May 24, 2023

Case No. FL-2021-00033

Gary Ruskin
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Ruskin:

As we noted in our letter dated April 24, 2023, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State ("Department") has identified an additional 43 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined that all 43 records may be released in part.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.
We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Christopher M. Lynch, Trial Attorney, at Christopher.M.Lynch@usdoj.gov or (202) 353-4537. Please refer to the case number, FL-2021-00033, and the civil action number, 20-cv-08415, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Diamonece Hickson  
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch  
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.
The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:

1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
1.4(b) Foreign government information
1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

- ARMSEXP  Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)
- CIA PERS/ORG  Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
- EXPORT CONTROL  Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)
- FS ACT  Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004
- INA  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)
- IRAN  Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505

(b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Personal privacy information

(b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
   (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
   (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
   (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
   (D) disclose confidential sources
   (E) disclose investigation techniques
   (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR  Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester
From: "SMART Archive" <>
To: SMART Core <>
Subject: Sierra Leone: Chinese Delegation Discusses Support for Health Systems, and Pushes Forward on New Airport
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2016 12:28:13 GMT

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MRN: 16 FREETOWN 388
Date/DTG: Jun 14, 2016 / 141224Z JUN 16
From: AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, KORB, SHLH, SOCI, TBIO, HHS, CDC, CN, SL
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: 16 FREETOWN 212
Subject: Sierra Leone: Chinese Delegation Discusses Support for Health Systems, and Pushes Forward on New Airport

1. **(SBU) Summary:** A Chinese delegation visited Sierra Leone to discuss plans for additional infrastructure projects and to better understand the health development needs and opportunities of the country. Discussions with an interagency U.S. Government team demonstrated that China is still considering how to balance its engagement in Sierra Leone between infrastructure projects and more technical assistance, but also identified possible areas for further collaboration in a “One Health” strategy, birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination, and the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP). The visit also underscored China’s strategy to use assistance in health as leverage to move forward on other projects, as President Ernest Bai Koroma publicly stated his administration’s commitment to the construction of a new Chinese-financed international airport. End Summary.

**China CDC’s Interests and Plans for Sierra Leone**

2. **(U) During the week of June 6,** a delegation from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) visited Sierra Leone, following its stop in Liberia. The delegation was led by Suo Debo, Director of the West African Division of the Department of Foreign Assistance at MOFCOM, and Dr. Ni Da-xin, Deputy Director of the China CDC and Public Health Emergency Center.

3. **(U) Sierra Leone has emerged as a potential model for greater collaboration in health between the United States and China,** because of both countries’ experience with the Ebola outbreak and because of
our respective commitments to assisting Sierra Leone in its health recovery plans and public health systems strengthening. During a June 9 meeting with an interagency U.S. Government team, the China CDC delegation provided an overview of some of China CDC’s plans moving forward, several of which build on areas of potential collaboration identified in discussions in Beijing between China CDC and U.S. Mission health staff.

China’s Continued Focus on Infrastructure

4. China’s health support for Sierra Leone has emphasized infrastructure development, which allows China to use its own companies, staff, equipment, and supplies. China built a 200-bed hospital and a P3 laboratory in Jui (just east of Freetown). The China CDC delegation suggested that the P3 laboratory would continue to grow, in terms of the tests performed and the trainings conducted, and welcomed closer collaboration with US CDC, but was not ready to discuss details or timelines.

5. China is considering building a tropical medicine research center, across the street from the existing hospital and P3 laboratory in Jui, and/or new facilities for the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS). Neither idea is fleshed out. It is unclear whether the center would target visiting Chinese researchers or Sierra Leoneans, while the delegation indicated that the MoHS complex was requested by the Government of Sierra Leone and fell outside of China’s original plans. The delegation did not indicate a timeline for making decisions on these or any other projects. (Comment: A new MoHS complex would improve operations at the Ministry, which is currently spread across Freetown. But it is unlikely that a research center would provide meaningful inputs to Sierra Leone’s need for basic health development and systems strengthening in the next five years, especially given the significant limitations within Sierra Leone to conducting medical research and advanced trainings and the lack of current donor support for “research” initiatives. End comment.)

Opportunities for Collaboration

6. The China CDC team expressed interest in pursuing a “One Health” strategy for Sierra Leone, in which animal health surveillance, research, and capacity building would be included in its operational plans. Details and timelines were not clear, and continued dialogue between USAID and Chinese partners working on “One Health” plans at global and country levels will be needed to move this concept forward. Specific ideas suggested as next steps include the electrification of the Teko lab and establishing/strengthening a training facility on “One Health” and zoonotic diseases.

7. The delegation expressed interest in supporting birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination, but again it did not appear ready to immediately act. The immunization program within the Ministry of Health sees this as an important action item over the next 1-2 years. Because the GAVI Alliance does not support birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination globally, there is a need for additional donor support. China CDC has the experience of leading massive birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination efforts in China and this has largely been seen as successful in reducing Hepatitis and liver cancer in China.

8. The delegation was also very interested in the US CDC-operated Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) and other long-term capacity building and training projects. The Chinese are considering providing mentors for the current FETP program, but would not commit. This is an area where meaningful collaboration is possible, because training enough medical epidemiologists over the next 5-10 years will require expanding the FETP to include the intermediate (1 year) and advanced (2 year) courses, which will in turn require a larger number of competent FETP trainers and mentors.
China Maintains Pressure on Sierra Leone to Move Forward on an Airport

9. Apart from its meetings on health systems strengthening, the Chinese delegation used its visit to push Sierra Leone on other infrastructure projects. After meeting with MOFCOM representatives on June 8, President Koroma issued a statement expressing his commitment to moving forward on the construction of a new international airport at Mamamah. (Note: Sierra Leone and China reached an agreement in 2012 under which the airport will be financed through a $315 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China. In response to concerns raised by an IMF mission in January 2016, President Koroma reportedly reassured the IMF that he was focused on projects that could be completed by the end of his term in early 2018 (ref tel). End note.) The President’s statement noted his “optimism that the visit will work towards something conclusive on the Mamamah International Airport within the year.”

Comment

10. (b)(5)

11. (b)(5)

Signature: HOOVER
Drafted By: CDC:Friedman, Michael
Cleared By: USAID: (b)(6) ECON: (b)(6)
Approved By: Executive: Hoover, John F
Released By: FREETOWN: (b)(6)
Info: ATLANTA GA, CDC ROUTINE; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; ECOWAS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE

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E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, TBIO, SENV, PREL, EAID, HHS, CDC, DOD, CB, XC
Captions: SENSITIVE
Pass Line: PASS TO EAP/MLA[6]
Subject: LMI Health Pillar Technical Meeting Promotes Integration of One-Health

1. (U) Summary: The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) Health Pillar meeting, held in Phnom Penh on December 11-12, 2014, focused on developing One-Health capabilities among LMI member countries. Officials from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States with responsibilities in the areas of health, wildlife, and the environment, as well as representatives from non-government organizations (NGOs), discussed their experience with implementing One-Health programs and shared lessons learned. They also shared their experience in implementing WHO International Health Regulations and the Global Health Security Agenda. Participants discussed future plans for a tabletop exercise, the Health Pillar Plan of Action, and the next LMI Regional Working Group meeting which will take place January 29-30, 2015 in Bangkok. End Summary.

2. (U) The Lower Mekong Initiative Health Pillar held a technical meeting in Phnom Penh from December 11-12, 2014. Nearly 30 technical-level officials with responsibilities in the areas of health, wildlife, and the environment, and NGO representatives, from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States attended the meeting. The session focused on developing One-Health expertise in the region. One-Health recognizes the interconnection between human health, domestic animal health, wildlife health, and the environment. Developing this expertise enhances capabilities for the early detection of infectious disease outbreaks.
3. (U) Dr. Ly Sovann, Director of the Department of Communicable Disease Control, Ministry of Health of Cambodia, and [b](6) Team Lead, Office of International Health and Biodefense, U.S. Department of State co-chaired the meeting. Embassy Phnom Penh DCM Julie Chung provided opening remarks and invited her counterparts from the embassies of Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam to join her in the opening session to welcome the participants and demonstrate support for the LMI Health Pillar.

**One Health**

4. (U) Thailand gave a presentation on lessons learned from implementing One-Health programs. The country’s working group on One-Health includes officials working at the local, district and federal levels, representing all sectors and includes civil society representation. Thailand’s model builds trust at the working level through regular meetings. The working group is part of Thailand’s efforts to strengthen disease surveillance, and is represented in its National Emerging Infectious Disease Strategic Plan.

5. (U) The NGO FHI 360 provided a briefing on health vulnerabilities found in the rice field rat trade based on a pilot project in Cambodia and Vietnam. Rice field rats are mostly caught in Cambodia and transported to Vietnam where they are sold in various markets. Little is known about this trade, but catchers, transporters, and processors are exposed to bites, blood, saliva, and excreta from the rats. Environmental waste from the processing of the rats is often dumped into local water sources or left in the open. More research is required to fully gauge the potential of the trade to spread disease.

6. (U) Laos provided a presentation on interactions between local community members and wildlife. With 70 percent of the population in Laos living in rural areas and working on subsistence agriculture there are many opportunities for both interaction and conflict with wildlife. The risk factors in disease emergence are associated with trade in wildlife and meat, and changes in land use (especially the clearing of forests). An official from Cambodia’s Forestry Administration Department of Wildlife and Biodiversity said that dealing with wildlife diseases was a relatively new area for wildlife agencies and the movements of local wildlife were relatively unknown. While these agencies’ capacity for widespread disease surveillance was limited, they were conducting surveillance among wild birds and taking samples from confiscated trafficked wildlife. Wildlife conservationists are worried that finding diseases in wildlife will result in calls for culling the wildlife.

**International Health Regulations**

7. (U) Vietnam gave a presentation on its experience in implementing the WHO International Health Regulations. Vietnam has strengthened its national capacity for disease surveillance and response, and conducted exercises of its system with China, Cambodia, and Laos. It has scored itself weakest in the core capacity dealing with risk communication. Both Laos and Cambodia are seeking help in developing their response capabilities for radiological and chemical emergencies. Thailand pointed out that radiological and chemical events are outside the Ministry of Health’s chain of command and require extra inter-ministry coordination.
GHSA, Future Tabletop Exercise, Next Steps

8. (U) The U.S. delegation, along with Thailand and Vietnam, gave presentations on the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). The U.S. delegation provided information on the September 2014 GHSA meeting in Washington and USAID’s Emerging Pandemic Threats program which overlaps with seven GHSA strategic areas. Thailand reported on their efforts to enhance lab capacity, promote One-Health, enhance infectious control, and deal with antimicrobial drug resistance. Vietnam suggested that the GHSA work could be incorporated into regional groups such as ASEAN’s working group on infectious diseases.

9. (U) The U.S. delegation led a session on planning a future tabletop exercise in the region. Participants were interested in testing cooperation and coordination between different ministries through a zoonotic disease outbreak scenario. They were also interested in testing response capabilities to a radiological or chemical emergency. Further discussions will take place and a decision will be made at the LMI Regional Working Group meeting in Bangkok January 29-30, 2015.

10. (U) Participants also reviewed the Health Pillar Plan of Action (2011-2015). There was consensus that the core areas of preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious diseases, along with control of counterfeit and substandard medications, and implementing the International Health Regulations would remain in the next five-year plan of action. In addition to a focus on One-Health, fighting antimicrobial drug resistance will possibly be added to the new plan. The revised Plan of Action will be discussed at the next LMI Regional Working Group meeting.

11. (SBU) Comment: Dr. Ly Sovann, Cambodia’s Health Pillar Co-Chair and Director of the Department of Communicable Disease Control, is new in his role leading the Health Pillar. Knowledgeable and engaging, he can help bring out the full potential of the LMI Health Pillar in strengthening regional cooperation if given the right kind of support. This meeting revitalized cooperation at the technical working level among LMI members, and laid an important foundation for the work that will be taken up at the LMI Regional Working Group meeting in Bangkok January 29-30, 2015. End Comment.

Signature: Kerry

Drafted By: [b](6) OES_IHB
Cleared By: [b](6) OES/IHB
[1800.0 - ECON](b)(6)
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Approved By: [b](6) OES/IHB
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Date/DTG: Mar 17, 2020 / 170933Z MAR 20
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TAGS: SHLH, PREL, PGOV, ETRD, EAID, CDC, PK
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 20 ISLAMABAD 490
B) 20 ISLAMABAD 488
Pass Line: Coronavirus Global Response Coordination Unit (CGRCU)
Subject: CORONAVIRUS REPORTING4PPO: PAKISTAN IMPLEMENTS AGGRESSIVE NEW MEASURES AS CASES CONTINUE TO CLIMB

1. (SBU) KEY POINTS:

- Following a March 13 National Security Committee meeting, Pakistan announced more aggressive measures to control the spread of COVID-19, including closing all land borders, limiting international air travel to its three principal airports, and closing schools at least until April 5.
- The National Assembly suspended parliamentary proceedings and the annual Pakistan Day parade (March 23) was canceled – both actions being described in the press as historic firsts.
- The MFA announced the creation of a crisis management cell “to coordinate and monitor developments.”
- The Ministry of National Food Security and Research will formulate a food security plan, in anticipation of food shortages.
- The number of confirmed cases in Pakistan continued to increase: on March 15 it was 31, the morning of March 16 it was 52, and mid-day March 17 it rose to at least 183. Pakistan currently tests less than 100 cases per day.
- Sindh has reported the most cases, totaling 150 confirmed cases on March 17; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa closed its Torkham border and three other land crossings; and Punjab reported
its first case over the weekend.

- As efforts to track and diagnose the disease ramp up, health practitioners are concerned the efforts will shift capacity from other infectious disease priorities, such as polio, dengue fever, and tuberculosis.

2. **COMMENT:** The flurry of March 13 announcements indicates COVID-19 is being addressed as a national emergency. The claims to date by Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on Health and Population (de facto Minister of Health) Dr. Zafar Mirza that all confirmed cases are imported from other countries appears no longer to be valid, as new cases are starting to emerge from contact with those already in Pakistan. The new measures seem to acknowledge this, as efforts to keep COVID-19 out of the country are now supplemented by an increased focus on slowing the spread of the disease in the country – a welcomed development that our assistance will continue to support. **END COMMENT.**

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RAMPS UP ITS RESPONSE**

3. **Following a March 13 National Security Council meeting chaired by Prime Minister Imran Khan, Pakistan announced more aggressive measures to control the spread of COVID-19.** The measures include closing all land borders for 15 days; limiting international air travel to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore airports; closing schools at least until April 5; and banning large public gatherings, including at cinemas, marriage halls, and theaters. Even the annual Pakistan Day parade on March 23 was canceled – reportedly for the first time. Also, Pakistan’s National Assembly suspended its parliamentary session that was scheduled to continue until March 19. Media described this as a historic first for the institution. In addition, the MFA announced to the diplomatic community the creation of a crisis management cell “to coordinate and monitor developments,” though with little specifics about the cell’s role or planned activities. **The Ministry of National Food Security and Research will formulate a food security plan, in anticipation of food shortages.**

**NUMBER OF CASES CONTINUES TO RISE – AND NO LONGER LIMITED TO IMPORTS**

4. **Media in Pakistan continued to cover COVID-19 as a lead story, with coverage reflecting mixed messages from federal and provincial authorities.** Media reported that two confirmed cases were a Pakistani couple in Islamabad – the wife reportedly having tested positive after returning to Pakistan from the United States and her husband subsequently contracting the virus from her. In addition, two of the new cases in Sindh were locally transmitted. Special Advisor Mirza had tweeted as early as March 10 that there was “no need to worry...the situation is completely under control,” but numbers continued to rise. **Some social media users criticized the Balochistan provincial government for failing to contain COVID-19 at the Pakistan-Iran border.**

**SINDH BATTLES THE MOST CASES, BUT JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES EMERGE**

5. **Sindh province continued to see the highest number of cases, including a family member of the Sindh Chief Minister.** In a March 17 meeting at the National Emergency Operations Center, authorities reported 150 confirmed cases. These include 119 cases who were purportedly quarantined at the Taftan border crossing with Iran (western Balochistan) for 14 days before moving to Sukkur, Sindh. **The provincial government canceled fan attendance at Pakistan Super League cricket matches in Karachi.** The Karachi Commissioner confirmed 238 COVID-19 tests had been conducted in Sindh as of March 13. **Prior to the federal government announcement on school**
closures, the Sindh and Balochistan provincial governments both announced school closures, with Sindh’s educational facilities closed until May 30. A Consulate contact, who works closely with the Chinese, said the Sindh government extended the closure of schools on the advice of the Chinese Consul General in Karachi. The Chinese Consul General also reportedly offered financial assistance, which the Chief Minister of Sindh declined.

6. (SBP) The Sindh Home Secretary told EmbOffs that Sindh and federal governments disagree over who is responsible for detecting new cases at the ports of entry (air, land, and sea). The province believes this should be a federal government responsibility, but, in Balochistan, for example, the province has ended up having to take on this task. The Sindh government has announced plans to monitor inter-provincial borders. While speaking to media March 11, Sindh government’s spokesperson Barrister Murtaza said that the federal government needed to improve its COVID-19 monitoring system at airports and that the provincial government lacked the jurisdiction to take measures at the ports. However, on March 10, the Sindh government issued its own COVID-19 preparedness and response plan and travel advisory. Provincial authorities also established their own screening desks (separate from the one operated by federal officials) at the Karachi airport.

KP CLOSES TORKHAM BORDER

7. (SBP) Following the March 13 NSC meeting, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Cabinet implemented a 14-day closure of the Torkham border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Four travelers had recently been denied entry at the Angoor Adda border crossing in South Waziristan, after fever and other symptoms were found by the KP health screening team. In response to COVID-19, KP has initiated a 24-hour hotline for public information, designated 20 hospitals as back-up facilities, and established 24 intensive care units across the province. Additional training on infection control, disinfection, and decontamination were conducted with UNICEF assistance. Trained epidemiologists are contacting hundreds of persons with previous travel to or from Iran and health teams continue to screen at points of entry throughout the province. KP health teams also began domestic travel screening at KP’s border with Punjab province at the Dera Ismail Khan district. KP reported 15 confirmed cases, while suspected cases have tripled in the past week and doubled since March 13.

PUNJAB BRACING FOR MORE CASES, DECLARES EMERGENCY

8. (SBP) Punjab reported its first confirmed COVID-19 case over the weekend. The Punjab cabinet declared a medical emergency on March 12, according to media, with the expectation that more confirmed cases are imminent and to ensure it can allocate necessary resources to fight the disease. Prior to the March 13 announcements, life has remained largely unchanged for the average Punjabi. Schools were open, few events were canceled or postponed, and contacts continued to greet others as before with a handshake or hug. Doctors stated they have not yet experienced any shortages of necessary supplies. One business contact stated, if anything, COVID-19 has created better business conditions for the province. “For once, the Chinese are honoring contracts,” he commented.

DONORS QUESTION LOW TESTING RATES, IMPACT ON OTHER DISEASE EFFORTS

9. (SBP) At a WHO-convened donor meeting on March 11, donors and foreign diplomats discussed the low numbers of testing Pakistan has conducted, pointing out that less than 100 tests are done per day in Pakistan, despite claims that Pakistan has the capacity for up to 15,000 tests in eight
laboratories nationwide. Media reported that Pakistan's National University of Science and Technology developed a new, cheaper testing kit that has been effective in trials, with Columbia University, Wuhan Institute of Virology China, DZIF Germany, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Rawalpindi. Donors provided commitments in response to the Ministry of Health's $11 million request that included health infrastructure and equipment for COVID-19. Separately, the WHO confirmed that there was a three-day data reporting delay from the Sindh provincial government to the federal government on case numbers. Health practitioners also raised concerns that the focus on COVID-19 in Pakistan would have unintended effects for the health sector, including negative effects on existing efforts to combat dengue fever, polio, and tuberculosis.

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Sensitive but Unclassified

Signature: Jones

Drafted By: ISLAMABAD

Exec: [b](6)

ECON: [b](6)
POL-ECON: [b](6)
PD: [h](6)

POL: [b](6)

POL-ECON: [b](6) Karachi

POL-ECON: [h](6)

USAID: [b](6)

A/DCM: [h](6)

Approved By: EXEC/LEG

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E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PREL, SHLH, TBIO, KHIV, KNCV, CDC, CN, AO
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 20 LUANDA 418  
B) 20 LUANDA 444

1. **Summary:** On July 16, the Angolan government and China Shenzhen BGI signed an agreement for BGI to construct five laboratories to detect COVID-19. The Chinese-constructed labs will likely only be compatible with Chinese supplies and equipment. The adherence to Chinese standards will complicate staffing, technical assistance, and the operability of the laboratories. The agreement follows high-profile donations and purchases of biosafety equipment and materials from other Chinese companies. Post notes that with only 304 tests per million people, Angola lags behind most of the world in testing and has twice requested U.S. assistance in procuring additional test kits (ref A and B). End Summary.

**China Delivering to Meet Angolan Health Needs**

2. **Summary:** On July 16, the Angolan government (GRA) and China Shenzhen BGI (formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute) group representatives signed a contract to boost Angola's COVID-19 detection capacity. According to media reports, BGI will construct five Huoyan, or Fire Eye, laboratories to detect COVID-19 across the country, including in Uíge, Lunda Norte, and Huambo provinces, with a total daily capacity of 6,000 samples. Angola's Foreign Minister Tete Antonio said the agreement would provide Angola with virus detection capacity and give Angolans the opportunity to learn advanced technology. Silvia Lutucuta, Angola's Health Minister, thanked China for the assistance, emphasizing Angola and other countries have
benefited from China’s experience in fighting COVID-19. Ministry of Health officials put the cost for the laboratories at $6 million, the funding for which has been included in the revised 2020 Angolan national budget, set to be approved by the end of July.

3. (SBU) BGI group co-founder and chairman Yang Huanming underscored that BGI’s Huoyan laboratory has played an important role in combating epidemics in China and around the world and has proven to be very effective. “More than 20 countries and regions have started or are in negotiations with more than 70 Huoyan laboratories, with the total daily test volume expected to exceed 300,000 tests. Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Serbia, the Philippines, Gabon and other countries have put [laboratories] in place,” he said. Yang added Huoyan laboratories were equipped with automated equipment for the extraction of high-performance nucleic acids to improve the efficiency of large-scale detection.

Historic Challenges with Chinese Health Facilities

4. (SBU) Molecular biology requires a highly trained and technically sound cadre of laboratory technicians to produce reliable test results. In the best circumstances, it is difficult to find well educated laboratory technicians outside of Luanda or to convince highly technical staff to move out of Luanda to more rural provinces. Chinese specific laboratory platforms will limit the technical assistance ability of the GRA’s traditional laboratory technical partners (CDC and WHO) which will also impact GRA’s ability to develop human resources to staff the new laboratories. Several health facilities in Angola have been built by Chinese companies; some required post-construction adaptations, and thereby incurred unbudgeted costs to be made usable. Other facilities were presented to GRA full of Chinese equipment with instructions for use only in Mandarin and signs and labels in the facilities also in Mandarin, making the equipment practically unusable and the facilities impossible to navigate.

5. (SBU) The agreement between the GRA and BGI followed high-profile donations and sales of biosafety material from China. On July 10, the Chinese company Yutong Bus donated 100,000 masks. In a public ceremony to mark receipt of the donation, Angolan Minister of Transportation Ricardo d’Abreu praised China’s readiness to assist Angola’s COVID-19 response, adding that Angola could always rely on China. In May, Angola purchased 380 tons of biosafety material from China to respond to COVID-19. Minister of Health Silvia Lutucuta noted that the purchase was one of, if not the largest, procurements in Angolan history. The material included ventilators, surgical masks, test kits, and a wide array of equipment and biosafety materials.

Reinforcing Angolan Dependency on Chinese Supply Chains?

6. (SBU) Comment: Experience indicates that the equipment for these laboratories likely will not be compatible with supplies or other equipment from vendors outside China. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Angolan National Reference Laboratory received equipment from China that only operates with Chinese consumables (from specimen collection swabs and viral transport media to testing reagents). If that is true of the BGI Group laboratories, the GRA will be completely dependent on the Chinese life sciences and medical equipment industry to support a large portion of the COVID-19 laboratory capacity in Angola. Post has similar
concerns about reliance on a single source for equipment maintenance and troubleshooting both of which are critical for sustainability of the new laboratories. USG, and any other non-Chinese, technical assistance will be limited at best in the Chinese product specific laboratories. However, China is stepping up to meet an Angolan need. The GRA has twice specifically reached out to the U.S. to help it purchase COVID-19 testing reagents (ref A and B). End Comment.

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<tr>
<td>Drafted By:</td>
<td>LUANDA:HV6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleared By:</td>
<td>HHS/CDC/GHT: (b)(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approved By:</td>
<td>EXEC:Fite, Nina M</td>
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<td>Released By:</td>
<td>LUANDA:HV6</td>
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<td>Info:</td>
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**SBU**

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1. **SUMMARY AND COMMENT:** The PRC National Health Commission (NHC) announced March 31 that it will begin reporting identified asymptomatic COVID-19 cases starting April 1. While the new reporting requirement is a positive step, the omission of retrospective asymptomatic case information limits understanding of the pandemic’s scope for global and U.S. health risk assessment. Since the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, PRC health authorities have publicly dismissed the risks of transmission from asymptomatic cases and downplayed fears that “silent carriers” could spread COVID-19. As some of the areas hardest hit by the epidemic reopen, top PRC officials appeared to finally acknowledge this risk. Statements by Premier Li Keqiang and China’s COVID-19 leading group indicate increasing concern by PRC leadership that infections by asymptomatic cases could lead to another outbreak. Publicly reported data are lacking on the number of asymptomatic cases in China confirmed through contact tracing and laboratory testing, as the PRC’s official guidelines required that reported cases of COVID-19 have signs and symptoms of clinical illness. At the same time, China’s NHC has rebuffed repeated requests by HHS and the U.S. CDC for information on testing, asymptomatic cases, and other epidemiological data that could assist with addressing knowledge gaps in COVID-19 epidemiology. While the WHO technical team that visited China in February concluded that the risk of transmission from asymptomatic individuals was “relatively
rare,” a growing body of newly available scientific studies, epidemiological data from other affected countries, and news media reports indicate that asymptomatic cases were likely significantly undercounted during the initial phase of the outbreak and pose a greater risk than originally thought. The forthcoming serological studies announced by the NHC March 31 will potentially help provide more accurate risk assessments of asymptomatic cases. End Summary and Comment.

PRC Reports Number of Asymptomatic Cases for the First Time

2. (U) China’s NHC on April 1 officially reported the number of current and new asymptomatic cases in Mainland China for the first time (link). According to the NHC, public health authorities reported 130 new asymptomatic infections on March 31 as of midnight, with a total of 1,367 asymptomatic patients currently in quarantine under medical observation. These asymptomatic cases include individuals who do not show any signs of illness but who have a positive laboratory test result for SARS-CoV-2. The NHC report on April 1 did not provide any retrospective information about the total number of asymptomatic infections to date, or the total number of people who have been tested.

3. (U) NHC officials stressed the need for local public health authorities to strengthen the reporting of asymptomatic infections. Consistent with the rules and guidelines for reporting diagnosed cases of symptomatic COVID-19 patients, Director Chang Jile of NHC’s Disease Control Bureau said on March 31 that local authorities would be required to upload reports of positive asymptomatic cases to the national online reporting system within two hours, and that county-level CDCs would be expected to confirm cases in order to identify close contacts and the possible source of transmission within 24 hours. Asymptomatic cases and any close contacts are required to undergo 14 days of medical quarantine at a government-designated facility. Chang also announced on March 31 that the NHC would conduct a representative serological survey of populations in major outbreak-affected areas to identify the larger population of affected individuals, including symptomatic and asymptomatic persons (link). [Note: The results of the serological survey will be especially critical for helping us understand the burden of disease, including the true estimated burden of asymptomatic cases. As of now, it seems as if asymptomatic cases are being identified through testing of contacts of confirmed cases, which means that these numbers would not represent the true burden of asymptomatic individuals. End Note.]

PRC Leadership Increasingly Uneasy

4. (SBU) Commentary by senior CCP leaders indicated the party is increasingly concerned about a second wave of infections, particularly the risks posed by asymptomatic cases of COVID-19. Premier Li Keqiang called on cadres to actively and accurately report cases of COVID-19 during a March 23 leading small group meeting, one of the first times a senior leader has publicly exhorted cadres to accurately report data during the epidemic. Li also called for transparent reporting at a March 26 meeting, emphasizing the importance of testing and reporting on cases of asymptomatic persons, which posed a particular risk as China began to reopen. Li reiterated these points on March 30, when he again underscored to cadres that China must strengthen its focus on preventing COVID-19 transmission, particularly by asymptomatic
patients.

Shifting Diagnosis Procedures Left Out Asymptomatic Cases

5. (U) Since January, China’s National Health Commission (NHC) has revised its diagnosis and reporting guidelines for COVID-19 several times but, until now, had not included lab-confirmed but asymptomatic persons as reportable cases. Until April 1, NHC reported only confirmed and suspected COVID-19 cases. Under NHC guidelines, patients reported as “suspected” and “confirmed” cases of COVID-19 must show some sign of illness, such as fever, cough, or radiographic pneumonia, usually in combination with evidence of possible exposure, whether through contact with an infected person or travel to an affected area. Per the current guidelines, in addition to the epidemiological and clinical criteria for suspected cases, confirmed cases must also be diagnosed through a respiratory or blood specimen test. [Note: On February 12, NHC had re-defined “confirmed” cases to also include “clinically diagnosed” patients in Hubei Province who exhibited pneumonia-like symptoms on chest scans in the absence of a positive lab test. NHC reversed this decision a week later. End note.] Patients who later develop symptoms are shifted to the category of “confirmed” cases. PRC officials have maintained that the rationale for excluding asymptomatic cases from the case definitions was to ensure resources were directed to patients showing illness. [Note: Directing tests towards ill patients is a sensible approach for case finding especially when laboratory resources are limited. A serosurvey, which is often conducted later in an outbreak, is the best approach for identifying the true burden of asymptomatic cases. End Note] In practice, however, the exclusion of asymptomatic cases from the official reports for COVID-19 in China has resulted in a lack of public information on the presence of such cases, as provincial health authorities had not been required to include such cases in their daily reports until now.

6. (SBU) PRC public health experts partially attributed the omission of asymptomatic cases during the initial phase of the COVID-19 outbreak to limited Chinese testing capabilities, as opposed to a national effort to suppress case numbers. Chinese hospitals were initially unfamiliar with reporting procedures and the healthcare system was overwhelmed with the thousands of cases, explained NHC Director-General of Healthcare Reform Liang Wannian. Other PRC public health officials have said Chinese healthcare workers were grossly under-resourced and lacked proper testing kits, forcing them to concentrate solely on symptomatic cases for testing and official reporting. An executive at a government-approved testing kit company told ESTHOff that initial PRC reporting on COVID-19 case numbers was initially questionable, but that the mass mobilization of medical supplies, testing kits, and hospital personnel had since equipped Chinese medical facilities with the resources to detect both symptomatic and asymptomatic cases.

Underestimating the Risk

7. (SBU) Assessments by PRC health authorities and the WHO during the height of the COVID-19 epidemic in China in February reinforced the view that asymptomatic cases did not constitute a significant risk. The first large-scale epidemiological study by China’s CDC of COVID-19 cases in China, published February 17 in China CDC Weekly and the Chinese Journal of Epidemiology, reported that asymptomatic cases represented only 1.2 percent of the
72,314 COVID-19 cases documented between December 31 and February 11 (link). The study sample included 44,672 lab-confirmed cases, 10,567 clinically diagnosed cases, 889 asymptomatic cases, and 16,186 suspected cases. [Note: The asymptomatic cases included in the studies were reportedly diagnosed based on nucleic acid tests. End note.] Shortly thereafter, the WHO noted in the summary report of the technical mission to China published February 28 that, "The proportion of truly asymptomatic infections is unclear but appears to be relatively rare and does not appear to be a major driver of transmission" (link). The WHO report lacked a critical assessment of the data provided to the WHO team by the PRC, including on asymptomatic cases. The WHO report also did not include a presentation or evaluation of laboratory testing data, despite WHO guidelines and requests for information about the total number of lab tests conducted and the number of laboratory tests positive for COVID-19 (Ref A).

8. (SBU) As the domestic epidemic situation in China improved, PRC public health officials continued to downplay the risk of transmission from asymptomatic cases and focused their attention on reducing foreign imported cases. During a March 24 press conference, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) Chief Epidemiologist Wu Zunyou flatly rejected a possible resurgence of COVID-19, elaborating that PRC contact tracing already identified all asymptomatic patients. [Note: Contact tracing is the process of identifying people that may have entered direct contact with an infected individual and isolating them in quarantine for testing regardless of whether they manifest symptoms. End Note]. In a March 28 press briefing, NHC spokesperson Mi Feng declared the number of confirmed cases still being treated dropped to less than 3,000, and that China successfully prevented further spread of COVID-19 domestically. Mi warned, however, that China would remain cautious toward foreign imported cases. [Note: While the exclusion of asymptomatic cases hindered our ability to conduct risk assessment on the publicly available data, the official PRC case counts showing an overall declining trend of COVID-19 cases during late February and March is consistent with other indicators, including reduced hospital burden and relaxation of closed management measures. Post has assessed the overall improvement in the epidemic situation in China in its recent reporting (Refs B-D). End note.]

9. (SBU) Recent studies and case data from other countries have revealed that asymptomatic infections may represent a much higher percentage of total infections than originally thought. PRC officials did not include asymptomatic cases in publicly available reports as they did not meet the case definition designated for confirmed cases. Citing unpublished official documents, however, South China Morning Post reported on March 23 that the PRC had identified more than 40,000 asymptomatic cases in China. Researchers at Huazhong University of Science and Technology estimated that asymptomatic cases could represent 30-60 percent of all COVID-19 infections in China.

Risks of a Resurgence

10. (SBU) The lack of public information on asymptomatic cases has exacerbated the difficulty of detecting and preventing the transmission of COVID-19, especially when contact tracing failed. On March 28, NHC reported a new case in Henan province where an asymptomatic case of COVID-19 transmitted the virus to a friend who unknowingly transmitted the disease to two
people. Public health authorities eventually tracked the asymptomatic cases down, but the three individuals already had close contact with 68 other individuals before undergoing quarantine for symptom monitoring. Public health experts have worried that these types of cases would become more frequent as restrictions in Hubei province and the rest of the country eased, creating higher risks for a resurgence of COVID-19 to a susceptible population.
From: SMART Archive
Sent: Tue, 14 Jun 2016 12:28:13 GMT
To: SMART Core
Subject: Sierra Leone: Chinese Delegation Discusses Support for Health Systems, and Pushes Forward on New Airport

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MRN: 16 FREETOWN 388
Date/DTG: Jun 14, 2016 / 141224Z JUN 16
From: AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, KORB, SHLH, SOCI, TBIO, HHS, CDC, GN, SL
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: 16 FREETOWN 212
Subject: Sierra Leone: Chinese Delegation Discusses Support for Health Systems, and Pushes Forward on New Airport

1. (SBU) Summary: A Chinese delegation visited Sierra Leone to discuss plans for additional infrastructure projects and to better understand the health development needs and opportunities of the country. Discussions with an interagency U.S. Government team demonstrated that China is still considering how to balance its engagement in Sierra Leone between infrastructure projects and more technical assistance, but also identified possible areas for further collaboration in a “One Health” strategy, birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination, and the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP). The visit also underscored China’s strategy to use assistance in health as leverage to move forward on other projects, as President Ernest Bai Koroma publicly stated his administration’s commitment to the construction of a new Chinese-financed international airport. End Summary.

China CDC’s Interests and Plans for Sierra Leone

2. (U) During the week of June 6, a delegation from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) visited Sierra Leone, following its stop in Liberia. The delegation was led by Suo Debo, Director of the West African Division of the Department of Foreign Assistance at MOFCOM, and Dr. Ni Da-xin, Deputy Director of the China CDC and Public Health Emergency Center.

3. (U) Sierra Leone has emerged as a potential model for greater collaboration in health between the United States and China, because of both countries’ experience with the Ebola outbreak and because of our respective commitments to assisting Sierra Leone in its health recovery plans and public health
systems strengthening. During a June 9 meeting with an interagency U.S. Government team, the China CDC delegation provided an overview of some of China CDC’s plans moving forward, several of which build on areas of potential collaboration identified in discussions in Beijing between China CDC and U.S. Mission health staff.

**China’s Continued Focus on Infrastructure**

4. China’s health support for Sierra Leone has emphasized infrastructure development, which allows China to use its own companies, staff, equipment, and supplies. China built a 200-bed hospital and a P3 laboratory in Jul (just east of Freetown). The China CDC delegation suggested that the P3 laboratory would continue to grow, in terms of the tests performed and the trainings conducted, and welcomed closer collaboration with US CDC, but was not ready to discuss details or timelines.

5. China is considering building a tropical medicine research center, across the street from the existing hospital and P3 laboratory in Jul, and/or new facilities for the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS). Neither idea is fleshed out. It is unclear whether the center would target visiting Chinese researchers or Sierra Leoneans, while the delegation indicated that the MoHS complex was requested by the Government of Sierra Leone and fell outside of China’s original plans. The delegation did not indicate a timeline for making decisions on these or any other projects. (Comment: A new MoHS complex would improve operations at the Ministry, which is currently spread across Freetown. But it is unlikely that a research center would provide meaningful inputs to Sierra Leone’s need for basic health development and systems strengthening in the next five years, especially given the significant limitations within Sierra Leone to conducting medical research and advanced trainings and the lack of current donor support for “research” initiatives. End comment.)

**Opportunities for Collaboration**

6. The China CDC team expressed interest in pursuing a “One Health” strategy for Sierra Leone, in which animal health surveillance, research, and capacity building would be included in its operational plans. Details and timelines were not clear, and continued dialogue between USAID and Chinese partners working on “One Health” plans at global and country levels will be needed to move this concept forward. Specific ideas suggested as next steps include the electrification of the Teko lab and establishing/strengthening a training facility on “One Health” and zoonotic diseases.

7. The delegation expressed interest in supporting birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination, but again it did not appear ready to immediately act. The immunization program within the Ministry of Health sees this as an important action item over the next 1-2 years. Because the GAVI Alliance does not support birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination globally, there is a need for additional donor support. China CDC has the experience of leading massive birth dose Hepatitis B vaccination efforts in China and this has largely been seen as successful in reducing Hepatitis and liver cancer in China.

8. The delegation was also very interested in the US CDC-operated Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) and other long-term capacity building and training projects. The Chinese are considering providing mentors for the current FETP program, but would not commit. This is an area where meaningful collaboration is possible, because training enough medical epidemiologists over the next 5-10 years will require expanding the FETP to include the intermediate (1 year) and advanced (2 year) courses, which will in turn require a larger number of competent FETP trainers and mentors.
China Maintains Pressure on Sierra Leone to Move Forward on an Airport

9. (SBU) Apart from its meetings on health systems strengthening, the Chinese delegation used its visit to push Sierra Leone on other infrastructure projects. After meeting with MOFCOM representatives on June 8, President Koroma issued a statement expressing his commitment to moving forward on the construction of a new international airport at Mamamah. (Note: Sierra Leone and China reached an agreement in 2012 under which the airport will be financed through a $315 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China. In response to concerns raised by an IMF mission in January 2016, President Koroma reportedly assured the IMF that he was focused on projects that could be completed by the end of his term in early 2018 (ref tel). End note.) The President’s statement noted his “optimism that the visit will work towards something conclusive on the Mamamah International Airport within the year.”

Comment

(b)(5)

| Signature: | HOOVER |
| Drafted By: | CDC:Friedman, Michael |
| Cleared By: | USAID: (b)(6) |
| Approved By: | Executive: (b)(6) |
| Released By: | FREETOWN: (b)(6) |
| Info: | ATLANTA GA, CDC ROUTINE; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; ECOWAS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE |
| Dissemination Rule: | Archive Copy |

UNCLASSIFIED
Sir,

I have attached the Supply Chain slide that [b](6) just forwarded, and I wanted to flag this article below in case you had not seen it already.

Thank you,

[b](6)

Subject: Wash Post Op: State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

By Josh Rogn

April 14, 2020

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China’s first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international biosecurity safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy’s counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab’s work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

“During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory,” states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy’s environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department
declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials’ visit, Shi’s team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

“Most importantly,” the cable states, “the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention.”

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi’s team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as “gain-of-function” experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn’t come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

“The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab’s research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected,” he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That’s important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

“The cable was a warning shot,” one U.S. official said. “They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on.”

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated
whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

“The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there’s almost nothing on the other side,” the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government’s original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn’t sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for “rectification.” Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It’s crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don’t know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

“I don’t think it’s a conspiracy theory. I think it’s a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered,” he said. “To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future.”
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 1:29 PM
To: (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6)  
Subject: WHTF Paper for today at 2:30 PM

Sir,

Attached please find paper for today’s WHTF meeting.  

Attachments:

0 – WHTF Agenda
1 – Background and points for the meeting

Best,

(b)(6)

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I will talk to the exec, but this will likely get downgraded to the DCM.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: [b](6) (Beijing) [b](6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 4:50 AM
To: [b](6) (Beijing)
Cc: [b](6) (Beijing)
Subject: Fw: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

We have some adjustments for briefing with Ambassador today. Can your staff work with us to help amend the BCL and work out embassy access requirements? I am on my way back to Beijing and should land at 09:30. Slight chance that I might be delayed for 11:00 prebrief with Ambassador. If so could you lead?

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org>
Sent: Monday, September 4, 2017 22:37
To: [h](6) (Beijing) [h](6) (Beijing) [b](6) (GH/HIDN) [b](6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
Cc: [h](6) (Beijing) [h](6) (Beijing) [b](6) (GH/HIDN) [b](6)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi [b](6)

George Gao will have to attend another meeting with the Ministry of Health at 3pm, so unfortunately cannot join our meeting at the Embassy. However, he has recommended Dr. Yongzhen Zhang to represent China CDC to attend the meeting to pass his message. Also, we had a meeting with the Beijing Genomics Institute today, and [b](6) has invited their Vice President, Dr. Weijun Chen, to join our meeting and the briefing for Ambassador. Other attendees, Peter, Brooke, Guangjian, and me are keeping the same schedule as before.

Below please find the ID information about these two scientists:

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<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Chinese ID</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongzhen</td>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td><a href="6">b</a></td>
<td>Director, Department of Zoonoses, National Institute for Communicable Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weijun</td>
<td>Chen</td>
<td><a href="6">b</a></td>
<td>Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sorry for this last-minute change. I will also try to get their bios to send to you tomorrow morning. Please let me know if this can be approved. Thank you.

Best Regards,
Hongying

On Aug 29, 2017, at 9:53 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Hongying,

Well-noted. It is OK to add one more person. But we want to clarify the participants for the following marked in yellow:

1. **A. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-13:15**: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. **B. Health Working Group Meeting 13:30-14:50**: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it’s an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. **C. Briefing for Ambassador 15:00-16:00**: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

4. **D. Early Dinner Reception at Development Counselor’s Residence 16:30-18:00**: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

Therefore, there are some logistic details to consider. For example and Peter may arrive at the south gate of US Embassy at 11:45am; while the 6 of you can arrive at 13:15. When the 4 of them go to the Ambassador’s office, the rest of you can still stay at the conference room (Mammoth Cave Conference Room) during 15:00-16:00? When their meeting with the Ambassador finishes, all of you can walk to (h)(6) residence which is not far from the Embassy compound. Please see the attached location map for (h)(6) residence.

And for entering US Embassy, I think you know all the details since you have been here before. Pls. tell them to bring an original pictured ID/passport and avoid too many electronic items. If you have a PPT presentation for the 13:30 health working group meeting, please let me know so that I can arrange in advance.

And for the meeting with the Ambassador, we have the bios for (b)(6) Peter, and George Gao, but we do not have that for Prof. SHI Zhenglin, can you provide? We need to pass on to the Ambassador’s office.
Thank you very much!

(6)
USAID/Beijing
US Embassy Beijing
Phone: (6) Fax: (6)
E-mail (6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Hongying Li (6)@ecohealthalliance.org
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1:26 AM
To: (6) (Beijing)
Cc: (6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (6)

Plan changes everyday... We are adding another person to the meeting, Dr. Guangjian Zhu, China Field Coordinator of EcoHealth Alliance.

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<td>China Programs Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
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Contact Cell: (6) (Hongying Li)

Thanks,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 4:58 PM, Hongying Li (6)@ecohealthalliance.org> wrote:

Hi (6)

Apologies for these repeated emails. But just arrived in Beijing and found my phone number doesn’t work any more.

So please use my new phone number: (6) as the contact cell, or you can find me anytime on (6) Thank you.
Best,

Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 3:40 PM, Hongying Li[1@ecohealthalliance.org] wrote:

Hi[2][b](6)

Just got confirmation from George to attend the meetings on Sept. 5. So the updated information is as the follows:

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Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)

Just in case, the email address of George and his assistant are: George Gao: (b)(6) and his assistant Ms. Yu Bai: (b)(6)

Thank you.

Best,

Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 11:47 AM, Hongying Li[2(b)@ecohealthalliance.org] wrote:

Hi[2][b](6)

Of course! Peter’s email is (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org, please feel free to send the invites.

And thank you very much for sharing the meeting agenda, all sounds great, and I have forwarded it to George Gao and his assistant.

Per your previous request, below is the ID information of our attendees (except for George):

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Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)
Since I will be with them, so please feel free to contact me if there is any questions or issues need to be addressed.

(b)(6) will arrive in Beijing on Saturday at 5:20pm, his flight no. is CX5992, and he said he can take a taxi from the airport to the hotel, so no need to arrange pickup transportation. During other time in Beijing, I will take care of them.

Let me know if any further information I can provide, hope George will confirm his attendance soon. Thank you very much!

Best,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 10:38 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Can you kindly provide Peter’s email address so that I can send the meeting invites to this calendar? I will also copy you. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2017 9:19 AM
To: Hongying Li
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6) GH/HIDN (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi, Hongying,

We know you are planning the trip so we’d like to share with you the below activities we’ve proposed to (b)(6) If you have any questions, just let us know.

On Sept. 5:

1. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-1:00: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. Health Working Group Meeting 1:30-3:00: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it’s an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.
3. Briefing for Ambassador 3:00-4:00: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

4. Reception at Development Counselor’s apartment: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

We are very glad that George Gao and some other scientists would join the Embassy. Please share with them the agenda as well. Kindly let us know which activities George and Chinese scientists will attend and we’ll make preparations accordingly.

Thanks and best,

USAID Beijing

Hi

Very nice to hear from you!

Dennis will stay at the Kerry Hotel Beijing, close to the Embassy, and I will get his flight info. and send to you if he needs the pick up. (I will also be in Beijing with them, so it should be fine)

There may be 1-2 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences attending the meeting at the US Embassy, so will confirm with to finalize the attendee list and send you the passport information by this Friday.

Will write back to you soon. Thank you!

Best,
Hongying

On Aug 23, 2017, at 4:41 AM, (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Since Peter will come together with (h)(6) for meetings inside the US Embassy Beijing on September 5th afternoon, can you pass on the passport information for Peter? As usual, I need:
- his full name as same as on the passport
- contact cell

Which hotel have you booked (h)(6)? And I think we do not need to arrange airport pick-up or sending for him since Eco-Health Alliance will cover?

Thank you very much!

(b)(6)

USAID/Beijing
US Embassy Beijing
Phone: (h)(6) Fax: (h)(6)
E-mail: (h)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2017 3:07 AM
To: (h)(6) (GH/HIDN)
Cc: (h)(6) (Beijing); (h)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for all the information for (b)(6)!

On the point of scheduling, what information would be helpful to know? Dennis and Peter will likely arrive in Beijing on Sunday, 9/3. The hope is that they will spend Monday having various other GVP-related meetings, including meeting with George Gao (Chinese Academy of Sciences), who is one of the GVP Steering Committee members. They have reserved 9/5 for Embassy meetings and are currently available for dinner that evening. The plan is for them to travel to Hong Kong the morning of 9/6.

Much like with the Beijing GVP meeting, Hongying Li (EcoHealth Alliance) is handling the coordination of the visit (ecohealthalliance.org) and I would be happy to connect the two of you if that would be helpful.

Additionally, as you get a sense of whether or not the 5th will work for the Embassy meetings and if a dinner will work, please let us know and we can work with Hongying to ensure that the rest of the schedule is built around that.
Thanks again,

Emerging Threats Division
Office of Infectious Disease
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Desk: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 10:17 AM, (b)(6) wrote:
(b)(6) the letter for Jennifer would be perfect

Thanks

U.S. Agency for International Development
Office: (b)(6)
Mobile: (b)(6)

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 9:56 PM, (b)(6) wrote:
> Hi (b)(6)
> We would very much like to provide assistance for your Chinese visa application. But after viewing your draft letter that requires (b)(6) to endorse, I have questions on doing so.
> Usually, if you travel on your personal passport, you are not doing business trips, but for tourism purpose, right? If so, it seems inappropriate for (b)(6) to send you the following invitation letter. Instead, he can send you a letter for tourism purpose; or you do not need any letter for a tourism visa to China?
> Do you have a chance to renew your diplomatic passport? Is it OK to send an eCC by quoting your personal passport number? Anyway, we need an eCC for building access.
> Even when you travel by your diplomatic passport, our Visa-Let would only mention that you will travel to China for doing consultations with US Embassy Beijing. We usually do not
mention details since we are afraid that the Chinese Embassy may require more information or a Chinese receiving institution to issue a formal invitation letter that we have nowhere to ask for. Please see a sample as attached.

> Please check with someone in DC who handles your visa application.

> One more question is on your Agenda to Beijing. [b](6) plans to arrange an inter-agency meeting and a possible meeting with the Ambassador on the afternoon of Sept. 5, followed by a dinner hosted by [b](6). What about your other meetings in Beijing and how long will you stay in Beijing? Thank you very much!

> [b](6) USAID/Beijing

> This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

> From: [b](6) (Beijing)
> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 7:38 AM
> To: [b](6) (GH/HIDN); [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
> Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

> Sure. We understand the problem. We will get the letter back to you today.

> From: [b](6) mailto:[b](6)
> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 1:35 AM
> To: [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
> Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

> [b](6) greetings from Washington. Quick request. In processing my visa for China I need a letter from you (because i am using my personal passport; my diplomatic passport has less than 6 months remaining but still has some very valuable and active visas for other countries). I have drafted a letter below. Could you modify as you wish and send it back on official letter head? Thanks

> [b](6)

> [b](6)

> Bureau for Global Health
> U.S. Agency for International Development
> Dear (b)(6)
>
> I would like to invite you to come to Beijing the week of September 3 in order to follow up the discussions held earlier this year between USAID and the China Centers for Disease Control, the Beijing Genomics Institute and the China Academy of Science on the Global Virome Project (GVP). The government of China has continued to express their interest in an expanded partnership on GVP; your visit would be an important opportunity to further develop the details of such a partnership.
>
> Sincerely,

(b)(6)
USAID (b)(6)
U.S. Embassy

> Official
> UNCLASSIFIED
> <winmail.dat>

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Hongying Li, MPH 李泓萤
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)
(b)(6) (China mobile)
Hongying Li (Skype)
WeChat

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.
Hongying Li, MPH 李泓萱
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)
(b)(6) (China mobile)

Hongying Li (Skype)
(b)(6) (WeChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge scientific research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science, we develop solutions that prevent pandemics and promote conservation.

<081218 NEC Map.ppt><USAID Development Counselor House.ppt>
That is why they got (b)(6). Also did you see his CV?
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

That's nuts! How does a “private” company take the place of China CDC at a meeting?

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

You'll like this.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Hi (b)(6) EXEC,

Please see the Bio for Dr. Weijun CHEN. Sorry for not being able to download he updates into Robo Tasker. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
From: [b](6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 9:26 AM
To: [b](6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Yes, please send it.

Thank you,

[b](6)
U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel: [b](6)
Cell: [b](6)

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: [b](6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 9:06 AM
To: [b](6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: [b](6) (Beijing); [h](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (Beijing)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi [b](6) and EXEC,

Thanks for your quick reply and re-arranging. I will submit the access request for the replacement, Dr. Weijun Chen ASAP. Do you still need his Bio?

Thanks,
[b](6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: [b](6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 8:53 AM
To: [b](6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: [h](6) (Beijing); [h](6) (Beijing); [h](6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

[b](6)

Political Minister Counselor [b](6) will now take the meeting. He is serving as A/DCM today.
Thank you,

U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel:  
Cell:  

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 8:23 AM
To: Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
Importance: High

Hi EXEC,

We received the following emails from our visitors. We have planned a 3pm meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon. However, Dr. George Gao, Director-General of China CDC, will not be able to come because NHFPC-National Health and Family Planning Commission requested him to go for their meeting. So they recommended Dr. Weijun Chen, Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute, to join the meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon.

Not sure if this would be appropriate for switching a major visitor at this time?

(b)(6) will be traveling back from Hangzhou to Beijing this morning.

Thank you very much!

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing (b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Hongying Li (b)(6) ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Monday, September 04, 2017 11:30 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (GH/HIDN)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)
Please only add Dr. Weijun Chen, because Dr. Zhang just texted me about a family emergency that he has to be in the hospital tomorrow afternoon.

Please Wechat anytime if any question or slides downloading issues.

Thanks,
Hongying
On Sep 4, 2017, at 10:36 PM, Hongying Li@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi

George Gao will have to attend another meeting with the Ministry of Health at 3pm, so unfortunately cannot join our meeting at the Embassy. However, he has recommended Dr. Yongzhen Zhang to represent China CDC to attend the meeting to pass his message. Also, we had a meeting with the Beijing Genomics Institute today, and has invited their Vice President, Dr. Weijun Chen, to join our meeting and the briefing for Ambassador. Other attendees, Peter, Brooke, Guangjian, and me are keeping the same schedule as before.

Below please find the ID information about these two scientists:

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<tr>
<td>Yongzhen</td>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, Department of Zoonoses, National Institute for Communicable Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weijun</td>
<td>Chen</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Sorry for this last-minute change. I will also try to get their bios to send to you tomorrow morning. Please let me know if this can be approved. Thank you

Best Regards,
Hongying
On Aug 29, 2017, at 9:53 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Hongying,

Well-noted. It is OK to add one more person. But we want to clarify the participants for the following marked in yellow:

1. A Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-13:15: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. B Health Working Group Meeting 13:30-14:50: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it's an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.
3. **C.Briefing for Ambassador 15:00-16:00:** to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

5. **D.Early Dinner Reception at Development Counselor’s Residence 16:30-18:00:** with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

Therefore, there are some logistic details to consider. For example, [John] and Peter may arrive at the south gate of US Embassy at 11:45am; while the 6 of you can arrive at 13:15. When the 4 of them go to the Ambassador’s office, the rest of you can still stay at the conference room (Mammoth Cave Conference Room) during 15:00-16:00? When their meeting with the Ambassador finishes, all of you can walk to [Helen’s] residence which is not far from the Embassy compound. Please see the attached location map for [Helen’s] residence.

And for entering US Embassy, I think you know all the details since you have been here before. PIs, tell them to bring an original pictured ID/passport and avoid too many electronic items. If you have a PPT presentation for the 13:30 health working group meeting, please let me know so that I can arrange in advance.

And for the meeting with the Ambassador, we have the **bios for [b](6).** Peter, and George Gao, but we do not have that for Prof. SHI Zhenglin, can you provide? We need to pass on to the Ambassador’s office.

Thank you very much!

---

**USAID/Beijing**

**US Embassy Beijing**

**Phone:** [b](6)

**E-mail:** [b](6)


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This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

**From:** Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org

**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1:26 AM

**To:** [b] (Beijing)

**Cc:** [b] (Beijing)

**Subject:** Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

**Hi [b]**
Plan changes everyday... We are adding another person to the meeting. Dr. Guangjian Zhu, China Field Coordinator of EcoHealth Alliance.

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Thanks,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 4:58 PM, Hongying Li<mailto:b(b)@ecohealthalliance.org> wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Apologies for these repeated emails. But just arrived in Beijing and found my phone number doesn’t work any more.

So please use my new phone number: (b)(6) as the contact cell, or you can find me anytime on Wechat (h)(6). Thank you.

Best,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 3:40 PM, Hongying Li<mailto:b(b)@ecohealthalliance.org> wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Just got confirmation from George to attend the meetings on Sept. 5. So the updated information is as the follows:

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Just in case, the email address of George and his assistant are: George Gao<mailto:b(b)@6> and his assistant Ms. Yu Bai: (b)(6)
Thank you.

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 28, 2017, at 11:47 AM, Hongying Li@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi Ellen,

Of course! Peter’s email is @ecohealthalliance.org, please feel free to send the invites.

And thank you very much for sharing the meeting agenda, all sounds great, and I have forwarded it to George Gao and his assistant.

Per your previous request, below is the ID information of our attendees (except for George):

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Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)

Since I will be with them, so please feel free to contact me if there is any questions or issues need to be addressed.

(b)(6) will arrive in Beijing on Saturday at 5:20pm, his flight no. is CX5992, and he said he can take a taxi from the airport to the hotel, so no need to arrange pickup transportation. During other time in Beijing, I will take care of them.

Let me know if any further information I can provide, hope George will confirm his attendance soon. Thank you very much!

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 28, 2017, at 10:38 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Can you kindly provide Peter’s email address so that I can send the meeting invites to this calendar? I will also copy you. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
Hi, Hongying,

We know you are planning the trip so we’d like to share with you the below activities we’ve proposed to [b][6]. If you have any questions, just let us know.

On Sept.5:

1. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-1:00: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. Health Working Group Meeting 1:30-3:00: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it’s an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. Briefing for Ambassador 3:00-4:00: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

4. Reception at Development Counselor’s apartment: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

We are very glad that George Gao and some other scientists would join [b][6] the Embassy. Please share with them the agenda as well. Kindly let us know which activities George and Chinese scientists will attend and we’ll make preparations accordingly.

Thanks and best,

[b][6]

Development Program Specialist
USAID Beijing

Tel: [b][6]
Fax: [b][6]
Mobile: [b][6]
Email: [b][6]
From: Hongying Li  [b](6) ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 10:03 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)

Very nice to hear from you!

(b)(6) will stay at the Kerry Hotel Beijing, close to the Embassy, and I will get his flight info. and send to you if he needs the pick up. (I will also be in Beijing with them, so it should be fine)

There may be 1-2 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences attending the meeting at the US Embassy, so will confirm with Dennis to finalize the attendee list and send you the passport information by this Friday.

Will write back to you soon. Thank you!

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 23, 2017, at 4:41 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Since Peter will come together with (b)(6) for meetings inside the US Embassy Beijing on September 5th afternoon, can you pass on the passport information for Peter? As usual, I need:
- his full name as same as on the passport
- contact cell

Which hotel have you booked (b)(6)? And I think we do not need to arrange airport pick-up or sending for him since Eco-Health Alliance will cover?

Thank you very much!

(b)(6)

USAID/Beijing
US Embassy Beijing
Phone: (b)(6) Fax (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2017 3:07 AM
Hi [b](6)

Thanks for all the information for [b](6)!

On the point of scheduling, what information would be helpful to know? [b](6) and Peter will likely arrive in Beijing on Sunday, 9/3. The hope is that they will spend Monday having various other GVP-related meetings, including meeting with George Gao (Chinese Academy of Sciences), who is one of the GVP Steering Committee members. They have reserved 9/5 for Embassy meetings and are currently available for dinner that evening. The plan is for them to travel to Hong Kong the morning of 9/6.

Much like with the Beijing GVP meeting, Hongying Li (EcoHealth Alliance) is handling the coordination of the visit [[ecohealthalliance.org]](http://ecohealthalliance.org) and I would be happy to connect the two of you if that would be helpful.

Additionally, as you get a sense of whether or not the 5th will work for the Embassy meetings and if a dinner will work, please let us know and we can work with Hongying to ensure that the rest of the schedule is built around that.

Thanks again,

[b](6)

Emerging Threats Division
Office of Infectious Disease
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Desk: [b](6)
Cell: [b](6)
E-mail: [b](6)

On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 10:17 AM, [b](6) wrote:
[b](6) the letter for Jennifer would be perfect

Thanks

[b](6)

U.S. Agency for International Development
On Jul 31, 2017, at 9:56 PM, (b)(6) (Beijing) wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

We would very much like to provide assistance for your Chinese visa application. But after viewing your draft letter that requires (b)(6) to endorse, I have questions on doing so.

Usually, if you travel on your personal passport, you are not doing business trips, but for tourism purpose, right? If so, it seems inappropriate for (b)(6) to send you the following invitation letter. Instead, he can send you a letter for tourism purpose; or you do not need any letter for a tourism visa to China?

Do you have a chance to renew your diplomatic passport? Is it OK to send an eCC by quoting your personal passport number? Anyway, we need an eCC for building access.

Even when you travel by your diplomatic passport, our Visa-Let would only mention that you will travel to China for doing consultations with US Embassy Beijing. We usually do not mention details since we are afraid that the Chinese Embassy may require more information or a Chinese receiving institution to issue a formal invitation letter that we have nowhere to ask for. Please see a sample as attached.

Please check with someone in DC who handles your visa application.

One more question is on your Agenda to Beijing. (b)(6) plans to arrange an inter-agency meeting and a possible meeting with the Ambassador on the afternoon of Sept. 5, followed by a dinner hosted by Miles. What about your other meetings in Beijing and how long will you stay in Beijing? Thank you very much!

USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 7:38 AM

To: (b)(6) (GH/HIDN); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)

Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Sure. We understand the problem. We will get the letter back to you today.

From (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 1:35 AM
To: [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Greetings from Washington. Quick request. In processing my visa for China I need a letter from you (because I am using my personal passport; my diplomatic passport has less than 6 months remaining but still has some very valuable and active visas for other countries). I have drafted a letter below. Could you modify as you wish and send it back on official letterhead? Thanks

Emerging Threats Division
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development

Dear [b](6)

I would like to invite you to come to Beijing the week of September 3 in order to follow up the discussions held earlier this year between USAID and the China Centers for Disease Control, the Beijing Genomics Institute and the China Academy of Science on the Global Virome Project (GVP). The government of China has continued to express their interest in an expanded partnership on GVP; your visit would be an important opportunity to further develop the details of such a partnership.

Sincerely,

[b](6)
USAID [b](6)
U.S. Embassy

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

<winmail.dat>
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Hongying Li, MPH 李泓荧
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)
(b)(6) (China mobile)
Hongying Li (Skype)
(b)(6) WeChat

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.

Hongying Li, MPH 李泓荧
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)
(b)(6) (China mobile)
Hongying Li (Skype)
(b)(6) WeChat

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge scientific research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science, we develop solutions that prevent pandemics and promote conservation.

<081218 NEC Map.ppt><USAID Development Counselor House.ppt>

| Sender: | (b)(6) |
| Recipient: | (b)(6) |
Great, in that case, the pre-brief will be held in the A/DCM office.

Thanks,

U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 10:55 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

I believe it's [b] and me, possibly [h] from CDC and [app] from APHIS, all with access. Thanks.

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 10:46 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi [b](6)

Yes, the pre-brief will be with [b](6). Can you confirm that everyone in the pre-brief is a cleared American with access to A-bldg? If not, we will find another location to meet.

Thanks,
Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 10:31 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Thanks. Are will still on with (b) for the pre-brief that we planned with the Ambassador at 11:00 today?

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 8:53 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

(b)(6)

Political Minister Counselor (b)(6) will now take the meeting. He is serving as A/DCM today.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 8:23 AM
To: Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hello EXEC,

We received the following emails from our visitors. We have planned a 3pm meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon. However, Dr. George Gao, Director-General of China CDC, will not be able to come because NHFPC-National Health and Family Planning Commission requested him to go for their meeting. So they recommended Dr. Weijun Chen, Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute, to join the meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon.

Not sure if this would be appropriate for switching a major visitor at this time?

(b)(6) will be traveling back from Hangzhou to Beijing this morning.

Thank you very much!

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing (b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org
Sent: Monday, September 04, 2017 11:30 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (GH/HIDN)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)

Please only add Dr. Weijun Chen, because Dr. Zhang just texted me about a family emergency that he has to be in the hospital tomorrow afternoon.

Please Wechat anytime if any question or slides downloading issues.

Thanks,

Hongying

On Sep 4, 2017, at 10:36 PM, Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

George Gao will have to attend another meeting with the Ministry of Health at 3pm, so unfortunately cannot join our meeting at the Embassy. However, he has recommended Dr. Yongzhen Zhang to represent China CDC to attend the meeting to pass his message. Also, we had a meeting with the Beijing Genomics Institute today, and (b)(6) has invited their Vice
President, Dr. Weijun Chen, to join our meeting and the briefing for Ambassador. Other attendees, Peter, Brooke, Guangjian, and me are keeping the same schedule as before.

Below please find the ID information about these two scientists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Chinese ID</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongzheng</td>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, Department of Zoonoses, National Institute for Communicable Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weijun</td>
<td>Chen</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sorry for this last-minute change. I will also try to get their bios to send to you tomorrow morning. Please let me know if this can be approved. Thank you

Best Regards,
Hongying

On Aug 29, 2017, at 9:53 AM (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Hongying,

Well-noted. It is OK to add one more person. But we want to clarify the participants for the following marked in yellow:

1. **A. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-13:15**: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. **B. Health Working Group Meeting 13:30-14:50**: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it’s an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. **C. Briefing for Ambassador 15:00-16:00**: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

4. **D. Early Dinner Reception at Development Counselor’s Residence 16:30-18:00**: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

Therefore, there are some logistic details to consider. For example, and Peter may arrive at the south gate of US Embassy at 11:45am; while the 6 of you can arrive at 13:15. When the 4 of them go to the Ambassador’s office, the rest of you can still stay at the conference room (Mammoth Cave Conference Room) during 15:00-16:00? When their meeting with the Ambassador finishes, all of you
can walk to (b)(6) residence which is not far from the Embassy compound. Please see the attached location map for (b)(6) residence.

And for entering US Embassy, I think you know all the details since you have been here before. Pls. tell them to bring an original pictured ID/passport and avoid too many electronic items. If you have a PPT presentation for the 13:30 health working group meeting, please let me know so that I can arrange in advance.

And for the meeting with the Ambassador, we have the bios for (b)(6) Peter, and George Gao, but we do not have that for Prof. SHI Zhenglin, can you provide? We need to pass on to the Ambassador’s office.

Thank you very much!

(b)(6)

USAID/Beijing
US Embassy Beijing
Phone: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Hongying Li [((h)(6))@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1:26 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6).

Plan changes everyday… We are adding another person to the meeting. Dr. Guangjian Zhu, China Field Coordinator of Ecohealth Alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Passport or Chinese ID</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>Fu</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, China CDC/Professor, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dazsak</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td></td>
<td>President, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi</td>
<td>Zhengli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>Brooke</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu</td>
<td>Guangjian</td>
<td></td>
<td>China Field Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Hongying</td>
<td></td>
<td>China Programs Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thanks,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 4:58 PM, Hongying Li (b)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Apologies for these repeated emails. But just arrived in Beijing and found my phone number doesn’t work any more.

So please use my new phone number: (b)(6) as the contact cell, or you can find me anytime on Wechat (b)(6) Thank you.

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 28, 2017, at 3:40 PM, Hongying Li (b)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Just got confirmation from George to attend the meetings on Sept. 5. So the updated information is as the follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Passport or Chinese ID</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>Fu</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, China CDC/Professor, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daszak</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td></td>
<td>President, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi</td>
<td>Zhengli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>Brooke</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Hongying</td>
<td></td>
<td>China Program Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)

Just in case, the email address of George and his assistant are: George Gao: (b)(6) and his assistant Ms. Yu Bai: (b)(6)

Thank you.

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 28, 2017, at 11:47 AM, Hongying Li (b)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Of course! Peter’s email is (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org, please feel free to send the invites.

And thank you very much for sharing the meeting agenda, all sounds great, and I have forwarded it to George Gao and his assistant.
Per your previous request, below is the ID information of our attendees (except for George):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Passport or Chinese ID No.</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daszak</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>President, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi</td>
<td>Zhengli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>Brooke</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Hongying</td>
<td></td>
<td>China Program Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)

Since I will be with them, so please feel free to contact me if there is any questions or issues need to be addressed.

(b)(6) will arrive in Beijing on Saturday at 5:20pm, his flight no. is CX5992, and he said he can take a taxi from the airport to the hotel, so no need to arrange pickup transportation. During other time in Beijing, I will take care of them.

Let me know if any further information I can provide, hope George will confirm his attendance soon. Thank you very much!

Best,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 10:38 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Can you kindly provide Peter's email address so that I can send the meeting invites to this calendar? I will also copy you. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2017 9:19 AM
To: Hongying Li
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (GH/HIDN)(b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi, Hongying,

We know you are planning the trip so we'd like to share with you the below activities we've proposed to (b)(6) If you have any questions, just let us know.

On Sept.5:
1. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-1:00: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. Health Working Group Meeting 1:30-3:00: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it's an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. Briefing for Ambassador 3:00-4:00: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price's visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

4. Reception at Development Counselor's apartment: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

We are very glad that George Gao and some other scientists would join Dennis to the Embassy. Please share with them the agenda as well. Kindly let us know which activities George and Chinese scientists will attend and we'll make preparations accordingly.

Thanks and best,

[Redacted]

USAID Beijing

Tel: [Redacted]
Fax: [Redacted]
Mobile: [Redacted]
Email: [Redacted]

From: Hongying Li [mailto:b@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 10:03 PM
To: [Redacted] (Beijing)
Cc: [Redacted] (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi [Redacted]

Very nice to hear from you!

[b@6] will stay at the Kerry Hotel Beijing, close to the Embassy, and I will get his flight info. and send to you if he needs the pick up. (I will also be in Beijing with them, so it should be fine)
There may be 1-2 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences attending the meeting at the US Embassy, so I will confirm with Dennis to finalize the attendee list and send you the passport information by this Friday.

Will write back to you soon. Thank you!

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 23, 2017, at 4:41 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Since Peter will come together with Dennis for meetings inside the US Embassy Beijing on September 5th afternoon, can you pass on the passport information for Peter? As usual, I need:
- his full name as same as on the passport
- contact cell

Which hotel have you booked (b)(6)? And I think we do not need to arrange airport pick-up or sending for him since Eco-Health Alliance will cover?

Thank you very much!

(b)(6)

USAID/Beijing
US Embassy Beijing
Phone: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

From: (h)(6)  [mailto:(h)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2017 3:07 AM
To: (h)(6) (GH/HIDN)
Cc: (h)(6) (Beijing) (h)(6) (Beijing) (h)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for all the information for (b)(6)!

On the point of scheduling, what information would be helpful to know? (b)(6) and Peter will likely arrive in Beijing on Sunday, 9/3. The hope is that they will spend Monday having various other GVP-related meetings, including meeting with George Gao (Chinese Academy of Sciences), who is one of the GVP Steering Committee members. They have reserved 9/5 for Embassy meetings and are currently available for dinner that evening. The plan is for them to travel to Hong Kong the morning of 9/6.
Much like with the Beijing GVP meeting, Hongying Li (EcoHealth Alliance) is handling the coordination of the visit [b]ecohealthalliance.org[/b] and I would be happy to connect the two of you if that would be helpful.

Additionally, as you get a sense of whether or not the 5th will work for the Embassy meetings and if a dinner will work, please let us know and we can work with Hongying to ensure that the rest of the schedule is built around that.

Thanks again,

(b)(6)

Emerging Threats Division
Office of Infectious Disease
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Desk: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 10:17 AM, (b)(6) wrote:
(b)(6) the letter for (b)(6) would be perfect.

Thanks

Emerging Threats Program
U.S. Agency for International Development
Office: (b)(6)
Mobile:

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 9:56 PM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:
> Hi (b)(6)
>
> We would very much like to provide assistance for your Chinese visa application. But after viewing your draft letter that requires (b)(6) to endorse, I have questions on doing so.
>
> Usually, if you travel on your personal passport, you are not doing business trips, but for tourism purpose, right? If so, it seems inappropriate for (b)(6) to send you the following
invitation letter. Instead, he can send you a letter for tourism purpose; or you do not need any letter for a tourism visa to China?
>
> Do you have a chance to renew your diplomatic passport? Is it OK to send an eCC by quoting your personal passport number? Anyway, we need an eCC for building access.
>
> Even when you travel by your diplomatic passport, our Visa-Let would only mention that you will travel to China for doing consultations with US Embassy Beijing. We usually do not mention details since we are afraid that the Chinese Embassy may require more information or a Chinese receiving institution to issue a formal invitation letter that we have nowhere to ask for. Please see a sample as attached.
>
> Please check with someone in DC who handles your visa application.
>
> One more question is on your Agenda to Beijing. [b][6] plans to arrange an inter-agency meeting and a possible meeting with the Ambassador on the afternoon of Sept. 5, followed by a dinner hosted by [b][6]. What about your other meetings in Beijing and how long will you stay in Beijing? Thank you very much!
>
> [b][6] USAID/Beijing
>
> This email is UNCLASIFIED.
>
> From: [b][6] (Beijing)
>
> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 7:38 AM
>
> To: [b][6] (Beijing); [b][6] (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
>
> Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
>
> Sure. We understand the problem. We will get the letter back to you today.
>
> From: [b][6] [mailto:[b][6]]
>
> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 1:35 AM
>
> To: [b][6] (Beijing); [b][6] (Beijing); [b][6] (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
>
> Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
>
> [b][6], greetings from Washington. Quick request. In processing my visa for China I need a letter from you (because I am using my personal passport; my diplomatic passport has less than 6 months remaining but still has some very valuable and active visas for other countries). I have drafted a letter below. Could you modify as you wish and send it back on official letterhead? Thanks
>
> d

>
Emerging Threats Division
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development

Dear [b](6)

I would like to invite you to come to Beijing the week of September 3 in order to follow up the discussions held earlier this year between USAID and the China Centers for Disease Control, the Beijing Genomics Institute and the China Academy of Science on the Global Virome Project (GVP). The government of China has continued to express their interest in an expanded partnership on GVP; your visit would be an important opportunity to further develop the details of such a partnership.

Sincerely,

USAID [b](6)
U.S. Embassy

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

[c](6) (U.S. mobile)
[c](6) (China mobile)
Hongying Li (Skype)
(b)(6) (WeChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.

Hongying Li, MPH 李泓荧
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001
(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)
(China mobile)
Hongying Li (Skype)
(b)(6) (WeChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge scientific research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science, we develop solutions that prevent pandemics and promote conservation.

<081218 NEC Map.ppt><USAID Development Counselor House.ppt>
If only people had taken my concerns seriously perhaps this thing could have been avoided. I only hope my current concerns aren’t similarly ignored because the stakes are far, far higher! Get Outlook for iOS.

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 2:13:44 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

Dear (b)(5)

Wow. If we could only wind back the clock...

(b)(6)

Here is the Ref A cable too:

5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

6. (SBU) The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like disease. From a public health perspective, (b)(5)

(b)(5)
I actually forgot about this cable until very recently and just tracked down a copy.

1. **Summary with Comment**: China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global pandemic will originate in China [b](5)

End Summary with Comment.
Indeed; so many pitches, so few swings.

The messaging possibilities abound.

Here is the Ref A cable too [18 BEIJING 138]:

5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

6. (SBU) The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like disease. From a public health perspective,
I actually forgot about this cable [18 WUHAN 38] until very recently and just tracked down a copy.

1. (SBU) **Summary with Comment**: China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global pandemic will originate in China.[(b)(5)]

**End Summary with Comment.**
Just go to Taiwan. It is a great place! Best,

Get Outlook for iOS

If only. I suspect my chances of ever getting another visa to China are zero!

Oh, [male] if they had only listened to you......Nice to see your name in the paper. I'll bet the Chinese just love you right now....

Senators demand answers from Pompeo on Wuhan lab cables


By

Josh Rogen

Columnist
The State Department was warned two years ago of safety concerns at a Wuhan lab doing dangerous research on bat coronaviruses. Now, two Democratic senators want to know if those warnings were ignored — and why, despite these warnings, the Trump administration reduced our government’s health presence in China before the novel coronavirus pandemic broke out.

On Tuesday, Sens. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) sent a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo requesting information about two sensitive but unclassified diplomatic cables sent from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing back to the State Department in Washington in early 2018. The cables, one of which I obtained, reported that scientists at the Wuhan Institute of Virology complained about a lack of properly trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate their highest-security lab, which claimed the top level of biological security (Biosafety level 4). The U.S. diplomats also warned of the risk of a new virus pandemic breaking out at the lab if more wasn’t done to address these concerns.

The cables contain no firm evidence the novel coronavirus outbreak originated in the WIV lab. But their emergence has stirred an intense debate inside the Trump administration — and now on Capitol Hill — over whether this lab or the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab is connected to the origin of the pandemic. The lab
and the Chinese government have categorically denied any connection.

“The cables raise really serious red flags and it would stand to reason that anybody that received these cables would take steps to figure out whether there was fire underneath the smoke,” Murphy told me in an interview. “But we still have more questions than we have answers about the origin of this virus.”

These Democrat senators are not endorsing the lab origin theory outright and they definitely don’t agree with Trump on China policy. But they do not dismiss the possibility that the Wuhan labs were connected to the outbreak, and they want the U.S. government to get to the bottom of it.

First of all, they want Pompeo to hand over the cables. The House Foreign Affairs Committee minority side has also put in a formal request for the cables. The State Department denied my request for the cables and declined to comment for this article.

The senators also want to know: What did the State Department do to follow up on the cables? Did the U.S. government investigate its assertions, address its concerns, share the information with other agencies, engage the Chinese government on the matter or offer the WIV lab the help it was clearly asking for to be able to operate safely? Why did the Trump administration slash the staff of our own CDC inside China in 2018 and 2019? And why did the Trump administration cancel funding for the USAID Predict program, which
was trying to prevent the next viral pandemic by working with Chinese researchers, including the WIV lab? Murphy is proposing new funding for international public health infrastructure and restoration of the mechanisms the Trump administration cut.

“If you got this cable and you had an infrastructure inside China that could help you investigate the claims, you would think the response would be to increase that presence,” Murphy said. “It appears that the Trump administration’s response to these cables was to pull out our investigators rather than empower them.”

Since the existence of the cables was revealed, top Trump administration officials have said they’re still trying to understand the virus’s origins but the Chinese government is intentionally thwarting their efforts. The National Institutes of Health has suspended its work with the WIV lab and is conducting its own investigation, but without China’s help.

“We are still asking the Chinese Communist Party to allow experts to get into that virology lab so that we can determine precisely where this virus began,” Pompeo said earlier this month. The Chinese government rejected Pompeo’s request.

U.S. intelligence agencies have been looking for evidence about the virus origin for months, but they haven’t found any proof that would either implicate or exonerate the labs. There’s an intelligence gap, several officials told me, which means they don’t know anything either way.
Murphy said China should allow international experts into Wuhan to investigate the lab-related theory as well as a scenario that links the outbreak to a local seafood market. He wants the Trump administration to take a more international approach to bringing pressure to bear on Beijing.

“Everything [Chinese authorities] have done suggests that they have something to hide,” he said. “If this virus did emanate from bats in a wet market as they claim, then why not allow outsiders inside to confirm that claim? You have to view their actions incredibly suspiciously.”

He thinks the Trump administration and its allies are attacking China to deflect from Trump’s mishandling of the pandemic and make up for Trump’s early praise of the Chinese government’s response. Whatever one’s view on the Trump administration’s coronavirus response, however, Americans’ public health depends on figuring out the truth about the labs — not just in Wuhan but in all of China.

“If there is an ongoing security crisis in Chinese labs, then we need to resource our overseas public health infrastructure to address that,” Murphy said.

The important question of how the coronavirus pandemic started is caught up in our domestic political fight over how to deal with China. But there’s a bipartisan consensus that we must figure out what happened in Wuhan in order to help mitigate this pandemic and prevent the next one.
Josh Rogen
Columnist - Washington Post
Political Analyst - CNN

(b)(6) Mobile

This message and any related attachments are hereby designated as confidential communications between the sender and named recipient.

--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Josh Rogen's VIP Distribution List" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Josh-Rogen--

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Josh-Rogen--

Sender: (b)(6)
Recipient: (b)(6)
Received, thank you.

(b)(6)

U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 9:52 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (h)(6) and EXEC,

Please see the Bio for Dr. Weijun CHEN. Sorry for not being able to download he updates into Robo Tasker. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (h)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 9:26 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (h)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Yes, please send it.
Thank you.

(b)(6)

U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 9:06 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6) and EXEC,

Thanks for your quick reply and re-arranging. I will submit the access request for the replacement, Dr. Weijun Chen ASAP. Do you still need his Bio?

Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 8:53 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

(b)(6)

Political Minister Counselor (b)(6) will now take the meeting. He is serving as A/DCM today.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

U.S. Embassy Beijing
Tel: (b)(6)
Hi EXEC,

We received the following emails from our visitors. We have planned a 3pm meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon. However, Dr. George Gao, Director-General of China CDC, will not be able to come because NHFPC-National Health and Family Planning Commission requested him to go for their meeting. So they recommended Dr. Weijun Chen, Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute, to join the meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon.

Not sure if this would be appropriate for switching a major visitor at this time?

(b)(6) will be traveling back from Hangzhou to Beijing this morning.

Thank you very much!

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing (b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Hi (b)(6)

Please only add Dr. Weijun Chen, because Dr. Zhang just texted me about a family emergency that he has to be in the hospital tomorrow afternoon.

Please Wechat anytime if any question or slides downloading issues.

Thanks,
Hongying
On Sep 4, 2017, at 10:36 PM, Hongying Li wrote:

Hi

George Gao will have to attend another meeting with the Ministry of Health at 3pm, so unfortunately cannot join our meeting at the Embassy. However, he has recommended Dr. Yongzhen Zhang to represent China CDC to attend the meeting to pass his message. Also, we had a meeting with the Beijing Genomics Institute today, and has invited their Vice President, Dr. Weijun Chen, to join our meeting and the briefing for Ambassador. Other attendees, Peter, Brooke, Guangjian, and me are keeping the same schedule as before.

Below please find the ID information about these two scientists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Chinese ID</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongzhen</td>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, Department of Zoonoses, National Institute for Communicable Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weijun</td>
<td>Chen</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sorry for this last-minute change. I will also try to get their bios to send to you tomorrow morning. Please let me know if this can be approved. Thank you

Best Regards,
Hongying

On Aug 29, 2017, at 9:53 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) wrote:

Hi Hongying,

Well-noted. It is OK to add one more person. But we want to clarify the participants for the following marked in yellow:

1. **A. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-13:15**: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. **B. Health Working Group Meeting 13:30-14:50**: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it’s an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. **C. Briefing for Ambassador 15:00-16:00**: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.
5. **Early Dinner Reception at Development Counselor’s Residence 16:30-18:00**: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

Therefore, there are some logistic details to consider. For example, and Peter may arrive at the south gate of US Embassy at 11:45am; while the 6 of you can arrive at 13:15. When the 4 of them go to the Ambassador’s office, the rest of you can still stay at the conference room (Mammoth Cave Conference Room) during 15:00-16:00? When their meeting with the Ambassador finishes, all of you can walk to [b](6)’s residence which is not far from the Embassy compound. Please see the attached location map for [b](6)’s residence.

And for entering US Embassy, I think you know all the details since you have been here before. Pls. tell them to bring an original pictured ID/passport and avoid too many electronic items. If you have a PPT presentation for the 13:30 health working group meeting, please let me know so that I can arrange in advance.

And for the meeting with the Ambassador, we have the bios for Peter, and George Gao, but we do not have that for Prof. SHI Zhenglin, can you provide? We need to pass on to the Ambassador’s office.

Thank you very much!

---

USAID/Beijing  
US Embassy Beijing  
Phone  
E-mail  

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

---

**From:** Hongying Li  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1:26 AM  
**To:** (Beijing)  
**Cc:** (Beijing)  
**Subject:** Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi [b](6)

Plan changes everyday… We are adding another person to the meeting. Dr. Guangjian Zhu, China Field Coordinator of Ecohealth Alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Passport or Chinese ID</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>Fu</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, China CDC/Professor, CAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thanks,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 4:58 PM, Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org> wrote:

Hi [b](6)

Apologies for these repeated emails. But just arrived in Beijing and found my phone number doesn’t work any more.

So please use my new phone number:[b](6) as the contact cell, or you can find me anytime on Wechat[b](6) Thank you.

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 28, 2017, at 3:40 PM, Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org> wrote:

Hi Ellen,

Just got confirmation from George to attend the meetings on Sept. 5. So the updated information is as the follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Passport or Chinese ID</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>Fu</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>Director, China CDC/Professor, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daszak</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td></td>
<td>President, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi</td>
<td>Zhengli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>Brooke</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Hongying</td>
<td></td>
<td>ChinaProgram Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contact Cell: [b](6) (Hongying Li)

Just in case, the email address of George and his assistant are: George Gao[b](6) and his assistant Ms. Yu Bai:[b](6)

Thank you.

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 28, 2017, at 11:47 AM, Hongying Li [b]@ecohealthalliance.org> wrote:
Hi [b](6)

Of course! Peter’s email is [b](6)@ecohealthalliance.org, please feel free to send the invites.

And thank you very much for sharing the meeting agenda, all sounds great, and I have forwarded it to George Gao and his assistant.

Per your previous request, below is the ID information of our attendees (except for George):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Passport or Chinese ID No.</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daszak</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>President, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi</td>
<td>Zhengli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>Brooke</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Hongying</td>
<td></td>
<td>China Program Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b)(6) Hongying Li</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since I will be with them, so please feel free to contact me if there is any questions or issues need to be addressed.

(b)(6) will arrive in Beijing on Saturday at 5:20 pm, his flight no. is CX5992, and he said he can take a taxi from the airport to the hotel, so no need to arrange pickup transportation. During other time in Beijing, I will take care of them.

Let me know if any further information I can provide, hope George will confirm his attendance soon. Thank you very much!

Best,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 10:38 AM, [b](6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Can you kindly provide Peter’s email address so that I can send the meeting invites to this calendar? I will also copy you. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: [b](6) (Beijing)
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2017 9:19 AM
To: Hongying Li
Cc: [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) GH/HIDN; [b](6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
Hi, Hongying,

We know you are planning the trip so we’d like to share with you the below activities we’ve proposed to (b)(6). If you have any questions, just let us know.

On Sept.5:

1. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-1:00: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.

2. Health Working Group Meeting 1:30-3:00: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it’s an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. Briefing for Ambassador 3:00-4:00: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price’s visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.

4. Reception at Development Counselor’s apartment: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

We are very glad that George Gao and some other scientists would join (b)(6) to the Embassy. Please share with them the agenda as well. Kindly let us know which activities George and Chinese scientists will attend and we’ll make preparations accordingly.

Thanks and best,

(b)(6)

Development Program Specialist
USAID Beijing

Tel: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6) Mobile: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

From: Hongying Li [(b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 10:03 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Hi (b)(6)

Very nice to hear from you!

(b)(6) will stay at the Kerry Hotel Beijing, close to the Embassy, and I will get his flight info. and send to you if he needs the pick up. (I will also be in Beijing with them, so it should be fine)

There may be 1-2 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences attending the meeting at the US Embassy, so will confirm with Dennis to finalize the attendee list and send you the passport information by this Friday.

Will write back to you soon. Thank you!

Best,
Hongying
On Aug 23, 2017, at 4:41 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Since Peter will come together with (b)(6) for meetings inside the US Embassy Beijing on September 5th afternoon, can you pass on the passport information for Peter? As usual, I need:
- his full name as same as on the passport
- contact cell

Which hotel have you booked (b)(6)? And I think we do not need to arrange airport pick-up or sending for him since Eco-Health Alliance will cover?

Thank you very much!

USAID/Beijing
US Embassy Beijing
Phone: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6)
E-Mail: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2017 3:07 AM
To: (b)(6) GH/HIDN
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)
Thanks for all the information for (b)(6).

On the point of scheduling, what information would be helpful to know? (b)(6) and Peter will likely arrive in Beijing on Sunday, 9/3. The hope is that they will spend Monday having various other GVP-related meetings, including meeting with George Gao (Chinese Academy of Sciences), who is one of the GVP Steering Committee members. They have reserved 9/5 for Embassy meetings and are currently available for dinner that evening. The plan is for them to travel to Hong Kong the morning of 9/6.

Much like with the Beijing GVP meeting, Hongying Li (EcoHealth Alliance) is handling the coordination of the visit to (b)ecohealthalliance.org and I would be happy to connect the two of you if that would be helpful.

Additionally, as you get a sense of whether or not the 5th will work for the Embassy meetings and if a dinner will work, please let us know and we can work with Hongying to ensure that the rest of the schedule is built around that.

Thanks again,

Emerging Threats Division
Office of Infectious Disease
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Desk: (b)(6)  
Cell: (b)(6)  
E-mail: (b)(6)

On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 10:17 AM, (b)(6) wrote:
(b)(6), the letter for (b)(6) would be perfect

Thanks

Emerging Threats Program
U.S. Agency for International Development
Office: (b)(6)  
Mobile: (b)(6)
On Jul 31, 2017, at 9:56 PM, [b](6) (Beijing) [b](6) wrote:

Hi [b](6)

We would very much like to provide assistance for your Chinese visa application. But after viewing your draft letter that requires [b](6) to endorse, I have questions on doing so.

Usually, if you travel on your personal passport, you are not doing business trips, but for tourism purpose, right? If so, it seems inappropriate for [b](6) to send you the following invitation letter. Instead, he can send you a letter for tourism purpose; or you do not need any letter for a tourism visa to China?

Do you have a chance to renew your diplomatic passport? Is it OK to send an eCC by quoting your personal passport number? Anyway, we need an eCC for building access.

Even when you travel by your diplomatic passport, our Visa-Let would only mention that you will travel to China for doing consultations with US Embassy Beijing. We usually do not mention details since we are afraid that the Chinese Embassy may require more information or a Chinese receiving institution to issue a formal invitation letter that we have nowhere to ask for. Please see a sample as attached.

Please check with someone in DC who handles your visa application.

One more question is on your Agenda to Beijing. [b](6) plans to arrange an inter-agency meeting and a possible meeting with the Ambassador on the afternoon of Sept. 5, followed by a dinner hosted by Miles. What about your other meetings in Beijing and how long will you stay in Beijing? Thank you very much!

USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: [b](6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 7:38 AM
To: [b](6) GH/HIDN; [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Sure. We understand the problem. We will get the letter back to you today.

From: [b](6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 1:35 AM
To: [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (Beijing); [b](6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
greetings from Washington. Quick request. In processing my visa for China I need a letter from you (because I am using my personal passport; my diplomatic passport has less than 6 months remaining but still has some very valuable and active visas for other countries). I have drafted a letter below. Could you modify as you wish and send it back on official letterhead? Thanks

Emerging Threats Division
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development

Dear

I would like to invite you to come to Beijing the week of September 3 in order to follow up the discussions held earlier this year between USAID and the China Centers for Disease Control, the Beijing Genomics Institute and the China Academy of Science on the Global Virome Project (GVP). The government of China has continued to express their interest in an expanded partnership on GVP; your visit would be an important opportunity to further develop the details of such a partnership.

Sincerely,

USAID
U.S. Embassy

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
Hongying Li, MPH 李泓萤
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)
(b)(6) (China mobile)
Hongying Li (Skype)
(weChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science, we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.

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<081218 NEC Map.ppt><USAID Development Counselor House.ppt>
Hi all,

Sorry, please see the update for the correct conference room-Mammoth Cave.

We would like to organize this health working group meeting to provide an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP). We will hear what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

Visitors:
George Gao Fu, Director, China CDC Director, also Director, CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunolog, Institute of Microbiology
Shi Zhengli, Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS
(b)(6) Director, Global Health Security and Development, Bureau for Global Health, USAID/Washington
Peter Daszak, President, EcoHealth Alliance
Brooke Watson, Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance
Zhu Guangjian, China Field Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance
Li Hongying, China Programs Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance

For more information about GVP, please look at: http://www.globalviromeproject.org/about/

See you then!

(b)(6)
Sir - this might be a helpful addition to your trip book.

From: [b](6)
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 7:22 PM
To: Keshap, Atul
Subject: FW: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 28)

Attached includes an additional topline theme (the assault on international transparency), along with updates as of April 28.

Updated major themes:
--The silenced and the disappeared: E.g. Wuhan doctors Li Wenliang, Ai Fen and others; journalists Fang Bin, Chen Quishi, and Li Zehua; activist Xu Zhiyong; professor Xu Zhangrun; billionaire and Xi Jinping critic Ren Zhiqiang; online activists Cai Wei, Tang, and Chen Mei...

--The suppression and destruction of evidence: E.g. virus samples ordered destroyed at genomics labs, wildlife market stalls bleached, genome sequence not shared publicly, Shanghai lab closed for “rectification” after sharing genome on its own, academic articles subjected to prior review by the Ministry of Science and Technology, data on asymptomatic “silent carriers” kept secret...

--The deadly denial of human-to-human transmission: Despite evidence of human-human transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until Jan. 20. The World Health Organization does the same. Yet officials in Taiwan raised concerns as early as Dec. 31, as did experts in Hong Kong on Jan. 4...

--The endangerment of other countries: Millions of people leave Wuhan after the outbreak and before Beijing locks down the city on Jan. 23. Thousands fly overseas. Throughout February, Beijing presses the U.S., Italy, India, Australia, Southeast Asian neighbors and others not to protect themselves via travel restrictions, even as the PRC imposes severe restrictions at home...

--The assault on international transparency: As EU diplomats prepare a report on the pandemic, PRC successfully presses Brussels to strike language on PRC disinformation. As Australia calls for an independent inquiry into the pandemic, PRC threatens to cut off trade with Australia. (PRC has likewise responded furiously to US calls for transparency.)

New timeline elements in the attached:

— 2020 —

January 25: Major General Chen Wei, the Chinese military’s top epidemiologist and virologist, assumes a senior position at the Wuhan Institute of Virology overseeing coronavirus vaccine research.

January 31: Acclaimed author and Wuhan resident Fang Fang writes online, “How many people have died in Wuhan and their families destroyed? . . . But so far not a single person has said sorry or taken responsibility. I’ve even seen a writer use the phrase ‘complete victory’. What are they talking about?” Her “Wuhan Diary” writings become an increasing target of scorn online, backed by state media outlets, in a campaign she says recalls the Cultural Revolution.

February 6: The leaders of the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine write to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy on the importance of information-sharing and transparency “for managing the 2019-nCoV outbreak and for preventing future outbreaks.” “Samples collected as early as possible in the outbreak in Wuhan and samples from wildlife would be particularly valuable,” they write, adding that the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has indicated that the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory “is willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCov with the international community.” This transfer apparently never happened.

February 16: The Wuhan Institute of Virology issues a public denial that its former researcher Huang Yanling is “patient zero,” as speculated on Chinese social media based on the disappearance of Huang’s biographical information from the Institute’s website
and Huang’s unknown whereabouts. Institute researcher Shi Zhengli writes on social media that she “guaranteed with her own life” that the outbreak was unrelated to the lab. She instructs “those who believe and spread malicious media rumors to close their stinky mouths. (In 2004, China suffered a SARS outbreak due to a lab leak that killed one person and infected nine. PRC authorities blamed negligence and punished five senior officials at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention.)

April 18: Yuan Zhiming, vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology and director of the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, tells state broadcaster CGTN, “There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute. . . . I hope such a conspiracy theory will not affect cooperation among scientists around the world.”

April 21: A study published in the Lancet by researchers from Hong Kong estimates that China might have had tens of thousands more coronavirus cases than officials have disclosed.

April 22: Citizen journalist Li Zehua surfaces for the first time since February, saying that his detention included a quarantine in Wuhan and another in his hometown, after which he was reunited with his family. He says in a video: “During the whole process, the police enforced law in a civilised manner, ensured my rest time and food. They also cared about me very much. . . . I’m grateful to all the people who looked after me and cared about me. I wish all people suffering the epidemic can pull through. God bless China. I wish the world can unite together.”

April 24: Under pressure from Beijing, the European Union softens a published report on Covid-19 disinformation. The final text removed a draft reference to Beijing’s “global disinformation” campaign and struck mention of the diplomatic dispute between China and France over Chinese PPE exports and the aggressive rhetoric of China’s ambassador in Paris.

April 25: SCMP reports Chinese police have detained three Beijing residents (Cai Wei, a woman surnamed Tang, and Chen Mei) who helped publish articles about Covid-19 on open-source website Github that were previously censored from mainstream PRC media and social media, including material about Wuhan doctor Ai Fen.

April 27: PRC ambassador to Australia Cheng Jingye threatens economic harm if Australia continues pushing for an independent investigation into the coronavirus. “Maybe the ordinary [Chinese] people will say ‘Why should we drink Australian wine? Eat Australian beef?’, ” Cheng said, also citing the tourism and higher-education sectors. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne answered: “We reject any suggestion that economic coercion is an appropriate response to a call for such an assessment, when what we need is global cooperation.”
On April 17, 2020 at 7:19:08 PM EDT, (b)(6) wrote:

Updated timeline attached, through April 17. New elements include:

— 2015 —

November 9: Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (including Shi Zhengli) and several U.S. labs (including the FDA's National Center for Toxicological Research) publish a study in Nature Medicine entitled “A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence.” It stated: “To examine the emergence potential (that is, the potential to infect humans) of circulating bat CoVs, we built a chimeric virus encoding a novel, zoonotic CoV spike protein—from the RsSHC014-CoV sequence that was isolated from Chinese horseshoe bats—in the context of the SARS-CoV mouse-adapted backbone.”

— 2019 —

March 2: Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology publish a study in the medical journal Viruses noting that “it is highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China.”

March 5: Gao Fu, director of the PRC's CDC, says in a speech: “Viruses like SARS could emerge anytime, but there'll never be another SARS incident. That's thanks to how well our national contagious disease surveillance system works.”

— 2020 —

January 3: The Wuhan Health Commission sets narrow criteria for confirming that a case is officially part of the outbreak, saying patients can be counted only if they had ties to the Huanan seafood market, excluding the growing number of cases with no such ties. An official from a district disease control center in Wuhan also tells a hospital doctor handling infection reports that “this was a special contagious disease and we should report only after superiors had notified us.”

January 6: The head of an expert team sent to Wuhan from Beijing, Xu Jianguo, reports that “China has many years of disease control, there’s absolutely no chance that this will spread widely because of Spring Festival travel,” and there is “no evidence of human-to-human transmission.”

January 10: After leading a second expert team from Beijing to Wuhan, prominent PRC government expert Wang Guangfa tells state broadcaster CCTV that the Wuhan pneumonia was “under control” and mostly a “mild condition.” His team reported no clear signs of human-to-human transmission, though more than half a dozen doctors already were will. [On March 15, Wang wrote on social media that he “always suspected it was human-to-human transmissible.”]

January 14: In a confidential teleconference with provincial health officials, PRC National Health Commission chief Ma Xiaowei reportedly warns that the novel virus is “the most severe challenge since SARS in 2003, and is likely to develop into a major public health event,” adding that “clustered cases suggest that human-to-human transmission is possible.” Citing the case reported in Thailand the day prior, Ma warns of spread overseas and during China's coming Lunar New Year festivities. It would be another six days before any of these official concerns are made public.
January 15: A day after the confidential teleconference, China’s CDC initiates the highest-level emergency response internally and the National Health Commission distributes 63 pages of instructions to provinces on identifying cases and equipping doctors with protective gear. These instructions are marked “internal,” “not to be spread on the internet,” and “not to be publicly disclosed.”

February 15: Finance magazine Barron’s finds that China’s official coronavirus data fit a near-perfect model that is almost impossible to naturally occur, as the number of cumulative deaths reported could be predicted by a simple mathematical formula to a 99.99% accuracy.

March 3: WHO chief Tedros plays down the risk of asymptomatic silent carriers, citing official PRC data: “COVID-19 does not transmit as efficiently as influenza, from the data we have so far. With influenza, people who are infected but not yet sick are major drivers of transmission, which does not appear to be the case for COVID-19. Evidence from China is that only 1% of reported cases do not have symptoms, and most of those cases develop symptoms within two days.” Later reports cited classified PRC data showing up to 33% of cases were asymptomatic (see March 22).

April 17: Wuhan raises its official tally of Covid-19 fatalities by 1,290, to nearly 3,900, blaming the initial undercount on cases unrecognized, untreated, or underreported by overstressed hospitals.

On April 13, 2020 at 9:51:31 AM EDT wrote:

Updated timeline attached. This version notes at the top that major themes include:

--The silenced and the disappeared: E.g. Wuhan doctors Li Wenliang, Ai Fen and others; journalists Fang Bin, Chen Quishu, and Li Zehua; activist Xu Zhiyong; professor Xu Zhangrun; billionaire CCP member and Xi Jinping critic Ren Zhiquiang...

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Beijing locks down the city on Jan. 23. Thousands fly overseas. When Beijing cuts off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of China, it doesn’t stop travel from Hubei to the rest of the world. Throughout February, Beijing presses the U.S., Italy, India, Australia, Southeast Asian neighbors and others not to protect themselves via travel restrictions...

New timeline elements in the attached:

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Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus 96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.

--2019--

February 20: Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: “bat–animal and bat–human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks.”

December 30: Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher Shi Zhengli (known as “bat-woman” for her research) is called by the Institute’s director and summoned back to Wuhan from a conference in Shanghai to study samples of the novel coronavirus. “Could they have come from our lab?” Shi feared.

--2020--

January 7: Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology recalled in a March 11 interview with Scientific American that by January 7 her team found that the novel coronavirus's sequence did not match any of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. “That really took a load off my mind,” she said. But the novel sequence was 96% identical to one her team had sampled previously in Yunnan.

January 13: The first coronavirus case outside of China is reported in Bangkok when a 61-year-old woman from Wuhan tests positive four days after arriving from China with a fever at the airport. The patient had begun exhibiting symptoms (fever, chills, sore throat, headache) three days before leaving Wuhan.

January 15: The patient who becomes the first confirmed U.S. case leaves Wuhan and arrives in the U.S., carrying the coronavirus.

January 22: WHO holds emergency committee meeting, decides not to declare the novel coronavirus a “public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says afterward that declaring a PHEIC is a decision he takes “extremely seriously” and is “only prepared to make with appropriate consideration of all the evidence.” The emergency committee meeting excluded Taiwan from its deliberations.

January 23: Despite locking down Wuhan and cutting off travel from the surrounding Hubei Province to the rest of China, PRC officials did not cut off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of the world.
January 24: Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas biocontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by the Wuhan lab to share these samples.

January 30: WHO declares a public-health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), after nearly 10,000 cases of the virus are confirmed, including in at least 18 countries outside of China.

February 6: Researchers from South China University of Technology publish a study concluding that “the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories.” The paper is soon withdrawn because it “was not supported by direct proofs,” according to author Botao Xiao. “No scientists have confirmed or refuted the paper’s findings,” scholar Yanzhong Huang wrote on March 5.

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February 23: Xi Jinping delivers speech to PRC officials calling virus “a crisis for us and also a major test.” He stresses “social stability” and states that “the effectiveness of the prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”

March 11: WHO declares the novel coronavirus a “pandemic,” after the official worldwide case count is 118,000 people in 114 countries.

March 26: China bars entry of all foreigners in attempt to limit virus spread. This measure is harsher than the travel restrictions of other countries that Beijing had criticized just weeks before.

April 3: While lifting lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, officials limit funerals of those who died from the coronavirus, suppress online discussions of fatalities, scrub images of funeral homes from social media, assign minders to families in mourning, and face questions from families such as why it took the government weeks to inform the public that the virus could spread among humans.

April 3: China’s Ministry of Science and Technology announces that ongoing clinical research on the coronavirus must be reported to authorities within three days or be halted.

April 7: Human rights activists report, citing public records alone, that Chinese police punished nearly 900 people for online speech or information-sharing about the virus over three months.

April 11: Chinese universities publish online—and then apparently delete—new guidelines stating that academic papers on the origin of the novel coronavirus can be published only with the approval of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
On April 2, 2020 at 4:58:00 PM EDT, (b)(6) wrote:
Updated here to include more on the WHO, and some other tweaks. Please use this document (stamped 5pm).

On April 2, 2020 at 3:07:15 PM EDT, Stilwell, David R wrote:
Would like to include the timeline of WHO requesting access to the site (mid-January, I believe), WHO ADVON getting permission to travel to Beijing (10 Feb), and the investigative team actually heading out to investigate (around 20 Feb).

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 11:16 AM
To: EAP-QC-Principals-DL; NSC Asia; Ortagus, Morgan D; Pottinger; @worldbank.org; Buigan, Richard L; Snyder, Nicholas; Storch, Thomas

Subject: Updated timeline of PRC coverup (April 2)
Some of the new items in the attached:

January 4: Amid PRC denials, another expert outside mainland China begins to sound alarms over human-to-human transmission. The head of the University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Infection, Ho Pak-leung, warns that Hong Kong “should implement the strictest possible monitoring system for a mystery new viral pneumonia that has infected dozens of people on the mainland, as it is highly possible that the illness is spreading from human to human.”

January 23: Chinese authorities lock down Wuhan, after letting some five million people leave the city without screening in the weeks prior, amid the growing outbreak. NYT estimates seven million people left between Jan. 1 and Jan 23. Before the lockdown, some 900 people flew from Wuhan to New York City per month on average, while some 2,200 flew to Sydney and 15,000 to Bangkok (site of the first overseas case of the novel coronavirus in mid-January). Some 85% of infected travelers went undetected.

January 30: WHO special committee on the novel coronavirus states that it “does not recommend any travel or trade restriction based on the current information available.”

January 31: U.S. shuts down entry from China for non-Americans. By this time, outbreaks were already growing in 30 cities across 26 countries. PRC state media criticize the U.S. travel advisory urging citizens not to travel to China due to health concerns. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims the U.S. action is “certainly not a gesture of goodwill.”

February 1: Referring to travel restrictions, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi tells his Indian counterpart that China “opposes certain countries’ actions that are creating tension and causing panic.”

February 3: WHO chief Tedros calls on countries not to take measures that “unnecessarily interfere with international travel and trade.” He adds, “The chances of getting this going to anywhere outside China is very low, and even in China, when you go to other provinces, it’s very low.” This statement was amplified in PRC state media.

February 6: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qin Gang meets with Italy’s ambassador to China and “requires” Italy to suspend its decision cancelling direct flights between Italy and China. PRC press release states that Beijing “is strongly dissatisfied with the overreaction and restrictions of the Italian side” and claims that Italy agreed to resume some flights.

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On March 22, 2020 at 4:58:25 PM EDT, wrote:
Attached updates thru today, March 22. Thanks for suggestions.

On March 18, 2020 at 7:53:15 PM EDT, wrote:
Updated coverup timeline attached, including publication of this study March 11.

On March 18, 2020 at 3:52:25 PM EDT, wrote:
Shocking detail here from March 11 University of Southampton study. Estimates that if Beijing had owned up to the Wuhan virus and responded with significant measures just a week before it did, 66% of cases could have been avoided. And had Beijing responded three weeks sooner, 95% could have been avoided.

From "The research also found that if interventions in the country could have been conducted one week, two weeks, or three weeks earlier, cases could have been reduced by 66 percent, 86 percent and 95 percent respectively – significantly limiting the geographical spread of the disease."
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(b)(6) Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

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Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6) (c)

On March 22, 2020 at 4:58:25 PM EDT, [b](6) ________________________ wrote:
Attached updates thru today, March 22. Thanks for suggestions.

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(b)(6)
Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6) (o)
On March 18, 2020 at 7:53:15 PM EDT, [redacted] wrote:
Updated coverup timeline attached, including publication of this study March 11.

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Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

On March 18, 2020 at 3:52:25 PM EDT, [redacted] wrote:
Shocking detail here from March 11 University of Southampton study. Estimates that if Beijing had owned up to the Wuhan virus and responded with significant measures just a week before it did, 66% of cases could have been avoided. And had Beijing responded three weeks sooner, 95% could have been avoided.

From https://www.southampton.ac.uk/news/2020/03/covid-19-china.page: “The research also found that if interventions in the country could have been conducted one week, two weeks, or three weeks earlier, cases could have been reduced by 66 percent, 86 percent and 95 percent respectively — significantly limiting the geographical spread of the disease.”

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Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

@state.gov

<Wuhan virus coverup timeline 2020 03 18.docx>
<Wuhan virus coverup timeline 2020 03 22.docx>
<Coronavirus coverup timeline 2020 04 02.docx>
Latest here. I'd like to circulate this soon if possible.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: (b)(6)  
Date: April 12, 2020 at 6:01:35 PM EDT  
Subject: Fwd: Timeline new  
To: (b)(6)

Further updates here and attached. Marked below in bold --  
Updated timeline attached.

This version notes at the top that major themes include:
The silenced and the disappeared: E.g. Wuhan doctors Li Wenliang, Ai Fen and others;  
journalists Fang Bin, Chen Quishi, and Li Zehua; activist Xu Zhiyong; professor Xu Zhangrun;  
billionaire and Xi Jinping critic Ren Zhiqiang...
The suppression and destruction of evidence: E.g. virus samples ordered destroyed at genomics  
labs, wildlife market stalls bleached, genome sequence not shared publicly, Shanghai lab closed  
for “rectification” after sharing genome on its own, academic articles subjected to Ministerial  
prior review...
The deadly denial of human-to-human transmission: Despite evidence of human-human  
transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until Jan. 20. The World Health  
Organization does the same. Yet officials and doctors in Taiwan raised concerns about human-  
human transmission as early as Dec. 31, as did officials and doctors in Hong Kong on Jan. 4...  
The endangerment of other countries: Millions of people leave Wuhan after the outbreak and  
before Beijing locks down the city on Jan. 23. Thousands fly overseas. When Beijing cuts off  
travel from Hubei Province to the rest of China, it doesn’t stop travel from Hubei to the rest of  
the world. Throughout February, Beijing tries to bully the U.S., Italy, India, Australia, Southeast  
Asian neighbors and others not to protect themselves via travel restrictions...  
New timeline elements in the attached:

--2013--
Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a  
cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus  
96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.
2019:

February 20: Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: “bat–animal and bat–human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks.”

December 30: Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher Shi Zhengli (known as “bat-woman” for her research) is called by the Institute’s director and summoned back to Wuhan from a conference in Shanghai to study samples of the novel coronavirus. “Could they have come from our lab?” Shi feared.

2020:

January 7: Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology recalled in a March 11 interview with Scientific American that by January 7 her team found that the novel coronavirus’s sequence did not match any of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. “That really took a load off my mind,” she said. But the novel sequence was 96% identical to one her team had sampled previously in Yunnan.

January 13: The first coronavirus case outside of China is reported in Bangkok when a 61-year-old woman from Wuhan tests positive four days after arriving from China with a fever at the airport. The patient had begun exhibiting symptoms (fever, chills, sore throat, headache) three days before leaving Wuhan.

January 15: The patient who becomes the first confirmed U.S. case leaves Wuhan and arrives in the U.S., carrying the coronavirus.

January 22: WHO holds emergency committee meeting, decides not to declare the novel coronavirus a “public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says afterward that declaring a PHEIC is a decision he takes “extremely seriously” and is “only prepared to make with appropriate consideration of all the evidence.” The emergency committee meeting excluded Taiwan from its deliberations.

January 23: Despite locking down Wuhan and cutting off travel from the surrounding Hubei Province to the rest of China, PRC officials did not cut off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of the world.

January 24: Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas bioccontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by the Wuhan lab to share these samples.

January 30: WHO declares a public-health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), after nearly 10,000 cases of the virus are confirmed, including in at least 18 countries outside of China.

February 6: Researchers from South China University of Technology publish a study concluding that “the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan.”
Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories.” The paper is soon withdrawn because it “was not supported by direct proofs,” according to author Botao Xiao. “No scientists have confirmed or refuted the paper’s findings,” scholar Yanzhong Huang wrote on March 5.

February 16: The Wuhan Institute of Virology issues a public denial that its former researcher Huang Yanling is “patient zero,” as speculated on Chinese social media based on changes to the Institute’s website and Huang’s unknown whereabouts. Institute researcher Shi Zhengli writes on social media that she “guaranteed with her own life” that the outbreak was unrelated to the lab. [In 2004, China suffered a SARS outbreak due to a lab leak that killed one person and infected nine. PRC authorities blamed negligence and punished five senior officials at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention.]

February 23: Xi Jinping delivers speech to PRC officials, calls virus “a crisis for us and also a major test.” He stresses the need to maintain “social stability,” “positive energy” news reporting, and enhanced “external propaganda.” He states that “the effectiveness of the prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”

March 11: WHO declares the novel coronavirus a “pandemic,” after the official worldwide case count is 118,000 people in 114 countries.

March 26: China bars entry of all foreigners in attempt to limit virus spread. This measure is harsher than the travel restrictions of other countries that Beijing had criticized just weeks before.

April 3: While lifting lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, officials limit funerals of those who died from the coronavirus, suppress online discussions of fatalities, scrub images of funeral homes from social media, assign minders to families in mourning, and face questions from families such as why it took the government weeks to inform the public that the virus could spread among humans.

April 3: China’s Ministry of Science and Technology announces that ongoing clinical research on the coronavirus must be reported to authorities within three days or be halted.

April 7: Human rights activists report, citing public records alone, that Chinese police punished nearly 900 people for online speech or information-sharing about the virus over three months.

April 11: Chinese universities publish online—and then apparently delete—new guidelines stating that academic papers on the origin of the novel coronavirus can be published only with the approval of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Summary timeline of novel coronavirus outbreak and PRC political coverup

NOTE: All information here is detailed in open sources available online, as cited in the footnotes.

Major themes observed below:

- **The silenced and the disappeared**: E.g. Wuhan doctors Li Wenliang, Ai Fen and others; journalists Fang Bin, Chen Chiqui, and Li Zehua; activist Xu Zhiyong; professor Xu Zhangrun; billionaire and Xi Jinping critic Ren Zhiqiang...

- **The suppression and destruction of evidence**: E.g. virus samples ordered destroyed at genomics labs, wildlife market stalls bleached, genome sequence not shared publicly, Shanghai lab closed for "rectification" after sharing genome on its own, academic articles subjected to Ministerial prior review...

- **The deadly denial of human-to-human transmission**: Despite evidence of human-human transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until Jan. 20. The World Health Organization does the same. Yet officials and doctors in Taiwan raised concerns about human-human transmission as early as Dec. 31, as did officials and doctors in Hong Kong on Jan. 4...

- **The endangerment of other countries**: Millions of people leave Wuhan after the outbreak and before Beijing locks down the city on Jan. 23. Thousands fly overseas. When Beijing cuts off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of China, it doesn't stop travel from Hubei to the rest of the world. Throughout February, Beijing tries to bully the U.S., Italy, India, Australia, Southeast Asian neighbors and others not to protect themselves via travel restrictions...

--2013--

- Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus 96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.¹

--2019--

February 20:

- Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: “bat–animal and bat–human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks.”²

December 6:

- Five days after a man linked to Wuhan’s seafood market presented pneumonia-like symptoms, his wife also presents with pneumonia and is hospitalized in an isolation ward. The wife had no connection to the market, suggesting human-human transmission.³

December 27:


• Zhang Jixian, a doctor from Hubei Provincial Hospital of Integrated Chinese and Western Medicine, tells China’s health authorities that a novel disease (then affecting some 180 patients) was caused by a new coronavirus.  

December 26-30:
• Evidence of new virus emerges from Wuhan patient data sent to multiple Chinese genomics companies.  

December 30:
• Ai Fen, a senior doctor at Wuhan Central Hospital, posts information on WeChat about the new virus and is reprimanded by superiors. Ai subsequently instructs her staff to wear protective clothing and masks, despite official instructions not to. “I knew there must be human-to-human transmission,” she said in a later interview.  
• Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang also shares information about the virus on WeChat, including a photo of lab results initially shared by Ai Fen.  
• Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher Shi Zhengli (known as “bat-woman” for her research) is called by the Institute’s director and summoned back to Wuhan from a conference in Shanghai to study samples of the novel coronavirus. “Could they have come from our lab?” Shi feared.  

December 31:
• Chinese officials alert the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office of several cases of pneumonia of unknown cause detected in Wuhan, claiming erroneously that “the disease is preventable and controllable.”  
• Chinese internet authorities begin censoring terms from social media such: Wuhan Unknown Pneumonia, SARS Variation, Wuhan Seafood Market, and keywords critical of the government’s handling of the infection.  
• Officials in Taiwan report to the World Health Organization (WHO) that medical staff in China are reportedly getting ill with the new virus, signaling human-to-human transmission. But Taiwan’s information is not published on the WHO platform for data-exchange among 196 countries. Taiwan officials also alert PRC health authorities.  

--2020--

January 1:
• Eight doctors in Wuhan who warned about new virus reports via social media in late December, including Dr. Li Wenliang, are detained and condemned for “making false statements on the Internet.” Li is forced to write a self-criticism saying his warnings “had a negative impact.”  
• Hubei health commission orders genomics companies to stop testing and destroy all samples.  

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13 Yong Xiong and Nectar Gan, “This Chinese doctor tried to save lives, but was silenced. Now he has coronavirus,” CNN, February 4, 2020.  
• Wuhan authorities close the city’s seafood market, then disinfect it without swabbing individual animals and cages or drawing blood from workers, eliminating evidence of what animal might have been the source of the coronavirus and which people had become infected but survived.  

January 2:
• PRC state media aggressively highlight the detentions of the Wuhan doctors. Top national TV news program Xinwen Lianbo reports the detentions while Xinhua publishes a call from Wuhan police for “all netizens to not fabricate rumors, not spread rumors, not believe rumors.” Global Times tweets that “Police in Central China’s Wuhan arrested 8 people spreading rumors about local outbreak of unidentifiable #pneumonia. Previous online posts said it was SARS.”
  [On Feb. 1, Washington Post cited Chinese surgeon and writer Wang Guangbao recalling that while speculation about a SARS-like virus was rampant within medical circles around Jan. 1, the detentions of the Wuhan doctors chilled open discussion. “The eight posters getting seized made all of us doctors feel we were at risk,” Wang said.]
• Wuhan Institute of Virology completes mapping of the novel coronavirus genome, but this breakthrough is not made public by Chinese authorities.

January 3:
• China’s top health authority, the National Health Commission, follows the Hubei Health Commission by issuing a gag order directing that Wuhan pneumonia samples be moved to designated testing facilities or destroyed. The National Health Commission also orders institutions not to publish any information related to the unknown disease.

January 4:
• Another expert outside mainland China begins to sound alarms over human-to-human transmission. The head of the University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Infection, Ho Pak-leung, warns that Hong Kong “should implement the strictest possible monitoring system for a mystery new viral pneumonia that has infected dozens of people on the mainland, as it is highly possible that the illness is spreading from human to human.”

January 5:
• The Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center, a research lab, alerts National Health Commission that one of its professors has identified a SARS-like coronavirus and mapped its genome. The lab also recommends “appropriate prevention and control measures in public places.”
• Wuhan Municipal Health Commission stops releasing daily updates on new cases.
• WHO releases statement characterizing PRC’s initial Dec. 31 notice about “pneumonia of unknown etiology.” WHO states: “Based on the preliminary information from the Chinese

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18 Global Times tweet, Jan. 2, 2020, 1:20am Beijing time (https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1212409366684894995)
investigation team, no evidence of significant human-to-human transmission and no health care worker infections have been reported.” This continues to ignore Taiwan’s warnings of Dec. 31.

January 6:
- US CDC offers Beijing technical expertise to help with the virus. Beijing ignores this offer for more than a month, along with repeated additional offers from HHS Secretary Alex Azar and other senior U.S. officials.26

January 7:
- Wall Street Journal reports for the first time that Chinese scientists have tied the mystery illnesses to a new strain of coronavirus.27
  - Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology recalled in a March 11 interview with Scientific American that by January 7 her team found that the novel coronavirus’s sequence did not match any of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. “That really took a load off my mind,” she said. But the novel sequence was 96% identical to one her team had sampled previously in Yunnan.28

January 9:
- Chinese authorities identify a novel coronavirus as the likely cause of the outbreak in Wuhan, two days after the Wall Street Journal reported on Chinese scientists discovering the novel strain.29 In response to Beijing’s confirmation, international scientists urge Chinese authorities to quickly share data on the virus, the disease it causes, and how it spreads.30
- WHO releases a statement: “Preliminary identification of a novel virus in a short period of time is a notable achievement and demonstrates China’s increased capacity to manage new outbreaks. . . . According to Chinese authorities, the virus in question can cause severe illness in some patients and does not transmit readily between people. . . . WHO does not recommend any specific measures for travellers. WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions on China based on the information currently available.”31

January 10:
- More international scientists and public-health experts call on China to share more information on the new coronavirus.32
- Prominent PRC government expert Wang Guangfa tells state broadcaster China Central Television that the Wuhan pneumonia was “under control” and mostly a “mild condition.”33

January 11:
- Hong Kong’s secretary for food and health announces, “According to the mainland authorities, there is no evidence of human to human transmission and there is also no healthcare

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professional being infected. . . Also of note is after the closure of the concerned market in Wuhan, there is no new case since January 3."  

- Having provided the genomic sequence of the virus to national authorities on January 5 and seen no action from them, Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre Professor Zhang Yongzhen publishes the data on virological.org and GenBank, allowing teams around the world to begin work on testing methods.  

January 12:  
- Professor Zhang Yongzhen’s lab in Shanghai is closed by authorities for “rectification,” one day after it shared genomic sequence data with the world for the first time.  
- The closure has greatly affected the scientists and their research when they should be racing against the clock to find the means to help put the novel coronavirus outbreak under control,” a lab source says.  
- With the private Shanghai lab having already gone public, the PRC government’s National Health Commission shares virus genomic information with the WHO for the first time.  

January 13:  
- First coronavirus case outside of China is reported in Bangkok when a 61-year-old woman from Wuhan tests positive four days after landing with a fever at the airport.  
- The patient began exhibiting symptoms (fever, chills, sore throat, headache) three days before leaving Wuhan.  

January 14:  
- The chief of the WHO emerging diseases unit reports that “it is possible that there is limited human-to-human transmission, potentially among families, but it is very clear right now that we have no sustained human-to-human transmission.”  
- Official WHO twitter page announces: “Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel #coronavirus (2019-nCoV) identified in #Wuhan, #China.”  
- This is more than five weeks after the first evidence of human-to-human transmission in Wuhan.  
- Plainclothes police detain journalists trying to report from Wuhan’s Jinyintan Hospital and force them to delete their TV footage and hand in phones and cameras for inspection.  

January 15:  
- Li Qun, head of the Chinese CDC’s emergency center, plays down the human-to-human transmission threat on state television: “After careful screening and prudent judgment, we have reached the latest understanding that the risk of human-to-human transmission is low.”  

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• The patient who becomes the first confirmed U.S. case leaves Wuhan and arrives in the U.S., carrying the coronavirus.45

January 18:
• Wuhan Municipal Health Commission announces a new case of the virus for the first time since before January 5.46 The announcement comes after the close of the five-day meeting of Wuhan’s Communist Party-controlled People’s Congress, during which officials made daily claims of no new cases, no human-human transmission, and no infected medical workers.47
• Wuhan hosts mass “potluck” banquet of 40,000 families in attempt to break world record.48

January 20:
• PRC state media publish first public remarks from Xi Jinping about the virus, ordering officials to contain it.49
• Dr. Zhong Nanshan, a leading authority on respiratory health well-known for his role in fighting SARS, confirms in a TV interview that the disease is spreading from person-to-person, a fact first identified by doctors in Wuhan in December.50 He later said that if the government had taken action earlier, in December or even early January, “the number of sick would have been greatly reduced.”51

January 21:
• WHO delegation concludes a two-day field visit to Wuhan, notes that “Data collected through detailed epidemiological investigation and through the deployment of the new test kit nationally suggests that human-to-human transmission is taking place in Wuhan.”52

January 22:
• WHO holds emergency committee meeting, decides not to declare the novel coronavirus a “public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says afterward that declaring a PHEIC is a decision he takes “extremely seriously” and is “only prepared to make with appropriate consideration of all the evidence.”53 As usual, Taiwan and its reporting was excluded from the deliberations of the committee.

January 23:
• Chinese authorities lock down Wuhan, after letting some five million people leave the city without screening in the weeks prior, amid the growing outbreak.54
  o NYT estimates seven million people left between Jan. 1 and Jan. 23. Before the lockdown, some 900 people flew from Wuhan to New York City per month on average, while some 2,200 flew to Sydney and 15,000 to Bangkok (site of the first overseas case

45 “First Travel-related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States,” U.S. CDC, January 21, 2020
of the novel coronavirus in mid-January). Some 85% of infected travelers went undetected.\textsuperscript{55}

- Despite locking down Wuhan and cutting off travel from the surrounding Hubei Province to the rest of China, PRC officials did not cut off travel from Hubei to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{56}

January 24:

- Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas biocontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by the Wuhan lab to share these samples.\textsuperscript{57}
- The Lancet publishes a study noting that the first novel coronavirus case in Wuhan had no connection to the Huanan seafood market.\textsuperscript{58}

January 27:

- Wuhan Mayor Zhou Xianwang says that rules imposed by Beijing limited what he could disclose about the threat posed by the virus: “As a local government official, after I get this kind of information I still have to wait for authorization before I can release it.”\textsuperscript{59}

January 28:

- WHO Director-General Tedros visits Beijing and meets with Xi Jinping and other senior officials. “The two sides agreed that WHO will send international experts to visit China as soon as possible,” said the WHO afterward, adding that “the WHO delegation highly appreciated the actions China has implemented in response to the outbreak, its speed in identifying the virus and openness to sharing information with WHO and other countries.”\textsuperscript{60}

January 30:

- WHO declares a public-health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), after nearly 10,000 cases of the virus are confirmed,\textsuperscript{61} including in at least 18 countries outside of China.\textsuperscript{52} WHO special committee states that it “does not recommend any travel or trade restriction based on the current information available.”\textsuperscript{63}

January 31:

- U.S. shuts down entry from China for non-Americans. By this time, outbreaks were already growing in 30 cities across 26 countries.\textsuperscript{64}
- PRC state media criticize the U.S. travel advisory urging citizens not to travel to China due to health concerns. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims the U.S. action is “certainly not a gesture of goodwill.”\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{56} Niall Ferguson, “Let’s Zoom Xi. He has questions to answer,” The Globe and Mail, April 6, 2020.
\textsuperscript{57} Yasmine Abutaleb et al., “The U.S. was beset by denial and dysfunction as the coronavirus raged,” Washington Post, April 4, 2020.
\textsuperscript{60} “WHO, China leaders discuss next steps in battle against coronavirus outbreak,” WHO, January 28, 2020.
February 1:
- Referring to travel restrictions, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi tells his Indian counterpart that China “opposes certain countries’ actions that are creating tension and causing panic.”

February 3:
- WHO chief Tedros calls on countries not to take measures that “unnecessarily interfere with international travel and trade,” calling the spread outside of China “minimal and slow.” He adds, “The chances of getting this going to anywhere outside China is very low, and even in China, when you go to other provinces, it’s very low.” These statements are amplified in PRC state media.

February 6:
- China’s internet watchdog tightens controls on social media platforms following Xi Jinping directive to strengthen online media control to maintain social stability.
- Citizen journalist and former rights lawyer Chen Qiushi disappears in Wuhan after posting mobile-phone videos of packed hospitals and distraught families.
- Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qin Gang meets with Italy’s ambassador to China and “requires” Italy to suspend its decision cancelling direct flights between Italy and China. PRC press release states that Beijing “is strongly dissatisfied with the overreaction and restrictions of the Italian side” and claims that Italy agreed to resume some flights.
- Researchers from South China University of Technology publish a study concluding that “the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level need may be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories.” The paper is soon withdrawn because it “was not supported by direct proofs,” according to author Botao Xiao. “No scientists have confirmed or refuted the paper’s findings,” scholar Yanzhong Huang wrote on March 5.

February 7:
- Dr. Li Wenliang dies of the novel coronavirus contracted from a patient, five weeks after his police detention for trying to alert fellow doctors to the outbreak. His death triggers an outpouring of grief and anger at Chinese authorities.

February 9:
- Citizen journalist and local businessman Fang Bin disappears after posting videos from Wuhan that circulated widely on Chinese social media.

February 15:

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66 “China opposes some countries’ actions that create tension and panic,” CGTN, Feb. 1, 2020.
68 Al Heng and Bo Leung, “WHO chief holds to line against travel bans,” Xinhua, February 5, 2020.
71 “Vice Foreign Minister Qin Gang Requires the Italian Side to Suspend the Decision to Cancel Direct Flights Between Italy and China; The Italian Side Agrees to Resume Some Commercial Flights,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 7, 2020.
• PRC state media publishes a speech, said to have been delivered by Xi Jinping to party leaders on Feb. 3, saying he had been leading the fight against the virus “at every moment” since Jan. 7. His first public comments on the epidemic had been Jan. 20.77
• Xi’s published speech also urges tightened control over online discussion and increased policing to ensure “positive energy” and social stability.78
• Activist Xu Zhiyong arrested after nearly two months on the run, and after publishing a Feb. 4 essay calling on Xi Jinping to step down for suppressing information about the virus.79

February 16:
• The Wuhan Institute of Virology issues a public denial that its former researcher Huang Yanling is “patient zero,” as speculated on Chinese social media based on changes to the Institute’s website and Huang’s unknown whereabouts. Institute researcher Shi Zhengli writes on social media that she “guaranteed with her own life” that the outbreak was unrelated to the lab.80
  o [In 2004, China suffered a SARS outbreak due to a lab leak that killed one person and infected nine. PRC authorities blamed negligence and punished five senior officials at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention.]81
• Tsinghua University Professor Xu Zhangrun is placed under house arrest, barred from social media, and cut off from the internet after publishing an essay declaring that “The coronavirus epidemic has revealed the rotten core of Chinese governance.”82
• A group of 12 WHO officials and 13 PRC officials begin a nine-day “WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019,” led by Canadian Bruce Aylward of WHO and Wannian Liang of the PRC National Health Commission.83

February 17
• PRC ambassador Cheng Jingye publicly pressures Australia to ease travel restrictions, saying: “We have expressed our strong wish and hope that the Australian government in their review will take a balanced approach and remove these harsh restrictions.”84

February 19:
• Beijing revokes press credentials of three Wall Street Journal reporters who had widely covered the outbreak, including one that was reporting from Wuhan.85

February 20:
• At a meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi pressures countries to ease travel restrictions, saying: “In light of the conditions on the ground, countries need to resume people-to-people ties and cooperation.”86

February 23:

78 “China’s Xi urges more policing as virus toll rises,” AFP, February 15, 2020.
82 Verna Yu and Emma Graham-Harrison, “‘This may be the last piece I write’: Prominent Xi critic has Internet cut after house arrest,” The Guardian, February 16, 2020.
84 “Coronavirus: Beijing urges Australia to ease travel ban on China travelers,” Reuters, February 17, 2020.
86 Dewey Sim, “Coronavirus: China’s top diplomat Wang Yi urges world to resume links with Beijing, says it’s taken ‘forceful action,’” South China Morning Post, Feb. 20, 2020.
Xi Jinping delivers speech to PRC officials, calls virus “a crisis for us and also a major test.” He stresses the need to maintain “social stability,” “positive energy” news reporting, and enhanced “external propaganda.” He states that “the effectiveness of the prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”87

February 26:
- Citizen journalist Li Zehua, who quit his job at state broadcaster CCTV to report independently from Wuhan, is detained and disappears. With security officers at his door, Li records a video testament to free speech, truth, and the memory of the Tiananmen movement.88

February 28:
- The WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 publishes its report after a “huge back and forth” between PRC and non-PRC officials over wording. PRC officials refused to call the virus “dangerous” or include reference to a possible “second wave” of infections (preferring “resurgence” instead).89

February 29:
- WHO announces that it “continues to advise against the application of travel or trade restrictions to countries experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks.”90

March 6:
- Wuhan residents shout from windows “It’s all lies!” as senior official Sun Chunlan visits. After this goes viral on Chinese social media, PRC state media doctor and re-distribute the footage to claim that only one person had yelled this.

March 11:
- WHO declares the novel coronavirus a “pandemic,” after the official worldwide case count is 118,000 people in 114 countries.91
- Researchers at the University of Southampton (UK) estimate that had Beijing owned up to the coronavirus outbreak and responded with significant measures just one week before it did, 66% of cases could have been avoided, and had Beijing responded three weeks sooner, 95% could have been avoided.92

March 14:
- Entrepreneur and activist Ren Zhiqiang disappears in Beijing after criticizing Xi Jinping’s coronavirus response.93 PRC officials announce a corruption investigation into Ren on April 7.94

March 22:

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- Reports emerge of classified PRC government data showing a far higher rate of asymptomatic illness in China than previously disclosed. Per South China Morning Post, the classified data show some 43,000 people in China tested positive without symptoms by the end of February, representing one-third of cases. But PRC officials excluded these cases from their public count. When epidemiologists from the Chinese CDC published a paper on Feb. 24, they cited only 889 asymptomatic patients out of 44,672 confirmed cases as of Feb. 11, a rate of only 2%.96
- Experts worldwide call for expanded testing and greater transparency regarding asymptomatic “silent carriers,” as evidence mounts from countries such as Iceland that as many as 50% of positive cases may be asymptomatic.96

March 26:
- China bars entry of all foreigners in attempt to limit virus spread.97 This measure is harsher than the travel restrictions of other countries that Beijing had criticized just weeks before.

March 27
- Photographs and reports surface of many thousands of urns at Wuhan funeral homes, raising doubts about government claims that the virus caused only about 2,500 deaths in Wuhan and 3,700 in China.98 Local Wuhan social media users estimate, based on the daily capacity of inciners, that more than 40,000 may have died there.99

March 31
- Chinese National Health Commission announces for the first time that it excluded from its national tally people who had the virus but without symptoms, and that as of April 1 it would begin including these in the tally “in order to respond to society’s concern in a timely manner.”100

April 3
- While lifting lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, officials limit funerals of those who died from the coronavirus, suppress online discussions of fatalities, scrub images of funeral homes from social media, assign mourners to families in mourning, and face questions from families such as why it took the government weeks to inform the public that the virus could spread among humans.101
- China’s Ministry of Science and Technology announces that ongoing clinical research on the coronavirus must be reported to authorities within three days or be halted.102

April 7
- Human rights activists report, citing public records alone, that Chinese police punished nearly 900 people for online speech or information-sharing about the virus over three months.103

April 11

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100 “Estimates Show Wuhan Death Toll Far Higher Than Official Figure,” Radio Free Asia, March 27, 2020.
104 Sophie Yan, “Inside Wuhan as city at heart of coronavirus outbreak tries to return to normal,” Daily Telegraph, April 7, 2020.
- Chinese universities publish online—and then apparently delete—new guidelines stating that academic papers on the origin of the novel coronavirus can be published only with the approval of the Ministry of Science and Technology.\textsuperscript{204}