From: [Redacted]
Sent: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 18:02:20 +0000
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DTRA CMD GP
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(USA); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA); Kuliascha, Michael A SES DTRA RD (USA); Dowling, Stephen J SES DTRA RD (USA)

Subject: Weekly Legislative Update - 12.15.21
Attachments: 2021-12-15 Legislative Update.pdf, Hearing on Biosecurity.pdf

Senior Leaders,

Good afternoon. Attached is this week’s legislative update.

Today, the Senate passed the NDAA and sent it to the President. The update also includes a summary of last week’s hearing on biosecurity and I’ve attached a condensed transcript.

V/r,

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DTRA Legislative Affairs
HEADLINES

- **Senate:** The upper chamber will be in session this week, and possibly next, as they attempt to complete three priority items before the holidays: the debt limit, the NDAA, and the Build Back Better Act—a $2 trillion climate and social spending bill. The debt limit was approved yesterday and today the NDAA was agreed to and sent to the President. SASC also sent the JCS Vice-Chair nomination of ADM Christopher Grady to the floor.

- **House:** Yesterday, the House completed their work for the week with votes on the debt limit, combating Islamophobia, barring the importation of goods made with forced Uyghur labor, and holding Mark Meadows in contempt of Congress over his refusal to comply with the January 6th special committee. This is likely the final week in session for the House this year.

- **NDAA:** The Senate voted to pass the $768 billion defense bill today by a vote of 89–10. The measure now goes to the President for his signature. The bill language is identical to the text that was released last week. A key provision on EcoHealth Alliance bars any funding of projects conducted in China. Funding-wise, notable increases include $105 million more for BTRP and $5.877 million more for overall RDT&E.

- **Debt Limit:** Yesterday, both chambers approved of the final step to raise the debt limit by another $2.5 trillion. The bill’s passage sets up another showdown on the debt ceiling as soon as November 2022.

- **Nominations:** DoD nominees John Sherman (CIO) and Nickolas Guertin ( Operational Test & Evaluation) were confirmed yesterday. However, with 158 nominees blocked over holds placed by conservatives on other key posts, Senate Majority Leader Schumer has threatened to keep his chamber in session over the weekend and into next week to get movement on the slate. Two Republican Senators have placed holds on high profile Defense and State Department nominees over their objections to related administration policies. Sens. Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley have pledged to maintain their holds until they get a vote on sanctions over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline effort and more accountability over the pullout of troops from Afghanistan, respectively.

KEY HEARING SUMMARY

*Biosecurity for the Future: Strengthening Deterrence and Detection*

- **8 Dec, 1000**
- House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia & Nonproliferation
- **Witnesses:**
  - Dr. Jamie Yassif (Nuclear Threat Initiative)
  - Dr. Anesh Adalja (Johns Hopkins University-School of Public Health)
  - Hon. Andy Weber (Council on Strategic Risks; Former ASD-NCB)
  - Dr. Kevin Esvelt (Sculpting Evolution Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
- **Summary:** Discussion alternated between the prevention and defeat of naturally occurring health challenges as well as acts of bioterrorism. The chairman advocated for improved international
biosecurity systems, but also praised advancements and investments in efforts such as gene sequencing, bio surveillance, and detection. The ranking member was critical of China’s efforts to hide COVID, highlighted the fact that lab accidents are frequent, and sought a better enforcement mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. Former ASD(NCB) Andy Weber focused on a “deterrent through denial” strategy for biological weapons that would render any bio threat ultimately unsuccessful through the availability of sufficient countermeasures. He stated that we have the technologies today to make this strategy a reality. Mr. Weber’s optimism was contrasted by the testimony from Dr. Kevin Esvelt who was highly critical of scientists who seek to learn and share which viruses could cause new pandemics as their research will eventually assist bioterrorists. Professor Esvelt called out Eco Health Alliance as a prime culprit in this area and blasted federal funding for making it all possible. Dr. Amesh Adalja encouraged the panel to support more focused research as opposed to the “overly broad surveillance and basic analysis” that is currently conducted to combat zoonotic events. He also expressed support for vaccines and felt that the medical community should be more proactive in pushing back on anti-vaccine elements. Finally, Dr. Jamie Yassif promoted a three-pronged approach to biosecurity, which included (1) stronger global norms, (2) development of a reliable system for attribution and accountability, and (3) an increased financial commitment from the U.S. and global partners to make these goals a reality.

NOMINATIONS

Department of Defense:

- **Confirmed (Date)**
  - John Sherman – DoD Chief Information Officer (14 Dec)
  - Nickolas Guertin – Dir. DoD Operational Test & Evaluation (14 Oct)

- **Intention to Nominate (Date Announced)**
  - Erik Raven – Under Secretary of the Navy (13 Dec)
  - Kristyn Jones – USAF Asst. Secretary-Financial Management & Comptroller (13 Dec)
  - Agnes Schaefer – Army Asst. Secretary-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (8 Dec)
  - William LaPlante – USD-A&S (Nov 30)

- **Reported to Full Senate (Date reported)**
  - ADM Christopher Grady – Vice Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff (14 Dec)
  - Ashish Vazirani – DUSD Personnel & Readiness (8 Dec)
  - Carrie Ricci – Army General Counsel (8 Dec)
  - Alexandra “Sasha” Baker – DUSD for Policy (28 Oct)
  - Douglas Bush – ASA Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (28 Oct)
  - John Coffey – USN General Counsel (28 Oct)
  - Gabe Camarillo – Under Secretary of the Army (21 Oct)
  - David Honey – DUSD for Research & Engineering (21 Oct)
  - Andrew Hunter – USAF Asst. Secretary-Acquisition, Technology, Logistics (21 Oct)
  - Rachel Jacobson – Asst. Army Secretary for Installations & Environment (21 Oct)
  - Alex Wagner – USAF Asst. Sec.-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (21 Oct)

- **Nomination Hearing Held (Date of Hearing)**
- Brenda Fulton  ASD Manpower & Reserve Affairs (7 Oct)

- **Nominated (Date SASC received)**
  - Ravi Chaudhary – USAF Asst. Secretary-Installations, Energy & Environment (6 Dec)
  - Christopher Lowman – ASD Sustainment (15 Nov)
  - Peter Beshar – USAF General Counsel (21 Oct)
  - John Plumb – ASD-Space Policy (4 Aug)
  - Celeste Wallander – ASD International Security Affairs (23 Jun)

**Other National Security Posts:**
- Kenneth Wainstein  DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis (17 Nov received by SSCI)
- Adam Scheinman  Special Representative, Bureau of International Security & Nonproliferation (19 Oct reported to full Senate)
- Mallory Stewart – Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (5 Oct hearing held)

**CRS REPORTS OF INTEREST**

- **U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments & Issues** (14 Dec 2021)
- **North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs** (13 Dec 2021)
- **AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation** (10 Dec 2021)
- **Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer** (8 Dec 2021)
REP. BERA: The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific Central Asia, nonproliferation will come to order.
Without objection the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the Committee at any point, and all
members will have five days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I want to thank my good friend, the Ranking Member Mr. Chabot, the members of the Subcommittee, our
witnesses and the members of the public for joining today’s hearing.

For almost two years to COVID 19 pandemic ravaged communities, devastated economies and disrupted
the fabric of our international global system. It’s a reminder of the grave consequences that low
probability, high impact biological threats can have on our daily lives if we’re not prepared. Moving
forward we can do better.

As chair of the Subcommittee, I’ve convened multiple hearings related to the 2019 novel Coronavirus,
including the first congressional hearing on this topic in early February 2020 and then on enhancing US
Global biosecurity in the near two years since the first hearing on COVID-19. We have thankfully seen
meaningful efforts and expanding investments in technologies and practices such as gene sequencing, bio
surveillance and detection. Many of these efforts have been crucial in the global fight against this
pandemic thus far.

For example, advances in rapid sequencing and diagnostic capabilities in South Africa allowed the
government to correctly identify and report a new variant of concern to the international community in
record time. New technologies also enabled partnerships between governments and pharmaceutical
companies to develop, test, manufacture, and begin distribution of vaccines and therapeutics in
timeframes that were previously thought impossible. Such developments do not occur overnight. They
require time, dedicated staff, and resources well before an incident.
As we continue to combat the Coronavirus we were reminded of the importance of making long term investments in the global health infrastructure and taking other steps to help prevent such catastrophe in the future. That's the primary focus of today's hearing to take stock of current resources dedicated to this critical field and to assess what more needs to be done to work with international partners to strengthen biosecurity and virus surveillance practices globally. These conversations are particularly relevant when one factors in the possibility of facing pathogens and diseases intentionally created by bad actors. Biological weapons and especially dangerous pathogens existed before COVID-19, but the threat they pose today is now undeniable. Laboratories around the world regularly handled dangerous pathogens, and these threats are only amplified by the widespread availability of new gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR. It is imperative that we ensure our government has the right strategy and resources to prevent naturally occurring, as well as, manmade pathogens from causing the next pandemic. We cannot afford to be stagnant in our preparations and planning for the biological threats of tomorrow. The pandemic also reaffirms the need for continued US global leadership for proactive biological security and defense strategy.

Prioritizing investments to counter and prepare for biological threats, ranging from research related or medical center accidents, to naturally occurring pathogens, to deliberate biological weapon attacks, is a national security imperative and requires appropriate resourcing and sustained attention.

Much like the counterterrorism and countering weapons of mass destruction and proliferation, the field of biosecurity measures success through the absence of an incident. But as the pandemic clearly demonstrates, we must not wait for devastating crisis to start investing biosecurity, particularly in today's interconnected world, a deadly pathogen unleashed in the opposite corner of the world would be upon our doorstep shortly thereafter. Therefore, we must be proactive.

The international community has a collective responsibility to work together to improve biosecurity systems, and regimes worldwide. We need to examine how we're making investments in deterrence and detection and ensure that we have well-resourced mechanisms to prevent and defeat both naturally occurring health challenges as well as acts of bioterrorism.

I want to thank our witnesses today in advance for sharing their expertise with us as we consider this crucial matter.

And with that, let me go ahead and yield five minutes to my good friend from Ohio, our Ranking Member, Representative Chabot for any opening comments he may have.

REP. CHABOT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this important hearing today. I'd also like to thank our witnesses for being here and for providing us their uniquely qualified insights. It's important to be discussing the threats posed by potential new diseases as well as a new generation of bio weapons. So I commend you for doing this.

This hearing comes at a pivotal time. COVID-19 has taught us like nothing else, the devastation that can be caused by previously unknown disease. The Chinese Communist Party hid the emergence of the disease from the world allowing it to become a global pandemic. This shows just how crucial it is to detect and address a new disease early on.

But such a contagion could easily begin somewhere that has a less malevolent government, but a weak health system. In fact, Ebola did just that. The bottom line is, the world needs to be better prepared to
detect and combat new diseases before they get out of control. It's possible, of course, that even deadlier diseases and viruses than COVID-19 could threaten us as well as chemical compounds.

Syria, Russia and North Korea, for example, have used chlorine gas, novichok and VX nerve agent to murder dissidents and proceed enemies both in their own countries and across the globe. To make matters worse, the Biological Weapons Convention on the international treaty banning biological weapons lacks enforcement, while the UN's implementation support unit has three people on staff and a budget smaller than that of a McDonald's. Further, according to the State Department, North Korea and Russia have current offensive bio weapon programs, which are illegal under treaty. And China and Iran are engaging in dual-use research in violation of the treaty as well.

All this is compounded by new and emerging science and technologies that have made it easier than ever before for individuals, even with a limited amount of training and knowledge to genetically engineer new threats. Such advances which could potentially do wonders in the fields of health and medicine are inherently dual use and in the hands of our adversaries pose a threat to our national security unless we take this threat seriously.

Countries that have already violated their legal obligations not to use chemical weapons could see advances in biotechnology as offering a new range of weapons that are targeted, deniable and incredibly lethal. COVID-19 has raised questions about the nature of this technology itself, including around the issue of gain of function research.

As we now know, scientists have the ability to genetically manipulate and modify viruses without leaving any evidence. They can even create synthetic viruses from scratch, choosing the level of transmissibility and lethality in humans, even before the current pandemic groups of researchers around the world are using existing techniques to create hybrid viruses known to have pandemic potential, and testing new and novel viruses. Going forward, we must balance our need to predict and detect new diseases that could cause pandemics with the potential for accidents or for the weaponization of new discoveries.

Supporters argue that gain of function research is critical to safeguarding public health, and that lab accidents are rare and isolated, but they downplay the inherent risks posed by aggressive experimentation. The level of sophistication seen in terrorist groups like the Islamic State makes it more likely not less, that these new technologies will be exploited by terrorist organizations seeking new asymmetric weapons.

There is no need to hijack an airliner, when you can simply release a weaponized virus in an airport terminal. The death toll from the resulting pandemic could be in the millions. Worse, it might not even take terrorists acting intentionally.

History shows us that lab accidents are frequent. For instance, in 1979, Anthrax was accidentally released from a Soviet military research facility. Despite assurances to the contrary from American and Soviet scientists, we know that this lab leak resulted in infections and the deaths of close to 100 people. Moving forward, it's clear that we need to rebalance our priorities to better prepare for such threats.

Chairman Bera, I look forward to working with you as we consider how to respond to these challenges. We are facing a very real threat, one that we are not adequately addressing. I believe at the present time.

So again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for being here today.

REP. BERA: Thank you Ranking Member Chabot. Let me go briefly introduce our witnesses.
First we have Dr. Jamie Yassif senior fellow for global bilateral policy and programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Dr. Yassif was previously a program officer at Open Philanthropy, where she led the biosecurity and pandemic preparedness initiative. Prior to that, she was a Science and Technology Policy Advisor at the US Department of Defense, where she focused on oversight of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and East Asia security issues.

Next, we welcome the Honorable Andy Weber, senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks James E. Nolan Center of Strategic Weapons. Mr. Weber has had a long career US government service, including as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs from 2009 to 2014. He also coordinated US leadership of the International Ebola response for the Department of State. He serves on the boards of Healthcare Ready, and the Arms Control Association among others.

Next, we have Dr. Amesh Adalja, who is the Senior Scholar at the John Hopkins Center for Health Security, an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Johns Hopkins, Bloomberg School of Public Health and affiliate, the John Hopkins Center for Global Health. Among his many accomplishments and contributions, Dr. Adalja has served on US government panels, tasked with developing guidelines for the treatment of plague botulism and anthrax and mass casualty settings for the system of care for infectious disease emergencies.

Last, but not least, we have Dr. Kevin Esvelt, an Assistant Professor at the MIT Media Lab where he leads the Sculpting Evolution Group and Exploring Evolutionary and Ecological Engineering. Professor Esvelt helped pioneer the development of CRISPR, a powerful new method of genome engineering and is the inventor of synthetic viral ecosystems for the direct directed evolution of biomolecules.

I want to thank all of you for participating in today’s hearing, and I will now recognize witnesses for five minutes.

Without objection, your prepared written statements will be made part of the record. I will first invite Dr. Yassif to share her testimony.

JAIME YASSIF: Thank you, Chairman Bera. Ranking Member Chabot and other members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join today’s hearing to share my perspective on biosecurity for the future. I’m a senior fellow at NTI, which is a nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats imperiling humanity.

Over the past 21 months, COVID has revealed that national governments and the international community are unprepared to respond to pandemics, underscoring our shared vulnerability to future catastrophic biological threats that could match the impact of the current pandemic or cause damage that is much more severe.

To effectively guard against these risks, the world needs a layered defense comprised of measures for prevention, detection and response. I will focus my testimony today primarily on actions necessary to prevent catastrophic biological events, and specifically. I’ll discuss three initiatives that NTI has been working to advance.

First, I’ll start with NTI’s work to reduce emerging biological risks associated with rapid technology advances. Bioscience and biotechnology offer tremendous benefits. They’re vital for fighting disease, protecting the environment and promoting economic development. However, these innovations can also
pose unique challenges, increasing the risks of lab accidents or deliberate misuse by malicious actors. This threat becomes increasingly pressing as the technical barriers to manipulating biological organisms continue to fall.

Governments are key to safeguarding the life sciences, but they have struggled to keep pace with rapid technology advances. And at the international level governance is also weak. There's no existing international entity dedicated as its primary mission to strengthening biosecurity and bioscience governance, notwithstanding the important work of WHO and the Biological Weapons Convention.

To address this gap, NTI is working to develop the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, or IBIS. We envision that this new organization will work collaboratively to strengthen global biosecurity norms and develop innovative and practical tools to uphold them.

And the underlying goal would be to safeguard science and to reduce the risk of catastrophic events that could result from deliberate abuse or accidental misuse. IBIS will begin with a narrow focus on improving DNA synthesis screening practices internationally, with the understanding that its remit can expand over time, as he is working with international partners to continue shaping the vision for IBIS and we aspire to launch this new organization in 2022. We encourage Congress and specifically members of this Subcommittee to support the goals of this initiative and to help us build broad international support for this effort.

The second portion of my remarks will focus on our initiative for investigating high consequence biological events of unknown origin. An effective deterrence strategy rests in part on the ability of the international community to demonstrate to would-be developers or users of bioweapons that there is a reliable system for attribution and accountability for such actions. But to do that, it will be important to bolster the capabilities of the UN system to investigate pandemic origins, whether naturally emerging, accidental or deliberate. And this includes investing more resources in the UN Secretary General's mechanism, which has the authority to investigate alleged deliberate bio weapons use. We must also fill gaps however, specifically in the capabilities to investigate the source of biological events of unknown origin. This important work falls at the scene between existing mechanisms including the outbreak investigation capabilities of the World Health Organization, and the UN Secretary General's mechanism.

To meet this need NTI is pursuing the establishment of a new joint assessment mechanism for investigating high consequence bio events of unknown origin. We envision that this mechanism would take an approach that is rapid, transparent, evidence based and legitimate in the eyes of the international community. I hope Congress and this Subcommittee will support the establishment of this type of multilateral mechanism which will be critical for mitigating pandemic effects in real time, and for deterring future bio weapons development and use.

The third initiative that I will very briefly address is financing for pandemic preparedness. Building strong systems for early detection and robust response is critical for stopping outbreaks from evolving into global pandemics, and it can also contribute to deterrence. But none of this can happen without resources.

As documented by the 2021 Global Health Security Index, which we are releasing this morning, most nations have not made dedicated financial investments and pandemic preparedness. The current shortsighted approach to financing doesn't make a lot of sense because investing in pandemic preparedness is highly cost effective. COVID has led to trillions and economic losses and extensive damage to global
economies, and yet the international community can effectively guard against these risks with a global investment on the order of one to several 100 billion dollars.

To achieve and sustain this level of investment, we need to redesign our collective approach to financing. That's why NTI is working with partners to advocate for a new catalytic, multilateral financing mechanism for pandemic preparedness in countries around the world. We applaud the leadership that the US has already signaled by championing the establishment of a new multilateral financing mechanism at the recent global COVID-19 summit. Now it must follow through with funding to set the bar for others and challenge them to step up and contribute.

The US should contribute at least 2 billion in seed funding and work with partners to mobilize at least 10 billion annually. Such an investment would constitute a tiny fraction of the potentially catastrophic cost of inaction.

To conclude COVID has served as a warning shot, highlighting our shared vulnerability to global pandemics. While national and global leaders are understandably focused on the current crisis, they cannot afford the essential work to prevent and respond to future high consequence bio events.

Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot and other members of this Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today and I look forward to answering your questions.

REP. BERA: Thank you. I now invite Mr. Weber for his testimony.

ANDY WEBER: Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot, and members of the Committee. I'm honored to appear before you today.

I would like to applaud the Committee for hosting this hearing on what I believe is one of the most consequential issues for the United States and the international community: deterring biological weapons threats and preventing pandemics.

I have focused on countering biological threats for the bulk of my career. In the 1990s, I worked with the Department of Defense Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and saw firsthand the massive scale of the Soviet Union's offensive biological weapons complex.

One facility we completely dismantled at the request of first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was capable of producing 300 tons of anthrax agent during a mobilization period of about eight months. Another laboratory and called Kosovo, Russia perfected viral weapons to cause horrific diseases like smallpox, Marburg, and Ebola.

Biological weapons threats are increasing due to several factors, including advanced North Korean and Russian offensive programs, China's huge investments in dual use bio technologies, and the revolution in biotechnology that is making it easier and cheaper for even small groups or individuals to misuse biology.

The United States should now pursue a strategy based on two reinforcing goals. The first is preventing future outbreaks from ever again reaching pandemic scale. This goal is more achievable than ever, though it will take leadership and sustained investments in bio defense, the US bio economy, and international partnerships.
The second focus is on deliberate biological threats, which are increasing. The United States should lead the world in making biological weapons the first category of weapons of mass destruction to be effectively eliminated or rendered obsolete.

Deterrence is at the heart of this proposal. Specifically, we're calling for a US strategy of deterrence by denial. This type of deterrence strategy would focus on ultimately denying the attacker success in their aims regarding biological weapons.

Today, US innovation has created a new paradigm. We now have the technologies and tools needed to make deterrence by denial regarding delivered biological threats and pandemic prevention a reality. Our task today is to deploy such advanced technologies effectively and integrate them via a systems approach to addressing the full range of biological threats.

We need fast and precise pathogen early warning. We need these systems to produce and share robust data that can be used for rapidly characterizing pathogens and tailoring diagnostics and countermeasures, vaccines and medical treatments to help stop them.

One of the top opportunities to enhance early warning stems from the Biological Threat Reduction Program at the Department of Defense. This program, which I helped create, has long been used for advancing bio surveillance and biosecurity with many partners around the world. This paid off heavily. Several US allies and partners have been leaders in detecting and monitoring COVID-19.

I deeply appreciate that this year, you in the House of Representatives, on a bipartisan basis, restored the severe and inexplicable Pentagon cuts to the Biological Threat Reduction Program. It will also be critical to revitalize and expand another Department of Defense program that has suffered budget cuts and underutilization in recent years. The Pentagon’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program or CBDP. Despite a strong track record of performance and extensive national capacities, in recent years, Department leaders have slashed CBDPs budget, even during a pandemic and restricted its ability to respond to COVID-19 early in the pandemic.

I am heartened, however, that in launching the first ever Pentagon bio defense posture review last month, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin commanded the Department of Defense to prioritize bio defense across the full spectrum of biological threats from naturally occurring, to accidental and deliberate biological incidents. To enact a national strategy to take biological weapons off the table as a weapon of mass destruction threat and to prevent future infectious disease threats from growing to pandemic scale. I and my colleagues recommend an investment plan that we call 10 plus 10 over 10. This entails investing 10 billion per year for 10 years for deterring and addressing biological weapons threats, plus 10 billion per year for 10 years for global health security and direct pandemic prevention initiatives.

The details of this $200 billion 10 year plan will be published in our forthcoming handbook for deterring biological weapons and preventing future pandemics. The Council on Strategic Risks will release it this month.

In conclusion, the United States has made significant progress in addressing biological threats over the past several decades. The COVID 19 pandemic was a wake-up call. The good news is that it is within our reach to take biological threats off the table. To do so, we must summon the political will to set a bold strategy for the United States and our partners around the world.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your questions.

REP. BERA: Thank you. I now invite Dr. Adalja for his testimony.

AMESH ADALJA: Chairman and Dr. Bera, Ranking Member Chabot distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony today on the Biosecurity for the Future, Strengthening Deterrence and Detection. I'm a Senior Scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. The opinions expressed herein are my own and do not reflect the views of Johns Hopkins University.

As our country and the rest of the world continue to grapple with the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic it is appropriate and important to put surveillance systems and strategies in place to detect in the future the emergence or reemergence of dangerous viruses with pandemic potential. Because many infectious diseases are contagious and transmitted between humans easily, infectious disease threats anywhere can universalize very quickly. We are now seeing firsthand that pathogens no longer travel at the speed of a steamship they travel at the speed of a jet. Borders are porous and diseases and diseases seep through them quickly.

The US needs to have as comprehensive global situational awareness of infectious disease threats as possible. As the US government decides how to best invest limited resources in early warning systems for detection of future viral threats, it is critical to prioritize surveillance activities that: (1) are the most likely to uncover actual, rather than hypothetical, threats, and (2) are practical and add value every day to preparedness even between outbreaks.

Too often our limited surveillance dollars are funding overly broad surveillance and basic analysis that includes a vast collection of animal samples, with the goal of identifying potential infectious diseases emanating from animals in spillover zoonotic events.

Given the history of viruses such as SARS-CoV-2, Zika, Ebola and HIV, zoonotic spillover events are an appropriate priority, however. Focusing our surveillance efforts on the constant sampling of animals can be like looking for a needle in the never-ending haystack. While this type of surveillance can play a part in early warning systems, and it helps us to improve our understanding of disease and animal species, we should be careful not to place an overemphasis on viral cataloging efforts. These are indeed essential virologic and scientific tasks, but should not be construed to be synonymous with early warning or a substitute for pandemic preparedness activities. We should complement the broad sampling of animal species with a more targeted type of surveillance focus on sampling of viruses present in pocket patients in clinical environments. A microbe most likely to cause a pandemic or disruptive outbreak is likely one that possesses the ability to infect humans to some extent, now. These are infections that are occurring in humans by pathogens that have the capacity to do so now. Such a microbe may go unnoticed, mistaken for other causes or current populations, or diagnostic technology is not available. It may be spread via the respiratory route and cause of respiratory infections such as pneumonia. It may also have characteristics that can cause a brain or central nervous system infection like meningitis. And critically it is likely to result in sepsis or septic shock as the final common pathway to severe disease and death.

The majority of these cases go without identification of the virus without a specific diagnosis. The empiric treatment either works or it doesn't. This is something I witnessed in the United States and it's very common internationally. I liken the undiagnosed syndromes to biological dark matter which likely
contain key information about what is making people sick, some definitely today, right now, everywhere. The first COVID-19 cases in Wuhan were mixed in with influenza, and they were missed. A few weeks it would have saved lives if there was early detection. The first US cases of the novel 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus was only identified because people went to a Naval surveillance study site and got this this virus identified much earlier.

Whether what is lurking in the biological dark matter is the first human foray for an emerging pathogen, the changing behavior of a known pathogen when ordinary infection that went undiagnosed it is valuable information. We need to commit and spend more time diving deep to understand this dark matter. This is a “no regret” investment because it is likely to uncover actual, rather than hypothetical threats.

The value is fivefold. First, if it is a new emerging pathogen that is obscured because it is causing a familiar clinical syndrome, this discovery could be an early warning for the entire world.

Second, if a new property has evolved in a known pathogen, it can be valuable clinical information.

Third, inappropriate use of antibiotics for these undiagnosed syndromes contributes to antimicrobial resistance worldwide.

Fourth, we will learn a lot about the epidemiology of what is circulating.

And fifth, we will engage in global health diplomacy.

I believe Congress should prioritize augmentation of diagnostic technologies as part of the international biosurveillance enterprise. These technologies exist today. It doesn’t necessarily involve building a very big lab. I think it’s about improving bread and butter diagnostic capacities. I think it will help us all.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

REP. BERA: Why don’t we, in the interest of time, we will now move on to questions. And then when Professor Esvelt gets back on, we can allow him to do his opening testimony. I will recognize myself for five minutes of questioning.

Mr. Weber, I applaud your optimism that we could actually reduce the threat significantly down to zero, but I do worry about the readily available technology as the fact that high school students are learning how to use CRISPR technology, which isn’t a bad thing as a doctor we’ve made remarkable achievements in the therapeutics that we have to treat oncology cancers and remarkable advances, but I do worry about the downside.

I’m gonna ask. I guess each of the witnesses one thing that we touched on was bio surveillance and how we ought to use bio surveillance. We’ve invested billions of dollars into gene sequencing, which was woefully inadequate here in the United States, but also worldwide, and we’re doing a much better job around COVID-19 in terms of addressing those threats. You may be starting with Dr. Yassif.

As we in Congress think about these investments and beyond COVID-19, what are the regimes and biosurveillance that we should be thinking about? Both here? Domestically, but then also internationally to identify as quickly as possible of naturally occurring pathogens but also manmade pathogens?
JAIME YASSIF: Thank you, Chairman Bera. I'm appreciate that really timely and important question. Certainly, bio surveillance is critically important for part of the layered defense that we need to protect against high consequence biological risks. I'll share three quick points.

One, is that we really need to integrate gene sequencing technology, as you've mentioned, into bio surveillance systems both domestically and internationally. I would argue that before COVID, that wasn't really in place, and I think that's still a work in progress.

Second, we'll need to ensure that our bio surveillance systems and data sharing capabilities are integrated across countries and across regions. This has been a significant challenge that experts in the community have been discussing for years and we have a long way to go to create an integrated global system.

Third, I would offer is that we need to have a combination of a baseline set of data so we know what normal background biological noise looks like. And so we can detect unusual events and new pathogens that we might not have been looking for. So we can detect unknown unknowns, especially as we're looking to the future where we might have to contend with engineer pathogens. So those are some recommendations that I would offer.

Thank you.

REP. BERA: Mr. Weber, do you want to add.

ANDY WEBER: Yes, I completely agree. With you that these new technologies like meta-genomic sequencing give us incredible capabilities to improve our bio surveillance and early warning systems, which are key to both preventing pandemics isolating outbreaks, before they become epidemics and pandemics. But, also an important part just as we have a nuclear detection system to prevent biological terrorism, having early warning against deliberate biological threats, needs to be a big part of our deterrence strategy. Our adversaries need to know that they will be detected and caught if they launched biological weapons attacks.

So, I think it's an exciting time and one of the tools that the US government has is the Biological Threat Reduction Program that is implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I was involved in that for decades. And one of the goals was to enhance global bio-surveillance working with partners all around the world. And I think in the next phase with sufficient funding from Congress, it's a shame that the Department cut over $100 million from this program in the current year, FY 22 budget requests.

But if we can restore that funding, we can use those dollars to surge technologies that will enable genomic sequencing to be used broadly as part of our early warning system against pandemics and bio attacks. So the opportunity is really incredible.

Also, meta-genomic sequencing gives us new opportunities to identify unknown pathogens. We don't have to just test for a list of 10 or 12 specific pathogens, but we can take a sample and test it for everything, virtually hundreds of potential pathogens, and it's getting much cheaper and faster to do this.

So I agree we need to both domestically and abroad deploy these new capabilities on a massive scale.

REP. BERA: Right, wonderful. I see I'm out of time. I do see Professor Esvelt is back on. Professor, do you want to give your testimony and then we'll come back to the Ranking Member. Mr. Chairman.
KEVIN ESVELT: Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot, members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today. And additional thanks to my fellow witnesses for outlining the situation.

As a practicing biotechnologist I am deeply concerned that pandemic viruses pose a proliferation threat greater than that of nuclear weapons. The US government can take specific steps that would greatly reduce this risk. The threat is severe because new technologies have given thousands of skilled individuals the ability to assemble infectious viruses using materials and equipment that can be ordered online.

If scientists learn and share which viruses could cause new pandemics, no matter how pure our motives, everyone with these skills will gain access to credible weapons of mass destruction. For example, even though there are no virologist in my own lab at MIT, perhaps a third of us could order synthetic DNA in the mail, and successfully follow published step by step virus assembly verticals.

Thankfully, scientists don't yet know of any animal or lab-created viruses that would cause another pandemic. But, some well-meaning programs that aim to prevent or mitigate natural pandemics are trying to identify all of the viruses that could cause them and publish a list of the most threatening ones. This inadvertently threatens US national security and the world's future. I do not believe that there are remotely commensurate benefits. The vast majority of pandemic viruses would never naturally jump into humans and finding the remainder would not speed vaccine development.

The main proliferation risk comes from laboratory experiments performed by Eco Health Alliance and similar programs to determine which viruses would likely cause pandemics. These experiments are the equivalent of nuclear tests. They first received federal support back when it was much harder to make viruses. And funding has continued under administrations of both parties. Nations from the Netherlands to China to Germany have also funded these kinds of experiments. In my opinion, they should be stopped. Not just in China and in the US, but everywhere.

If successful, pandemic virus prediction will give thousands of actors the ability to ignite more pandemics at the same time than would normally occur in a century.

If there is published peer-reviewed research describing the potential of these viral weapons, threats to use them will be all too credible. Imagine a rogue state warning that infectious samples of all the top ranked pandemic viruses will be released in airports if their regime is overthrown. Extremist groups, apocalyptic cults, or even a lone wolf bioterrorist could kill more people than any nuclear weapon.

So what can be done to minimize our vulnerability to pandemic proliferation? First, Congress should issue a finding that pandemic virus prediction threatens the security of the United States. That alone would change the tenor of the discussion and lead federal agencies with little security expertise to rethink their support and oversight of such experiments, which are only performed by a tiny fraction of neurology labs.

Second, the US and other governments should limit access to synthetic viral DNA. The California State Legislature recently passed well-targeted legislation with this intent, but it was vetoed on the grounds that security bills should be enacted federally.
Third, the US could work with China on these issues, because this is one case where our interests are aligned. Both nations have little to gain and much to lose if pandemic viruses become widely accessible. Any diplomatic benefits or leverage that we gained here could be applied to more sensitive challenges.

Fourth, as the other witnesses have emphasized, we should invest in detecting biological threats early, a sequencing-based nucleic acid observatory focused on travel hubs such as airports could reliably detect any emerging biological threat. And it could be done using current technology we believe for less than a billion dollars a year. This would improve our response time to all pandemics and deter attacks.

Last, Congress could amend the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 to regulate all viruses with evidence suggestive of pandemic potential through the federal select agent program, which applies to all research as well as export controls.

If we act now, we can greatly reduce the chance that viruses will be used as weapons. Pandemic virus prediction is a needless game of Russian roulette and we keep adding more ammunition.

Thank you.

REP. BERA: Thank you. Let me now recognize my good friend, the Ranking Member gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot for five minutes of questioning.

REP. CHABOT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank you for holding this what I think is a very, very important meeting and I want to commend all of the witnesses for their testimony this morning.

Dr. Eswert, I'm gonna turn to you if I can. Since the beginning of this pandemic, I think to a considerable degree the American public has been misinformed and misled first of all, obviously by the PRC, but to some degree, the coverage in the media as far as the relative likelihood that a lab leak caused this pandemic.

So I have a few questions. First of all, it's my understanding that lab leaks, even in this country, but especially in other parts of across the globe, are pretty safe, but that lab leaks do happen. In fact, much more often than the general public or, or the media seem to appreciate.

Could you comment on that, you know, how frequently do such lab leaks actually occur?

KEVIN ESVEKT: That is an excellent question, Ranking Member Chabot.

There is well-documented evidence that hundreds of lab leaks involving dangerous pathogens occur around the world. This evidence is so substantial. Of course, most of them do not involve potential pandemic viruses, but nevertheless, we know that the risk is non-trivial.

To the extent that we add one more to the list, whether or not we can do so, doesn't change our assessment of the risks, which is that it is definitely non-trivial. I'm not saying that some of these experiments cannot be performed safely in theory, but in practice, we are all human and humans do make mistakes.

REP. CHABOT: Thank you. Let me ask you specifically this. How many times, for example, was there a SARS leak in the PRC in a lab in China?
KEVIN ESVELT: There were two known occasions at least two known occasions confirmed of leaks of SARS 1 after the initial outbreak. One of them actually did lead to a chain of transmission through people associated with the laboratory members that experience the leak.

REP. CHABOT: Thank you. And I think, you know, much of the world unfortunately is woefully behind in getting their health care systems up to the standards that are set by the International Health Regulations. And that's why I've been working very closely with my Democratic colleagues, Gerry Connolly, on the Global Health Security Act.

We've been working on that now for a number of years and I would want to add that it was somewhat prescient, and I want to say particularly on Mr. Connelly's part because we introduced this prior to COVID was almost a year prior to COVID that we introduced this legislation and then the COVID came around you know, it's facing it's around the corner.

So could you talk about right now, even if our standards are very good here in the United States, if they're not up to par in other countries across the globe, how it can affect us here at home and obviously COVID is the best example, but why should we care? Why should we? For example, you know, we give assistance across the globe with off that's the recommendation the how that assistance, or requirements of how that assistance is utilized?

How do things across the globe? How can they affect us here at home? Why should we care about that?

KEVIN ESVELT: Well, unfortunately, a leak of a pandemic capable virus anywhere in the world will most certainly come to affect us here in the United States, unless it can be contained elsewhere. And as noted, many countries have much less sophisticated systems for detection and containment.

It's also certainly true that even in the United States, in well-regarded labs, leaks do happen. So the risk is not zero anywhere in the world. And it is arguably more severe elsewhere for certain. So I don't mean to say that we should not support other countries in monitoring animal human interface, as Dr. Adalje just suggested, and in assisting them in detecting threats as early as possible and containing them before they get to American shores. With supporting other nations in directly culturing these kinds of viruses in the lab, does risk lab leaks. What's more, if we identify a pandemic capable virus anywhere in the world and we publish it, then a malevolent actor anywhere in the world could assemble it using available published protocols and deliberately release it as a weapon of mass destruction.

So that kind of research pandemic virus prediction simply cannot be performed safely anywhere in the world.

REP. STEVE CHABOT: Thank you very much, Doctor. Mr. Chair. My time is expired. I yield back.

Great, thank you.

REP. BERA: Let me now recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Miss Titus, for five minutes.

REP. TITUS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank our witnesses. I'm glad that Dr. Esvelt made it back. I had a question for him. And I know he's an expert on this. And if we didn't know it from his resume, we could tell it from the whiteboard behind him. It's very impressive.

We've talked a lot about what happens in the lab, but I'd like to extend that and talk about the relationship between biosecurity and climate change.
Climate change leads to demographic changes, people move, animals move, weather changes, patterns that affect growth of crops. All other those things seem to be related to biosecurity and I wonder if you can address that relationship and how we might look at this big picture and not just the labs?

KEVIN ESVELT: Thank you, Congresswoman. So the idea you've so well-articulated is often called One Health. And the idea is that the health of animals and the environment and people is all connected. Most obviously because viruses can, and other pathogens, can spread between animals and people.

And as we've seen with SARS-2, that can even occur back and possibly back and forth. We're not certain. So monitoring the health of the environment and animals and detecting animal outbreaks could potentially allow us to anticipate threats to humans.

Whether the risk of natural pandemics resulting from spillover from animals to humans is greater now than before, has been advanced as a hypothesis. But there isn't a lot of data to support that one way or another. To the extent that we're forcing wild animals into contact with humans as we advance into the environment, that should increase the risk. On the other hand, more people now live in cities than before, which might imply fewer people in direct contact with those animals. But, it is certainly true that the impacts on the environment can come back to affect our health indirect ways.

So I fully support the sorts of monitoring programs that examine the animal human interface, as those really could detect nascent pandemics before they actually spread out of control. That is very distinct from serving for animal viruses, the vast majority of which will never actually come in contact with humans, but if identified could be deliberately assembled and released as well.

REP. TITUS: Well, thank you for that answer and kind of confirms what I just suspected on an informal level not liking we could look into that, Mr. Chairman, see if there's some way we can be supportive of that kind of research. I cannot. I would ask Dr. Yassif if we can have different responses to the COVID. Different states have different degrees of prevention or cure different countries have come along earlier later.

Do you think it's better for us to have universal standards that everybody follows? So we're all on the same page? Or is it better to respond individually as with circumstances that differ how we can meet those as opposed to being bound by one set of rules?

JAIME YASSIF: Well, thank you so much for that a really important and timely question. I think the challenge of finding a way for every country to lead its own pandemic response and mitigation efforts while having an integrated global response is not trivial. But it's important to get it right.

I think the short answer is it's sort of a balance between the two sort-of poles that you're talking about. One, is having a shared global standard while still allowing countries the flexibility to respond as appropriate based on their needs and capabilities. And I think that this got a few pieces.

So first, I think at the international level, what we really need is a more integrated and effective early warning system associated with the WHO alert and warning system the Public Health Emergency of International Concern declaration. That needs to be strengthened. And we had NTI have recommended that it shift from a binary sort of “yes/no” signal to something that has multiple grades, so it provides information to countries about how had an emerging pandemic risk might be. So we just need to
strengthen that system so countries have better sense of what the risk is over the horizon, even perhaps before it might have materialized.

And I think to make that really you can think about the early stages of COVID, perhaps in February and March of 2020, when we saw it start to break out in certain parts of the world that we weren't really sure how serious it was, and we need to really do better in terms of early intelligence - epidemic intelligence - in sort of thinking about the emerging risks of a new a new pandemic.

Second, I would offer is that countries, you know, I think the shared approach that countries should offer is a proactive response. That's you know, triggered early response to emerging pandemics not wait for mounting case counts and fatalities, because then it's too late. But, fundamentally, countries around the world have different populations and different capabilities. And so we'll have to have flexibility within that system to respond effectively.

Thank you.

REP. TITUS: Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

REP. BERA: Great, thank you. Let me now recognize the gentileady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan for five minutes of questioning.

REP. HOULAHAN: Hi, thank you so much for the conversation. It's been riveting and terrifying all at the same time. And I've been trying to compose my questions and there I have so many of them and that no real way good way to articulate them into one cogent question.

Dr. Esvelt, I think your testimony was perhaps the most devastating and so at the same time, I hear optimism coming, that we will be able to manage and control future pandemics.

But, I'm concerned and confused where the advice is, you know, basically, not to make it too exaggerated, but we should stick our heads in the collective sand and not look up or around because of the implications that bad actors, you know, would have if we were to be able to understand what the threats are.

So I also look at the response that the nation took in the world has taken to COVID-19 and this has something to do with Representative Titus his line of questions, which is we've done horribly as a collective in terms of managing what happened with COVID-19. And even had we had advanced warning and a couple of weeks of warning, I'm not certain that we would end up in much of a different place than where we are.

And so here we are, optimism coming from you all and advice to you know, not look around, but we really have mismanaged this one, how can we possibly do this better?

And what is your prescription for the average person citizen to be able to prevent this from happening. I'm just trying to figure out, what do we do to prevent another pandemic from happening if we're not going to look around and understand what it is. If we're not going to develop cures or techniques to address those issues. And if we've got a population that is uncompliant.

I would like to turn that over to my fellow MIT alumni Dr. Esvelt.

KEVIN ESVELT: Thank you for that very difficult question. So, I think, to be blunt, we are in a very bad place. And even with very substantial investments, we will still struggle against a truly nasty pandemic.
In my assessment, something deliberate could be much worse than anything that is natural, simply because something that is natural is a single point of spillover and involves a single virus, whereas something deliberate could be multiple points in travel hubs with multiple viruses.

So, that is why I say deliberate would be worse. Also engineered would be worse, but that is something that I really would prefer that we not discuss today.

If we want to be actually immune to future pandemics, as the Honorable Andy Weber has indicated, I think we need early warning meta-genomic sequencing systems, especially in travel hubs, so we know what it is. Once we know what it is then we can figure out where it is with diagnostics.

But, then we need to ensure that food distribution, water distribution, and power all stay on, health care remains operational in the teeth of a 30% plus lethality pandemic. And I think that can only be done by investing in new personal protective equipment. Make it comfortable, as good as a powered air purifying respirator today. It needs to be reliable enough that all essential workers can be confident going out there in that kind of pandemic and keeping our civilization intact. If we do that, then I think we will be resistant to just about any kind of pandemic.

I am not confident in our ability to reliably come up with vaccines or any kind of countermeasure against every kind of threat. Note that we still don’t have an HIV vaccine. Note how long it took us to get packs a little bit, although I would love to see that approved immediately. These things are amazing when you can get them we should not assume they are possible. Whereas gear that can prevent Americans from getting infected in the first place, that will always work.

And I’m not saying stick our heads in the sand on this. I’m saying building network to ensure that whatever it is, we can see it when it comes. But that the vast majority of pandemic capable viruses out there, whether they’re in nature, or they don’t exist yet, and scientists are trying to evolve them the vast majority of those would never hit us anyway. Even if we had advanced warning of a particular one, mRNA vaccine design can be done in a day now. So if we can get a virus we’re going to have it almost immediately. And so advanced knowledge of a particular virus out there that is going to come and bite us actually doesn’t save us any time, as long as we’re willing to combine phase one and phase two trials, which I would like to think we would certainly do it a pandemic.

So that’s why I say I don’t think knowing a particular virus as a threat is going to help us respond. And I also don’t think we’re really going to invest the kind of money needed to develop vaccines for what are probably hundreds of existing pandemic capable viruses out there in nature just doesn’t seem practical to me.

So I would prefer to work on preparedness plans that would work for everything across the board.

REP. HOULAHAN: And so these detection systems that you’re talking about that are at airports, etc. I’m assuming that these are some sort of passive detection systems that they don’t require anybody participating in them in any way shape or form and, help me understand as a lay person, how would a passive detection system where you don’t have a cataloguing of what it is that you’re looking for? Do you even know that you’ve seen something? If that makes any sense?

KEVIN ESVELT: That’s a great question. And roughly the answer is, any serious biological threat must be growing exponentially. So if we sequence all the nucleic acids out there, all of the RNA and DNA
because viruses can come in either form, and we just look for the sequence fragments that are growing rapidly in abundance. That is a biological threat, and every biological threat will display that signature and we think that by looking for it, we can reliably find anything of that variety.

So that’s why I say even if an adversary designs something to be undetectable by targeted probes, looking for the kinds of viruses we know are threats, we’ll still be able to detect it using meta-genomic testing sequencing in that way.

REP. HOULAHAN: Thank you, Doctor. Is my time out? Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

REP. BERA: The gentlelady’s time has expired.

REP. HOULAHAN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

REP. BERA: Let me go and recognize the gentleman from California Mr. Lieu for five minutes of questioning.

REP. LIEU: Thank you, Chair Bera for holding this important hearing my first question goes to Dr. Adalja. I saw that in your biography you previously work on the anthrax issue. I note that I was vaccinated for anthrax when I served on active duty in the military. I served overseas. And my question to you is about vaccines.

Would you agree with me that vaccines are one of the best ways to mitigate pandemics?

AMESH ADALJA: Thank you. Thank you for that question. Yes, I think when it comes to any infectious disease prevention is always better than treatment, especially if you have a safe and effective vaccine. So vaccines have to be the cornerstone of our medical countermeasure policy, because that’s what takes the threat off the table. That’s what reduces severity from illness. And that ultimately is what we have to aim for by looking at what’s out there in the threat scape that we know can cause infection and starting to work towards vaccines, even if it may not be the exact vaccines that that’s used during an epidemic or a pandemic. Making those steps down the road will get us much faster response

The work that people did on the first SARS and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, MERS, made it much easier to develop a vaccine for SARS-CoV-2 because they already knew for example, that the spike protein was an important target for immunity. So yes, vaccines are always going to be one of the cornerstones for medical countermeasures.

REP. LIEU: And it also turns out that our immune system is pretty smart. So when we put vaccines in and train our immune system, even with their variants, or our immune system, still sort of figured it out that oh, maybe this is something we need to take care of. So while the vaccines may not be 100% effective, they’re still somewhat effective and making immune system better against even a variants isn’t that correct?

AMESH ADALJA: Right. If you have an effective vaccine, it’s very hard for a variant or a mutation to erase all the protection of vaccine gives you. Vaccines are not all or none. It’s not an on or off switch. It’s a spectrum of protection.

So even if a vaccine may allow you to get infected, other arms of the immune system other than the antibodies may protect you against the severe consequences. So even when you have a vaccine, that’s not 100%. That’s not a magic bug zapper, you still get benefits from them and they are beneficial. This is this
underscores what we do with the influenza vaccine every year. We know it's much more protective against severe disease than it is protection against mild disease and that's also true for the COVID-19 vaccines.

REP. LIEU: Thank you. Question for Dr. Esvelt, you said something interesting about combining phase one and phase two trials. Can you explain the difference between phase one and phase two trials for vaccine development?

KEVIN ESVELT: Thank you, Representative. Yes, a phase one trial normally seeks to establish the safe dosage and doesn't try to figure out whether or not a vaccine actually is effective against the given pathogen.

Phase two is when we give it to enough people, some of whom we know will become infected, that we will be able to tell how effective the vaccine actually is. So when I suggest combining phase one and phase two, if there is a pandemic that is very high lethality, much higher than SARS 2, then in all likelihood, we would want to get shots into arms sooner rather than later, if necessary, trying multiple different doses of the same vaccine in different cohorts.

Honestly, if we're serious about it, we would actually run challenge trials in which we take volunteer cohorts guaranteed them the best medical care and deliberately infect them, some of whom would have been vaccinated with different vaccines and different amounts.

REP. LIEU: In a high lethality pandemic, would the FDA have authority to do this or there needs to be a change to a law for them to combine the trials and speed things up?

KEVIN ESVELT: No, that is an excellent question. I'm afraid I do not know I suspect Dr. Adalja may know.

REP. LIEU: Does anyone on the panel know?

AMESH ADALJA: If I can answer, I do think that this is something that has been that's in the public health authority laws of the FDA. I don't know that for sure. But I do think there. There has been a lot of discussion about running phase one and phase two simultaneously.

And I think that's there's not any obstacle to doing so and it would be necessary during a pandemic to get the vaccine as quickly as possible to meet those 100 day goals that we hear talked about.

REP. LIEU: Thank you. And now let me speak to my Republican colleagues across the aisle. We need your help to counter vaccine disinformation. As you've just heard, vaccines are one of the most effective ways to mitigate a pandemic.

And yet we have lots of folks believing that these vaccines are microchip in the way that they cause autism, or that they're going to give you COVID, or other crazy things and all that is false. And so we simply need Republican colleagues to step up, and when they go on Fox News, just push back on their hosts who are saying crazy stuff about these vaccines, because that's how we can beat this pandemic by getting as many people vaccinated as quickly as possible without a yield back.

REP. BERA: Right. Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentlelady from Virginia Miss Spanberger five minutes of questions.
REP. SPANBERGER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to our witnesses today. Thank you so much for being here. This has been extraordinarily interesting. Frightening, but I believe that the way that we prepare ourselves for the threats that exist is by facing them head on, so I truly appreciate your honest assessments and the information you shared.

I also and thankful that the chair and the Ranking Member included the term deterrence and the title of today’s hearing, because, you know, frankly, the best defense against future bio threats is our ability to quickly mitigate the spread of them and the effects of any biological agent.

In a critical part of any biosecurity deterrence strategy is to ensure that the United States has the manufacturing capacity to quickly ramp up our production of necessary medical countermeasures in the event of an emergency.

I’m sure all of our witnesses know Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) are the base ingredients for producing essential generic medicines, but unfortunately, 87% of the facilities that produce APIs are overseas. Our health care system suffers routine shortages, even outside of emergencies and our reliance on foreign suppliers really jeopardizes our ability to keep Americans healthy.

For example, the US has lost the capacity to produce penicillin here at home. That should be kind of a flashing warning sign to those who are focused on how prepared we may be into the future, to ultimately deter or respond to future biosecurity threats or even supply chain challenges.

I introduced a bill called the Prepare Act, it’s a bipartisan piece of legislation to identify the essential generic medicines that are necessary for us to have as a nation available at all times and to authorize the creation of a stockpile of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients so that we can ensure that our pharmaceutical supply chain is always able to produce the essential medicines that we need in the event of an emergency. Certainly, my district in central Virginia is leading the way in ensuring robust domestic supply of essential medicines, which is why I’m so focused on this issue.

The bipartisan Prepare Act would provide statutory authorization for this important federal effort and would create thousands of well-paid jobs, improve patient’s access to medicines and bolster our national biosecurity.

All of this, kind of preface, leads me to my question, either for Mr. Weber or for Dr. Adalja. How does strengthening the domestic production capacity of essential medicines and other medical countermeasures improve our nation’s ability to deter biosecurity threats?

ANDY WEBER: Thank you for your leadership in this area. It’s very important, and I’ll just give you one example.

Smallpox, we vaccinate our forces against smallpox. We have a stockpile of enough for every American in our Strategic National Stockpile. And I think just that fact is deterrence. It tells our adversaries that smallpox would not be successful as a weapon against the United States and its citizens.

So that kind of preparedness, deterrence by having those capacities to respond, I think are key and on-shoring those capabilities here in the United States to surge and rapidly manufacture All of these medical countermeasures is vital to not just public health, but to US national security.

REP. SPANBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Weber. Dr. Adalja, would you add anything to that?
AMESH ADALJA: I completely agree. I liken medical countermeasures to almost an anti-ballistic missile defense system. The more prepared we are for these threats, natural or deliberate, the less likely they are to be used. And I think the smallpox example is a great one and I think and I applaud your leadership on the Protect Act, because I've worked on this issue in the past where we know that there are many active pharmaceutical ingredients that all trace back to one place and if there is a supply chain disruption, it becomes really disastrous, and I think we need a lot more redundancy when it comes to certain medical countermeasures, that should be thought of as part of national security.

REP. SPANBERGER: So Dr. Adalja, just following up briefly on that point. The World Health Organization maintains the list of essential medicines since at least 2007, but only in 2020 did FDA publish its first list of essential medicines. As new pathogens and bio threats emerge, how can the government identify the essential medicines and medical countermeasures for the threats that exist that we as a nation will want to have to protect our people and our service members?

AMESH ADALJA: We have to have a lot of clinical reading to what's actually effective, what drugs are being used. Which ones are in trials, which ones are promising, but not yet approved. All of those should be on the radar of people that are trying to figure out how to augment the strategic national stockpile, and how to think about what needs to have redundancy in supply chains.

REP. SPANBERGER: Excellent. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Again to our witnesses, thank you so much for your time today. It's extraordinarily helpful, as we think about what Congress's role should be in making sure we're protecting our people.

REP. BERA: Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentlelady from North Carolina Miss Manning for five minutes.

REP. MANNING: Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to our witnesses for being with us today on this important topic.

Mr. Weber. I'm interested in what you started talking about at the beginning of your testimony about the strategy of deterrence of denial. And I'm wondering what exactly that would have meant, how could have been used to prevent COVID from becoming international? What systems did we not have in place and why?

ANDY WEBER: What we didn't have a system of early warning, rapid detection, a global system. This pandemic could have been stopped in its tracks in China, if they had had a robust system of early warning. And then, the other part is rapid diagnostics, testing, and contact tracing. And then countermeasures like programmable platforms like mRNA vaccine. If we could have had that not in 10 months, but in 100 days or even less, that would give us tools to respond to any biological threat, whether it's engineered as a biological weapon, or naturally occurring.

So it's that system it's all about time. Time to detect to know there's a problem and then to isolate it and have those rapid countermeasures available, so we can prevent them from spreading from the source to different places around the world.

REP. MANNING: So without ever required cooperation or first steps by the Chinese, or could we have had people in place who could have instigated that kind of a deterrence by denial system?
ANDY WEBER: Well, the deterrence by denial strategy that I laid out is primarily to prevent the deliberation use of biological weapons against the United States, its partners and its allies around the world. Pandemic prevention is a subset of that, I believe. And, yes, we could have had in place a system of information sharing in meta-genomic testing that would have given the Chinese a better capability and prepared us better for a possible spread to this country. We didn't have those systems in place, and it's gonna require a sustained investment. I don't want to say this is going to be easy.

REP. MANNING: Okay, all right. Thank you.

Mr. Adalja, I appreciate your answer to Mr. Lieu, that vaccines are a critically important first line of defense against the pandemic and I certainly echo Mr. Lieu’s comments to our colleagues, because we've seen an almost unimaginable level of vaccine hesitancy and an anti-vax movement that is dramatically harmed our efforts to prevent the spread of COVID.

I'd like your thoughts, Dr. Adalja about what steps we could take to get ahead of this problem the next time around and by this problem, I mean, vaccine hesitancy or an anti-vax movement.

How can we develop our population in a way that then people are not just willing but anxious to get vaccinated to prevent the spread of a future pandemic?

AMESH ADALJA: Thank you for that question. I think this is one of the most important aspects of the pandemic that we have to think about and reflect on to get us prepared for the next pandemic because vaccine hesitancy is a major threat. No one imagined that we would in the United States still be facing the onslaught of this pandemic, not because we didn't have a bad vaccine, but because people chose not to take the vaccine. And I think that this self-inflicted wound is really something that's going to make us all think about how to make us how we make ourselves more resilient, even if we have these great tools if no one wants to utilize them.

So I think that we as a as a medical community, and I'm an infectious disease physician, have to be very proactive. The vaccine hesitancy movement has been something that has been coming at us for some time. Basically since the dawn of vaccines, but with measles, mumps, rubella, with Gardasil, they continually meet each new vaccine with misinformation. And I think we have to really call it out as something that takes lives and we can't be passive and try and debunk them only after they bring these things up. We have to have a toolkit to talk to people to train physicians trained healthcare providers to be able to almost vaccinate people against the anti-vaccine movement by showing them how to think about this data and allowing them to really actually just open their eyes and see the benefits of vaccines. The fact that decades of have been added to all of our lives because of vaccines, hundreds of thousands of lives saved. And to me, it's mind-boggling and it's frustrating. It is almost as if it is the voice of the Dark Ages that has gained access to internet technology and has allowed itself to spread so much bad information out there.

I don't think it's going to be one single solution. It really has to be the whole healthcare community, the whole medical community, scientific community, as well as policymakers that call this out for how dangerous it is and take the fight to them instead of being merely reactive.

REP. MANNING: Thank you. My time is expired. I yield back.
REP. BERA: Great, thank you. Let me recognize the gentlelady from Missouri, Miss Wagner five minutes question.

REP. WAGNER: I thank the Chair very much and I thank our witnesses for their time today.

The COVID-19 pandemic has called immense suffering and we grieve the millions of victims who have lost their lives. As we continue to combat COVID-19 we must acknowledge that right from the outset of this devastating crisis, the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP, suppressed, misrepresented and falsified information necessary to prevent a pandemic in clear violation of the International Health Regulations.

Holding the CCP accountable is the only way to deter the release of another deadly virus on the global community in the future and to ensure that the Communist Party stops violating international laws. That is why I introduced the Compensation for Americans Act, which will establish a compensation fund for those affected and allow the President to freeze Chinese assets to bring the Communist Party to the negotiating table and give the United States a comprehensive toolbox of punitive measures to further incentivize China’s cooperation.

However, the United States must also lead efforts to reform the international organizations and laws governing pandemic prevention and response to ensure there are real consequences for putting all nations at risk of a deadly outbreak. The United States alone cannot prevent the next pandemic. Every member of the international community must honor their legal obligations to defend against emerging bio threats and the World Health Organization’s failure to combat China’s Coronavirus related misinformation campaign in the early days of the pandemic, cost the international community precious time it needed to avert a crisis and the WHO remains a deeply flawed institution and is highly susceptible to China’s malign influence.

Assistant Secretary Weber, what reforms to the WHO are needed to prevent authoritarian states like China from co-opting global health policy to serve their interests? What leverage does the United States have to secure these badly needed reforms?

ANDY WEBER: Well, I think the first thing that was unfortunate was several years ago, we pulled out of the WHO and lost our influence there. It’s great that the United States is back at the table and using our influence, but we need to strengthen the International Health Regulations. We need to support this new pandemic treaty initiative that will close some of the gaps that exist in the IHR. And we need to make this a priority, but it should be in the interest of all nations to work together against what is clearly a global, increasing threat of pandemics and biological weapons. I think it’s very important that that this hearing is being held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee because it is a global problem and there is no single-nation solution to it. We have to work with partners around the world, even difficult partners, if we’re going to get ahead of this problem.

REP. WAGNER: Dr. Esvelt, the State Department’s 2021 Arms Control report states that the People’s Republic of China has been quite engaged in activities with dual use applications and that the US does not have sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its biological weapons program. Can you tell me what type of dual use activities are scientists in the PRC engaged in and do you believe the PRC is complying with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention?

KEVIN ESVELT: Thank you for the questions. The scientists in China, like those elsewhere in the world, have definitely been attempting to identify pandemic-capable pathogens. They have, additionally, in
pursuit of that goal, been exploring whether combinations of potentially risky viruses are more infectious and more transmissible than the natural wild versions.

Whether that is a violation of the Biological Weapons Convention, is very much a legal international question. If it is, then many nations would need to change their behavior on this. But whether or not it is true, pandemic virus prediction fundamentally contributes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and undermines our national security.

REP. WAGNER: I'm very concerned about these dual use applications. My time has expired. I'd like to explore this further and I thank the Chairman for this for this very important hearing. Thank you.

REP. BERA: Great, thank you. I'm gonna take chairman's prerogative. I can ask an additional question. And I'm told Mr. Levin may be joining us shortly.

You we talked a little bit about countermeasures as one of our best strategies for deterrence. I think it is quite remarkable that we were able to come up with a vaccine within 10 minutes time I've heard several of these suggests that if we can narrow that down to 100 days that would, obviously the shortest possible time. My senses with the mRNA technology we can we can achieve that 100-day goal is that the right target at this point that we should be thinking about? Dr. Adalja, or, or any of the witnesses?

AMESH ADALJA: Thanks for the question. I think 100 days is what's been articulated and I think that is something to aim for. Whether its 100 days or 180 days, or 150 days. I think, doesn't matter so much. The point is that we have the technology to speed vaccine development and even just a week faster would have saved lives in the United States, for example, if the Pfizer vaccine was available a week later.

So we do have to be much more innovative artists in these vaccine technologies trying to run trials at the same time. But we also have to be cognizant of the fact that the vaccine hesitancy movement is going to say this happened even faster. And that may that may end up becoming a problem. But I do think that we it's not a scientific problem now to get vaccines faster.

I think we have to really incentivize companies to move quickly. And rapidly characterize these threats and develop vaccines and I think it can be done.

REP. BERA: So but the scientific component of it might be the easiest component, looking at the regulatory process of having phase one and phase two trials, ready to go in a pandemic and then obviously, but the faster they are just the how do we market those vaccines and address the hesitancy? I've got one last question. Then I'll turn it back over to Mr. Levin recognize Mr. Levin. We've also talked about surveillance a little bit something I've explored and talked to some of our technology companies is how we use technology, your search terms and etc.

As a form of surveillance, and, you know, you'd be curious if you know, any of the experts that we have on as witnesses have any thoughts on that, you know, if all of a sudden in a certain area people are searching, fever, searching, particular search terms, is that an area that we should explore in terms of biosurveillance we work with the tech sector, maybe Dr. Yassif.

JAIME YASSIF: Thank you, Chairman Bera, I really appreciate that question. I do think that we need to think creatively about using all the different and emerging new technologies that are at our disposal to take creative approaches to bio surveillance. So that kind of Google search and bass, strategy that you're describing is something that you know, Google and others have tried to do in the past, I think with some
success, but you know, in some ways, mixed results. But I think over time, we're seeing more and more different types of data streams come online that we could think about integrating into 21st century biosurveillance and I think that could be really useful for early detection of emerging infectious disease outbreaks so that we can stop outbreaks as at the source, which is critical as the other witnesses have shared.

And it may also perhaps yield information, other types of information that could help us more reliably attribute the source of outbreaks in the event that we're not sure if they were natural or not. And we're thinking about that in the context of our joint assessment mechanism that I discussed in my testimony. And if I may, I just wanted to offer one more thought about the role of vaccines and other capabilities for ensuring that the United States and the globe can respond effectively to pandemics. And I absolutely agree with all the comments that have been made about the critical importance of vaccines and the critical importance of platform technologies.

And the most robust thing we can do is to be prepared to be surprised and that we shouldn't assume that we will know in advance where the next pandemic threat will emerge from and we absolutely need to have a flexible and adaptable response and it has to be quick. I could not agree more. But I would also offer that we need non-pharmaceutical interventions in the interim. So when we saw with COVID, it took us well over a year and actually quite a lot longer to have a vaccine that was developed tested and ready to go and we should absolutely accelerate those timelines.

I think that's a high priority. But we need to acknowledge that there's going to be a lag time and in that interim, the virus will spread and lives will be lost and economies will be damaged. And social distancing and non-pharmaceutical interventions can be incredibly valuable for slowing the chains of transmission and saving lives during a public health emergency of international concern. And we shouldn't be winging it during a pandemic.

We should have plans in place we should have national governments around the world should have response plans in place for high consequence biological events where you are triggering proactive, early response that incorporates these kinds of provisions for national and global response in addition to all the other important medical countermeasures and other provisions that we've been discussing. Thank you.

REP. BERA: Right. Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Levin for five minutes questioning.

REP. LEVIN: Thank you so much. Chairman Bera for holding this really important hearing and for your leadership on these issues. I want to talk about arms control and its relationship. With bio threats. You know, the COVID 19 pandemic has made the importance of international cooperation in the face of emerging bio threats abundantly clear, and it appears that all the witnesses before the Subcommittee today would agree.

We have to improve international cooperation among national governments and international organizations on biosecurity issues, if we hope to prevent more severe threats in the future, despite the US and Russia being in communication on arms control, which is certainly an improvement from the last four years it's my sense that real progress towards another major arms control agreement is stall. So I'm curious whether you think that investing in international cooperation and negotiations with other governments on biosecurity would also yield benefits for broader arms control efforts. For instance, could
the US leverage cooperation on biosecurity as we seek to address the arsenals of other nuclear powers? Now, Mr. Weber you stated in your testimony, we could use that we could more effectively deter the use of bio weapons if US policy were explicitly to state that US nuclear weapons so purpose was to deter the use of nuclear weapons.

Why is the threat of nuclear use not credible in deterring biological attacks? Can you explain that?

ANDY WEBER: Yes, and I certainly support what candidate Biden said that we should adopt a sole purpose strategy that nuclear weapons are for deterring nuclear weapons. Traditionally, we’ve included bio threats and cyber threats, chemical threats as something that we think that nuclear weapons are useful in deterring, but the truth is, they’re just not credible. No nation thinks that we would actually use nuclear weapons in response to a biological attack. They’re not credible.

And that’s why we’re favoring a deterrence by denial strategy by having such good early warning and defenses against infectious disease after all biological weapons are infectious disease that our adversaries will decide that it’s not worth pursuing biological weapons because they won’t be very effective. So that’s, that’s the approach that that we’re recommending is investing in our bio defenses to make these threats, obsolete as weapons of mass destruction, and we also need to support the efforts to strengthen the biological and toxin Weapons Convention. Which bans biological weapons. These activities that are happening in North Korea and Russia are already prohibited by the international community.

And we need to work harder to find mechanisms to strengthen that. That International Convention against the development and stockpiling of biological weapons.

REP. LEVIN: All right, well, thanks and hopefully we can, you know, in tandem improve our, you know, cooperation on biological weapons with a revamped effort on arms control with in terms of nuclear weapons. Now COVID-19 has proved that we can’t prevent future pandemics alone. It’s just blown up the idea of a go alone strategy on foreign policy generally, and that expanding health capabilities around the globe requires sharing financial resources and making strategic investments. I understand that Dr. Yasser, in her testimony has recommended that the United States invest in a new multilateral financing mechanism, pandemic preparedness that would incentivize other governments to invest in their own readiness to respond to future pandemics.

And you were just touching on this So, Dr. Yasser, how can we ensure that US investments in international pandemic preparedness efforts are targeted effectively?

JAIME YASSIF: Well, thank you, Representative, that the issue of financing is absolutely critically important and thank you for raising the multilateral pandemic preparedness financing mechanism that we’ve been advocating for. And I would also think, think, the house for being so proactive and forward leaning on this issue. We’re hoping that Congress can really advance this important initiative and get it across the finish line, understanding that it’s currently the matter of active discussion. And, you know, we are advocating for this financing mechanism because everything we’ve had in place so far hasn’t worked.

You know, we’ve seen a cycle of panic and neglect in the run up to COVID that has led us woefully unprepared and has really led the US and the globe I think to inadequately respond and so we need a better approach. We don’t think the United States can or should do it alone. We absolutely think other governments should step up and put their money on the table and contribute to their own pandemic preparedness. But absolutely, it should be targeted and it shouldn’t just be based on the fashion of the day
we should move money to the most the places where it's most needed and where it can have the greatest impact in reducing global biological risks.

You know, there are a number of tools at our disposal to figure out what that is. I will share that today. NTi and in partnership with Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, we released the 2021 Global Health Security Index which has a lot of data about pandemic preparedness and biosecurity capabilities in countries around the world, including gaps and where there's room for improvement. We put that forward as a tool to help funders within government and in the private sector to think about how they can most effectively invest their resources.

To target the areas that need the most investment. As part of our financing mechanism. The other provision that we're thinking about is that countries should absolutely be part of the discussion to think about what their own internal priorities should be and where they need the greatest investment to shore up their vulnerabilities. So appreciate the question.

About targeted financing. I couldn't agree more. And fortunately, we have at our disposal a number of tools that can help make that effective. Thank you.

REP. LEVIN: Thanks. Well, Mr. Chairman, it looks like my time is expired. But I'll just say in closing, if I'm not able to ask this as a further question that no clearly we need to a multilateral financing mechanism like this would need to incentivize efforts to improve transparency and data sharing and support countries and doing that as we prepare for future biosecurity threats because the kind of idea that South Africa and other countries did such a great job and sharing and then they seem to be penalized for it. You know, we have to figure out ways to get beyond that.

So thanks, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.

REP. BERA: Thank you. And yeah, I think with that, we've asked all the questions. Doesn't look like the Ranking Member Chabot has a closing statement. So I want to commend you know, each of the witnesses for your testimony and look forward to working with the other members on this Subcommittee, full Committee and Congress to address some of the issues that were raised and, again, defeat COVID-19 But at the same time, make sure we're prepared for the next pandemic or any other bio threat.

So again, thank you for the testimony. That was timely and with that, I will go ahead and bang the gavel and the hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 18:17:59 +0000
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA); DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DTRA CMD GP
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Directors; DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Deputy Directors; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List Staff Office Chiefs; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DAG Team; [Redacted]; Hann, Ronald Jr SES DTRA RD (USA); Kulaisha, Michael A SES DTRA RD (USA); Dowling, Stephen J SES DTRA RD (USA)

Subject: Compromise NDAA released

Senior Leaders,

Earlier today a compromise version of the NDAA was released by the House Rules Committee. The House will take up the bill as early as today. Two updates on notable items LA was tracking:

* ECOHEALTH II: The new language only bars funding of projects in China. No funds may be "obligated or expended to fund any work to be performed by EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. in China on research supported by the government of China."

* EOD: Original language assigning DTRA to manage defense-wide program element funding has been removed.

Will have a fuller analysis of funding later today. The full text is posted here:

https://dtral.portal.unet.dtra.mil/LA/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2FLA%2FShared%20Documents%2FAuthorizations%20NDAA%2FFY22%20NDAA%2FE5%2F%20Conference&FolderCTID=0x012090EA6C8E03C44BC4F815D207E683C980E&View=%7B13B0EAB7%2D7D4%2D49FE%2DA9BE%2D9CA015F1E3A0%7D&initialize=Read&VisibilityContext=WSSTabPersistence

V/r,

[Redacted]

DTRA Legislative Affairs

[Redacted]
Senior Leaders,

Good afternoon. Attached is this week's legislative update. It's a quiet week as Congress holds hearings, but no votes.

Very Respectfully,

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
HEADLINES

- **Congress:** This week, Congress is holding committee hearings, but no votes are scheduled. When Members formally return on 15 November, they will have three more weeks in session, but schedule changes are expected due to the long list of priorities requiring action before the year is out. Their to-do list includes: extending government funding, raising the debt ceiling, completion of the NDAA, and coming to an agreement on the President’s large social spending package.

- **Senate:** Early indications point to the Senate floor taking up the FY22 NDAA the week of 15 November. SASC is likely to hold a hearing on 2 December for ADM Christopher Grady to be the next Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- **House:** Last Friday, the House passed the long-awaited $1.2 trillion infrastructure package and sent the bill to the President for his signature.

- **Government Funding:** The current continuing resolution expires at midnight on 3 December, however, a shutdown is unlikely. Leadership of the respective Appropriations committees met on 2 November, but could not reach an agreement on top-line numbers for defense and non-defense spending. There is a potential that Congress could pass another short-term funding bill, but any votes are expected to be delayed until after Thanksgiving.

CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENTS

- 2 Nov: Call with SASC staff
  - CT Director Dr. Robert Pope spoke with SASC staff member Dr. Jon Epstein concerning a block on Defense funding going to EcoHealth Alliance in the House version of the NDAA. Dr. Pope explained why CTR conducts these biosurveillance studies with our partners and the good partnership DTRA has had with EcoHealth.

- 6 Nov: CODEL to Jordan
  - Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA) visited the DTRA-provided Jordan Border Security System as part of a CODEL visit to Jordan, Israel, and Albania. She was able to tour a section of the border via helicopter and met with some JAF officials. A summary of the visit is pending.

- 11-12 Nov: CODEL to Offutt AFB
  - Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT), SAC-D Chair, is to visit USSTRATCOM to receive briefings on the operations and programs focused on strategic and integrated deterrence to include a Global Operations Tour to visualize how the NC3 process integrates with required mission partners.

NOMINATIONS

- **Department of Defense:**
  - **Confirmed**
    - Michael Connor  *Army Asst. Secretary-Civil Works* (Confirmed Nov 4)
○ On the Executive Calendar (awaiting a vote)
- Sasha Baker – DUSD for Policy (placed Oct 28)
- John Coffey – USN General Counsel (placed Oct 28)
- Nickolas Guertin – Dir. DoD Operational Test & Evaluation (placed Oct 28)
- Gabe Camarillo – Under Secretary of the Army (placed Oct 21)
- David Honey – DUSD for Research & Engineering (placed Oct 21)
- Andrew Hunter – USAF Asst. Secretary-Acquisition, Technology, Logistics (placed Oct 21)
- Rachel Jacobson – Asst. Army Secretary for Installations & Environment (placed Oct 21)
- Alex Wagner – USAF Asst. Sec.-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (placed Oct 21)

○ In Committee
- ADM Christopher Grady – Vice Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff (referred to SASC Nov 1)
- Ashish Vazirani – DUSD Personnel & Readiness (hearing held on Oct 28)
- Carrie Ricci – Army General Counsel (hearing held on Oct 28)
- John Sherman – DoD Chief Information Officer (hearing held on Oct 28)
- Peter Beshar – USAF General Counsel (Referred to SASC Oct 21)
- Ravi Chaudhary – USAF Asst. Secretary-Installations, Energy & Environment (Intent to nominate announced Oct 14)
- Brenda Fulton – ASD Manpower & Reserve Affairs (Hearing Oct 7)
- Melissa Dalton – ASD-Homeland Defense & Global Security (referred to SASC Aug 10)
- John Plumb – ASD-Space Policy (referred to SASC Aug 4)
- Celeste Wallander – ASD International Security Affairs (referred to SASC June 23)

● Other National Security Posts:
- Corey Hinderstein – NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (placed on the Executive Calendar on Oct 21)
- Adam Scheinman – Special Representative, Bureau of International Security & Nonproliferation (placed on the Executive Calendar on Oct 19)
- Mallory Stewart – Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (Hearing held Oct 5)
Dr. Hann and [redacted]

Attached is the final RAND brief for the IPT for your reference. There is no earth shattering discovery. The aims seem to be reduce DW6 and LS6 funding (for now), and negotiate with Army on MILCOM money for sustain Army laboratories’ infrastructures. It also suggested that better alignment between JPEO, T&E community, and JSTO is needed. There are talks about consolidating the performers’ list and pivot more toward private industries for CBD research as well. I will circle back after the IPT meeting if I hear anything that needs our attention.

DoD Service Lab Coordinator
Warfighter Integration Division (CBW)
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department (RD-CB), Defense Threat Reduction Agency Joint Science & Technology Office for Chemical & Biological Defense (JSTO-CBD)
Office: [redacted]
Mobile: [redacted]
Senior Leaders,

Good morning. Last night, the House passed the FY22 NDAA by a vote of 316-113. The bill authorizes $740 billion in DoD spending - an increase of $25 billion over the President’s request - and $28 billion for nuclear weapons programs under the Department of Energy. SASC approved similar funding levels in July and the full Senate is expected to take up the measure in the coming weeks.

High profile provisions included in the House-passed version include a 2.7% pay increase for service members, requiring women to register for the draft, and the establishment of a bipartisan commission to review U.S. involvement in Afghanistan over the last 20 years. The bill also includes provisions designed to strengthen U.S. alliances and pivots to Asia, especially through the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative.

Aside from CTR - which received a $1.05 million increase - DTRA funding was authorized at the levels from the President’s request. Of the 487 amendments considered this week, notable items successfully added to the bill include:

• Blocks funding for any purpose to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

• Directs the Executive Agent to designate a Joint Program Executive Officer for the EOD Program and assigns the DTRA Director to manage the Defense-wide program element funding for the Program.

• Increases funding for the Development of Medical countermeasures Against Novel Entities (DOMANE) program by $4.5 million to allow for the rapid screening of all FDA approved compounds and other human safe compound libraries to identify optimal drug candidates for repurposing as medical countermeasures for COVID-19 and other novel and emerging biothreats.

• Creates the Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council to implement the Global Health Security Agenda and to appoint a U.S. Coordinator for Global Health Security to coordinate such efforts.

• Establishes a National Security Commission on Synthetic Biology.

• DoD, in coordination with Agriculture, HHS, and DHS, is to develop an annex to the National Biodefense Strategy for a national biodefense science and technology strategy and implementation plan.

• Includes the Global Pandemic Prevention and Biosecurity Act, which seeks to address the source of highly infectious diseases beginning in animal species, including by reducing the sale and trade of live and fresh wildlife.
for human consumption, and addressing food insecurity associated with a reliance on local game and wildlife.

- Provides an apology to individuals and their families in NM, UT, ID, and other states who were exposed to radiation from nuclear testing.

- Requires reporting on recent security assistance programs to Mali, Guinea, and Chad

- Requires an annual report on and Congressional notification of U.S. efforts to counter malign foreign influence in Africa.

- Requires the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for engagement with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

- The U.S. is to work with state and non-state partners to shut down certain commercial wildlife markets, end the trade in terrestrial wildlife for human consumption, and build international coalitions to reduce the demand for wildlife as food, to prevent the emergence of future zoonotic pathogens. Authorizes USAID to undertake programs to reduce the risk of endemic and emerging infectious disease exposure and to help transition communities globally to safer, non-wildlife sources of protein.

Very Respectfully,
Subject: Weekly Legislative Update - 09.21.21

Senior Leaders,

Good afternoon. Attached is this week’s legislative update. Also attached is a list of FY22 NDAA amendments recently approved by the House Rules Committee considered to be in order for House Floor debate. We expect they may take up the NDAA tomorrow afternoon after the government funding discussion is resolved.

Some amendments we will be tracking closely include:
- Rep. Crawford (121) - Directs the Executive Agent to designate a joint program executive officer for the EOD Defense Program.
- Rep. Dunn (131) - Increases the Development of Medical countermeasures Against Novel Entities (DOMANE) program to allow for the rapid screening of all FDA approved compounds and other human safe compound libraries to identify optimal drug candidates for repurposing as medical countermeasures for COVID-19 and other novel and emerging biothreats.
- Rep. Joyce/Langevin (210) - Directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to develop an annex to the National Biodefense Strategy described under Section 104 of title 6, United States Code) for a national biodefense science and technology strategy and implementation plan, no later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this bill.
- Rep. Reschenthaler (354) - States that no funds authorized under this Act may be made available for any purpose to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.
- Rep. Smith (396) - Requires the GAO to conduct a study of the possible experimentation of ticks, insects, or vector-borne agents by the DOD between 1950 and 1977 for use as a bioweapon.

Very Respectfully,
HEADLINES

- **Top Line:** Congress is attempting to tackle four difficult tasks before month’s end:
  - *Continuing Resolution:* Democrats in the House are planning to vote later today on a bill to extend government funding at current levels until December 3, 2021. Also included in the measure are a suspension of the debt ceiling, aid to states hit by natural disasters, and funds to help settle Afghan refugees.
  - *Debt Ceiling:* While Congressional Democrats are seeking to suspend the debt limit until December 2022, Republicans oppose doing so and have pledged to vote against it despite being included in a necessary continuing resolution. The GOP has suggested that Democrats can push off the debt limit on their own through their planned filibuster-proof budget reconciliation package.
  - *Budget Reconciliation:* President Biden’s $3.5 trillion social spending bill has received support among most Democrats, but moderates have begun to voice their opposition. With two Democratic Senators now calling for a slimmed-down version, it is assured that the package will not pass the Senate in its current form. Progressives, meanwhile, have refused to budge on the original number.
  - *Infrastructure:* House Democratic leaders are planning to vote on a $550 billion Senate-passed infrastructure bill on September 27. However, Progressive Democrats have long maintained that they will oppose the bill until the lower chamber first approves the $3.5 trillion social spending package.

- **Senate:** The Senate is in session this week and acting on more nominations. No plans have been announced for floor debate on the SASC-passed version of the FY22 NDAA. Senate Appropriations Ranking Member Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) said that Republicans won’t approve any more individual spending bills until both parties first settle on topline numbers for defense and non-defense programs.
- **House:** The House is in session this week and will consider both a continuing resolution and the FY22 NDAA.

HEARINGS OF INTEREST

*Briefing on Biological Security Threats (CLOSED)*
- 20 Sep, 1700
- House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation
- Witnesses:
  - DASD Brandi Vann (introductions)
  - IC Members

*Nomination Hearing: TRANSCOM Commander*
- 23 Sep, 0930
• Senate Armed Services Committee
• Witnesses: Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost

Afghanistan Update (Tentative)
• 28 Sep (Tentative)
• Senate Armed Services Committee
• Witnesses:
  o Hon. Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defense)
  o GEN Mark Milley (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Afghanistan Update (Tentative)
• 29 Sep (Tentative)
• House Armed Services Committee
• Witnesses:
  o Hon. Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defense)
  o GEN Mark Milley (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)

CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL OF INTEREST
• Oct 8-15 CODEL Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Katrina Self (MLA, Sen. Gillibrand)
  o Visiting Czech Republic, Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia to better understand the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP).

NOMINATIONS

• Department of Defense:
  o On the Executive Calendar (awaiting a vote)
    • Michael Connor  Asst. Army Secretary-Civil Works (placed Sep 13)
  o In Committee
    • John Sherman  DoD Chief Information Officer (referred to SASC Sep 20)
    • Nickolas Guertin – Dir, DoD Operational Test & Evaluation (referred to SASC Sep 20)
    • Melissa Dalton – ASD-Homeland Defense & Global Security (referred to SASC Aug 10)
    • Alex Wagner – USAF Asst. Sec.-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (referred to SASC Aug 9)
    • Sasha Baker – DUSD for Policy (referred to SASC Aug 10)
    • John Coffey – USN General Counsel (referred to SASC Aug 10)
    • David Honey – DUSD for Research & Engineering (referred to SASC Aug 9)
    • John Plumb  ASD-Space Policy (referred to SASC Aug 4)
    • Andrew Hunter  USAF Asst. Secretary-Acquisition, Technology, Logistics (referred to SASC on July 22)
    • Gabe Camarillo – Under Secretary of the Army (referred to SASC on July 15)
    • Rachel Jacobson  Asst. Army Secretary for Installations & Environment (referred to SASC on July 13)
    • Celeste Wallander – ASD International Security Affairs (referred to SASC June 23)
Other National Security Posts:
- Thomas Monheim – ODNI Inspector General (placed on Exec Calendar Sep 20)
- Corey Hinderstein – NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (referred to SASC Aug 9)
- Mallory Stewart – Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (referred to SFRC July 13)
- Adam Scheinman – Special Representative, Bureau of International Security & Nonproliferation (SFRC hearing held Sep 15)
H. Res. __

H.R. 3755 - Women’s Health Protection Act of 2021
H.R. 5305 - Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act

2. Provides one hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce or their designees.
3. Waives all points of order against consideration of the bill.
4. Provides that the amendment printed in part A of the Rules Committee report shall be considered as adopted and the bill, as amended, shall be considered as read.
5. Waives all points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended.
6. Provides one motion to recommit.
7. Structured rule for H.R. 4350.
8. Provides one hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services or their designees.
9. Waives all points of order against consideration of the bill.
10. Provides that an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 117-13, modified by the amendment printed in part B of the Rules Committee report, shall be considered as adopted and the bill, as amended, shall be considered as read.
11. Waives all points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended.
12. Provides that following debate, each further amendment printed in part C of the Rules Committee report not earlier considered as part of amendments en bloc pursuant to section 4 shall be considered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, may be withdrawn by the proponent at any time before the question is put thereon, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.
13. Provides that at any time after debate the chair of the Committee on Armed Services or his designee may offer amendments en bloc consisting of further amendments printed in part C of the Rules Committee report not earlier disposed of. Amendments en bloc shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services or their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

14. Waives all points of order against the amendments printed in part C of the Rules Committee report and amendments en bloc described in section 4.

15. Provides one motion to recommit.


17. Provides one hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations or their designees.

18. Waives all points of order against consideration of the bill.

19. Provides that the bill shall be considered as read.

20. Waives all points of order against provisions in the bill.

21. Provides one motion to recommit.

22. Provides that at any time through the legislative day of Friday, September 24, 2021, the Speaker may entertain motions offered by the Majority Leader or a designee that the House suspend the rules with respect to multiple measures that were the object of motions to suspend the rules on the legislative days of July 26, July 27, or September 21, 2021, and on which the yeas and nays were ordered and further proceedings postponed. The Chair shall put the question on any such motion without debate or intervening motion, and the ordering of the yeas and nays on postponed motions to suspend the rules with respect to such measures is vacated.

23. Provides that proceedings may be postponed through October 1, 2021, on measures that were the object of motions to suspend the rules on the legislative days of July 26, July 27, or September 21, 2021 and on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

24. Provides that House Resolution 188, agreed to March 8, 2021 (as most recently amended by H. Res. 555, agreed to July 27, 2021), is amended by striking "September 22, 2021" each place it appears and inserting (in each instance) "October 27, 2021".

25. Provides that ordering of the yeas and nays on the motion that the House suspend the rules and pass S. 2382 is vacated.

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to
consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3755) to protect a person's ability to
determine whether to continue or end a pregnancy, and to protect a health care
provider's ability to provide abortion services. All points of order against
consideration of the bill are waived. The amendment printed in part A of the
report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be
considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. All
points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended, are waived. The
previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on
any further amendment thereto, to final passage without intervening motion
except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and
ranking minority member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce or their
respective designees; and (2) one motion to recommit.

Sec. 2. Upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in
the House the bill (H.R. 4350) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022
for military activities of the Department of Defense and for military
construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and
for other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are
waived. In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Committee on Armed Services now printed in the bill, an amendment in the
nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 117–13,
modified by the amendment printed in part B of the report of the Committee on
Rules accompanying this resolution, shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as
amended, shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions in
the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto, to final
passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally
divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the
Committee on Armed Services or their respective designees; (2) the further
amendments described in section 3 of this resolution; (3) the amendments en
bloc described in section 4 of this resolution; and (4) one motion to recommit.

Sec. 3. After debate pursuant to section 2 of this resolution, each further
amendment printed in part C of the report of the Committee on Rules not
earlier considered as part of amendments en bloc pursuant to section 4 of this
resolution shall be considered only in the order printed in the report, may be
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read,
shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, may be withdrawn by the
proponent at any time before the question is put thereon, shall not be subject to
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

Sec. 4. It shall be in order at any time after debate pursuant to section 2
of this resolution for the chair of the Committee on Armed Services or his
designee to offer amendments en bloc consisting of further amendments printed
in part C of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution
not earlier disposed of. Amendments en bloc offered pursuant to this section
shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for 30 minutes equally divided
and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Armed Services or their respective designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

Sec. 5. All points of order against the further amendments printed in part C of the report of the Committee on Rules or amendments en bloc described in section 4 of this resolution are waived.

Sec. 6. Upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 5305) making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2022, and for providing emergency assistance, and for other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. The bill shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions in the bill are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and on any amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations or their respective designees; and (2) one motion to recommit.

Sec. 7. (a) At any time through the legislative day of Friday, September 24, 2021, the Speaker may entertain motions offered by the Majority Leader or a designee that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV with respect to multiple measures described in subsection (b), and the Chair shall put the question on any such motion without debate or intervening motion.

(b) A measure referred to in subsection (a) includes any measure that was the object of a motion to suspend the rules on the legislative day of July 26, 2021, July 27, 2021, or September 21, 2021, in the form as so offered, on which the yeas and nays were ordered and further proceedings postponed pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX.

(c) Upon the offering of a motion pursuant to subsection (a) concerning multiple measures, the ordering of the yeas and nays on postponed motions to suspend the rules with respect to such measures is vacated to the end that all such motions are considered as withdrawn.

Sec. 8. (a) Notwithstanding clause 8 of rule XX or section 7 of House Resolution 555, further proceedings on a vote by the yeas and nays on the question of adoption of a motion that the House suspend the rules offered on the legislative day of July 26, 2021, or July 27, 2021, may continue to be postponed through the legislative day of October 1, 2021.

(b) Notwithstanding clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on a vote by the yeas and nays on the question of adoption of a motion that the House suspend the rules offered on the legislative day of September 21, 2021 may be postponed through the legislative day of October 1, 2021.

Sec. 9. House Resolution 188, agreed to March 8, 2021 (as most recently amended by House Resolution 555, agreed to July 27, 2021), is amended by striking “September 22, 2021” each place it appears and inserting (in each
instance) “October 27, 2021”.

Sec. 10. The ordering of the yeas and nays on the motion that the House suspend the rules and pass S. 2382 is vacated to the end that the motion be considered as withdrawn.

### SUMMARY OF AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3755 IN PART A PROPOSED TO BE CONSIDERED AS ADOPTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pallone (NJ)</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>(REVISED) (MANAGER’S) Clarifies provisions under the legislation with respect to enforcement of limitations or requirements in violation of the Women’s Health Protection Act, and makes other necessary technical and conforming changes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### SUMMARY OF AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4350 IN PART B PROPOSED TO BE CONSIDERED AS ADOPTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Smith, Adam (WA)</td>
<td>#718</td>
<td>(MANAGER’S) Amends section 901 and makes technical and clerical changes to the authorizations of appropriations tables in sections 4101, 4201, and 4301.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 4350 IN PART C PROPOSED TO BE MADE IN ORDER

(summaries derived from information provided by sponsors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Perlmutter (CO), Velázquez (NY), Davidson (OH), Correa (CA), Blumenauer (OR), Joyce, David (OH),</td>
<td>#599</td>
<td>Adds the bipartisan SAFE Banking Act which allows state-legal cannabis businesses to access the banking system and help improve public safety by reducing the amount of cash at these businesses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Debate Time (10 minutes)
2. Sánchez (CA), Titus (NV) #389 (REVISED) Extends consumer credit protections to active duty armed and uniformed consumers to dispute adverse actions or inaction on their credit report that occurred while they were in a combat zone, aboard a U.S. vessel, or away from their usual duty stations. (10 minutes)

3. Torres, Norma (CA), Perlmutter (CO), Fitzpatrick (PA), Hayes (CT) #489 (REVISED) Categorizes public safety telecommunications as a protective service occupation under the Standard Occupational Classification System. (10 minutes)

4. Waters (CA) #720 (REVISED) Authorizes a $200 million contribution to the IMF’s Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) that allows the IMF to provide immediate debt service relief to poor countries in the wake of catastrophic natural disasters and major, fast-spreading public health emergencies. (10 minutes)

5. Dean (PA) #442 Directs the holder of a private education loan to discharge the loan in the event of the borrower’s death or total and permanent disability. (10 minutes)

6. Plaskett (VI) #760 (REVISED) Provides for U.S. Virgin Islands nonimmigrant visitor visa waivers (as currently provided for Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) for stays of up to 45 days in the U.S. Virgin Islands. (10 minutes)

7. Costa (CA), Tiffany, Thomas (WI), Perlmutter (CO), Young (AK), Steel, Michelle (CA) #473 Expands eligibility for burial in US national cemeteries for Hmong and Lao veterans from the Vietnam war to include individuals naturalized before 2000. (10 minutes)

8. Castro (TX) #173 Strengthens contract authority of the Department of Defense to improve minority representation in certain media projects and submit a report on the summary of the communities represented in such projects. (10 minutes)

9. Green, Al (TX) #507 (REVISED) Requires the Department of Veterans Affairs to distribute a payment of $25,000 to U.S. merchant marines who engaged in qualified service during World War II. To be eligible, an individual must apply for the benefit and must not have received benefits under the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944. Sets forth what constitutes qualified service, including time frame of service and licensing requirements. (10 minutes)
10. Cicilline (RI), Golden (ME), Takano (CA), Reschenthaler (PA), Brown (MD)

#809 (LATE) Prohibits the enforcement of forced arbitration clauses in contracts covered by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. (10 minutes)

11. Tlaib (MI)

#266 (REVISED) Strengthens servicemember consumer protections with regards to medical debt collections and credit reporting, including prohibiting the collection of medical debt for the first two years and prohibiting debt arising from medically necessary procedures from ever appearing on servicemember credit reports. (10 minutes)

12. Higgins, Brian (NY)

#812 (LATE) (REVISED) Increases authorized funding to the National Maritime Heritage Grants Program, as established under Sec. 38703, Title 54 USC. (10 minutes)

13. Casten (IL)

#338 Requires that any new construction of DoD buildings larger than 5,000 square feet be designed to be net-zero by 2035 and includes a national security waiver, and separately directs a status report on progress towards meeting DoD’s current energy security goal to produce or procure renewable energy not less than 25 percent by FY25. (10 minutes)

14. Larsen, Rick (WA), Grijalva (AZ), Kilmer (WA), Strickland (WA), DelBene (WA), Lowenthal (CA), Schrier (WA)

#265 Expands protections for marine mammals to include vessel speed mitigation measures, monitoring of underwater soundscapes, and grants to support research and development into marine mammal monitoring technologies. (10 minutes)

15. Slotkin (MI), Sarbanes (MD), Delgado (NY), Fitzpatrick (PA), Levin, Andy (MI), Leger Fernandez (NM), Ross (NC), Mace (SC), Posey (FL)

#860 (LATE) (REVISED) Directs the Secretary of Defense to provide DOD medical providers with mandatory training with respect to the potential health effects of PFAS; requires EPA to obtain analytical reference standards for PFAS for the development of protocols and methodologies and enforcement activities; clarifies the scope of the PFAS Data Reporting from the 2020 NDAA; amends Title III, Section 318 to: (1) clarify that DOD must comply with safe incineration of PFAS as enacted in section 330 of the NDAA for FY2020; (2) require the report on DOD progress to comply with EPA safe PFAS disposal guidelines to be submitted one year after enactment of the act and include report submission to the Committee on Armed Services of the (10 minutes)
Senate and House; (3) require the report to include actions DOD has taken to comply with section 330 of NDAA FY2020 and recommendations for the safe storage of PFAS; (4) and define the scope of prohibition to ensure PFAS materials sent to third parties for disposal are also covered on the provision; expresses the sense of Congress that the Air Force has contaminated real property with PFOS and PFOA chemicals and should use existing authority to acquire property and provide relocation assistance; requires a report detailing contamination sites and acquisition and relocation status; requires a national primary drinking water regulation for PFAS; and clarifies Congressional intent by requiring manufacturers to disclose all PFAS discharges over 100 lbs.

16. DeGette (CO), Huffman (CA), Schiff (CA), Kilmer (WA), Carbajal (CA), Chu (CA)  
#270 (REVISED) Adds the text of Titles I - VI of the Protecting America's Wilderness and Public Lands Act. (10 minutes)

17. Neguse (CO), Grijalva (AZ)  
#429 Adds the text of H.R. 577, the Colorado Outdoor Recreation and Economy Act, and H.R. 1052, the Grand Canyon Protection Act to the bill. (10 minutes)

18. Kim (NJ), Pfluger (TX), Garamendi (CA), Norcross (NJ)  
#439 Requires that to the extent practicable, DoD shall give preference for military construction contracts to firms who certify that at least 51 percent of employees hired to perform the contract shall reside in the same State or within a 60-mile radius and requires all contractors and subcontractors for military construction (MilCon) projects be licensed in the state where the work is to be performed, and requires Congressional notification on major MilCon contracting/subcontracting awards. (10 minutes)

19. McCaul (TX), Kaptur (OH), Kinzinger (IL), Gallego (AZ), Wilson, Joe (SC), Quigley (IL), Fitzpatrick (PA), Levin, Andy (MI), Turner (OH), Cohen (TN), Pfluger (TX), Jackson Lee (TX), Meijer (MI)  
#631 Authorizes new mandatory sanctions on foreign entities and individuals responsible for the planning, construction, and operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Repeals the national interest waiver for sanctions required by existing law related to the pipeline project. (10 minutes)
20. Sherman (CA), Waters (CA)  
#746 (REVISED) Imposes sanctions to prohibit Americans from purchasing or selling newly issued Russian sovereign debt in primary and secondary markets, in response to Russian interference in the past three U.S. elections. Requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to complete a report on foreign interference for each future midterm and Presidential election and directs the President, after receiving this report, to determine whether to suspend or keep in place these sanctions. (10 minutes)

21. Cárdenas (CA), Schiff (CA), Speier (CA), Levin, Andy (MI), Bilirakis (FL), Lofgren (CA), Pallone (NJ), Schakowsky (IL), Sherman (CA), Valadao (CA), Chu (CA), Eshoo (CA), Porter (CA), Kim, Young (CA), Krishnamoorthi (IL), Titus (NV)  
#586 (REVISED) Creates a report on Azerbaijan’s activities in Nagorno Karabakh in 2020 to be submitted to the relevant congressional committees by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State. Also expresses the Sense of Congress that the government of Azerbaijan should immediately return all Armenian prisoners of war and captured civilians. Urges the Administration to engage with Azerbaijani authorities, including through the OSCE Minsk Group, to make clear the importance of adhering to their obligations under the November 9 statement and international law to immediately release all prisoners of war and captured civilians. (10 minutes)

22. Cleaver (MO), Cohen (TN), Moore (WI), Meeks (NY)  
#497 Establishes the Alcee L. Hastings Leadership Institute for Inclusive Transatlantic Engagement to honor and continue the important work of our colleague Rep. Hastings to increase diversity in international affairs and national security leadership and public service careers in the United States and Europe. Assists in addressing extremism, hate crimes, and other security challenges. (10 minutes)

23. Schiff (CA)  
#569 Requires proceedings for military commissions to be publicly available on the internet. (10 minutes)

24. Schiff (CA)  
#545 Prohibits the use of evidence obtained by or with the assistance of a member of the Armed Forces in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in a court or other legal proceeding. (10 minutes)
25. Bowman (NY), Khanna (CA), DeFazio (OR), Tlaib (MI), Torres, Ritchie (NY), Schakowsky (IL), Cohen (TN) #771 (LATE) (REVISED) Prohibits U.S. military presence in Syria without Congressional approval within one year of enactment. (10 minutes)

26. Mfume, Kweisi (MD), Neguse (CO) #138 (REVISED) Increases the governmentwide goals for small business participation in federal contracts and for certain small business concerns. (10 minutes)

27. Omar (MN), Lee, Barbara (CA), Johnson, Hank (GA), Pressley (MA) #63 (REVISED) Adds requirement that the final report of the Commission on Afghanistan created by Section 1080 includes an assessment of the impact of civilian harm and human rights violations, including civilian casualties from airstrikes, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, and the use of torture. (10 minutes)

28. Khanna (CA), Jayapal (WA), Schiff (CA), Smith, Adam (WA), DeFazio (OR), Porter (CA), Welch (VT), Johnson, Hank (GA), Schakowsky (IL), Connolly (VA), Lieu (CA), Himes (CT), Torres, Ritchie (NY), Tlaib (MI), Blumauer (OR), Cohen (TN), Dingell (MI) #573 (REVISED) Terminates U.S. military logistical support, and the transfer of spare parts to Saudi warplanes conducting aerial strikes against the Houthis in Yemen and permanently ends intelligence sharing that enables offensive strikes and any U.S. effort to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany Saudi or United Arab Emirates-led coalition forces in the war in Yemen. (10 minutes)

29. Correa (CA), Carson (IN), Case (HI), Sherrill (NJ), Jones, Mondaire (NY), Suozzi (NY) #769 (LATE) (REVISED) Establishes an Afghan Refuge Special Envoy position. (10 minutes)

30. Meeks (NY), Deutch (FL), #57 (REVISED) Requires the suspension of U.S. sustainment and maintenance support to Saudi air force (10 minutes)
Lieu (CA), Smith, Adam (WA), Schiff (CA)
units responsible for airstrikes resulting in civilian
casualties in Yemen with certain exemptions for
territorial self-defense, counterterrorism operations,
and defense of U.S. government facilities or personnel.

31. Torres, Norma (CA), Sires (NJ)
#713 Establishes additional criteria for accountability
mechanisms in the Northern Triangle, including visa
restrictions and limitations on security assistance for
corruption and obstructing democratic processes.
Establishes a fellowship for rule of law and democracy
defenders from the region to continue their work when
under threat and collaborate with international
organizations and U.S. government agencies to
advance work that supports core U.S. policy goals.

32. Langevin (RI)
#502 Makes a technical correction to Section 1752 of the
FY21 NDAA (6 U.S.C. 1500) that will allow the
Office of the National Cyber Director to accept the
services of non-reimbursed detailees from departments
and agencies.

33. Kahele (HI), Blumenauer (OR), Norton (DC), Cleaver (MO), Huffman (CA), Williams (GA), Gallego (AZ), Ruiz (CA)
#258 Rescinds twenty Medals of Honor awarded to the
members of the United States army for killing
hundreds of unarmed Lakota women, children and men
on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, which later
became known as the Wounded Knee Massacre.

34. Adams (NC), Green, Al (TX)
#741 (REVISED) Extends the private student loan
protections until January 31, 2022.

35. Maloney, Carolyn (NY), Connolly (VA), Sarbanes (MD), Castro (TX)
#21 Replaces the congressional publication entitled United
States Government Policy and Supporting Positions,
commonly known as the Plum Book, with an online
public directory and requires the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to publish the information
contained in the Plum Book on a public website in a
format that is easily searchable and that otherwise
meets certain data standards.

36. Johnson, Hank (GA), Schakowsky (IL), Connolly (VA), Norton (DC), Carson (IN), Tlaib (MI), Jacobs, Sara (CA), Lee, Barbara (CA), Moore (WI),
#534 Restricts the Department of Defense (DOD) from
transferring certain surplus military property to federal,
state, or local law enforcement agencies. Specifically,
DOD may not transfer to such agencies specified
property such as controlled firearms, ammunition,
grenade launchers, explosives, certain vehicles or
trucks, armored or weaponized drones, certain
controlled aircraft, silencers, or long-range acoustic
devices. DOD may waive this limitation and transfer
certain vehicles or trucks if DOD determines that the
transfer is necessary for disaster or rescue purposes or
for another purpose where life and public safety are at risk.

37. Houlahan (PA), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH), Clarke, Yvette (NY), Gallagher (WI)  
   #649 Creates a cybersecurity training pilot program at the Department of Veterans Affairs for veterans and members of the Armed Forces transitioning from service to civilian life. Creates a registered apprenticeship program at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) focused on cybersecurity and infrastructure security. Both programs are established in coordination with the Department of Defense. (10 minutes)

38. Garamendi (CA), Khanna (CA), Jacobs, Sara (CA), Blumenauer (OR), Beyer (VA)  
   #289 (REVISED) Prohibits funding for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program and W87-1. (10 minutes)

39. Schrader (OR)  
   #48 Reduces Unfunded Priority Lists to only the six Service Branches of the United States Military and United States Special Operations Command. (10 minutes)

40. Pocan (WI), Lee, Barbara (CA), Schakowsky (IL), Gomez (CA), Espaillat (NY), Cohen (TN), Johnson, Hank (GA), Lowenthal (CA), Watson Coleman (NJ), Pressley (MA),  
   #397 Reduces overall authorization level by 10%. Excludes military personnel, DoD federal civilian workforce, and defense health program accounts from the 10% reduction. (10 minutes)
Norton (DC), Grijalva (AZ), Blumenauer (OR), Tlaib (MI), Levin, Andy (MI), DeFazio (OR), Khanna (CA), Velázquez (NY), Torres, Ritchie (NY), Auchincloss (MA), Welch (VT), Huffman (CA), Lofgren (CA), Chu (CA), Nadler (NY), Raskin (MD), Garcia, Jesús (IL), Jayapal (WA), Meng (NY), Barragán (CA), Omar (MN), Ocasio-Cortez (NY), McGovern (MA)  

41. Lee, Barbara (CA), Pocan (WI), Ocasio-Cortez (NY), Jacobs, Sara (CA), Pressley (MA), Moore (WI)  

#602 Reduces amounts authorized for defense spending in FY22 to no more than the amount requested by the President.  

42. Langevin (RI), Escobar (TX), Ross (NC)  

#420 (REVISED) Allows for admission of essential scientists and technical experts to promote and protect the national security innovation base.  

43. Spanberger (VA), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH)  

#324 (REVISED) Requires the Treasury Department to conduct and submit to Congress a report on any risks to the U.S. financial stability and the global economy emanating from the People’s Republic of China, along with any recommendations to the U.S. representatives at the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board to strengthen international cooperation to monitor and mitigate such financial stability risks through the work of the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board.
44. Gottheimer (NJ) #341 Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit to Congress (1) a copy of licenses authorizing financial institutions to provide services benefiting a state sponsor of terrorism, and (2) a report on foreign financial institutions conducting significant transactions for persons sanctioned for international terrorism and human rights violations. (10 minutes)

45. Adams (NC) #405 Clarifies that "nursing" is another status through which an individual may be subject to discrimination. (10 minutes)

46. Adams (NC), Brown (MD) #575 (REVISED) Clarifies the definition of Historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the context of defense research. (10 minutes)

47. Arrington (TX) #332 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of the Air Force, or the Secretary's designee, to provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the process for evaluating and granting military type certifications for aircraft. (10 minutes)

48. Arrington (TX) #680 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to submit a report that describes the financial benefits Russia will obtain through the Nordstream 2 Pipeline as well as an analysis of the security risks of a completed pipeline to Ukraine, our European allies and partners, and the NATO alliance. (10 minutes)

49. Auchincloss (MA) #481 (REVISED) Directs the Treasury Secretary to determine if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that there is a primary money laundering concern in connection with Afghan illicit finance. (10 minutes)

50. Auchincloss (MA) #528 (REVISED) Gives the Afghanistan Commission, established in the NDAA base text, the authority to secure information and intelligence related to its investigations while protecting sources and methods. (10 minutes)

51. Baird (IN), Carson (IN), DesJarlais (TN) #775 (LATE) (REVISED) Designates $15 million in funding for the Hypersonics Advanced Manufacturing Technology Centers (HAMTC) under Section 1402, Advanced Technology Development Defense-wide Manufacturing Science and Technology Program, offset from Operations and Maintenance. (10 minutes)

52. Banks (IN) #224 (REVISED) Modifies the rules for appointees of the military academy Board of Visitors to mandate that the President must choose the replacement for Presidential appointees. (10 minutes)

53. Barr (KY), Chabot (OH) #628 (REVISED) Directs the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific Region and efforts by the U.S. to work with Taiwan to disrupt such operations. (10 minutes)
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<tr>
<td><strong>54. Barr (KY)</strong></td>
<td>#710 Directs the Defense Health Agency to carry out a pilot program to determine the prevalence of sleep apnea among members of the Armed Forces assigned to initial training.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<td><strong>55. Barragán (CA)</strong></td>
<td>#470 Changes the name of The Battleship IOWA Museum, located in Los Angeles, California, and managed by the Pacific Battleship Center, to the “National Museum of the Surface Navy”.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<td><strong>56. Barragán (CA)</strong></td>
<td>#498 Requires the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to provide notice to all noncitizen military recruits about their options for naturalization.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>57. Beatty (OH), Wagner (MO)</strong></td>
<td>#381 Directs an interagency study and report on the housing and service needs of survivors and those at risk of trafficking.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>58. Bera (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA)</strong></td>
<td>#421 Authorizes U.S. participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI).</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>59. Bera (CA), Chabot (OH), Bacon (NE)</strong></td>
<td>#616 Supports Taiwan’s investment in an asymmetric defense strategy by requiring a report with programmatic and policy options to support Taiwan’s defense budgeting and procurement process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment in capabilities aligned with Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>60. Bera (CA)</strong></td>
<td>#676 Requires a joint report from the Department of State and Department of Defense on the utilization of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database to verify Afghan special immigrant visa applicant information.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>61. Biggs (AZ), Van Duyne (TX)</strong></td>
<td>#110 Expresses a sense of Congress about the importance of the U.S.-Israel relationship.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>63. Blumenauer (OR), Garamendi (CA)</strong></td>
<td>#261 <strong>(REVISED)</strong> Requires the Director for Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation to conduct a study on the unexpected cost increases for the W80-4 nuclear warhead life extension program.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>64. Blumenauer (OR), Newman (IL), Espaillat (NY)</strong></td>
<td>#263 Requires a Department of Defense report to Congress on activities and planned activities related to Superfund sites in which DoD is responsible for the pollution.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>65. Blunt Rochester (DE)</strong></td>
<td>#802 <strong>(LATE) (REVISED)</strong> Sense of Congress honoring Dover Air Force Base, including the 436th and 512th Airlift Wings, and the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs.</td>
<td>(10 minutes)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
66. Bourdeaux (GA) #726 Requires a report from DOD on the implementation of GAO’s recommendations to improve the Procurement Technical Assistance Program, as set forth in GAO-21-287. (10 minutes)

67. Boyle (PA) #368 Creates a new section to review agreements with non-Department entities with respect to prevention and mitigation of spills of Aqueous Film-Forming Foam. (10 minutes)

68. Brown (MD), Katko (NY), Balderson (OH), Davis, Rodney (IL), Krishnamoorthi (IL) #201 (REVISED) Provides a limited, targeted waiver of the FAR provision only as it applies to forgiven PPP loans received by engineering firms doing work on federally funded transportation projects. (10 minutes)

69. Brown (MD) #335 Requires a report from the Department of Defense on training provided to the acquisition workforce on commercial item determinations. (10 minutes)

70. Brown (MD), Trahan (MA), Green, Mark (TN) #363 (REVISED) Adds installation support services to intergovernmental service agreements in order to protect individuals with disabilities. (10 minutes)

71. Brown (MD), Strickland (WA) #364 Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to congress on the demographic breakdown of security forces citations. (10 minutes)

72. Brownley (CA) #8 (REVISED) Requires DOD to implement GAO recommendations to address disparity in military uniform costs by gender and allows for a one-time retroactive payment from DOD to women service members affected by disparity in uniform costs over last 10 years. The revision makes the payment optional and makes clear that retired/separated members are not eligible, and our second revision was necessary to fix something with the caption at the request of Leg Counsel. (10 minutes)

73. Brownley (CA) #22 (REVISED) Requires Government Accountability Office to conduct a study of DOD's policy to discharge women based on pregnancy or parenthood between 1951-1976 based on Executive Order by President Truman. Requires study to include number of women impacted, identify the impact on their access to VA benefits and health care, and make recommendations on restoring access. (10 minutes)

74. Brownley (CA), Langevin (RI) #23 Establishes a federal grant program to help states create and implement a Seal of Biliteracy program that encourages and recognizes high school students who achieve proficiency in both English and at least one other language. (10 minutes)
75. Brownley (CA) #24 Revises the reporting requirement for the VA Advisory Committee on Women Veterans to make the report annual instead of every other year.

76. Buchanan (FL) #254 Directs the Secretary of Defense to implement the recommendations included in the July 2021 GAO report on increasing the safety of military training drills and reducing fatalities within the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

77. Buck (CO), Khanna (CA) #755 (REVISED) Amends section 1241 of subsection E of title XII to clarify that China’s atrocities in Xinjiang are genocide, to be consistent with previous designations made by the Executive branch.

78. Budd (NC) #811 (LATE) Prohibits any funding in the bill from being used to remove publicly available accountings of military assistance provided to Afghan security forces from the website of the Department of Defense or any other agency.

79. Burchett (TN) #366 Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate on plans by DoD for fielding electronic autonomous shuttles on military installations for the purpose of transporting personnel and equipment.

80. Bush, Cori (MO) #750 Studies nuclear contamination in Coldwater Creek and installs warning signage to reduce potential harm.

81. Bustos (IL), Axne (IA), Balderson (OH), Schakowsky (IL), Fitzpatrick (PA), Lofgren (CA), Joyce, David (OH), Courtney (CT), Houlahan (PA), Luria (VA), Norton (DC), Hartzler (MO), Kilmer (WA), Kuster (NH) #336 Amends Section 106 of Title 38 USC recognizing the service of the U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps and allows applicable discharge from service by the DoD and provision of service medal and grave marker, while not providing other Veteran benefits or burial rights at Arlington National Cemetery.

82. Bustos (IL), Newman (IL), Quigley (IL) #349 Creates USD (R&E) 3-year Pilot Program in concert with Manufacturing Innovation Institutes (MII) to transfer digitally secured manufacturing technologies to defense industrial base contractors and provides reimbursement to MIIs for associated transfer costs and requires annual briefing submission to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
83. Bustos (IL), Newman (IL), Quigley (IL)  
#355 Directs the USD(R&E) to create a disruptive manufacturing capabilities integration roadmap in consultation with DoD Manufacturing Innovation Institutes. Requires submission of roadmap briefing to HASC. (10 minutes)

84. Cammack, Kat (FL)  
#795 (LATE) (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of Commerce to submit a report that includes an assessment of establishing a preclearance facility in Taiwan. (10 minutes)

85. Cammack, Kat (FL)  
#847 (LATE) Requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct an anonymous survey to determine the effects that the COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the Secretary on August 24, 2021, has had on recruitment to and reenlistment in the Armed Forces. (10 minutes)

86. Carbajal (CA)  
#124 (REVISED) Requires the Chief of Space Operations to consider commercial launch when completing the requested range infrastructure report. (10 minutes)

87. Carson (IN), McKinley (WV), Eshoo (CA)  
#285 Increases pancreatic cancer research funding at the Department of Defense's Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP) by 5 million, to the already appropriated 15 million. (10 minutes)

88. Case (HI), Kahele (HI), Chabot (OH)  
#304 Modifies the DIA annual report on China's military and security developments to include an assessment of China's military expansion into the Pacific Islands Region. This assessment would include their strategic interests in the region, mil-to-mil engagements, financial assistance and other investments in the region. (10 minutes)

89. Case (HI), Kahele (HI)  
#306 Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. and Republic of Palau have a strong relationship and that Congress is receptive of Palau's request to the U.S. to establish a regular military presence in Palau for the purposes of Palau's defense. It also requires a report on the DoD's plans to review Palau's request and any planned military construction associated with the request. (10 minutes)

90. Case (HI), Kahele (HI)  
#307 Requires a report from the Secretaries of State and Defense on the activities and resources required to enhance security partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific countries. (10 minutes)

91. Case (HI), Kahele (HI)  
#311 Requires an annual report from the Secretary of Defense describing the progress being made by the DoD to renew military land leases and easements in the State of Hawaii that expire within the next 10 years. (10 minutes)

92. Case (HI), Kahele (HI)  
#316 Expresses the sense of Congress that the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage facility in Hawaii needs to be operated at the highest standard possible and its continued
availability is a matter of national security. It also requires an inspection of the facility and its appurtenances to ensure its integrity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (HI), Kahele (HI)</th>
<th>#319 Requires a report on long-term infrastructure needs to support the Marine Corps realignment in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility. (10 minutes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case (HI), Kahele (HI)</td>
<td>#327 Requires an update once every five years of the DoD’s Hawaii Master Land Use Plan to synchronize each service’s use of land. Expresses the sense of Congress that the partnership between Hawaii and the DoD is based on the principles of respect, maximum joint use of land, and synchronized communication between the state and DoD. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case (HI), Kahele (HI)</td>
<td>#331 (REVISED) Requires the DoD to conduct an investigation into incidents of military aircraft being lazed by the general population in Hawaii and provide a report to Congress and requires the DoD find ways to mitigate future lazing incidence through data collection and tracking, a change of operating procedures, and providing laser eye protection against commercial off the shelf lasers. Revision includes the date for investigation. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case (HI), Kahele (HI)</td>
<td>#337 Requires a report from the DoD to Congress on best practices for coordinating relations with state and local governmental entities in the State of Hawaii. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castro (TX), Sires (NJ)</td>
<td>#455 Requires the Department of State to submit a report on efforts to counter firearms trafficking to Mexico and implement the recommendations of a Government Accountability Office report. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castro (TX)</td>
<td>#458 Requires the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to include information on the treatment of migrants. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chabot (OH)</td>
<td>#20 (REVISED) Requires GAO to conduct a study of U.S. capabilities for, and competence in, conducting and responding to gray zone campaigns, both within agencies and across the interagency. The study shall include recommendations for changes to enhance U.S. ability to more effectively compete in the gray zone. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney (WY)</td>
<td>#687 Limits the Availability Of Funds For the secretary of the Air Force for Prototype Program For Multiglobal Navigation Satellite System Receiver Development. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney (WY)</td>
<td>#730 (REVISED) Directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Commerce, to conduct an assessment of the effect on national security that would result from uranium ceasing to be designated as a critical mineral by the Secretary of the Interior under section 7002(c) (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. Chu (CA) #407 Extends and expands the Department of Defense’s requirement to track and report on incidents of hazing and bullying in each service branch. Directs the Secretary to develop plans to improve hazing and bullying prevention and response during the next reporting year. (10 minutes)

103. Chu (CA) #853 (LATE) Responds to the Department of Defense’s August airstrike in Kabul that wrongfully killed as many as 10 civilians by expressing the Sense of Congress that the Department must ensure full accountability for this mistake, conduct a timely and transparent investigation into the events leading up to the strike, and provide compensation to the families of the victims. (10 minutes)

104. Cicilline (RI), Trahan (MA), Courtney (CT), Moulton (MA), Auchincloss (MA), Keating (MA), Langevin (RI), Lynch (MA), DeLauro (CT), Neal (MA) #392 Establishes the Southern New England Regional Commission, which would assist in the development of defense manufacturing in Southern New England. (10 minutes)

105. Clark, Katherine (MA) #105 Adds the President, Vice President, and any Cabinet member to the current statutory prohibition on Members of Congress contracting with the federal government. (10 minutes)

106. Clark, Katherine (MA), Fitzpatrick (PA), Speier (CA), Miller-Meeks (IA), McMorris Rodgers (WA) #568 Expresses the sense of Congress that the United States honors the women who served in World War II and former Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers for her role in establishing the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps and the Women’s Army Corps. (10 minutes)

107. Clarke, Yvette (NY), Thompson, Bennie (MS), Katko (NY), Garbarino (NY) #310 Authorizes the CyberSentry program within the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), a critical Industrial Control System (ICS) cybersecurity program that allows CISA to enter into strategic, voluntary partnerships with priority ICS owners and operators to provide enhanced cyber threat monitoring and detection. (10 minutes)

108. Clarke, #322 (REVISED) Requires the DHS Cybersecurity and (10 minutes)
Yvette (NY), Thompson, Bennie (MS), Katko (NY), Garbarino (NY) Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to establish requirements and procedures for covered critical infrastructure owners and operators to report covered cybersecurity incidents to a new Cyber Incident Review Office, to be established within CISA.

109. Cleaver (MO) #650 Directs the Secretary of Treasury to carry out a study on the Secretary's delegation of examination authority under the Bank Secrecy Act. (10 minutes)

110. Cohen (TN), Wilson, Joe (SC), Malinowski (NJ), Curtis (UT), Kaptur (OH), Jackson Lee (TX), Salazar (FL), Cleaver (MO), Phillips (MN), Hudson (NC), Gallego (AZ), Hill, French (AR), Porter (CA), Meijer (MI) Establishes priorities of U.S. engagement at INTERPOL. identifies areas for improvement in the U.S. government's response to INTERPOL abuse, and protects the U.S. judicial system from abusive INTERPOL notices. Creates a country-by-country tiered reporting requirement based on compliance with anti-corruption norms and commitments. (10 minutes)

111. Cohen (TN) #780 (LATE) Requires the Secretary of Defense to attempt to recover any aircraft that were provided by the United States to the Afghan security forces that have been relocated to other countries. (10 minutes)

112. Comer (KY), Hice (GA), Norman (SC), Higgins, Clay (LA), Fallon (TX), Gibbs (OH), Foxx (NC), LaTurner (KS), Herrell (NM), Gosar (AZ), Mace (SC), Franklin (FL), Grothman (WI), Clyde (GA) #684 (REVISED) Requires the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to investigate and report on the disposition of military equipment provided by the United States to Afghanistan, as well as whether Afghan government officials took United States taxpayer funds or equipment when fleeing the country. (10 minutes)

113. Connolly (VA), Meeks (NY) #19 Imposes temporary limits on arms sales to Saudi Arabia and requires various reports and actions related to the death of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal. (10 minutes)
Khashoggi.

114. Connolly (VA), Bera (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA), Larsen, Rick (WA), Chabot (OH)

#146 Directs the President to create the Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council to implement the Global Health Security Agenda and to appoint a U.S. Coordinator for Global Health Security to coordinate and report on the interagency process for responding to global health security emergencies. (10 minutes)

115. Connolly (VA), Turner (OH)

#294 Requires a report related to human rights abusers, terrorists, and military coup participants who have received security cooperation training from the United States. (10 minutes)

116. Connolly (VA), Comer (KY)

#604 (REVISED) Provides a statutory framework for the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) that will make the program more accountable and transparent and help ensure that agencies’ processes of moving safely to the cloud are streamlined and efficient. (10 minutes)

117. Correa (CA)

#247 Requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to submit an annual report on women veterans access to gender specific services under arrangements entered into by the VA with non-VA medical providers for the provision of hospital care or medical services. (10 minutes)

118. Craig (MN)

#424 (REVISED) Adds $30 Million to the Army Community Services account to provide family assistance, victim advocacy, financial counseling, employment readiness, and other similar support services at installations where 500 or more military members are assigned. (10 minutes)

119. Crawford (AR)

#84 Directs Secretary of the Army to divest 20th CBRN command to Army Special Operations Command, establishing the 1st EOD Command. (10 minutes)

120. Crawford (AR)

#85 Directs Secretary of the Army to designate an Assistant to provide oversight of the Army’s EOD program. (10 minutes)

121. Crawford (AR)

#86 Directs the Executive Agent to designate a joint program executive officer for the EOD Defense Program. (10 minutes)

122. Crist (FL)

#837 (LATE) Requires a report on aircraft turbine engine rotor inventory, maintenance, and repairs. (10 minutes)

123. Crow (CO), Meijer (MI), Speier (CA), Frankel (FL), Lawrence (MI)

#504 (REVISED) Makes clear that those employed under cooperative agreements and grants are eligible for the Afghan SIV program. (10 minutes)

124. Crow (CO), Gallagher

#529 (20/20 PROTOCOL) (REVISED) Authorizes the establishment of a memorial for service members of
(WI), Taylor
(TX), Panetta
(CA), Houlahan
(PA), Speier
(CA), Crenshaw
(TX), Wilson,
Joe (SC),
Gonzales, Tony
(TX), Kelly,
Mike (PA),
Waltz (FL),
Steuhe (FL),
Costa (CA),
McClain (MI),
Katko (NY),
Mast (FL),
Budd (NC),
Miller-Meeks
(IA), Suozzi
(NY),
McMorris
Rodgers (WA),
Ross (NC),
Stevens (MI),
Axne (IA), Vela
(TX), Kahele
(HI), Palazzo
(MS), Hartzler
(MO), Brown
(MD), Carbajal
(CA), Moulton
(MA), Luria
(VA), Green,
Mark (TN),
Pfluger (TX),
Hayes (CT),
Bustos (IL),
Kim, Young
(CA), Bacon
(NE), Golden
(ME), Langevin
(RI), Meijer
(MI),
Strickland
(WA), Franklin
(FL), Lamb
(PA), Bergman
(MI), García,
Mike (CA),
Kinzinger (IL),

the Global War on Terrorism on the National Mall.
Kelly, Trent
(MS), Wild
(PA),
Spanberger
(VA), Norcross
(NJ), Gallego
(AZ),
Westerman
(AR), Van
Duyne (TX),
Valadao (CA),
Wilson,
Frederica (FL),
Sherrill (NJ)

125. Curtis
(UT),
Malinowski
(NJ), Kim,
Young (CA),
Phillips (MN),
Spanberger
(VA)

#468 Updates the Annual Report on Human Rights Practices (10 minutes)
to report on the status of surveillance and use of
advanced technology to impose arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy, or unlawful or unnecessary
restrictions on freedoms of expression, peaceful
assembly, association, or other internationally
recognized human rights.

126. Davis,
Rodney (IL),
Garamendi
(CA)

#844 (LATE) Increases funding for 3D Printing of
Infrastructure with an offset from the Integrated
Personnel and Pay System - Army (IPPS-A).

127. Dean (PA),
Armstrong
(ND), Turner
(OH),
Perlmutter
(CO),
Reschenthaler
(PA)

#445 Authorizes every notary to use remote online
notarization (RON) and creates national standards and
protections on its use (10 minutes)

128. Dean (PA),
Stell (WI)

#476 Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to designate a
Coordinator for Human Trafficking Issues to
coordinate activities, policies, and programs of the
Department that relate to human trafficking and to
participate in coordination across government agencies
on these issues. Additionally, the amendment requires
the Secretary of the Treasury to designate an office
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence that shall coordinate efforts to combat the
illicit financing of human trafficking within 180 days of enactment.

129. Delgado
(NY)

#539 Directs the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress (10 minutes)
within 180 days following enactment on any
discrepancies between in-home/nursing care between
TRICARE and CHAMPVA.

130. DeSaulnier (CA), Lee, Barbara (CA) #329 Expresses the sense of Congress that the Port Chicago 50 should be exonerated of any charges brought against them in the aftermath of the deadliest home front explosion in World War II. (10 minutes)

131. Dunn (FL) #506 Increases the Development of Medical countermeasures Against Novel Entities (DOMANE) program to allow for the rapid screening of all FDA approved compounds and other human safe compound libraries to identify optimal drug candidates for repurposing as medical countermeasures for COVID-19 and other novel and emerging biothreats. (10 minutes)

132. Escobar (TX), Castor (FL) #624 Directs the DoD to reduce flood risk, damage, and disruption to military facilities and to improve with established floodplain management practice by requiring use of 500-year flood standard for mission-critical facilities and consideration of projected changes in flooding over the expected service life of facilities. (10 minutes)

133. Escobar (TX), Schrier (WA), Castor (FL) #674 Enhances military installation master plans by requiring them to address installation resilience, increases the frequency at which the plans must be developed, and ensures reporting on ongoing coordination with public or private entities. (10 minutes)

134. Escobar (TX), Stansbury (NM), Castor (FL) #681 (REVISED) Directs the DoD Climate Working group to design technical specifications for the assessment and mitigation of risk to supply chains from extreme weather and changes in environmental conditions. (10 minutes)

135. Estes (KS) #546 Requires the Secretary of Defense shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services on the evaluation of commercially available small unmanned air craft systems with capabilities that align with the Department’s priorities. (10 minutes)

136. Evans (PA), Fitzgerald (WI) #186 Provides additional flexibilities and streamlines the waiver process required under 15 U.S.C. 637(a)(21). (10 minutes)

137. Fitzgerald (WI), Gallagher (WI) #132 Requires the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to submit an annual report to Congress on the number of sexual assault cases involving members of the Army and Air National Guard. (10 minutes)

138. Fortenberry (NE), Ruppersberger (MD) #637 Adds a Sense of Congress that it is in the best interests of the region for Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to immediately reach a just and equitable agreement regarding the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. (10 minutes)

139. Foster (IL) #763 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense to enter into an arrangement with JASON Defense (10 minutes)
Advisory Council to update the FY2010 NDAA study on discrimination capabilities of the ballistic missile defense system. Creates a report on the status of the JASON Defense Advisory Council contract by the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

140. Gallagher (WI), Moulton (MA)  
#495 (REVISED) Establishes a National Security Commission on Synthetic Biology.  
(10 minutes)

141. Gallagher (WI), Courtney (CT)  
#505 Prohibits federal operation or procurement of certain foreign-made unmanned aircraft systems.  
(10 minutes)

142. Garamendi (CA)  
#17 Directs DOD to implement its own recommendations on improving use of unmanned aircraft systems by the National Guard, from Congressionally directed review/report.  
(10 minutes)

143. Garamendi (CA)  
#96 Requires the DOD to include accounting of costs for wildfire response in the annual budget request to Congress, including military support for states and FEMA/federal land management agencies. Current law only requires DOD to account for climate adaptation and mitigation costs on U.S. military installations in the President’s annual budget request.  
(10 minutes)

144. Garamendi (CA)  
#97 Removes arbitrary cap on the number of excess military aircraft that DOD may transfer at no cost to DHS (FEMA) or the U.S. Forest Service for firefighting. Current law only allows DOD to transfer 7 excess military aircraft. Requires annual report to Congress by DOD on transfers of excess military aircraft authorized by prior NDAA’s.  
(10 minutes)

145. Garamendi (CA)  
#98 Requires DOD/OMB to review existing authorities for using Air Force and Air National Guard modular airborne fire-fighting systems and other military assets to fight wildfires. Then requires update to the 2004 Congressionally directed report on any changes to the law needed to enhance those authorities.  
(10 minutes)

146. Garamendi (CA), Davis, Rodney (IL)  
#838 (LATE) Increases funding for cold weather capabilities.  
(10 minutes)

147. Garbarino (NY), Langevin (RI), Katko (NY), Clarke, Yvete (NY), Thompson, Bennie (MS), Gallagher (WI), Norman (SC)  
#191 Creates a 5-year term for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Director and reaffirms that the position will be Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed.  
(10 minutes)
148. Garbarino (NY), Langevin (RI)
   #193 Establishes a Department of Homeland Security grant program to facilitate closer U.S.-Israel cybersecurity cooperation. (10 minutes)

149. Garbarino (NY), Evans (PA), Houlanah (PA), Chabot (OH)
   #396 (REVISED) Establishes a cyber counseling certification program for Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) assisting small businesses with planning and implementing cybersecurity measures. Authorizes the SBA to reimburse SBDCs for employee certification costs up to $350,000 per fiscal year. SBDC’s are established nationwide with nearly 1,000 local centers; given their reach, they are well positioned to assist small businesses with their cybersecurity needs. (10 minutes)

150. Garbarino (NY), Clarke, Yvette (NY)
   #566 Requires CISA to update its cyber incident response plan not less often then biennially, and requires CISA to consult with relevant Sector Risk Management Agencies and the National Cyber Director, to develop mechanisms to engage with stakeholders to educate them about Federal Government cybersecurity roles for cyber incident response. (10 minutes)

151. Garcia, Jesús (IL), Castro (TX), Johnson, Hank (GA), Wild (PA), Schakowsky (IL)
   #737 (REVISED) Prohibits funding to Brazil for the purpose of displacing indigenous or Quilombola communities. (10 minutes)

152. Garcia, Jesús (IL), Omar (MN), Jacobs, Sara (CA), Bass (CA), Tlaib (MI), Watson Coleman (NJ), Jayapal (WA), Hayes (CT), Johnson, Hank (GA)
   #765 (LATE) (REVISED) Requires the GAO to submit a report to Congress on humanitarian impacts of US sanctions. (10 minutes)

153. Garcia, Mike (CA), Van Duyne (TX)
   #648 Creates professional licensure reciprocity for military service members and their spouses who move to new jurisdictions as a result of Permanent Change of Station Orders provided they submit to certain requirements. Exempts individuals licensed under an interstate licensure compact from this reciprocity. (10 minutes)

154. Gibbs (OH)
   #677 Requires GAO to submit to Congress a report accounting for any equipment provided by the United
States Coast Guard or the Army Corps of Engineers to any regime in Afghanistan.

155. Gohmert (TX)
#4 Creates a separate career track for military judges to prevent undue influence from swaying trial outcome. (10 minutes)

156. Gomez (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA), Kim, Young (CA), Meng (NY), Steel, Michelle (CA), Chu (CA)
#583 Expresses the Sense of Congress that Korean-American and Korean veterans who fought alongside United States Armed Forces in the Vietnam war served with distinction and honor. (10 minutes)

157. Gomez (CA)
#668 Expresses a Sense of Congress that the Department of Defense should select electric or zero-emission models when purchasing new, non-combat vehicles. (10 minutes)

158. Gonzales, Tony (TX), Kelly, Robin (IL), Bice (OK), Kahele (HI), Bacon (NE), Carbajal (CA), Taylor (TX), Sherrill (NJ), Moore, Blake (UT), Gottheimer (NJ), Salazar (FL), Escobar (TX), Pfluger (TX), Cuellar (TX), Feenstra (IA), Golden (ME), Kim, Young (CA), Moulton (MA), Miller-Meeks (IA), Suozzi (NY), Reed (NY), Lee, Susie (NV), Franklin (FL), Lamb (PA), Meijer (MI), Luria (VA), González-Colón, Jennifer (PR), Mace (SC), Valadao (CA), Wild
159. Gonzalez, Anthony (OH), Luria (VA), Doyle (PA) #325 Requires federal agencies to issue a report that assesses the risk to U.S. national security posed by Russian and Chinese dominance in the global nuclear energy market and identifies opportunities for the U.S. to regain global leadership. (10 minutes)

160. Gonzalez, Anthony (OH), Allred (TX), Phillips (MN), Stevens (MI), Barr (KY), Waltz (FL), Hill, French (AR) #516 Directs the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, to establish within the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce a China Economic Data Coordination Center to collect and synthesize official and unofficial Chinese economic data developments in China's financial markets and United States exposure to risks and vulnerabilities in China's financial system. (10 minutes)

161. Gonzalez, Anthony (OH), Langevin (RI), Miller-Meeks (IA), Wild (PA) #715 Creates a pilot program within the Department of Defense's Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to provide mental health counseling to transitioning servicemembers, and specifically with information regarding the mental health programs and benefits at their local VA facility. (10 minutes)

162. González-Colón, Jenniffer (PR) #444 Requires the Secretary of Defense to commission a National Academies of Sciences study that would investigate the connection between certain toxic exposures and health effects on the islands of Vieques. (10 minutes)

163. González-Colón, Jenniffer (PR) #462 (REVISED) Prohibits the use of FY22 NDAA funds for the purpose of retiring the LCM-8 platform from service in Puerto Rico. Includes a Congressional Finding that the LCM-8 is a mission critical Puerto Rico National Guard asset that provided essential materials such as food and water to the USVI, Vieques, and Culebra following Hurricane Maria. (10 minutes)

164. González-Colón, Jenniffer (PR) #467 Requires the Secretary of the Army to provide a Modular Small Arms Range in Puerto Rico. Currently, USAR must rely on PRNG training assets which cause significant scheduling difficulties and backlogs. (10 minutes)

165. Gosar (AZ) #515 Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report to Congress on the impact of mergers and acquisitions of defense industrial base contractors on the procurement processes of the Department of Defense. (10 minutes)
166. Gottheimer #351 (REVISED) Requires the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, to report to Congress on the use of online social media by U.S. State Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations, and the threat posed to U.S. national security by online radicalization.  

167. Gottheimer #361 Requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to prepare an annual report to Congress containing an analysis of the nationwide costs of living for members of the Department of Defense.  

168. Gottheimer #372, Meijer Requires public disclosure of lead testing results completed by the Department of Defense in “covered areas,” i.e., an area located immediately adjacent to and down gradient from a military installation, a formerly used defense site, or a facility where military activities are conducted by the National Guard of a State.  

169. Gottheimer #376 Directs the Defense Logistics Agency to conduct a study within one year of enactment of this law regarding the degree to which LESO/1033 equipment and materials for Law Enforcement use are equitably distributed between larger, well-resourced municipalities and units of government and smaller, less well-resourced municipalities and units of government; and to identify potential reforms to the LESO/1033 program to ensure that equipment and materials are distributed in a manner that provides adequate opportunity for participation by smaller, less well-resourced municipalities and units of government.  

170. Gottheimer #446 (REVISED) Requires GAO to carry out a study on the financing of domestic violent extremists and terrorists, including foreign terrorist-inspired domestic extremists.  

171. Graves, Garret (LA) #486 Authorizes the President and the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the state or territorial governor (and subject to appropriations), the ability to offer support for large scale, complex, catastrophic disasters.  

172. Graves, Sam (MO) #705 (REVISED) Increases funding for Soldier Lethality for further development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities that will enable a next-generation command and control system for the warfighter.  

173. Graves, Sam (MO), Kahele (HI) #845 (LATE) Ensures that general aviation (GA) pilots receive flight training in the aircraft they will be operating in the National Airspace System (NAS).  

174. Green, Al (TX) #427 Requires the uniform residential loan application to include a military service question in a prominent location on the form.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Bill Number</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>175. Green, Al (TX)</td>
<td>#475</td>
<td>Requires public housing agencies to consider the housing needs of veterans when creating their annual plans and housing strategies, the latter in consultation with agencies that serve veterans. Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) must revise its regulations to require jurisdictions that receive funding from HUD to include information relating to veterans in their consolidated plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176. Green, Mark (TN), Van Duyne (TX)</td>
<td>#620 (REVISED)</td>
<td>Mandates the Department of State maintain and report to Congress an accounting of the number of American Citizens evacuated from Hamid Karzai International Airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177. Hagedorn (MN)</td>
<td>#797 (LATE)</td>
<td>Permits financial literacy training on overseas military installations by financial services providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178. Higgins, Clay (LA), Bacon (NE)</td>
<td>#418</td>
<td>Adds a Sense of Congress that stresses the importance of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft and reinforces Congress’ intent that the previous NDAA language be strictly adhered to before any are retired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179. Hill, French (AR)</td>
<td>#699</td>
<td>Amends the Defense Production Act (DPA) to protect medical materials for Americans by bolstering our supply chain during times of crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180. Hill, French (AR)</td>
<td>#706</td>
<td>Requires an interagency strategy to disrupt and dismantle narcotics production and trafficking and affiliated networks linked to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181. Himes (CT), Crawford (AR), Schiff (CA), Crow (CO)</td>
<td>#126</td>
<td>Instructs the Department of Defense to provide an analysis of the cost of implementing next generation cryptography across the DOD through a report on the resources necessary to fully fund the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) in order to address cybersecurity requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182. Himes (CT)</td>
<td>#683 (REVISED)</td>
<td>Allows Treasury Department (via FinCEN) to use the special measures authority to designate jurisdictions, accounts, and others that are determined to be “Primary Money Laundering Concerns” due to illicit finance involvement such as cross-border laundering the proceeds of ransomware attacks, business email compromise fraud, and other cyber-enabled financial crimes which are often conducted outside of the correspondent banks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183. Horsford (NV), Strickland (WA)</td>
<td>#34 (REVISED)</td>
<td>Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct a pilot program to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of software, emerging technologies, and methodologies to track real-time emissions from installations and installation assets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
184. Horsford
(NV) #182 Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program to establish data libraries containing data sets relevant to the development of artificial intelligence software and technology and to allow private companies to access such data libraries for the purposes of developing artificial intelligence models and other technical software solutions.

185. Horsford
(NV) #183 Directs the Department of Defense to conduct a review of the implementation of its CUI program. The review would include an assessment of the DoD’s compliance with DoDI 5200.48 and recommended changes to current statutes, policy or regulations.

186. Houlanhan
(PA), Fitzgerald
(WI) #178 Exempts certain contracts awarded to small business concerns from category management or successor strategies for contract consolidation.

187. Houlanhan
(PA), Langevin
(RI), Bacon
(NE), Larsen,
Rick (WA) #615 Requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a plan to collect and analyze data on the use of enhanced transfer of technology developed at Department of Defense laboratories. Requires the Secretary of Defense submit a report to the congressional defense committees.

188. Houlanhan
(PA), Langevin
(RD), Bacon
(NE), Larsen,
Rick (WA), Stefanik (NY) #701 Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the recommendations made by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence with respect to the Department of Defense to include a determination of whether the Secretary of Defense intends to implement each recommendation.

189. Houlanhan
(PA), Langevin
(RI), Comer
(KY), Keller
(PA) #728 (REVISED) Requires an annual report to Congress and OPM from the Chief Human Capital Officers Council describing the activities of the council and a description of barriers preventing agencies from hiring qualified applicants, including for digital talent positions, and recommendations for addressing those barriers.

190. Huizenga
(MI), Mann
(KS), Hudson
(NC) #485 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to Congress detailing the plans and timeline for the recovery operations of the C-119 Gamble Chalk 1 crash site at Mt Silverthorne, Alaska.

191. Jackson
Lee (TX) #456 (REVISED) Provides authorization for a $10 million increase in funding for increased collaboration with NIH to combat Triple Negative Breast Cancer.

192. Jackson
Lee (TX) #459 (REVISED) Provides authorization for $2.5 million increase in funding to combat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

193. Jackson
Lee (TX) #463 Directs the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations to ensure that candidates granted admission
to attend a military academy undergo screening for speech disorders and be provided the results of the screening test and a list of warfare unrestricted line (URL) Officer positions and occupation specialists that require successful performance on the speech test. Academy students shall have the option of undergoing speech therapy to reduce speech disorders or impediments.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>194. Jackson Lee (TX)</td>
<td>#471 (REVISED)</td>
<td>Establishes a task force on the historical and current barriers to African American participation and equal treatment in the Armed Services. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195. Jackson Lee (TX)</td>
<td>#480</td>
<td>Requires report on Maternity Mortality Rates for military members and their dependents. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196. Jackson Lee (TX)</td>
<td>#487</td>
<td>Requires a report to be submitted to Congress within 240 days following enactment on the risks posed by debris in low earth orbit and to make recommendations on remediation of risks and outline plans to reduce the incident of space debris. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197. Jackson Lee (TX)</td>
<td>#493</td>
<td>Requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress programs and procedures employed to ensure students studying abroad through Department of Defense National Security Education Programs are trained to recognize, resist, and report against recruitment efforts by agents of foreign governments. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198. Jackson Lee (TX)</td>
<td>#691</td>
<td>Directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report 180 days following enactment that explains the progress made over the history of the Department of Defense and its predecessor departments (Department of War) and experiences in integrating African Americans into the branches of the armed services and the civilian staffing of Pentagon offices and agencies, and the steps being taken to recognize the service of African Americans who have served in the Armed Forces with honor, heroism, and distinction. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199. Jackson, Ronny (TX), Van Duyne (TX)</td>
<td>#220</td>
<td>Expresses the Sense of Congress that Israel is a critical defense partner and highlights various things such as improving interoperability, opposing terrorism in the Middle East, and maintaining a strong relationship. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200. Jacobs, Chris (NY), Stefanik (NY)</td>
<td>#281</td>
<td>Requires the Department of Defense and all service branches to commence defense innovation open topic activities similar to the “SBIR Open Topics” program operated by the Air Force’s AFWERX office. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201. Jacobs, Sara (CA)</td>
<td>#229</td>
<td>Requires a report from the Secretary of State on a conflict assessment in Haiti. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202. Jacobs, Sara (CA), Malinowski</td>
<td>#563 (REVISED)</td>
<td>Requires human rights vetting of potential recipients of U.S. support to combat terrorism under 10 U.S.C. 127e. (10 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill Number</td>
<td>Sponsor and State</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>#597</td>
<td>Jacobs, Sara (CA)</td>
<td>Requires a strategy to address the root causes of violent extremism and conflict in Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#625</td>
<td>Jacobs, Sara (CA)</td>
<td>Requires congressional notifications and an annual reporting requirement related to oversight of the peacekeeping operations account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#184</td>
<td>Jayapal (WA)</td>
<td>Directs federal agencies to initiate debarment proceedings for contractors with repeat and willful wage theft violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#565</td>
<td>Jayapal (WA)</td>
<td>Requires GAO to submit a report on cost analyses of options for reducing nuclear security programs and modifying force structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#622</td>
<td>Jayapal (WA), Johnson, Hank (GA)</td>
<td>Commissions a Defense Department report on estimated savings to come from full drawdown from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria compared to the status quo ante and the estimated cost of redirecting U.S. personnel and materials to effectively engage in great power competition with Russia and China, including increased outlays in ships, aircraft, nuclear weapons, etc. sufficient to effectively curb and deter both countries militarily in their respective regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#257</td>
<td>Jones, Mondaire (NY)</td>
<td>Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress by September 30, 2022 a plan to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of the Department of Defense in line with science-based emissions targets and report to Congress annually thereafter on the progress made towards these emissions reduction targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#284</td>
<td>Joyce, David (OH), Van Duyne (TX)</td>
<td>Directs the Secretary of Defense, along with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security, to report to Congress within one year a plan to combat the Taliban’s illegal drug trade; a description of the risk to the United States of drugs emanating from such drug trade, including risks posed by the profits of such drugs; and a description of any actions taken to interdict and prevent such drugs from reaching the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#849</td>
<td>Joyce, John (PA), Langevin (RI)</td>
<td>Directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to develop an annex (to the National Biodefense Strategy described under Section 104 of title 6, United States Code) for a national biodefense science and technology strategy and implementation plan, no later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this bill.</td>
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<tr>
<td>211. Katko (NY), Delgado (NY)</td>
<td>#168</td>
<td>Establishes a grant at HHS for the formation of Tick Identification Pilot Programs, which will require the ability to submit photo images of ticks and the images to be reviewed by qualified professionals for the likelihood of carrying a tick-borne disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212. Katko (NY), Kuster (NH)</td>
<td>#180</td>
<td>Revises HUD's Annual Fair Housing Report to specifically report sexual harassment complaints. Codifies the DOJ's Sexual Harassment in Housing Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213. Katko (NY), Crow (CO), Fitzpatrick (PA), Gottheimer (NJ)</td>
<td>#549</td>
<td>(REVISED) Provides for the Department of Labor to conduct a study on obstacles to employment facing certain Afghan SIVs and other eligible populations legally present in the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214. Keating (MA), Frankel (FL)</td>
<td>#518</td>
<td>Requires a pilot program to assess the barriers to women's participation in the national security forces of six participating partner countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215. Keller (PA)</td>
<td>#346</td>
<td>(REVISED) Directs the Secretary of Defense to acquire domestically sourced alternatives to existing defense products, which currently rely on foreign sources alone. These are designed to streamline the design, development, and production of high efficiency power conversion technology and advanced AC-DC power converters that improve performance for the dismounted soldier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216. Keller (PA)</td>
<td>#369</td>
<td>Directs the Secretary to report on efforts within the Department of Defense to reduce duplicative information technology contracts within 180 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217. Kelly, Robin (IL), Gonzales, Tony (TX)</td>
<td>#395</td>
<td>Establishes a pilot program requiring a spouse specific Transition Assistance Program for a spouse of a member of the Armed Forces eligible for the Transition Assistance Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218. Kelly, Robin (IL), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH)</td>
<td>#432</td>
<td>(REVISED) Requires the DoD provide a briefing to the civilian agencies responsible for certain aspects of U.S. civilian and commercial space activities and relevant Committees in Congress on the threats posed by nation states, in particular China’s activities in space on U.S. civilian and commercial space systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219. Kelly, Trent (MS), Van Duyne (TX)</td>
<td>#67</td>
<td>Revises the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act to explicitly include SME and semiconductor materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220. Kelly, Trent (MS), Gallego (AZ)</td>
<td>#78</td>
<td>(REVISED) Directs the Secretary of Defense to execute an investigation to determine if the procurement of optical transmission equipment or</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hudson (NC), Lesko (AZ) services manufactures, produced, or distributed by an entity owned, controlled, or supported by the People’s Republic of China.

221. Kelly, Trent (MS), Ryan (OH), Bacon (NE), Stefanik (NY), Cheney (WY), Jacobs, Sara (CA), Langevin (RI)

#117 Expands eligibility of Military Space Available Travel to Gold Star Family Members by updating Section 2641b(c) of Title 10, United States Code.

222. Kelly, Trent (MS), Posey (FL)

#174 Revises the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act Semiconductor Incentives Program to include SME and semiconductor materials.

223. Kelly, Trent (MS)

#358 (REVISED) Directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to Congress on the use of funding made available pursuant to section 333 of title 10, United States Code, for counter-narcotics missions in Central Asia.

224. Khanna (CA)

#581 Authorizes continued support for ex gratia payments and requires DoD to develop and implement procedures to receive and respond to allegations of civilian harm within 180 days, and provide quarterly reports on DoD’s implementation of these procedures.

225. Kilmer (WA), Wittman (VA), Kahele (HI), Luria (VA), Pingree (ME), Case (HI), Kuster (NH)

#66 Provides for Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) protected overtime pay for Navy employees working on Naval vessels Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS).

226. Kilmer (WA), Wittman (VA), Kahele (HI), Luria (VA), Pingree (ME), Case (HI), Kuster (NH)

#73 Calls for an independent study on the impacts to Navy shipyard workers by the December 2016 pause to the Accelerated Promotion Program (APP).

227. Kinzinger (IL), Axne (IA), Turner (OH), McMorris Rodgers (WA), Bost (IL)

#103 Limits the availability of funds for retirement of RC-26B manned ISR/IAA aircraft.
228. Kirkpatrick (AZ), Gallego (AZ) #719 Directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit to Congress within 45 days a report on the status of the A-10 re-winging program and spend plan for appropriated funds. (10 minutes)

229. Krishnamoorthi (IL), Jayapal (WA), Pocan (WI), Malinowski (NJ), Auchincloss (MA), Khanna (CA), Lee, Barbara (CA), Wild (PA), Jacobs, Sara (CA) #524 (REVISED) Authorizing HHS to receive donated vaccines. (10 minutes)

230. Lamb (PA), Waltz (FL) #383 Directs the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to establish a two-year pilot program to employ veterans for Departments of the Interior and Agriculture conservation and resource management projects. (10 minutes)

231. Lamb (PA), González-Colón, Jenniffer (PR) #390 Ensures veterans’ service-connected medical qualifications and expertise are utilized by the VA and civilian healthcare facilities to meet the challenges during public health emergencies. (10 minutes)

232. Lamborn (CO), DesJarlais (TN), Cheney (WY) #478 (REVISED) Requires a report from the Missile Defense Agency on the role of the positions of Director of MDA, Sea-based Weapons Systems, and Deputy Director of MDA with respect to their relationship to the combatant commands on missile defense requirements. (10 minutes)

233. Lamborn (CO) #578 Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on mitigating space debris through the use of on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing capabilities. (10 minutes)

234. Langevin (RI), Gallagher (WI) #384 (REVISED) Requires the Department of Homeland Security to designate four Critical Technology Security Centers to evaluate and test the security of technologies essential to national critical functions. (10 minutes)

235. Langevin (RI), Stefanik (NY), Banks (IN) #606 Elevates Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering from advisor to a voting member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. (10 minutes)

236. Langevin (RI) #807 (LATE) Directs DOD to conduct a study on the best way to organize cyber roles around core functions. (10 minutes)

237. Larsen, Rick (WA) #747 Extends the authority for temporary personnel flexibilities for domestic defense industrial base (10 minutes)
facilities and major range and test facilities base civilian personnel.

238. Lawrence (MI) #275 States that the Secretaries of the military departments shall share and implement best practices (including use of civilian industry best practices) regarding the use of retention and exit survey data to identify barriers and lessons learned to improve the retention of female members of the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of such Secretaries. (10 minutes)

239. Lawrence (MI) #305 Requires the establishment of a DOULA pilot program at the Department of Veterans Affairs. (10 minutes)

240. Lee, Susie (NV), Gonzales, Tony (TX) #128 Requires GAO to conduct an assessment of the quality and nutrition of food available at military installations for members of the Armed Forces. (10 minutes)

241. Leger Fernandez (NM) #818 (LATE) Provides an apology to individuals and their families in NM, UT, ID, and other states who were exposed to radiation from nuclear testing. (10 minutes)

242. Lesko (AZ), Hinson (IA) #629 (REVISED) Requires a report on the feasibility of establishing an inter-agency United States-Taiwan working group for coordinating cooperation related to semiconductors, including the global supply chain integrity and security of semiconductors. (10 minutes)

243. Levin, Mike (CA), Porter (CA) #59 Expands SCRA protections to a servicemember who receives military orders for a PCS, enters into a telecommunications contract, then receives a stop movement order from DoD in response to a local, national, or global emergency for a period of not less than 30 days which prevents them from using the contract. (10 minutes)

244. Levin, Mike (CA) #60 Adds and makes technical changes to DoD Transition Assistance Program (TAP) counseling pathway factors. (10 minutes)

245. Lieu (CA), Wilson, Joe (SC), Castro (TX), Meeks (NY), Strickland (WA) #154 Establishes an Office of City and State Diplomacy at the State Department and requires the appointment of a senior official to head the office, outlines the duties of the office, authorizes members of the civil service and Foreign Service to be detailed to city halls and state capitol offices to support their international engagement efforts, and requires a report to Congress followed by annual briefings on the work of the office. (10 minutes)

246. Lieu (CA) #437 Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to determine the effectiveness of using scent detection working dogs to detect the early stages of diseases, including COVID-19, and upon detection, to alert the handler of the dog. (10 minutes)

247. Lieu (CA) #852 (LATE) (REVISED) Extends an existing prohibition on in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen (10 minutes)
for two years, or until a specific authorization has been enacted.

248. Lofgren (CA), Schiff (CA), Perlmutter (CO) #216 Directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report on the capabilities of the Department of Defense to assist fighting wildfires through the use and analysis of satellite and other aerial survey technology.

249. Luria (VA), Meijer (MI), Sherrill (NJ), Gottheimer (NJ), Rice, Kathleen (NY), Wilson, Joe (SC), Katko (NY), Van Drew (NJ) #496 (REVISED) Expresses a sense of Congress that the Government of Iran’s decision to enrich uranium up to 60 percent purity is a further escalation and shortens the breakout time to produce enough highly enriched uranium to develop a nuclear weapon, and the Government of Iran should immediately abandon any pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

250. Luria (VA), Chabot (OH) #500 Directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out a study of the challenges posed by the emergence of militia fleets in the South China Sea.

251. Luria (VA) #839 (LATE) Directs the Secretary of Defense to amend the Space Available Travel program for flights for members of the Armed Services traveling for purposes of attending funerals and memorial services.

252. Lynch (MA) #79 Reauthorizes the independent and bipartisan Wartime Contracting Commission to conduct oversight of U.S. contracting and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas of contingency operations.

253. Lynch (MA) #134 (REVISED) Expands the mandate of the supervisory team created by the "Combating Illicit Finance Through Public-Private Partnerships Act" that is convened by Treasury to examine strategies to improve public-private partnerships to counter illicit finance, to include sanctions evasion and other illicit finance activities. Establishes within the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) a voluntary public-private information sharing partnership among law enforcement agencies, national security agencies, financial institutions, and OFAC to more effectively administer and enforce economic and trade sanctions against targeted persons.

254. Lynch (MA), Taylor (TX) #152 (REVISED) Directs the President to reestablish the interagency Afghan Threat Finance Cell to identify and disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and corruption.

255. Mace (SC) #538 Expresses the sense of Congress that there should be designated a Military Heart Health Awareness Day.
256. Mace (SC)  #828 (LATE) Establishes a pilot program to improve military readiness through nutrition and wellness initiatives. (10 minutes)

257. Malinowski (NJ), Schiff (CA), DeFazio (OR), Cicilline (RI), Cohen (TN), Castro (TX), Khanna (CA), Titus (NV), Norton (DC), Luria (VA), Allred (TX), Kim (NJ), Doggett (TX), Raskin (MD)  #449 Imposes sanctions on foreign persons listed in the report of the Director of National Intelligence for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which is the language from HR 1464 that as passed by voice vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee during the 117th Congress. (10 minutes)

258. Malinowski (NJ)  #491 Amends the Export Control Reform Act to right-size the Secretary of Commerce’s scope of authority to regulate exports by US persons to foreign military, security, and intelligence agencies. (10 minutes)

259. Malinowski (NJ), Wagner (MO), Spanberger (VA)  #532 Requires the Secretary of State to provide a report on state-sanctioned intimidation and harassment by the Egyptian government against Americans and their families. (10 minutes)

260. Malinowski (NJ), Beyer (VA), Lieu (CA), Levin, Andy (MI), Wild (PA), Omar (MN), Khanna (CA), Lynch (MA)  #536 (REVISED) Requires a report by the State Department on allegations of systematic extrajudicial killings and torture by Egyptian security forces and a determination of whether such acts constitute a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. (10 minutes)

261. Malinowski (NJ), Phillips (MN), Jacobs, Sara (CA), Kim (NJ), Pressley (MA)  #555 Requests the administration make a determination on whether genocide or crimes against humanity have occurred in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. (10 minutes)

262. Malinowski (NJ), Lieu (CA)  #567 (REVISED) Requires the Department of State to report on war crimes and torture committed by US citizens in Libya. (10 minutes)
263. Malinowski (NJ), Lien (CA)  
#609 Requires the President to review certain alleged arms embargo violators for sanction under Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of persons contributing to the situation in Libya). (10 minutes)

264. Malinowski (NJ), Meijer (MI), Eshoo (CA), Mace (SC), Lien (CA), DelBene (WA)  
#642 Prohibits federal agencies from encouraging the weakening of encryption or insertion of backdoors on commercially-available phones, computers, and devices. (10 minutes)

265. Malinowski (NJ)  
#660 Strengthens the annual reporting requirement on the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (interagency process to determine whether to disclose known cyber-vulnerabilities to the public and industry). (10 minutes)

266. Malinowski (NJ), Phillips (MN), Porter (CA), Khanna (CA), Lien (CA)  
#698 Requires an annual report to Congress by the State Department on foreign companies proliferating dangerous cyber-weapons and hack-for-hire capabilities to known human rights abusers and repressive governments. (10 minutes)

267. Malinowski (NJ), Curtis (UT), Fitzpatrick (PA), Kaptur (OH), Salazar (FL), Phillips (MN), Spanberger (VA), Meijer (MI), Hill, French (AR)  
#776 (LATE) Requires the President to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination of the 35 Russian officials and businessmen with respect to the imposition of sanctions. (10 minutes)

268. Malliotakis (NY), Chabot (OH)  
#521 (REVISED) Requires a report to Congress of all malign operations by Iran conducted on United States soil. Including: Iran-backed terrorist attacks, kidnapping, export violations, sanctions busting activities, cyber-attacks, and money laundering. (10 minutes)

269. Manning (NC)  
#377 Adds the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the assessment of the security of global maritime chokepoints. (10 minutes)

270. Manning (NC)  
#386 Adds a requirement that the Secretary of Defense notify Congress of any attempt to threaten or abduct a citizen or U.S. resident by a country supporting international terrorism. (10 minutes)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>271. Manning (NC)</th>
<th>#391 Adds a Sense of Congress on the safety of women and girls in Afghanistan. (10 minutes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>272. Manning (NC)</td>
<td>#411 Includes a consideration of the benefits in terms of cost and emissions savings of the increased use of electric vehicles at military installations for transport to Department of Defense education activity facilities. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273. Manning (NC), Porter (CA)</td>
<td>#426 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense within 60 days to consult with the Secretary of State and appoint an official to assist with the State Department on the continued evacuations of Americans and Afghan partners from Afghanistan. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274. McCarthy (CA)</td>
<td>#541 Requires an infrastructure assessment and report to the committees of jurisdiction on the Air Force Research Laboratory, Aerospace Systems Directorate, Rocket Propulsion Division for fiscal years 2023 and 2025. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275. McCaul (TX), Meeks (NY), Van Duyne (TX), Chabot (OH)</td>
<td>#230 Provides statutory authority and guidance for the interagency &quot;Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program&quot; to partner with countries in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Requires pre-notification to Congress of funding obligation, submission of comprehensive five-year plans, and regular monitoring and evaluation reports. This amendment is based on a bill that was passed by the House as H.R. 567 in the 117th Congress. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276. McCaul (TX), Meeks (NY), Van Duyne (TX), Chabot (OH)</td>
<td>#236 Makes factual findings and declares that the ongoing abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China constitute genocide and crimes against humanity by the Chinese Communist Party. Condemns this genocide and calls upon the President to take actions to help end the genocide and hold perpetrators accountable. This amendment is based on a bill that was ordered favorably reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee as H. Res. 317 in the 117th Congress. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277. McCaul (TX), Meeks (NY), Van Duyne (TX)</td>
<td>#240 Requires the State Department to provide briefings and specified materials to U.S. delegations to international athletic competitions regarding human rights and security concerns in certain host countries (Communist countries, Tier 3 countries for human trafficking, or other countries that the Secretary of State determines present serious human rights or counterintelligence concerns). This amendment is based on a bill that was ordered favorably reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee as H.R. 1211 in the 117th Congress. (10 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278. McGovern (MA)</td>
<td>#655 Modifies the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XXI of PL 114-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
328) to authorize sanctions for serious human rights abuse, any violation of internationally recognized human rights, or corruption; adds two new reports to Congress; and repeals the sunset.

279. McHenry (NC), Lynch (MA), Budd (NC), Davidson (OH), Thompson, Glenn (PA)

280. McKinley (WV)

281. McKinley (WV), Walberg (MI)

282. McNerney (CA)

283. McNerney (CA)

284. Meeks (NY), Deutch (FL)

285. Meeks (NY), McCaul (TX)
assistance, and other forms of foreign assistance provided to the Federal Government of Somalia to improve stability, governance, and economic development.

286. Meeks (NY), McCaul (TX) #723 (REVISED) Modifies the management and operations of the Department of State through various measures.

287. Meeks (NY), McCaul (TX) #738 (REVISED) Requires congressional notification for certain rewards provided under the State Department rewards program.

288. Meeks (NY) #753 Prohibits the use of US assessed contribution the UN for support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

289. Meng (NY), Fortenberry (NE) #192 Adds the text of the Global Pandemic Prevention and Biosecurity Act, legislation that seeks to address the source of highly infectious diseases beginning in animal species, including by reducing the sale and trade of live and fresh wildlife for human consumption, and addressing food insecurity associated with a reliance on local game and wildlife.

290. Meng (NY) #194 Requires that menstrual products are stocked in and made available free of charge in all restrooms in public buildings, including the Smithsonian Institution, the National Gallery of Art, and the U.S. Capitol.

291. Meng (NY) #196 Requires that all medical professionals who provide direct care services to patients under the military health system receive a mandatory training on how to screen, intervene, and refer patients to treatment for eating disorders.

292. Meng (NY) #198 (REVISED) Requires the Department of Veterans Affairs to conduct an awareness campaign regarding the types of fertility treatments, procedures, and services available to veterans experiencing issues with fertility, and requires the Department to submit a report to Congress on how the Secretary plans to better engage women veterans to ensure they are aware of the covered fertility services available.

293. Miller (WV), Posey (FL), Van Duyne (TX) #166 Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide Congress with a briefing on status of women and girls in Afghanistan.

294. Miller (WV), Kelly, Trent (MS), Axne (IA), Wittman (VA), Webster (FL), Mast (FL), #172 (REVISED) Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish a memorial dedicated to the 13 service members who lost their lives in the attack on the Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 26, 2021.
Garcia, Mike (CA), Gibbs (OH), Garbarino (NY), Kim, Young (CA), Balderson (OH), Van Drew (NJ), Curtis (UT), Upton (MI), Hudson (NC), Fallon (TX), Budd (NC), McMorris Rodgers (WA)

295. Miller (WV), Posey (FL), Boebert, Lauren (CO), Van Duyne (TX)

   #177 Blocks any funding for military cooperation or intelligence sharing with the Taliban. (10 minutes)

296. Miller (WV), Van Duyne (TX)

   #179 Adds money and classified materials to the report of equipment and arms left behind in Afghanistan by the U.S. Military. (10 minutes)

297. Miller-Meeks (IA), Westerman (AR), Grijalva (AZ), Gallego (AZ)

   #686 Provides free annual America the Beautiful Passes to current military service members and also provides free lifetime America the Beautiful Passes to veterans and members of Gold Star Families so they can always access our National Parks and public lands at no cost. (10 minutes)

298. Moore (WI)

   #153 (REVISED) Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to provide assistance to states that have created dedicated green alerts or are considering creating such alerts to help locate missing active duty servicemembers or veterans, including to connect located individuals to any VA or DOD benefits they have earned through their military service. (10 minutes)

299. Moulton (MA)

   #155 Promotes mapping of mission-relevant terrain in cyberspace for Defense Critical Assets and Task Critical Assets. (10 minutes)

300. Moulton (MA)

   #156 Amends the Defense Resource Budgeting & Allocation Commission to include a diversity and inclusion statement for the commission membership. (10 minutes)

301. Napolitano (CA), McKinley (WV), Carbajal

   #115 (REVISED) Increases funding for the National Guard Youth Challenge Program by $35,281,000 million, matching the program’s 2022 funding of $210 million (10 minutes)
302. Napolitano #308 Supports the National Guard Youth Challenge Programs (NGYCP) by instructing the Department of Defense to issue non-state matched funding in limited circumstances of up to 10 percent of the funds appropriated for the NGYCP for fiscal year 2022. This would provide support for new program start-up costs, special projects, workforce development programs, and emergency unforeseen costs, all at the Secretary’s discretions.

303. Neguse #394 Expands travel and transportation allowances for family members to attend the funeral and memorial services of members.

304. Neguse #425 (REVISED) Expresses the Sense of the Congress that the US government should commit to the safe passage of humanitarian parolees, P-1 and P-2 visa recipients to the United States.

305. Neguse #508 Allows state and local governments to utilize Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation (OLDCC) funds for maintaining and improving military installation resilience, and expands the definition of military installation to include State-owned military facilities.

306. Neguse #519 Expands the annual report submitted by the Department of Defense on vulnerabilities of the National Technology and Industrial Base to include the current and projected impacts of climate change and cyberattacks.

307. Neguse #525 Expresses the Sense of Congress that the Department of Defense should take the most recent IPCC report into consideration for decisions about military bases and installations, and should consider adding the recommendations of the report into the Unified Facilities Criteria.

308. Neguse #531 Requires the Department of Defense to amend the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) for military construction and planning to incorporate the latest consensus-based codes and standards for energy efficiency by September 1, 2022, and requires an annual report to Congress comparing the current UFC with the latest codes and standards.

309. Neguse #582 Establishes a housing stipend for federal wildland firefighters, many of whom are veterans, hired at a location more than 50 miles from their primary residence with the allowance being determined by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture and be based on the cost of living in the area of deployment.
310. Neguse
(CO), Porter
(CA), Brownley
(CA) #590 Establishes a mental health program for federal wildland firefighters, many of whom are veterans, including a mental health awareness campaign, peer-to-peer support network, expansion of the Critical Incident Stress Management Program, mental health leave, and ensuring trauma-informed mental health professionals are readily available to provide services. (10 minutes)

311. Neguse
(CO) #736 (REVISED) Encourages the Department of Defense to contract with women-owned, minority-owned and small disadvantaged businesses in qualified military construction apprenticeship programs. (10 minutes)

312. Newman
(IL) #83 Directs the Department of Defense to conduct a study on herbicide agent exposure, such as Agent Orange and Agent Purple in the Panama Canal Zone between January 1, 1958 – December 31, 1999, or the day in which a member of armed services departed from official duty in the Panama Canal Zone. (10 minutes)

313. Newman
(IL) #87 Requires the involvement of accredited service officers from military and veteran service organizations in the Transition Assistance Program. (10 minutes)

314. Newman
(IL), Meuser
(PA) #218 (REVISED) Amends the Small Business Act to clarify that the HUBZone Price Evaluation Preference applies to certain contracts. (10 minutes)

315. Norman
(SC), Boeher, Lauren (CO) #297 Directs the Department of Defense to submit a report to Congress showing they are in compliance with disclosure requirements for recipients of research and development funds as required by federal law. (10 minutes)

316. Norman
(SC) #435 Requests a report from the armed services on substance abuse by servicemembers and their dependents with 180 days of enactment. (10 minutes)

317. Norton
(DC), Beyer
(VA) #29 Corrects a longstanding drafting error and clarify that D.C. National Guard members who are federal civilian employees are entitled to leave without loss in pay or time from their civilian employment during their mobilization. The change would apply prospectively. (10 minutes)

318. Ocasio-
Cortez (NY), Connolly (VA), Welch (VT), Tlaib (MI) #520 (REVISED) Prohibits funds from being used to provide weapons or military aid or military training to Saudi Arabia’s Rapid Intervention Force (RIF), the unit responsible for the murder of U.S. journalist Jamal Khoshoggi. (10 minutes)

319. Ocasio-
Cortez (NY), Tlaib (MI) #527 (REVISED) Prohibits funds from being used to conduct aerial fumigation in Colombia unless certain actions are taken by the Colombian Government. (10 minutes)

320. Ocasio-
Cortez (NY), Porter (CA) #535 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to Congress a report on human rights in Colombia, including an assessment of the capabilities of the
military and paramilitary forces of Colombia; a
description of the human rights climate in Colombia;
an assessment of the Colombian military and
paramilitary forces' adherence to human rights; and
more.

321. Ocasio-
Cortez (NY),
Tlaib (MI)  #553 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of State to make a
yearly determination as to whether Colombia’s Mobile
Anti-Disturbances Squadron committed gross
violations of human rights, and prohibits funds and
export licenses for certain items to that Squadron upon
a positive determination.

322. Omar
(MN), Jacobs,
Sara (CA)  #62 (REVISED) Requires reporting on recent security
assistance programs to Mali, Guinea, and Chad.

323. Omar
(MN)  #781 (LATE) (REVISED) Requires annual reporting to the
Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees on
U.S. strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

324. Omar
(MN)  #817 (LATE) Requires State and USAID to report on
human trafficking and slavery in Libya, and develop a
strategy for addressing root causes and holding
perpetrators accountable.

325. Pallone
(NJ), Meng
(NY), Tlaib
(MI), Bilirakis
(FL), Schiff
(CA), Speier
(CA), Costa
(CA), Sánchez
(CA), Lofgren
(CA), Eshoo
(CA), Valadao
(CA), Chu
(CA), Spanberger
(VA)  #123 (REVISED) Requires a report from the Secretary of
Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of State,
addressing allegations that some units of foreign
countries that have participated in security cooperation
programs under section 333 of title 10, U.S.C. may
have also committed gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights before or while receiving U.S.
security assistance. This report would also include
recommendations to improve human rights training
and additional measures that can be adopted to prevent
these types of violations.

326. Panetta
(CA)  #301 Authorizes the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management to conduct an annual survey of Federal
employees to assess Executive agency performance,
leadership, employee satisfaction, and organizational
resilience.

327. Panetta
(CA)  #345 Requires the Director of the Strategic Capabilities
Office, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy,
provide a report and briefing on Project Pele mobile
nuclear microreactors.

328. Pence (IN)  #144 (REVISED) Extends by 2 years the sunset date for
Sec. 1651 of the FY2019 NDAA (Public Law 115
232; 32 U.S.C. 501 note) Pilot Program on Regional
Cybersecurity Training Center for the Army National Guard.

329. Perry (PA), #199 Chabot (OH) Makes it the policy of the United States to reject any attempt by the People’s Republic of China to mandate that US vessels provide them with information about US vessels (ship name, call sign, location, type of cargo) in areas that China illegally includes as part of its maritime claims. (10 minutes)

330. Pfluger (TX) #296 (REVISED) Requires DNI, DHS, and DOD to conduct a threat assessment of terrorist threats to the United States posed by the prisoners released by the Taliban from the Pul-e-Charkhi Prison and Parwan Detention Facility in Afghanistan. (10 minutes)

331. Pfluger (TX), Bacon (NE) #387 Requires DOD and State to complete a report on ANDSF aircraft left in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or other foreign countries. (10 minutes)

332. Phillips (MN) #231 Requires the Secretary of the Army to identify and establish a plan to clean up contaminated sites where the Department has previously participated in cleanup efforts, but due to contaminants not discovered until after transfer or newly identified contaminants, additional clean-up may be required. The report requires a detailed plan to conduct preliminary assessments/site inspections of these locations within five years. (10 minutes)

333. Phillips (MN), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH) #232 Requires a Secretary of Defense report on how the US is working with other countries in CENTCOM area of responsibility to improve Israel’s coordination with other regional militaries and also requires the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator provide an analysis of the strategic initiatives taken to integrate the Abraham Accords into congressionally authorized and appropriated programs. (10 minutes)

334. Phillips (MN) #233 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of State to deliver an annual report on U.S. policy towards South Sudan, including the most recent approved interagency strategy developed to address political, security, and humanitarian issues prevalent in the country since it gained independence from Sudan in July 2011. (10 minutes)

335. Phillips (MN) #234 (REVISED) Requires the US Coordinator for the Arctic Region to assess, develop, and budget for plans, policies, and actions related to strengthening US diplomatic presence with Arctic countries, enhancing resilience capacities of Arctic countries, and assessing risks regarding environmental change and increased civilian and military activities by Arctic countries. (10 minutes)

336. Phillips (MN), Omar #235 Requires the Secretary of the Air Force report on its justification for the C-130 total aircraft inventory (10 minutes)
reduction, considering such recommendation is inconsistent with the 2018 and 2020 mobility capabilities requirements studies.

337. Phillips (MN), Van Dyne (TX) #451 Requires DOD to submit a report on the effects of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification on small businesses. (10 minutes)

338. Phillips (MN) #509 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator, to report on countries for which the Department has a presence and are suitable for stabilization operations support provided under Section 1210A of FY20 NDAA to inform ongoing interagency discussions on stabilization efforts. (10 minutes)

339. Phillips (MN), Mallinowski (NJ), Schakowsky (IL) #638 (REVISED) Expands the recusal time frame from one to two years for DoD officers and employees when the financial interests of any organization they were involved in (including employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner) as well as any former direct competitor or client organization are being considered. (10 minutes)

340. Porter (CA), Radewagen (AS), Sablan (MP) #342 Directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, to conduct a declassification review of documents related to U.S. weapons testing in the Marshall Islands during the Cold War. (10 minutes)

341. Porter (CA), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH) #344 Requires the Secretary of Defense to brief and deliver to Congress a report regarding Government Accountability Office recommendations to Combat Trafficking in Persons by Department of Defense contractors. (10 minutes)

342. Porter (CA), Lieu (CA), Mallinowski (NJ) #350 Extends the sunset date and makes modifications to the reporting requirement in Sec. 1205(f) of the FY15 NDAA (Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1205(f)). (10 minutes)

343. Porter (CA), Moore, Blake (UT), Neguse (CO), Carabajal (CA), LaMalfa (CA) #585 Directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, to submit a report to Congress on the risks posed to Department of Defense infrastructure and readiness posed by wildland fire. (10 minutes)

344. Porter (CA), Speier (CA) #630 Requires a quarterly summary of Department of Defense reports delivered to Congress in the previous quarter. (10 minutes)
345. Porter (CA), Lieu (CA) #636 Requires an independent study of lessons learned during the war in Afghanistan for security cooperation. (10 minutes)

346. Porter (CA), Jayapal (WA), Omar (MN), Lee, Barbara (CA) #749 Limits funding for travel by the Secretary of Defense pending delivery of certain congressionally mandated reports and briefing on compliance with statutory reporting requirements. (10 minutes)

347. Porter (CA) #751 (REVISED) Requires a Department of Defense Inspector General audit of NATO policies and processes for sexual assault and sexual harassment involving U.S. personnel. (10 minutes)

348. Posey (FL) #778 (LATE) Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide priority for domestically sourced, fully traceable, bovine heparin approved by the Food and Drug Administration when available. (10 minutes)

349. Pressley (MA), Lee, Barbara (CA), Pocan (WI), Espaillat (NY), Tlaib (MI), Brown (MD) #557 Expresses the Sense of Congress that the President should make full use of his authority under the Defense Production Act to scale vaccine production and deployment globally, and protect Americans from the risk of emerging viral threats. (10 minutes)

350. Quigley (IL), Upton (MI), Khanna (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA) #127 (REVISED) Establishes the foreign policy of the United States to work with state and non-state partners to shut down certain commercial wildlife markets, end the trade in terrestrial wildlife for human consumption, and build international coalitions to reduce the demand for wildlife as food, to prevent the emergence of future zoonotic pathogens. Authorizes USAID to undertake programs to reduce the risk of endemic and emerging infectious disease exposure and to help transition communities globally to safer, non-wildlife sources of protein. (10 minutes)

351. Quigley (IL), Upton (MI), Khanna (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA) #129 (REVISED) Expands the existing US Fish and Wildlife Service law enforcement attaché program. (10 minutes)

352. Radewagen (AS), Houlanhan (PA) #130 Transfers final decision-making power of protested HUBZone small business status of a small business concern from the Associate Administrator of the Office of Government Contracting & Business Development to the SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals. (10 minutes)

353. Reschenthaler (PA), Houlanhan (PA), Van... #33 (REVISED) Directs the National Academies to study the feasibility of providing enhanced research security services to further protect the United States research enterprise against foreign interference, theft, and...
Duyne (TX) espionage.

354. Reschenthaler (PA), Van Drew (NJ), Perry (PA), Harshbarger (TN), Keller (PA), Budd (NC)
#148 (REVISED) States that no funds authorized under this Act may be made available for any purpose to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

355. Reschenthaler (PA), Kim, Young (CA), Van Duyne (TX)
#160 (REVISED) Adds countries that are major producers of fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances to the Majors List and adds a new section on fentanyl to the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

356. Reschenthaler (PA), Fitzpatrick (PA), Kelly, Mike (PA), Thompson, Glenn (PA), Smucker (PA), Lamb (PA)
#402 (REVISED) Develops and implements an investment and sustainment plan to ensure the sourcing of cannon tubes for the purpose of mitigating risk to the Army and the industrial base.

357. Reschenthaler (PA), Kelly, Mike (PA), Lamb (PA), Doyle (PA)
#464 Includes Purple Heart award recipients on the DOD military valor website who receive the award after the enactment of this Act.

358. Reschenthaler (PA), Kelly, Mike (PA), Thompson, Glenn (PA), Lamb (PA), Doyle (PA)
#483 Expresses a Sense of Congress that the additive manufacturing and machine learning initiative of the Army has the potential to accelerate the ability to deploy additive manufacturing capabilities in expeditionary settings and strengthen the United States defense industrial supply chain.

359. Ross (NC)
#141 Requires a report on the availability of menstrual hygiene products on military bases and accommodations related to menstrual hygiene available to members of the Armed Forces.

360. Ross (NC)
#143 Requires a report on potential TRICARE coverage of preconception and prenatal carrier screening tests for certain medical conditions.
361. Ruiz (CA)  #607 Requires GAO to conduct a study on the factors contributing to low numbers of Hispanic officers and enlisted members in leadership positions within the DOD and recommendations to increase Hispanic representation. (10 minutes)

362. Ruiz (CA)  #610 Requires GAO to conduct a study on the factors contributing to low numbers of Hispanic students and in leadership positions within the military service academies and recommendations to increase Hispanic representation. (10 minutes)

363. Sablan (MP), Garbarino (NY), Kahele (HI), Radewagen (AS)

364. Salazar (FL), Case (HI), Posey (FL), Cammack, Kat (FL), Murphy, Stephanie (FL)

365. Salazar (FL), Newman (IL), Evans (PA)

366. San Nicolas (GU)

367. Sánchez (CA), Connolly (VA), Titus (NV), Larsen, Rick (WA)

368. Sánchez (CA), Connolly (VA), Titus (NV), Larsen, Rick (WA)
Center in fostering strategic communications and information operations within NATO.

369. Sánchez (CA), Connolly (VA), Titus (NV), Larsen, Rick (WA) #413 Requires a briefing and a report be delivered to Members on HASC, HFAC, and NATO PA’s US delegation on how the Department of Defense is working with the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to improve NATO’s ability to counter and mitigate disinformation, and offer recommendations to improve strategic communications within NATO. (10 minutes)

370. Sánchez (CA), Connolly (VA), Titus (NV), Larsen, Rick (WA) #433 Expresses the sense of Congress that the US should prioritize countering misinformation, increasing NATO’s resources, building technological resilience, and supporting NATO and NATO PA. (10 minutes)

371. Sánchez (CA) #447 (REVISED) Requests a report from the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, to be sent within one year to Congress reporting on the obstacles veterans experience related to receiving benefits under Federal housing programs, including obstacles relating to women veterans, LGBTQ+ veterans face, and multi-generational family types, and obstacles relating to eligibility requirements (including local Area Median Income limits, chronicity and disability requirements, and required documentation). (10 minutes)

372. Sánchez (CA) #453 (REVISED) Requests a report from the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs in coordination with the Secretaries of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Labor submitted to Congress related to how often and what type of supportive services (such as career transition, mental health services, and services for elderly veterans) are being offered to and used by veterans, and requests additional data on any correlation between a lack of supportive services programs and the likelihood of veterans falling into housing insecurity. Requests that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs de-identify any medical information. (10 minutes)

373. Schakowsky (IL), Porter (CA) #742 (REVISED) Implements reporting requirements regarding private security contractor contracts to allow increased Congressional oversight of private security contractor DOD contracts. (10 minutes)

374. Schiff (CA), Armstrong (ND), Courtney #537 Requires the Secretary of Defense to order the names of the 74 sailors who died in the USS Frank E. Evans disaster in 1969 be added to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall. (10 minutes)
375. Schiff (CA), Malinowski (NJ) #601 Establishes measures to protect the human rights of journalists. Expands the scope of required reports related to violations of the human rights of journalists, requires the President to impose certain property- and visa-blocking sanctions on persons responsible for gross violations of the human rights of journalists, and prohibits certain foreign assistance to a governmental entity of a country if an official acting under authority of the entity has committed a gross violation of human rights against a journalist. (10 minutes)

376. Schneider (IL), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH) #584 Includes parental bereavement as eligible paid leave for federal employees (10 minutes)

377. Schneider (IL), Williams (TX) #608 Codifies into law the existing, successful Boots to Business program that provides entrepreneurial training for servicemembers transitioning to civilian life. (10 minutes)

378. Schneider (IL), Wilson, Joe (SC), Murphy, Stephanie (FL), Manning (NC), Frankel (FL), Lieu (CA), Torres, Ritchie (NY), Gottheimer (NJ), Salazar (FL), Steube (FL) #672 Requires the creation of a U.S.-Israel Operations- Technology Working Group. (10 minutes)

379. Schrader (OR), Bourdeaux (GA) #46 (REVISED) Requests a Department of Defense report on the obligation and expenditure of funds that were authorized to be appropriated for Overseas Contingency Operations for Fiscal Year 2010 and Fiscal Year 2019. (10 minutes)

380. Schrader (OR) #354 Directs the U.S. Army Veterinary Services to conduct an updated study on the potential introduction of foreign animal diseases and current prevention protocol and strategies to protect the health of military working dogs. (10 minutes)

381. Schrader (OR) #360 Establishes a national One Health Framework to coordinate federal activities around zoonotic disease prevention, preparation, and response, driven by DoD, HHS, USDA, CDC, EPA, and other related agencies and departments. (10 minutes)
382. Schrier (WA), Miller-Meeks (IA)  
#542 Directs DOD, in coordination with the White House, FEMA, and HHS, to report on the current status of COVID-19 rapid test procurement through the Defense Production Act as required by the American Rescue Plan. (10 minutes)

383. Schrier (WA)  
#547 Directs GAO to report on the effectiveness of current health screenings administered to servicemembers separating from the military to identify the risk of social isolation and other health concerns. (10 minutes)

384. Schrier (WA)  
#617 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a GAO recommendation to establish strategies for sharing information on outreach approaches to raise awareness of employment resources among military spouses. (10 minutes)

385. Schweikert (AZ), Houlahan (PA)  
#785 (LATE) Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress regarding recommendations on cyber hygiene practices. Additionally, requires DOD to assess each DOD component's cyber hygiene and requires a GAO assessment of that report. (10 minutes)

386. Scott, Austin (GA)  
#271 Expands the "Never Contract with the Enemy" program and the applicability of the statutory authorities initially authorized under Sections 841, 842, and 843 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291). The changes will enable the Department to exercise the full intent of the legislation across all combatant commands (CCMDs), types of operations, the spectrum of vendor threats faced, and to integrate with the whole of Government in support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and POTUS and SECDEF anti-corruption objectives. (10 minutes)

387. Scott, Austin (GA)  
#287 Adds the services provided to Gold Star Families to the reporting requirements of the Quadrennial Quality of Life Review. (10 minutes)

388. Scott, Austin (GA)  
#291 Raises the caps on the funds made available by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to purchase items during any fiscal year from the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. (10 minutes)

389. Scott, Bobby (VA), Wittman (VA), Sarbanes (MD), Brown (MD), Mace (SC), Luria (VA)  
#64 (REVISED) Supports the deployment of stormwater management infrastructure on and around military installations to enhance installation resilience and conserve stormwater-stressed ecosystems. Applies only to future appropriations. (10 minutes)

390. Scott, David (GA),  
#735 Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that all contractors and subcontractors for military construction
Cleaver (MO)  (MilCon) projects have a plan to hire, retain, and increase African American and other nontraditional apprentice populations.

391. Sherman (CA)  #28 (REVISED) Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, upon request of the Government of Iraq and in consultation and coordination with the Government of Iraq, to provide support for vetted forces in Iraq operating in the Nineveh Plains to successfully facilitate the return of religious minorities. (10 minutes)

392. Sherrill (NJ), Katko (NY), Newman (IL), Miller-Meeks (IA), Kim (NJ), Garbarino (NY), Salazar (FL), Taylor (TX), Moulton (MA), Baird (IN), Strickland (WA), Franklin (FL), Bacon (NE), Golden (ME), Gonzales, Tony (TX), Houlahan (PA), Luria (VA), Meijer (MI), Pfluger (TX), Kahele (HI), Wild (PA), Horsford (NV), Schrier (WA), Norcross (NJ), Stefanik (NY), Waltz (FL), Cheney (WY), Crow (CO)  #756 Implements a pilot program to optimize services available for transitioning service members, and provide valuable data for future transition efforts. (10 minutes)

393. Slotkin (MI), Gallagher (WI), Langevin (RI)  #282 Directs the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to build on its existing work by codifying a National Cyber Exercise Program, in order to test U.S. response plans for major cyber incidents. Also codifies CISA’s work on model exercises that can be readily used by state/local governments and businesses to test the safety and security of their own critical infrastructure. (10 minutes)

394. Slotkin (MI)  #671 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Departments and Agencies, to
develop a strategy to safely process Afghans abroad with pending special immigrant visa applications and refugee referrals, and regular progress reports on the number of Afghan special immigrant visas and referrals, and their locations.

395. Smith, Adam (WA), Rogers, Mike (AL)  
#846 (LATE) Honors the United States Armed Servicemembers who served in Afghanistan.  
(10 minutes)

396. Smith, Christopher (NJ)  
#190 Requires the GAO to conduct a study of the possible experimentation of ticks, insects, or vector-borne agents by the DOD between 1950 and 1977 for use as a bioweapon.  
(10 minutes)

397. Soto (FL)  
#159 Directs the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress within a year of implementing the plan developed in response to GAO recommendations on tracking, response, and training for civilian employees of the Department of Defense regarding sexual harassment and assault.  
(10 minutes)

398. Soto (FL)  
#645 Adds related technologies like advanced storage capacity to the renewable or clean energy resources that can be considered to further data center energy efficiency and resiliency.  
(10 minutes)

399. Soto (FL), Schweikert (AZ)  
#659 Adds "distributed ledger technologies" to the definition of "digital talent" when specifying the responsibilities of the digital talent recruiting officer and the technologies they are trying to identify future talent and closing any skills gaps. Further encourages workforce pipeline and technical skills needed for potential distributed ledger technology within the Department in the future.  
(10 minutes)

400. Soto (FL), Schweikert (AZ)  
#688 Adds "blockchain and cryptographic technologies" to the list of technologies that are included in the Department's support for industry participation in global standards organizations.  
(10 minutes)

401. Soto (FL), Schweikert (AZ)  
#721 Adds blockchain technologies in the consideration of technologies to use to assist in the technology pilot program transmission absent uniform services and overseas votes that builds on successful state-based initiatives for overseas servicemember voting.  
(10 minutes)

402. Soto (FL), Schweikert (AZ), Blunt Rochester (DE)  
#732 Adds blockchain technologies to the technologies considered to help improve and development the Department's digital health strategy in order to improve digital health care strategy & data organization.  
(10 minutes)

403. Soto (FL)  
#733 Requires military service academies and senior reserve officer's training corps to report on their plans to increase the number of minority cadets and
midshipmen.

404. Spanberger (VA), McGovern (MA), Taylor (TX), Davis, Rodney (IL)

#226 Recognizes the service and sacrifice of Atomic Veterans by requiring the President to issue a proclamation every year calling on the people of the United States to observe Atomic Veterans Day.

405. Spanberger (VA), Kim, Young (CA), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH), Meeks (NY)

#227 Requires a report on the national security implications of open radio access networks (Open RAN or O-RAN) technology, including descriptions of U.S. efforts to ensure we are leading in standards development and assessments of national security risks associated with certain dynamics in the O-RAN industry.

406. Spanberger (VA), Meeks (NY), Schiff (CA), Katko (NY), McCaul (TX), Waltz (FL), Kim (NJ), Slotkin (MI), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH)

#571 Strengthens interagency coordination and response to suspected attacks presenting as anomalous health incidents, sometimes referred to as “Havana Syndrome,” including by requiring the administration to designate senior officials at the National Security Council and at relevant agencies to manage and coordinate the response and report to Congress on these efforts. Reiterates the severity of the incidents as well as the importance of prioritizing a robust, whole-of-government response to assist victims, investigate, and prevent future incidents.

407. Speier (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA), Schakowsky (IL), Porter (CA), Phillips (MN)

#91 Requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a GAO recommendation to update acquisition rules to require contractors to represent that their employees comply with DoD’s post-employment lobbying restrictions.

408. Speier (CA), Sarbanes (MD), Porter (CA)

#108 Extends the “cooling-off” period for senior executive branch officials who leave government service from 1 year to 2 years before former officials may lobby their previous agency.

409. Speier (CA), Frankel (FL), Keating (MA), Waltz (FL)

#149 (REVISED) Requires the Department of Defense to submit a report and brief Congress on its plan to implement the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military’s recommendation to standardize and better integrate gender advisors and women, peace, and security principles across organizations within the Defense Department.

410. Speier (CA)

#511 (REVISED) Adds TRICARE coverage for preconception and prenatal carrier genetic screening tests. Adds reporting requirement for utilization of the
newly covered tests.

411. Speier (CA), Lawrence (MI), Frankel (FL), Crow (CO), Price (NC), Escobar (TX), Garcia, Sylvia (TX)

#813 (LATE) Removes barriers to and improves the processing of applications and evacuation of Afghan refugees, especially prominent Afghan women and individuals working in support of democracy and human rights including women's rights.

(10 minutes)

412. Stauber (MN), Golden (ME)

#374 Requires the status of a company be updated in the System for Award Management when a final decision is made pursuant to such concern's small business or socioeconomic (i.e. HUBZone, service-disabled veteran-owned, women-owned, 8(a)) status. Requires such companies notify contracting officers for which they have pending bids on contracts in which they lost such status.

(10 minutes)

413. Stauber (MN), Tiffany, Thomas (WI)

#385 Allows the Secretary of the Navy to solicit contracts from non-homeport shipyards for maintenance work should the shipyards meet the Navy's requirements for ship repair work.

(10 minutes)

414. Stefanik (NY), Turner (OH)

#25 Establishes a Subcommittee on the Economic and Security Implications of Quantum Information Science through the National Science and Technology Council.

(10 minutes)

415. Stefanik (NY), Posey (FL)

#135 (REVISED) Amends Sec. 1216 to clarify requirements related to quarterly briefings on the security environment in Afghanistan and U.S. military operations related to the security of, and threats emanating from, Afghanistan.

(10 minutes)

416. Steil (WI)

#370 Requires the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the short- and long-term threats posed by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and to United States persons and interests.

(10 minutes)

417. Steil (WI)

#393 Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report to Congress on the status of United States and United Nations sanctions imposed with respect to the Taliban. The report will include a description of any gaps in current sanctions authorities to block the Taliban's sources of finance given the current situation in Afghanistan; recommendations for ways current sanctions can be enhanced; and a list of current waivers and licenses granted under Afghanistan sanctions, the reasons behind them, and how such waivers and licenses affect the Taliban's financing.

(10 minutes)

418. Steil (WI), Auchincloss

#576 Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to regularly report to Congress any sanctions waivers provided to

(10 minutes)
allow transactions between financial institutions and a state sponsor of terrorism or a sanctioned person.

419. Stewart (UT), Moore, Blake (UT) #773 (LATE) Requires a briefing, not later than March 1, 2022, to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on current and future plans for the replacement of aging aerospace ground equipment.

420. Takano (CA), Cicilline (RI) #591 Ensures DOD OIG considers sexual orientation in any future Department-wide Racial Disparity Reviews.

421. Tenney, Claudia (NY) #318 Revises the report on Iran’s military capabilities to include all instances of the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related material, to or from Iran.

422. Tenney, Claudia (NY) #323 (REVISED) Requires a report on the United Nations arms embargo on Iran and its effectiveness in constraining Iran’s ability to supply, sell, or transfer arms or related material while the arms embargo was in effect. Requires report to include the measures that the agencies are taking, in the absence of such a United Nations arms embargo on Iran, to constrain Iranian arms proliferation.

423. Tenney, Claudia (NY) #326 (REVISED) Requires a report on all IRGC-affiliated operatives serving in diplomatic and consular posts outside of Iran, and the ways in which the Departments of Defense and State are working with partner nations to inform them of the threat posed by IRGC-affiliated operatives.

424. Tenney, Claudia (NY) #333 (REVISED) Establishes a China Watcher Program within the Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, to monitor and combat the People’s Republic of China’s malign influence across military, economic, and political sectors in foreign countries, and will monitor the PRC’s military trends abroad and counters its advancements in foreign nations that pose a threat to US interests and the rules-based order.

425. Tenney, Claudia (NY), Stefanik (NY) #343 (REVISED) Establishes a program for the Department of Air Force to develop a proof-of-concept quantum network testbed that may be accessed by prototype quantum computers.

426. Tenney, Claudia (NY) #759 (REVISED) Requires a report on the net worth of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

427. Thompson, Bennie (MS), Katko (NY) #598 Adds a new title with measures related to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), comprised of House-passed legislative provisions to strengthen and improve DHS headquarters, research and development, cybersecurity, and transportation
security, among other matters.

428. Thompson, Glenn (PA), Joyce, John (PA), Reschenthaler (PA) #690 Requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit to Congress a report detailing the processing of Requests for Equitable Adjustment by the Department of the Navy, including progress in complying with the covered directive. (10 minutes)

429. Tiffany, Thomas (WI) #764 (LATE) (REVISED) Enhances cooperation with Ukraine’s titanium sector as an alternative to China and Russia for the US Defense industrial base. (10 minutes)

430. Titus (NV), Jacobs, Sara (CA) #548 Ordering a report by the State Department and USAID assessing the United States assistance to Turkmenistan, including the impact on public health outcomes related to COVID-19 in Turkmenistan. (10 minutes)

431. Titus (NV), Lofgren (CA), Kim, Young (CA), Chu (CA), Costa (CA), Eshoo (CA) #579 Requires a report by the Secretary of State on the activities of the Grey Wolves organization (AKA Bozkurtlar & Ülkü Ocakları) undertaken against U.S. interests, allies, and international partners, including a review of the criteria met for designation as a foreign terrorist organization. (10 minutes)

432. Tlaib (MI) #70 Adds a requirement that individuals in charge of oversight of privatized military housing be evaluated on their performance addressing instances and concerns about housing discrimination. (10 minutes)

433. Tlaib (MI) #72 Clarifies that surveys on diversity, equity and inclusion and annual reports on sexual assaults and racial and ethnic demographics in the military justice system must address islamophobia. (10 minutes)

434. Tlaib (MI), Johnson, Hank (GA), Pressley (MA), Brown (MD), Ocasio-Cortez (NY) #100 (REVISED) Directs the Secretary of State to submit a plan to Congress for vetting foreign security assistance participants for participation in groups that have a violent ideology. (10 minutes)

435. Torres, Norma (CA), Porter (CA) #457 Reinstates standard Congressional Notification procedures for the export of certain items to foreign countries. (10 minutes)

436. Torres, Norma (CA), Wagner (MO), Salazar (FL), Sires (NJ), Titus (NV), Himes (CT), Moore, Blake (UT), Espaillat #652 Adds the text of the Central American Women and Children Protection Act of 2021, which directs the State Department to enter into bilateral multi-year agreements, known as “Women and Children Protection Compacts,” with the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, specifically to strengthen the countries’ criminal justice systems and civil protection courts, create safe communities and protect vulnerable families, ensure the safety of
children in schools and promote early prevention and detection of gender-based violence and domestic abuse, and increase access to high quality health care.

437. Torres, Ritchie (NY), Garbarino (NY) #125 (REVISED) Directs DHS to modernize its information and communications technology or services (ICT(S)) acquisitions process by requiring the Under Secretary for Management to issue Department-wide guidance to require DHS contractors to submit software bills of materials (SBOM) that identify the origins of each component of the software furnished to DHS.

438. Torres, Ritchie (NY) #564 Ensures that private sector, non-financial entities can participate in the Financial Crime Enforcement Network Exchange, and ensures that information use and confidentiality limitations apply to these entities. (10 minutes)

439. Torres, Ritchie (NY) #717 Requires the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to review and assess programs administered by the Agency to improve Federal network security. (10 minutes)

440. Trahan (MA) #137 (REVISED) Requires the National Space Council to submit a report that includes an assessment of the risks space debris orbiting the Earth imposes on night sky luminance, collision risk, radio interference, astronomical data loss by satellite streaks, and other potential factors relevant to space exploration, research, and national security. Further, the report should consider the current and future impact low Earth orbit satellites may impose on space exploration, research, and national security. (10 minutes)

441. Trone (MD), McCaul (TX) #359 (REVISED) Prioritizes efforts of the Department of State to combat international trafficking in covered synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances. (10 minutes)

442. Turner (OH), Van Duyne (TX) #165 Requires the President to submit to Congress an assessment of China's compliance with Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (10 minutes)

443. Turner (OH), Bacon (NE) #175 (REVISED) Requires the Secretary of Defense to certify the extent to which Afghan Security Forces' equipment in Uzbekistan has been transferred to a foreign nation and not been transferred to Taliban or Afghanistan and to report on the disposition of said equipment and the circumstances which led to such disposition. (10 minutes)

444. Turner (OH), Chabot (OH), Wenstrup (OH), Johnson, Bill (OH), Davidson (OH), #185 Authorizes the Secretary of the Energy to release its reversionary interest in real property and a building formerly used by the National Nuclear Security Administration to the Community Improvement Corporation of Clark County, a non-profit entity created by the City of Springfield, Ohio. (10 minutes)
Ryan (OH), Joyce, David (OH), Gonzalez, Anthony (OH), Laatta (OH), Kaptur (OH)

445. Turner (OH) #187 Requires the Secretary of Defense to report annually on anomalies related to the sensors used in international monitoring system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. (10 minutes)

446. Turner (OH), Connolly (VA) #249 Amends Section 1301 for the purpose of including "NATO specific infrastructure" in a Secretary of Defense reporting requirement on the status of U.S. military investment in Europe including the European Deterrence Initiative. (10 minutes)

447. Turner (OH), Connolly (VA) #251 Express a Sense of Congress in support of the Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania and their importance to the defenses of Poland, Romania, the United States, and NATO members. (10 minutes)

448. Turner (OH) #801 (LATE) Makes technical corrections related to Section 1608, National Security Council Briefing on Potential Harmful Interference to Global Positioning System. (10 minutes)

449. Valadao (CA), Sherman (CA), Wild (PA), Levin, Andy (MI), Lofgren (CA), Kim, Young (CA), Chu (CA), Costa (CA), Spanberger (VA), Krishnamoorthi (IL), Porter (CA), Pallone (NJ), Schwegert (AZ), Trone (MD), Beyer (VA)

450. Van Duyne (TX), Golden (ME) #805 (LATE) Requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency to jointly report to Congress on vulnerabilities in supply chains that are critical to U.S. national security, economic security, or public health. The report shall also contain recommendations for (10 minutes)
addressing those vulnerabilities.

451. Vargas (CA) #714 Expands certain authorities under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and directs the President and federal agencies to take specific actions to support the production of critical medical supplies during the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019) emergency, including with respect to private-sector coordination, needs assessments, and overall strategies.

452. Velázquez (NY), Donalds (FL) #151 Exempts certain thresholds from periodic adjustments for inflation.

453. Velázquez (NY), Kim, Young (CA) #412 Requires the collection of demographic information provided voluntarily by the inventor on each patent application submitted to the USPTO.

454. Wagner (MO), Castro (TX), Moore, Blake (UT), Steel, Michelle (CA) #572 Requires the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for engagement with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

455. Walberg (MI) #662 Requires an evaluation of the capabilities of the Taliban post-withdrawal to monetize through the transfer of abandoned covered United States equipment, property, and classified material to adversaries of the United States.

456. Walberg (MI), Dingell (MI) #829 (LATE) Promotes United States leadership in standards-setting bodies that set standards for 5G networks and for future generations of wireless communications networks; encourages participation by companies and a wide variety of relevant stakeholders (not including any company or relevant stakeholder that the Assistant Secretary has determined to be not trusted) in such standards-setting bodies.

457. Waltz (FL), Chabot (OH) #440 Prohibits DoD assistance to the government of Afghanistan if such government includes any individual belonging to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

458. Waltz (FL) #452 Establishes a research security training requirement for Federal research grant personnel.

459. Waltz (FL), Feenstra (IA) #740 (REVISED) Prohibits malign talent recruitment program participants from receipt of research and development awards from Federal research agencies.

460. Waters (CA), Brown (MD) #544 Includes the Federal Officer Candidate and Training Schools in the collection of demographic information and improves a central source of military leader training in the service-wide diversity and inclusion efforts.
461. Waters (CA) #588 Requires the collection of demographic information of students enrolled in the JROTC program and tasks that an assessment of JROTC program’s diverse recruitment and retention efforts be conducted. (10 minutes)

462. Waters (CA), Wagner (MO) #693 (REVISED) States that it is the policy of the United States that it will not recognize the Burmese military junta as the official government of Burma for the purpose of the provision of assistance from the international financial institutions (IFIs). Directs the Secretary of Treasury to instruct the United States executive director at each IFI to notify the respective institution that the provision of any assistance to Burma through the State Administrative Council, or any successor entity controlled by the military, would be cause for a serious review of future U.S. participation in the institution. Includes limited waiver for humanitarian assistance channeled through an independent implementing agency responsible for procurement of goods and services and control of the flow of funds from the respective IFI. (10 minutes)

463. Wenstrup (OH), Jackson, Ronny (TX) #827 (LATE) Exempts from the Separation Health and Physical Examination (SHPE) requirement certain members of the Reserve Component and National Guard who are not fully separating from the military, but rather returning from Active Duty status to reserve or guard status. Nothing in this amendment prohibits a member of the Reserve Component or National Guard from requesting and receiving a physical examination, a mental health assessment if desired, filing a disability claim, or line of duty injury, or receiving treatment for any of the above. (10 minutes)

464. Wild (PA) #667 (REVISED) Requires an annual report on and congressional notification of U.S. efforts to counter malign foreign influence in Africa. (10 minutes)

465. Wild (PA), Malinowski (NJ) #712 Requires a report on human rights abuses related to arms exported by the top five global arms exporters, which includes both China and Russia. This study will aid in safeguarding U.S. servicemembers, American citizens abroad and other civilians as well as report on the potential of exported arms being used by hostile anti-American non-state actors. (10 minutes)

466. Wild (PA) #806 (LATE) (REVISED) Increases funding by $1 million dollars for the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies for civilian harm mitigation and increases funding by $1 million dollars for the Institute of Security Governance for civilian harm mitigation to ensure robust and effective efforts to reduce civilian casualties and harm. (10 minutes)
467. Williams (GA), Stauber (MN), Chu (CA), Fitzpatrick (PA), Strickland (WA)

468. Williams (GA), Dean (PA), Schakowsky (IL), Adams (NC), Maloney, Carolyn (NY), DelBene (WA), Johnson, Hank (GA), Evans (PA), Blumenauer (OR), Cohen (TN), Strickland (WA), Newman (IL), Carson (IN), Wilson, Frederica (FL)

469. Wilson, Joe (SC)

470. Wittman (VA)

471. Young (AK)

472. Schneider (IL), Williams (TX), Bourdeaux (GA)

473. Smith, Christopher

#120 Tasks the Small Business Administration with maintaining a resource guide for small businesses operating as child care providers that includes guidance on topics such as operations, finances, and compliance with relevant laws.

#367 Reestablishes the National Equal Pay Enforcement Task Force, a federal interagency task force focused on improving compliance, public education, and enforcement of equal pay laws.

#403 (REVISED) Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to make impact aid payments to local educational agencies who have higher concentrations of military children with severe disabilities.

#574 Requires a report on current commercial satellite communication (COMSATCOM) initiatives, particularly new NGSO COMSATCOM technologies, the Navy has employed to increase SATCOM throughput to afloat platforms currently constrained by legacy capabilities.

#656 (REVISED) Requires an Air Force strategy for the acquisition of combat rescue aircraft and equipment that aligns with the National Defense and Arctic strategies.

#855 (LATE) Codifies into law the existing, successful Boots to Business program that provides entrepreneurial training for servicemembers transitioning to civilian life.

#654 (REVISED) Directs the Army Corps of Engineers to provide each Army Corps district with clarifying and
uniform guidance that conforms with USDOL’s regulations and guidance with respect to proper implementation and enforcement of existing laws regarding worker classification by federal construction contractors and subcontractors.

474. Lieu (CA), Brownley (CA)  #431 (REVISED) Authorizes the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) to use any funds collected pursuant to easements, or other use-agreements at the West LA VA for the development of supportive housing and services on campus for homeless veterans. (10 minutes)

475. Slotkin (MI), Khanna (CA)  #357 Revises the language for the definition of plant based protein for clarity purposes. (10 minutes)

476. Escobar (TX), Brown (MD)  #646 Directs GAO to examine DOD and the military services’ policies on servicemembers’ tattoos. The report shall discuss DOD and the military services’ policies on unauthorized tattoos, including the process and waivers used for recruiting or retaining servicemembers who have unauthorized tattoos. The report should also describe what is known about the effect of unauthorized tattoos on recruitment, retention, reenlistment, and servicemembers’ careers. (10 minutes)
Rhys/Ron:

Jim Ward came across this article that alleges that DTRA was involved in funding gain of function experimentation at the Wuhan lab that created the Corona virus. For your SA.

Mike

Sir,

Here it is.

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android < Caution-
https://go.onemlink.me/107872968?pid=InProduct&c=Global_YGrowth_AndroidEmailSig__AndroidUsers
&af_w1=ym&af_sub1=Internal&af_sub2=Global_YGrowth&af_sub3=EmailSignature >

----- Forwarded Message -----
In short, DTRA was funding gain of function experimentation in bat coronaviruses in Wuhan. I suspect, even the money that went from NIH may have originated from DTRA.

DTRA may get its 15 minutes of fame.

Perhaps you would like to alert DTRA PAO. The link is to the RedState blog article which has a link to the Daily Mail (UK) article.

Money quote from RedState:

"Research papers published by the two on coronaviruses identify the grant funding as having come from USAID and PREDICT. But that limited attribution didn’t reveal that the funding distributed through PREDICT had, in part, come from the Defense Department — specifically the DOD “Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”"


From the Daily Mail:

Sub headline that reads:

* Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020

The article states, "Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020 with the description: 'Understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.'"

The Pentagon funneled $39 million to a charity that funded Wuhan lab | Daily Mail Online < Caution-https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9652287/The-Pentagon-funneled-39million-charity-funded-Wuhan-lab.html >
The Pentagon funneled $39 million to a charity that funded Wuhan lab

Josh Boswell

Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39 million to charity EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), w...

I would NOT assume anyone in PAO is doing anything about this or is even aware. I would urge you to make them at least aware, and Dr. K as well.
The Pentagon gave $39 MILLION to Dr. Peter Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance - the charity that funded coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab accused of being the source of the outbreak, federal data reveals

- Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39 million to EcoHealth Alliance, which funded a lab in Wuhan, China, between 2013 and 2020
- The Wuhan Institute of Virology is accused of being the source of Covid-19
- The majority of the DoD funding came from the DTRA, a military branch with a mission to 'counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and improvised threat networks'
- Federal grant data assembled by independent researchers shows that the charity has received more than $123 million from the government in total
- Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020
- EHA also received $84.7 million from the US Agency for International Development (USAID)
- It received $13 million from Health and Human Services, which includes the National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control
- It is not known how much of the money actually went to the Wuhan lab
- EHA has also funded deeply controversial 'gain of function' experiments, where dangerous viruses are made more infectious to study their effect on human cells

By JOSH BOSWELL and MARTIN GOULD FOR DAILYMAIL.COM
Published: 12:31 EDT, 4 June 2021 | Updated: 16:45 EDT, 4 June 2021

4.7k shares

The Pentagon gave $39 million to a charity that funded controversial coronavirus research at a Chinese lab accused of being the source for Covid-19, federal data reveals.

The news comes as the charity's chief, British-born scientist Dr. Peter Daszak, was exposed in an alleged conflict of interest and back-room campaign to discredit lab leak theories.

The charity, EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), has come under intense scrutiny after it emerged that it had been using federal grants to fund research into coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China.

The U.S. nonprofit, set up to research new diseases, has also partly funded deeply controversial 'gain of function' experiments, where dangerous viruses are made more infectious to study their effect on human cells.

A political storm broke when former president Donald Trump canceled a $3.7 million grant to the charity last year amid claims that Covid-19 was created in, or leaked from, the Wuhan lab funded by EHA.

But federal grant data assembled by independent researchers shows that the charity has received more than $1 million from the government – from 2017 to 2020 - and that one of its biggest funders is the Department of Defense, funneling almost $39 million to the organization since 2013.

Exactly how much of that money went toward research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology is unknown.
Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39 million to charity EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), which funded a lab in Wuhan, China.

### FEDERAL GRANTS TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>AWARD ID</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AMOUNT AWARDED</th>
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Federal grant data assembled by independent researchers shows that the charity has received more than $123 million from the government – and that one of its biggest funders is the Department of Defense, funneling almost $39 million to the organization since 2013.

Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020 with the description: 'Understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.'

The grant was categorized as 'scientific research - combating weapons of mass destruction.'
The majority of the DoD funding came from the DTRA, a military branch with a mission to 'counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and improvised threat networks.'

EHA also received $64.7 million from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), $13 million from Health and Human Services, which includes the National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control, $2.3 million from the Department of Homeland Security, and $2.6 million from the National Science Foundation.

A government funding figure of $3.4 million was widely reported, after White House chief medical advisor Anthony Fauci was questioned in a Senate hearing on how much money the National Institutes of Health sent to the Wuhan lab via its grants to EcoHealth Alliance in 2019.

But the total grant figures including Pentagon funding dwarf that number.

Researchers James Baratta and Mariamne Everett assembled grant filings from US government agencies to EHA, which were published on popular science site Independent Science News in December.

The site found EHA's declaration of its vast military funding is nestled deep in the 'Privacy Policy' section of its website, under the title 'EcoHealth Alliance Policy Regarding Conflict of Interest in Research'.

In the disclosure EHA says it is 'the recipient of various grant awards from federal agencies including the National Institute of Health, the National Science Foundation, US Fish and Wildlife Service, and the US Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense.'

It does not disclose the size of its DoD funding.

In 2014 the Obama administration outlawed gain of function research, such as the experiments funded by EHA, after concerns were raised among scientists that it could lead to a global pandemic from a genetically enhanced virus escaping a lab.

But EHA reportedly continued to legally fund the practice, using a loophole that allowed for the research in cases 'urgently necessary to protect the public health or national security.'

One notable EHA 'policy advisor' is David Franz, a former commander at the principal US government biowarfare and biodefense facility Fort Detrick.

Franz was an official in the United Nations Special Commission which inspected for bioweapons in Iraq.
Researchers at a number of top universities have recently penned a letter claiming that theories that COVID-19 escaped from a Wuhan lab 'remain viable'.
While China has tried to insist the virus originated elsewhere, academics, politicians and the media have begun to contemplate the possibility it escaped from the WIV - raising suspicions that Chinese officials simply hid evidence of the early spread.

The charity's head, Daszak, has been accused of orchestrating a behind-the-scenes 'bullying' campaign to ensure the blame for covid-19 did not fall on the Wuhan lab he funded.

The 55-year-old worked closely with the lab's so-called 'bat woman,' Shi Zhengli, in their studies of coronaviruses.

In February 2020 Daszak persuaded more than two dozen other scientists to sign off on a letter he had written to highly respected medical journal The Lancet, that was seen as so influential that it cowed most experts into refusing even to consider that the virus could have been man-made and escaped from the Wuhan institute.

Former high-level Clinton administration staffer Jamie Metzl, who now sits on the World Health Organization's advisory committee on human genome editing, told DailyMail.com that the Lancet letter 'was scientific propaganda and a form of thuggery and intimidation.'

Freedom of Information Act disclosures revealed Daszak tried to distance his charity from the letter to make it appear it was coming from 'a community supporting our colleagues.'

The charity chief told his fellow signatories in an email that the letter would not be sent under the EcoHealth logo 'and will not be identifiable as coming from any one organization or person.'

The joint letter, published in the journal on February 19 last year, praised the Chinese 'who continue to save lives and protect global health during the challenge of the Covid-19 outbreak' and added 'We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that Covid-19 does not have a natural origin.'

Despite his close connections to the Chinese lab, Daszak was also picked by the World Health Organization to be part of its 13-member team that was tasked with finding the cause of the pandemic which began in Wuhan city of some 11 million people in Central China.
Shi Zhengli (left), the so-called 'bat woman' and a coronavirus expert at the lab, insists there were no infections at the lab.

Metzl told DailyMail.com the appointment was a 'massive and outrageous conflict of interest,' allowing a man who had significant financial and reputational stakes in discrediting lab leak theories to investigate those theories.

Prominent scientists have criticized the WHO probe, which dismissed lab leak theories, as lackluster and incomplete.

In a Freedom of Information disclosure of Fauci's emails obtained by Buzzfeed last month, Daszak thanked the White House doctor for pushing back on the theory that covid-19 was man made.

'I just wanted to say a personal thank you on behalf of our staff and collaborators, for publicly standing up and stating that the scientific evidence supports a natural origin for COVID-19 from a bat-to-human spillover, not a lab release from the Wuhan Institute of Virology,' Daszak wrote in April 2020.

Fauci says the emails have been taken out of context.

EHA's most recent financial statements filed with the IRS say that around 90 per cent of its funding comes from government sources.

The 2019 report says Daszak was paid a total $410,801 for the year, including $311,815 base pay, $42,250 bonus, $24,500 deferred compensation and $32,236 nontaxable benefits.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has been collecting numerous coronaviruses from bats ever since the SARS outbreak in 2002.
They have also published papers describing how these bat viruses have interacted with human cells.

US Embassy staff visited the lab in 2018 and 'had grave safety concerns' over the protocols which were being observed at the facility.

The lab is just eight miles from the Huanan wet market which is where the first cluster of infections erupted in Wuhan.

The market is just a few hundred yards from another lab called the Wuhan Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (WHCDC).

The WHCDC kept disease-ridden animals in its labs, including some 605 bats.

Those who support the theory argue that Covid-19 could have leaked from either or both of these facilities and spread to the wet market.

Most argue that this would have been a virus they were studying rather than one which was engineered.

Last year a bombshell paper from the Beijing-sponsored South China University of Technology recounted how bats once attacked a researcher at the WHCDC and 'blood of bat was on his skin.'

The report says: 'Genome sequences from patients were 96% or 99% identical to the Bat CoV ZC45 coronavirus originally found in Rhinolophus affinis (intermediate horseshoe bat).'

It describes how the only native bats are found around 600 miles away from the Wuhan seafood market and that the probability of bats flying from Yunnan and Zhejiang provinces was minimal.

In addition there is little to suggest the local populace eat the bats as evidenced by testimonies of 31 residents and 28 visitors.

Instead the authors point to research being carried out within 300 yards at the WHCDC.

One of the researchers at the WHCDC described quarantining himself for two weeks after a bat's blood got on his skin, according to the report. That same man also quarantined himself after a bat urinated on him.

And he also mentions discovering a live tick from a bat - parasites known for their ability to pass infections through a host animal's blood.

'The WHCDC was also adjacent to the Union Hospital (Figure 1, bottom) where the first group of doctors were infected during this epidemic.' The report says.

'It is plausible that the virus leaked around and some of them contaminated the initial patients in this epidemic, though solid proofs are needed in future study.'
If you're over 50 - this game is a must!
Vikings: Free Online Game

New Anti-Mosquito Device Is Changing Outdoor Life In Virginia
Best Future Gadgets

The buzz around Bitcoin: why 2021 may be the year to invest
etoro

Grab A Tissue Before You See Richard Simmons At 72
News Sharper

Greatest High School Basketball Teams of All Time
Stadium Talk

Actors Who Retired Way Too Soon
POPSUGAR

Walmart Shoppers That Shouldn't Be Allowed In Public
Notablely

Top 25 NBA Players Since 1973-74, Ranked
Forbes.com

High-profile media personality is charged with raping a 13-year-old girl and allegedly telling her she should be GRATEFUL he was 'teaching her how to be a good lover'

News

They're lovin' it! McDonald's reveals all milkshakes will be just 99p today - while early birds can also pick up a hot drink and bacon roll for £1.99

Food

Shackled skeleton discovered by workmen building a conservatory in Rutland is first to be discovered of a Roman slave who was thrown in a ditch 1,800 years ago and is an 'internationally significant' find
Senior Leaders,

Good afternoon. Attached is this week’s legislative update. Thank you to the entire team in preparing Dr. Williams for his testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations today. The full transcript and video of the hearing will be available tomorrow. We expect to receive questions for the record by the end of this week.

Have a great evening!

V/r,

Chief of Legislative Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Attachments: 2021-05-04 Legislative Update.docx
HEADLINES

- **Senate**: Not in session this week. Returning next week for votes.
- **House**: Committee work only this week. Returning next week for votes. HASC-ISO held their annual CWMD posture hearing today. A summary can be found below.

HEARINGS OF INTEREST

**FY22 DoD CWMD Strategy, Policy & Programs**

- May 4, 1100
- House Armed Services - Intelligence & Special Operations Subcommittee
- Witnesses:
  - [905] ASD-Homeland Defense & Global Security
  - [A/ASD-NCB]
  - [906] Deputy Commander, USSOCOM
  - Dr. Rhys Williams (A/DIR, DTRA)
- The virtual hearing was attended by eight of fifteen members on the Subcommittee. Chairman Gallego opened the hearing by expressing his concern over a possible weaponized COVID-like virus. He also asked the panel about the quality of our CWMD efforts with allies like South Korea, India and Japan. Ranking Member Kelly highlighted the threat of poisoning from biological agents as evidenced by recent Russian activity and how we preserve or strengthen international norms in the chem/bio arena. He also asked specifically about DoD grant funding for EcoHealth Alliance and their subsequent work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology – Secretary Austin recently received a letter on this topic from a separate group of House Members.
- Rep. Bacon asked Dr. Vann if Iran was our number one threat for nuclear proliferation and if there were concerns with Iran colluding with Al Qaeda and WMD. He finished by commenting on the current status of Open Skies. Rep. Waltz, a green beret and former Director of the OSD Afghanistan policy desk, inquired on what CIED capabilities we are leaving behind in Afghanistan and what the withdrawal plan looked like. Other members raised questions about synthetic biology, fentanyl, the Korean Peninsula, and the impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan on CWMD efforts including the Pakistan nuclear program. A number of questions were deferred to a classified discussion or written response.

POSTURE HEARING RECAP

**United States Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy**

- April 28 (SASC-Strategic Forces)
- While the hearing was sparsely attended, SASC full committee Chairman Reed did join and asked questions. As expected, there was agreement among panelists and witnesses that nuclear
modernization is necessary and no-first-use policies should be rejected. Moving beyond those points, Franklin Miller discussed expanding deterrence into the realms of space, cyber, AI, and advanced conventional forces. Meanwhile, Dr. Bracken advocated for a more nuanced approach to war and deterrence as he pointed out that surprise attacks get too much study, while accidental war receives short shrift. He also characterized China as a nation highly unlikely to engage in arms control as they see it as a western “trick” and urged a bit of perspective in that they are surrounded by five nuclear armed countries that are more likely to bring devastation to them than the United States.

- Chairman King offered likely the most salient point of the hearing when he spoke about the threat emanating from a non-state actor getting a hold of a nuclear weapon, in which case the strategy shifts decidedly away from deterrence and toward reliable intelligence. During Chairman Reed’s line of questioning he lamented the loss of traction on arms control, wherein Dr. Bracken pointed out that no internal lobby for it exists as the U.S. abolished the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. To turn the corner, arms control must fit the 21st century and recognize China’s skeptical stance and Russia’s transactional motivations. Dr. Roberts offered that “competition serves our interest more than cooperation in these areas.” Much time was also spent discussing the U.S. model of placing sole nuclear launch authority in the hands of one person. However, it was largely determined that no other viable alternative was available.

Substantive questioning wrapped up with Sen. Rosen where she advocated for increased NC3 cyber security and preventing the resumption of explosive nuclear testing. Chairman King then concluded with his final concerns: (1) the best way to avoid a nuclear war is to modernize our nuclear force and (2) preventing a terrorist group from possessing a nuclear weapon.

**STRATCOM & SPACECOM: FY22 Posture Hearing**

- April 21 (HASC)

- Although he refrained from questions, Chairman Cooper made a very brief statement where he shared two concerns: moving SPACECOM to Alabama and the lack of urgency from some of his colleagues in recapitalizing the triad. However, most members of the panel on both sides expressed their support for modernizing the ground based leg with the exception of Rep. Garamendi. The latter strenuously challenged ADM Richard by highlighting the prior STRATCOM Commander’s apparent support for one more life extension of the Minuteman III. Other related topics included NC3, no-first-use, and plutonium pit production.

**STRATCOM & SPACECOM: FY22 Posture Hearing**

- April 20 (SASC)

- The hearing included generally bipartisan support for modernizing the ground based leg of the triad. Members sought to highlight the cost of not modernizing, the benefits gained from increased cyber defenses, and the comparison to Russia and China’s significant head start in the area. Sen. Warren marked the exception when she stated that STRATCOM likes spending “$44.5 billion a year on nuclear weapons... but I don’t.” She also asked for ADM Richard’s commitment to not undermine the President’s Nuclear Posture Review. Other Senators focused on how cutting ICBMs would impact arms control negotiations and the stress it would place on the other legs of the triad. Of interest to DTRA, Sen. Shaheen asked about the benefits we gain from New START with inspections and data exchanges. Also, Sen. Cotton pointed out that a sole purpose nuclear policy would also “undermine our ability to deter chemical or biological attacks.” On space matters, both Senators King and Gillibrand advocated for some manner of international norms in space. The former also spoke of the risk we take with large U.S. satellites,
instead of seeking a “constellation of small satellites that would be harder to disable.”

CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENTS

- HASC Intelligence & Special Operations Subcommittee Hearing on Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (4-May-2021)

NOMINATIONS

- **Department of Defense:**
  - Michael Brown – USD A&S (referred to SASC on April 12)
  - Michael McCord – USD Comptroller (referred to SASC on April 12)
  - Ronald Moultrie – USD Intelligence & Security (referred to SASC on April 12)
  - Susanna Blume – Director, CAPE (referred to SASC on April 15)
  - Christine Wormuth – Secretary of the Army (referred to SASC on April 15)
  - Mara Karlin – ASD Strategy, Plans & Capabilities (referred to SASC on April 22)
  - Frank Kendall – Secretary of the Air Force (referred to SASC April 28)
  - Deborah Rosenblum – ASD-NCB (referred to SASC April 27)
  - Caroline Krass – General Counsel (referred to SASC April 28)
  - Christopher Maier – ASD-SO/LIC (referred to SASC April 28)
  - Gina Ortiz Jones – Under Secretary of the Air Force (referred to SASC April 28)
  - Heidi Shyu – USD for Research & Engineering (referred to SASC April 28)

- **Other National Security Posts:**
  - Christine Abizaid – Director, National Counterterrorism Center (referred SSCI on April 19)
  - Robin Ashton – Inspector General, CLA (referred to SSCI on April 19)
  - Jon Meyer – General Counsel, DHS (referred to SHSGAC on April 19)
  - Jen Easterly – Director, CISA (Referred to SHSGAC on April 22)
  - Jill Hruby – Administrator, NNSA (Referred to SASC on April 22)
  - Chris Inglis – National Cyber Director (referred to SHSGAC on April 27)
  - Thomas Monheim – Inspector General-Intelligence Community (announced April 27)
  - Bonnie Jenkins – Under Secretary of State for Arms Control & International Security (hearing April 28)
  - Adam Scheinman – Special Representative, Bureau of International Security & Nonproliferation (referred to SFRC April 29)

CRS REPORTS OF INTEREST

- State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism (4-May2021)
Subject: Weekly Legislative Update - 12.15.21
Attachments: 2021-12-15 Legislative Update.pdf, Hearing on Biosecurity.pdf

Senior Leaders,

Good afternoon. Attached is this week’s legislative update.

Today, the Senate passed the NDAA and sent it to the President. The update also includes a summary of last week’s hearing on biosecurity and I’ve attached a condensed transcript.

V/r,

[Redacted]

DTRA Legislative Affairs
HEADLINES

- **Senate**: The upper chamber will be in session this week, and possibly next, as they attempt to complete three priority items before the holidays: the debt limit, the NDAA, and the Build Back Better Act – a $2 trillion climate and social spending bill. The debt limit was approved yesterday and today the NDAA was agreed to and sent to the President. SASC also sent the JCS Vice-Chair nomination of ADM Christopher Grady to the floor.

- **House**: Yesterday, the House completed their work for the week with votes on the debt limit, combating Islamophobia, barring the importation of goods made with forced Uyghur labor, and holding Mark Meadows in contempt of Congress over his refusal to comply with the January 6th special committee. This is likely the final week in session for the House this year.

- **NDAA**: The Senate voted to pass the $768 billion defense bill today by a vote of 89-10. The measure now goes to the President for his signature. The bill language is identical to the text that was released last week. A key provision on EcoHealth Alliance bars any funding of projects conducted in China. Funding-wise, notable increases include $105 million more for BTRP and $5.877 million more for overall RDT&E.

- **Debt Limit**: Yesterday, both chambers approved of the final step to raise the debt limit by another $2.5 trillion. The bill’s passage sets up another showdown on the debt ceiling as soon as November 2022.

- **Nominations**: DoD nominees John Sherman (CIO) and Nickolas Guertin (Operational Test & Evaluation) were confirmed yesterday. However, with 158 nominees blocked over holds placed by conservatives on other key posts, Senate Majority Leader Schumer has threatened to keep his chamber in session over the weekend and into next week to get movement on the slate. Two Republican Senators have placed holds on high profile Defense and State Department nominees over their objections to related administration policies. Sens. Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley have pledged to maintain their holds until they get a vote on sanctions over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline effort and more accountability over the pullout of troops from Afghanistan, respectively.

KEY HEARING SUMMARY

*Biosecurity for the Future: Strengthening Deterrence and Detection*

- 8 Dec, 1000
- House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia & Nonproliferation
- Witnesses:
  - Dr. Jamie Yassif (Nuclear Threat Initiative)
  - Dr. Amesh Adalja (Johns Hopkins University-School of Public Health)
  - Hon. Andy Weber (Council on Strategic Risks; Former ASD-NCB)
  - Dr. Kevin Esvelt (Sculpting Evolution Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
- **Summary**: Discussion alternated between the prevention and defeat of naturally occurring health challenges as well as acts of bioterrorism. The chairman advocated for improved international
biosecurity systems, but also praised advancements and investments in efforts such as gene sequencing, bio surveillance, and detection. The ranking member was critical of China’s efforts to hide COVID, highlighted the fact that lab accidents are frequent, and sought a better enforcement mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. Former ASD(NCB) Andy Weber focused on a “deterrence through denial” strategy for biological weapons that would render any bio threat ultimately unsuccessful through the availability of sufficient countermeasures. He stated that we have the technologies today to make this strategy a reality. Mr. Weber’s optimism was contrasted by the testimony from Dr. Kevin Esvelt who was highly critical of scientists who seek to learn and share which viruses could cause new pandemics as their research will eventually assist bioterrorists. Professor Esvelt called out Eco Health Alliance as a prime culprit in this area and blasted federal funding for making it all possible. Dr. Anesh Adalja encouraged the panel to support more focused research as opposed to the “overly broad surveillance and basic analysis” that is currently conducted to combat zoonotic events. He also expressed support for vaccines and felt that the medical community should be more proactive in pushing back on anti-vaccine elements. Finally, Dr. Jamie Yassif promoted a three-pronged approach to biosecurity, which included (1) stronger global norms, (2) development of a reliable system for attribution and accountability, and (3) an increased financial commitment from the U.S. and global partners to make these goals a reality.

**NOMINATIONS**

**Department of Defense:**

- **Confirmed (Date)**
  - John Sherman – DoD Chief Information Officer (14 Dec)
  - Nickolas Guertin – Dir. DoD Operational Test & Evaluation (14 Oct)

- **Intention to Nominate (Date Announced)**
  - Erik Raven – Under Secretary of the Navy (13 Dec)
  - Kristyn Jones – USAF Asst. Secretary-Financial Management & Comptroller (13 Dec)
  - Agnes Schaefer – Army Asst. Secretary-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (8 Dec)
  - William LaPlante – USD-A&S (Nov 30)

- **Reported to Full Senate (Date reported)**
  - ADM Christopher Grady – Vice Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff (14 Dec)
  - Ashish Vazirani – DUSD Personnel & Readiness (8 Dec)
  - Carrie Ricci – Army General Counsel (8 Dec)
  - Alexandra “Sasha” Baker – DUSD for Policy (28 Oct)
  - Douglas Bush – ASA Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (28 Oct)
  - John Coffey – USN General Counsel (28 Oct)
  - Gabe Camarillo – Under Secretary of the Army (21 Oct)
  - David Honey – DUSD for Research & Engineering (21 Oct)
  - Andrew Hunter – USAF Asst. Secretary-Acquisition, Technology, Logistics (21 Oct)
  - Rachel Jacobson – Asst. Army Secretary for Installations & Environment (21 Oct)
  - Alex Wagner – USAF Asst. Sec.-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (21 Oct)

- **Nomination Hearing Held (Date of Hearing)**
Brenda Fulton  ASD Manpower & Reserve Affairs (7 Oct)

- **Nominated (Date SASC received)**
  - Ravi Chaudhary – USAF Asst. Secretary-Installations, Energy & Environment (6 Dec)
  - Christopher Lowman – ASD Sustainment (15 Nov)
  - Peter Beshar – USAF General Counsel (21 Oct)
  - John Plumb – ASD-Space Policy (4 Aug)
  - Celeste Wallander – ASD International Security Affairs (23 Jun)

Other National Security Posts:
  - Kenneth Wainstein  DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis (17 Nov received by SSCI)
  - Adam Scheinman  Special Representative, Bureau of International Security & Nonproliferation (19 Oct reported to full Senate)
  - Mallory Stewart – Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (5 Oct hearing held)

**CRS REPORTS OF INTEREST**

- U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments & Issues (14 Dec 2021)
- North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs (13 Dec 2021)
- AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation (10 Dec 2021)
- Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer (8 Dec 2021)
Senior Leaders,

Good afternoon. Attached is this week's legislative update. It's a quiet week as Congress holds hearings, but no votes.

Very Respectfully,

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
HEADLINES

- **Congress:** This week, Congress is holding committee hearings, but no votes are scheduled. When Members formally return on 15 November, they will have three more weeks in session, but schedule changes are expected due to the long list of priorities requiring action before the year is out. Their to-do list includes: extending government funding, raising the debt ceiling, completion of the NDAA, and coming to an agreement on the President’s large social spending package.

- **Senate:** Early indications point to the Senate floor taking up the FY22 NDAA the week of 15 November. SASC is likely to hold a hearing on 2 December for ADM Christopher Grady to be the next Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- **House:** Last Friday, the House passed the long-awaited $1.2 trillion infrastructure package and sent the bill to the President for his signature.

- **Government Funding:** The current continuing resolution expires at midnight on 3 December, however, a shutdown is unlikely. Leadership of the respective Appropriations committees met on 2 November, but could not reach an agreement on top-line numbers for defense and non-defense spending. There is a potential that Congress could pass another short-term funding bill, but any votes are expected to be delayed until after Thanksgiving.

CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENTS

- **2 Nov: Call with SASC staff**
  - CT Director Dr. Robert Pope spoke with SASC staff member Dr. Jon Epstein concerning a block on Defense funding going to EcoHealth Alliance in the House version of the NDAA. Dr. Pope explained why CTR conducts these biosurveillance studies with our partners and the good partnership DTRA has had with EcoHealth.

- **6 Nov: CODEL to Jordan**
  - Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA) visited the DTRA-provided Jordan Border Security System as part of a CODEL visit to Jordan, Israel, and Albania. She was able to tour a section of the border via helicopter and met with some JAF officials. A summary of the visit is pending.

- **11-12 Nov: CODEL to Offutt AFB**
  - Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT), SAC-D Chair, is to visit USSTRATCOM to receive briefings on the operations and programs focused on strategic and integrated deterrence to include a Global Operations Tour to visualize how the NC3 process integrates with required mission partners.

NOMINATIONS

- **Department of Defense:**
  - **Confirmed**
    - Michael Connor  *Army Asst. Secretary-Civil Works* (Confirmed Nov 4)
- On the Executive Calendar (awaiting a vote)
  - Sasha Baker – DUSD for Policy (placed Oct 28)
  - John Coffey – USN General Counsel (placed Oct 28)
  - Nickolas Guertin – Dir. DoD Operational Test & Evaluation (placed Oct 28)
  - Gabe Camarillo – Under Secretary of the Army (placed Oct 21)
  - David Honey – DUSD for Research & Engineering (placed Oct 21)
  - Andrew Hunter – USAF Asst. Secretary-Acquisition, Technology, Logistics (placed Oct 21)
  - Rachel Jacobson – Asst. Army Secretary for Installations & Environment (placed Oct 21)
  - Alex Wagner – USAF Asst. Sec.-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (placed Oct 21)
- In Committee
  - ADM Christopher Grady – Vice Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff (referred to SASC Nov 1)
  - Ashish Vazirani – DUSD Personnel & Readiness (hearing held on Oct 28)
  - Carrie Ricci – Army General Counsel (hearing held on Oct 28)
  - John Sherman – DoD Chief Information Officer (hearing held on Oct 28)
  - Peter Beshar – USAF General Counsel (Referred to SASC Oct 21)
  - Ravi Chaudhary – USAF Asst. Secretary-Installations, Energy & Environment (Intent to nominate announced Oct 14)
  - Brenda Fulton – ASD Manpower & Reserve Affairs (Hearing Oct 7)
  - Melissa Dalton – ASD-Homeland Defense & Global Security (referred to SASC Aug 10)
  - John Plumb – ASD-Space Policy (referred to SASC Aug 4)
  - Celeste Wallander – ASD International Security Affairs (referred to SASC June 23)
- Other National Security Posts:
  - Corey Hinderstein – NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (placed on the Executive Calendar on Oct 21)
  - Adam Scheinman – Special Representative, Bureau of International Security & Nonproliferation (placed on the Executive Calendar on Oct 19)
  - Mallory Stewart – Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (Hearing held Oct 5)
Senior Leaders,

Good Afternoon. Please see attached this week’s legislative update.

Included in this issue are updates on House NDAA and appropriations activity.


V/r,

[Signature]

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- **Top Line:** Both House NDAA and Defense appropriations measures were reported to the floor this week. More detail on both bills can be found below, but the key takeaways are:
  - The appropriations bill includes prohibitions on funding any EcoHealth Alliance work in China and any activity associated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
  - HASC’s NDAA mark assigns DTRA as the Defense-wide funds manager for EOD.
- **Senate:** Yesterday, the Senate passed the most significant firearm-related legislation in nearly 30 years by a 65-33 vote. The chamber is now on recess for the next two weeks.
- **House:** Members acted quickly on the Senate’s firearm legislation and passed the measure today before heading out of town for a two week recess. On Wednesday, Members passed a bill that established the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Health (ARPA-H) within the Department of Health & Human Services to accelerate health and medical innovation.

On 22 June, members of HASC completed their markup of the FY23 NDAA. The floor is expected to take up the measure on 11 July. Some notable highlights include:

- DTRA is assigned to manage the Defense-wide program element funding for EOD.
- Places overall supervision of the EOD mission with ASD-SO/LIC.
- Increased the PB23 Defense request by $37 billion which includes a bump of $75 million for CBDP.
- Prohibits the reconverting or retiring of the W76-2 warhead.
- Increased the R&D budget by $45 million for Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs).
- Increased the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative by $550 million. This brings the total recommendation for the program up to $1 billion.
- Report and Briefing requests:
  - U.S. nuclear launch processes and procedures, including the checks and balances that exist to prevent the accidental or inappropriate use of nuclear weapons.
  - Current state of counter-UAS capability of allied forces and partners in the Middle East.
  - Georgia’s defense capabilities and their ability to meet defense requirements.
  - Theater and low-yield nuclear capabilities that are presently and expected to be operationally deployed by Russia and China.
  - The feasibility of releasing an annual interim National Defense Strategy.
The full House Appropriations Committee conducted a lively markup on 22 June of the FY23 Defense spending measure and sent it to the floor. Members approved the President's request of $761 billion in DoD funding, but that level was criticized by Republicans as too low to meet the current threat environment and keep up with inflation. Chairwoman DeLauro stated that the Pentagon was actually well-insulated from inflation due to the multiyear contracts inherently preferred by DoD.

The committee adopted several individual amendments, including repeals of the 2001 and 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and funding restrictions concerning EcoHealth Alliance and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Specifically, these latter two amendments would:

- Bar funding "any work to be performed by EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. in China on research supported by the government of China." Waiver options are available.

- Prohibit funding "used to support any activity conducted by, or associated with, the Wuhan Institute of Virology."

Floor consideration of the bill is expected in July. Prospects for a bicameral deal are unclear as Senate appropriators have not yet decided on topline numbers.

**FY23 Congressional Marks (in thousands)**

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### Notes

- **27 Jun-1 Jul**: CODEL to Germany, Poland, Romania
  - Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI) SASC Chair
  - European oversight

- **4-10 Jul**: CODEL to Serbia, Romania, Latvia, Finland, Lithuania
  - Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL), Sen.
Jerry Moran (R-KS), Sen. Brian Schatz (D-HI), Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-ME), Sen. Richard Burr (R-NC), Sen. Roy Blunt (R-MO), Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX)

- Conduct SAC-D oversight with emphasis on the EUCOM AOR, specifically focusing on non-NATO allies that are bordering Russia and the current state of the EU.

**Department of Defense:**

- **Confirmed**
  - NSTR

- **Reported to Full Senate (Date reported)**
  - Ravi Chaudhary  USAF Asst. Secretary-Installations, Energy & Environment (5 May)
  - Russell Rumbaugh  Navy Asst. Secretary-Financial Management (21 Mar)
  - Rheanne Wirkkala  ASD-Legislative Affairs (15 Mar)
  - Robert Storch  DoD Inspector General (28 Mar)
  - Lester Martinez-Lopez  ASD-Health Affairs (8 Mar)
  - Christopher Lowman  ASD Sustainment (8 Mar)
  - Franklin Parker  ASN Manpower & Reserve Affairs (8 Mar)
  - Agnes Schaefer, PhD  Army Asst. Secretary-Manpower & Reserve Affairs (8 Mar)
  - Ashish Vazirani  DUSD Personnel & Readiness (8 Dec)

- **Nomination Hearing (Date of Hearing)**
  - GEN Christopher Cavoli – EUCOM Commander (26 May)
  - Brenda Fulton – ASD Manpower & Reserve Affairs (7 Oct 21)

- **Nominated (Date SASC received)**
  - Dr. Radha Iyengar Plumb  DUSD(A&S) (15 Jun)
  - Terrence Edwards  Inspector General, National Reconnaissance Office (7 Jun)
  - LTG Bryan Fenton  SOCOM Commander (6 Jun)
  - Dr. Laura Taylor-Kale  ASD-Industrial Base Policy (26 May)
  - LTG Randy George  Army Vice Chief of Staff (4 Apr)
  - Brendan Owens  ASD-Energy, Installations & Environment (15 Mar)

- **Expected Nominations**
  - Milancy Harris – DUSD(Security & Intelligence)

**Other National Security Posts:**

- Kate Heinzelman  CIA General Counsel (10 May reported to floor)

- **U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine** (24 Jun 2022)
FYI for those that may not have gotten the email yesterday.

-----Original Message-----
From: RAND National Defense Research Institute <pubs+order@rand.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 15, 2022 1:01 PM
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) [b][e]
Subject: [EEMSG: Marketing][URL Verdict: Neutral][Non-DoD Source] New Research on Department of Defense Management of Infrastructure Supporting the Chemical and Biological Defense Program

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

----

We are pleased to announce the publication of a new RAND report, "A Strategic Assessment of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Infrastructure Management to Support the Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program," by Drake Warren, Joel B. Predd, Trupti Brahmbhatt, Matthew A. DeNardo, Emily Grayek, and Karlyn D. Stanley.

In this report, the authors present the results of an assessment of how the Department of Defense (DoD) governs and manages the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure that supports the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. Drawing from a mix of case studies, policy and budget analysis, and semi-structured interviews, they synthesize four foundational problems that DoD confronts and offers recommendations for steps that DoD can take to address the problems. They also frame a set of choices and trade-offs that DoD must confront in three infrastructure use cases. This report should be of interest to policymakers and analysts who are concerned with the mission of chemical and biological defense or with RDT&E infrastructure governance and management.

NOTE: This report is marked CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION; controlled by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment.

This document is available as a PDF from Inetlink at
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Sent: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 14:56:17 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA); Musgrave, David L (Dave) SES DTRA OB (USA);
Cc: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA);
Subject: Coronavirus Lab Escape Theory - DTRA mentioned.....

Team,
Below is a very interesting article making the case that the COVID pandemic was caused by an accidental lab release (VERY long read). Additionally, the article makes at least two comments identifying DTRA funding that supported research at the Wuhan BSL-4 lab related to bats and bat carried diseases.


I had my team go back through the records to see if it was RD-CB, but found no info related to that work. We did find references to CBEP work with EcoHealth Alliance on the DTRA server that might be what they are talking about:

https://dtra1portal.unet.dtra.mil/sites/Search_Center/Pages/results.aspx?k=EcoHealth%20Alliance&k=EcoHealth%20Alliance

I wanted to provide this to you in case there are follow-up questions at some point. I know back in Apr/May timeframe we had to identify any DTRA finding that might have gone to Wuhan, so this may not be news to anyone.

v/r,
Ron Hann
From:

Sent: Mon, 4 May 2020 15:10:14 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA);
Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Attachments: smime.p7s

Responded negative.

Just want to double check. The only grant out there is the one below, which CT (CBEP/BTRP) owns. There is no CB work, correct?

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 9:25 AM
To: 
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

FYI

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 9:19 AM
To: 
CC:
Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Looks like only 1 WP for TA7, but no proposal submitted for that one (yet).

All others from EcoHealth Alliance are for TA6 (CBEP).

To get to what you are looking for, we will have to go through each of the proposals.
-----Original Message-----
From: <name>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:31 PM
To: [Email]
Cc: [Email] [Email] [Email]

Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Team.

Sending this right out in case anyone is still at their laptop.

The task will be coming, but it is marked URGENT.

Thank you,
V/r,
Deputy Chief for the NCR

Enabling Capabilities Department

Research and Development Directorate

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRA RM 3312

8725 John J. Kingman Rd

Fort Belvoir VA 22060

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:27 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

[redacted]
Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS0105206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS0105206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

[Redacted]
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted] <mail>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09
To: [Redacted] <mail> ; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List Task CS < Mailto: dira.belvoir.dit.list.task.es@mil > ; [Redacted]
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD:Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r
Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>

Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

NIPR:

SIPR:

JWICS

GOVT CELL:

(b)(6)
Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Executive Secretary

OUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886
From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil> <mailto:donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil> 
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM

To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil> 
Cc: <ES-DSD> <dfseceforens@gmail.com> 
<mailto:dfseceforens@gmail.com> 
<osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil> 
<mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>

Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD [5] SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS01052016YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO LECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal

Category: General

Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Task Initiator: CMD

Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head

Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)


OPR Suspension: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR Instructions:

"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No

For Response: No

OCR: N/A

OCR Suspension: N/A

OCR Instructions:

N/A
Original Instructions:

"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/>
Rhys,

Good catch. This is a CTR-funded project. Talked to Kirk and we’ll work the details when we get the EIS tasker next week.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:28 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Cc: 

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS0105200206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

With the attachment this time.

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

- for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Cc: [REDACTED] (US)
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD: Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To: [Redacted]
OSD/DUSD A-S (USA) <john.a.oman.mil@mail.mil>; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.list.enterprise-solutions@mail.mil>
Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD:Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS0105202006YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours. CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Executive Secretary

OUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886

From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil <mailto:donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil>>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>>
Cc: <ES-DSD> <deptsedinfo@sd.mil <mailto:deptsedinfo@sd.mil>>; <ExecSec> <execsecCATMS@sd.mil>
Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR: USA [https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=269ceade-d88b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], LA
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=269ceade-d88b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], GC
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=269ceade-d88b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], ExecSec
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=269ceade-d88b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], PA
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=269ceade-d88b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], USP

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCR: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions: N/A

[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], GC
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], ExecSec
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], PA
[https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-c111-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord], USP

Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"
Just did a scan. This company has been invited for a full proposal on the FY21 FR-BAA/CALL.

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:35 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir RD List RD-CB CB Div Chiefs <dtra.belvoir.rd.list.rd-cb-cb-div-chiefs@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Very short turn Congressional inquiry task:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

Dr. Hann

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:28 PM
To:
Cc:

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

With the attachment this time..

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302
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From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:27 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Cc: (US)
Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Kirk,
We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

Steve - for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: (US)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Cc: (US)
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,
URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062
3015 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-3015
From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@email.mil>

To: OSD Pentagons OSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO

Cc: OSD Pentagon OSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions

Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD\Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS01052020YF4IP8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant).

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours.CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Executive Secretary

OSUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CML SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCRs: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions:
N/A

<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?ctn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ca11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, PA
Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CA1MS1/>
Team,

I got 'pinged' again by COL Hofmann if we had been funding ECOHEALTH for other work as well. They are anticipating possible future questions.

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 8:05 AM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir RD List RD-CB CB Div Chiefs;<dtra_ftbelvoir_rd_list_rd_cb_div Chiefs@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Looks like it was a CTR project. We should still go ahead and look for any other research that we might have done with Wuhan. It’s bound to get asked and I Bob has already found one project we have a phase II proposal on.

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:33 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Cc: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Rhys,

Good catch. This is a CTR-funded project. Talked to Kirk and we'll work the details when we get the EIS tasker next week.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction
With the attachment this time..

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Cc: [US]

Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

----- Original Message -----
From: [USA]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09
To: [USA]
Cc: [mail.mil]

Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD:Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,
Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)
Room 3E1062
3015 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

NIPR
SIPR
JWIC
GOV'T CELL

From
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To
OSD OUSD A-S (USA) <john.a.roman.mil@mail.mil>; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.list.enterprise-solutions@mail.mil>
Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD:Lee, Erika | SUST 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATM010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

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I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours.
From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil> <mailto:donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
<mailto:osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Cc: ES-DSD <deptseddefinec@od.mil> <mailto:deptseddefinec@od.mil> ; ExecSec <execsecCATMS@od.mil>
<mailto:execsecCATMS@od.mil> ; OSD Pentagon OASD LA Mailbox Coordinations <osd.pentagon.oasd-
la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> ; OSD Pentagon PA
Mailbox Admin <osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil>
OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USP <osd.pentagon.osud-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.osud-
policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil> ; OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff <osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-
staff@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-
staff@mail.mil>
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD/Lec, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy
of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

0950569c5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>
Looking into any other past awards.

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:35 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir RD List RD-CB CB Div Chiefs <dtra.belvoir.rd.list.rd-cb-cb-dv-chiefs@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Very short turn Congressional inquiry task:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

Dr. Hann

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:28 PM
To: R.A.
Cc: R.A.

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

With the attachment this time...

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302
-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:27 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Cc: (US)
Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

Steve - for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Cc: (US)
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

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We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

----- Original Message -----
From: [REDacted]
Sent: Friday, May 15, 2020 16:09
To: DUSD A&S (USA) <john.e.mason.cpl@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List Task CS <dira.belvoir.dir.list.task.cs@mail.mil>
Cc: [REDacted]

Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD, Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS0105200206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015
Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours. CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Executive Secretary

OUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
<mailto:osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>;
Cc: <ES-DSD> <depscede@sd.mil> <mailto:depscede@sd.mil>;; <ExecSec> <execsec@catms@sd.mil>
<mailto:execsec@catms@sd.mil>>; OSD Pentagon OUSD LA Mailbox Coordinations <osd.pentagon.osd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil>
<mailto:osd.pentagon.osd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil>;; OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Admin <osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil>
<mailto:osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil>;; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USP <osd.pentagon.osd-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil>
<mailto:osd.pentagon.osd-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil>;; OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff
<mailto:osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil>;
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD:Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCRs: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions:
N/A

<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?ctn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, ExecSec
<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?ctn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, PA
Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CA1MS1/>
No sir. Not CBS

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:35 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir RD List RD-CB CB Div Chiefs <dtra.belvoir.rd.list.rd-ch-cb-div-chiefs@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Very short turn Congressional inquiry task:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

Dr. Hann

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From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:28 PM
To: R A

CC: Popc, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

With the attachment this time..

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:27 PM
To: R A

We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

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Thank you,

Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

[Redacted]
-----Original Message-----

From: (redacted)

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:49

To: (redacted)

Cc: (redacted)

Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD: Lee, Enka | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team.

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

NPR

SIPR

JWIC

GOV'T CELL: (redacted)
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Executive Secretary
OUUSD Acquisition & Sustainment
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Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCR: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions: N/A

<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etr=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, ExecSec
<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etr=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, PA

Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/>
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:28:04 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT
CC: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Attachments: OSD004467-20-Congressional incoming.pdf, smime.p7s

With the attachment this time..

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

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From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:27 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
CC: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA)

Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

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From:
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
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Defense Threat Reduction Agency

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD:Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)
Room 3E1062
3015 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

From:
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To: OSD OUSD A-S (USA) <john.a.oman.mail@mail.mil>; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.list.enterprise-solutions@mail.mil>
Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.osd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
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<mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Cc: <ES-DSD> <depscedefina@osd.mil> <mailto:depscedefina@osd.mil> >; <ExecSec> <execsecCATMS@osd.mil>
<mailto:execsecCATMS@osd.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OASD LA Mailbox Coordinations <osd.pentagon.oasd-
lx.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.oasd-lx.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Admin <osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USPS <osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.mbx.usps@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.mbx.usps@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff
<osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil> <mailto:osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-
staff@mail.mil> >
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMF<NI> SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

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Action: None

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Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

0f30f69c5e6f&pagetype=entityrecord>
OPR Suspension: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCRs: N/A
OCR Suspension: N/A
OCR Instructions:
N/A

<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?cm=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ca11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, GC
<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?cm=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ca11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, ExecSec
<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?cm=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ca11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, PA
<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?cm=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ca11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>, USP
<https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?cm=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ca11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>

Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/>
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
331 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-3604
(202) 225-5631

April 30, 2020

The Honorable Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Esper:

Thank you for your strong leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic and for your efforts to repatriate Americans abroad, counter adversaries like Venezuela and Iran, and keep our servicemembers safe during this unprecedented crisis. I write to bring your attention to a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc., an organization that has a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which reports suggest may be linked to the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak.

In 2017, DOD awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth Alliance under Assistance Listing 12.351 — Scientific Research — Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The description of this grant is listed as “understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.” On March 23, 2020, EcoHealth Alliance received their final payment in the amount of $1,509,531 for the continuation of their research, which is projected to be completed in October 2022.

As you are likely aware, on April 24, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) cut all grant funding for EcoHealth Alliance after reports circulated that the organization sent US taxpayer dollars to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. It is my understanding that the NIH grant was for research on coronaviruses spread from bats to humans. Given the similarities between EcoHealth Alliance’s NIH research and the description of the 2017 DOD grant, I respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?
2. If no, what, if any, steps is DOD taking to determine whether department grant funding was utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?
3. If yes, what is the DOD doing to ensure American dollars can no longer be utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?
Given the Chinese Communist Party's cover-up of the global threat posed by COVID-19, it is critical we ensure taxpayer dollars are not being used to support their activities. I appreciate your commitment to our national security, our servicemembers, and their families.

Thank you for your consideration of my request.

Very Respectfully,

[Signature]

Guy Reschenthaler
Member of Congress
We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

Steve - for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

Deputy Chief of Staff
---Original Message---

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09

To: [Redacted]

Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMI [Redacted]
SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

[Redacted]

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

[Redacted]
Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours. CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR: USA
For Release: No
For Response: No
OCR: N/A
OCR Instructions:

Info Copies: ES-DSD
LA
GC
PA
USP
Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CA1M51/>
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 19:21:50 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: [Redacted]
DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: CONGRESSIONAL Concerns over nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance Inc Relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology - CATMS16032021A3KGDOQ

Dr. Hann

CB reviewed the request and provided the below information back, if you have no other concerns I can close this for RD.

RDCB has one completed project funded at $565K in FY17, the Global Rapid Identification Tool System (GRITS); and one project pending, with planned funding at $253K in FY21.

RDCB has done a thorough look at past project activities and to the best of our knowledge funding was not associated with work done at Wuhan Institute of Virology.

TASK Action:

Action: Request you review and provide answers to the best of DTRAs ability to the congressional in regards to the DoD funding awarded to EcoHealth Alliance Inc

V/r

SAIC
RD Front Office
Technical Analyst
The Honorable Lloyd Austin  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Austin:

We write regarding federal funding awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc. (EcoHealth), a New York-based non-profit organization with a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).

As New York Magazine recently reported, EcoHealth funneled federal grant funding awarded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to researchers at the WIV.¹ This is deeply concerning given the WIV is a possible origin site of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lab has significant ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military biological research.

It is also troubling that, according to government records, published research papers, and significant reporting, this is not the first time EcoHealth transferred taxpayer funding to a CCP lab. EcoHealth has partnered with the WIV since 2004, as discovered by the Wall Street Journal.² Additionally, between 2015 and 2019, the WIV received approximately $598,500 from EcoHealth for a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases-funded study on the risk of bat coronavirus emergence. Further, a 2015 WIV research project, which utilized Gain of Function (GOF) research on bats in China, was partially funded by EcoHealth through a grant awarded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.³

Government spending data shows that from 2013 to the present, the DOD has awarded approximately $35 million in funding to EcoHealth in the form of contracts and grants.⁴ Significantly, in 2017, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth to study the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.

As you know, the CCP runs the WIV. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the CCP replaced the former WIV head with China’s top biowarfare expert, Major General Chen Wei. The WIV facility houses a Biosafety Level IV laboratory, which is the only maximum-security biosafety containment lab in China, and has a history of safety concerns even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.⁵ For example, in 2018, two Department of State cables raised concerns regarding safety at the WIV, highlighting “a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators

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¹ https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/coronavirus-lab-escape-theory.html  
² https://www.wsj.com/articles/nihs-presses-us-nonprofit-for-information-on-wuhan-virology-lab-11597829400  
³ https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985  
⁴ https://www.usaspending.gov/search?hash=c86d1a3dc7d3b3ed538f6489363297d0  
needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory." In recent weeks, the Department of State confirmed that several researchers at the WIV became sick with COVID-19-like symptoms in the fall of 2019, and since 2017, the WIV has engaged in classified research with the Chinese military.  

Given the similarities between previously federally funded research at the WIV and the DOD grant funding awarded to EcoHealth, we respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. How much funding awarded to EcoHealth through DOD has been given to or used in collaboration with the WIV?
2. Was EcoHealth authorized by DOD to transfer taxpayer funding to the WIV? If so, how much funding was provided the Chinese WIV, and for what purposes?
3. Was the grant funding awarded to EcoHealth for GOI research?
4. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, has DOD reconsidered, paused, or cancelled work with EcoHealth or the WIV?
5. Has any other DOD grant, contract, or subcontract been used to fund work at the WIV?

Thank you for your consideration of our request. We look forward to hearing from you.

Very respectfully,

Guy Reschenthaler  
Member of Congress

Matt Gaetz  
Member of Congress

Jeff Van Drew  
Member of Congress

Michael Cloud  
Member of Congress

Tom Tiffany  
Member of Congress

Louie Gohmert  
Member of Congress

Dr. James R. Baird  
Member of Congress

W. Gregory Steube  
Member of Congress

Bill Posey  
Member of Congress

Brian Babin  
Member of Congress

Scott Perry  
Member of Congress

Fred Keller  
Member of Congress

\[^6\] Ib\textit{id}.

The Honorable Guy R. Reschenthaler  
531 Cannon House Office Building  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Reschenthaler:

Thank you for your letter dated April 30, 2020, regarding the 2017 Department of Defense (DoD) grant to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. under Assistance Listing 12.351 - Scientific Research - Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. I am responding on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

The grant was made by DoD’s Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

For grants awarded in support of the BTRP, the program engages with applicants early in the project development process to ensure there is a clear understanding of the limitations regarding use of funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) directorate, including the prohibition of CTR funds being used to support any activities in the PRC. We also carefully review grant proposals to ensure that no prohibited activities – technical or financial – are included as part of any funded projects. Finally, we provide routine project execution oversight above and beyond what is required for research grant awards.

Thank you for your service to this Nation and for your unwavering support of our Service members across the globe. Please contact Andrew Tabler in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs at 703-571-2391 for any further questions on this matter.

Sincerely,

Ellen M. Lord  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
Thank you for submitting topics for a proposed FY23 FR-BAA/CALL. Based on our analysis of continuing projects, the projected budget reserve allocated for new starts in FY23 is about $1M. Therefore, you will need to carve out additional funding in FY22 to support your topics for FY23 (new starts can be funded early using FY22 funds). Funding FY23 topics can be accomplished in one or more of three ways:

1) not exercising options for continuing projects
2) transitioning ongoing projects to your applied program (6.2)
3) reducing FY22 funding of poorly executing projects

Please look over your basic research portfolio and provide Sam and I with a plan on how you intend to support FY23 topics proposed. Outline which projects will be affected. To aide you, I have attached two XL files outlining the FY22 budget allocation and under-executing FY21 projects. Please submit your plan by OCTOBER 14.

You also may want to consider funding new starts at a reduced amount in the first year and then increase funding in FY24. Remember, the projected budget reserve for FY24 is $11-12M because of natural attrition of continuing programs/projects, thus creating a bow wave of excess funding available. Given that our overall allocation for FY24 new starts would be $5-6M, it follows that $5-6M would be available for continuation funding of FY23 projects.

Now that you are armed with the facts, let's have a successful FY23 FR-BAA/CALL.

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Withheld pursuant to exemption (R)(5) of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
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Withheld pursuant to exemption
(R)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(R)(S)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Dr [redacted]

Please see attached budget analysis for the meeting today at 4pm.

Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Good morning

Please see the attached consolidated response to use as your RAH for today's 15:00-16:00 BioDefense Deep Dive JSTO Coordination meetings. We will align the agenda per the tabs in this file (see below).

Agenda:
1) CBS
2) CBA
3) CBI
4) CBT
5) CBM
6) Administrative to include identification of the 2 JSTO principals

Respectfully,

DTRA RD CBW
Operations Research Systems Analyst
Ph
NIP

----- Original Appointment -----
I need to schedule a Biodefense Deep Dive Tasker Review and Sync meeting for 6 January with Dr. Hann, the Division Chiefs (CBS, CBA, CBI, CBT, CBM, and CBW - COL Quinn) myself, and Tom Yuzuik. Looking at schedules, after 15:00 looks like an available time for all participants currently and should give the divisions some time to review the RAH materials. Tom and I plan to have RAH materials and agenda to the participants by COB 5 January (tasker is due 1300 on 5 January). One hour for this sync meeting should suffice.

Purpose: To synchronize divisional input to the Biodefense Deep Dive matrix to ensure JSTO is speaking with 'one voice' at the 14 January 2021, Biodefense Deep Dive meeting before submitting its response to ODASD(NCB/CB) on 7 January 2021.

Let me know if you have any issues or questions.

V/R

DTRA RD CBW
Operations Research Systems Analyst
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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
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Withheld pursuant to exemption (R)(S) of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Page 210 of 266

Withheld pursuant to exemption

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Brief attached which I will use to update Dr. Hann at 1.

R,

-----Original Appointment-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2020 10:12 AM
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: DURC Update w/

When: Tuesday, November 17, 2020 1:00 PM-1:30 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: Telecom/Skype: 703-767-5977, Conf ID: 854894

Dial In: 703-767-5977
Conf ID

Updated: 13Nov20/SMN
March 2012: USG Funding Agency Policy on Oversight of DURCEstablishes regular review of USG-funded life sciences researchAll life sciences research is to be reviewed for DURC biannually to ensure risks are identified and appropriate mitigation plans are in placeFunding agency oversight of DURC to ensure processes in place to identify and mitigate risks May 2012: DOD DURC Implementation Guide Defines 5 Step process March 2014: JSTO DURC Implementation Guide Follows DOD 5 Step process and is compliant with all other USG DURC policies Defines JDCO function internal to JSTO Sept 2015: USG Policy on Institutional Oversight for DURC Defines internal controls, Institutional Review Entity (IRE) process, and reporting Reiterates that both this Institutional Policy and the 2012 Funding Agency Policy remain in effect and are complementary 7.3: “The oversight process and the roles and responsibilities of the USG departments and agencies that fund life sciences research are delineated in the complementary March 2012 DURC Policy. In conjunction with the requirements delineated in the March 2012 DURC Policy, USG funding agencies are to… Require all institutions they fund that meet the applicability criteria in Section 6.1 to implement this Policy.”
JSTO DURC Compliance Officer (JDCO) functions:

Oversee biannual assessments and reporting processes within JSTO. Provide JSTO STMs and Division Chiefs timelines and taskings. Provide independent assessments of reporting and portfolio risks, in accordance with policies and instructions. Compile and staff official responses for JSTO/D signature. Maintain records of DURC assessments, reports, and mitigation plans. Act as liaison between JSTO, DoD, and the interagency, to develop and share best practices for whole-of-government DURC compliance. Maintain a current and compliant JSTO DURC Implementation Guide and other related materials. In collaboration with STMs and Division Chiefs, convene a DURC Panel in order to 1) Review project proposals designated at DURC, 2) Assign a DURC Category (see JSTO DURC flowchart), 3) Review biannual DURC assessments as needed, and 4) Review proposed performer publications from DURC projects intended for unclassified release, and maintain a database of these publications.
• Provide the JSTO DIR with the results of the Nov 2020 DURC data call
Make recommendation to approve findings and sign the memo for their release
Reported projects work with one or more of 15 high-consequence agents and toxins listed in section III.1 of the DURC policy.

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<td>Building Laboratory Diagnostic Capacity for Zoonotic Disease Risk Mitigation in Underserved Regions of Arid and Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya</td>
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• 3 DURC Reportable projects for the NOV 2020 cycle5 MERS-CoV projects and no H7N9 (CTR portfolio) identified for the Nov 2020 cycleRecommendation to JSTO DIR: - Approve findings and sign release memo
Dr. H,

Attached are the materials for the upcoming Principal’s Mtg on “FY22 and Beyond”. Things to note as you are going thru the data:

Please take a look and provide comments – I know you’re busy but I would like to send out by Wednesday so they can confer with their respective STMs before the meeting.

Bob

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
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**CBT**

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<td>Predicting Antiviral Resistance Using a Machine Learning Model for Antibody Titers</td>
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<td>CB1864</td>
<td>University of California, Irvine</td>
<td>Nanoparticles for the Detection of Pathogens</td>
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<tr>
<td>CB1865</td>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>Understanding the Requirements for Enhanced Immunity Using mRNA-Based Vaccines for Pathogens</td>
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<tr>
<td>CB1965</td>
<td>University of California, Irvine</td>
<td>Separation of Viral and Host Polyadenylated Nucleic Acids Using Liposomes and Polymers with Programmable Release Properties</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119647</td>
<td>Los Alamos National Lab</td>
<td>Antigen Delivery and Design Capabilities for Broadly Protective Single-Dose Vaccines</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119704</td>
<td>SVS UNIV</td>
<td>Genome-wide mapping of host peptidoglycan-antibiotic interactions for discovery of broad-spectrum antibiotics</td>
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<td>C119688</td>
<td>CMAURIT</td>
<td>Inhibitor-based antibacterial peptides as therapeutic strategies for drug-resistant infections</td>
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<td>C119757</td>
<td>George Mason University</td>
<td>GPR55 regulation of neuronal survival and inflammation following SIV infection</td>
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<td>C119599</td>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>A high-throughput platform for discovery and early preclinical development of SIV-including animal models to conduct</td>
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<td>C119688</td>
<td>Temple University</td>
<td>Understanding capsids with human immunodeficiency virus-like particles and novel cyclophilin-based inhibitors for infectious disease</td>
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<td>C119697</td>
<td>Wake Forest University</td>
<td>Determining the Fundamental Differences Among These Organisms From Different Species For Mapping The Effects Of Pharmaceuticals</td>
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<td>C119730</td>
<td>LANL</td>
<td>Comparative Analysis of the Bioenergetic and Pathway Expressions to the Broad-Spectrum Human Pharmacopeia, and the Evolutionary Processes of Antibiotic Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119746</td>
<td>University of Pittsburgh</td>
<td>Evaluate the effectiveness of small-molecule inhibitors of various targets for the treatment of SIV infection</td>
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<td>C119774</td>
<td>Merck Pharmaceuticals, Inc.</td>
<td>Optimization of Antibody-Mediated Mutations in Pursuit of a Prevention and Treatment Prophylactic Medical Countermeasure</td>
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<td>C120685</td>
<td>UCSF</td>
<td>High-resolution characterization of human immunodeficiency virus recognition epitopes</td>
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<td>C119854</td>
<td>Cornell University</td>
<td>A novel platform for multi-scale camouflage of therapeutic proteins</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119530</td>
<td>West Virginia University Research Corp</td>
<td>Identification of protective antigenic epitopes using machine learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119530</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge)</td>
<td>Robust AI-driven countermeasures: screening, targeting, and combining</td>
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<td>C119530</td>
<td>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory</td>
<td>Applying the AIOM drug discovery platform to small molecule 1556</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119530</td>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Discovering novel antibacterial agents to counter biological threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119530</td>
<td>Iowa State University of Science and Technology</td>
<td>Artificial intelligence (AI)-based predictive modeling of the host immune system to improve vaccine effectiveness</td>
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**CBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C119642</td>
<td>US Army Medical Research and Development Laboratory</td>
<td>Understanding and Testing Novel Nicotinamide-Imidazole, Thromboxane D-Polyesters</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119571</td>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td>Synthesis of a functionalized protein using genetic engineering and proteomics</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119652</td>
<td>Northern Arizona University</td>
<td>Characterization of the viable but non-culturable state of Francisella tularensis</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119653</td>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>Exogenous regulation of acute lung injury</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119654</td>
<td>University of Texas, Austin</td>
<td>Immunization with translation state analogues to detoxify chemical warfare agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119654</td>
<td>CTD Research Corp</td>
<td>An integrated targeted silencing, screening, and quantification method for identifying and translating DNA receptors in animal models</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119654</td>
<td>Pacific Northwest National Laboratory</td>
<td>Identifying and translating DNA receptors in animal models and humans using activity-based protein profiling</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119681</td>
<td>West Virginia University</td>
<td>Spatiotemporal inflammation associated with agent exposure</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119882</td>
<td>Research and Technology Institute</td>
<td>Evaluation of immunization associated with chemical warfare agent exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C119655</td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>Human virome model for understanding of host-protective and pathogenic response to anthrax and Clostridium botulinum</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119655</td>
<td>Los Alamos National Security, LLC</td>
<td>Human virome model for understanding of host protective and pathogenic response to anthrax</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119655</td>
<td>University of Washington</td>
<td>Revealing the role of the virome in the development of immune responses to small molecules</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119655</td>
<td>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory</td>
<td>Small molecule therapeutic agent discovery and optimization through genome-to-molecule design</td>
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**CBR**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>C119701</td>
<td>CBR CBR</td>
<td>Comprehensive metabolic profiling of organophosphonates and chemical warfare agents for OP and PC agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119702</td>
<td>Collaborations Pharmacopeia/Ohio State/Ohio</td>
<td>Using machine learning and imaging methods to assess human metabolism of organophosphonates and chemical warfare agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>C119715</td>
<td>National Academy of Sciences</td>
<td>MRC Post Docs</td>
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<td>C119850</td>
<td>NSEIR, West Point</td>
<td>Summer Intern, US Military Academy</td>
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<td>C119860</td>
<td>USMA, USMA, USAF</td>
<td>Service Academy Research Initiative (SAR)</td>
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**CBI**

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<tr>
<td>C119860</td>
<td>CCDC</td>
<td>Deep learning for the prediction of experimental spectra</td>
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<td>C119870</td>
<td>Naval Research Laboratory</td>
<td>Protein structural model for antibody-based drug design</td>
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<td>C119870</td>
<td>The University of Texas - Austin</td>
<td>A structure-based machine learning framework to engineer antibody stability, affinity, and specificity</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Philips Systems</td>
<td>Monitoring, Exposure through Spectral Imaging (MSI)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Sandia National Laboratories</td>
<td>Physiological signature identification and analysis in support of remote detection of chemical and biological exposures</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Regents of the University of Michigan</td>
<td>A Physical-Constraint Hybrid Learning Architecture for Contaminant Dispersion Modeling through Multisource Data</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pacific Northwest National Laboratory</td>
<td>Machine Learning Forecasting of Infectious Biological Agents Following Similar Disease Pathways</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>CoHealth Alliance</td>
<td>Predicting Biobehavioral Impacts from Early Stage Data via Transfer Learning</td>
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<th>Summary</th>
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<td>Continuing Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Start</td>
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DTRA RD-BRO
(Basic Research)

FY22-24 Budget Review

Robert Botto, Ph.D. Chief, Basic Research Office
(BRO) 09/23/2020
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

defined in the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
I had a nice conversation with David Church this AM about EcoHA. He agreed that we can go forward with award if we add a stipulation in the contract that they “cannot work with China”, and provide a close monitoring of the project. He will also have FBI brief CB about issues involving China, and intends to have the FBI brief EcoHA about issues the DoD has with performers working with China. So, the bottom line is that we can move forward with the award.

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Dr. H,

Please see attached SSM for your signature and return.

Have a great day,

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Withheld pursuant to exemption (P)(S) of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Dr. H,
Sorry that I missed the tag up this AM. When I looked up from working on this compilation, it was 8:26. Tried to dial in but the meeting had ended.

Jana, would you please get back to me with possible dates/times to set up a meeting.

Thank you,

Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(4)  (b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(4); (b)(5)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(2)(4) (2)(5)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Hi [Name],

Dr. Han's brief attached here. I have analyzed data for DURC projects and will report six projects from past cycle, nothing new reported in this cycle. This is basically DURC projects call but every cycle there is side bar question on projects researching H7N9 and MERS-CoV projects where RD-CB does not report any project but CT-BT reports three projects involving MERS-CoV projects. Two excels attached one with consolidated DURC projects and other with MERS-CoV projects. Both Excels have their own identity that's why they need to be reported separately. Once I brief him tomorrow, then he needs to sign the memo which Cassie has for official package with DTRA form 1A. I will send an informal message with data including two Excel sheets to OSD. This is just like previous cycles and then stand to answer any technical questions they might have in next three weeks.

Copying here both Dr. Han and [Name] to be well communicated since it is a bit technical.

Thanks for your help and support,

R.

--------
Senior SME, Research Compliance and Tech Watch Seminar Program Manager
Research Operations (RD-CBC) Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir

We are stronger when we listen, and smarter when we share.” Rania Al-Abdullah

*****************************
Detect→Deter→Defend
*****************************

-----Original Message-----
From:
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 7:45 AM
To: [Name]
Subject: RE: DURC Package for May 2020
Thank you.

V/r

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 7:44 AM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: DURC Package for May 2020

Good Morning Short slide deck I will forward by 1 today, putting final touches....

R,

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 3:57 PM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: DURC Package for May 2020

Will there be any read-aheads or slides available for the meeting with Dr. Hann for Friday? Please let me know if we have to shift the meeting to right so that I can update the calendar. Thank you.

v/r

Executive Assistant to CB Director  
Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
8725 John J. Kingman Road  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 10:25 AM
To: 
DIT
Cc: 

Subject: RE: DURC Package for May 2020

Deadline is always flexible, I always brief Dr. Hamm and informally send the data excel then the formal data package goes out to OSD to close formal requirement which is June 5, 2020.

R,

-----Original Message-----
From: [Remove]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 10:51 AM
To: [Remove]
Cc: [Remove]
Subject: RE: DURC Package for May 2020

Two days is really insufficient to get something through RD. You need to strive for two weeks if possible. Is there an upcoming deadline beyond your mtg with Dr. Hamm?

V/r,

-----Original Message-----
From: [Remove]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 9:55 AM
To: [Remove]
Cc: [Remove]
Subject: DURC Package for May 2020
Importance: High

Good Morning, Hope this email finds you in good health. So I analyzed DURC data for this cycle and reported in DTRA form 1, IA attached here. Dr. Hamm’s memo attached here too. I followed strict format provided by RD in last cycle and since this data collection and reporting happens to OSD every six months, I am hoping NOT many changes by RD. I am aligned to brief Dr. Hamm on Friday around noon. Please coordinate with RD as you did in last cycle and return these to me by May 14 by 10am.

Many thanks for your help and support,

R.

-----------------------------
Senior SME, Research Compliance and
Tech Watch Seminar Program Manager
Research Operations (RD-CBC) Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir

“We are stronger when we listen, and smarter when we share.”  Rania Al-Abdullah

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Detect—Deter—Defeat

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<tr>
<th>CTBT</th>
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<th>Sponsor</th>
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<th>End Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding the Risk of Bat-Borne Zoonotic Disease Emergence in Western Asia</td>
<td>RIBSP</td>
<td>10/1/22</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>Understanding the Risk of Bat-Borne Zoonotic Disease Emergence in Western Asia</td>
<td>EHA</td>
<td>5/31/2022</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>Building Laboratory Diagnostic Capacity for Zoonotic Disease Risk Mitigation in Underserved Regions of Arid and Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya</td>
<td>Colorado State University</td>
<td>7/31/2024</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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Approved and signed.
Dr. H-

-----Original Message-----
From:
Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 1:46 PM
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: FY21 BR Source Selection Memo

Dr. H,

Please see attached SSM for your signature and return.

Have a great day,

Chief, Basic Research

Chemical & Biological Technologies Department

Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Page 254 of 286

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5) 10 USC 3309

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Hah! That took a while to get done. Approved as requested. Have a nice day!

Dr. Hann

Good afternoon Dr. Hann,

[Redacted] asked me to send these directly to you, as they relate to your position as approving authority rather than RD Director.

Package Title: Form1A_ROB_Quarterly_Minutes_Sep

Package requires your initials on the attached ROB Meeting Minutes.

Please note: This was previously routed through RD (see attached Form1A) and up to DTRA FO to be signed by the DTRA DDIR. It was sent back to us, as you have been delegated as the approving authority.

Thank you!

v/r,

A&S Contractor Support to RD-CBC
Office of the Research Operations Division
Chemical/Biological Technologies Department/Research & Development Directorate
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)

FROM: [Redacted] Executive Secretary (ES), Research Oversight Board (ROB)

SUBJECT: Research Oversight Board Meeting Minutes

1. A Research Oversight Board (ROB) meeting held on September 14, 2021, by Microsoft Teams from 10:00 – 11:00 a.m.

2. Attendees:

   DTRA NE
   DTRA CT-BT
   DTRA RD-CBW
   DTRA SI
   DTRA DIR-ES [Alternate Member]
   DTRA IG [Advisory/Non-Voting]
   DTRA RD-CBC [ROB Executive Secretary]
   DTRA GC
   DTRA CXR
   DTRA RD-CBC [ROB A&AS Support]
   DTRA RD-CBC [ROB Program Manager]

   Absent:

   DTRA RD-CBI
   DTRA IG [Advisory/Non-Voting]
   DTRA EC
   DTRA RD-CBS [Excused Absence]
   DTRA IG
   DTRA CT-BT
   DTRA OPI
   DTRA HR
   DTRA RD-CBM
   DTRA AL-AC

3. Agenda:

   I. Old Business/Action Items
      a) Update on Training.
      b) Report of Research Studies Approved between Meetings.
      c) Approved Research Studies Summaries.
      d) Open items from June 8, 2021 Meeting.
- U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command, Office of Research Protections (USAMRDC ORP) Meetings.
- DTRA Instruction 3216.01 – released.
- Electronic Grants System (EGS) update.

II. New Business
   a) New ORP Proposal Submission Form Process.
   b) Colonel Greenhaw Brief.

III. Next ROB Meeting

I. Old Business/Action Items:
   a) Update on Training. Since the June 8, 2021 meeting, two DTRA members have completed the initial Basic Course training, zero DTRA members have completed refresher training. In all, 159 DTRA employees have completed the DTRA Human Research Protection Program and Animal Use Oversight Program (HRPP/AUOP) online training program. DTRA Instruction (DTRA1) 3216.01, establishes policy of Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA’s) Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) and Animal Use Oversight Program (AUOP) to be in compliance with the DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3216.01, DoDI 3216.02, and Federal regulations governing research involving human subjects, human anatomical substances, and animal use. ROB Members were asked to continue to notify new DTRA personnel of this training requirement. (Standing item.)

   b) Report of Human and Animal Studies Approved Between Meetings. The ROB Executive Secretary approved 16 research studies since June 1, 2021. At present, 127 studies are pending approval. The breakout is as follows: 25 animal-use studies pending approval by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command, Office of Research Protections (USAMRDC ORP) Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) and ROB, and 23 human-use studies are pending USAMRDC ORP Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) and ROB approval. While DTRA awaits approval confirmations from ACURO and HRPO, studies have a pending status. The total number of Active studies is currently 263. (Standing item).

   c) Approved Research Studies Summaries

   - CT00008: Objectives of this research project are to strengthen Cameroon’s brucellosis diagnostic capacity to more effectively detect and prevent the disease in both humans and animals. This effort also will determine the prevalence and specific strains of Bruce/la in-country (enabling the Cameroonian Government and Laboratoire National Veterinaire du Cameroun (LANA VET) with the needed research data to develop a vaccination campaign to manage disease spread), and reduce the availability and, thus, the likelihood of the use of Bruce/la in nefarious acts of terrorism. The prevalence of brucellosis in cattle, pigs, and small ruminants (sheep and goats) in three regions of Cameroon will be evaluated using serological and molecular based approaches, including the validation and use of a Point-of-Care Portable PCR diagnostic tool (POC) to enhance diagnostic capacity with the ultimate goal of reducing bio threat and providing the Cameroonian Government with the needed data and tools to better prevent, detect, and respond to brucellosis in the country. Research includes individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition,
motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. This project involves collecting animal tissue from a slaughterhouse and is not considered research involving animals. The Texas Agricultural and Mechanical University (TAMU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the subject protocol on February 1, 2021. The TAMU IRB determined that continuing review is not required under the 2018 Common Rule. The LANAVET sites have permission from the Cameroonian Regional Delegates for the research to be conducted as reviewed and approved by the TAMU IRB. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Office of Research Protections (ORP), Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) reviewed the protocol and found that it complies with applicable DoD, U.S. Army, and USAMRDC human subjects protection requirements. The USAMRDC Human Research Protections Office (HRPO) approved this effort on June 9, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on June 9, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB 2019-35: The overall goal of this project is to develop and evaluate efficacy of a customizable ultra-lightweight, comfortable in-Ear Wearable Device (EWD) and algorithms that can help detect onset of Autonomic-Bio-Chemical (ABC) responses to warfighter’s health state and provide remote warfighter readiness assessment capabilities. The goals for this project is to establish overall system requirements and quantitative performance metrics for the EWD. Develop and customize hardware including data processor and external electronics to integrate data from multiple sensors. Customize algorithms and software for physiological data collection and analysis. Conduct laboratory and maritime testing of the EWD at The Polytechnic School, Arizona State University (TPS-ASU) and Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWC-DD) under realistic conditions to validate performance. Evaluate EWD Hardware and Software using Algorithm developed at NSWC-DD (ongoing effort). Cross evaluate EWD performance using sweat patch or saliva biomarkers of physiological distress. The Naval Health Research Center Institutional Review Board approved the protocol on February 4, 2021. In accordance with DoDI 3216.02, section 3.6, approval from a DoD Human Research Protection Official is not required when the research, including oversight of any non-DoD partners, is approved by a DoD IRB. The project may proceed with no further review by the USAMRDC HRPO. The USAMRDC HRPO approved this effort on June 14, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 18, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB11031: They will employ a hyperspectral remote sensing approach (>100 spectral bands) to measuring physiological data (blood pressure, oxygen saturation, and temperature) at stand-off distances ranging from 10m - 200m. The data set will be validated against wearable technology. This data will permit robust computational models to be created that predict vital signs based on spectroscopic response, and understand the obstacles blocking the full potential of remote physiological measurements. In the initial year, the primary aim is to generate a comprehensive data set from a combination of remote sensing technologies at short-range distances under controlled conditions in the laboratory that span the variation expected in field deployment. The subject protocol approved by the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Institutional Review Board (IRB) on May 18, 2021. The SNL IRB subsequently approved the revision to the informed consent document on June 14, 2021. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Office of Research Protections (ORP), Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) reviewed the protocol and found that it complies with applicable DoD, U.S. Army, and USAMRDC human subjects protection requirements. The
USAMRDC HRPO approved this effort on June 29, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 18, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB10945: The Research and Development Directorate (RD) Detection and Diagnostics Division (RD-CBA), a component of DTRA, and the Joint Science and Technology Office (JSTO), requires of a Point-of-Need diagnostic device that can shift disease detection "to the left," to before symptoms with the goal of identifying contagious individuals in order to prevent subsequent transmissions. In response, Darwin Biosciences has developed a hand-held, self-administered test that reads human saliva. This diagnostic, SickStick, can be thought of as a "molecular thermometer" that reads the status of the human immune system rather than temperature. It reads molecules produced by the earliest and most general arm of the human immune response to infection, innate immunity, which is activated across a broad range of infections. Darwin Biosciences will provide a complete solution to DTRA's requirement of a Point-of-Need Device, SickStick, for various screening procedures, which will allow segregation of people that are getting sick from others before transmission chains begin. The project will begin at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 2-3 in that the technology has already demonstrated detection of biomarkers in human saliva (although not soldiers specifically), proof that a broad array of pathogens induce these biomarkers, prior to symptoms onset. The amendment to the subject protocol version 03, the University of Colorado Boulder (UCB) Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved dated July 27, 2021, on August 6, 2021. The UCB IRB originally approved the subject protocol on April 19, 2021. The Darwin Biosciences, Inc is relying on the review provided by the UCB IRB. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Office of Research Protections (ORP), Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) reviewed the protocol and found that it complies with applicable DoD, U.S. Army, and USAMRDC human subjects protection requirements. The USAMRDC Human Research Protections Office (HRPO) approved this effort on August 10, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 31, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB 2019-16: The goal of this project is evaluate a number of clinically used, biological therapeutics with known anti-inflammatory properties to reduce brain inflammation in mouse models of alphavirus encephalitis. Specifically, the project intends to verify the presence of the targets for human anti-inflammatory therapeutics in a mouse model of encephalitic alphavirus disease by selecting human therapeutics that have previously been shown to have biological effects in the mouse experimental system. This regimen will be tested in aerosol models of Venezuelan, Western and Eastern equine encephalitic alphavirus disease (VEEV, WEEV, EEEV, respectively). The project is divided into 3 key tasks: Task 1: Verify the presence of therapeutic targets in a VEEV mouse model and establish metrics to measure brain pathologies. Task 2: Test and down select therapeutics in a VEEV mouse model using fully factorial design. Task 3: Test optimum therapy in military relevant mouse models of VEEV, WEEV, and EEEV. Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) protocol CB 2019-16.e001 entitled, "Understanding the fundamental biology of dangerous pathogens," Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) protocol number PID46FB69, Protocol Principal Investigator Dr. Andrew Scott, is approved by ACURO as of June 11, 2021, for the use of mice and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. This protocol approved by the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) IACUC on April 9, 2021; IACUC approval expires April 9, 2024. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on June 11, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 9, 2021. (CLOSED).
• CB 2020-05: This project proposes to develop, optimize, and evaluate an autoinjectable formulation prototype of a centrally and peripherally acting acetylcholinesterase (AChE) reactivator, SWRI80A. SWRI80A was developed by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) and DTRA on an earlier effort, and is an AChE reactivator that crosses the Blood Brain Barrier (BBB) and acts as a nerve agent countermeasure. The current organophosphate nerve agent (OPNA) antidote, 2-PAM, is not able to protect the central nervous system (CNS) against OPNA intoxication, and furthermore, is not sufficient in protecting against a broad variety of OPNAs that are arising in the threat landscape. SWRI80A will be optimized for stability to increase the storage half-life and solubility to enhance the eventual drug product (DP) formulation properties. ACURO protocol CB 2020-05.e001 entitled, "Single Dose Intravenous Pharmacokinetic Study of SWRI80A in Sprague-Dawley Rats Single Dose Acute and 7-Day Range-Finding Intravenous Toxicity and Toxicokinetic Study of SWRI80A in Sprague-Dawley Rats," IACUC protocol number 21-11, Protocol Principal Investigator Bradley S. Wahle, is approved by ACURO as of June 11, 2021, for the use of rats and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on June 11, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 9, 2021. (CLOSED).

• CB 2019-21: In order to identify potential prophylactic or therapeutic treatments for injury or insult, due to Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) exposure, chemical libraries are often screened. A robust chemical library serves as a preliminary filter of existing compounds to initially elucidate and identify potential hit candidates that could be down-selected for further screening and studies. CWAs continue to be a threat to the Armed Forces, against which there are no broad-spectrum medical countermeasures. The goal of this initiative is to support the development and expansion of a prototype CWA drug discovery library. This expanded library will be used to down-select clinical candidate molecules targeting relevant CWA-induced injuries and/or intoxication. The Investigational New Drug (IND)-enabling studies of the lead candidate (Aim 4) will involve GLP Tox studies in rats and dogs, scheduled to begin August 2023 (rats) and February 2024 (dogs). ACURO protocol CB10777.e001 entitled, "Identification of novel reactivators of organophosphate inhibited acetylcholinesterase," IACUC protocol number 202111330, Protocol Principal Investigator [REDACTED] is approved by ACURO as of June 14, 2021, for the use of rats and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. The University of Florida IACUC approved this protocol on March 9, 2021. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on June 15, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 9, 2021. (CLOSED).

• CT00010: This project will build Liberian capacity for threat reduction through an integrated human-animal surveillance approach to high consequence zoonotic pathogens associated with human acute febrile illness (AFI) including Ebola virus, Lassa virus, and other emerging infections. They will identify and characterize the etiological agents of infectious AFI in Liberia, particularly among patients with a history of animal contact. Training provided to local partners in critical biosafety and biosafety skillsets will include sample transport and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity; human and animal sampling approaches; performance of both routine and advanced molecular diagnostic assays; cold-chain transport implementation; and data analysis and reporting. ACURO protocol CT00010.e001 entitled, "Reducing the threat from high-risk pathogens causing febrile illness in Liberia," IACUC protocol number G2020-
102. Protocol Principal Investigator DVM, is approved by ACURO as of July 12, 2021, for the use of mice, sheep, cattle, goats, dogs, other farm animals, pigs and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. The Ecohealth Alliance Inc. IACUC approved this protocol on December 14, 2020. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on July 12, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 18, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB 2017-48: This effort will develop novel and innovative small molecule therapeutics to treat (post-exposure therapeutic) infections by both filovirus family members (Ebola viruses (EBOV) and Marburg viruses (MARV)), including all agents causing disease in humans: EBOV, Bundibugyo virus, Tai Forest virus, Sudan virus, MARV, and Raven virus. The objective is to chemically optimize two novel glycoprotein interaction inhibitors and establish in vivo murine tolerance, pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamics, proof-of-principle efficacy, and dosing regimens to generate two pre-clinical therapeutic candidates. Two hundred forty mice will be tested at USAMRID. ROB registration is required in case the USAMRID vivarium is not available and animal use is subcontracted to an extramural location. ACURO protocol CB-2017-48.e002 entitled, "Pharmacokinetic Evaluation of Test Materials in Hamsters, Gerbils, and Guinea Pigs," IACUC protocol number NLS21-004, Protocol Principal Investigator Dr. Andrew Taylor, is approved by ACURO as of July 28, 2021, for the use of guinea pigs and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. This protocol was approved by the NeoSome Life Sciences, LLC IACUC on May 12, 2021. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on July 29, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 18, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB10981: Saxitoxin (STX) is a lethal paralytic neurotoxin that targets voltage-gated sodium channels (NaVs) and is the only marine toxin declared a biological weapon. Despite its extreme lethality, there are no medical countermeasures to mitigate STX poisoning; the current activity seeks to determine the STX binding properties of a family of frog Sxphs and identify pathways by which they neutralize toxins. The overall goal is to define the molecular logic of toxin resistance strategies. ACURO protocol CB10981.e001 entitled, "Electrophysiological, Genetic, and Structural Studies of Ion Channels and Ion Channel Modulators," IACUC protocol number AN178461-03, Protocol Principal Investigator Dr. Daniel Minor, PhD, is approved by ACURO as of July 27, 2021, for the use of amphibians and reptiles and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. This protocol approved by the University of California, San Francisco IACUC on October 19, 2020. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on July 29, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 9, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB 2020-26: Long-term goal is to combat Burkholderia pseudomallei (Bp) infection in military and civilian populations by adding two layers of defense: 1) A safe and effective subunit vaccine that elicits long lasting protection and 2) Novel monoclonal antibody (mAb) and nanobody (Nb) immunotherapies as prophylaxis and/or treatment. Our objective of this proposal is to further develop and characterize vaccine(s) and immunotherapies based on the novel virulence factors Surface Receptor 1 (SR1) and Surface Receptor 2 (SR2) that have shown positive results in preliminary pilot studies. ACURO protocol CB10913.e001 entitled, "Defense Against Burkholderia pseudomallei Infection: Subunit Vaccine and Monoclonal Antibody/Nanobody Technologies," IACUC protocol number 2238, Protocol Principal Investigator is approved by ACURO as of August 23, 2021, for the use of
mice and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. This protocol approved by the Colorado State University IACUC on July 12, 2021. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on August 24, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on August 30, 2021. (CLOSED).

- CB11004: Project aims to provide fundamental knowledge about the basic biology of Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) editing in vivo that can inform downstream strategies for methods to detect signatures that point to genetic engineering using this technology. CRISPR is an enzyme platform use in labs to make modifications to the genetic information of an organism. Aims include: fundamental understanding of CRISPR biology in cells and tissues following delivery (tissue distribution, CRISPR-associated analytes) and how to detect them. ACURO protocol CB11004.e001 entitled, "Detection of immunological responses to CRISPR gene editing," IACUC protocol number 307, Protocol Principal Investigator Nicole Collette, is approved by ACURO as of August 30, 2021, for the use of mice and will remain so until modification, expiration or cancellation. This protocol was approved by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory IACUC on June 17, 2021. The USAMRDC Animal Care and Use Review Office (ACURO) approved this effort on August 31, 2021. The ROB Executive Secretary reviewed and approved this study on September 7, 2021. (CLOSED).

d) Open Items from Previous Meetings

- USAMRDC ORP Meetings: The DTRA ROB held virtual Zoom meetings to discuss projects in review at USAMRDC ORP, ACURO and HRPO for research approval on the following dates; June 30, 2021, July 27, 2021, and September 9, 2021. Ms. Abigail Roots, Mr. Rob Kimbrough, and Mr. Robert Montecinos attended. In the July 27, 2021, meeting, the new ORP Proposal Submission Form for project entry into ORP’s Electronic Grants System (EGS) was discussed. The September 9, 2021, meeting, covered the issue of responsiveness from awarded performers and Principle Investigators was again discussed. This is an on-going issue and ROB Members were reminded to notify their performers to be responsive to requests from ORP, which will otherwise cause delays the review and approval for the research to begin. Currently there are 75 projects under review at ACURO, and 62 projects under review at HRPO. The DTRA ROB did not have a meeting with USAMRDC ORP ACURO in the past three months. Next DTRA/ORP telecom is not yet scheduled. (Standing item).

- DTRA Instruction 3216.01: The new DTRA Instruction (DTRAl) 3216.01, Implementation of the Human Research Protection Program and Animal Use Oversight Program, was released on August 17, 2021. This document updates and clarifies roles and responsibilities of all DTRA personnel participating in the HRPP or AUOP, to include training requirements, ROB meetings, familiarity with the DTRA Form 156, and the review process for project that fall within HRPP/AUOP requirements. (CLOSED).

- HRPP/AUOP Language: clarified that all DTRA funded or supported research involving human subjects, human anatomical substances, and animal use must comply with the requirements of the HRPP/AUOP, and that the DTRA ROB manages and maintains these programs through the review and approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)). Unless a specific event or task is in reference to the ROB (e.g., the ROB Quarterly Meeting), the terminology “HRPP/AUOP” will be used moving forward. (CLOSED).
• HRPP/AUOP Training Tasker: In accordance with (IAW) the DTRA1 3216.01, and DoD regulations, personnel participating in DTRA funded or supported research involving human subjects, human anatomical substances, and animal use, must complete the DTRA HRPP/AUOP training, provided through the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI). As such, on August 18, 2021, a DTRA-wide Tasker was sent to all Directorates requesting email addresses of personnel involved in these research activities, with a suspense date of August 25, 2021. [b] is currently working with the staff of the DTRA Learning Management System (LMS) to update and provide instructions and training through the DTRA LMS site. She recently worked with the administrators of CITI to update and reduce the course requirements so that all DTRA personnel now take the same course with fewer modules than before. These changes continue to comply with required DoD regulations, and also reduce the time DTRA personnel spend completing the training. [b] emphasized that the requirements for DTRA personnel to complete mandatory HRPP/AUOP training was a policy requirement, and is supported under the DTRA1 3216.01. (CLOSED).

• Electronic Grants System (EGS) Update: The DTRA ROB continues to work with USAMRDC ORP to migrate “legacy” projects, those project registered in ORP’s Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for Government database, into the EGS system. (CLOSED).

II. New Business:

a) New USAMRDC ORP Proposal Submission Form Process

• [b] discussed the updated USAMRC ORP Proposal Submission Form and how to properly complete this form so that DTRA funded or supported projects can be correctly entered into the EGS system. One important point Mr. Montecinos stressed is the Submission Number, which must not have any spaces (e.g., CB 2019-##), but to place dashes instead (e.g., CB-2019-##). Upon registering the effort, HRPO and ACURO create what is known as an E-number. Performers must reference this E-number or the Award Number when submitting documents that pertain to that particular effort. ORP will reach out to the ROB when a performer submits study documents with an “unknown award.” This takes time to track down the correct project based on the information provided, which causes delays in the review process. This is especially a problem with Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs). Subsequent protocols under a proposal that has been approved or is in review, may be submitted directly to ORP by performers using the E-number or Award Number. Performers must link the new protocol(s) to the current proposal by either of these numbers. (CLOSED).

b) ROB Brief to new RD-CB Deputy Director

• [b] briefed the new Deputy Director of RD Chemical and Biological Technologies Department (RD-CB) on August 18, 2021. [b] worked at DTRA in the past and was familiar with the ROB. [b] brief was to provide an overview of updates and changes since previous assignment with DTRA. (CLOSED).

c) Colonel Cloutier asked about the Chemical Biological Operational Analysis (CBOA)
When reviewing the projects that had been approved between meetings, asked if the CBOA effort should be included, responded that the approved projects discussed were simply those that had been approved since the previous ROB meeting, but that the CBOA effort, which was approved and stated in the previous meeting, is now included in the count for the overall number of Active Projects the ROB is managing. and went on to explain the purpose of CBOA to members who may not be familiar with the project, especially in the aspect of an increase in the use of Military Working dogs (MWD) in research, and how regulations have changed to provide stricter oversight of MWDs in RDT&E. (CLOSED).

III. The next ROB meeting will be held on Tuesday, December 15, 2021, on Microsoft Teams, from 1000 – 1130. (INFO).

RECOMMENDATION: Approve release of the ROB meeting minutes by initialing below.

Approve: ____________ Disapprove: ____________ Other: ____________

Attachments:
1. DTRA Instruction 3216.01
2. ORP Proposal Submission Form

Prepared by: and