



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 28, 2023

Case No. FL-2022-00075

Mr. Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD
U.S. Right to Know
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Suryanarayanan:

As noted in our letter dated February 28, 2023, we are processing your request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Thus far, the Department of State (“Department”) has located 12 responsive records subject to the FOIA. Upon review, we have determined 1 record may be released in full, 10 records may be released in part, and 1 record must be withheld in its entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The record that was withheld in full is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 5, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(1) and (b)(5). The document identification number for the record withheld in full is B-00002425485. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov.

Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00075, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Diamonece Hickson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and "H".

Diamonece Hickson
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

From:	"SMART Archive" <>
To:	SMART Core <>
Subject:	(b)(6) Say PRC Central Government -- Not Local Officials -- Responsible for the Coronavirus Cover-Up
Date:	Mon, 20 Jul 2020 09:18:30 GMT

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MRN: 20 TAIPEI 319
Date/DTG: Jul 20, 2020 / 200917Z JUL 20
From: AIT TAIPEI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CN, TW, KNCV
Captions: ~~SENSITIVE~~
Reference: A) 20 TAIPEI 183
B) 20 BEIJING 485
C) 18 TAIPEI 145
D) 17 TAIPEI 511
E) 20 TAIPEI 299
F) 20 BEIJING 894
G) 20 BEIJING 359
H) 20 BEIJING 742
I) 20 TAIPEI 317
Pass Line: AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PASS TO AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
Subject: (b)(6) Say PRC Central Government -- Not Local Officials -- Responsible for the Coronavirus Cover-Up

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Who Ordered the Cover Up? The Signs Point to Beijing, not Local Officials

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Beijing Knew Earlier than They Admit

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Leaked Directive Confirms Beijing Restricted Disclosure of Virus Information and Samples

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Xi Lied to Obfuscate His Role in the Cover-Up

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Would Beijing Have Been More Transparent Without Xi in Charge?


(b)(1); (b)(6)

Initial Outbreak Could Have Been Contained in China if Beijing Had Not Covered it Up

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1);
(b)(6)

The Cover-Up and the CCP's Campaign of Propaganda and Disinformation



Signature:

(b)(6)

Classified By:

Name: (b)(6) Title: Director
Office: EXEC
Agency: AIT

Reason:

1.4 (b), (d)

Declassify On:

2045/07/20

W/O Attachment(s):

This document is ~~SECRET~~ when separated from UNCLASSIFIED attachment(s).

Drafted By:

TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Cleared By:

POL: (b)(6)

POL: (b)(6)

EXEC: (b)(6)

Approved By:

EXEC: (b)(6)

Released By:

TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Info:

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; OSD WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; DIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI *ROUTINE*; COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI *ROUTINE*; COMSOPAC HONOLULU HI *ROUTINE*; USARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI *ROUTINE*; PACAF HICKAM AFB HI *ROUTINE*; COMMARFORPAC *ROUTINE*; CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*; ZEN/AUCKLAND, AMCONSUL

Attachments:

PRC National Health Commission Directive.pdf, Caixin Neican Report.pdf

Dissemination Rule:

Archive Copy

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Sender:	"SMART Archive" <>
Recipient:	SMART Core <>

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 07:14:32 +0000
To: svcSMARTCrossLow_SMG
Subject: FW: Emailing:(b)(6).pdf
Attachments: (b)(6).pdf

Mr. (b)(6)
Political Officer
American Institute in Taiwan
Office: (b)(6)
Mobile:
Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

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Page 1 of 5

国家卫生健康委员会办公厅

国卫办科教函〔2020〕3号

国家卫生健康委办公厅关于在重大突发 传染病防控工作中加强生物样本资源及 相关科研活动管理工作的通知

各省、自治区、直辖市及新疆生产建设兵团卫生健康委，各人间传染的病原微生物高级生物安全实验室：

为加强传染病疫情防控，根据《中华人民共和国传染病防治法》《病原微生物实验室生物安全管理条例》等法律法规，现就重大突发传染病防控工作期间，进一步做好有关病例生物样本资源的采集、运输、使用及科研活动管理工作要求如下：

一、本通知中的生物样本资源，是指病人和疑似病人及其密切接触者血液、血清、咽拭子、痰液、气管吸取液或支气管灌洗液、尿液、粪便，以及死亡患者尸体组织、器官等样品；各相关机构包括各级疾病预防控制机构、医疗机构、相关科研机构、第三方检验检测机构，以及其他可能利用生物样本开展工作的机构。

二、各相关机构应当在满足生物安全要求前提下，按照有关诊疗和疾病监测工作规范采集病例生物样本，准确记录样本来源、种类、数量，编号登记，并指定专门人员和机构保存管理。对涉及秘

密和个人隐私的,要加强保密意识并依据有关规定采取保密措施。

三、针对近期武汉肺炎病例样本,依据目前掌握的病原学特点、传播特性、致病性、临床资料等信息,在进一步明确病原信息之前,暂按照高致病性病原微生物(第二类)进行管理,相关样本的运输应当按照《可感染人类的高致病性病原微生物菌(毒)种或样本运输管理规定》(卫生部令第45号)要求进行;病原相关实验活动应当在具备相应防护级别的生物安全实验室开展。

四、各相关机构应当按照省级以上卫生健康行政部门的要求,向指定的病原检测机构提供生物样本开展病原学检测并做好交接手续;未经批准,不得擅自向其他机构和个人提供生物样本及其相关信息。

五、受省级以上卫生健康行政部门委托开展病原学检测的机构,应当妥善使用和保管生物样本,并按照规定处理使用后剩余样本;未经批准不得向任何其他机构和个人提供生物样本、病原体、培养物及其相关信息。

六、在本通知发布前,已经从有关医疗卫生机构取得相关病例生物样本的机构和个人,应当立即将样本就地销毁或送交国家指定的保藏机构保管,并妥善保存有关实验活动记录及实验结果信息。

七、疫情防控工作期间,各类机构承担病原学检测任务所产生的信息属于特殊公共资源,任何机构和个人不得擅自对外发布有关病原检测或实验活动结果等信息;相关论文、成果发表须经委托

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部门审核同意。

八、各相关机构的工作人员要弘扬追求真理、严谨治学的求实精神，加强学风作风建设，在涉及重大传染病、不明原因疾病等研究中，要树立公共卫生意识，严守法律红线和科研底线。机构应当对涉及传染病、生物安全领域的研究及论文、成果进行审核；未经科学验证和审核的观点，不得向社会公开传播。

九、各级卫生健康行政部门要切实加强组织领导，按照属地化、分级分类的原则开展实验室生物安全监管工作，明确工作职责，强化能力建设和日常监管，及时消除安全隐患，努力防范和化解重大生物安全风险，确保实验室生物安全万无一失。

十、我委将加强执法检查，对违法违规使用生物样本，不按要求报告检测结果、擅自发布疫情相关信息的机构和个人，依法严肃处理。




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抄送：教育部、科技部、海关总署、中国科学院办公厅。

国家卫生健康委办公厅

2020年1月3日印发

校对：梁冰

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Subject: FW: Emailing: (b)(6)
Attachments: (b)(6).pdf

Mr. (b)(6)
Political Officer
American Institute in Taiwan
Office: (b)(6)
Mobile: (b)(6)
Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

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Page 1 of 13

财新内参

2020年2月3日

财新编辑部编辑
机密资料，仅供领导参阅

武汉已有 600 医务人员感染

一线医生反思：我很内疚，没有勇敢说出来

财新记者高昱、萧辉调查

财新记者在武汉疫情一线采访，发现医务人员出现感染的情况比较普遍，但尚未引起专门关注。一位了解内情的高级医务管理人员和医学专家明确地告诉财新记者，现在初步估计医务人员感染600人以上，重点有武汉协和、新华、中南、红会、后湖等医院。

目前，在新华医院临床感染的医生梁武东，1月25日已经在金银潭医院去世。

医务人员普遍防疫意识较强，一旦受感染，不仅影响医疗力量，影响士气，而且会在

医院形成交叉感染。这是2003年 SARS 疫情的重要教训之一，当时中国医务人员的感染率高达20%。财新建议对医务人员感染，特别是武汉及湖北地区的医务人员感染引起特别关注，数据公开，这对于防止疫情扩散有特殊意义。

医院疫情严重

武汉的医生是第一批接触病人的患者。

我们在采访中获悉，至迟到1月6日，距华南海鲜市场较近的新华医院的一位呼吸内科

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医生已出现发热等病症，根据肺部 CT 磨玻璃状阴影，确认为“疑似病人”。至11日，新华医院出现第二例医务人员感染，一名接触过疑患的神经内科女医生单侧出现磨玻璃状阴影，“像被子弹打过的一块一块的阴影”。1月16日，女医生再做肺部 CT，双肺感染，病情加重。

在1月中旬，新华医院内部做了一个新冠肺炎疫情防控方案（试行），但执行不力。除一线医生外，体检科、皮肤科、康复科、检验科等科室都有医护人员感染，甚至连保安也被感染，显示明显交叉感染迹象。有男医生查出来肺部磨玻璃状三天后，其妻也发现感染。他们家中有一个7岁的孩子。

1月16日，医院耳鼻喉科原主任梁武东出现发烧畏寒，CT显示全肺感染。1月18日，60岁的梁武东转入新冠肺炎的定点医院金银潭医院，于1月25日去世，成为此次武汉新冠肺炎疫情首位去世的医护人员。

新华医院共900多医务人员，最新感染数字难详。医生们说，一位体检科医生跟一名疑似患者客户交流了半小时，不久就查出肺部感染；一名牙医感染后，传给了放射科两位找他看牙的放射科医生；不仅是呼吸内科，其他二线科室甚至保安也感染了。

1月29日，该医内部通报，截至1月29日，该医院900多名医务人员中已经出现30多名新冠疑似病患，其中2人危重。

仅在武汉协和医院，五六千员工中，确诊和疑似的感染人数已经过百。至2月下旬，每天都20多名医务人员出现类新冠临床症状，CT人检查为典型的肺炎毛玻璃样。仅放射科已有3人被隔离。

武汉医院出现人传人，医护感染较普遍，也通过微信等互相知道。但总数据不详。例如在新华医院，规定 CT 检查怀疑对于肺部不明原因肺炎的，片子不可给本人，由科室统一交给医院内部的感染管理

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科。财新记者采访的武汉多位医生都透露，他们的医院也有类似规定——“检测结果不公开，阳性结果以电话通知”。

1月20日央视采访钟南山，首次透露曾有14名医务人员被感染；CDC 1月29日英文论文所提为15人，1名危重。这些数据远非医院感染真实的人数。

被威惧的知情医生

财新采访的当地许多医生被迫选择沉默，主要是因为“平安武汉”的威胁。

武汉于2019年12月30日首检新冠病毒，当时内部确定为SARS-related。由于患者及疫情由临床医生报告，确诊后医生们必然有所获知。当天，武汉市卫健委印发的《关于做好不明原因肺炎救治工作的紧急通知》，要求严格信息上报，并强调“未经授权任何单位，个人不得擅自对外发布救治信息”。

武汉中心医院眼科医生李文亮、医治同济肿瘤科医生谢琳卡等，通过不同渠道获知此

事，在微信群向同仁发出警示。2020年元旦，武汉警方微博“平安武汉”发布消息，“八名散布谣言者被依法查处”。

这份警方公告和对“吹哨人”的“依法处理”，犹如一道紧箍咒套牢了医生们。随着接诊越来越多的不明原因肺炎病人，越来越多的医生确认出现了不同寻常的传染病毒，而且人传人的迹象也越来越明显，但多数医生不再敢公开发声。

“吹哨人”李文亮已经于后在临床被感染，至2月1日仍然躺在武汉市中心医院呼吸与重症医学监护室的隔离病房里。他告诉财新记者，他的父母和一批同事均被感染。

财新采访的许多医生都悔不当初。新华医院放射科医生 ██████ 1月以来一直在一线，内心天人交战。这位有29年放射科经验的医生说：“现在很后悔。如果事情再来一次，哪怕失去公职，我也要勇敢把实情说出来。”

他说，过去见过很多肺炎

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病例，但很少看到这样磨玻璃状的影像。“我从没见过传染这么快的病毒，每过3-4天就翻1倍，这个增长速度太快了，太骇人了。1月18日我看到磨玻璃状的CT影像有86个，之后每天都超过100例，1月21日是136例，1月22日是137例。医院的CT机器每天超负荷运转，到1月20日就达到饱和状态，机器

都累傻了，经常死机，只能拍这么多，磨玻璃状的数字终于不再往上蹦了，因为达到极限了。”

“1月16日，我和一位同事私底下交流疫情，我的判断是一场流行传染病难以避免，同事说了一句经典的话，‘武汉将因此载入史册。’” [REDACTED] 流泪道，一语成讖。©

财新在武汉采访了新华医院一位有29年经验的放射科医生。以下为财新对话记录：

被威慑的一线知情医生

问：你是什么时候对新冠病毒有印象？

答：我最早听说这个病是在2019年12月30日，那天早上我在医院走廊上碰到一个同事，他跟我说：“运气不好，接到两个SARS病患”。我当时还认为他大惊小怪。

当天晚上，我又遇到一个神经内科的女医生，她在跟家人打电话，听得出来她非常焦虑，她说感冒了，身体不舒服。她老公在武汉市中心医院后湖医院，当天后湖医院也接诊了7名与华南海鲜市场有接触的类似病患。两位一线医生的焦虑，我有点警觉了。

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2019年12月31日，武汉市卫健委通报确认了27例不明原因的病毒性肺炎，但调查未发现明显人传人，未发现医务人员感染。看到卫健委的通报，我稍稍放心了。

问：你什么时候发现事情不对劲？

答：是1月6日，当时我们医院呼吸科一位男医生做CT检查，CT影像显示肺部有一小块阴影，初步显示磨玻璃状，但是他没有华南海鲜市场接触史。

1月11日，之前我说的那个神经内科女医生做CT检查，影像显示她的肺部感染较为严重，像被枪击穿的一小块一小块的阴影，我做了29年放射科医生，见过很多肺炎病例，但很少看到这样磨玻璃状的影像。这个女医生也没有华南海鲜市场接触史。当时卫健委的说法是没有发现人传人，但身边同事的病例，让我们已经不相信了。

问：那你什么时候感觉事态严重了呢？

答：2019年12月31日的时候，武汉市卫健委要求各医院发现不明原因的病毒性肺炎要上报，我们医院也上报了。2020年1月5日，武汉市卫健委又通报说，确认符合不明原因的病毒性肺炎诊断患者是59例。不知何故，从1月6日到1月10日，卫健委停止通报了，1月11日，武汉市卫健委更新疫情通报，病例数从59人减少为41人。但通报中仍表示，未发现医务人员感染，未发现明确的人传人证据。这和我从临床一线掌握的情况相差很大。

我是医院放射科医生，可以看到医院所有CT检查结果。我留心这个病毒感染的曲线变化，1月5日刚开始时，每天2-3个磨玻璃状影像，第二天4-5个，第三天7-8个，前三天增加不是很明显，个位数增加，之后突然就呈现倍数增长，到1月10日就有30个磨玻璃状，然后每过3-4天就翻1倍。我从没见过传染这么快的病毒，每过3-4天就翻1倍，这个增长速度太快了，太骇人了。

1月18日我看到磨玻璃状的CT影像有86个，之后每天都超过100例，1月21日是136例，1月22日是137例。医院的CT机器每天超负荷运转，到1月20日

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(b)(6)

财新内参

就达到饱和状态，机器都累傻了，经常死机，只能拍这么多，磨玻璃状的数字终于不再往上蹦了，因为达到极限了。

我有点吓住了，和其他医院放射科医生私下交流，他们医院大多也是这种情况。根据医院的规模和肺部磨玻璃状病例的比率，1月21日我就预估全市感染人数可能有1万人左右，那时候官方通报的数字才几百人。医院CT饱和后，我观测不到实际的感染率变化曲线，不好估计现在的疫情，但情况不容乐观。

1月16日，我和一位同事私底下交流疫情，我的判断是一场流行传染病难以避免，同事说了一句经典的话，“武汉将因此载入史册。”一语成谶。

问：作为一线医生，你们知道事态严重后，为何不向上级汇报或者提醒公众？

答：1月6日，我们医院有医生感染后，当天院方召集各科室负责人开会，科室主任回来传达指示，不得把相关情况泄露给外界，尤其是不能告诉给媒体。从1月6日开始，科室负责人通过微信群反复向我们强调：“不造谣不传谣，以免造成社会恐慌，对医院造成不利后果，严重者将承担法律责任。”上级态度如此，我们也不好多说，只能关起门来私下讨论。

真正震慑住我们的是武汉警方宣布依法查处八名散布谣言者，这件事对医疗界的封口起到很大作用。虽然我们有一线的数据，但大多不敢公开发声，怕被警方传唤。那八名敢于说真话的人据说基本都是医生，他们值得敬佩。我有时候在想，如果知道后来会酿成这么大的灾难，我宁愿牺牲公职，也要把事情说出来。当时害怕“被造谣”，懦弱了，选择了沉默。我只敢私底下在微博上发出隐晦的消息，“武汉的爹爹婆婆们，请戴好口罩。”我的微博关注者仅有数百人，人轻言微，没有人听到。

“我们医院死了十几个疑似病患”

问：医院对重症病患的救治效果怎样？

答：确诊病患之前集中在武汉市金银潭医院，我们医院集中力量救治重

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(b)(6)

财新内参

症疑似患者，除了用基本的药，也会用一些体外生命支持。要降低死亡率，才能稳定住社会情绪。我们医院死了十几个疑似病患，第一例死亡病例是呼吸内科的一名重症患者，他们都没有登记在官方公布的死亡名单中，因为都没有做病毒检测，只能是疑似病例。如果对重症病人治疗得当，死亡率控制在百分之一以内，情况就会不错。对于那些有基础病的老年患者，危险系数确实比较高。

问：为何有大量疑似病患住不了院的情况？

答：这个病毒传染太厉害了，等普通民众有警觉意识的时候，很多人已经传染了。刚才提到根据我们一线医生的预估，在1月21日疑似感染的病例可能就有上万人了，这段时间一直是感染的高发期，疑似病患的数字不断在往上翻滚，床位是有限的，只能优先那些已经确诊的病患和疑似重症患者，轻症患者在家隔离，这也是没有办法的事情。

我们医院门诊挤满了大量住不进院的疑似病患，有病人下跪哀求医生收治他，有的重症患者连爬上台子拍CT的力气都没有，颤颤巍巍的，这些爹爹婆婆真是可怜，他们或许原本可以避免遭受这些痛苦。这个时候，我们就感觉到了，他们是我们的乡亲，我们医护人员24小时轮流值班，要从死神手上抢救病人。

问：大量疑似患者为何难以确诊？

答：在1月16日之前，疑似病患确诊要通过三级审核，武汉疾控、湖北疾控还有中国疾控中心，过程繁杂而漫长，确诊的病例很少。之后这个审核权下放到省里，省、市二级审核，一开始有六家医院有上报疑似病患的资格，我们医院是其中一家。上报审核的流程分两步，第一步是各医院上报疑似病例样本，第二步省疾控中心从病例标本中抽查几份，取走做病毒检测。

刚开始，省疾控的监测能力一天就200-300份病毒样本，大家心知肚明各医院是有相应的上报指标。省疾控中心要求保证阳性率，虽然没有明文说，

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财新内参

但实际上各医院都能领会到只报重症疑似病患，控制上报数量。在前期通过控制检测病毒样本的数量，来控制确诊病例的增加，实际上也是一种控制的手段。有大量疑似病患超过十天都没有机会做病毒检测确诊。

现在增加了更多检测机构，加快检测样本数量和速度，确诊患者数量单日激增，这是很正常的现象，前期积累了大量疑似病患。希望尽快对所有的疑似病患做病毒检测，可以对疫情的发展进行摸底。

问：在现有医疗资源条件下，如何安排疑似病患，你有何建议？

答：现在医疗资源集中救治确诊者和重症疑似病患，政府也在加大力度提供更多的床位收治疑似病患。但床位还是远远不够，防疫的关键之点是阻断传染源，尤其是对大量疑似病患的隔离和护理。

现在疑似患者主要在家隔离，在家隔离缺少自觉性，也缺少医护人员的关照，我建议尽量把重症疑似病患收治住院；对于轻症病患，由政府征用宾馆安置，派少量的医护人员照顾，比如两三名护士照顾100名疑似轻症病患，需要的医疗资源相对较少。新冠肺炎发展很快，几天就能从轻症发展成重症，在早期治疗得当，可以减缓医疗压力。

有30多名本院医护人员感染

问：你们医院医护人员的感染状况如何？

答：卫健委没有公布医护人员的感染数字，我们医院在1月29日开会时通报有30多名本院医护人员感染，有两个重症患者。这个感染比例是比较高的，说明我们的院感是做得不成功的。

在1月中旬，医院内部做了一个新冠肺炎疫情防控方案（试行），但大家并没有太在意。尤其是不在一线的医护人员，对新冠病毒缺少认识，放松了警惕，导致不少医护人员感染。从我们医院的感染情况来看，在二线的医护人员和一线的医护人员感染几率差不多，体检科、皮肤科、康复科、检验科等科室都有医护人员感染，甚至连保安也感染了。体检科的一名医生和一位

财新内参

体检的客户有半个小时接触，后来那位体检客户肺部发生磨玻璃状病变，体检科医生立即去做 CT，显示正常，他很高兴，和朋友搓了一回麻将，一周后他的 CT 报告显示磨玻璃状。一位牙医感染了，没什么明显症状，放射科的两为医生去找牙医看牙，也感染了。

我在1月15日之后对这病毒就比较谨慎，没有防护服，我会穿着手术服工作，还要求我的同事也穿着手术服。但哪能料到他们两个被医院牙医感染了。这个病毒太狡猾了，预防很困难，但提高防护意识也是很有必要的。

问：医护人员感染风险大，你作为一线医生害怕吗？

答：医护人员感染，是很影响士气的，而且有可能再转让给病人。所以要加强防护，尽量减少医护人员感染。我们一线医生的想法就是有病治病，如果我们不幸感染了，那就去治病，治好了再回到岗位。对我们医生来说，看病救人是职业本分，不是我故意要把医生的职业说得崇高，就是本分，我们选择做医生这一行，就注定要承受这份风险。如果这个时候医生先恐慌了逃跑了，那情况肯定会更糟糕。

我是土生土长的武汉人，我对武汉的爹爹婆婆也是有感情的，虽然他们平时有这样那样的缺陷，但是在这场灾难面前，他们就是我们的乡亲，他们原本或许避免这些痛苦。我看到那些没有力气爬上 CT 台的重症病患，没有办法住院的病人，我的眼泪都要流出来了。我希望尽力去抢救他们。

问：医院如何对待感染的医护人员？有康复支持吗？

答：在1月11日前后，单位陆续有医护人员感染，很多同事害怕了，都到放射科做 CT 检查。1月11日，医院出了一条规定，对于拍出不明原因肺炎的，CT 片子及结果一律都不给本人。由科室统一交给院感科，由院感科口头通知本人。我当时不理解为何要出这项规定。

新冠肺炎大面积暴发后，医院里挤满了人，局面有点混乱，医院领导要应对的事情太多，对疑似感染的医护人员在心理上和情感上关爱不够。我们

财新内参

院里有疑似感染的医护人员在同事微信群里就悄悄消失了，他们不再说话。有个男同事查出来肺部磨玻璃状三天后，他的老婆也查出来，家里还有个7岁的小孩，不知道谁照顾。

问：你们单位医疗物资短缺吗？是如何筹集的？

答：医用口罩、防护服是消耗品，消耗得非常快，各大医院都短缺。到目前为止，我就从单位领到5个医学口罩，一般情况下我都是戴自己买的普通口罩，把两个普通口罩叠在一起戴。发热门诊直到1月27日都没有防护服，此前我都是用手术服改装成防护服使用。1月28日有私人定向捐赠，我开车去拉了1000套防护服、900个护目镜回来，首先分给了隔离病房和发热门诊的医护人员，还分给了打扫卫生的保洁员，她们也是高危人群。

接受捐赠物资有两种，一种是通过红十字会定额配发，程序是医院根据实际情况向武汉市卫健委上报实际需求，卫健委定额，把定额名单给红十字会，医院与红十字会对接捐赠物资。这个途径太慢了，手续繁杂，需要的防护服总是领不到。

还有一种是定向捐赠，专门指定捐给医院或者个人。定向捐赠给医院，需要医院物资科同意签收盖章，我们单位签收了一部分社会定向捐赠，领导也拒绝了一些定向捐赠，尤其是海外捐赠，担心通关报关太麻烦，等得太久。

有关系的医生可以到社会上去寻求帮助。这存在两个问题，一是社会捐赠的物资达不到医学使用标准，有的防护服实际只能起到防尘服的效果，造成了浪费；二是不利于有效监督。我知道一个医生在社会上募捐了2000个护目镜，但是同事没有从他那分到护目镜。这2000个护目镜去哪里了，是个问题。

武汉周边地区的医疗资源也很紧张，现在全国的救援物资向武汉倾斜，我认为武汉周边县市的灾情也很严重，也急需救援医疗物资。

我个人认为医疗救援物资由政府统一调配会更好，但是目前的调配机制和效率出了问题。

财新内参

当务之急是要对所有疑似病患摸底

问:从你在一线的观察来看,新冠肺炎病情现在处在什么阶段?什么时候拐点出现?

答:我从1月23日一直在单位值班,医院给我们在附近的宾馆开了房间,我没回过家。1月22日、23日本来上头决定我们医院关闭发热门诊,发热病患都去定点医院看,但1月24日又改了政策,我们医院发热门诊重新开门。病人还是不少,但总体来说比1月23日的高峰期少了一些,是疑似病患增长数降下来了,还是其他别的原因,比如社区医院分流,或者交通封城导致疑似病患看病难选择在家里呆着?原因还不清楚。

拐点什么时候出现,现在还不好说。我觉得当务之急是要对所有疑似病患做个摸底,合理安置疑似病患,切断传染源。只有疑似病患增长速度真正控制住了,增长曲线放缓了,到那时我们才能说疫情得到控制。现在我们还有一场艰难的战役要打。

从全国范围来说,1月23日武汉封城,有效阻止了更多疑似患者涌入全国,但封城之前已经有500万武汉人走出去了,全国其他城市一定要高度警惕。我看着武汉的传染速度指数级暴发,希望武汉在防疫阶段犯过的错误,其他城市不要再犯。必须集中十二分注意力来对付新冠病毒,这个病毒非常狡猾,传染力度太快了,切不可掉以轻心。以河南为例,与湖北相邻的河南,即使采取了断路等极端措施严防死守,但从公布的疫情来看,河南的新冠肺炎病人数量也是排在前面的。

世界卫生组织最近将新冠肺炎疫情列为国际关注的突发公共卫生事件,在全球拉响警报,有些国家从中国撤侨、停运航班。如果不能阻断病毒源,传染到全世界,在那些公共卫生条件差的国家内传播失控,将会酿成全球灾难。新冠病毒是人类面临的一次严峻挑战,大家要携手合作,共同抵抗人类的敌人。

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财新内参

问：你认为此次疫情，有哪些值得反思的？

答：教训当然是惨重的，在2019年12月30日发现并上报不明肺炎情况时，那时如果像现在这样采取严格措施严防死守，疫情或许可以避免。对于烈性传染病，防控比救治付出代价小得多。

通过这场疫情可以看出，中国缺少科学精神，我们的科学家缺少那种捍卫科学、为真理献身的精神；我们的一些官员对科学缺少尊敬和敬畏，大家互相欺骗推诿，造成的恶果就是百姓受了很多苦。警钟当长鸣，按科学规律办事，不能按个人意志办事，病毒又不会以个人意志为转移。

现在的当务之急是治病救人，先把病人救回来，问责是之后的事情，现在应当凝聚力量抵抗疫情。

（注：医生为新华医院放射科[REDACTED]医生。为保护消息来源，在公开报道中曾用名李云华。）

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
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
Wuhan: China's Biotech Center and a Model City for MCF Development

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PLA Contractor Involved in the Construction of the Wuhan Institute of Virology

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(b)(1); (b)(6)

PLA Presence at WIV Continued After Construction Completed

(b)(1); (b)(6)

WIV Personnel with Possible PLA Ties

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(6) identifies Two PLA Bio-Warfare Research Institutes: AMMS and ICD

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Official Chinese Websites Show Robust Cooperation between WIV and PLA AMMS

(b)(1); (b)(6)

PLA ICD May Be Linked to the WIV Through CAS and 863 Program

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

No Newcomer to Wuhan: The PLA and the Wuhan Institute for Biological Products


(b)(1); (b)(6)

Another PLA Link: WIV's Formal Partnership with WIBP


(b)(1)

Cyber Evidence of PLA Shadow Labs at WIV and Bioengineering University


(b)(1); (b)(6)



(b)(1)



(b)(1); (b)(6)



(b)(1); (b)(6)

Classified By: Name: (b)(6) Title: Director
Office: EXEC
Agency: AIT

Reason: 1.4 (a), (b), (d), (h)

Declassify On: 2045/08/04

Drafted By: TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Released By: TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Sensitive

Sender:	"SMART Archive" <>
Recipient:	SMART Core <>

From:	"Margolis, Jonathan A" (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
To:	(b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov> (b)(7)(C)
Subject:	FW: [redacted]
Date:	Mon, 4 Jan 2021 15:58:06 -0500

Please keep this close hold.

Thanks,

Jonathan

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 3:40 PM
To: Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: (b)(1);

As discussed.

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:58 PM
To: Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(7)(C)

Jonathan, further to your call, attached is the (b)(7)(E) EAP POC/drafter is David Feith. Thank you,
 (b)(6)

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 1/4/2046
Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 7:10 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Subject: RE: For records: (b)(7)(F)

Confirming receipt for the Specials – the updated AA and PRC article tab. Thank you!

(b)(6)
Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State
Secure: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

NOTE: Please always include the S_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov distro to ensure your message is received.

Official -SBU

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED/NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
Classified By: (b)(6) Special Assistant, Office:S, Agency:Department of State
Declassify On: 1/1/2046
Reasons: (Derived) Derived per DSCG

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:26 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Subject: RE: For records: (b)(7)(E)

Colleagues – per further discussion with (b)(6) please use the attached, which also adds an additional note (on the latest about WHO investigation timing) on page 3.

Thanks much.

++ other EAP fysa.

Official -SBU

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: Feith - DAS, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/31/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender:	"Margolis, Jonathan A" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

(b)(7)(E)

From: "Moore, Jonathan M" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: Margolis, Jonathan A (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: [REDACTED]
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 15:40:25 -0500

As discussed.

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Finerty, Tressa R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:58 PM
To: Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(7)(E)

Jonathan, further to your call, attached is the (b)(6) AA to S. EAP POC/drafter is David Feith. Thank you,
 (b)(6)

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046
 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 7:10 PM
To: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;
 SES-Line Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap,
 Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (h)(6)
 (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: For records (b)(7)(E)

Confirming receipt for the Specials – the updated AA and PRC article tab. Thank you!

(b)(6)

Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State
Secure: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

NOTE: Please always include the S_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov distro to ensure your message is received.

Official -SBU-

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
Classified By: (b)(6) Special Assistant, Office:S, Agency:Department of State
Declassify On: 1/1/2046
Reasons: (Derived) Derived per DSCG

From: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:26 PM
To: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov; SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: For records: (b)(7)(E)

Colleagues – per further discussion with Stephanie, please use the attached, which also adds an additional note (on the latest about WHO investigation timing) on page 3.

Thanks much.

++ other EAP fysa.

Official -SBU-

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
Classified By: Feith - DAS, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 12/31/2045
Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender:	"Moore, Jonathan M" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov
Recipient:	Margolis, Jonathan A (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov

(b)(1);
(b)(7)(
E)

202011164

~~SECRET//REL~~

(b)(1);
(b)(7)(
E)

(b)(7)(

~~(SBU)~~ The Secretary's Non-Secure Call with the
Foreign Ministers on New Intelligence on COVID Origins
Monday, January 04, 2020, 4:00 p.m., 60 minutes

PURPOSE

[Redacted Purpose Section]

(b)(5)

KEY OBJECTIVES

[Redacted Key Objectives Section]

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1);

Classified by: EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Atul Keshap

E.O. 13526, Reason(s): 1.4 b, c, and d

Declassify on: December 31, 2045

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1);
-2-

(b)(5)

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1);
/bV7VΓ

~~SECRET//RE~~ (b)(1);

-3-

(b)(5)

~~SECRET//RE~~ (b)(1)

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1);
-4-

Attachment:

Article on PRC Efforts to Halt Research on Covid-19 Origins

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1);

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(1);

-5-

Approved: EAP – Acting A/S Atul Keshap [AK]

Drafted: EAP/FO – David Feith, (b)(6)

Cleared:

D: Robert Palladino (ok)

P: David Hale (ok)

EAP/FO: Jonathan Fritz (ok)

S/P: (b)(6) (no response)

WHA: (b)(6) (ok)

EUR: Michael Murphy (ok)

INR: (b)(6) (info)

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(7)(

UNCLASSIFIED**China clamps down in hidden hunt for coronavirus origins**

By DAKE KANG, MARIA CHENG and SAM MCNEIL – December 30, 2020

MOJIANG, China (AP) — Deep in the lush mountain valleys of southern China lies the entrance to a mine shaft that once harbored bats with the closest known relative of the COVID-19 virus.

The area is of intense scientific interest because it may hold clues to the origins of the coronavirus that has killed more than 1.7 million people worldwide. Yet for scientists and journalists, it has become a black hole of no information because of political sensitivity and secrecy.

A bat research team visiting recently managed to take samples but had them confiscated, two people familiar with the matter said. Specialists in coronaviruses have been ordered not to speak to the press. And a team of Associated Press journalists was tailed by plainclothes police in multiple cars who blocked access to roads and sites in late November.

More than a year since the first known person was infected with the coronavirus, an AP investigation shows the Chinese government is strictly controlling all research into its origins, clamping down on some while actively promoting fringe theories that it could have come from outside China.

The government is handing out hundreds of thousands of dollars in grants to scientists researching the virus' origins in southern China and affiliated with the military, the AP has found. But it is monitoring their findings and mandating that the publication of any data or research must be approved by a new task force managed by China's cabinet, under direct orders from President Xi Jinping, according to internal documents obtained by the AP. A rare leak from within the government, the dozens of pages of unpublished documents confirm what many have long suspected: The clampdown comes from the top.

As a result, very little has been made public. Authorities are severely limiting information and impeding cooperation with international scientists.

"What did they find?" asked Gregory Gray, a Duke University epidemiologist who oversees a lab in China studying the transmission of infectious diseases from animals to people. "Maybe their data were not conclusive, or maybe they suppressed the data for some political reason. I don't know ... I wish I did."

The AP investigation was based on dozens of interviews with Chinese and foreign scientists and officials, along with public notices, leaked emails, internal data and the documents from China's cabinet and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. It reveals a pattern of government secrecy and top-down control that has been evident throughout the pandemic.

As the AP previously documented, this culture has delayed warnings about the pandemic, blocked the sharing of information with the World Health Organization and hampered early testing. Scientists familiar with China's public health system say the same practices apply to sensitive research.

"They only select people they can trust, those that they can control," said a public health expert who works regularly with the China CDC, declining to be identified out of fear of retribution. "Military teams and others are working hard on this, but whether it gets published all depends on the outcome."

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The pandemic has crippled Beijing's reputation on the global stage, and China's leaders are wary of any findings that could suggest they were negligent in its spread. The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and the National Health Commission, which are managing research into the coronavirus' origins, did not respond to requests for comment.

"The novel coronavirus has been discovered in many parts of the world," China's foreign ministry said in a fax. "Scientists should carry out international scientific research and cooperation on a global scale."

Some Chinese scientists say little has been shared simply because nothing of significance has been discovered.

"We've been looking, but we haven't found it," said Zhang Yongzhen, a renowned Chinese virologist.

China's leaders are far from alone in politicizing research into the origins of the virus. In April, President Donald Trump shelved a U.S.-funded project to identify dangerous animal diseases in China and Southeast Asia, effectively severing ties between Chinese and American scientists and complicating the search for virus origins. Trump also has accused China of setting off the pandemic through an accident at a Wuhan lab — a theory that some experts say cannot be ruled out but as yet has no evidence behind it.

Research into COVID-19's origins is critical to the prevention of future pandemics. Although a World Health Organization international team plans to visit China in early January to investigate what started the pandemic, its members and agenda had to be approved by China.

Some public health experts warn that China's refusal to grant further access to international scientists has jeopardized the global collaboration that pinpointed the source of the SARS outbreak nearly two decades ago. Jonna Mazet, a founding executive director of the UC Davis One Health Institute, said the lack of collaboration between Chinese and U.S. scientists was "a disappointment" and the inability of American scientists to work in China "devastating."

"There's so much speculation around the origins of this virus," Mazet said. "We need to step back...and let scientists get the real answer without the finger-pointing."

—

The hidden hunt for the origins of COVID-19 shows how the Chinese government has tried to steer the narrative.

The search started in the Huanan Seafood market in Wuhan, a sprawling, low-slung complex where many of the first human coronavirus cases were detected. Scientists initially suspected the virus came from wild animals sold in the market, such as civet cats implicated in the spread of SARS.

In mid-December last year, Huanan vendor Jiang Dafa started noticing people were falling ill. Among the first was a part-time worker in his 60s who helped clean carcasses at a stall; soon, a friend he played chess with also fell ill. A third, a seafood monger in his 40s, was infected and later died.

Patients began trickling into nearby hospitals, triggering alarms by late December that alerted the China CDC. CDC chief Gao Fu immediately sent a team to investigate.

At first, research appeared to be moving swiftly.

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Overnight on Jan. 1, the market suddenly was ordered shut, barring vendors from fetching their belongings, Jiang said. China CDC researchers collected 585 environmental samples from door handles, sewage and the floor of the market, and authorities sprayed the complex down with sanitizer. Later, they would cart out everything inside and incinerate it.

Internal China CDC data obtained by the AP shows that by Jan. 10 and 11, researchers were sequencing dozens of environmental samples from Wuhan. Gary Kobinger, a Canadian microbiologist advising WHO, emailed his colleagues to share his concerns that the virus originated at the market.

"This corona(virus) is very close to SARS," he wrote on Jan. 13. "If we put aside an accident ... then I would look at the bats in these markets (sold and 'wild')."

By late January, Chinese state media announced that 33 of the environmental samples had tested positive. In a report to WHO, officials said 11 specimens were more than 99% similar to the new coronavirus. They also told the U.N. health agency that rats and mice were common in the market, and that most of the positive samples were clustered in an area where vendors traded in wildlife.

In the meantime, Jiang avoided telling people he worked at Huanan because of the stigma. He criticized the political tussle between China and the U.S.

"It's pointless to blame anyone for this disease," Jiang said.

As the virus continued spreading rapidly into February, Chinese scientists published a burst of research papers on COVID-19. Then [a paper by two Chinese scientists](#) proposed without concrete evidence that the virus could have leaked from a Wuhan laboratory near the market. It was later taken down, but it raised the need for image control.

Internal documents show that the state soon began requiring all coronavirus studies in China to be approved by high-level government officials — a policy that critics say paralyzed research efforts.

[A China CDC lab notice](#) on Feb. 24 put in new approval processes for publication under "important instructions" from Chinese President Xi Jinping. [Other notices ordered CDC staff not to share any data, specimens or other information related to the coronavirus with outside institutions or individuals.](#)

Then on March 2, Xi emphasized "coordination" on coronavirus research, [state media reported](#).

The next day, China's cabinet, the State Council, centralized all COVID-19 publication under a special task force. [The notice, obtained by the AP and marked "not to be made public,"](#) was far more sweeping in scope than the earlier CDC notices, applying to all universities, companies and medical and research institutions.

The order said communication and publication of research had to be orchestrated like "a game of chess" under instructions from Xi, and [propaganda and public opinion teams](#) were to "guide publication." It went on to warn that those who publish without permission, "causing serious adverse social impact, shall be held accountable."

"The regulations are very strict, and they don't make any sense," said a former China CDC deputy director, who declined to be named because they were told not to speak to the media. "I think it's political, because people overseas could find things being said there that might contradict what China says, so it's all being controlled."

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After the secret orders, the tide of research papers slowed to a trickle. Although China CDC researcher Liu Jun returned to the market nearly 20 times to collect some 2,000 samples over the following months, nothing was released about what they revealed.

On May 25, CDC chief Gao finally broke the silence around the market in an interview with China's Phoenix TV. He said that, unlike the environmental samples, no animal samples from the market had tested positive.

The announcement surprised scientists who didn't even know Chinese officials had taken samples from animals. It also ruled out the market as the likely source of the virus, along with further research that showed many of the first cases had no ties to it.

With the market proving a dead end, scientists turned more attention to hunting for the virus at its likely source: bats.

Nearly a thousand miles away from the wet market in Wuhan, bats inhabit the maze of underground limestone caves in Yunnan province. With its rich, loamy soil, fog banks and dense plant growth, this area in southern China bordering Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar is one of the most biologically diverse on earth.

At one Yunnan cave visited by the AP, with thick roots hanging over the entrance, bats fluttered out at dusk and flew over the roofs of a nearby small village. White droppings splattered the ground near an altar in the rear of the cave, and Buddhist prayer strings of red and yellow twine hung from the stalactites. Villagers said the cave had been used as a sacred place presided over by a Buddhist monk from Thailand.

Contact like this between bats and people praying, hunting or mining in caves alarms scientists. The coronavirus' genetic code is strikingly similar to that of bat coronaviruses, and most scientists suspect COVID-19 jumped into humans either directly from a bat or via an intermediary animal.

Since bats harboring coronaviruses are found in China and throughout Southeast Asia, the wild animal host of COVID-19 could be anywhere in the region, said Linfa Wang at Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

"There is a bat somewhere with a 99.9% similar virus to the coronavirus," Wang said. "Bats don't respect these borders."

COVID-19 research is proceeding in countries such as Thailand, where Dr. Supaporn Wacharapluesadee, a coronavirus expert, is leading teams of scientists deep into the countryside to collect samples from bats. During one expedition in August, Supaporn told the AP the virus could be found "anywhere" there were bats.

Chinese scientists quickly started testing potential animal hosts. Records show that Xia Xueshan, an infectious diseases expert, received a 1.4 million RMB (\$214,000) grant to screen animals in Yunnan for COVID-19. State media reported in February that his team collected hundreds of samples from bats,

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snakes, bamboo rats and other animals, and ran a picture of masked scientists in white lab coats huddled around a large, caged porcupine.

Then the government restrictions kicked in. Data on the samples still has not been made public, and Xia did not respond to requests for an interview. Although Xia has co-authored more than a dozen papers this year, an AP review shows, only two were on COVID-19, and neither focused on its origins.

Today, the caves that scientists once surveyed are under close watch by the authorities. Security agents tailed the AP team in three locations across Yunnan, and stopped journalists from visiting the cave where researchers in 2017 identified the species of bats responsible for SARS. At an entrance to a second location, a massive cave teeming with tourists taking selfies, authorities shut the gate on the AP.

"We just go a call from the county," said a park official, before an armed policeman showed up.



Vehicles blocking AP journalists from visiting a mine shaft where the closest known relative of the COVID-19 virus was found.

Particularly sensitive is the mine shaft where the closest relative of the COVID-19 virus — called "RaTG13" — was found.

RaTG13 was discovered after an outbreak in 2012, when six men cleaning the bat-filled shaft fell ill with mysterious bouts of pneumonia, killing three. The Wuhan Institute of Virology and the China CDC both studied bat coronaviruses from this shaft. And although most scientists believe the COVID-19 virus had its origins in nature, some say it or a close relative could have been transported to Wuhan and leaked by mistake.

Wuhan Institute of Virology bat expert Shi Zhengli has repeatedly denied this theory, but Chinese authorities haven't yet allowed foreign scientists in to investigate.

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Some state-backed scientists say research is proceeding as usual. Famed virologist Zhang, who received [a 1.5 million RMB \(\\$230,000\) grant](#) to search for the virus' origins, said partnering scientists are sending him samples from all over, including from bats in Guizhou in southern China and rats in Henan hundreds of miles north.

"Bats, mice, are there any new coronaviruses in them? Do they have this particular coronavirus?" Zhang said. "We've been doing this work for over a decade. It's not like we just started today."

Zhang declined to confirm or comment on reports that his lab was briefly closed after publishing the virus' genetic sequence ahead of authorities. He said he hasn't heard of any special restrictions on publishing papers, and the only review his papers go through is a routine scientific one by his institution.

But scientists without state backing complain that getting approval to sample animals in southern China is now extremely difficult, and that little is known about the findings of government-sponsored teams.

—

Even as they controlled research within China, Chinese authorities promoted theories that suggested the virus came from elsewhere.

The government gave Bi Yuhai, the Chinese Academy of Sciences scientist [tapped to spearhead origins research](#), a 1.5 million RMB grant (\$230,000), [records show](#). [A paper co-authored by Bi](#) suggested an outbreak in a Beijing market in June could have been caused by packages of contaminated frozen fish from Europe.

China's government-controlled media [used the theory](#) to suggest the original outbreak in Wuhan could have started with seafood imported from abroad — a notion international scientists reject. WHO has said it is very unlikely that people can be infected with COVID-19 via packaged food, and that it is "highly speculative" to suggest COVID-19 did not start in China. Bi did not respond to requests for an interview, and China has not provided enough virus samples for a definitive analysis.

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Posters in southern China's Yunnan province advising people not to eat wild animals.

The Chinese state press also has widely covered initial studies from Europe suggesting COVID-19 was found in wastewater samples in [Italy](#) and [Spain](#) last year. But scientists have largely dismissed these studies, and the researchers themselves acknowledged they did not find enough virus fragments to determine conclusively if it was the coronavirus.

And in the last few weeks, Chinese state media has [taken out of context](#) research from a German scientist, interpreting it to suggest that the pandemic began in Italy. The scientist, Alexander Kekule, director of the Institute for Biosecurity Research, has said repeatedly that he believes the virus first emerged in China.

Internal documents show that various government bodies also sponsored studies on the possible role of the Southeast Asian pangolin, a scaly anteater once prized in traditional Chinese medicine, as an intermediary animal host. Within the span of three days in February, Chinese scientists put out [four separate papers on coronaviruses](#) related to COVID-19 in trafficked Malayan pangolins from Southeast Asia seized by customs officials in Guangdong.

But many experts now say the theory is unlikely. Wang of the Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore said the search for the coronavirus in pangolins did not appear to be “scientifically driven.” He said blood samples would be the most conclusive evidence of COVID-19’s presence in the rare mammals, and so far, no incriminating matches have been found.

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WHO has said more than 500 species of other animals, including cats, ferrets and hamsters, are being studied as possible intermediary hosts for COVID-19.

The Chinese government is also limiting and controlling the search for patient zero through the re-testing of old flu samples.

Chinese hospitals collect thousands of samples from patients with flu-like symptoms every week and store them in freezers. They could easily be tested again for COVID-19, although politics could then determine whether the results are made public, said Ray Yip, the founding director of the U.S. CDC office in China.

"They'd be crazy not to do it," Yip said. "The political leadership will wait for that information to see, does this information make China look stupid or not? ... If it makes China look stupid, they won't."

In the U.S., CDC officials long ago tested roughly 11,000 early samples collected under the flu surveillance program since Jan. 1. And in Italy, researchers recently found a boy who had fallen ill in November 2019 and later tested positive for the coronavirus.

But in China, scientists have only published retrospective testing data from two Wuhan flu surveillance hospitals — out of at least 18 in Hubei province alone and well over 500 across the country. The data includes just 520 samples out of the 330,000 collected in China last year.

These enormous gaps in the research aren't due just to a lack of testing but also to a lack of transparency. Internal data obtained by the AP shows that by Feb. 6, the Hubei CDC had tested over 100 samples in Huanggang, a city southeast of Wuhan. But the results have not been made public.

The little information that has dribbled out suggests the virus was circulating well outside Wuhan in 2019 — a finding that could raise awkward questions for Chinese officials about their early handling of the outbreak. Chinese researchers found that a child over a hundred kilometers from Wuhan had fallen ill with the virus by Jan. 2, suggesting it was spreading widely in December. But earlier samples weren't tested, according to a scientist with direct knowledge of the study.

"There was a very deliberate choice of the time period to study, because going too early could have been too sensitive," said the scientist, who declined to be named out of fear of retribution.

A WHO report written in July but published in November said Chinese authorities had identified 124 cases in December 2019, including five cases outside Wuhan. Among WHO's aims for its upcoming visit to China are reviews of hospital records before December.

Coronavirus expert Peter Daszak, a member of the WHO team, said identifying the pandemic's source should not be used to assign guilt.

"We're all part of this together," he said. "And until we realize that, we're never going to get rid of this problem."

—

Kang reported from Beijing and Cheng reported from London. Associated Press journalists Han Guan Ng and Emily Wang in Wuhan, China, Haven Daley in Stinson Beach, California, and Tassanee Vejpongsa in Kanchanaburi, Thailand, contributed to this report.

(b)(7)(E)

From: "Moore, Jonathan M" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: [REDACTED]
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 15:41:30 -0500

For discussion when we're both in the office.

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046
 Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:58 PM
To: Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Shaw, Marc L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: (b)(7)(E)

Jonathan, further to your call, attached is the (b)(7)(E) EAP POC/drafter is David Feith. Thank you,
 (b)(6)

Official

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)
 Classified By: Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath - DepExecSec, Office:S/E-S, Agency:U.S. Department of State
 Declassify On: 1/4/2046
 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 7:10 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper <SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES-Line Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov> (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: RE: For records: (b)(7)(E)

Confirming receipt for the Specials – the updated AA and PRC article tab. Thank you!

(b)(6)

Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State

Secure: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

NOTE: Please always include the S_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov distro to ensure your message is received.

Official - SBU

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: (b)(6) Special Assistant, Office:S, Agency:Department of State

Declassify On: 1/1/2046

Reasons: (Derived) Derived per DSCG

From: Feith, David <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:26 PM

To: Syptak-Ramnath, Stephanie F (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; SES_FO Paper
<SES_FOPaper@state.sgov.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>;

SES-Line_Only <SES-Line_Only@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap,

Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Subject: RE: For records: (b)(7)(E)

Colleagues – per further discussion with Stephanie, please use the attached, which also adds an additional note (on the latest about WHO investigation timing) on page 3.

Thanks much.

++ other EAP fysa.

Official - SBU

This message is **UNCLASSIFIED** when separated from **SECRET** attachment(s)

Classified By: Feith - DAS, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/31/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender:	"Moore, Jonathan M (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From:	"Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject:	FW: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement
Date:	Mon, 4 Jan 2021 18:31:37 -0500

FYSA, nodis please.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 2:16 PM
To: Biegun, Stephen E (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Hale, David <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ford, Christopher A <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Krach, Keith J (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Brown, Cale (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Cc: Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; EAP-Staffers Mailbox <EAPStaffers@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: ACTION: Flagging Draft S Statement

Colleagues,

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

V/R
Dave

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; DiNanno, Thomas G (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: CLOSE HOLD: WIV Declassification Effort Heads Up
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 17:25:14 -0500

(b)(5)

~~(SBU)~~ **Hong Kong Update:** In response to the arrest of 53 people in Hong Kong on January 6, including an American, the Secretary released a statement condemning the actions and outlining future actions.

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(1);
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Classified By: (b)(6) - Deputy Director, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 1/5/2046
Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

~~Official - Sensitive~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(6) - Deputy Director, Office:EAP/CM, Agency:U.S. Department of State
Declassify On: 1/5/2046
Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

Sender:	(b)(6)	@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)	@state.sgov.gov>

From:	"Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
To:	Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; S_SpecialAssistants <S_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>
CC:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Subject:	COVID origins material
Date:	Wed, 30 Dec 2020 10:53:54 -0500

Lisa and team, as requested, please see attached on COVID origins info:

1. Unclassified language from ODNI.
2. Draft S statement.

Thanks.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State
202.647.4612 (office)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov (SIPR)

(b)(6)@state.ic.gov (JWICS)

Official

This message is ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ when separated from UNCLASSIFIED attachment(s)

Classified By: Feith - DAS, Office:EAP, Agency:U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 12/30/2045

Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender:	"Feith, David" (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>
Recipient:	Kenna, Lisa D (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; S_SpecialAssistants <S_SpecialAssistants@state.sgov.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>; Keshap, Atul <(b)(6)@state.sgov.gov>

From:	"SMART Archive" <>
To:	SMART Core <>
Subject:	(U) USARPAC OSIR-13-410-0272-China Says No Evidence Wuhan Virus Created in Laboratory
Date:	Fri, 17 Apr 2020 19:25:07 GMT

UNCLASSIFIED

MRN: 20 CDRUSARPAC G2 FT SHAFTER HI 4170523

Date/DTG: Apr 17, 2020 / 171923Z APR 20

From: CDRUSARPAC G2 FT SHAFTER HI

Action: ZEN/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC CG FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDR205THMIBN FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC DCSENG FT SHAFTER HI; KATHMANDU, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDR501STGCCIDCK PYONGTAEK KOR; NEW DELHI, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC COIC FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC G1 FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDRICORPS (FWD) COMMAND CENTER CP ZAMA JA; BANGKOK, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/JICPAC HONOLULU HI; ZEN/CDR501STDISE SEOUL KOR; TOKYO, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDRICORPS EOC FT LEWIS WA; SEOUL, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA; ZEN/ALCOM J02 ELMENDORF AFB AK; ZEN/CDR500MIBDE SCHOFIELD BARRACKS HI; ZEN/COMSOPAC HONOLULU HI; ZEN/CDRICORPS SSO FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC G2 FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/COMNAVFORJAPAN DET OKINAWA JA; BEIJING, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC DCSMED FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDRICORPS TES FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/CDRINSCOM ACO FT GEORGE G MEADE MD; ZEN/CDR501STBDEMGSN PYONGTAEK KOR; ZEN/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR; ZEN/COMNAVFORKOREA BUSAN KOR; ZEN/EMBASSY OF THAILAND WASHINGTON DC; SINGAPORE, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; TAIPEI, AIT *ROUTINE*; ANKARA, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDRICORPS G3 FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/CDRICORPS G2 FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/CDRICORPS SGS FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/CDR205THASASAS FT SHAFTER HI; MANILA, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; JAKARTA, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CDRICORPS G6 FT LEWIS WA; ZEN/COMNAVFORJAPAN INTEL YOKOSUKA JA; ZEN/COMSOPAC SOJ2; ZEN/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA; ZEN/CDR205THASASSS KUNIA HI; ZEN/DIA WASHINGTON DC; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC IG FT SHAFTER HI; ZEN/CDRINSCOMIOC FT BELVOIR VA; ZEN/HQ INSCOM G2X FT BELVOIR VA; ZEN/CDRUSARPAC G35 EXERCISE FT SHAFTER HI; KUALA LUMPUR, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; ZEN/CG III MEF; ZEN/CDR501STMIBDE INTEL SEOUL KOR; ZEN/OSC RESTON VA; ZEN/ONI WASHINGTON DC; ZEN/MCIA QUANTICO VA; ZEN/NGIC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE

VA; ZEN/CDRNGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA; ZEN/CDRUSACYBER FT BELVOIR VA; ZEN/CDRUSACYBER G3 FT BELVOIR VA; ZEN/513TH MI BDE OSINT CELL FORT GORDON GA; ZEN/APTCAE KUNIA HI; ZEN/RTCAE KUNIA HI; ZEN/CDR501STGCCTCAE PYONGTAEK KOR
Subject: (U) USARPAC OSIR-13-410-0272-China Says No Evidence Wuhan Virus Created in Laboratory

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

1. (U) OVERALL CLASSIFICATION: /UNCLASSIFIED/
2. (U) TITLE: China Says No Evidence Wuhan Virus Created in Laboratory
3. (U) SERIAL NUMBER: OSIR-13-410-0272-FY20
4. (U) DATE OSIR GENERATED: 16 April 2020
5. (U) DATE OF ACCESS: 16 April 2020
6. (U) REQUIREMENT NUMBER: USARPAC-RFI-089-20, USARPAC-RFI-109-20, 902650487, 902650136, 902649860, 902650998
7. (U) OWNING ORGANIZATION: USARPAC G2
8. (U) COUNTRY/TOPIC CODE/ TARGET CODE/BE#: CHN, USA
9. (U) CONTAINS U.S. PERSONS INFORMATION (USPI): N
10. (U) COORDINATES: N/A
11. (U) ORGANIZATION PRIORITY: High
12. (U) WARNINGS: This report is to provide initial publicly-available information (PAI) on a developing event. This is single source information and is not finally evaluated intelligence. Research and analysis is on-going and additional updates will be provided as needed.
13. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, told reporters that World Health Organization officials have said, "multiple times there is no evidence the new coronavirus was created in a laboratory." His statement follows remarks made by POTUS on 15 April 2020 that the U.S. government is trying to determine if the Wuhan Virus originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
14. (U) BODY OF TEXT: On 16 April 2020, during a daily briefing, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, told reporters World Health Organization (WHO) officials have said, "multiple times there is no evidence the new coronavirus was created in a laboratory." He also said, "Many well-known experts in the world also believe that there is no scientific basis for such claims as laboratory leaks."
(U) Zhao's statement follows 15 April 2020 remarks made by POTUS that the U.S. government is trying to determine if the Wuhan Virus (COVID-19) originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, China. POTUS's statement was in response to a Fox News report that the U.S. government had "increasing confidence" from "classified and open-source" sources that the Wuhan Virus is a bat-to-human virus that originated in a Wuhan laboratory. Fox News reports from multiple sources that the virus did not originate as a bioweapon, but are "part of China's attempt to demonstrate that its efforts to identify and combat viruses are equal to or greater than the United States."
(U) According to Chinese state-sponsored media source, Global Times, the Fox News organization was criticized by netizens and experts for demonstrating a "lack of professionalism" in not explaining how their anonymous sources acquired the information. Global Times also reports that Fox News is "known as a hub for fake news about coronavirus."
(U) On 16 April 2020, the Global Times highlighted a social media post containing a video from Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin, calling the Fox News claim "outrageous." Hu also said "27 of the world's top scientists" have issued statements opposing the "conspiracy theory" that the Wuhan Virus originated in a laboratory and emphasized that the virus was a natural occurrence. Hu also accused Fox News of creating "fake news" for political purposes.
(U) Other media outlets besides Fox News have speculated the coronavirus may have originated in a laboratory. In a 14 April 2020 article, Forbes reported that "China has not been forthcoming" regarding the origins of the Wuhan Virus. The article claims the Wuhan Institute of Virology (30.539211, 114.350903) conducted studies on bat coronaviruses while maintaining "sub-par safety standards."
15. (U) COLLECTOR COMMENT: Information included in this report was obtained from U.S. and foreign

media sources, including social media. For more information on the Wuhan Virus (COVID-19) outbreak, please visit the USARPAC OSINT Center's Highpoint page or contact us using the information below.

16. (U) FILE ATTACHMENTS: N/A

17. (U) FILE LOCATION: N/A

18. (U) FILE CAPTION: Figure 1 - (U) Social media post from the Global Times with Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin accusing Fox News of creating "fake news" for serve political gain (Twitter, 2020

19. (U) SOURCE INFORMATION: Due to OPSEC and cybersecurity concerns, consumers are strongly advised to comply with their own command policies before attempting to access any of the foreign websites cited in this report.

[[BULLET]] (U) Website; Forbes; "China Lab In Focus Of Coronavirus Outbreak"; 2020-04-14; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/14/the-washington-post-goes-rogue-china-lab-in-focus-of-coronavirus-outbreak/#2d9713c31ee1>

(U) Website; Fox News "Sources believe coronavirus outbreak originated in Wuhan lab as part of China's efforts to compete with US"; 2020-04-15; <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/coronavirus-wuhan-lab-china-compete-us-sources>

[[BULLET]] (U) Website; Global Times; "Fox News berated as fake news hub spreading conspiracies about COVID-19"; 2020-04-16; [hxxps://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185825.shtml](https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185825.shtml)

[[BULLET]] (U) Website; Reuters; "China says WHO has said no evidence coronavirus was made in a lab"; 2020-04-16;

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-mofa/china-says-who-has-said-no-evidence-coronaviruswas-made-in-a-lab-idUSKCN21Y0U4?utm_source=reddit.com

[[BULLET]] (U) Website; Straits Times; "Trump says US investigating whether coronavirus came from Wuhan Lab"; 2020-04-16;

[hxxps://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/trump-says-us-investigating-whether-virus-came-from-wuhan-lab](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/trump-says-us-investigating-whether-virus-came-from-wuhan-lab)

[[BULLET]] (U) Website; Twitter; "Global Times @globaltimesnews"; 2020-04-15;

<https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1250839408518950912>

20.(U) NOTICE: This is an Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysis report based on exploitation of primary PAI materials. It has not been coordinated with other US Government components unless otherwise indicated. Information contained herein is intended to enhance situation awareness and supplement classified collection and reporting.

We request customers provide feedback and evaluate this report using the email provided below.

21. (U) OSIR OWNER ORGANIZATION POC DATA:US Army Pacific Open Source Intelligence Center Ft. Shafter, Hawaii

Office: 808.438.6898 / TANDBERG: 915.4870; NIPR: usarmy.shafter.usarpac.list.g2-osint@mail.mil

SIPRNET: usarmy.shafter.usarpac.list.g2-osint@mail.smil.mil

USARPAC OSINT Team products are available at <https://go.ic.gov/rL45663> (<https://go.ic.gov/rL45663>)

Attachments: OSIR-13-410-0272-FY20 China says No Evidence Wuhan Virus Created in Laboratory.pdf

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"SMART Archive" <>
Recipient:	SMART Core <>



UNCLASSIFIED
USARPAC OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER
UNITED STATES ARMY PACIFIC G2
FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII 96858



OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

1. (U) OVERALL CLASSIFICATION: /UNCLASSIFIED/
 2. (U) TITLE: **China Says No Evidence Wuhan Virus Created in Laboratory**
 3. (U) SERIAL NUMBER: **OSIR-13-410-0272-FY20**
 4. (U) DATE OSIR GENERATED: **16 April 2020**
 5. (U) DATE OF ACCESS: **16 April 2020**
 6. (U) REQUIREMENT NUMBER: **USARPAC-RFI-089-20, USARPAC-RFI-109-20, 902650487, 902650136, 902649860, 902650998**
 7. (U) OWNING ORGANIZATION: **USARPAC G2**
 8. (U) COUNTRY/TOPIC CODE/ TARGET CODE/BE#: **CHN, USA**
 9. (U) CONTAINS U.S. PERSONS INFORMATION (USPI): **N**
 10. (U) COORDINATES: **N/A**
 11. (U) ORGANIZATION PRIORITY: **High**
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- (U) Zhao's statement follows 15 April 2020 remarks made by POTUS that the U.S. government is trying to determine if the Wuhan Virus (COVID-19) originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, China. POTUS's statement was in response to a *Fox News* report that the U.S. government had "increasing confidence" from "classified and open-source" sources that the Wuhan Virus is a bat-to-human virus that originated in a Wuhan laboratory. *Fox News* reports from multiple sources that the virus did not originate as a bioweapon, but are "part of China's attempt to demonstrate that its efforts to identify and combat viruses are equal to or greater than the United States."

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

(U) According to Chinese state-sponsored media source, *Global Times*, the *Fox News* organization was criticized by netizens and experts for demonstrating a “lack of professionalism” in not explaining how their anonymous sources acquired the information. *Global Times* also reports that *Fox News* is “known as a hub for fake news about coronavirus.”

(U) On 16 April 2020, the *Global Times* highlighted a social media post containing a video from Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin, calling the *Fox News* claim “outrageous.” Hu also said “27 of the world’s top scientists” have issued statements opposing the “conspiracy theory” that the Wuhan Virus originated in a laboratory and emphasized that the virus was a natural occurrence. Hu also accused *Fox News* of creating “fake news” for political purposes.



Pinned Tweet (U)

GT Global Times ✓
@globaltimesnews

Fox News is creating fake news to help the president's reelection campaign. This is an unscrupulous manipulation that lets the media serve politics and should be condemned by the global press: Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin #HuSays

HU SAYS
胡侃

Fox News quoted an anonymous source
福克斯新闻援引匿名消息源

16.3K views 0:05 / 1:52

7:32 AM · Apr 16, 2020 · Twitter Media Studio

Figure 1 - (U) Social media post from the Global Times with Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin accusing Fox News of using “fake news” for political gain (Twitter, 2020)

(U) Other media outlets besides *Fox News* have speculated the coronavirus may have originated in a laboratory. In a 14 April 2020 article, *Forbes* reported that “China has not been forthcoming” regarding the origins of the

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Wuhan Virus. The article claims the Wuhan Institute of Virology (30.539211, 114.350903) conducted studies on bat coronaviruses while maintaining “sub-par safety standards.”

15. (U) COLLECTOR COMMENT: Information included in this report was obtained from U.S. and foreign media sources, including social media. For more information on the Wuhan Virus (COVID-19) outbreak, please visit the USARPAC OSINT Center’s Highpoint page or contact us using the information below.

16. (U) FILE ATTACHMENTS: N/A

17. (U) FILE LOCATION: N/A

18. (U) FILE CAPTION: Figure 1 – (U) Social media post from the *Global Times* with Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin accusing *Fox News* of creating “fake news” for serve political gain (Twitter, 2020)

19. (U) SOURCE INFORMATION: *Due to OPSEC and cybersecurity concerns, consumers are strongly advised to comply with their own command policies before attempting to access any of the foreign websites cited in this report.*

- (U) Website; Forbes; “China Lab In Focus Of Coronavirus Outbreak”; 2020-04-14; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/14/the-washington-post-goes-rogue-china-lab-in-focus-of-coronavirus-outbreak/#2d9713c31ee1>
- (U) Website; Fox News “Sources believe coronavirus outbreak originated in Wuhan lab as part of China’s efforts to compete with US”; 2020-04-15; <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/coronavirus-wuhan-lab-china-compete-us-sources>
- (U) Website; Global Times; “Fox News berated as fake news hub spreading conspiracies about COVID-19”; 2020-04-16; <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185825.shtml>
- (U) Website; Reuters; “China says WHO has said no evidence coronavirus was made in a lab”; 2020-04-16; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-mofa/china-says-who-has-said-no-evidence-coronavirus-was-made-in-a-lab-idUSKCN21Y0U4?utm_source=reddit.com
- (U) Website; Straits Times; “Trump says US investigating whether coronavirus came from Wuhan Lab”; 2020-04-16; <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/trump-says-us-investigating-whether-virus-came-from-wuhan-lab>
- (U) Website; Twitter; “Global Times @globaltimesnews”; 2020-04-15; <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1250839408518950912>

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We request customers provide feedback and evaluate this report using the email provided below.

21. (U) OSIR OWNER ORGANIZATION POC DATA:

US Army Pacific Open Source Intelligence Center
Ft. Shafter, Hawaii

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

April 28, 2020

The Honorable Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20050

Dear Secretary Pompeo,

We write to request information about the Administration's response to reports of safety and management concerns at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Such information is critical to Congress's responsibility to enact legislation to respond to the current pandemic and prevent the next outbreak.

We understand that as early as January 2018 Department officials issued warnings about the WIV, including the serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians needed to safely manage research on potentially deadly zoonotic coronaviruses. While the exact origin of the 2019 novel coronavirus has not yet been determined and there is no evidence linking the virus to the WIV, it is important to understand how the administration responded to these warnings. This is not academic: unless we fully understand what happened we will be unable to effectively act and lead the world to prevent the next global pandemic.

We understand that in the first months of 2018, senior officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate in Wuhan led multiple delegations to the WIV. In a series of reporting cables sent to the Secretary of State, the delegation warned about severe safety and management weaknesses at the lab. They explained that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses with potential for human transmission was made even more dangerous by these shortcomings. The cable reportedly provided recommendations for increased U.S. engagement and technical assistance.

It would be irresponsible for such dire warnings not to be taken seriously. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available evidence that the administration gave these warnings the attention they merited. Instead, throughout 2018 and 2019 the Administration dramatically rolled back public health engagement in China. This included a two-thirds staff reduction at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) office in Beijing and the elimination of a U.S. advisor position embedded in China's CDC, among other changes.

Understanding what happened at the WIV is critical to keeping Americans safe. We urgently need to fully understand the origins of this pandemic because the next pandemic will not wait. Indeed, if COVID-19 did accidentally escape from this lab, we need to understand what happened and how this could have been prevented, and work with the World Health Organization to ensure the security and safe management of sensitive bioresearch laboratories. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic originated naturally through animal-to-human transmission, as

many scientists believe, the State Department cables suggest the risk of a new virus emerging from a laboratory due to lax safety procedures or other accidental release remains high.

Therefore, we respectfully request that you transmit any cables concerning the WIV to Congress and provide an immediate and complete accounting of the administration's response to these cables, including:

- What specific concerns and recommendations were provided in these cables?
- What follow up and monitoring was done to investigate the assertions made in these cables, assess the scope of the problem, and understand what actions could be taken to address these concerns?
- Were the cables shared with any other agencies or White House staff members?
- What specific diplomatic actions did the State Department take to engage China's national or regional governments regarding WIV safety and management?
- Which staff were responsible for following up on these claims? Were they provided sufficient resources to do so?
- What additional programmatic or technical assistance was either offered or provided by the U.S. government to the lab or regional Wuhan government?
- In the context of these alarming reports, why were key CDC staff positions, including the resident CDC advisor position in Beijing, eliminated in 2018 and 2019?

We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Christopher S. Murphy
United States Senator

Edward J. Markey
United States Senator

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MRN: 18 WUHAN 38
Date/DTG: Apr 19, 2018 / 190551Z APR 18
From: AMCONSUL WUHAN
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, PGOV, CN, PREL, TBIO, KGHI, CDC, EAID, KHIV, IN, JP, TW, TSPL, PINS, SENV
Captions: ~~SENSITIVE~~
Reference: A) 18 BEIJING 138
 B) 17 BEIJING 2458
 C) 11 MUMBAI 630
 D) 17 TOKYO 716
 E) 13 SEOUL 790
Subject: China Virus Institute Welcomes More U.S. Cooperation on Global Health Security

1. (SBU) **Summary with Comment:** China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

End Summary with

Comment.

2. (U) Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers and staff gave an overview of the lab and current cooperation with the United States to visiting Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counsellor Rick Switzer and Consulate Wuhan Consul General Jamie Fouss in late March. In the last year, the institute has also hosted visits from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation, and experts from the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston. The institute reports to the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing.

P4 Lab is Open and Transparent, Officials Emphasize

3. (SBU) The Wuhan P4 lab, referring to labs with the highest level of safety precautions, became fully operational and began working with live viruses early this year. Institute officials said they believed it is the only operational P4 lab in Asia aside from a U.S. Centers for Disease

Control (CDC)-supported facility in Pune, India (Ref C). China plans to stand up a second P4 lab in Harbin. Institute officials said Japan's biosafety labs are "old" and lack cutting-edge equipment, so they consider Japan's labs to be "P3 Plus" (*Note: the Japanese government says it has one P4-level lab in the Tokyo suburbs, though its activities are limited, and Japan is building a new P4 lab in Nagasaki, see Ref D. Taiwan operates at least one P4 lab. South Korea was close to opening a P4 lab as of last year, see Ref E. End Note.*) Wuhan's lab is located about 20 miles from the city center in Zhengdian district, and the institute plans to gradually consolidate its other training, classroom and lab facilities at that location.

4. (U) Officials described the lab as a "regional node" in the global biosafety system and said it would play an emergency response role in an epidemic or pandemic. The lab's English brochure highlighted a national security role, saying that it "is an effective measure to improve China's availability in safeguarding national bio-safety if [a] possible biological warfare or terrorist attack happens."

5. (SBU) Institute officials said there would be "limited availability" for international and domestic scientists who had gone through the necessary approval process to do research at the lab. They stressed that the lab aimed to be a "worldwide, open platform" for virology. They said they welcomed U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) experts, noting that the Chinese Academy of Sciences was not strong on human disease expertise, having only focused on it in the last 15 years, after the SARS outbreak. A Wuhan-based French consulate official who works on science and technology cooperation with China also emphasized that the lab, which was initiated in 2004 as a France-China joint project, was meant to be "open and transparent" to the global scientific community. "The intent was to set up a lab to international standards, and open to international research," he said. French experts have provided guidance and biosafety training to the lab, which will continue, the French official said. Institute officials said that France provided the lab's design and much of its technology, but that it is entirely China-funded and has been completely China-run since a "handover" ceremony in 2016.

6. (U) In addition to French assistance, experts from the NIH-supported P4 lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston have trained Wuhan lab technicians in lab management and maintenance, institute officials said. The Wuhan institute plans to invite scientists from the Galveston lab to do research in Wuhan's lab. One Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher trained for two years at the Galveston lab, and the institute also sent one scientist to U.S. CDC headquarters in Atlanta for six months' work on influenza.

NIH-Supported Research Revises SARS Origin Story

7. (U) NIH was a major funder, along with the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), of SARS research by the Wuhan Institute of Virology's (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 (h)(6) This tends
 weight to the theory that SARS originated in bat populations before jumping first to civet cats
 (likely via bat feces) and then to humans, (b)(6)
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(b)(6) team has provided support in statistical modeling to assess the risk of more coronaviruses like SARS crossing over to human populations.

Ready to Help with the Global Virome Project

8. (U) Institute officials expressed strong interest in the Global Virome Project (GVP), and said Chinese funding for the project would likely come from Chinese Academy of Sciences funding already earmarked for One Belt, One Road-related initiatives. The GVP aims to launch this year as an international collaborative effort to identify within ten years virtually all of the planet's viruses that have pandemic or epidemic potential and the ability to jump to humans. "We hope China will be one of the leading countries to initiate the Global Virome Project," one Wuhan Institute of Virology official said. China attended a GVP unveiling meeting in January in Thailand and is waiting for more details on the initiative. The officials said that the Chinese government funds projects similar to GVP to investigate the background of viruses and bacteria. This essentially constituted China's own Virome Project, officials said, but they noted the program currently has no official name.

9. (SBU) The Wuhan Institute of Virology's (b)(6) is the (b)(6) (b)(6) which is designed to show "proof of concept" and be a forerunner to the Global Virome Project. (b)(6) with the EcoHealth Alliance (a New York City-based NGO that is working with the University of California, Davis to manage the (b)(6), recently planned to visit Wuhan to meet with (b)(6) noted that China has expressed interest in building the GVP database, which would put China in a leadership position. Other countries have confidence in China's ability to build such a database, but are skeptical on whether China could remain transparent as a "gatekeeper" for this information, (h) said. (h) expressed frustration with the slow progress so far in launching GVP, noting that the effort lacked funding sources, needed to hire a CEO, and would have to boost its profile at G7, G20 and other high-level international meetings.

U.S.-China Workshop Explores Research Partnerships

10. (U) The Institute also has ongoing collaboration with the U.S. National Science Foundation, including a just-concluded workshop in Shenzhen, involving about 40 scientists from the United States and China, on the topic of the "Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases." Co-sponsored by the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the Chinese lead for this workshop was the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Hu Zhihong, and the U.S. co-chair was the University of Oklahoma's Xiao Xiangming. The workshop explored opportunities for U.S.-China research cooperation in areas like using "big data" to predict emerging infectious diseases, climate change's effect on vector-borne diseases, and pathogen transmission between wildlife, domestic animals and humans.

11. (SBU) Some workshop participants also expressed skepticism about the Global Virome Project's (GVP) approach, saying that gaining a predictive understanding of viruses with pandemic potential would require going beyond the GVP's strategy of sample collection, to take an "ecological" approach that considers the virome beyond vertebrate systems to identify

mechanisms driving pathogen evolution. A follow-on workshop will be held in June at the University of Berkeley. NSF and NSFC hope to jointly announce a funding call for collaborative projects later this year.

Signature: FOUSS

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