered from insufficient biosafety compliance and biorisk management, which stemmed from poor organization, low budgets, and inadequate virology testing, creating issues at the prefectural and provincial levels. According to this assessment, Chinese laboratories also coordinated surveillance and early detection activities poorly at the provincial, prefectural, and county level, weakening PRC public health emergency response capabilities.

Closing the PRC Biosafety Gaps and Reforming its Laboratory System

10. ~~(S/BU)~~ Possibly in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the PRC has begun to initiate enhancements to its biosafety system. President Xi Jinping called for new reforms during a February 14 CCP Central Committee meeting, saying that biosafety was a “national security issue.” Following Xi’s statement, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued new guidelines the next day requiring public health institutions throughout China to boost laboratory biosafety. The National People’s Congress was also planning to unveil new biosafety laws and regulations for public health institutions and laboratories managing infectious diseases, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) discussions were even underway to elevate the status of public health agencies such as China CDC.

11. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1)

PRC Efforts to Build Labs Abroad

12. ~~(S/BU)~~ The ability of the PRC to properly adhere to international biosafety and biosecurity standards has even greater implications globally as China constructs biosafety facilities for other countries. During the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the PRC government provided Sierra Leone a mobile BSL-3 laboratory and subsequently established the BSL-3 Sierra Leone-China Friendship Biological Safety Laboratory (SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab) in 2015. **[Note:** Chinese media claimed the SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab met WHO biosafety standards, which Post Beijing was unable to verify. **End Note]**. On March 25, Iraq opened a new PRC-built laboratory in Baghdad as part of China’s assistance to Iraq for combatting COVID-19. With the new laboratory, Iraqi Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Health Asaad Mahdi said Iraq could conduct 1,000 COVID-19 tests per day. Africa CDC also welcomed PRC public health assistance in enhancing its laboratory system capacity as COVID-19 struck African countries.

China’s Role in Global Health Security Agenda

13. ~~(S/BU)~~ China is a member of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a global partnership effort started in 2014 to assess countries’ capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. The GHSA’s Biosafety and Biosecurity action package

emphasizes: 1) whole-of-government biosafety and biosecurity systems for human, animal, and agricultural facilities, and 2) biosafety and biosecurity training and practices. The GHSA also encourages members to use the World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool to determine their gaps and weaknesses in preparing for and responding to infectious disease risks. The JEE is a useful tool for ensuring full compliance with global biosafety and biosecurity standards, which is a key aspect of implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR). The PRC, however, has not participated in a WHO JEE despite U.S. efforts to encourage it to do so. China has only participated as a technical observer to other country JEEs and has yet to agree to conduct its own.

(b)(1)

14. ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)
 (b)(1); (b)(6)

15. ~~(SDU)~~ Anecdotal Chinese media reporting also highlights the challenges that China faces as it attempts to ensure highest standards in its laboratory system. In January, renowned Chinese scientist Li Ning was sentenced to 12 years in prison for selling experimental animals in local markets for personal gain. In December 2019, a factory producing animal brucellosis vaccines used expired disinfectant to decontaminate its facilities, leading to the infection of 181 lab workers, students, and faculty at the nearby Lanzhou Veterinary Research Institute. **[Note:** Brucellosis is classified as a Class B infectious disease, the second most serious level in China's three-tier infectious disease classification system. **End Note]**.

Signature: BRANSTAD

Classified By: Name: (b)(6) Title: ESTH Counselor
 Office: Embassy Beijing
 Agency: Department of State

Reason: 1.4 (b), (d)

Declassify On: 2045/04/30

Drafted By: BEIJING: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Cleared By:

ESTH: (b)(6) (Beijing)
ECON: (h)(6) Beijing)
POL: (b)(6) (Beijing)
A/DCM: Munchmeyer, Katherine A (Beijing)
HHS: (h)(6) (Beijing)
CDC: (h)(6) Beijing)

Approved By:

A/DCM: Munchmeyer, Katherine A (Beijing)

Released By:

BEIJING (b)(6) Beijing)

Info:

SEOUL, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; TAIPEI, AIT ROUTINE; HANOI, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; SINGAPORE, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; ULAANBAATAR, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; PHNOM PENH, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; BANGKOK, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; HONG KONG, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; MANILA, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; PARIS, AMEMBASSY ROUTINE; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; ATLANTA GA, CDC ROUTINE; DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; CIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI ROUTINE; ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE ROUTINE; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE; ZEN/AUCKLAND, AMCONSUL

XMT:

ZEN/CARACAS, AMEMBASSY; WHA, DOM; ZEN/ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL

Action Post:

NONE

Dissemination Rule:

ECON, POL, MED, ESC, SCIENCE, RSO, DAO_ACTION, POL_INFO, PAS, MGT_ACTION, TSA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sensitive

Sender: "Waters, John R (Rick)" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Recipient:

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Margolis, Jonathan A. (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
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