From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_01 Dec 22.xlsx
Date: Monday, December 19, 2022 9:03:58 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_01 Dec 22.xlsx

Sir,

This week's TMT tracker for our meeting at 0930.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject	Release Level	Task Issued	Task Received in CTR DAG	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments
DTRA-221201-J9ZT	Supportability Determination for Iraqi Embassy Support Request	GS15/O6	12/1/2022	12/1/2022	12/14/2022	12/15/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-PI,	DP/RL
DTRA-221128-2CS9	Call for Nominations for the DTRA CY22, 4th Quarter Awards	GS15/O6	11/28/2022	11/28/2022	12/22/2022	12/22/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP		Manpower finalizing packages
DTRA-221201-QC4Q	IT Monitor and Printer Data Call	AO	12/1/2022	12/6/2022	12/22/2022	12/22/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-PI, CT-PP	SE has none
DTRA-221215-9DVN	DTRA/DTIC Overarching FS7600A	GS15/O6	12/15/2022	12/15/2022	12/27/2022	12/28/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Ralph Miller sub-tasked to depts
DTRA-221117-2H3F	FOIA Case 23-014 US Right to Know EcoHealth Alliance Docs	AO	11/17/2022	11/17/2022	12/29/2022	12/31/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	
DTRA-221213-75RM	SNET Coord; JS-221206-D2Q7 Russia-Ukraine Data Call	GS15/O6	12/6/2022	12/14/2022	12/29/2022	12/30/2022	CT-PI, CT-PP, CT-SE	CT-PP,	No Input from SE /PI.
DTRA-221212-XZ2K	Request for FY23 Directorate Training Plans (Q2-Q4)	GS15/O6	12/12/2022	12/12/2022	1/5/2023	1/6/2023	CT-PI	CT-PI	
DTRA-221213-VJ3R	Agency Detail List (Civilian and Military)	GS15/O6	12/13/2022	12/13/2022	1/5/2023	1/6/2023	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	
DTRA-221214-8FSV	Request Directorate AO level POC for DTRA Federal Employee Viewpoint Surve	GS15/O6	12/14/2022	12/14/2022	1/6/2023	1/9/2023	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-PI, CT-PP	SE - Melissa Kincaid.
DTRA-221130-JR5R	SIPR COORD: DTRA 221130 6LLV NMS Questionnaire	GS15/O6	11/30/2022	11/30/2022	1/10/2023	1/11/2023	CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-PI, CT-PP	Ensure Dr Pope and Mr. Long reviews
DTRA-221206-G4RR	BPCIC COP FY23 Forecast (NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM)	AO	12/6/2022	12/6/2022	1/10/2023	1/10/2023	CT-PI	CT-PI	

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_1 28Jan22.xlsx
Date: Tuesday, February 22, 2022 8:56:26 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_1 28Jan22.xlsx

Sir,

ETMS2 tracker attached for today's meeting.

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

STID	Task Subject		Task Received in CTR DAG	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments	Tasker Link
DTRA-220208-8FVP	Second Update to DTRA Transition Book	GS15/06	2/8/2022	2/22/2022	2/25/2022	CT-P	CT-P	Waiting on SF's input for the finance piece then CT DAG will consolidate and submit for review. Dr Pope wants to review before submission	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#332997159
DTRA-220216-Q95V	**Monthly BPCIC Tasker**	AO	2/16/2022	2/24/2022	2/24/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Issued to all, CT-PI OPR	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#1344062314
DTRA-220218-55Q.	**2022 Blacks in Government Meritorious Service Award**	SES	2/18/2022	2/24/2022	2/28/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#993888000
DTRA-220218-3FA9	Quarterly Dormant Account Review (DAR-O) Tasker - Q2 FY22	AO	2/18/2022	2/25/2022	3/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	2nd Suspense issued to Depts.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#640514258
DTRA-220218-W729	**Representatives for CTR Metrics working group**	AO	2/18/2022	2/28/2022	2/28/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#846540142
CATV5-170222-E8FB	**NCB Components (& CBDP) Support to CCMDs, other orgs.**	SES	2/18/2022	3/2/2022	3/4/2022	CT-P	CT-P	Per Pat B. PI owns this one	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#300332382
DTRA-220218-JVQX	**One (1) year projection of CTRIC III new awards**	AO	2/18/2022	3/3/2022	3/3/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Issued to all, CT-PI OPR	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#914390642
DTRA-220216-WKIN	**Call for Nominations for Board Members to serve on the Civilian Awards**	SES	2/16/2022	3/4/2022	3/9/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Sent to all Depts	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#491403603
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063 EcoHealth and BT Containment	AO	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	submitting input to Eugene McGirt as completing	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#1580315874
DTRA-220105-E334	Call for Nominations - 2022 Department of Defense Spirit of Hope Award	GS15/06	1/5/2022	**3/7/2022**	**3/11/2022**	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI	**New suspense date from HR.**	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#818192568
DTRA-220217-22N_	Air Force Officer Assignment for Winter 2022-2023 Cycle [Requisitions]	GS15/06	2/17/2022	3/9/2022	3/9/2022	CT-P	CT-P		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#1661426231
DTRA-220216-22T3	**March Lunchtime Chats with Dr Pope**	AO	2/16/2022	3/30/2022	3/30/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#462306835
DTRA-220209-VXNF	Q2/FY22 DSO Country Fact Sheets and Regional Summaries Update	AO	2/9/2022	4/26/2022	4/30/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Issued Q2 / Q3 due dates	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#752560166

OTB	Task Subject		Task Received in PM DRB	Days Suspense for CT 45	OTBH DHD Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments	Tasker QM
TRK-220108-P17	Donald Jaskiw, LCDR, Contract Auth	10/4/96	1/8/2022	2/22/2022	2/25/2022	0	0	Waiting on CO rated for the Reserve prior Nov 17, DHD. Self-assessment and submit for review. To Capt review to review NDAA addendum.	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000107224
TRK-210110-W0001	Security Birth Name	AD	3/16/2021	3/24/2022	3/24/2022	0	0	Sent to LA, JA on 3/24.	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000106212
TRK-210118-V01	2021 Made in Government Mentorship Service Award	NA	3/18/2021	3/24/2022	3/28/2022	0	0		https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000106300
TRK-210114-W1A0	Security Personal Access Review (Quickly Tracer - Q-Trac)	AD	1/14/2021	2/24/2022	3/28/2022	0	0	Sent Suspense Scanch to Tasker.	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105114
TRK-220118-W1B0	Representatives for CR Mentors working group	AD	1/18/2022	3/28/2022	3/28/2022	0	0		https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000106110
TRK-170311-P0A0	NDA Addendum for DHRC Support to CNIC, other ships	NA	3/13/2017	3/17/2022	3/17/2022	0	0		https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000106000
TRK-211214-W1J0	Non-Critical Addendum to TRK 20-xxx-xxx-xx	AD	12/14/2021	3/3/2022	3/3/2022	0	0	Sent to LA, JA 3/4	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105611
TRK-211214-W1K0	Non-Critical Addendum to TRK 20-xxx-xxx-xx for the Human Service	AD	12/14/2021	3/3/2022	3/3/2022	0	0	Sent to LA, JA 3/4.	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105612
TRK-210105-W0J0	Force Data Number (FDN) Formally and IT Informally Assigned Data Elements Required for Navy Personnel Records	AD	1/5/2021	3/1/2022	3/1/2022	0	0		https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105013
TRK-220102-V0A0	Sailor Support Program Management Working Group	10/15/96	1/7/2022	3/17/2022	3/11/2022	0	0	Navy Leadership Will Lead MR.	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000106104
TRK-210117-V0A	Air Force Officer Assignment for Winter 2021-2022 Cycle (Requirement	10/15/96	1/17/2021	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	0	0		https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105201
TRK-210114-V1J0	Social Justice Data and IA Team	AD	1/14/2021	3/28/2022	3/28/2022	0	0		https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105010
TRK-210209-V0F	SLATTED 2022 Cosmic Tour Shows and Regional Contrails Sailors	AD	2/9/2021	3/26/2022	3/28/2022	0	0	Sent 3/8 / CO Bob Klein.	https://tracker.dc.navy.mil/tasks/1000105818

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_1 28Jan22.xlsx
Date: Monday, February 14, 2022 8:22:52 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_1 28Jan22.xlsx

Sir,

Good Morning. Attached is the updated task tracker for this morning's meeting.

(b)(6)

STID	Task Subject		Task Received in CTR DAG	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments	Tasker Link
DTRA-220118-4C9E	Call for Nominations - 67th Annual Competitive Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award	GS15/06	1/18/2022	2/15/2022	4/26/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-P	Issued with a short suspense to id if there are any candidates, then once we know that, the individuals can work on complete packages, per Ms. Sanders	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#66812247
DTRA-220118-6D3E	Call for OSD Nominations - 18th Annual Department of Defense David O. Cooke Excellence in Public Administration Award	CoS	1/26/2022	2/15/2022	4/28/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI	Requesting names of possible candidates by 2/15 then once approved, will give time to build larger candidate package.	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#40734375
DTRA-220208-9336	The Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman (SEAC) and GATEWAY Course Manager	SES	2/8/2022	2/15/2022	2/17/2022	CT-P	CT-PI		https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#70[illegible]946
DTRA-220917-9YMN	DTRA 3000 issuance series: DTRA-D 3000 Strategy, Plans, and Operations; DTRA-I 3000.02 Operations, DTRA- 3000.03 Strategy and Plans	CoS	2/22/2022	2/16/2022	2/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE,	CT-BT, CT-PP,	BT is OPR/PP/SE OCR's	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#50096677
DTRA-220204-8K2C	CTR Representative for DTRA's Individuals with Disabilities Employee Resource Group (IwD ERG)	AO	2/4/2022	2/16/2022	2/16/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#15147555
DTRA-220208-FVPX	PDASD NCB Engagements	GS15/06	2/8/2022	2/16/2022	2/17/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-P		https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#35768758
Internal	Zoom for Government Collaboration License Availability	GS15/06	2/9/2022	2/16/2022	2/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP,	Mickey emailed to Sr Staff for input	Task deconflicted
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063 EcoHealth and BT Containment	AO	2/3/2022	2/17/2022	2/18/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	submitting input to Eugene McGirt as completing	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#58[illegible]4
DTRA-220130-THVD	Litigation Hold re: Updated COVID vaccination mandate	CoS	2/1/2022	2/17/2022	2/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-P	Pending additional info from Mickey and CoS's	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#96176841[illegible]
DTRA0-220201-P84Z	FY22 Annual Records Management Validations	AO	2/1/2022	2/17/2022	2/17/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-PI	CT-PI is the OPR. Internal to PI	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#[illegible]24427
DTRA-220208-0VG0	FY22 Q1 ForeignAssistance.gov Data Call	GS15/06	2/8/2022	2/18/2022	2/21/2022	CT-P	CT-PI	Mickey directed this goes to P for all inputs	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#86621460
DTRA-220210-06G3	2022 General Larry O. Spencer Innovation Award	SES	2/10/2022	2/18/2022	2/22/2022	CT-BT, CT-PI, CT-SE	CT-BT, CT-P , CT-SE		https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#13424557
DTRA-220211-DQL7	24 Special Operations Wing Chiefs Professional Development Seminar	GS15/06	2/11/2022	2/18/2022	2/22/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Asking for 3 slides and a briefer for their course.	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#58[illegible]46488
DTRA-220208-8FVH	Second Update to DTRA Transition Book	GS15/06	2/8/2022	2/22/2022	2/25/2022	CT-P	CT-PI	Randy directed this one to go to P , tasks 1&3 only.	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#55[illegible]259
DTRA-220118-3FA9	Quarterly Dormant Account Review (DAR-Q) Tasker - Q1 FY22	AO	1/18/2022	2/25/2022	3/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-P	2nd Suspense Issued to Depts.	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#64[illegible]4258
DTRA-220105-E334	Call for Nominations - 2022 Department of Defense Spirit of Hope Award	GS15/06	1/5/2022	3/11/2022	3/15/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#81[illegible]258
DTRA-211201-EAF5	CTR Semi-Annual Program Activity Upload to Socrum	AO	12/1/21	3/16/2022	3/16/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE	CT-PP, CT-SE,		https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#7[illegible]5910
DTRA-220209-VXNF	Q2/FY22 DSD Country Fact Sheets and Regional Summaries Update	AO	2/9/2022	4/26/2022	4/30/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-P	Issued Q2 / Q1 due dates	https://strat.tr.t.army.mil/ma.n.aspx#75[illegible]68

OTM	Task Subject		Task Assigned to PM Date	Stop Suspense for CT #3	OTM# DMS Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments	Tasker link
OTM-12311-20-NEW	Call for Nominations - 19th Annual Conspicuous Departments of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award	10/16/20	1/18/2021	1/19/2021	4/16/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-1	Issued with a short suspense to all of them only as a reminder. Then once a is know, [illegible] Then [illegible] Then [illegible] Temporary Tasker to process [illegible]	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12311-20-NEW	Call for Nominations - 19th Annual Department of Defense Civil Service Leadership in Public Administration Award	10/8	1/19/2021	1/19/2021	4/19/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-1	Just approved, will give time to both Project Leadership and DLA.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12310-20-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of the Interior DOI Civil Servant Leadership Award	10/8	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#1	CT-1		http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12282-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Department of Defense Civilian Service Medal of Valor - OTM # 12282-19 Strategy and Operations (OTM # 12282-19 Strategy and Operations)	8/28	2/3/2021	2/16/2021	4/30/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#7 OPPOSE 2/17.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12310-20-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of the Interior DOI Civil Servant Leadership Award	10/8	2/3/2021	2/16/2021	2/16/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8		http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12310-20-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	10/8	2/3/2021	2/16/2021	2/16/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8		http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12310-20-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	10/8	2/3/2021	2/16/2021	2/16/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8		http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12309-19-NEW	DLA's Job Quality Tool Sheets and Regional Scorecards Update	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12307-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12306-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12305-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12304-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12303-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12302-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12301-19-NEW	Call for Nominations - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575
OTM-12300-19-NEW	DLA's Job Quality Tool Sheets and Regional Scorecards Update	8/2	1/8/2021	1/15/2021	1/17/2021	CT-#7, CT-#9, CT-#1, CT-#8	CT-#1, CT-#8, CT-#7	Issued 12 - 15 day done.	http://citrix.cs.dla.mil/citrix/ui/?#/tasks/8205575

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota		(b)(6)	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight	(b)(6)	10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)	(b)(6)	3/11 requested extension t 4/18 approved			

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6); DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_8 September22.xlsx
Date: Monday, October 3, 2022 9:37:37 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_8 September22.xlsx

Sir,

Attached is the weekly task tracker for today's meeting.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR:

STID	Task Subject	Release Level	Task Issued	Task Received in CTR DAG	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments
DTRA-220826-57M7	Cong RFI: EcoHealth Documents	GS15/O6	8/26/2022	8/26/2022	9/30/2022	9/30/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	Pending Friday's meeting with Dr Pope for additional time needed.
DTRA-220916-VQMG	SIPR COORD: DTRA 22091G-WR26 Information Resilience Deliverable Development	GS15/O6	9/16/2022	9/19/2022	10/3/2022	10/3/2022	Small/James; CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	Small/James; CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	
DTRA-220919-9G6R	SNET Coord: CATMS-160922-W8XN O-6 Coordiation on the 2022 Draft CWMD Strategy	GS15/O6	9/19/2022	9/20/2022	10/3/2022	10/3/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Lt Col Small and David Hamon per Jackie
DTRA-220908-FKW9	FY23 CTR Operational Imperatives	GS15/O6	9/8/2022	9/8/2022	10/4/2022	10/4/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	
DTRA-220921-X7TD	SNET Tasker: IS-220920-PFKM - (U) Preliminary Coord of the 22 DTRA CSAR1 Assessment	GS15/O6	9/20/2022	9/23/2022	10/4/2022	10/4/2022	CT-PI, Mr. Long	CT-PI, Mr. Long	
DTRA-220929-K2F7	FY23 AFRICOM Common Operating Picture (COP) slide Update and DDIR-DCOM Letter	AO	9/29/2022	9/29/2022	10/4/2022	10/6/2022	OPR-PI, OCR-SE, BT, PP	OPR-PI, OCR-SE, BT, PP	Per Lt Col Small, issue to all, PI will consolidate
DTRA-220915-FBFC	Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) / Wireless Priority Service (WPS) Cards Program for ERG/DERG and Reconstitution member	AO	9/15/2022	9/19/2022	10/7/2022	10/7/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Mickey is working
DTRA-220922-W877	SIPR Coord - DTRA-220922-ZPKT- DTRA Support Plan Review CJCS Conplan	GS15/O6	9/22/2022	9/22/2022	10/11/2022	10/11/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Mickey is working; Directorate level review of the CJCS Conplan
DTRA-220324-X9DL	FOIA Case Number 22-045	AO	3/24/2022	3/24/2022	10/14/2022	10/14/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	Reviewing SNET emails
DTRA-220407-F8TL	Support Agreement, Form 7600A Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	AO	4/7/2022	4/7/2022	10/14/2022	10/14/2022	CT-PI	Ralph Miller	Waiting on CBP to sign final version and then we will close out task
DTRA-220928-6FL5	ETMS2 Account Validation and New License Request	CoS	9/30/2022	9/30/2022	10/13/2022	10/14/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	Pending Review by Mickey
JS-220913-NFLH	Invitation to Attend the FY23 Joint Senior Leaders' Course	AO	9/14/2022	9/14/2022	10/18/2022	10/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-SE	
DTRA-220929-XZBP	7-10NOV DTRA OI DIR Canada Agreements Site Visit - RAH and Talking Points	SES	9/29/2022	9/29/2022	10/19/2022	10/19/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PP	Per jackie, send to these 3.
DTRA-220926-J6NZ	Lunchtime Chat (October) with Dr. Pope	AO	9/26/2022	9/26/2022	10/21/2022	10/21/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-SE, CT-PP	
DTRA-220928-W7WQ	FY23 Appointment of Primary and Alternate Official Representation Funds Directorate Coordinators	AO	9/28/2022	9/28/2022	10/24/2022	10/24/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	
DTRA-220907-3JFP	Q4/FY22 OSD Country Fact Sheets	AO	9/7/2022	9/7/2022	10/26/2022	10/26/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PP	
CATMS-220922-PQVV	DTM for Enterprise Management of Defense Critical Technologies Supporting the National Defense Strategy	GS15/O6	9/22/2022	10/3/2022	10/11/2022	10/11/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Mickey is Reviewing
DTRA-221003-54ST	Competitive Leadership Development Program Winter Solicitation Cycle	GS15/O6	10/3/2022	10/3/2022	10/31/2022	10/31/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota		(b)(6)	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions. Extensio granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight	(b)(6)	10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)	(b)(6)	3/11 requested extensio 4/18 approved			

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Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_8 September22.xlsx
Date: Monday, September 26, 2022 8:12:24 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_8 September22.xlsx

Sir,

Attached is the task tracker for today's meeting.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

STID	Task Subject		Task Issued	Task Received in CTR DAG	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments
DTRA-220826-57M7	Cong RFI: EcoHealth Documents	GS15/O6	8/26/2022	8/26/2022	9/26/2022	9/26/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	Will request 2 week extension this AM pending Dr Pope's approval.
DTRA-220907-ZJPN	DTRA Joint Rating Scheme	GS15/O6	9/8/2022	9/8/2022	9/26/2022	9/26/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Extension approved for mondayExtension Approved 9/19 for 9/20. Extension requested for 9/20 per Mickey.
DTRA-220910-KR34	Call for Nominations for the DTRA CY22, 3rd Quarter Awards	SES	9/10/2022	9/12/2022	9/26/2022	9/26/2022	CT-PI, CT-MP		Packages with Mickey and Dr Pope.
DTRA-211202-F635	DTRA Instruction 1020.02 Implementation of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973	GS15/O6	9/13/2022	9/13/2022	9/27/2022	9/27/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Hold for Mickey's review
DTRA-220916-6KLC	Audit: GAO 104715 U.S. Efforts to Secure Nuclear Weapons Usable Material Worldwide	GS15/O6	9/16/2022	9/16/2022	9/27/2022	9/27/2022	CT-SE	CT-SE	Randy needs to see prior to submission
DTRA-220916-ZTZK	Call for CFC Team Coordinators, Key Workers & Staff Support	GS15/O6	9/20/2022	9/20/2022	9/29/2022	9/29/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	
DTRA-220324-X9DL	FOIA Case Number 22-045	AO	3/24/2022	3/24/2022	9/30/2022	9/30/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	Reviewing SNET emails
DTRA-220916-VQMG	SIPR COORD: DTRA 220916-WR26 Information Resilience Deliverable Development	GS15/O6	9/16/2022	9/19/2022	9/30/2022	9/30/2022	Small/James; CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	Small/James; CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	Pending guidance on issuance
DTRA-220919-9G6R	SNET Coord: CATMS-160922-W8XN O-6 Coordiation on the 2022 Draft CWMD Strategy	GS15/O6	9/19/2022	9/20/2022	10/3/2022	10/3/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Lt Col Small and David Hamon per Jackie
DTRA-220921-S3LX	Sen Rand Paul: Unredacted Docs re FOIA Requests 20-063 and 22-008	GS15/O6	9/21/2022	9/22/2022	10/3/2022	10/3/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	
DTRA-220908-FKW9	FY23 CTR Operational Imperatives	GS15/O6	9/8/2022	9/8/2022	10/4/2022	10/4/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	CT-BT, CT-SE, CT-PI, CT-PP	
DTRA-220908-PPN8	SIPR Coord: DTRA-220908-7543- UoF SPPOD October	AO	9/8/2022	9/9/2022	10/4/2022	10/4/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
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STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota		(b)(6)	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight	(b)(6)	10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)	(b)(6)	3/11 requested extension 4/18 approved			

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STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

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DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota		(b)(6)	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight	(b)(6)	10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)	(b)(6)	3/11 requested extension 4/18 approved			

Legend:
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Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG (b)(6)
DTRA CT (USA)
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx
Date: Monday, August 29, 2022 9:22:09 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx

Sir,

Attached is the weekly task matrix for our call this morning.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

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DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(6)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota		(b)(6)	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions. Extensio granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight	(b)(6)	10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT	(b)(6)	Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)	(b)(6)	3/11 requested extensior 4/18 approved			

Legend:
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Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: DASD TRAC EcoHealth Alliance Query
Date: Friday, September 9, 2022 2:40:00 PM

Team,

On Monday, please provide me with the original letter DASD Reif sent DTRA requesting us to audit a selection of our BTRP grants to EcoHealth Alliance. We have the audit results back from the DTRA IG, but need to see the precise language in DASD TRAC's letter before we craft our response using the results from the IG. The DTRA response is due to TRAC by 30 Sep and we will need enough time for the DTRA Front Office to review the response. Thank you.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: (b)(6)
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA); Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA); Lutinski, Hunter E SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6) (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Disinformation Towards DTRA CTR Labs
Date: Wednesday, March 9, 2022 11:15:56 AM
Attachments: Break Glass_UKR_Final DTRA_Pol_NCB_20220301.docx
CTR Fact Sheet Bio_Press.docx
special26feb.pdf

Dr. Williams and Dr. Pope,
Gentlemen, I'm following up on the info submission/DTRA TPs input for OSD PA. We sent the "Break Glass" product up to OSD PA last week and we will now follow up again to stress the importance of using this specific messaging in some form.
We also shared with them the CTR Fact Sheet and we shared the factsheet with the Press Operations Desk for their use.
Also, I will bring Ms. Rosenblum's STRAT lead (b)(6) online with this. The A&S/NCB communications team(s) may not be fully aware of the NCB/Policy coordination that has already taken place and it appears they have limited purview at this point.
V/r,
(b)(6)
Chief, DTRA Public Affairs Office
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWIC

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, February 28, 2022 4:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: Disinformation Towards DTRA CTR Labs

(b)(6)
(b)(5)

influenza (avian flu) that is not transmitted between humans. However, NIH projects aim to make avian influenza viruses capable of transmitting between mammals and to assess their pandemic potential as a possible threat to humans. Gain of function (GOF) studies improve a pathogen's ability to cause disease by increasing its virulence and transmissibility. These dangerous experiments have not ended even though COVID-19 has been suspected to be the result of such NIH-funded GoF research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Instead of ending all GoF research since the beginning of the pandemic, the NIH and its sub-agency – the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), continued their financial support for the following GoF studies: Transmissibility of avian influenza viruses in mammals (NIAID support ended in August 2021); Centres of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS) (NIAID support ended in March 2021). The third: Mimicking the evolution to define the mechanisms of aerial transmission of H7N9 viruses, began on September 2, 2021 and continues. H5N1, a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, is not transmitted between mammals. Researchers aim to make the virus capable of being transmitted in order to assess its pandemic potential. According to the project description, "no sustained human-to-human transmission has yet been reported. Several attempts in the past to select transmissible H5 viruses (which are not usually transmitted between mammals) have not been successful." That's why the researchers "plan to smuggle non-transmissible viruses from different gene pools into ferrets (an established model of influenza virus transmission) to select transmissible mutants." Selected mutations will be characterized for their biological effects and the potential for transmission of H5N1 in mammals. According to the description provided for project 1R21AI144135-01: "Viruses of the Asian H7N9 lineage of avian influenza (VIA)... have not spread to humans; however, there is a strong potential for these viruses to evolve to be transmitted by air and cause a pandemic... Viruses carrying H7N9 HA and NA on the skeleton of the A/PR8 vaccine will be generated. Mutations will be introduced into the HA and NA gene segments... we will evaluate the replication kinetics of recombinant H7N9-A/PR8 viruses for their growth in primary epithelial cells of the human respiratory tract. Primary human cells will include nasal, tracheal, bronchial and small airway epithelial cells. The researchers want to make the virus capable of being transmitted by air in order to assess the pandemic potential of H7N9 viruses. These latest NIH-funded experiments are only a small part of many controversial laboratory studies approved by the agency. One of them was the risky research on the bat coronavirus in China, which is under investigation in the United States for a possible link to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite repeated denials by NIAID Director Dr. Antony Fauci, including before Congress, the NIH finally acknowledged last year that the United States had funded the GoF's research into bat coronaviruses in Wuhan, from where the pandemic began and spread around the world. The $3.7 million grant went to the U.S. nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance. In a letter to the U.S. House of Representatives, the NIH states that EcoHealth Alliance violated the terms and conditions of the NIH AI110964 grant and did not report all of its activities in China. According to the NIH letter, a "limited experiment" was conducted to test whether "advanced proteins from naturally occurring bat coronaviruses circulating in China were able to bind to the human ACE2 receptor in a mouse model." It's much more important than Dr. Fauci – it involves the entire U.S. government: U.S. Congressman Following the release of a House Intelligence Committee report stating that "significant circumstantial evidence" supports the hypothesis of a laboratory leak, Rep. Mike Gallagher urged members of Congress and members of the media to take a closer look at the additional U.S. funding flows that sent money from taxpayers to EcoHealth Alliance. According to the congressman, "If you start doing basic research, it quickly becomes clear that it's much more important than Dr. Fauci — it involves the entire U.S. government." EcoHealth Alliance has received a total of $112.1 million in funding from the U.S. government since 2003, according to information obtained from the U.S. Federal Contract Registry. Among its main sponsors are the NIH via NIAID and the Pentagon via the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The objectives of the projects are the discovery and assessment of viruses with pandemic potential mainly in Africa and Asia. Coronavirus research in a controversial Pentagon biolab in Georgia EcoHealth Alliance has implemented a number of military biological research programs for the Pentagon. In 2017, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) commissioned EcoHealth Alliance with a $6.5 million project to collect and isolate coronaviruses from 5,000 bats in West Asia. The duration of the program is 5 years (2017-2022) with the Lugar Center, the Pentagon's biolaboratory in the Republic of Georgia, being the local laboratory for this genetic research. The objectives of the project are: 1. Capture and sample 5,000 bats non-lethally; 2. Collect 20,000 samples (i.e. oral and rectal swabs and/or feces and blood) and screen for CoV using consensual PCR in regional laboratories in Georgia and Jordan. According to the project presentation, Eco Health Alliance has already sampled 270 bats of 9 species in three West Asian countries: 90 individual bats in Turkey (August 2018), Georgia (September 2018) and Jordan (October 2018). The Lugar Center, which is the partner laboratory for this research, is a $180 million Pentagon biolaboratory located in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. It was operated by a special unit of the US Army - USAMRU-G, whose personnel were given diplomatic immunity to search for viruses without being diplomatic. The Lugar Center has become famous in recent years for its controversial activities, laboratory incidents and scandals surrounding U.S. drug giant Gilead's hepatitis C program in Georgia, which resulted in the deaths of at least 248 patients. The cause of death in the majority of cases was listed as unknown, according to internal documents. There is no public information about the results of the research done by the EcoHealth Alliance at the Pentagon's Lugar Center, nor about the viruses that have been discovered and the genome experiments that have been carried out. $5,000 for a black market bat The South Ossetia State Security Committee has raised public awareness of the EcoHealth Alliance bat research project in neighboring Georgia after a Georgian national Khvicha Mgebrishvili was arrested on July 3, 2020 near the village of Adzisar in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia for violating the state border. During interrogation by the KGB South Ossetian border agents,

he explained that he was interested in a bat colony in the villages of Artseu and Grom in the Tskhinvali region. According to Mgebrishvili, he intended to capture the so-called "bat cocoons" and sell them in Georgia for $5,000 each. These species are listed in the Red Book and their hunting is punishable by prison in South Ossetia. Local authorities accused neighboring Georgia of suspicious activity, stating that "the Lugar Center for Public Health Research has shown increased interest in the Bat population of South Ossetia since 2012." As always, the Lugar Center and the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi have denied all allegations of fake news and conspiracy theory. In response to all the scandals surrounding the Lugar Center and the growing distrust of Georgians, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi launched a propaganda campaign to educate the local population with animated films on Georgian social media and TV channels. All information about the Lugar Center, with the exception of the government's official account, has been labeled "fake news," "disinformation," and "conspiracy theories." The Lugar Center was given by Western media as an example in the fight against the novel coronavirus, even though COVID-ravaged Georgia ranks seventh globally among countries with the highest number of deaths per million this month. I am a freelance journalist and I do not work for governments or corporations. If you'd like to support my work, visit the Donate or Become a Volunteer page. Thank you! If you would like to follow me on Telegram, please subscribe to the Arms Watch Telegram channel using the link: https://t. me/ arms watch

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To whom in Russia

Forwarded from **Politjoystic (Marat Bashirov)**

That is, in addition to the nuclear threat from Zelensky, we were also preparing bio-extermination.

...

https://t.me/obrazbuduschego2/8352

Telegram

About the future

The military special operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine coincided with the planned launch of Us military biological laboratories in Kiev and Odessa, The Octagon found out. Perhaps this launch was the deadline for the Kremlin. Russian President Vladimir Putin back in 2017-2018...

t.me/komunarussia/3619 56 Feb 26 at 05:58

Olga Budina

«.. We are talking about cooperation between the Ministry of Health of Ukraine and the US Department of Defense (Pentagon). An institution like DTRA has quite specific military tasks – testing the latest American developments on a specific gene pool – people, animals and plants. This refers to the creation of biological agents - bacteria and viruses. It is clear that this is the activity of US military virologists, they work in the gray zone. The Americans do not conduct such dangerous experiments on their territory, but [they do it] where they have good positions, where the government is corrupt and controlled by them. And this document only confirms all this..."

https://octagon.media/voj/na_specoperacija_rf_sovpala_s_zapuskom_voennyx_laboratorij_ssha_na_ukraine.html

octagon.media

The special operation of the Russian Federation coincided with the launch of US military laboratories in Ukraine

The military special operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine coincided with the planned launch of Us military biological laboratories in Kiev and Odessa, The Octagon found out. Perhaps this launch was the deadline for the Kremlin.

[illegible] 2017

Elena Sabelnikova in Royal Cross Movement (Chat)

Forwarded from Natalia

The military special operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine coincided with the planned launch of Us military biological laboratories in Kiev and Odessa, The Octagon found out. Perhaps this launch was the deadline for the Kremlin.

Back in 2017-2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin pointed to the danger of developing

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA); (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Disinformation: DoD and DTRA Lied to Congress about EcoHealth Alliance
Date: Wednesday, February 16, 2022 8:20:00 PM
Attachments: image001.jpg

FYSA, this is a new message, picked up by both Russia and China on Twitter. (Best viewed in HTML)

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----

Dr. Andrew Huff purports to be, "a former EcoHealth Alliance VP and Whistle Blower, Army Combat Veteran, and Scientist." On Mon 14 Feb he tweeted the following:

RT @AGHuff < Caution-https://twitter.com/AGHuff > : DTRA and DoD funding to

EcoHealth Alliance. Rumor is that the DoD has been lying to Congress about

funding EHA. Caution-https://t.co/P < Caution-https://t.co/P > :

This has been picked up by other twitter accounts in Russia and China.

twitter.com | justinsmith (jfeezy34) | 15.02.2022 08:44:22 | Аудиторный

охват - 38

Dr. Andrew Huff @AGHuff · Feb '4

DTRA and DoD funding to EcoHealth Alliance.

Rumor is that the DoD has been lying to Congress about funding EHA.

AGENCY	AWARD ID	YEAR	AMOUNT AWARDED	TOTAL AMOUNT	RECIPIENT
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Теги:

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Caution-https://twitter.com/jfeezy34/status/1493581956659179521 <

Caution-https://twitter.com/jfeezy34/status/1493581956659179521 >

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twitter.com | AMERICAN WOMAN (wokemom209) | 15.02.2022 08:37:44 | Аудиторный охват - 512

RT @AGHuff < Caution-https://twitter.com/AGHuff > : DTRA and DoD funding to EcoHealth Alliance. Rumor is that the DoD has been lying to Congress about funding EHA. Caution-https://t.co/P < Caution-https://t.co/P > :

Теги:

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Caution-https://twitter.com/wokemom209/status/1493580288999362566 <

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twitter.com | Huang Yanling (C19 code name: Yunnan Jade) (HuangYan_ling)

15.02.2022 08:29:42 | Аудиторный охват - 36

RT @AGHuff < Caution-https://twitter.com/AGHuff > : DTRA and DoD funding to EcoHealth Alliance. Rumor is that the DoD has been lying to Congress about funding EHA. Caution-https://t.co/P < Caution-https://t.co/P > :

Теги:

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Caution-https://twitter.com/HuangYan_ling/status/1493578266485354499 <

Caution-https://twitter.com/HuangYan_ling/status/1493578266485354499 >

Dr. Andrew Huff @AGHuff · Feb 14

DTRA and DoD funding to EcoHealth Alliance.

Rumor is that the DoD has been lying to Congress about funding EHA.

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: Dr. Pope quotes, In support of CTR PM II
Date: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 3:43:06 PM
Attachments: 20210609_CT Virtual Town Hall Minutes_FINAL.docx
Metrics, excerpt Jun 2021.pptx
10-Team Travel_20210611, excerpt.pptx

(b)(5)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: Reif, Kingston A SES (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: DTRA Response to EHA Audit Request
Date: Monday, September 19, 2022 6:01:00 PM
Attachments: EHA Audit - DTRA Response to TRAC - 20220919.pdf
EcoHealth Alliance Review--signed.pdf

Kingston,

We have completed our audit of CTR grants to EcoHealth Alliance and offer the attached audit summary in response to your 2 Dec 21 memo.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

SUBJECT: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Reviews

This document directs the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), to initiate and support a full-scale review of three grants awarded to EcoHealth Alliance (EHA). DTRA may choose which active grants to review, with a strong emphasis on selecting those nearing the end of their periods of performance. DTRA may choose between employing a third-party to conduct the review or conducting the review internally. Please keep my office informed throughout the process, including which grants are selected for review and the review format.

Based on my January 2021 review of all active scientific research grants sponsored by BTRP, EHA dominated the BTRP research portfolio as the prime awardee on seven grants totaling nearly $34M in research funding. This total encompasses nearly a third of all funding for scientific research awarded through BTRP. The second-highest funded awardee is the University of Florida, with two grants totaling less than $6M. EHA's active grants are awarded at near-maximum funding levels (at a combined 97% of allowable funding) and recent proposal submissions continue to request a similar level.

Since EHA is a recipient of a large portion of BTRP's grant funds, we must ensure that EHA is expending those funds capably and responsibly, in line with grant requirements, federal regulations, and BTRP's threat reduction mission. Through this review, we aim to ensure that all grant funds are used for the documented purpose for which they were awarded.

Further, conducting a review of EHA grants at this time demonstrates DoD's focus on ensuring accountability from grantees. This is especially important given the increased congressional attention on EHA and its use of federal funding. We should ensure that EHA is conducting research, reporting findings, and managing sub-awards consistent with grant agreements.

Our objectives in requesting this review of three grants are therefore:

1. To review all grant financial records for consistency with specific grant purposes and for compliance with legal requirements;
2. To review all experimental records for proper and ethical data handling, reporting, and dissemination requirements; and
3. To assess whether EHA's internal grant management processes continue to comply with DoD and USG guidelines that would allow for EHA to remain a potential candidate to compete for CTR funding.

I ask that DTRA deliver a comprehensive report on the results of the review to my office by the end of FY22. Please make my office aware if additional time is required to complete this

review. I look forward to supporting your efforts in this regard, and please let me know what my office can do to assist.

My point of contact for this guidance is (b)(6) at (b)(6) (b)(6)

Kingston Reif
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Threat Reduction and Arms Control

cc:
DASD(CWMD Policy)

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG (b)(6)
Subject: DTRA-220826-57M7 - Cong RFI: EcoHealth DTRA-220826-57M7 - Cong RFI: EcoHealth D
Date: Friday, September 23, 2022 1:00:38 PM
Importance: High

Sir,

Regarding the Congressional RFI on EcoHealth documents tasker you mentioned on Monday you wanted to ensure Front Office Leadership review prior to release.

BTRP located far too many to send in an email. The docs have been placed in a J Drive folder for review and transmission to (b)(6) upon your approval.

Pending your concurrence, we will grant permission to Leg Affairs for access to the file.

(b)(6)

This task is due today NLT 1700 hrs.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR

SIPR

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: Robert Pope
Subject: EHA Presentation Thu 8pm
Date: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 11:49:00 AM
Attachments: Document1.docx

What does it mean to say An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure? To anticipate–and then to prevent–is more efficient and effective than simply to respond. The sentiment is hardly a revolutionary one, but what it represents is a radical rethinking of our global strategy to fight infectious disease.

We hope you will join EcoHealth Alliance this Thursday, April 29 as we talk about this vision: one where COVID-19 is caught and contained before it's able to spread around the world. We *can* prevent pandemics and this Thursday we'll tell you how.

Stream the program completely free here < https://ecohealthalliance.us1.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0a916e47b07734ecc76aaf6c5&id=80efa97625&e=6029bce97b > at 8:00 PM ET.

You'll hear from EcoHealth Alliance scientists who are working all around the world in areas at the greatest risk of disease emergence, as well as a conversation about bringing EcoHealth Alliance field research into the lab to develop therapies and vaccines for viruses *before* they start to make people sick.

An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: April 29, 2021 at 8 PM ET

Event is open to the public.

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA)
Subject: EHA Requests
Date: Monday, September 26, 2022 2:23:00 PM
Attachments: SHSGAC Letter re EHA (18 Nov 2021).pdf
Sen Paul incoming_GOF research (20SEP22).pdf

Rhys,

FYSA, here's the tasking letter for our current EcoHealth Alliance document request from Congress. The tasking is from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. It asks for all research proposals or grant applications submitted by or on behalf of EcoHealthAlliance (EcoHealth) and/or the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) and all documents or communications sent by the agency in response to any research proposal or grant application submitted by or on behalf of EcoHealth and/or the WIV. The date shows Nov 2021 because OSD initially rejected the task and accepted it again this summer.

I've also attached the request that just arrived from Senator Rand Paul, which asks for unredacted documents from an August 2020 FOIA request from the U.S. Right to Know asking for "finished intelligence, policy-related documents, and/or scientific and technical
reports regarding" containment failures and/or accidental or deliberate release of biological agents and potential flaws in BSL-2/3/4 containment schemes in labs in 21 countries (9 of which are CTR partner countries).

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

November 18, 2021

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL (b)(6)

The Honorable Lloyd Austin III
Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Austin:

Pursuant to its authority under Senate Resolution 70 (117th Cong.), the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ("Subcommittee") is examining the public health implications of federal funding provided for certain virological research. To assist the Subcommittee with its review, please provide the following information:

1. All research proposals or grant applications submitted by or on behalf of EcoHealth Alliance (EcoHealth) and/or the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).

2. All documents or communications sent by the agency in response to any research proposal or grant application submitted by or on behalf of EcoHealth and/or the WIV.

Please provide this information by no later than December 13, 2021. Thank you for your attention to this matter. To expedite the Subcommittee's review, we ask that you submit the material responsive to this request as it becomes available, rather than waiting to provide it all at once. To avoid any unnecessary delays, we ask that you carefully review the attached *Procedures for Transmitting Documents to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations* and contact the Subcommittee to discuss the method and timing of the Department's production.

Sincerely,

Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permeant Subcommittee on Investigations

Jon Ossoff
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PROCEDURES FOR TRANSMITTING DOCUMENTS TO THE U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Due to security procedures at the U.S. Senate, the following are guidelines for transmitting documents to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

VIA PERSONAL DELIVERY AND/OR COURIER SERVICE:

Deliveries during normal business hours (9:00 am to 5:00 pm) should be brought in an unsealed envelope directly to the Russell Senate Office Building Room 199 and dropped off with Subcommittee Clerk Kate Kielceski.

VIA FILE-SHARING SITE:

Before providing any production electronically through a file-sharing site or similar online platform, please discuss these arrangements with Subcommittee staff to ensure the production meets Subcommittee standards and appropriate staff have access.

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS OR OTHER COMMERCIAL CARRIERS:

Before shipping any production through FedEx or other commercial carriers, please first discuss with Subcommittee Staff. Subcommittee staff can provide an address for a secure delivery of the production, which may be located offsite.

***DO NOT SEND PACKAGES VIA U.S. POSTAL SERVICE*:**

Packages sent via the U.S. Postal Service are irradiated. Irradiation causes disintegration of the documents being shipped, often rendering them unusable. Discs have been known to arrive melted due to the irradiation process.

Any questions regarding the transmittal of documents to the Subcommittee can be directed to Subcommittee Clerk Kate Kielceski at 202-224-9868 or Kate_Kielceski@hsgac.senate.gov.

Updated September 2021

Data Delivery Standards
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
United States Senate

The following document describes the technical requirements for electronic productions produced to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ("PSI"). **Any proposed formats other than what is listed below (including databases) should not be produced without prior discussion with PSI staff.** PSI uses Concordance 10 and Concordance Image 5.

General Instructions:

1. Provide a cover letter with each production which includes the Bates range and a general description of the documents. The cover letter should also summarize the number of records, images, emails and attachments in the production.
2. Produce documents in the same form that they were created or maintained. Documents created or stored electronically should not be produced in hard copy.
3. Deliver data on CD, DVD, or hard drive. Hard drives with external power supplies are preferred. The smallest number of media is requested.
4. Label all media submitted. Include on the label at least the following information: producing party, production date, Bates range, and disk number, if applicable.
5. Provide all passwords for documents, files, or compressed archives provided in the production.
6. To the extent practicable, de-duplication of email and native file productions is preferred.
7. Overview of preferred formats for production:
    a. Paper Documents – Scanned paper converted/processed to TIFF files, Bates numbered, and includes OCR text.
    b. Email Collections Electronic mail converted/processed to TIFF files for the email and attachment(s), Bates numbered, includes a link to the email or native file, and includes full text.
    c. Native Files Electronic documents converted/processed to TIFF files, Bates numbered, includes a link to the native file, and includes full text.

A. Paper Documents:

1) **Image files.** Images must be Group IV TIFF files (single or multi-page files). All images should be Bates numbered. The number of files per folder should be limited to 1,000 files.

2) **Delimited Text file.** At a minimum, this file must contain an IMAGEID field (image key used to reference images in Concordance Image). The image key must be unique, fixed length, and CANNOT be the Bates number of the document. Bates numbers (endorsed on the documents and included in the delimited text file) MUST be delivered in a consistent manner for sorting purposes. For example, if the first production delivered is Bates stamped ABC-0000001-ABC-0005267, subsequent productions with the same prefix should have the same format (spaces, dashes, etc.) and the same number of digits, not ABC 0005268, ABC0005268 or ABC-00005268. The delimited text file must also include a header record. The delimiters for the file should be as follows:

    Comma ASCII character 20
    Quote – ASCII character 254
    Newline – ASCII character 174

3) **OCR Text.** The OCR text provided to the PSI can be delivered two ways. (1) The OCR text can be delivered as multi-page ASCII files. The name of the file must match the IMAGEID field. (2) The OCR text can be included in the Delimited Text file (OCRTEXT field). Option 1 is preferred.

If possible (regardless of delivery method), please place page markers at the beginning or end of each OCR text page as shown:

*** LA000001 ***

The data surrounded by *** is the Concordance Image ImageID.

4) **Concordance Image Cross-Reference file.** The Concordance Image cross-reference file is a comma delimited file consisting of six fields per line. There must be a line in the cross-reference file for every image in the database. The format for the file is as follows:

ImageID,VolumeLabel,ImageFilePath,DocumentBreak,FolderBreak,BoxBreak,PageCount

- *ImageID*: The unique designation that Concordance and Concordance Image use to identify an image.
- *VolumeLabel*: Optional.
- *ImageFilePath:* The full path to the image file.
- *DocumentBreak:* If this field contains the letter "Y," then this is the first page of a document. If this field is blank, then this page is not the first page of a document.
- *FolderBreak:* Leave empty.
- *BoxBreak:* Leave empty.
- *PageCount:* Optional.

B. <u>Email Collections:</u>

Preferred Format: Delimited Text with Images and Native Attachments

1) **Image files.** The producing party will provide a TIFF image for each page of the email and attachment(s). Images must be Group IV TIFF files (single or multi-page files). All images should be Bates numbered. The number of TIFF files per folder should be limited to 1,000 files. Refer to the Paper Documents section for Bates and image key numbering rules.

2) **Native files.** The producing party will provide a copy of the email and native attachment files. The number of native files per folder should be limited to 1,000 files.

3) **Delimited Text file.** The text and metadata of the email and the attachment(s) is extracted and entered in the appropriate fields and provided as an ASCII delimited text file. The email will be the "*parent*" and the attachment(s) will be the "*child.*" An email may have more than one *child*. The *child* attachment's Bates number will be listed in the *parent* email's coded fields under *CHILD_BATES*. If there is more than one attachment, list the first Bates number of each attachment and separate them by semi-colons (;). The *parent* email's Bates number will be listed in the *child(s)* attachment(s) under *PARENT_BATES*. The *child/children* will immediately follow the parent record. The following is a field definition table of the data requested.

Field Definitions - Email

Field	Comment
BEGBATES	First Bates number of email
ENDBATES	Last Bates number of email
BEGATTACH	First Bates number of attachment range
ENDATTACH	Last Bates number of attachment range
PARENT_BATES	First Bates number of parent email
CHILD_BATES	First Bates number of "child" attachment(s); can be more than one Bates number listed; depends on number of attachments
CUSTODIAN	Mailbox where the email resided
FROM	Sender
TO	Recipient(s)
CC	Carbon copy recipient(s)
BCC	Blind carbon copy recipient(s)
SUBJECT	Subject of the email
DATE_SENT	Date the email was sent
TIME_SENT	Time the email was sent; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_SENT field
HYPERLINK	Hyperlink to the email
FILE_EXTEN	The file extension of the email; will vary depending on the email format
AUTHOR	Empty for email
DATE_CREATED	Empty for email
TIME_CREATED	Empty for email
DATE_MOD	Empty for email
TIME_MOD	Empty for email
DATE_ACCESSD	Empty for email
TIME_ACCESSD	Empty for email
PRINTED_DATE	Empty for email
FILE_SIZE	Size of email in KB
INTFILEPATH	Location of email
MESSAGE ID	Unique Identifier from the email system used to duplicate emails
CONVERSION ID	Identifier from the email system used to group and manage related emails
CONVERSATION INDEX	Identifier from the email system used to group and manage related emails
HASHVALUE	Value generated for deduplication
TEXT	Text of the email

Field Definitions - Attachment

Field	Comment
BEGBATES	First Bates number of attachment
ENDBATES	Last Bates number of attachment
BEGATTACH	First Bates number of the attachment range
ENDATTACH	Last Bates number of the attachment range
PARENT_BATES	First Bates number of parent email
CHILD_BATES	First Bates number of "child" attachment(s); can be more than one Bates number listed; depends on number of attachments
CUSTODIAN	Mailbox where the email resided

FROM	Empty for attachment
TO	Empty for attachment
CC	Empty for attachment
BCC	Empty for attachment
SUBJECT	Empty for attachment
DATE_SENT	Empty for attachment
TIME_SENT	Empty for attachment
HYPERLINK	Hyperlink to the native attachment
FILE_EXTEN	The file extension will vary depending on the document type
AUTHOR	Attachment/native file metadata
DATE_CREATED	Attachment metadata
TIME_CREATED	Time the attachment was created; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_CREATED field
DATE_MOD	Attachment metadata
TIME_MOD	Time the attachment was modified; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_MOD field
DATE_ACCESSD	Attachment metadata
TIME_ACCESSD	Time the attachment was accessed; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_ACCESSD field
PRINTED_DATE	Attachment metadata
FILE_SIZE	Size of file in KB
INTFILEPATH	Path where attachment file was stored
HASHVALUE	Value generated for deduplication
TEXT	Text of the attachment

The delimited text file must include a header record. Please refer to the Paper Documents section for ASCII character assignments.

4) **Full Text.** When the full text is not provided in the ASCII delimited text file or if text exceeds 12MB in the TEXT field, the full text provided to the PSI can be delivered as multi-page ASCII files. The name of the file must match the image key field. Any document in which text cannot be extracted should be OCR'd, particularly in the case of PDFs without embedded text.

5) **Concordance Image Cross-Reference file.** The Concordance Image cross-reference file is a comma delimited file consisting of six fields per line. There must be a line in the cross-reference file for every image in the database. Refer to the Paper Documents section for file format.

C. <u>Native Files:</u>

Preferred Format: Delimited Text with Images and Links to Native Files:

1. **Image files.** The producing party will provide a TIFF image of the native files. Images must be Group IV TIFF files (single or multi-page files). All images should be Bates numbered. The number of TIFF files per folder should be limited to 1,000 files. Refer to the Paper Documents section for Bates and image key numbering rules.

2. **Native files.** The producing party will provide a copy of the native files. The number of native files per folder should be limited to 1,000 files.

3. **Delimited Text file.** An ASCII delimited file containing the metadata associated with the file, text extracted from the native file, and a directory path to the native file. The fields to be included in the production are as follows:

FIELD	COMMENT
BEGBATES	First Bates number of native file
ENDBATES	Last Bates number of native file
CUSTODIAN	Individual from whom the documents originated
HYPERLINK	Hyperlink to native file
AUTHOR	
DATE_CREATED	
TIME_CREATED	Time the document was created; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_CREATED field
DATE_MOD	
TIME_MOD	Time the document was modified; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_MOD field
DATE_ACCESSD	
TIME_ACCESSD	Time the attachment was accessed; must be a separate field and cannot be combined with the DATE_ACCESSD field
PRINTED_DATE	
FILE_SIZE	Size of file in KB
PATH	Path where native file was stored
HASHVALUE	Value generated for deduplication
TEXT	Text extracted from native file.

The delimited text file must include a header record. Please refer to the Paper Documents section for ASCII character assignments.

4. **Full Text.** When the full text is not provided in the ASCII delimited text file or if text exceeds 12MB in the TEXT field, the full text provided to the PSI can be delivered as multi-page ASCII files. The name of the file must match the image key field. Any document in which text cannot be extracted should be OCR'd, particularly in the case of PDFs without embedded text.

5. **Concordance Image Cross-Reference file.** The Concordance Image cross-reference file is a comma delimited file consisting of six fields per line. There must be a line in the cross-reference file for every image in the database. Refer to the Paper Documents section for file format.

If Unable to Comply with Format Described Above:

<u>Any proposed formats other than what is listed above should not be produced without prior discussion with PSI staff.</u>

All documents derived from word processing programs, email applications, instant message logs, spreadsheets, and wherever else practicable, may be produced in text searchable PDF format. Spreadsheets shall also be provided in their native form. Audio and video files shall be produced in their native format, although picture files associated with email or word processing programs shall be produced in PDF format along with the document it is contained in or to which it is attached.

Native files may be delivered in Custodian named folders.

If PDFs are delivered, all PDF files must meet the following requirements:

1. All PDFs must be unitized i.e. each PDF represents a discrete document; a single PDF cannot contain multiple documents
2. All PDFs must contain embedded text to include all discernable words within the document, not selected text.
3. The PDF file will be named as the Bates range, with all document text contained within.

# # #

RAND PAUL
KENTUCKY

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 20, 2022

Ms. Rebecca K.C. Hersman
Director
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Stop 6201
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201

Director Hersman:

I write to request additional information regarding the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) activities and operations. On August 3, 2022, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight held a hearing titled, "Revisiting Gain of Function Research: What the Pandemic Taught Us and Where Do We Go from Here."[1] The hearing testimony raised important considerations about the dangers associated with gain of function research and the need for Congress to better understand the nature of taxpayer-funded medical research.

For this reason, I respectfully request you provide my office with the following information no later than 5:00 PM on October 4, 2022:

1. Unredacted copies of any and all records excluded from production under 5 U.S.C. 522(c) with respect to FOIA Request No.: 20-063.
2. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the February 16, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 20-063 including, but not limited to, the records that originated with other U.S. Government agencies.
3. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the March 16, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 20-063.
4. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the March 31, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 20-063.
5. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the April 15, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 20-063.
6. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the April 28, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 20-063.
7. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the May 13, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 20-063.
8. Unredacted copies of any and all records excluded from production under 5 U.S.C. 522(c) with respect to FOIA Request No.: 22-008.

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[1] https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/etso/hearings/revisiting-gain-of-function-research-what-the-pandemic-taught-us-and-where-do-we-go-from-here

9. Unredacted copies of all responsive records produced in the February 17, 2022 production of documents in FOIA Request No.: 22-008.

For any documents that are responsive to this request but not produced, please include a justification and citation of the legal authority that authorizes the withholding of the document from Congress.

The American people have a right to a transparent and open government. I appreciate your attention to this critical matter.

Sincerely,

Rand Paul, M.D.
U.S. Senator

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: FOIA and Congressional RFI Summary Tables
Date: Friday, November 25, 2022 6:33:00 PM
Attachments: DTRA CT FOIA Requests and Congressional RFIs.docx

(b)(6)

I request that the FOIA Team complete the attached tables of FOIAs and Congressional RFIs. The team briefed much of the info to me verbally on Wednesday, but I don't have it in writing in one place. Can the team provide the first version of this to me by Fri 2 Dec, with monthly updates coinciding with the update briefs to me?

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

* Legislative Affairs

  * Senate will be back next week.
  * House will debate NDAA 20SEPT.
  * SECDEF will testify at end of SEP on Afghanistan with SASC and HASC
  * HASC/SASC Gen Milley testimony 22SEPT.
  * HASC markup included five CTR-related items, including EcoHealth Alliance. The provided RFI may go some way towards answering these items. There is no prohibition on working with EcoHealth Alliance.

* CT Front Office

  * NSTR.

* CT A&AS Program Management

  * Turnover discussion ongoing.

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SEP - 7 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR PENTAGON LEADERSHIP
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
DEFENSE AGENCY AND DOD FIELD ACTIVITY DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 23) – Department of Defense Guidance for Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination Attestation and Screening Testing for Unvaccinated Personnel

References:
(a) Safer Federal Workforce Task Force, "COVID-19 Workplace Safety: Agency Model Safety Principles," July 29, 2021
(b) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of Department of Defense Service Members," August 24, 2021
(c) DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," Change 1, December 8, 2020
(d) Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 15) Revision 2 – Department of Defense Guidance for Coronavirus Disease 2019 Laboratory Testing Services," July 2, 2021
(e) Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 22) – Department of Defense Guidance for Coronavirus Disease 2019 Surveillance and Screening Testing," July 21, 2021
(f) DoD Coronavirus Task Force Diagnostics and Testing Lead Memorandum, "Optimization of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Testing Resources," March 8, 2021
(g) Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 18) – Department of Defense Guidance for Protecting All Personnel in Department of Defense Workplaces During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic," March 17, 2021
(h) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense, "DoD Response to the Novel Coronavirus – Cost Reporting Guidance," April 13, 2020

This memorandum provides guidance for implementing additional force health protection and workplace safety measures directed by the White House Safer Federal Workforce Task Force (reference (a)) to reduce the transmission of the virus that causes the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). In accordance with reference (a), attestation of an individual's status as fully vaccinated or presentation of a recent negative COVID-19 test is a condition of physical access to DoD buildings and DoD-leased spaces in non-DoD buildings in which official DoD business takes place (referred to jointly in this memorandum as "DoD facilities"). These additional

measures are necessary to continue protecting the health of all DoD personnel, the communities we live and work in, and to preserve total force readiness.

This memorandum applies to all individuals issued a credential by DoD that affords the individual recurring access, classified herein as "credentialed recurring access" (CRA) (e.g., Common Access Cardholders), to DoD facilities, and to non-DoD individuals seeking access, one time or recurring, in association with the performance of official DoD business ("official visitors") (e.g., to attend a meeting).

This memorandum does not apply to personnel receiving ad hoc access to DoD facilities (e.g., delivery personnel, taxi services); to individuals who have access to the grounds of, but not into the buildings on, DoD installations[1] (e.g., contract groundskeepers, fuel delivery personnel, household goods transportation personnel); to personnel accessing DoD buildings unrelated to the performance of DoD business (e.g., residential housing); or to personnel accessing DoD facilities to receive a public benefit (e.g., commissary; exchange; public museum; air show; Morale, Welfare, and Recreation resources).

Individuals other than visitors seeking access to facilities located on DoD installations but operated by other Federal Departments and Agencies will follow the policies and procedures of that other Department or Agency. Visitors will follow applicable policies and procedures of both DoD and the Department or Agency they are visiting.

In accordance with reference (b), Service members (Armed Forces under DoD authority on active duty or in the Ready Reserve, including the National Guard) are required to be vaccinated for COVID-19, and therefore are not required to complete a DD Form 3150, "COVID-19 Certification of Vaccination" (Attachments 1 and 2), nor are they subject to the COVID-19 screening testing set forth in this guidance (Attachments 3 and 4). Service members who receive an exemption from the vaccination requirement are subject to COVID-19 screening testing set forth in this guidance.

DoD civilian employees (regardless of whether they are authorized to telework or perform remote work) and DoD contractor personnel with CRA must attest to their vaccination status by completing DD Form 3150. Such civilian employees and contractor personnel who are unvaccinated for COVID-19, as defined in this guidance, or who decline to attest to their COVID-19 vaccination status will be subject to COVID-19 screening testing at least weekly as set forth in this guidance (Attachment 3). Such civilian employees and contractor personnel who refuse required screening testing, will be denied access to DoD facilities. Service members who are not on active duty and who also hold a DoD civilian personnel position or who are DoD contractor personnel are subject to the requirements in this paragraph.

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[1] For the purpose of this memorandum, a DoD installation is a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other area under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a Military Department or the Secretary of Defense, including any leased location, or in the case of an activity in a foreign country, any area under the operational control of the Secretary of a Military Department or the Secretary of Defense, without regard to the duration of operational control.

Official visitors will be asked to complete DD Form 3150. Official visitors who are unvaccinated, as defined in this guidance, or who decline to volunteer their vaccination status, must show an electronic or paper copy of negative results from a COVID-19 test administered no earlier than 3 days prior to their visit. If an official visitor is unable to show a negative COVID-19 test result, the visitor may be provided onsite self-testing, if available, or will be denied access to the DoD facilities to which access is sought. Service members who are not on active duty at the time of their visit are subject to the requirements in this paragraph.

Heads of DoD Components, the Director of Administration and Management (for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Components, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities), and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands will:

- publish any necessary supplemental instructions and begin implementing the attestation requirements of this memorandum no later than September 13, 2021, followed by implementation of the screening testing requirements based on the availability of testing supplies; and

- ensure that all contract and associated funding implications are considered.

DoD Components should engage with employee unions at their earliest opportunity as they develop agency-specific testing plans and otherwise satisfy any applicable collective bargaining obligations under the law at the earliest convenience, including on a post-implementation basis where appropriate.

This memorandum and other COVID-19 guidance memoranda are centrally located at: **https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Latest-DOD-Guidance/**.

My point of contact for this guidance is (b)(6) or (b)(6)

Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.

Attachments:
As stated

ATTACHMENT 1
Determining COVID-19 Vaccination Status

1. **Privacy:**
    a. Medical and other information collected from individuals, including vaccination information and test results, will be treated in accordance with applicable laws and policies on privacy, including the Privacy Act of 1974 and DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019 (reference (c)).
    b. Such information, including vaccination status, will be accessible only to authorized DoD personnel who have a need to access the record in the performance of their duties to implement the guidance in this memorandum. DoD Components are advised to consult their Component Privacy Officer if there is a need to share this information outside of DoD.
2. **Determining Vaccination Status for the Purpose of this Guidance:**
    a. An individual will be considered "fully vaccinated" when:
        i. at least 2 weeks have elapsed after a second dose in a two-dose COVID-19 vaccine series, such as of the Pfizer-BioNTech/Comirnaty or Moderna COVID-19 vaccines; or at least 2 weeks have elapsed after a single-dose COVID-19 vaccine, such as Johnson & Johnson's Janssen COVID-19 vaccine. The vaccine may be either authorized for emergency use or fully approved; or
        ii. he or she has completed the recommended dose series of COVID-19 vaccines authorized for emergency use by the World Health Organization (e.g., AstraZeneca/Oxford).
    b. "Unvaccinated" will apply to an individual who either:
        i. has not completed the full COVID-19 vaccination dose series; or
        ii. declines to attest to his or her COVID-19 vaccination status.
    c. Completion of DD Form 3150, "Certificate of Vaccination" (Attachment 2):
        i. Individuals with access to Milconnect (**https://milconnect.dmdc.osd.mil/**) should complete the DD Form 3150 via Milconnect; otherwise use of other means is acceptable.
        ii. For Service members (Armed Forces under DoD authority on active duty or in the Ready Reserve, including the National Guard), commanders will determine the COVID-19 vaccination status of their Service members by accessing the Service-specific Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) system. If a Service member has been vaccinated outside the Military Health System, that Service member must show written proof of his or her COVID-19 vaccination status to update the IMR system.
        iii. For DoD civilian employees (including onsite local national employees and Service members not on active duty who are DoD civilian employees):
            - DoD civilian employees will complete DD Form 3150 and provide an electronic copy or hard copy to the appropriate commander or supervisor.
            - The appropriate commander or supervisor will maintain or access the completed DD Form 3150 in accordance with applicable law and policy, including appropriate privacy protection measures. (See paragraph 1 of this attachment).

iv. For DoD contractor personnel with CRA (including Service members not on active duty who are employees of DoD contractors):
    - DoD contractor personnel will complete DD Form 3150; and
    - Maintain a copy of the completed DD Form 3150 and show it to authorized DoD personnel, upon request.
    - Failure to complete the DD Form 3150 may result in denial of access to the DoD facility to which access is sought.

v. For official visitors (including Service members not on active duty):
    - Official visitors will complete DD Form 3150; and
    - Maintain a copy of the completed DD Form 3150 and show it to authorized DoD personnel, upon request.
    - Failure to complete the DD Form 3150 may result in denial of access to the DoD facility to which access is sought.

ATTACHMENT 2
DD Form 3150 – "Certification of Vaccination"

CUI (when filled in)

CERTIFICATION OF VACCINATION

OMB No. 0704-0613
Expiration: 20220228

AGENCY DISCLOSURE NOTICE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 2 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, at whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.dd-dod-informationcollections@mail.mil. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: DoD is authorized to collect the information on this form pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13991, Protecting the Federal Workforce and Requiring Mask Wearing and E.O. 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Program for Federal Employees; as well as 10 U.S.C. 113, 10 U.S.C. 136, 10 U.S.C. 7013, 10 U.S.C. 8013, 10 U.S.C. 9013, 10 U.S.C. 2672, 5 U.S.C. chapters 11, and 79, and DoD Instruction 6200.03.

Principal Purpose: This information is being collected and maintained to implement Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) workplace safety plans, including DoD's COVID-19 testing programs, and to ensure the safety and protection of the DoD workforce, workplace, and other DoD facilities and environments consistent with the above-referenced authorities, the COVID-19 Workplace Safety: Agency Model Safety Principles established by the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force, and guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Routine Use(s): While the information requested on this form is intended to be used primarily for internal purposes, in certain circumstances it may be necessary to disclose this information externally, for example to disclose information to: a person, organization, or governmental entity as necessary and relevant to notify them of, respond to, or guard against a public health emergency or other similar crisis, including to comply with laws governing the reporting of communicable disease or other laws concerning health and safety in the work environment; adjudicative bodies (e.g., the Merit System Protection Board), arbitrators, and hearing examiners to the extent necessary to carry out their authorized duties regarding Federal employment; contractors, grantees, experts, consultants, students, and others as necessary to perform their duties for the Federal government; agencies, courts, and persons as necessary and relevant in the course of litigation, and as necessary and in accordance with requirements for law enforcement; or to a person authorized to act on your behalf. A complete list of routine uses may be found in the applicable System of Records Notice (SORN) associated with the collection of this information. For most Federal employees: OPM/GOVT-10, Employee Medical File System of Records, **75 Fed. Reg. 35099 (Jun. 21, 2010)**, amended **80 Fed. Reg. 74815 (Nov. 30, 2015)**. For Federal employees not covered by OPM/GOVT-10, contractor personnel, and other DoD-affiliated persons: DPR 39 DoD, DoD Personnel Accountability and Assessment System of Records, 85 Fed. Reg. 17047 (Mar. 26, 2020) (also available at https://dpcld.defense.gov/Portals/49/Documents/Privacy/SORNs/OSDJS/DPR-39-DoD.pdf).

Consequences of Failure to Provide Information: Providing this information is voluntary. However, if you fail to provide this information, you will be treated as not fully vaccinated for purposes of implementing safety measures, including with respect to mask-wearing, physical distancing, testing, travel, quarantine, and restrictions on access to DoD facilities and environments. Failure to provide such information may also hinder DoD's ability to implement COVID-19 workplace safety plans, thereby increasing the health or safety risk to DoD-affiliated personnel and DoD facilities.

INSTRUCTIONS: This form should be completed by civilian employees, onsite contractor employees, and other individuals if required in accordance with current DoD Force Health Protection Guidance. Service members should not complete this form.

1. NAME ***(Last, First, MI)***:

2. DoD ID NUMBER:

3. PLEASE CHECK THE BOX BELOW THAT COINCIDES WITH YOUR COVID-19 VACCINATION STATUS:

☐ I am fully vaccinated.
Individuals are considered "fully vaccinated" two weeks after completing the second dose of a two-dose COVID-19 vaccine (e.g., Pfizer-BioNTech or Moderna) or two weeks after receiving a single dose of a one-dose vaccine (e.g., Johnson & Johnson/Janssen).

☐ I am not yet fully vaccinated. I received my first dose of Moderna or Pfizer and my second appointment is scheduled, or I received my final dose of any vaccine less than two weeks ago.

☐ I have not been vaccinated.

☐ I decline to respond.

Individuals who choose not to complete the form will be assumed to be not fully vaccinated for purposes of application of the safety protocols. If you are not vaccinated due to medical or religious reasons, please check either "I have not been vaccinated" or "I decline to respond." Note that if you have already received one dose of a vaccine, but are not yet fully vaccinated, or if you received your final dose less than two weeks ago, then you will be treated as not fully vaccinated until you are at least two weeks past your final dose and resubmit your vaccination information.

☐ I attest that the information provided in this form is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge.

I understand that a knowing and willful false statement on this form can be punished by fine or imprisonment or both (18 U.S.C. 1001). Checking "I decline to respond" does not constitute a false statement. I understand that making a false statement on this form could result in additional administrative action including an adverse personnel action up to and including removal from my position.

4. DATE ***(YYYYMMDD)***

5. SIGNATURE ***(Full Name)***

ATTACHMENT 3
COVID-19 Screening Testing Requirements for DoD Civilian Employees and DoD Contractor Personnel with CRA

1. For DoD civilian employees and DoD contractor personnel with CRA who attest that they are fully vaccinated for COVID-19 using the DD Form 3150, COVID-19 screening testing under this policy is not required. COVID-19 screening testing may be required or offered pursuant to references (d)–(f) regardless of vaccination status.
2. For DoD civilian employees and DoD contractor personnel with CRA, DoD Components will:
    a. execute the screening testing requirement with COVID-19 self-collection kits or self-tests at least weekly that can be performed primarily onsite on the installation or facility with proper supervision and documentation of testing results. If onsite COVID-19 screening testing is not feasible, as an alternative the self-testing can be performed at home or in other locations (Note: these COVID-19 self-tests do not require a health care provider's clinical care order and are, therefore, considered an over-the-counter test and do not require medical support to complete);
    b. procure and provide these COVID-19 self-tests and establish guidance for where and how these tests will be distributed and conducted and how results are to be reported.
        i. DoD civilian employees are responsible for providing documentation of negative COVID-19 test results, upon receipt, to the appropriate commander or supervisor. DoD civilian employees may not be required to use their own personal equipment for the purpose of documenting test results; offsite tests may not be used if there is not a means to document results using government equipment. The commander or supervisor is responsible for maintaining any COVID-19 test results provided by DoD civilian employees in accordance with applicable law and policy, including appropriate privacy protection measures (See paragraph 1 of Attachment 1).
        ii. DoD contractor personnel with CRA will maintain a copy of their most recent COVID-19 test result and show such results to authorized DoD personnel, upon request.
3. After screening testing procedures are established, for COVID-19 unvaccinated DoD civilian employees and contractor personnel with CRA entering a DoD facility, COVID-19 screening testing with a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorized or approved test is required and a negative COVID-19 screening test result is required for entry into the worksite in the DoD facility. If the COVID-19 screening test is administered offsite, the negative result must be from a test performed in the past 3 days. If the negative result is over 3 days old, a new test is required.
4. DoD civilian employees and contractor personnel with CRA who have positive COVID-19 screening tests will be required to remain away from the workplace in accordance with reference (g). DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor personnel with CRA with positive COVID-19 screening tests will be offered, but are not required to take, confirmatory laboratory-based molecular (i.e., polymerase chain reaction) testing paid for by their DoD Component. If the confirmatory test is negative, the individual is not COVID-19 positive and will be allowed into the workplace. Contact tracing will be conducted in accordance with references (d) and (e).

5. For DoD civilian employees, COVID-19 screening testing is expected to take no more than 1 hour of regular duty time, per test, to complete required testing as directed by the DoD Component. This includes time for travel to the testing site, time to complete testing, and time to return to work. Laboratory-based confirmatory COVID-19 testing for initial positive screening test results is expected to take no more than 2 hours of duty time. Commanders and supervisors will monitor duty time usage and keep duty time used for testing within these parameters to the extent possible.
6. Refusal of COVID-19 testing by unvaccinated DoD civilian employees:
    a. DoD Components may initiate adverse employment action, up to and including removal, against unvaccinated civilian employees who refuse COVID-19 testing.
    b. DoD Components may bar such employees from their worksites on the installation or facility to protect the safety of others, including while adverse action is pending. While barred from their worksites on the installation or facility, such employees may be required to telework or will be placed on administrative leave, as appropriate.
    c. A religious or medical exemption from COVID-19 vaccination is not an exemption from the COVID-19 testing required by this policy. If a DoD civilian employee requires a religious or medical exemption from participation in COVID-19 screening tests, DoD Components should follow existing processes to determine if an appropriate flexibility or accommodation may be provided.

ATTACHMENT 4
Requirements for Obtaining Self-Collection Kits and Self-Tests

1. COVID-19 self-tests must have Instructions for Use and FDA Approval, 510(K) clearance or have an FDA Emergency Use Authorization, and will be made available through the Defense Logistics Agency.
2. Cost reporting for the purchase of testing materials or reimbursement for member tests should be in accordance with reference (h).
3. Funding for COVID-19 testing: If self-collection kits or self-tests are not available:
    a. DoD Components are responsible for funding required COVID-19 screening tests.
    b. Each DoD Component will establish procedures to reimburse Service members and DoD civilian employees for COVID-19 screening tests that require payment for purposes of meeting the screening testing requirement (e.g., if the screening test is not available through the DoD Component and must be administered by a facility who charges for the test).
    c. For COVID-19 testing of DoD contractor employees with CRA, DoD Components will offer COVID-19 testing similar to that offered to DoD civilian employees at the DoD Component's expense and at no cost to the employee or their employer.

* CTR 3.0

  * Briefing to DTRA policy will occur 22 OCT, location TBD.
  * Briefs are being drafted by CT senior leaders; plan to walk through briefs with CT FO leadership early next week prior to brief.
  * Dr. Pope would like to attend at the beginning, if calendar permits, to provide opening remarks, as well as at the conclusion and happy hour.

* Weekly NCB/Policy meeting

  * Policy has agreed to NCB request to change CTR 3.0 to a new name, TBD.
  * (b)(6) has arrived. He has a one-on-one meeting with DDIR scheduled for 18 OCT. Will be getting answers for CTR with respect to Uzbekistan, the Kenya Agreement renewal, and the French Embassy.

* Prohibition of funding to EcoHealth Alliance appeal – Policy is reaching across the department before making a determination whether it goes to the Hill. Thank you to BTRP for the input into this appeal effort.
* Policy Priorities document changes complete, out for GO/FO Coordination

  * (b)(6) will send a copy to CTR soon.
  * CT's suspense is 26 OCT.

* Russia/China collaborating in protesting alleged U.S. and allies' noncompliance with Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) demarche to counter under development at Policy.

* CT CoS Notes

* CTR tracking both military and civilian vaccination status. Five CT persons are not yet validated as vaccine; one has filed a reasonable accommodation request.
* It is no longer numerically possible to achieve full vaccination via the Moderna vaccine by the 22 NOV deadline. Personnel using the Pfizer vaccine will need to have their first shot by next week to achieve full vaccination. If using Johnson & Johnson/Janssen vaccine, the single shot is needed by 8 NOV. Please note that Johnson & Johnson vaccines are limited in availability in the DC Metro area.
* Reasonable accommodation requests will be adjudicated within 30 days. If requests for exemption are not upheld, the requester will receive a timeline for certifying vaccination.

* CT-BT

* Assessing options and assembling talking points in response to possible Kazakhstan incident. Will brief to leadership when assembled.
* CTR 3.0 brief under development.
* CDC call that was slated for 14 OCT rescheduled to new date; TBD.

* CT-SE

* Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons call scheduled for 15 OCT.

  * SE will not be attending (b)(6) will instead attend and provide readout, and will discuss with State the appropriateness of reaching out directly to CTR.

* CT-PP

  * Quarterly working group with OSD 15 OCT. Philippine taxes currently under discussion.

* CT-PI

  * NSTR.

* Finance

  * NSTR.

* Contracting

  * Not present.

* General Counsel

  * Not present.

* Intel Support

  * Angola New Country engagement for BTRP expected to through review by COB 14 OCT.
  * (b)(6) will be on TW 18 OCT, OOO for next two weeks (b)(6) is out next week (b)(6) is CT's POC.

* Security

  * Not present.

* Strategic Communications and Public Affairs

  * Not present.

* Legislative Affairs

  * Congress is in recess.
  * Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense will release NDAA text tomorrow 15 OCT; final amount will likely be close to FY22 PB.
  * SASC nominations next week, to include Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Sasha Baker.

* CT Front Office

  * NSTR.

* CT A&AS Program Management

  * Beginning 18 Oct, all persons entering Terminal Road facility will need to show proof of vaccination or negative test within previous 72 hours.
  * Between 15-18 OCT, many A&AS personnel will be transferring contract from BAH to Noblis. Anticipate downtime based on GFE availability.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

CTR Director's Action Group Lead

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

CTR A&AS Contractor

Octant Associates, LLC | Booz Allen Hamilton

Corporate emai (b)(6)

NIP (b)(6)

SIP

Mai

Des

Mob

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, sensitive and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you received this communication in error, please do not distribute but delete the original message. Please notify the sender by email at the address shown. Thank you for your compliance.

* (b)(6) will attended a CTR101 briefing led by DDIR and possibly representatives from each department.

o Additional EcoHealth Alliance tasker from HASC yesterday reiterating questions about CTR involvement with EcoHealth

* Requesting grant information, to include funding amounts, and project status reports—due Friday 20 AUG at 1000.

* BTRP already submitted link to their input, including 9 grant totals.

* CT CoS Notes

o Attended Return to Work Meeting

* CoS notes will be forthcoming.

* CT-BT

o Pakistan

* CTR and FAO were coordinating Pakistan work—confirm that we are not initiating new work? (DIR: Correct.)

o Working to minimize people coming into DTRC, including supervisors, due to COVID concerns.

* CT-SE

o NCT Validation exercise week of 25-29 OCT. DIR to travel to exercise on 27 OCT.

* CT-PP

o BPCIC will produce first sent of country engagement plans (Bulgaria, Romania). Next set may include Georgia, Lebanon, Thailand, and Philippines. Need submissions for African nations to include.

* CT-PI

o Preparing for JAF Distinguished Visit and CWMD BPC Meeting.

* Finance

o Business Meeting slides have gone out afternoon 18AUG.

* Contracting

* We were alerted yesterday that FEVS data is posted to DTRA1.
* Travel medicine clinic: (b)(6) is departing and there will be gap before the backfill arrives. The clinic will need more time to take care of CT needs during this period. Please allow more time.
* DLA still has mask guidance that is different from DTRA; masks are required. Consider wearing a mask inside DLA.
* Kingman Gate onto Fort Belvoir (NOT into DTRC) will be closing 1 June for budget reasons. Other gates will need to be used moving forward. Some post amenities may be closing.
* (b)(6) ASD nominee) hearing has been moved to the right. Rosenblum hearing is still next week.
* EU is now opening up to U.S. travelers.
* DIR DAG will no longer be tasking Directorates directly.
* DTRA Post-COVID policies may be ready for announcement next week.
* INDOPACOM: locally employed staff are feeling isolated. PI and relevant programs should look for ways to connect with these staff members.

* CT DDIR Notes

* OI will be taking over MSG efforts. (b)(6) will be point of contact for the transition.
* QFR from (b)(6) hearing dealing with EcoHealth: we will be answering this this afternoon. RD has equities that complicate the CT response. BT is working with LA to make the DTRA response accurate.

* CT CoS Notes

* Daily building access requests need to more closely adhere to policies. Please be more compliant in being accurate with requests. Accountability must be kept as CT has a 25% workforce-in-the-DTRC ceiling, so CT CoS must know who is coming. Full legal names plus one sentence on who is coming in is needed the day before access.

* CT-BT

* BT is standing by to finish the EcoHealth Alliance RFI.
* BT is standing by to finish prep for CCMD/Policy Deep Dives and is looking for clarity on their scheduling.

* CT-SE

* NSTR.

* CT-PP

* Upcoming travel optional for Dr. Pope (does not plan to travel).

* CT-PI

* (b)(6) is on leave this week – please copy (b)(6) on communications.

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FOR REVIEW AND SIGNATURE: Letters for World One Health Congress
Date: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 9:47:24 AM
Attachments: DTRA_1A_AfOHNet Committee Letter_25Sep2020 +aab.pdf
DTRA_1A_AfOHNet Hackathon Winners Letter_25Sep2020 +aab.pdf
WOHC Letters AfOHNet Committee.rtf
WOHC Letters AfOHNet Hackathon Winners.rtf

Good Morning Sir,

Please find attached two DTRA 1A forms for signature on two separate letters (AfOHNet Steering Committee and Hackathon Winners). The two letter templates have also been attached for your review and approval.

Once the templates are approved, the BTRP team can print out the addressed letters (28 in total) and meet someone at DTRA to give to them to give to you. Once signed, they can pick them up as well so they can mail out the original signed letters.

Background Information and Rationale for your recognition is below:

AfOHNet Steering Committee Background:

The African One Health Congress Steering Committee initiated at the Africa One Health Congress (AOHC) meeting in February, 2019. The steering committee has worked hard since the congress meeting to connect existing One Health initiatives and networks across the continent and to formalize collaboration and communication.

In 2020, the steering committee focused on the development of an Africa One Health Network website, which is now live and being finalized. The website will be used as a launchpad to coordinate and follow through on regional actions and activities. The committee is planning for an in-person meeting in 2021 that will focus on identifying additional One Health (OH) champions and emerging regional experts. The 2021 meeting will also outline and describe the health burden of threats at both the national and regional levels and aim to coordinate solutions and activities to address the burden. We'd like to present the eight steering committee members with a letter and token of appreciation for their continued momentum and drive to develop and further the committee. They are working towards an informal charter agreement and have had at least three meetings in the past three months to continue planning towards their goals. The steering committee has persevered during COVID and become stronger than ever. BTRP recognizes their efforts and feels like it is appropriate to open their virtual committee meeting that is connected to the WOHC with a short mention of appreciation and reference to the letter and coin.

Hackathon Winners Background:

At the 2019 AOHC in Johannesburg, South Africa, an OH "Hackathon" was implemented to advance collaborations amongst the African partners attending the conference. A Hackathon is a marathon-like event where small teams must work together to solve large global challenges which usually result in idea solutions, prototypes, and new technologies.

Eight teams (6 members each) participated and worked diligently on one of two OH tracks (Early Warning Biosurveillance or Biosafety and Biosecurity). At the end of the event, the AOHC Steering Committee and representatives from BTRP, USAID, CDC, EcoHealth Alliance, the Australian Animal Health Laboratory, and the OH Platform judged the final solutions from each team and announced three teams as winners. The winning teams truly exemplified the spirit of genuine collaboration, innovation, sustainability, and commitment to OH. The first group proposed conducting biological risk management training and community outreach in Eastern Africa to harmonize regional OH BS&S guidelines, strategies, modeling tools, and policies. The second group proposed the development of a cloud-based surveillance system that included sample collection on the ground and a cloud component to collect mobile reporting of animal/human syndromes. The last group proposed to develop a mechanism to engage the community in biosurveillance through caller tune technology. The prize for these winning teams was for each member to be fully sponsored by BTRP to attend the World One Health Congress in Edinburgh this year. However, due to COVID-19, they will no longer be able to attend in person. BTRP recognizes these teams' hard work and dedication to OH and feels it is important to further acknowledge and support their work through a letter and coin.

Rationale for CTR Director Recognition:

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Thanks in advance for your thoughts and consideration.

V/R,

(b)(6)

Booz | Allen | Hamilton

CTR A&AS Support Contractor

Executive Assistant in support of the Director

Direct Line (b)(6)

CTR Mainl

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
8725 JOHN J. KINGMAN ROAD, STOP 6201
FORT BELVOIR, VA 22060-6201

September XX, 2020

Dr. XX XXX
Office XXX
Ministry of XXX

RE: Letter of Invitation to attend the upcoming World One Health Congress Virtual Meeting scheduled for 30 October to 3 November 2020.

(b)(5)

Sincerely,

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
8725 JOHN J. KINGMAN ROAD, STOP 6201
FORT BELVOIR, VA 22060-6201

September XX, 2020

Dr. XX XXX
Office XXX
Ministry of XXX

RE: Letter of Invitation to attend the upcoming World One Health Congress Virtual Meeting scheduled for 30 October to 3 November 2020

(b)(5)

Sincerely,

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: FOR REVIEW: FY21 CTR Annual Report to Congress
Date: Monday, January 11, 2021 2:20:26 PM
Attachments: 20200111_FY21 CTR Annual Report to Congress_for GOFO Coordination_CT+FM input.docx

Dr. Pope,

Please find attached the ARC with consolidated input from SE, PP, BT, and Finance. PI confirmed they had no comment or edits. The edits this round were minimal and we have adjudicated or accepted all edits or comments save for an ROK maritime question (page 45) and a GNS SOUTHCOM question (page 57). Our respective programs provided an answer to the question in both cases.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Booz | Allen | Hamilton

CTR A&AS Support Contractor

Director's Action Group Action Officer

Direct Line: (b)(6)

CTR Mainli

NIPR (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt
<dtra.belvoir.dir.list.la-govt@mail.mil>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

(b)(6) -- Sorry; I'm just seeing this now, as I was on leave on Friday afternoon. This language works great for CTR, as it prohibits work in China, but does not prohibit us from working with performers such as EcoHealth Alliance elsewhere.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 2:47 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt
<dtra.belvoir.dir.list.la-govt@mail.mil>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Gentlemen,

R&E just sent us a short fused informal review request.

BLUF: HASC staff are crafting an amendment with the text below and are looking for DoDs informal view on it (concur, non-concur, any suggestions). We anticipate this amendment will be proposed during committee markups next Wednesday, hence the short turn request. Seems straightforward to me.

(b)(5)

Please let us know your thoughts.
V/r,

(b)(6)

Chief of Legislative Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Offic (b)(6)
Cell:

-----Original Message-----
From: Nair, Bindu R SES OSD OUSD R&E (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 2:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Dear DTRA Team,

See below for a quick turn request from Congress. Let me know if you have any edits/concerns and/or if you wish to have a short phone call. Please let A&S know that I am requesting your support - I didn't remember who to copy.

Best,

Bindu

Good afternoon,

We just received this hot tasker for an informal view of the below amendment. This is apparently being drafted right now on the Hill, so a response as quickly as possible would be great. We need a concur or non-concur and a few sentences justifying why. Thank you!!!

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Senior Legislative Analyst

Strategic Analysis, Inc.

OUSD(R&E), Research, Technology, and Laboratories

(b)(6)

(b)(6) (Cell - Best to use during telework)

(Office)

-----Original Message-----

From (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:58 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: HOT - informal view from (b)(6) for Dr. Nair - FW: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Importance: High

Hello (b)(6)

This is a very high priority request, and please work with Dr. Nair on a response by COB today if possible.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Congressional & Public Affairs Analyst | Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, Research & Technology - DDR&E(R&T) | Email: (b)(6) <mailt | Mobile (b)(6) Desk Phone (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:49 PM

To: (b)(6) Nair, Bindu R SES OSD OUSD R&E (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6)

Subject: HOT - informal view from (b)(6) for Dr. Nair - FW: !!! HASC NDAA
Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Importance: High

Hi Dr. Nair and (b)(6) and (b)(6) nd (b)(6)

Please see below from (b)(6) on a request for views. Between Basic Research and PD Biotech, can you please provide a concur/nonconcur, or comments on the notional language below?

Language is being drafted AS WE SPEAK so this is very hot, and we need to reply by Monday at 1pm.

Thanks,

v/r

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:37 PM

To: OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E List USD-FO Congressional
(b)(6)

Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Team,

Quick turn HASC NDAA Informal View request below the tear line from (b)(6)
Please make sure the Director of Basic Research sees/approves.

This looks like a pretty easy one.

(b)(6)

For R&E RT input please -- please include Director of Basic Research input.

(b)(5)

Bindu R. Nair, Ph.D.

Director, Basic Research

OUSD (R&E)/ RT/ RTL

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] 9/28 Consolidated Clips--Focus BWC
Date: Wednesday, September 29, 2021 9:52:39 AM
Attachments: 928clips.pdf

FYI attached - yesterday's catch of combined RUS/PRC disinfo (more of the latter). Other than more chatter about the BWC, no change in narratives.

PRC: Fort Detrick, UNC (Barric), DoD 200~ labs, etc. (volume has been turned down, but the record still plays).
RUS: After several weeks of volume increase, the volume has been turned down, record still plays - but less than PRC)

(b)(6)

All,

Attached are the consolidated clips of interest for past week. While much of the aggressive information campaign subsided, a spate of articles did appear in the past two days pulling together the story-lines related to Unit 731, Labs investigation, and calling into question US compliance with the BWC. Speculatively, this up-tick could be a response to stories that the WHO may renew its investigation into COVID sources, and the lab-leak possibility in particular.

VR

(b)(6)

Updated on: Tuesday, September 28, 2021, 02:53 AM IST

WHO to relaunch Covid origins probe with fresh team (INDIA)

A joint WHO-China inquiry, whose findings were released in March this year, had dismissed the possibility that the virus had emerged accidentally from a laboratory as "extremely unlikely"

Washington: The World Health Organisation (WHO) is set to relaunch investigations into the origins of the Covid-19, with a fresh probe team, the media reported.

A new team consists of about 20 scientists, and includes specialists in laboratory safety and biosecurity and geneticists and animal-disease experts versed in how viruses spill over from nature. They will hunt for new evidence in China and elsewhere, the Wall Street Journal reported.

A joint WHO-China inquiry, whose findings were released in March this year, had dismissed the possibility that the virus had emerged accidentally from a laboratory as "extremely unlikely".

Undermining its own report, Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus in July, proposed a second phase of studies in Wuhan, which includes audits of laboratories and markets in the city of Wuhan.

As per Ghebreyesus, getting access to raw data had been a challenge for the international team that travelled to China to investigate the source of the pandemic.

According to scientists at the global health body, time is running out to determine how the pandemic began, as evidenced such as blood samples are being thrown away and antibodies in the earliest Covid-19 victims are fading to undetectable levels.

China has, however, rejected the probe accusing the WHO of "arrogance" and a "disrespect for common sense".

Chinese scientists have also asked the WHO to extend the hunt for origins of Covid-19 to labs in other countries including the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

As a result, the new team who will be chosen by the end of this week, are likely to face stiff resistance from China. The original WHO team has been disbanded, the WSJ report said.

The Chinese government has declined to clear whether it would allow a new team into the country.

The Foreign Ministry, in a statement, said that China has "cooperated fully" with the previous inquiry, the report added.

"China will continue to support and engage in global science-based origins tracing and stands firmly opposed to political maneuvering in whatever form," Chinese President Xi Jinping told the UN General Assembly last week.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry had stated that the country will closely monitor the WHO's selection of a new team, and that Beijing has also put forth a number of individuals to be part of it, the report said.

It is not yet clear if the new team will be able to fly experts into China or make significant progress in resolving the origins debate so long as that deadlock remains.

The new team's "priority needs to be data and access in the country where the first reports were identified", a WHO spokesman was quoted as saying.

https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/who-to-relaunch-covid-origins-probe-with-fresh-team

Western accusations against China over coronavirus

15:55 22 September 2021 / IA Krasnaya Vesna

Wuhan scientists wanted to infect bats with coronavirus in 2018

VC Telegram FB Twitter Youtube Instagram Zen rss

Image: Olga Skopina © IA Krasnaya Vesna

Study of the coronavirus Study of the coronavirus

The improved airborne coronavirus particles were planned to be released into the population of Chinese bats by scientists from Wuhan, The Telegraph reported on September 22.

Google.NewsIA channel Krasnaya Vesna in Google News

A leaked grant application document revealed that researchers applied for $ 14 million in funding for a research project in 2018.

The plan was to release coronavirus particles into a colony of cave bats to vaccinate them against diseases that could spread to humans.

The application was submitted by British zoologist Peter Dashak of the EcoHealth Alliance, an American organization that works closely with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in research on bat coronaviruses.

The team included Dr. Shi Zhengli, a WIV researcher dubbed "the woman bat," and American researchers from the University of North Carolina and the US Geological Survey's National Wildlife Health Center.

Documents show that just 18 months before the first cases of Covid-19 emerged, researchers unveiled plans to release skin-penetrating nanoparticles and aerosols containing coronavirus "novel chimeric spike proteins" for cave bats in Yunnan, China.

They also planned to create chimeric viruses genetically modified to infect humans more easily, and requested $ 14 million from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to fund the work.

The documents, confirmed by a former member of the Trump administration, show that they hoped to introduce "human-specific cleavage sites" into the bats' coronaviruses , which would facilitate the virus's entry into human cells.

The documents were published by Drastic, a research group created by scientists from around the world to find out the origin of Covid-19.

"Given what we find in this proposal discussing the planned introduction of human-specific cleavage sites, a broader scientific review of the plausibility of artificial implantation is warranted ," Drastic said.

The grant application also included plans to mix natural high-risk coronavirus strains with more infectious, but less dangerous varieties.

Recall that DARPA was created to develop new types of weapons - this is a division of the US Department of Defense. We also remind that the EcoHealth Alliance policy advisor is David Franz, who worked in Fort Detrick in the 1990s and finished his service with the rank of colonel.

Wuhan

ИА Красная Весна

Читайте материал целиком по ссылке:

https://rossaprimavera-ru.translate.goog/news/e1b85b38

DAY.AZ

Russia criticized US and EU for unwillingness to certify Sputnik V

Worldwide , 28 September 2021 10:40 664



The unwillingness to certify the Russian vaccine against coronavirus infection "Sputnik V" may have a certain medical and biological intent. This opinion was expressed on Tuesday by the deputy secretary of the United Russia General Council Andrei Klimov, who heads the international activities commission of the party's General Council Presidium, on the Echo of Moscow radio station, Day.Az reports with reference to TASS .

"Until now, I don't understand why the European Union cannot certify Sputnik. Well, the United States could, in principle, do the same, but it doesn't. attitude to medicine and biology. This is really an attempt to prove that our vaccine is somehow different, "he said.

Klimov also recalled the scandalous situation when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe practically did not let the representatives of the Russian delegation vaccinated with the Sputnik V vaccine to the autumn session and perceived them as "some not such delegates."

"Although, in principle, all this should be regulated by international law. The pandemic has shown many imperfections in legal norms," he said.

Sputnik V has not yet received approval from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) for use in the European Union. With regard to this Russian vaccine, the position of the European Commission has remained unchanged since the start of the EU covid certification system in early July. Community states that use Sputnik V (eg Hungary) have the right to issue European digital vaccination certificates for it, but the rest of the EU may or may not accept these documents at their own discretion.

Sputnik V was registered in Russia on August 11, 2020, becoming the world's first officially registered coronavirus vaccine.

Lancet Task Force Probing COVID Origins Disbanded 'in Favour of Wider Biosafety Research'

Daria Bedenko

Earlier in September, medical journal The Lancet published a letter signed by more than a dozen virologists calling for an "objective, open and transparent debate" on the origins of the coronavirus outbreak, with the authors arguing there is no evidence of a natural origin.

Columbia University professor Jeffrey Sachs has announced the closure of a task force affiliated with the Lancet medical journal that was investigating the origins of COVID-19, .

According to Sachs, chairman of The Lancet COVID-19 commission, it was done in order to favour a "wider biosafety research". He told the WSJ that studies into the origins of the novel coronavirus are to be continued, but the

scope will be broadened so that other biosafety experts in concerns including government oversight and transparency could make their input.

A report about their findings is expected to be released in mid-2022.

Per the WSJ, Sachs closed the commission over concerns about its links to EcoHealth Alliance, an organisation led by Peter Daszak, a leader of the task force probing the origins of COVID-19. The organisation reportedly used US funds for studies on bat coronaviruses carried out in cooperation with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Daszak led the task force until stepping down in June, and other members were said to have collaborated with him or EcoHealth Alliance on projects.

The Lancet commission has not released any official statement after the report.

Lancet Letter Urges 'Objective Debate' on COVID Origins, Says Lab-Related Accident 'Plausible'

Earlier in September, The Lancet published a letter from 16 virologists claiming that there was no direct evidence of the natural origin of COVID. The publication came after the journal as conspiracies, saying that scientists "overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife".

The origin of coronavirus remains a highly sensitive issue for some in the United States, with debates still unfolding over whether the viral disease emerged naturally or was a result of some kind of laboratory incident.

Officials of the former Trump administration have repeatedly alleged that China could have concealed the true origin of the virus, entertaining the idea that it escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and demanding an investigation. Beijing dismissed the claims, wondering why would the US call for probing the Chinese labs instead of allowing investigators into Fort Detrick - an American military base in Maryland which, according to some allegations, could have also produced the novel coronavirus.

Several pieces of research, including those made with the involvement of the World Health Organisation, have determined that COVID-19 most likely originated naturally. In late August, US released an intelligence report on the novel coronavirus, which said that the virus was not developed as a biological weapon. The American intelligence community remains divided over the exact origins of COVID-19.

https://sputniknews.com/20210925/lancet-task-force-probing-covid-origins-disbanded-in-favour-of-wider-biosafety-research-1089407429.html

WEIBO C/O VANNEVAR LABS "DECRYPT" TECHNOLOGY

Weibo-The-Sound-of-the-South-China-Sea_recent

1357Z 28Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

He also pointed out that Fort Detrick in the United States was and still is the research center for biological warfare in the United States. The international community should form an investigation team to investigate the biological military activities of the United States. The United States is the most opaque country with the most biomilitarization activities in the world

Weibo-Let's watch the anecdotes of the world

0838Z 28Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

In addition, the United States also included Ishii Shiro in Fort Detrick to continue the experiment. As one of the signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States has now established more than 200 biological laboratories in 25 countries and regions including the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, and has repeatedly caused major leaks due to poor supervision. In fact, the United States has made great efforts to make American exceptions in the field of biological weapons. Is there any qualification to say that the United States is an exception? The so-called exception in the United States is just another expression of American privilege. It is no wonder that 182 countries are opposed to the United States, because the US approach is not popular at all and will inevitably be spurned.

Weibo-Depending-daily-military

1447Z 28Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

On the 28th, Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency Director Naryshkin stated that the so-called "New Crown Traceability Report" issued by the United States a month ago was not only extremely unprofessional, but was obviously a lie made up for political purposes. Naryshkin also pointed out that on the one hand, the U.S. report claimed that the new crown epidemic was not developed as a

biological weapon, but on the other hand, it pointed the finger at China. This not only contradicted itself, but also seriously hindered the traceability work and aggravated the world. Russia firmly opposes the degree of tension in the situation. Coincidentally. Before the Russian side spoke out, Pakistan and other 65 countries supported China in the UN Human Rights Council, stating that they resolutely opposed the Western countries headed by the United States and any interference in China's internal affairs based on political purposes and false information. It can be seen that the United States' intention to fabricate facts, reverse right and wrong, in order to slander other countries, and then achieve ulterior political goals, has once again been countered by the international community. This shows that hegemonism is ultimately unpopular and everyone shouts at it. The sinister purpose of the United States can only end in failure. The so-called "American hegemony" will eventually be swept into the garbage dump of history. In short, justice is in the hearts of the people! White can't be black, black can't be white. The United States has the courage to plant and discredit other countries. Why doesn't it dare to conduct self-examination or invite the WHO to investigate the "bad" Fort Detrick to remove suspicion for itself? After all, paper cannot contain fire; it is a fox, and it will show its tail after all! Sooner or later, the United States will pay a heavy price for its wrongdoing!

Weibo-Peoples-Daily-Overseas-Edition-Overseas-Network
0330Z 28Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

He also pointed out that Fort **Detrick** in the United States was and still is the research center for biological warfare in the United States. The international community should form an investigation team to investigate the biological military activities of the United States. In 2001, the United States unilaterally withdrew from negotiations on the verification protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention on the grounds of "non-verification in the biological field." For 20 years, the United States has been exclusively opposed to the resumption of negotiations, resulting in the delay in establishing a multilateral biological weapons verification mechanism. At the same time, the United States has more than 200 **biological laboratories** overseas to carry out secret biological experiments; Fort **Detrick** in its territory has also been exposed by foreign media repeatedly to have bio-safety incidents. The various actions of the United States are contrary to the requirements of biological arms control. O web link

1. 2021
2. September
3. 25

Weibo-Qu-days-old-man
0514Z 25Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

Wouldn't it exclude the **biological laboratories** in the United States?

Weibo-Xinhua-Net
1520Z 25Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

Nipam Patel is an evolutionary and developmental biologist at the Mari-ne **Biological Laboratory** at the University of Chicago. Patel said: "They have evolved all the ways we can think of to make the wings transparent-some (the surface of the wing) are covered with transparent scales, and some have no scales at all. This is amazing." Whether it is to explore the structural diversity or optical properties of transparent wings, most of the previous studies used adult specimens provided by museums, so the development process of forming transparent wings is almost unknown. In a recent study published in the Journal of Experimental Biology, Patel and colleagues bred glass-winged butterflies, tracked and recorded the development of wings, and obtained the first detailed information about wings. Records of developmental processes. They found that sparse, slender, bristle-like scales grow on the transparent parts of the wings of glasswing butterflies, while the scales in other areas are wider, and their scales have fewer precursor cells than other butterflies. Since colorless wings can also reflect light, butterflies have evolved a variety of methods to reduce reflected light. The researchers used advanced electron microscopes to carefully observe the nanopillars scattered on the surface of the transparent wings, which are tiny structures known to prevent reflections. The research team observed that a layer of regularly arranged nanopillars composed of chitin (a fibrous substance found in insect exoskeletons) supports another layer of wax-like chemical substance (which can significantly Reduce the reflected light) composed of irregularly arranged nanopillars. Researchers believe that these findings can inspire the development of new anti-reflective materials. Robert Reed, an ecologist at Cornell University in the United States (not involved in the study), said that the research will also lay the foundation for the future elucidation of the genetic mechanism of the evolution of the wings of butterflies and moths. (Global Science WeChat Official Account)

1. 2021
2. September
3. 24

Weibo-Listening-to-the-wind-Yin-Bamboo
1208Z 24Sep2021

China/3. News & Social Media/Weibo

@中国公知psychiatric hospital spokesperson: The source of the new **crown** virus is 100% in the United States. Fort **Detrick Biolab** should be the source of the source. The e-cigarette pneumonia that began to appear in the United States in July 2019 is actually the new **crown** Virus pneumonia!

1. 2021
2. September
3. 23

Vannevar Sourcing:

huaxia-6789249
2 page(s) | DIRECT-INFERENCE-BOXES

Source Details

Huaxia
Huaxia is a news media website of Jingwei Information Technology Co. Its self-described audience is compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macau, and people and institutions concerned about national unification. It provides a view of Chinese news media aimed at cross-strat relations and other Taiwan-related narratives.

Published
0927Z 28Sep2021

Collected
0644Z 28Sep2021

Source URL
http://www.huaxia.com/thjq/jsgoucheng/2021/09/6789

huaxia-6789454

3 page(s) | DIRECT-INFERENCE-BOXES

Source Details

Huaxia

Huaxia is a news media website of Jingwei Information Technology Co. Its self-described audience is compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macau, and people and institutions concerned about national unification. It provides a view of Chinese news media aimed at cross-strat relations and other Taiwan-related narratives.

Published

1021Z 28Sep2021

Collected

0644Z 28Sep2021

Source URL

http://www.huaxia.com/thjq/jswz/2021/09/6789454

PeoplesDailyOverseas2021092810
1 page(s) | PDF

Source Details

People's Daily (Overseas)
People's Daily (overseas) is the daily flagship publication of the CCP; editorials are considered to reflect CCP policy. This version targets the Chinese overseas diaspora.

Published
28Sep2021

Collected
1240Z 27Sep2021

Source URL
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/images/2021-09/28/10/rmrbhwb2021092810.pdf

china_times-20210927005279-260408
8 page(s) | DIRECT-INFERENCE-BOXES

Source Details

China Times

China Times is a daily Chinese-language newspaper published in Taiwan. It is one of the four largest newspapers in Taiwan. China Times has veered into an editorial stance more sympathetic to the positions of the Chinese Communist party since being purchased by a pro-China Taiwanese businessman, Tsai Eng-Meng, in 2008.

Published
27Sep2021

Collected
1240Z 27Sep2021

Source URL
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20210927005279-260408

Hamilton 68-Alliance for Securing Democracy Tweets

Feimingxing retweeted [illegible] @indurban1 retweeted @Gandie03
RT @Gandie03: @Reuters July 2019 54 people near Fort Detrick were infected with an unknown fatal respiratory disease... In July 2019 54 people near Fort Detrick were infected with unidentified fatal...

13

16

25 Sep 2021

Lin Jing retweeted Lin Jing @CGCHINA_CPT retweeted @CGCHINA_CPT
RT @CGCHINA_CPT: The international community has long been seriously concerned about Fort Detrick. USAMRIID and IRF-Frederick, the two inst...

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] a little plug for DTRA and BTRP
Date: Thursday, April 23, 2020 2:19:28 PM

Do you want me to forward this to (b)(6)? And include (b)(6) since the podcast was hosted by a congressman Congressman Jim Greenwood from PA? We have funded Ecohealth Alliance so it might have to come with that disclaimer if they post anything. (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 1:02 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] a little plug for DTRA and BTRP

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

I did a podcast this week for BIO and made a plug for your work around the 32 minute time mark.

Caution-https://podcasts.google.com/?q=Episode%2012%3A%20COVID-19%3A%20COVID-19's%20True%20Origins < Caution-https://podcasts.google.com/?q=Episode%2012%3A%20COVID-19%3A%20COVID-19's%20True%20Origins >

or: Caution-https://www.bio.org/podcast < Caution-https://www.bio.org/podcast >

Please feel free to share.

Hope you are all well,

(b)(6)
Executive Vice President for Health and Policy

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street - 17th Floor
New York, NY 10001 USA

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(fax)
Caution-www.ecohealthalliance.org < Caution (b)(6)

President, OIE Working Group on Wildlife

Co-chair, IUCN Species Survival Commission - Wildlife Health Specialist Group

EPT Partners Liaison, USAID Emerging Pandemic Threats - PREDICT-2 Program

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation.

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR EIS Task Tracker_1.xlsx
Date: Tuesday, January 18, 2022 9:12:36 AM
Attachments: CTR EIS Task Tracker_1.xlsx

Sir.

Attached is today's TMT Tracker for our meeting.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension to 4/18 approved			

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Subject	Received	Task Issued	Program Suspense	DAG Suspense	OPR/OCR	Assigned Programs	Outstanding Programs	Comments	EIS 3.5 Tasker Hyperlink	OG EIS Hyperlink	Archived Y/N
DTRA-211008-GX5F	CTR FY21 OI Review Comments_Task 2	GS15/O6		TMT	8/17/21	12/31/2021	12/31/2021	OPR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE	CT-BT,	TIME DUE: 31DEC21	
DTRA-211027-6BF8	Career Ladder Checklist vice Newman			TMT	10/27/2021	11/10/2021	11/10/2021	OCR		DTRA Director for signature	12/22: Signed and closed by DTRA FO Dr Williams. 12/21: Checked with DTRA FO through the day. Expect DTRA ADIR signature any time now. As of 1700hrs 12/21/21, no signature yet. Expected DTRA Director Signature 12/21/21	
DTRA-211116-6BE8	Agreement Between DTRA and CDC For Detail of CDC Technical Subject Matter Expert to BTRP	TMT		11/16/2021	11/22/2021	11/22/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PI, GC, CS-Support Agreements	Issue with PDF Files	Closed 12/14/2021	Tasker: DTRA-211116-6BE8 (army.mil)	
DTRA-211201-EAF5	CTR Sem!-Annual Program Activity Upload to Socium	AO		TMT	12/1/21	3/16/2022	3/16/2022	OPR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE	CT-PP, CT-SE,		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#720535910
DTRA-211206-3733	FY 2023 President's Budget (PB) Exhibit Updates	AO		TMT	12/7/21	12/17/2021	1/5/2022	OCR	CT-PI, SI-FM	SI-FM	(b)(6) extended to 1/5/22	
DTRA-211207-4738	Leadership Development Program (LDP) Track 2 Solicitations	SES		TMT	12/7/21	12/30/2021	1/3/2022	OPR	CT-BT, CT-PI		Closed 1/3/22; submitted (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7bd00708ec-0b59-ec11-81a6-00505681367b%7d&newWindow=false&pagetype=entityrecord#380362876
DTRA-211213-753A	FY23President's Budget	AO		TMT	12/7/21	12/17/2021	12/20/2021	OCR	CT-PI, SI-FM	SI-FM		
DTRA-211209-6347	Foreign Contribution Report	GS15/O6		TMT	12/9/21	12/27/2021	12/27/20221	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP		Close per (b)(6) 12/22/21	
DTRA-211209-8A7F	Building Partner Capacity Integration Cell (BPCIC) Monthly Meeting Event Information Request	AO		TMT	12/9/21	12/28/2021	12/28/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Extension granted to 12/28 by (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7bd00708ec-0b59-ec11-81a6-00505681367b%7d&newWindow=false&pagetype=entityrecord#629037441
CATMS09112021VVS8DG	Coordination on Extension of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement	SES		TMT	12/10/21	12/29/2021	12/29/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PI		With (b)(6) for final review and comment	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main. All CT-PI Cancelled https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#237829739
DTRA-211129-F8E9	Call for final materials for AFRICOM Building Partner Capacity (BPC) Workshop	TMT		11/29/2021	12/10/2021	12/10/2021	OCR	CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, OB-BP	Closed 12/13/2021		
DTRA-211208-B348	SIPR Tasker DTRA 211208 CCD6 DTRA 2021 MEF VALIDATION	GS15/O6		TMT	12/10/21	1/6/2022	1/7/2022	OPR	CT-PI	CT-PI,	CT Concurs as written per (b)(6)	
DTRA-211210-7B85	DTRA Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) O6/GS15 Directorate level review	GS15/O6		TMT	12/10/21	1/4/2022	1/5/2022	OPR	CT-PI	CT-PI, CT-SE	Closed: 1/3/22. Submitted to (b)(6) for approval 1/3/22	
DTRA-211207-7877	2022 SMART Projection	TMT		12/7/2021	12/13/2021	12/13/2021	OCR			Closed 12/13/2021		
DTRA-211213-3845	Active Agreement Data Call	SES		TMT	12/13/2021	1/14/2022	1/18/2022	OPR	CT-BT	CT-BT		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#810332352
DTRA-211203-8647	Nominations for OUSD(A&S) Special Assistant	TMT		12/3/2021	12/14/2021	12/14/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI, CT-SE	Closed 12/13/2021		
DTRA-211210-445C	FY23 DOE Legislative Proposals	TMT		12/10/2021	12/14/2021	12/14/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI			
DTRA-211214-735C	Overarching Interagency Agreement between DTRA and CDC for upcoming and future BTRP Interagency Agreements	AO		TMT	12/14/21	12/20/2021	12/20/2021	OPR	CS-SA, GC, FM, CT-PI	CS-SA, GC, FM, CT-PI		
DTAR-211209-D88D	Initial call for OCONUS Medical Emergency TTX players	TMT		12/9/21	12/15/2021	12/15/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Closed 12/15/221 per Ms. Paisley		
DTRA-211201-EAAE	Call for Nominations for the DTRA CY21, 4th Quarter Awards	TMT		12/1/21	12/15/2021	12/15/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Closed 12/15/221 per email from Ms. Sanders		
DTRA-211209-E5A(	S-WRR	S-TMT		Weekly Recurring	12/15/2021	12/16/2021	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Closed per Mr. Freeland 12/15/21		
DTRA-211202-8B7A	SIPR - JS-211130-8152 (Joint Staff) Countering Chemical/biological Weapon Exercises	GS15/O6		S-TMT	12/16/21	1/26/2022	2/1/2022	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#155416199
DTRA-211206-3344	ETMS2 User Account Validation	TMT		12/6/21	12/16/2021	12/16/2021	OCR	CT-DAG		Closed per Randy Long 12/14/21		
DTRA-211209-FF6C	Weekly Report Requirement (WRR) and Upcoming Key Events	TMT		12/10/21	12/16/2021	12/16/2021	OCR	CT-DAG		Closed and completed Per Dr Pope 12/16/21		
DTRA-211216-75F4	Validation of Assigned Training Officers in support of the DTRA Joint Training Plan	AO		TMT	12/16/21	1/4/2022	1/6/2022	OCR	CT-PI	CT-PI	closed by (b)(6) 12/21/21	
DTRA-211216-82AA	Update DTRA Australia Action Plan	SES		TMT	12/17/21	1/6/2022	1/10/2022	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Submitted to (b)(6) for approval.	
DTRA-211217-2575	26 November – 02 December ADIR DTRA-E and EUCOM Trip Follow On	SES		TMT	12/17/21	1/7/2022	1/11/2022	OCR	CT-PP	CT-PP	Submitted to (b)(6) for approval	
DTRA-211217-6333	Update to DTRA Transition Book - Directorate and Staff Office Overview	GS15/O6		TMT	12/17/21	1/5/2022	1/18/2022	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Final Edits	
DTRA-211217-89D9	Part 2 - DTRA Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment (2022) Briefing Slides	GS15/O6		TMT	12/17/2021	1/12/2022	2/1/2022	OCR	Mr. Long/Lt Col Small	Mr. Long/Lt Col Small	Slides due on 2/1; IPR on 2/3, Agency Brief 2/11 AM and Directorate Brief 2/11 PM; 2/14 completion of Directorate briefs	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#601468949
DTRA-211217-CC8A	15-17 Nov ADIR UK and NATO Trip Follow On Taskers	SES		TMT	12/17/21	1/7/2022	1/11/2022	OCR	CT-PI	CT-PI	Closed per Dr Pope. 12/21/21	
DTRA-211217-EF95	READ-AHEADS: 10-12 Jan DDIR TRANSCOM Trip	SES		TMT	12/17/21	1/5/2022	1/6/2022	OCR	CT-SE	SE	Cancelled by (b)(6) 1/3/22	
DTRA-211217-F29F	SIPR - DTRA-212217-9524 DTRA Significant Activities for the Unity of Effort, Strategic Policy, Plans, Ops and Doc	DDIR		S-TMT	12/17/21	1/4/2022	1/5/2022	OCR	Per Dr Pope, NSTR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE		
CATMS-20122021-DE7B	2021 Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures Submission	GS15/O6			12/20/2021	1/17/2022	1/19/2022		CT-BT	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE	Closed per (b)(6) 12/22/21	
DTRA - 211220-2662	Agency Requirements Working Group Charter	GS15/O6		TMT	12/20/21	1/7/2022	1/11/2022		CT-PI	All	Sent to (b)(6) for approval.	
DTRA -211220-37C8	SIPR DTRA 211220 SCFA OPR Assignment and Instructsion fro Approved USSOCOM Requirements in OIMS	GS15/O6		S-TMT	12/20/21	1/11/2022	1/14/2022		CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#832435775
DTRA-211220-4B39	URR Inputs for Review with Dr Pope	AO		Internal	12/20/21	1/5/2022	1/5/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Meeting on the 11th.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#1388655643
DTRA-211220-628C	2021 A1 Award for Air Force members	SES		TMT	12/20/2021	1/10/2022	1/13/2022		No qualifying personnel. Closed	CT-BT,	BTRP - Noon on 7th.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#398585157
DTRA-211220-AEFD	SIPR - DTRA-211220-D0F9 (OPR Assignment and Instructions for approved USKF Requirements in OIMS)	GS15/O6		S-TMT	12/20/21	1/11/2022	1/14/2022		Close per Rand Long	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#757536569
DTRA-211220-889B	2022 FY21 Outstanding Airmen of the Year Award	SES		TMT	12/20/21	2/14/2022	2/18/2022	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#747885126
DTRA-211220-DF84	2022 FY21 USAF First Sergeant of the Year Award for Air Force	SES		TMT	12/20/21	2/14/2022	2/18/2022	OCR	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#471002911
CATMS-21122021-3353	Global Partnership Annual Activity Annex	SES		TMT	12/21/2021	1/7/2022	1/7/2022		Cancelled by DTRA		BTRP - Noon on 7th.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7bd00708ec-0b59-ec11-81a6-00505681367b%7d&newWindow=false&pagetype=entityrecordf230597943
DTRA-211221-8CEB	DCOI Inventory Q1FY22	GS15/O6		TMT	12/21/2021	1/13/2022	1/19/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#582090977
DTRA-211004-HDU8	DTRA Instruction 6055.09 Respiratory Protection Program	GS15/O6			12/27/21	1/6/2022	1/7/2022		CT-PI		sent to (b)(6) for approval	
DTRA-211227-524E	SIPR DTRA-211220-3C67 OPR Assignment and Instructions for Approved USAFRICOM Requirements in OIMS	GS15/O6		S-TMT	12/27/2021	1/20/2022	1/21/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	updates made to OIPM per (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7b2c6480a3-b161-ec11-81ad-00505681 3e0b%7d&newWindow=true&pagetype=entityrecord#269370533
DTRA-211227-7827	International Life Sciences Research and National Security	GS15/O6		TMT	12/27/2021	1/3/2022	1/4/2022		CT-BT	CT-BT	Dr Pope directed submission be sent to OSD/Dr Williams prior to submission. Requested extension through system.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7b2c6480a3-b161-ec11-81ad-00505681 3e0b%7d&newWindow=true&pagetype=entityrecord#929359807
DTRA-211228-7CD8	AO-Review of GNDA Report 2021	AO			12/28/21	1/3/2022	1/3/2022		REJECTED			Per Dr Pope, task rejected. Should be OB, not CT.
DTRA-211228-FB8A	COVID Quarterly Reporting for 1st Q FY22	AO		TMT	12/28/2021	1/12/2022	1/14/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=e1c3497a-0a59-ec11-81a6-00505681367b&pagetype=entityrecord#510667057
DTRA-211229-36E2	2022 Spirit of Hope Award	SES		TMT	12/29/21	1/10/2022	1/13/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7b2a242638-5855-ec11-8161-00505690336f%7d&newWindow=false&pagetype=entityrecord#93513676
DTRA-211230-22E5	WRR	SES		TMT	12/29/2021	1/4/2022	1/6/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		
DTRA-211231-839A	FOIA Case Number 21-005	AO		TMT	12/31/2021	1/13/2022	1/14/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#970086962
CATMS19112021M3TB6E	PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL FUNDING PROVIDED FOR CERTAIN VIROLOGICAL RESEARCH	SES			1/3/22	1/5/2022	1/6/2022		CT-BT	CT-BT		
DTRA-211217-89D9	Part 1 - DTRA Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) A	TMT		12/17/21	1/4/2022	1/5/2022	OCR	Mr. Long	Mr. Long			
DTRA220104-47DF	SIPR - DTRA-220104-77F4 - USAFRICOM 2022 Posture Statement	SES			1/4/22	1/11/2022	1/12/2022		CT-PI		Approved and Completed	
DTRA-220105-9338	Identify attendees for the DTRA Indo-Pacific Integrated TTX	AO			1/5/2022	1/14/2022	1/18/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#594292629
DTRA 211215-FDC9	DTRA Pre-Seminar Support to SOCOM Senior Leader Seminar	TMT		12/17/21	1/6/2022	1/10/2022	OCR	CT-PI				
DTRA-211115-C666	Directorate & Staff Offices Recall Roster Update	AO			1/6/22	2/1/2022	2/1/2022		CT-DAG	CT-DAG		
DTRA-220105-A7C9	DTRA Combatant Command Representative (CCR) Workshop support	GS15/O6			1/6/2022	1/18/2022	1/19/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#81898390
DTRA-220105-4593	Lunchtime Chats with Dr Pope (Non-Supervisory)	AO			1/6/2022	1/20/2022	1/20/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#137210931
DTRA-220105-CC63	FY22 Congressional Notification for CR2	AO			1/6/2022	1/18/2022	1/18/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#1059283153
DTRA-211216-8DCD	DTRA Emergencey Team Member (ETM) Designation and Trair	TMT		12/17/21	1/7/2022	1/11/2022	OCR	Mr Long				
DTRA-220107-8A5B	Directorate Designations of CAT Super Users	GS15/O6			1/7/2022	1/13/2022	1/14/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220107-DFCA	1Q/FY22 OSD Country Fact Sheets and Regional Summaries Update	GS15/O6			1/7/2022	2/8/2022	2/8/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT,		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#980158646
DTRA-220110-64D3	SIPR Tasker: DTRA-220110-EA3C Directorate Level Review of the Draft EUCOM Requirements	GS15/O6			1/10/2022	1/25/2022	1/26/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#612138290
DTRA-211229-8F8A	SIPR Coord: CATMS 231221 3FA6: 2020 DoD CWMD Annual Assessment	AO			1/12/2022	1/13/2022	1/13/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220112-2873	Air Force CY 2022 Intermediate/Senior Developmental Education (IDE/SDE)	AO			1/12/2022	1/21/2022	1/21/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI	This task will auto close on the 21st. Nothing due back to DAG	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#679023267
DTRA-220111-D68C	Director DTRA Military Assistant (MA) Selection	CoS/SES			1/13/2022	1/19/2022	1/21/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-SE,		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#76866921
DTRA-220118-23B2	SIPR Tasker: DTRA-220118-8395 Read Aheads CWMD Coord Conf SLS with ADIR Williams	SES			1/18/2022	1/27/2022	1/28/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220118-2EDA	Input for Acting Director's All-Hands	GS15/O6			1/18/2022	1/25/2022	1/26/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Waiting on part 2 of tasker (questions/concerns) from Depts	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#459167294
DTRA-220118-4C96	Call for Nominations - 67th Annual Competitive Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award	GS15/O6			1/18/2022	2/15/2022	4/26/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Issued with a short suspense to id if there are any candidates then once we know that, the individuals can work on complete packages, pe (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#568502479
DTRA-220118-5CB6	SIPR Tasker: DTRA 220118 D9F8 for read aheads: USCENTCOM visit.	SES			1/18/2022	2/1/2022	2/2/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#791871631
DTRA-220118-5DAD	Training Revamp Steering Group	AO			1/18/2022	1/26/2022	1/26/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE	CT-BT, CT-PP	Internal for PI	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#630295569
DTRA-220118-4C83	ADIR Williams HASC Testimony-Key Accomplishments	GS15/O6			1/18/2022	1/19/2022	1/20/2022		CT-PI/Jackson Tufts			
DTRA-220118-B6B3	BPCIC Monthly Meeting Information Request	AO			1/18/2022	1/26/2022	1/27/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE,	Internal collection of info on spreadsheets for (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#97654398
DTRA-220119-28C7	2021 A&S Accomplishments Annual Report	GS15/O6			1/19/2022	1/19/2022	1/19/2022		CT-BT, CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#178669523
DTRA-220119-3C8C	NCB Bi-Monthly Staff Spotlight	CoS			1/19/2022	1/20/2022	1/20/2022		Closed with no action.			
DTRA-220119-5778	SNET Tasker: DTRA-220119-353R - CY2021 Critical Programs and Technologies	GS15/O6			1/19/2022	2/2/2022	2/3/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Review and update Critical Programs and Tech List - Sent to Lt (b)(6) for solicitation and consolidation	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#276244551
DTRA-220120-2522	SIPR Tasker - DTRA-220120-DAA8 CENTCOM Invincible Sentry (S22) Call for Briefings	SES			1/20/2022	1/25/2022	1/26/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) / access approved for 1/25	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#317993596
DTRA-220120-D4AF	Determine OPR on Humanitarian Demining Briefing	CoS			1/20/2022	1/25/2022	1/26/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	Looking for POC	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#322284296
DTRA-220124-72FK	MD-715 FY2021 Accomplishments	SES			1/24/2022	2/4/2022	2/7/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Sent to Dr Pope for final approval	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#151321910
CATMS-24012-c999	Second FY22 CTR Congressional Notification	SES			1/25/2022	2/7/2022	2/8/2022		CT-SI/FM	CT-SI/FM		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#118963520
DTRA-220125-8KK4	RFI from AFRICOM CCDR Re: Funding	SES			1/25/2022	1/27/2022	1/27/2022		Dr Pope	Dr Pope		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#555816485
DTRA-220125-DV3M	SNET DTRA-220125-TC0C Synchronizing NCB Input for CWMD Strategy Revision	SES			1/25/2022	1/26/2022	1/27/2022		CT-FO			
DTRA-220113-52E9	SNET Coord: JS-220107-4E29 CENTCOM OPLAN DAPR Review	SES			1/26/2022	2/8/2022	2/10/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) submitted Neg Response, howeve (b)(6) small will review on Wed and provide final submission.	
DTRA-220118-6D0E	Call for OSD Nominations - 18th Annual Department of Defense David O. Cooke Excellence in Public Administration Award	CoS			1/26/2022	2/15/2022	4/28/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#407347375
DTRA-220124-FC74	Call for Nominations - 2022 Department of Defense National Capital Region "Spirit of Service" Recognition	Cos			1/26/2022	2/3/2022	2/4/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#958119625
DTRA-220126-87KP	DTRA Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) GOFO/SES Directorate level review and concurrence	SES			1/26/2022	2/3/2022	2/4/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#913465042
DTRA-220126-FRG6	FY22 Spend Plan Review and Call for Unresourced Requirements (URRs)	AO			1/26/2022	2/7/2022	2/9/2022		Per Becky/Pat and Mickey, closed tasker as it doesn't apply to us.	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		
DTRA-220126-MGN5	Call for Nominations for the DTRA CY 2021, Annual Awards	SES			1/26/2022	2/7/2022	2/9/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Nominee names due by 1/31. Then winners will have until 2/7 to submit packages	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#465246674
DTRA-220127-PPFJ	FEB Lunchtime Chat with Dr Pope	AO			1/27/2022	2/21/2022	2/23/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#283985789
DTRA-220127-QT7R	DTRA1-5 SharePoint Upgrade	AO			1/27/2022	2/2/2022	2/3/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Sent to (b)(6) for approval.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#11339431
DTRA-211217-F29F	SIPR Coord-DTRA-211217-9524 DTRA Sig Act CWMD UoE SPPOD WG	AO			1/28/2022	2/9/2022	2/11/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	Pending (b)(6) approval/AO release level then will close.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#817007064
DTRA-220124-QCLQ	Directors Action Group Chief Solicitation	SES			1/31/2022	2/9/2022	2/11/2022				JS mentioned no submission.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#780515852
CATMS-250122-7DB8	CTR Strategic Evaluation Public Summary and Action Plan	SES			2/1/2022	2/7/2022	2/8/2022		CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&extraqs=&id=%7b8947ac3a-e87e-ec11-81aa-00505681367b%7d&newWindow=false&pagetype=entityrecord#3906943
DTRA0-220201-P8HZ	FY22 Annual Records Management Validations	AO			2/1/2022	2/17/2022	2/17/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP,	CT-PI is the OPR. Internal by PI	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#291724427
DTRA-220130-THVD	Litigation Hold re: Updated COVID vaccination mandate	CoS			2/1/2022	2/21/2022	2/21/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Pending additional info from (b)(6) and CoS's	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#961768416
DTRA-210917-9YMN	DTRA 3000 Issuance series: DTRA-D 3000 Strategy, Plans, and Operations; DTRA-I 3000.02 Operations; DTRA-I 3000.03 Strategy and Plans	CoS			2/2/2022	2/16/2022	2/18/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE,	CT-PP,	BT is OPR/PP/SE OCR's	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#590962677
DTRA-220202-KQDJ	POCs for 2022 DTRA Virtual Industry Day	AO			2/2/2022	2/10/2022	2/16/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) was POC last year	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#722758045
DTRA-211013-6E4H	DTRA Instruction 5505.2 Inspector General Inquiry and Investigation Procedures, Change 3	SES			2/3/2022	2/15/2022	2/15/2022		Mickey	Mickey	(b)(6) took this one	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#741977093
DTRA-220203-2VXG	Air Force MyEval login access	SES			2/3/2022	2/8/2022	2/9/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI	This was for disseminate only. Once confirmation received, permission to close under your name?	
DTRA-220203-PF22	The Air Force Sergeants Association Pittsenbarger Award	SES			2/3/2022	2/9/2022	2/11/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	PI - only 1 possible candidate	
DTRA-220204-8KPC	CTR Representative for DTRA's Individuals with Disabilities Employee Resource Group (IwD ERG)	AO			2/4/2022	2/16/2022	2/16/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#153478555
DTRA-220208-93R6	The Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman (SEAC) and GATEWAY Course Manager	SES			2/8/2022	2/15/2022	2/17/2022		CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#701321986
DTRA-220208-9VGP	FY22 Q1 ForeignAssistance.gov Data Call	GS15/O6			2/8/2022	2/18/2022	2/21/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) directed this goes to PI for all inputs	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#846625450
DTRA-220208-FVPX	PDASD NCB Engagements	GS15/O6			2/8/2022	2/16/2022	2/17/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#357638758
Internal	Zoom for Government Collaboration License Availability	GS15/O6			2/9/2022	2/16/2022	2/18/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		(b)(6) emailed to Sr Staff for input	back door asker
CATMS-100222-7593	SASC Report to Congress: Identification of A&S's overlapping, duplicative CRRs	SES			2/10/2022	2/11/2022	2/14/2022		CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-PI	Submitted input to (b)(6) for closure and cancellation of remaining Depts	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#63801792
DTRA-220210-D6G3	2022 General Larry D. Spencer Innovation Award	SES			2/10/2022	2/18/2022	2/22/2022		CT-BT, CT-PI, CT-SE	CT-PI,		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#134241557
DTRA-220211-DQJZ	24 Special Operations Wing Chiefs Professional Development Seminar	GS15/O6			2/11/2022	2/18/2022	2/22/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI	Per Dr Pope, PI assigned briefing duties	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#383146489
DTRA-220216-44R8	A&S Governance Representation	GS15/O6			2/16/2022	2/17/2022	2/18/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#165412443
DTRA-220217-GZCW	CWMD Hearing Testimony Directorate Review	SES			2/17/2022	2/23/2022	2/23/2022		CT-FO	CT-FO	Dr Pope mentioned keeping this in the FO	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#714307769
DTRA-220218-VXQJ	Potential Redactions for Ukraine Activities - DoD	SES			2/18/2022	2/22/2022	2/22/2022		CT-FO	CT-FO	Dr Pope determined No redactions in the FAD.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#1332063153
DTRA-220208-8FVH	Second Update to DTRA Transition Book	GS15/O6		2/8/2022	2/22/2022	2/25/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#552992159		
DTRA-220216-Q95V	Monthly BPCIC Tasker	AO		2/16/2022	2/24/2022	2/24/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Issued to all, CT-PI OPR	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#344062314		
DTRA-220218-S5QJ	2022 Blacks in Government Meritorious Service Award	SES		2/18/2022	2/24/2022	2/28/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#993888600	CANCELLED BY DTRA HR	
DTRA-220218-W729	Representatives for CTR Metrics working group	AO		2/18/2022	2/28/2022	2/28/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#846546142		
DTRA 220223 IP4X	SIPR Coord DTRA 220223 9CJV	GS15/O6		2/23/2022	2/28/2022	3/1/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	SPPOD WG Update request			
DTRA-220301-70VT	SNET Coord: DTRA-220301-GMFL - Authorities in Support of UKR	GS15/O6		3/1/2022	3/2/2022	3/2/2022	CT-PP	CT-PP		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#636399335		
CATMS-170222-E8FB	NCB Components (& CBDP) Support to CCMDs, other orgs.	SES		2/18/2022	3/2/2022	3/4/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Per Pat B, PI owns this one	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#300532382		
DTRA-220224-GFTG	ARC Director's Review	GS15/O6		2/24/2022	3/2/2022	3/4/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#454196977		
DTRA-220218-JVQX	One (1) year projection of CTRIC III new awards	AO		2/18/2022	3/3/2022	3/3/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	Issued to all, CT-PI OPR	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#514390642		
DTRA-220302-H53Q	Data Call - Leased Space Reduction	GS15/O6		3/2/2022	3/3/2022

DTRA-220311-VFP2	DTRA DDIR D/C w/ (b)(6) JSSTRATCOM J8	GS15/O6	3/11/2022	3/15/2022	3/15/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B979A3472-55A1-EC11-81AD-005056813678%7D
CATMS-040322-37D3	Notification to Congress Regarding the Utilization of a Fiscal Year 2022 Outside Contribution to the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program	GS15/O6	3/7/2022	3/16/2022	3/17/2022	BT/LA/FM			
DTRA-220118-3FA9	Quarterly Dormant Account Review (DAR-Q) Tasker - Q1 FY22	AO	1/18/2022	3/16/2022	3/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	SI-FM	Waiting on (b)(6) to approve all inputs then close	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#640514258
DTRA-220308-W32H	SIPR Coord - DTRA-220308-GMCM - USSOUTHCOM EX	GS15/O6	3/8/2022	3/16/2022	3/17/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6)	
DTRA-220315-K994	CAPNOM Assignment: Superintendent to the Vice Chief of Staff (VCSAF)	SES	3/15/2022	3/16/2022	3/16/2022	(b)(6)			
DTRA-220215-58LC	FY22 Transition Book Current Operation Picture (COP)	AO	3/14/2022	3/17/2022	3/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B1996 7AAC-9EA3-EC11-819F-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220301-K33N	Nominations for the Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Com	GS15/O6	3/2/2022	3/17/2022	3/18/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	(b)(6) P/S	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#900515746
DTRA-220303-TZT5	CY23 Consolidated Line and Health Professions Squadron Commander and Deputy Group Commander Candidate Selection Process	GS15/O6	3/4/2022	3/17/2022	3/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Per (b)(6) issue to PI and (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#803809870
DTRA-220304-M6ZP	CDA on Classified Contracting with SBs	AO	3/4/2022	3/17/2022	3/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220311-L8SB	International Agreements Data Call	AO	3/11/2022	3/17/2022	3/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) Directed PI to receive	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BE13735D-54A1-EC11-81AD-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220314-86QD	2022 DTRA Virtual Industry Day Presenters and Presentations	AO	3/15/2022	3/17/2022	3/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BA014B69D-85A3-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220315-XR27	ADIR presentation to Sandia National Laboratories 24 March 2022	GS15/O6	3/15/2022	3/17/2022	3/21/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BADC544E4-69A4-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220311-FF2Z	Trends Analysis Report review	CoS	3/15/2022	3/18/2022	3/18/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT		
DTRA-220314-WD2C	NCB Town Hall Request for Information	SES	3/14/2022	3/18/2022	3/21/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Pending (b)(6) approval	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%786CFF8752-C8A3-EC11-819F-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220314-WRVN	FY23 CWMD hearing Questions and Answers	CoS	3/15/2022	3/18/2022	3/21/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Pending (b)(6) approval	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B918F5FE4-E8A3-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220316-TC4J	SIPR Coord: DTRA 220316-BR65 (UoE SPPOD Data Call)	AO	3/16/2022	3/18/2022	3/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220308-8MTD	FOUO) CY22C (P0622C) Colonel Line of the Air Force	SES	3/8/2022	3/21/2022	3/21/2022	PI	PI	Waiting to see if we have any eligibles	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BA39D1675-195F-EC11-81B2-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220309-JVWQ	DTRA Interorganizational Working Group - Call for Member Designations	GS15/O6	3/14/2022	3/22/2022	3/23/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Sent to (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7867004A79-9FA3-EC11-819F-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220309-CCSZ	Update to DTRA-United Kingdom Action Plan	SES	3/11/2022	3/23/2022	3/24/2022	CT-BT, CT-SE,		BT requested an extra day	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B58908B51-3CA1-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220317-7L9D	SNET task review: DTRA-220317-RTZP FY23 CWMD hearing talking points	GS15/O6	3/17/2022	3/23/2022	3/24/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		
CATMS-080322-9AD3	Solicitation of Input to the FY23 Top DoD Management Challenges and the FY23 DoD Office of Inspector General Oversight Plan	GS15/O6	3/14/2022	3/24/2022	3/24/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI	DTRA changed the suspense date. Dr Pope & (b)(6) Review	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BF3636 1B5-7CA1-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220311-DB36	SIPR COORD: DTRA 20220311-XLBP JTP Action Officer Review	AO	3/11/2022	3/24/2022	3/25/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Waiting on answer from (b)(6)	
DTRA-220311-TZP5	SIPR COORD: DTRA 22020311 2888 JTP Event Budget Update	AO	3/11/2022	3/24/2022	3/25/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Waiting on answer from	
DTRA-220318-8GP8	EUCOM support for 2 FAO's	GS15/O6	3/23/2022	3/24/2022	3/24/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220323-WJXW	U.S. assistance to build the capacity of foreign security forces	GS15/O6	3/23/2022	3/24/2022	3/25/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BA6A607F1-E8AA-EC11-8167-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220317-GGL8	Directorate Appointment of ETMS2 Awards Module POCs	GS15/O6	3/17/2022	3/25/2022	3/25/2022	CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B64058E27-06A6-EC11-819F-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220318-6SBD	DFG - Director Level Program Review Examples	AO	3/18/2022	3/25/2022	3/25/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BFE9ED292-DAA6-EC11-81AD-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220315-856H	SIPR Coord - DTRA 220315 JTC4 DTRA Support to AFRICOM Requirements Letter POM FY24	GS15/O6	3/15/2022	3/28/2022	3/29/2022	CT-PI			
DTRA-220321-T5WX	Preparation for DTRA Participation in CENTCOM Change of Command and CCC IPR	GS15/O6	3/21/2022	3/28/2022	3/29/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B4C785562-49A9-EC11-81AD-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220224-VG88	Call for Nominations for the Senator Daniel K. Inouye Outstanding Award for DTRA Federal Civil Service Personnel	GS15/O6	3/9/2022	3/29/2022	4/8/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B9410A2F0-D89F-EC11-8168-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220303-XCQ7	Call for Nominations for the DTRA "Spirit of the 442nd Infantry Regiment	GS15/O6	3/9/2022	3/29/2022	4/8/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI	Please note earlier suspense date for any nominees. Now due Tuesday 29 March to (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B7820187 7-D50F-EC11-8166-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220309-8RL8	Call for Nominations –Special Assistant, Director's Action Group	SES	3/16/2022	3/29/2022	3/30/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B4FC5CA13-23A5-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220316-R4BX	SIPR Coord: DTRA-220316-WCCJ Testing PDF Signature in Microsoft Edge	GS15/O6	3/16/2022	3/29/2022	3/30/2022	CT-DAG	CT-DAG		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B3D5B063C-58A5-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220316-ZLFZ	ETMS2 User Validation and User Activity	GS15/O6	3/16/2022	3/29/2022	3/30/2022	CT-DAG	CT-DAG		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B80493632-5AA5-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220311-5C58	Career Broadening Program request for Details	SES	3/11/2022	3/31/2022	4/1/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) Directed PI to receive	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B11872D6A-57A1-EC11-819F-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220321-49KV	Preparation for DTRA Participation in AFRICOM CCC	GS15/O6	3/21/2022	3/31/2022	4/1/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B02F4A52-4AA8-EC11-81AD-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220330-RXHH	**RED TAG* AFRICOM and CENTCOM COP Update**	GS15/O6	3/30/2022	3/31/2022	4/1/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	(b)(6) consolidating	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BE13B7E0-41B0-EC11-8184-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-211001-NUG2	DTRA-211001-NUG2 | DTRA Instruction 5145.5 Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) Progr	CoS	3/18/2022	4/1/2022	4/4/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BA8F02DB7-F1A6-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220322-B594	Final FY22 Congressional Notification of Proposed Obligation for CTR Funds	AO	3/22/2022	4/1/2022	4/1/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE,	CT-SE,		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BA8C326C0-FAA9-EC11-8183-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220324-J5ZP	Call for Nominations for the DTRA CY22, 1st Quarter Awards	SES	3/24/2022	4/1/2022	4/4/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		(b)(6) s collating and preparing for signature	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B1BC46418-7EAB-EC11-8167-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220331-WC2N	SIPR Coord DTRA-220331-9BQB - (U) Ukrainian and Initiative Proposal	GS15/O6	3/31/2022	4/1/2022	4/1/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT		
SNET	FOIA Litagation Consult Request Trance 2	AO	3/25/2022	4/1/2022	4/1/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Erik and Ted	
DTRA-220316-JZZB	SIPR Coord - DTRA-220316-RVHH AFRICOM Response Memo &Spreadsheet Update	GS15/O6	3/31/2022	4/4/2022	4/5/2022	CT-PI		(b)(6) will review after 10am Meeting	
CATMS-250222-3A39	Five Power/CNAD Call Memo	GS15/O6	3/31/2022	4/5/2022	4/5/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Approval Pending DTRA DAG/CATMS A&S 7 day extension	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B4428E00D-23B1-EC11-81A0-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220316-JZZB	SIPR Coord: DTRA-220316-RVHH - AFRICOM Response and RWG Mtg	GS15/O6	3/16/2022	4/5/2022	4/7/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		For Leadership review/approval per PI comments	
DTRA-220323-K9QH	Reimbursable Agreement Receipt and Acceptance	AO	3/23/2022	4/5/2022	4/6/2022	FM, CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	FM, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7896C3A1F0-E1AA-EC11-8167-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220216-22T3	March Lunchtime Chats with Dr Pope	AO	2/16/2022	4/6/2022	4/6/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) Directed PI to receive	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B44DEC5CE-568F-EC11-819D-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220328-6SGG	Follow up RFI from HSGAC - Permanent Investigations Subcommittee - Congressional EcoHealth Grants not Approved	GS15/O6	3/28/2022	4/6/2022	4/7/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	Congressional on EcoHealth Grants that were not approved.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%78C8A171F6-67AF-EC11-81AF-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220405-HLTP	Incoming DIR Brief: Countering Disinformation	GS15/O6	4/5/2022	4/6/2022	4/7/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BDEB6138-D9B5-EC11-8184-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220401-RNXR	Request for One Year O-6 Detail Supporting COVID DA2 Cell	SES	4/1/2022	4/8/2022	4/8/2022	CT-FO	CT-FO	Per (b)(6) Close No submission	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B0B4B164-CFB1-EC11-8168-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220401-S86M	Review of the DTRA Human Capital Roadmap (HCR)	SES	4/1/2022	4/12/2022	4/15/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%78BE0CC48-F8B1-EC11-8168-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220401-RQJ8	Review of the Human Resources Leadership and Learning Implementation Plan	SES	4/1/2022	4/14/2022	4/15/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BCDC2619D-ECB1-EC11-8168-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220405-S5B4	Visit to USSOCOM International SOF Officer to DTRA	GS15/O6	4/6/2022	4/14/2022	4/15/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B21E2866-BDB5-EC11-8184-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220408-NP6W	SOUTHCOM COP Update and Trip Preparation (25-26 April) for the OI Director	GS15/O6	4/8/2022	4/15/2022	4/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B83F6EE6A-7AB7-EC11-81AF-005056813678%7D
CATMS-110422-SLVG	Third Notification of FY22 DOD CTR Program Funds	GS15/O6	4/12/2022	4/18/2022	4/21/2022	FM	FM	(b)(6) emailed and said to pull it back from depts and only send to (b)(6) Task created by JDM	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B0D9263ED-708A-EC11-81A1-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007 Classification of Doc for DoD GC	GS15/O6	3/11/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B17729EC7-4EA1-EC11-8167-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220405-S5D7	FY 2023 Congressional Budget Brief	AO	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/21/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Dr Pope is reviewing	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B46AA236C-89B5-EC11-8168-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220405-2RFB	FY22 ARRS PBC Email	AO	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/19/2022			Closed per (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BC465FC38-BBB5-EC11-8168-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220411-PSQ9	FORAC - UNICRI Director visit to DTRA	AO	4/11/2022	4/20/2022	4/20/2022	CT-SE, CT-BT, CT-PP	CT-BT	Granted extension for PP/BT until Wed at 10am	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B07BCA0D0-B3B0-EC11-8185-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220406-JQ7S	FY22 Q2 DCOI Inventory	GS15/O6	4/6/2022	4/21/2022	4/22/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) has and will submit	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B15E1BB56-CAB5-EC11-8184-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220405-NZCM	DI DIR 4-6MAY NORTHCOM/NORAD/SOCNORTH Site Visit Read Ahead Material	GS15/O6	4/5/2022	4/25/2022	4/26/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) directed to (b)(6) Tasker as a barcodor direct to SE, but switched to ETMS task late on	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BCF92F6D8-04B5-EC11-81AF-005056813678%7D
IS-220405 RQ9F (JOINTSTAFF	Bilateral Countering WMD Leadership Group (BCLG) Operations Working Group: UK/US Counter-CBRN Opportunities	GS15/O6	4/5/2022	4/25/2022	4/26/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT	Friday. Asking for review of UK Issue Paper and ID Opportunities/Capabilities to improvke UK's Counter CBRN Capabilities	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B34954FF9-E28C-EC11-816A-005056903306%7D
DTRA-220209-VXNH	Q2/FY22 OSD Country Fact Sheets and Regional Summaries Update	AO	2/9/2022	4/26/2022	4/30/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Issued Q2 / Q3 due dates	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B289A8BCF-D689-EC11-81AA-005056813678%7D
CATMS-060422-5MB6	US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) MOA Review	GS15/O6	4/13/2022	4/27/2022	4/28/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Task created by JDM: (b)(6) orking	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B134C82DF-2DB8-EC11-81AF-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220331-CCQ7	Updated Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) document preservat	GS15/O6	3/31/2022	4/27/2022	4/29/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-PP, CT-PI	Changed Due date	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B4E3BCBB8-29B1-EC11-81A1-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220410-MTBM	Report of Gifts of Travel from non-Federal sources	AO	4/11/2022	4/27/2022	4/29/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Task created by JDM	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B227AAD0A-E489-EC11-81A1-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220413-6TT3	FY22 Q2 ForeignAssistance.gov Data Call	GS15/O6	4/13/2022	4/27/2022	4/28/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	Task created by JDM: (b)(6) review	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B7A56B860-6DBB-EC11-81A1-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220401-N34H	FY22 DTRA Risk Assessment Template Update	AO	4/4/2022	4/28/2022	4/29/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B06953E93-2EB4-EC11-8184-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220425-G69H	CTR Trifold Content Update	GS15/O6	4/25/2022	4/28/2022	4/29/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B31A378DD-ADC4-EC11-8186-E33DCE82DF66%7D
DTRA-220427-SWDG	FY2022 Quarterly Update to CTR Operational Imperatives	GS15/O6	4/27/2022	4/29/2022	4/29/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		Pending (b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B70877 3AB-29C6-EC11-81A2-8E6F8D6DC93A%7D
DTRA-220421-NTQH	SNET Shell: DTRA 220421-G647 UOE SPPOD	AO	4/21/2022	5/2/2022	5/2/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220407-76ZX	SIPR Coord DTRA 220407 CN3K USSOCOM Requirements DIMS	AO	2/16/1900	5/3/2022	5/3/2022	CT-PI		(b)(6) manages this one. Typically Negative input	
DTRA-220324-FFJR	FOIA Case Number 22-046	AO	3/24/2022	5/4/2022	5/4/2022	CT-SE	CT-SE	Per (b)(6) expected to be done by 4th. SE working it	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BA9FA02C-79A8-EC11-81AD-005056813678%7D
DTRA-220425-XH5R	Preparation for DTRA Participation at DARK SLEEPER OV Day	GS15/O6	4/25/2022	5/4/2022	5/5/2022	CT-SE	CT-SE		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B0F4EC1F-A2C4-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220418-X2CL	Agency Military Personnel Rosters and Civilian Details Update	AO	4/20/2022	5/5/2022	5/6/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B241A85CE-8FC0-EC11-81A2-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220419-ZKZG	FY22 DTRA Commercial Assessments POC Request	GS15/O6	4/19/2022	5/5/2022	5/20/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6)	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B01CF1780-F8BF-EC11-8186-005056813E08%7D
DTRA-220428-KS4F	Deputy Director DTRA Military Assistant (MA) Selection	GS15/O6	4/29/2022	5/5/2022	5/6/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-SE, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BAF44BD0A-CCC7-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220322-2JB5	By Country BTRP Facility Laydown in SEA	SES	3/22/2022	5/9/2022	5/9/2022	CT-BT	CT-BT	Meeting with KG today for approval submissions	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B1D53CE70-DDAA-EC11-819F-005056811 42C%7D
DTRA-220418-DVD3	Leadership Development Program Spring Solicitation Cycle	AO	4/18/2022	5/9/2022	5/16/2022	CT-PP, CT-PI, CT-SE, CT-BT	CT-PI		
DTRA-220503-347M	2022 Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Gratefull	SES	5/3/2022	5/9/2022	5/11/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B8F4FF644-E5CA-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220509-9JNC	FY22 Year End Closeout Guidance & Milestones & FY23 Start Up	AO	5/10/2022	5/10/2022	5/10/2022	FM, FO	FM, FO		
DTRA-220502-37VS	FY22 Spend Plan Review and FINAL Call for Unresourced Requirements (URRs)	GS15/O6	5/2/2022	5/11/2022	5/13/2022	CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B8FF3D59B-15CA-EC11-81B6-E33DCE82DF66%7D
DTRA-220512-K7T5	NonD/Ditem 288, DHS Report on Global Nuclear Detection Architecture	GS15/O6	5/12/2022	5/12/2022	5/13/2022	CoS	CoS		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B09C1A600-FCD1-EC11-81B0-E8F5F938BD1F%7D
DTRA-220502-J2LT	Facilities Utilization Board Charter	GS15/O6	5/2/2022	5/16/2022	5/16/2022	CoS	CoS		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%75398C36D-59CA-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220503-D6QM	Exercise TEMPEST WIND 2023 (TW23) DTRA Activities Summary	GS15/O6	5/4/2022	5/16/2022	5/18/2022	CT-SE	CT-SE		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7895D1F5CF-C1C8-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220418-8DDM	SIPR Coord - DTRA 220418-SPMV AFRICOM Req Letter	AO	4/18/2022	5/17/2022	5/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220430-CX5W	SIPR COORD: DTRA 220430 TZCL Initial Call for 2023 DTRA Trusted Agent	GS15/O6	5/2/2022	5/17/2022	5/18/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	(b)(6) replied negative reply.	
DTRA-211012-6Z7S	DTRA Instruction 4140.05 Weapons Management	GS15/O6	5/5/2022	5/18/2022	5/19/2022	CoS	CoS		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B0A4D5990-F8CB-EC11-81B0-E8F5F938BD1F%7D
DTRA-220509-VPQ8	SIPR Coord - DTRA-220509-72MB Directorate Review of DTRA Support Plan to IEAP-CJCS Vol VIII, Adapt NuclPlanning Procedures	SES	5/9/2022	5/19/2022	5/20/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI		
DTRA-220414-ZFH7	May Lunchtime Chat with Dr Pope	AO	4/14/2022	5/23/2022	5/25/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI			https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B33DBDFB6-0DBC-EC11-8169-005056903306%7D
21-L-0355 (21-cv-1099)	FOIA Litagation Consult Request DTRA Tranch 3	GS15/O6	5/3/2022	5/23/2022	5/23/2022	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		
DTRA-211210-F33B	CY22 JMETL Review_O6/GS15 Directorate Level Review	TMT	12/10/21		1/5/2022	OPR			CANCELLED By Jessica GIBBS
DTRA-220110-8F2C	SIPR Tasker: DTRA-220110-932E 20 Jan NATO DCMC Visit to DTRA	GS15/O6			1/18/2022	1/18/2022		CT-PI	CT-PI
DTRA-220511-Q7W6	DAS Olson Program Updates	GS15/O6	5/11/2022	5/13/2022	5/13/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, OD	OD		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B20A8CF52-23D1-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220512-JHX4	A&S Monthly Accomplishments Spotlight	GS15/O6	5/12/2022	5/16/2022	5/17/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-PI		
DTRA-220511-KVS2	RECURRING - OPSYNC Request Briefing inputs	GS15/O6	5/11/2022	5/16/2022	5/17/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B28D0A2A-5DD1-EC11-816A-8C6D6DDFE9E7%7D
DTRA-220512-W3GS	2022 Red Ribbon Week Activities and Nominations for the 32nd Annual Department of Defense Office of Drug Demand Reduction Awards	SES	5/13/2022	5/18/2022	5/23/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI		
DTRA-211005-UJY9	Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 22-XX Performance Management for DTRA Military Service members	CoS	5/12/2022	5/25/2022	5/26/2022	CoS	CoS		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7BC438BD7E-0602-EC11-81B0-E8F5F938BD1F%7D
DTRA-220510-JW7S	Request funding for full time US Army Reserve/Guardsmen to Perform OPERATIONAL SUPPORT during FISCAL YEAR 2023 [FY23]	SES	5/10/2022	5/20/2022	5/23/2022	CT-BT, CT-PP, CT-SE, CT-PI	CT-BT, CT-PI		https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=java_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B571D6960-7C00-EC11-81A2-8E6F8D6DC93A%7D

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extensio granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		/11 requested extensio 4/18 approved			

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_11 October 22.xlsx
Date: Monday, November 14, 2022 11:32:24 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_11 October 22.xlsx

Sir,

Task tracker attached for our 1300hr FO Sync today.

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	**FOIA Case Number 22-C-007**	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension to 4/18 approved			
DTRA-220324-X9DL	FOIA Case Number 22-045	"All emails, memos, briefings or reports sent or received by **Robert Pope**, director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, between February 1 and March 23, 2022 which address concerns about biological laboratories in Ukraine being attacked by Russia or coming under Russian military control."	John Power Al Jazeera		3/24/2022	4/4/2022	8/5/2022	8/5/2022		CT-BT		Dr Pope requested 3 month extension. Extension request was approved. Requested Extension			r guidance from (b)(6) we are okay to close this out in VT due to all docs being submitted to FOIA office and we are ow awaiting GC to review and render decision on recommended edactions. Once that is complete, the package will come back for rectorate Signature. Input to FOIA office, standing by for form to come back to CTR for signature.
DTRA-220810-SZZF	FOIA Case Number 22-058	GS15/O6	8/10/2022	10/11/2022	10/25/2022	10/25/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	FOIA specifically assigned this to (b)(6) Asking for PWS information for the existing contract # HDTRA119C0059 - RDTS contract	(b)(5)					

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension
[redacted]

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension t 4/18 approved			

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Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

SPD	Task Subject/FOIA Number	Folio Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CT & DAG	Original Suspense Date	Final Suspense to CT FO	DTRS/DMS Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Program	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Task or Link	CT Archive Box Link	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	FOIA Line Number 22-L-051	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Legend
Green: on target.
Amber: concern on completion, may need escalation.

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	**FOIA Case Number 22-C-007**	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension to 4/18 approved			
DTRA-220324-X9DL	FOIA Case Number 22-045	"All emails, memos, briefings or reports sent or received by **Robert Pope**, director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, between February 1 and March 23, 2022 which address concerns about biological laboratories in Ukraine being attacked by Russia or coming under Russian military control."	John Power Al Jazeera		3/24/2022	4/4/2022	8/5/2022	8/5/2022		CT-BT		Dr Pope requested 3 month extension. Extension request was approved. Requested Extension			Per guidance from (b)(6) we are okay to close this out in TMT due to all docs being submitted to FOIA office and we are now awaiting GC to review and render decision on recommended redactions. Once that is complete, the package will come back for Directorate Signature. Input to FOIA office, standing by for form 57 to come back to CTR for signature.
DTRA-220810-SZZF	FOIA Case Number 22-058	GS15/O6	8/10/2022	10/11/2022	10/25/2022	10/25/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	FOIA specifically assigned this to (b)(6) Asking for PWS information for the existing contract # HDTRA119C0059 - RDTS contract	(b)(5)					

Legend:
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Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

STRD	Task Subject/FOMA Number	FOMA Topic	FOMA Requestor	FOMA POC	Task Baselined in CT BDAG	Original Suspense Date	Dual Suspense to CT FO	DTRS/DMS Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Task Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	FOIA Line Number 22-L-051	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
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1-[illegible]
Green: on target
4-Higher concern on completion, may need extension.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
1	**STID**	**Task Subject/FOIA Number**	**FOIA Topic**	**FOIA Requester**	**FOIA POC**	**Task Received in CTR DAG**	**Original Suspense Date**	**Dept Suspense to CT FO**	**DTRA DAG Suspense**	**CT Completion Date**	**Assigned Programs**	**CT Dept POC**	**Extension Requests/ Comments**	**Tasker Link**
2	DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)
3	DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4	
4	DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.	
5	DTRA-220311-W6Q7	**FOIA Case Number 22-C-007**	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension t 4/18 approved	
6	DTRA-220324-X9DL	FOIA Case Number 22-045	"All emails, memos, briefings or reports sent or received by **Robert Pope**, director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, between February 1 and March 23, 2022 which address concerns about biological laboratories in Ukraine being attacked by Russia or coming under Russian military control."	John Power Al Jazeera		3/24/2022	4/4/2022	8/5/2022	8/5/2022		CT-BT		Dr Pope requested 3 mont extension. Extension reque was approved. Requested Extension	
7	DTRA-220810-SZZF	FOIA Case Number 22-058	G515/O6	8/10/2022	10/11/2022	10/25/2022	10/25/2022	CT-PI	CT-PI	FOIA specifically assigned this to (b)(6) Asking for PWS information for the existing contract # HDTRA119C0059 - RDTS contract	(b)(5)			
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21	Green: on target													
22	Amber: concern on completion, may need extension													
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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_11 October 22.xlsx
Date: Monday, October 24, 2022 8:39:36 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_11 October 22.xlsx

Sir,

Good Morning.

Attached is this week's Task Tracker for our meeting.

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)
D)
DSN)
C)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
1	**STID**	**Task Subject/FOIA Number**	**FOIA Topic**	**FOIA Requester**	**FOIA POC**	**Task Received in CTR DAG**	**Original Suspense Date**	**Dept Suspense to CT FO**	**DTRA DAG Suspense**	**CT Completion Date**	**Assigned Programs**	**CT Dept POC**	**Extension Requests/ Comments**	**Tasker Link**
2	DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)
3	DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4	
4	DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.	
5	DTRA-220311-W6Q7	**FOIA Case Number 22-C-007**	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension 4/18 approved	
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8	Legend:													
9	Green: on target													
10	Amber: concern on completion, may need extension													
11	[redacted]													
12														

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_17 Jun 22.xlsx
Date: Tuesday, June 21, 2022 9:20:03 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_17 Jun 22.xlsx

Sir,

Attached is the Weekly tracker for today's meeting.

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension t 4/18 approved			

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

ETID	Task Subject/RCAA Number	FOIA Topic	RCAA Requestor	RCAA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CTR FO	DFAS DoD Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Interim Response/Conversations	Tracker Link	CT Archer Doc Link
[illegible]	RCAA Case Number 22-[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	RCAA Case Number 22-C 003	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	RCAA Case Number 23-044	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	RCAA Case Number 22-042	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	RCAA Case Number 23-016 (with Metabase	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
DFAS-230028 M023	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
DFAS 230103-[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
DFAS-[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	RCAA Case Number 22-045	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	(b)(5), (b)(6)		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4			
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.			
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Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Subject: CWMD/China Policy chop on Response to Congressional letter on WIV
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 6:49:05 PM
Attachments: OSD002210-21 CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf
OSD004467-20 - USD(RE) signed - complete package.pdf
TAB B - DTRA Input on EcoHealth Letter response + CWMD_20210528.docx

Rob,

I told (b)(6) yesterday that I would send the Policy edits on the WIV response letter. As an interim update, China Policy clears the edits I've made – for whatever reason, the track changes reflect only "author". The edits are from me.

I still await OGC IA clearance (I've left them messages yesterday and today) – and expect that input sometime tomorrow. This is not considered cleared until we get OGC's input.

For your ease of reference, I also attach the Congressional correspondence (I didn't get it from DTRA, but through other channels). Generally, Policy tries to mirror the language used in the original inquiry. I also attach the 2020 package that Policy had not cleared on, but is important to have on hand for the totality of the picture/inquiry. China Policy and OGC IA received all these documents as part of their review. Letting you know I will separately share the attached with TRAC.

More to follow once I hear back from OGC tomorrow.

Best (b)(6)

(b)(6) | Director, CTR Policy | Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global Security | (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

March 15, 2021

The Honorable Lloyd Austin
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Austin:

We write regarding federal funding awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc. (EcoHealth), a New York-based non-profit organization with a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).

As *New York Magazine* recently reported, EcoHealth funneled federal grant funding awarded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to researchers at the WIV.[1] This is deeply concerning given the WIV is a possible origin site of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lab has significant ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military biological research.

It is also troubling that, according to government records, published research papers, and significant reporting, this is not the first time EcoHealth transferred taxpayer funding to a CCP lab. EcoHealth has partnered with the WIV since 2004, as discovered by the *Wall Street Journal*.[2] Additionally, between 2015 and 2019, the WIV received approximately $598,500 from EcoHealth for a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases-funded study on the risk of bat coronavirus emergence. Further, a 2015 WIV research project, which utilized Gain of Function (GOF) research on bats in China, was partially funded by EcoHealth through a grant awarded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.[3]

Government spending data shows that from 2013 to the present, the DOD has awarded approximately $35 million in funding to EcoHealth in the form of contracts and grants.[4] Significantly, in 2017, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth to study the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.

As you know, the CCP runs the WIV. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the CCP replaced the former WIV head with China's top biowarfare expert, Major General Chen Wei. The WIV facility houses a Biosafety Level IV laboratory, which is the only maximum-security biosafety containment lab in China, and has a history of safety concerns even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.[5] For example, in 2018, two Department of State cables raised concerns regarding safety at the WIV, highlighting "a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators

[1] https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/coronavirus-lab-escape-theory.html
[2] https://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-presses-u-s-nonprofit-for-information-on-wuhan-virology-lab-11597829400
[3] https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985
[4] https://www.usaspending.gov/search/?hash=e86d1a3de7d3bcdd538f4489363297d0
[5] https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Final-Minority-Report-on-the-Origins-of-the-COVID-19-Global-Pandemic-Including-the-Roles-of-the-CCP-and-WHO-9.20.20-Coverpage.pdf

OSD002210-21/CMD003378-21

needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."[6] In recent weeks, the Department of State confirmed that several researchers at the WIV became sick with COVID-19-like symptoms in the fall of 2019, and since 2017, the WIV has engaged in classified research with the Chinese military.[7]

Given the similarities between previously federally funded research at the WIV and the DOD grant funding awarded to EcoHealth, we respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. How much funding awarded to EcoHealth through DOD has been given to or used in collaboration with the WIV?
2. Was EcoHealth authorized by DOD to transfer taxpayer funding to the WIV? If so, how much funding was provided the Chinese WIV, and for what purposes?
3. Was the grant funding awarded to EcoHealth for GOF research?
4. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, has DOD reconsidered, paused, or cancelled work with EcoHealth or the WIV?
5. Has any other DOD grant, contract, or subcontract been used to fund work at the WIV?

Thank you for your consideration of our request. We look forward to hearing from you.

Very respectfully,

Guy Reschenthaler
Member of Congress

Matt Gaetz
Member of Congress

Jeff Van Drew
Member of Congress

Michael Cloud
Member of Congress

Tom Tiffany
Member of Congress

Louie Gohmert
Member of Congress

Dr. James R. Baird
Member of Congress

W. Gregory Steube
Member of Congress

Bill Posey
Member of Congress

Brian Babin
Member of Congress

Scott Perry
Member of Congress

Fred Keller
Member of Congress

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[6] *Ibid.*

[7] https://2017-2021.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/index.html

Ronny L. Jackson
Member of Congress

RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3030

ACTION MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

FROM: (b)(6) Acting, DDRE(R&T)

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Inquiry Regarding Funding to EcoHealth Alliance

- On April 30, 2020, Representative Reschenthaler sent an inquiry to the Secretary of Defense (TAB B) regarding a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

- EcoHealth Alliance has conducted research into zoonotic disease origins under grants from the National Institutes of Health. As part of this research, it has collaborated in the past with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, located in the People's Republic of China, on cataloging bat viruses.

- No portion of any funds granted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Biological Threat Reduction Program to EcoHealth Alliance supported work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other activity in China.

- A response letter is attached at TAB A

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the congressional response letter at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: (b)(6), Acting, DD(RT&L), (b)(6) (OSD004467-20)

TAB A

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3030

RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

July 6, 2020

The Honorable Guy Reschenthaler
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Reschenthaler:

Thank you for your letter dated April 30, 2020, regarding a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense (DoD) to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. I am responding on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

The 2017 grant awarded $6.5 million to EcoHealth Alliance for scientific research into combating weapons of mass destruction. In your letter, you stated that EcoHealth Alliance has a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology in the People's Republic of China. No portion of any funds granted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) to EcoHealth Alliance supported work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other activity in China.

For grants awarded in support of the BTRP, the program engages with applicants early in the project development process to ensure that they understand there can be no transfer of funds to parties other than those authorized as sub-recipients by the Department. The Department's program managers carefully review grant proposals to ensure that no prohibited activities (technical or financial) are included as part of any funded projects. Finally, the Department performs regular oversight of all grant awards through required reporting to ensure that research is conducted as authorized.

Thank you for your dedication to the Armed Forces and unwavering support of our Service members across the globe. The Department will continue to dedicate its efforts to ensure the best force protection against the most dangerous threats facing our Nation and our Warfighters.

My point of contact is (b)(6) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

Michael D. Griffin

TAB B

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
[illegible] Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC [illegible]
[illegible]

April 30, 2020

The Honorable Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Esper:

Thank you for your strong leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic and for your efforts to repatriate Americans abroad, counter adversaries like Venezuela and Iran, and keep our servicemembers safe during this unprecedented crisis. I write to bring your attention to a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc., an organization that has a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which reports suggest may be linked to the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak.

In 2017, DOD awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth Alliance under Assistance Listing 12.351 – Scientific Research – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The description of this grant is listed as "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia." On March 23, 2020, EcoHealth Alliance received their final payment in the amount of $1,509,531 for the continuation of their research, which is projected to be completed in October 2022.

As you are likely aware, on April 24, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) cut all grant funding for EcoHealth Alliance after reports circulated that the organization sent US taxpayer dollars to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. It is my understanding that the NIH grant was for research on coronaviruses spread from bats to humans. Given the similarities between EcoHealth Alliance's NIH research and the description of the 2017 DOD grant, I respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC)?
2. If no, what, if any, steps is DOD taking to determine whether department grant funding was utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?
3. If yes, what is the DOD doing to ensure American dollars can no longer be utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?

OS0044[illegible]20CM0[illegible]

Given the Chinese Communist Party's cover up of the global threat posed by COVID-19, it is critical we ensure taxpayer dollars are not being used to support their activities. I appreciate your commitment to our national security, our servicemembers, and their families.

Thank you for your consideration of my request.

Very Respectfully,

Guy Reschenthaler
Member of Congress

TAB C

See Attached

Consolidated Coordination Sheet
CMD005368-20 – 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Coordinating Office	Coordinator's Name and Duty Title	Date	Comments
OGC	Mike Glennon OGC (A&L)	6/5/20	OK as revised
LA	Jonathan Fay	6/8/20	Concur w/ edits
A&S	Kirk S. Hunter Deputy Chief of Staff Defense Threat Reduction Agency	6/10/20	Concur w/ comments
DD(RTL)/BRO	Bindu Nair, Director, Basic Research Office NAIR.BINDU.R.1289495980 Digitally signed by NAIR.BINDU.R.1289495980 Date: 2020.06.29 15:07:17 -04'00'		
DD(RT&L)	Douglas Blake, Acting, DD(RT&L) BLAKE.DOUGLAS.C.1158146602 Digitally signed by BLAKE.DOUGLAS.C.1158146602 Date: 2020.06.30 09:22:31 -04'00'		
DDRE(R&T)	JihFen Lei, Acting DDRE(R&T) LEI.JIH-FEN.1230395949 Digitally signed by LEI.JIH-FEN.1230395949 Date: 2020.07.05 17:23:02 -04'00'		

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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From: (b)(6)
To:

Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: Daily EIS Update - 5 May 2020
Date: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 11:36:07 AM

HTML

Good morning,

Please see today's EIS update below. Contact the DAG for questions.

Programs Complete; Needs FO Review

HOLD IN FO

FDO

For DIR Review

LATE

DUE TRAINING WEEK

STATUS PENDING

ISSUE TASK

NEW TASK

STID

Subject

Received

Program Suspense

DAG Suspense

CTR FY20 Q2 Dormant Account Review

4/23/2020

5/13/2020
5/27/2020

5/13/2020
5/27/2020

OPR

CT-BT, CT-PI, CT-PP, CT-SE

CT-BT, CT-PI, CT-PP, CT-SE

4/23: 50% response due 13 May; remaining response due 27 May
4/24: inputs support SI_095145_042420

https://eis/CT/Taskers/CT_140734_042320/SitePages/Home.aspx
<https://eis/CT/Taskers/CT_140734_042320/SitePages/Home.aspx>

CS_110923_050420

2017 Grant Award by DoD to EcoHealth Alliance (CATMS010520206YF4P8)

5/4/2020

5/12/2020

5/14/2020

OPR

CT-BT
GC, LA

CT-BT
GC, LA

https://eis/cs/taskers/CS_110923_050420/SitePages/Home.aspx
<https://eis/cs/taskers/CS_110923_050420/SitePages/Home.aspx>

OI_125345_050420

DTRA National Capital Region (NCR) Interagency Liaison Officer (LNO) Requirements Survey

5/5/2020

5/13/2020

5/15/2020

OCR

From:	Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To:	Robert Pope
Subject:	DTRA (CTR and RD) Grants to Eco Health Alliance.xlsx
Date:	Monday, November 1, 2021 9:45:00 AM
Attachments:	DTRA (CTR and RD) Grants to Eco Health Alliance.xlsx

Policy Advisor

Diligent Innovations

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

OSD(P)/HD&GS/CWMD/CTR-P

Pentagon 5C746

NI (b)(6)

SI

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0536Z 8Feb2022

美国国防威胁降低局简介

报道称，美国国防威胁降低局简介(DTRA)的任务是使国防部（DoD)美国政府和国际合作伙伴能够对抗和威慑大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）和新出现的威胁 DTRA 作为国防机构和作战支援机构，担任两个不同但高度整合的角色在这些双重角色的框架内，我们利用我们的核心功能，这使我们能够检测阻止和击败整个范围内的威胁，作为美国漏洞的标识符和缓解策略的开发者

自2013年以来，国防部向生态健康联盟注资约3900万美元其中大部分资助来国防部下属的国防威胁降低局（dtra）该军事机构的任务是应对大规模杀伤性武器和网络威胁 http://t.cn/A6iWxoiX

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Profile - The Defense Threat Reduction Agency Profile (DTRA) is reported to be mandated to enable the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. government and international partners to counter and deter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and new emerging threats. DTRA serves two distinct but highly integrated roles as a defense agency and a combat support agency. Within the framework of these dual roles, we leverage our core capabilities, which allow us to detect, block and defeat threats across the spectrum, as developers of US vulnerability identifiers and mitigation strategies. Since 2013, the Department of Defense has injected about $39 million into the EcoHealth Alliance. Much of this funding comes from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (dtra), part of the Department of Defense. The military agency's mission is to "counter weapons of mass destruction and cyber threats". http://t.cn/A6iWxoiX

The Manila Times

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Finding Fr. Ranhillo Callangan Aquino's match

By Mauro Gia Samonte
February 6, 2022 230

(Readers would recall that I was one of the most vocal critics of media slants accusing China as the international culprit in the Covid-19 pandemic. I have had data early on provided by a source detailing the creation of coronavirus by one Dr. Ralph Steven Baric who Wikipedia lists as Distinguished Professor in the Department of Epidemiology, and Professor in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of North

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Carolina at Chapel Hill. In a news story dated April 2019, the United States War Secretary is reported on a visit to the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases inside Fort Detrick, or USAMRIID, and discovers massive leaks of the virus being supplied to the institute for multiplication. In September of the same year, more than a hundred troops from the United States, including many from Fort Detrick, arrived in Wuhan, China, for the World Military Sports Games. The United States did not win a single medal, the reason being that most of the American soldiers were running fever. When the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan was officially acknowledged in December, speculations were rife as to its cause. The most popular tale woven at the time was one which told of the virus having made the spectacular leap from bats to humans; it has been more than two years since then and it would be interesting to know if bats are still being sold at the Wuhan market. This should settle once and for all the controversy of claims by the United States that coronavirus originated in China. Donald Trump had made much of that claim to promote his run for the presidency, and that he lost to Joe Biden should prove that his "China virus" spin has been popularly rejected. And yet, there remain people who would sort of pretend to be holier than thou by holding on to the "Chinese virus" line lock, stock and barrel even as events have already demolished the original progenitors of the idea. I would have written a lengthy rejoinder to Fr. Ranhillo Callangan Aquino for his piece "Why is nobody talking about China liability?" that appeared in The Manila Times last February 2. But Mentong Laurel forwarded to me an email of Ado Paglinawan's position on Fr. Aquino's column. I take the liberty therefore to adopt Ado's position as emailed as mine.)

Feb. 3, 2022

Fr. Ranhilio Callangan Aquino

Present

Dear Fr. Ranhillo,

With all due respect, allow me to introduce myself:

First, I am a journalist editing a daily social media news website Sovereignph.com, a radio anchor at Radyo Pilipinas and a co-host of Opinyon Ngayon at Golden Nation Network (GNN-TV).

Second, I was a former Philippine diplomat assigned to the Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C., as special assistant to the ambassador and press attaché, with concurrent accreditation with the United Nations through our Permanent Representative

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in New York City, roughly from 1986 to 1993.

Third, like you I have a connection with San Beda being an alumnus Elem '61, HS '65 and AB '69.

I am submitting to you my position on your article "Why is nobody talking about China liability?" that appeared in The Manila Times last February 2.

Should you require further reading on the matter, I can send you a free copy of my book mentioned in the article, and some answers to an interview by the Southern Metropolitan Daily. Just please give me an address where to send it.

Respectfully, this is my response to your column:

Nobody is talking about China's liability because she has no liability.

Your opener "I do not think that there is any serious doubt that Covid-19 that practically brought the world to a screeching halt and badgered many already struggling economies broke out first in China and was carried by Chinese tourists or passengers aboard planes flying to different destinations," is an assumption brought about by that it was China that first confirmed chronologically an outbreak occurring in December 2019.

But tracing Covid-19 origins to China has no factual basis.

In May 2021, no less than US President Joe Biden ordered the American intelligence community (AIC) to investigate the alleged lab-leak theory at Wuhan, China. Six months later on October 29, a declassified report confirmed that it has not reached a conclusion on the origins of Covid-19.

The intelligence community assessed that the fact that researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) fell sick in the fall of 2019 "is not diagnostic of the pandemic's origins," the report read. "Even if confirmed, hospital admission alone would not be diagnostic of Covid-19 infection."

The report explicitly rejected some public theorizing that a particular genetic feature of the coronavirus that causes Covid-19, known as a furin cleavage site, proves that the virus was created in a lab.

"The AIC assesses that public claims that some distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 are the result of genetic engineering are not diagnostic of genetic engineering," the report read.

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It also stated that Covid-19 was likely not developed as a biological weapon, as some Republicans had suggested last year. The report also noted that the intelligence community "has no indications" that the institute's research involved either the virus that causes Covid-19 or a close progenitor virus, and, ultimately, that the community will be unable to come to a more definitive conclusion one way or the other without new information.

Earlier in 2020 and 2021, the World Health Organization conducted its own investigations. The first report came out on Feb. 9, 2020 discrediting a theory that the coronavirus was leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Dr. Peter Ben Embarek, the WHO's food safety and animal disease specialist and chairman of the investigation team, told reporters, "The laboratory incident hypothesis is extremely unlikely to explain the introduction of the virus into the human population, therefore [it] is not in the hypotheses that we will suggest for future studies."

The initial findings of the investigation also did not find evidence of large Covid outbreaks in Wuhan or elsewhere before December 2019.

On March 30, 2021, WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus quoted an international team report on their Wuhan field visit, from Jan. 14 to Feb. 10, 2021, "We have not yet found the source of the virus, and we must continue to follow the science and leave no stone unturned as we do."

The WHO fact-finding stemmed from a member state resolution adopted by consensus at the World Health Assembly in May 2020 and calling on WHO "to identify the zoonotic source of the virus and the route of introduction to the human population, including the possible role of intermediate hosts, including through efforts such as scientific and collaborative field missions."

China has been totally transparent about the occurrence of Covid since Dec. 31, 2019 and has also opened itself up for investigation by the WHO and the US.

But when China requested to investigate Fort Detrick in Fredericksburg, MD (Maryland), it has been met so far with an overwhelming silence from the White House.

To be continued

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HASC NDAA report request: EcoHealth funding
Date: Monday, September 13, 2021 8:12:21 AM
Attachments: Report on Wuhan Inst of Virology Funding (Rep Gallagher).pdf

Sirs,

Good morning! Please see below and attached for your awareness from DTRA LA.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

CTR Director's Action Group Lead
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Octant Associates, LLC | Booz Allen Hamilton
Corporate email: (b)(6)
NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR
Main
Desk
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-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 1:40 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: HASC NDAA report request: EcoHealth funding

(b)(6)

Just for your SA, see the attached report request on EcoHealth that made it into HASC's NDAA markup. No action needed yet, but just good to be aware of and it looks like a good amount of the work you guys did already. The only difference this time is that the report will be made publicly available.

V/r,
(b)(6)

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 10:58:00 AM
Attachments: For Reference-Prior Cong RFI incoming on EcoHealth Alliance (30-Apr-2020).pdf
For Reference-Prior Cong RFI response on EcoHealth Alliance (13-May-2020).docx
20200430 TAB B_OSD004467-20-CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf
20200514 TAB A_OUSD AS Response to Rep Reschenthaler_CTR_Final.docx

Craig,

I want to keep your office in the loop on the Wuhan-related questions, because they may also affect A/ASD Vann coming out of yesterday's hearing.

DTRA received a query from Bill Gertz at the Washington Times yesterday. Unfortunately, CT didn't receive the query until this morning and Gertz already published his story. We'll provide a response to PA so they can close the loop with Gertz (I'll send to you SEPCOR).

We also have the tasker to help contribute to the response to the most recent Congressional query on this topic. The team is working the response now and I'll share our draft when they get it to me.

Also, for background, I've attached the previous (2020) Congressional queries and draft responses on the topic. If your office has the signed responses for ASD Lord, we would welcome those to ensure we stay consistent in our messaging to the Hill.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:46 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) <robert.s.pope12.civ@mail.mil>; (b)(6); (b)(6); DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

ALCON,

Please see attached for responses CTR assisted in drafting in response to previous Congressional RFIs WRT EcoHealth Alliance. I've included the RFIs for reference as well. Thanks to (b)(6) for digging up these documents. Standing by should anyone need anything else.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)
CTR Director's Action Group
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

CTR A&AS Contractor
Octant Associates, LLC | Booz Allen Hamilton
Corporate email: (b)(6)
NIPR (b)(6)
Main
Desk:
Mobi

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-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) < (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:17 AM
To: (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Importance: High

(b)(6) - Please see the Washington Times query below from Bill Gertz -- both the summary in DTRA/PA's note and actual questions from Bill Gertz at the bottom of this chain. We need to answer this today, the earlier the better.

DAG -- Please send to all on this note the answers we used on the 1-2 previous occasions we've responded to Congressional queries on this topic so we're consistent with those messages and don't have to reinvent them.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Good day all,
We received the below inquiry from the Washington Post regarding Dr. William's testimony yesterday. If I recall correctly, these questions have already been addressed in another effort...please see below excerpt:

"I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan

Institute of Virology."

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Gertz <(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Bill Gertz

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz | direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: Bill Gertz (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

Bill Gertz
(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz | direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

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A2: The grant was made by DoD's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 12:05 PM
To: (b)(6)
OSD (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYI - we will discuss this at 1430. We received another congressional inquiry on this topic too.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:54 AM
To: (b)(6)
THR (b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYSA -- Today's article from Bill Gertz (included in today's Defense Morning Clips):

==========
'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds
Washington Times Online, May 4 (1751) | Bill Gertz

Pentagon officials offered a qualified denial Tuesday when questioned on whether any of the nearly $40 million in defense money given to a non-government organization may have been used for research at the Chinese military-linked Wuhan Institute of Virology, a suspected potential origin point for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Rys Williams, acting director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Brandi Vann, acting assistant defense secretary for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, told a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing that all the funds they reviewed from DTRA and other government sources did not go to the Chinese institute following reviews of grants to EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based NGO that worked closely with the WIV.

"We have done a thorough look at all of our programmatic activities to ensure that at least the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding to this NGO was not provided, to the best of our knowledge, into the Wuhan Institute of Virology," Mr. Williams told the House panel that focuses on special operations.

Mr. Williams said DTRA reviews all activities related to NGOs "to make sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized and in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the federal acquisition process but equally in policy as well."

Ms. Vann, the acting assistant defense secretary, added that other defense agencies involved in nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) programs reviewed funding of EcoHealth Alliance research and found no links to the Chinese lab.

"We also across the NCB did a thorough review to identify any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory, and we have not identified any," she said in response to questioning from Mississippi Rep. Trent Kelly,

the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee. "It is something that we continue to watch to ensure that our investments are not going to places where they should not be," she noted.

Mr. Kelly asked the two defense officials "what kind of risk assessment or risk analysis we've conducted and how the Wuhan Institute of Virology became the partner of choice for U.S. government agencies, given its ties to the PLA," he said, using the acronym for People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military.

A State Department fact sheet made public in January for the first time disclosed that the WIV was engaged in covert biological weapons research with the PLA. Chinese officials at the WIV have denied the institute works with the PLA.

According to the fact sheet, the WIV is engaged in "secret military activity."

"Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing," the fact sheet said. "For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China's past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention."

The collaboration at the institute includes both publication and secret military projects including classified research and laboratory animal experiments. The work between WIV and PLA has been underway since 2017.

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress last month that U.S. intelligence agencies believe the pandemic began either through a leak from a Chinese laboratory or from an animal host. Many scientists and mainstream news outlets for months dismissed all suggestions the virus could have come from a lab as a conspiracy theory.

A list of grants and contracts for EcoHealth Alliance posted on the website of Independent Science News shows DTRA and the Pentagon provided the group with $38.9 million since 2014. DTRA's funding included $6.49 million between 2017 and 2020 for what the agency called "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia."

According to DTRA, the grant was used for research aimed at "combating or countering weapons of mass destruction" and was to be carried out between 2017 and 2022. It is not clear if the work is ongoing.

The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) provided EcoHealth Alliance with $3.7 million in funding from 2014 to 2019, and the National Institutes of Health gave the group $2.5 million between 2009 and 2012. The NIAID funds went to a program called "understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence."

A spokesman for EcoHealth Alliance did not return an email and phone call seeking comment.

EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak has worked closely with WIV virologist Shi Zhengli, known as the "Bat Woman of Wuhan" for her work on bat viruses and has been a vocal critic of the Wuhan lab transmission theory. He was also part of the World Health Organization team that investigated the virus origin earlier this year that called the lab theory "extremely unlikely" and not worth pursuing. Critics say the WHO report was influenced by the Chinese government that sought to play down the lab leak theory.

China, according to the Trump and Biden administrations, has engaged in disinformation in a bid to deflect criticism from its handling of the outbreak's earliest days. The Chinese government refused to provide virus samples to international virus hunters and initially hid the infectiousness of the virus from the world.
More than 3 million people have died since the pandemic broke out in Wuhan in December 2019.
==========

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Thursday, May 6, 2021 8:37:50 AM

FYI below. I am not responding. We do not need to coordinate media with them if it is a question aimed at DTRA as a whole. (b)(5)
(b)(5) (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:34 PM
To: (b)(6)
A C
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Thanks for sharing. In the future, DTRA CTR must coordinate media responses related to the DoD CTR Program with CWMD Policy. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Best, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 2:23 PM
To (b)(6)
OS
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Here is DTRA's response to the reporter's inquiry. Note - these answers were provided after he published the article below. So they were apparently not incorporated into his story.

Q1: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?
A1: No.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: The grant was made by DoD's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 12:05 PM
To (b)(6)
OS
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYI - we will discuss this at 1430. We received another congressional inquiry on this topic too.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:54 AM
To (b)(6)
TH
(b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYSA -- Today's article from Bill Gertz (included in today's Defense Morning Clips):

==========
'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds
Washington Times Online, May 4 (1751) | Bill Gertz

Pentagon officials offered a qualified denial Tuesday when questioned on whether any of the nearly $40 million in defense money given to a non-government organization may have been used for research at the Chinese military-linked Wuhan Institute of Virology, a suspected potential origin point for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Rys Williams, acting director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Brandi Vann, acting assistant defense secretary for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, told a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing that all the funds they reviewed from DTRA and other government sources did not go to the Chinese institute following reviews of grants to EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based NGO that worked closely with the WIV.

"We have done a thorough look at all of our programmatic activities to ensure that at least the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding to this NGO was not provided, to the best of our knowledge, into the Wuhan Institute of Virology," Mr. Williams told the House panel that focuses on special operations.

Mr. Williams said DTRA reviews all activities related to NGOs "to make sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized and in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the federal acquisition process but equally in policy as well."

Ms. Vann, the acting assistant defense secretary, added that other defense agencies involved in nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) programs reviewed funding of EcoHealth Alliance research and found no links to the Chinese lab.

"We also across the NCB did a thorough review to identify any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory, and we have not identified any," she said in response to questioning from Mississippi Rep. Trent Kelly, the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee. "It is something that we continue to watch to ensure that our investments are not going to places where they should not be," she noted.

Mr. Kelly asked the two defense officials "what kind of risk assessment or risk analysis we've conducted and how the Wuhan Institute of Virology became the partner of choice for U.S. government agencies, given its ties to the PLA," he said, using the acronym for People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military.

A State Department fact sheet made public in January for the first time disclosed that the WIV was engaged in covert biological weapons research with the PLA. Chinese officials at the WIV have denied the institute works with the PLA.

According to the fact sheet, the WIV is engaged in "secret military activity."

"Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing," the fact sheet said. "For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China's past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention."

The collaboration at the institute includes both publication and secret military projects including classified research and laboratory animal experiments. The work between WIV and PLA has been underway since 2017.

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress last month that U.S. intelligence agencies believe the pandemic began either through a leak from a Chinese laboratory or from an animal host. Many scientists and mainstream news outlets for months dismissed all suggestions the virus could have come from a lab as a conspiracy theory.

A list of grants and contracts for EcoHealth Alliance posted on the website of Independent Science News shows DTRA and the Pentagon provided the group with $38.9 million since 2014. DTRA's funding included $6.49 million between 2017 and 2020 for what the agency called "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia."

According to DTRA, the grant was used for research aimed at "combating or countering weapons of mass destruction" and was to be carried out between 2017 and 2022. It is not clear if the work is ongoing.

The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) provided EcoHealth Alliance with $3.7 million in funding from 2014 to 2019, and the National Institutes of Health gave the group $2.5 million between 2009 and 2012. The NIAID funds went to a program called "understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence."

A spokesman for EcoHealth Alliance did not return an email and phone call seeking comment.

EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak has worked closely with WIV virologist Shi Zhengli, known as the "Bat Woman of Wuhan" for her work on bat viruses and has been a vocal critic of the Wuhan lab transmission theory. He was also part of the World Health Organization team that investigated the virus origin earlier this year that called the lab theory "extremely unlikely" and not worth pursuing. Critics say the WHO report was influenced by the Chinese government that sought to play down the lab leak theory.

China, according to the Trump and Biden administrations, has engaged in disinformation in a bid to deflect criticism from its handling of the outbreak's earliest days. The Chinese government refused to provide virus samples to international virus hunters and initially hid the infectiousness of the virus from the world.
More than 3 million people have died since the pandemic broke out in Wuhan in December 2019.
==========

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 7:33:07 AM

FYSA.

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 6:33 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) >; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)
(b)(5)

V/r
(b)(6)
Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR
JWIC

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 4:52 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List

SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) >; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Thank you - I appreciate your partnership. Please advise how DTRA PA informs and seeks guidance from OSD PA about media inquiries that are related to the DoD CTR Program and that specifically ask for insight into strategies related to the DoD CTR Program.

Best, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 4:37 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) >; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you (b)(6) We will continue coordinating appropriately going forward and will include CWMD Policy for media queries. We appreciate you support.
V/r,
(b)(6)

Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWICS:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 2:39 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) >; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you again for coordinating the draft response with CWMD Policy. DASD Richard Johnson clears, as edited in the attached and copied below for ease of reference. Rationale: this responds to the exact question posed.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: Yes, we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Separately, CWMD Policy would like OSD PA to clarify the coordination process for media inquiries related to the DoD CTR Program and any of the underlying programs. I've cc'ed OSD Leg Af to likewise clarify the coordination process for Congressional inquiries related to the DoD CTR Program and any of the underlying programs. In each instance, CWMD Policy needs to be included in the clearance process.

Many thanks,

(b)(6) | Director, CTR Policy | Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global Security | (b)(6) | SIPR: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 12:50 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) >; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) <(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hello (b)(6)
Please find attached the actual query that we received on Tuesday evening from Bill Gertz. (b)(6) on my team acknowledged to Mr. Gertz that we received his query, however, we have not provided any information to him.
(b)(5)

I hope this paints a clearer picture of the query activity. I welcome any additional questions and concerns.
V/r,
(b)(6)
Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR
JWIC

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)
CIV
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA DIR (USA) <melissa.d.tune.civ@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hello (b)(6)
Will comply. Am bringing this request to the attention to (b)(6), the DTRA PA Chief for leadership coordination.

Please stand by...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 10:55 AM
To: (b)(6)
PA
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) update: please have DTRA send the actual press inquiry AND the proposed response to CWMD Policy for coordination.

Best (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 10:53 AM
To: (b)(6)
PA
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you (b)(6) DASD CWMD asks that DTRA formally send the proposed DTRA responses to CWMD Policy for coordination.

Will you relay that message to DTRA leadership?

Many thanks,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 9:36 AM
To (b)(6)
CI
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Good day all,
In response to your additional questions:

(b)(5)

Will standby for additional questions...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 6:45 PM
To: (b)(6)
US

Cc (b)(6)
DT
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hello,

Additional questions from DASD CWMD:

(b)(5)

CWMD Policy needs to understand what the response is intending to do, and we also need to review whatever DTRA puts together.

Thank you (b)(6)

From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 6:24 PM
To (b)(6)
A
Cc (b)(6)
DT
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

H (b)(6)

Adding DTRA PA here.

(b)(6) (via iPhone (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<mailto: (b)(6)
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 at 6:00:20 PM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

CWMD Policy needs to chop on the DTRA response.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:59 PM

To: (b)(6)

<mailto

Cc:

<mailto

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hi (b)(6)

I've received no queries to that effect. I've cc'd (b)(6) who works our DTRA portfolio – she says there's a response in the works to that piece.

(b)(6)

Department of Defense Spokesman

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

1400 Defense Pentagon (2D961), Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<mailto (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:34 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) checking to see if you've received any media enquiries related to this Washington Times Online article, "'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds"

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Director, CTR Policy I Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global Security (b)(6)
<mailto: (b)(6)
<mailto:

From: (b)(6)
<mailto (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 2:31 PM
To (b)(6)
<mailto
Cc
<mailto
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) this is the first I've heard of it.

Best,

(b)(6)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Legislative Affairs

Comm (b)(6)

Mobil

NIPR:

SIPR:

From: (b)(6)

<mailto (b)(6)

Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 at 2:21:28 PM

To: (b)(6)

<mailto (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Has OSD LegAf fielded any questions related to this article?

Many thanks, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) < (b)(6)

<mailto (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:54 AM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) <mailto:kevin.g.garrett2.civ@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >

Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYSA -- Today's article from Bill Gertz (included in today's Defense Morning Clips):

==========

'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds
Washington Times Online, May 4 (1751) Bill Gertz

Pentagon officials offered a qualified denial Tuesday when questioned on whether any of the nearly $40 million in defense money given to a non-government organization may have been used for research at the Chinese military-linked Wuhan Institute of Virology, a suspected potential origin point for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Rys Williams, acting director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Brandi Vann, acting assistant defense secretary for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, told a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing that all the funds they reviewed from DTRA and other government sources did not go to the

Chinese institute following reviews of grants to EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based NGO that worked closely with the WIV.

"We have done a thorough look at all of our programmatic activities to ensure that at least the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding to this NGO was not provided, to the best of our knowledge, into the Wuhan Institute of Virology," Mr. Williams told the House panel that focuses on special operations.

Mr. Williams said DTRA reviews all activities related to NGOs "to make sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized and in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the federal acquisition process but equally in policy as well."

Ms. Vann, the acting assistant defense secretary, added that other defense agencies involved in nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) programs reviewed funding of EcoHealth Alliance research and found no links to the Chinese lab.

"We also across the NCB did a thorough review to identify any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory, and we have not identified any," she said in response to questioning from Mississippi Rep. Trent Kelly, the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee. "It is something that we continue to watch to ensure that our investments are not going to places where they should not be," she noted.

Mr. Kelly asked the two defense officials "what kind of risk assessment or risk analysis we've conducted and how the Wuhan Institute of Virology became the partner of choice for U.S. government agencies, given its ties to the PLA," he said, using the acronym for People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military.

A State Department fact sheet made public in January for the first time disclosed that the WIV was engaged in covert biological weapons research with the PLA. Chinese officials at the WIV have denied the institute works with the PLA.

According to the fact sheet, the WIV is engaged in "secret military activity."

"Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing," the fact sheet said. "For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China's past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention."

The collaboration at the institute includes both publication and secret military projects including classified research and laboratory animal experiments. The work between WIV and PLA has been underway since 2017.

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress last month that U.S. intelligence agencies believe the pandemic began either through a leak from a Chinese laboratory or from an animal host. Many scientists and mainstream news outlets for months dismissed all suggestions the virus could have come from a lab as a conspiracy theory.

A list of grants and contracts for EcoHealth Alliance posted on the website of Independent Science News shows DTRA and the Pentagon provided the group with $38.9 million since 2014. DTRA's funding included $6.49 million between 2017 and 2020 for what the agency called "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia."

According to DTRA, the grant was used for research aimed at "combating or countering weapons of mass destruction" and was to be carried out between 2017 and 2022. It is not clear if the work is ongoing.

The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) provided EcoHealth Alliance with $3.7 million in funding from 2014 to 2019, and the National Institutes of Health gave the group $2.5 million between 2009 and 2012. The NIAID funds went to a program called "understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence."

A spokesman for EcoHealth Alliance did not return an email and phone call seeking comment.

EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak has worked closely with WIV virologist Shi Zhengli, known as the "Bat Woman of Wuhan" for her work on bat viruses and has been a vocal critic of the Wuhan lab transmission theory. He was also part of the World Health Organization team that investigated the virus origin earlier this year that called the lab theory "extremely unlikely" and not worth pursuing. Critics say the WHO report was influenced by the Chinese government that sought to play down the lab leak theory.

China, according to the Trump and Biden administrations, has engaged in disinformation in a bid to deflect criticism from its handling of the outbreak's earliest days. The Chinese government refused to provide virus samples to international virus hunters and initially hid the infectiousness of the virus from the world.

More than 3 million people have died since the pandemic broke out in Wuhan in December 2019.

==========

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: (b)(6)
To:
Cc: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Media Query
Date: Wednesday, March 2, 2022 12:01:49 PM

(b)(6) see below. Can you please research and get back to us soonest?
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 2, 2022 11:51 AM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA) (b)(6) Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
Subject: Media Query

Dr. Williams and Gentlemen,

FYSA - we received this media query this morning. BLUF: a reporter from the Washington Examiner is interested in clarification on a DTRA contract and whether we were associated with it and its location. The details are below. Dr. Pope and (b)(6) - I believe you've provided on the record responses before on a similar topic (EcoHealth,Wuhan)?

Here are the details:

Hello,

I'm a reporter with the Washington Examiner. I had a question for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in regards to a grant it has with the nonprofit group EcoHealth Alliance to study the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in western Asia. The grant number is: HDTRA11710064

This grant includes a subgrant in which the subawardee country name is identified as Jarvis Island, a small island in the Pacific Ocean that doesn't appear to be home to any bats. The subawardee name is the Royal Scientific Society in Amman, Jordan, and the subawardee address is listed as AHMAD AL TRAWNEH STREET in Amman, Jordan.

Can the DTRA confirm if Jarvis Island has any involvement whatsoever with this grant? It appears that perhaps the grant incorrectly codified Jarvis Island as the subawardee country name instead of Jordan. Can DTRA confirm if this is what happened here?

Best,

--

Andrew Kerr

Investigative Reporter

Washington Examiner

(b)(6)

@AndrewKerrNC

<https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aYWtlcnJAd2FzaGluZ3RvbmV4YW1pbmVyLmNvbQ%3D%3D&type=zerocontent&guid=2500c29c-5812-4f22-be9d-0e11099cea0a> ·

V/r,

(b)(6)

Chief, DTRA Public Affairs Office

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

JWIC

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: UK Article on DTRA funding of Virus
Date: Monday, June 7, 2021 8:11:00 AM
Attachments: The Pentagon funneled $39million to a company that funded Wuhan lab - Daily Mail Online.pdf

FYSA, here's the Daily Mail article.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA) <rhys.m.williams.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 7:36 AM
To: Kuliasha, Michael A SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: UK Article on DTRA funding of Virus

Plus Rob and Hunter - see attached.

Mike,
Thanks. This is not the first time this has arisen. I was asked about it during recent congressional testimony (I've cut/pasted the draft response that is going back to the Hill this week). The EHA work was funded by CTR and has been reviewed very closely to assure that funding was properly conducted and overseen.

Rhys

QFR submitted by Kelly, Trent
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022 Tuesday, May 4, 2021

(b)(5)

Rhys Williams, PhD
Director (acting)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

-----Original Message-----
From: Kuliasha, Michael A SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 6:56 AM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA (b)(6)
Subject: UK Article on DTRA funding of Viru

Rhys/Ron:

(b)(6) came across this article that alleges that DTRA was involved in funding gain of function experimentation at the Wuhan lab that created the Corona virus. For your SA.

Mike

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 6:29 AM
T (b)(6)
Subject: Article

Sir,

Here it is.

(b)(6)

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android < Caution-https://go.onelink.me/107872968?pid=InProduct&c=Global_Internal_YGrowth_AndroidEmailSig__AndroidUsers&af_wl_ym&af_sub1=Internal&af_sub2=Global_YGrowth&af_sub3=EmailSignature >

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Sent: Sun, Jun 6, 2021 at 15:01

Subject: Hmmmm.....

So, I warned the PAO and the front office and Chem/Bio about this before I left DTRA. An intrepid blogger had discovered this connection in late January 2020 and posted it on a popular blog (Zerohedge) along with grant numbers, certifying officials, etc.)

In short, DTRA was funding gain of function experimentation in bat coronaviruses in Wuhan. I suspect, even the money that went from NIH may have originated from DTRA.

DTRA may get its 15 minutes of fame.

Perhaps you would like to alert DTRA PAO. The link is to the RedState blog article which has a link to the Daily Mail (UK) article.

Money quote from RedState:

"Research papers published by the two on coronaviruses identify the grant funding as having come from USAID and PREDICT. But that limited attribution didn't reveal that the funding distributed through PREDICT had, in part, come from the Defense Department — specifically the DOD "Defense Threat Reduction Agency.""

Why Was the US Department of Defense Funding Bioweapons Research at Wuhan? RedState < Caution-https://redstate.com/shipwreckedcrew/2021/06/06/why-was-the-us-department-of-defense-funding-bioweapons-research-at-wuhan-n391796 >

From the Daily Mail:

Sub headline that reads:

* Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020

The article states, "Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020 with the description: 'Understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia."

The Pentagon funneled $39million to a charity that funded Wuhan lab Daily Mail Online < Caution-https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9652287/The-Pentagon-funneled-39million-charity-funded-Wuhan-lab.html >

<Caution-https://s.yimg.com/ing/storm/assets/enhancerV2/23/logos/dailymail.png>

The Pentagon funneled $39million to a charity that funded Wuhan lab

Josh Boswell

Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39 million to charity EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), w...

I would NOT assume anyone in PAO is doing anything about this or is even aware. I would urge you to make them at least aware, an (b)(6) s well.

(b)(6)

Privacy Policy | Feedback Follow 20.7M Monday, Jun 7th 2021 3AM 68°F 6AM 68°F 5-Day Forecast

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The Pentagon gave $39 MILLION to Dr. Peter Daszak's EcoHealth Alliance - the charity that funded coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab accused of being the source of the outbreak, federal data reveals

- **Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39 million to EcoHealth Alliance, which funded a lab in Wuhan, China, between 2013 and 2020**
- **The Wuhan Institute of Virology is accused of being the source of Covid-19**
- **The majority of the DoD funding came from the DTRA, a military branch with a mission to 'counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and improvised threat networks'**
- **Federal grant data assembled by independent researchers shows that the charity has received more than $123 million from the government in total**
- **Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020**
- **EHA also received $64.7 million from the US Agency for International Development (USAID)**
- **It received $13 million from Health and Human Services, which includes the National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control**
- **It is not known how much of the money actually went to the Wuhan lab**
- **EHA has also funded deeply controversial 'gain of function' experiments, where dangerous viruses are made more infectious to study their effect on human cells**

By JOSH BOSWELL and MARTIN GOULD FOR DAILYMAIL.COM
PUBLISHED: 12:31 EDT, 4 June 2021 | **UPDATED:** 16:45 EDT, 4 June 2021

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The Pentagon gave $39 million to a charity that funded controversial **coronavirus** research at a Chinese lab accused of being the source for Covid-19, federal data reveals.

The news comes as the charity's chief, British-born scientist Dr. Peter Daszak, was exposed in an alleged conflict of interest and back-room campaign to discredit lab leak theories.

The charity, EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), has come under intense scrutiny after it emerged that it had been using federal grants to fund research into coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in **China.**

Error code 200

The U.S. nonprofit, set up to research new diseases, has also partly funded deeply controversial 'gain of function' experiments, where dangerous viruses are made more infectious to study their effect on human cells.

A political storm broke when former president Donald Trump canceled a $3.7 million grant to the charity last y amid claims that Covid-19 was created in, or leaked from, the Wuhan lab funded by EHA.

But federal grant data assembled by independent researchers shows that the charity has received more than $ million from the government – from 2017 to 2020 - and that one of its biggest funders is the Department of Defense, funneling almost $39 million to the organization since 2013.

Exactly how much of that money went toward research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology is unknown.



Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39million to charity EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), which fur a lab in Wuhan, China

FEDERAL GRANTS TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

AGENCY	AWARD ID	YEAR	AMOUNT AWARDED	TOTAL AMOUNT	RECIPIENT
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-15-0034	2015	$2,217,037.00	$4,479,678.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2016	$2,262,641.00		
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-17-0037	2017	$721,249.00	$1,604,523.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2018	$883,274.00		
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-19-0039	2019	$998,437.00	$4,988,987.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2020	$3,990,550.00		
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-13-0029	2013	$1,371,611.00	$2,225,134.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2014	$957,145.00		
		2015	-$103,622.00		
DOD	HDTRA1-14-0039 #1	2014	$992,699.00	$2,942,019.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2015	$978,784.00		
		2016	$970,536.00		
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-10039 #1	2017	$996,147.00	$1,994,340.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2018	$998,193.00		
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-20-0016	2020	$4,912,818.00	$4,912,818.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-17-0034	2017	$782,330.00	$6,491,025.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
		2018	$2,203,917.00		
		2019	$1,995,247.00		
		2020	$1,509,531.00		
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-20-0018	2020	$4,995,106.00	$4,995,106.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIANCE
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (DOD)	[illegible]	2020	$1,360,002.00	$1,360,002.00	ECO-EALTH ALLIA
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	HDTRA1-20-0039	2020	$2,956,309.00	$2,956,309.00	ECO-EALTH

DESCRIPTION
BASE PER OD - PSC: AD92 GF::OT::IGF
SEROLOG CAL B:OSURVEILLANCE FOR SPILLOVER OF HENIPAVIRUSES AND FLOVIRUSES AT AGRICULTURAL AND HUNTING HUMANANIMAL INTERFACES IN PEN NSULAR MALAYSIA
REDUC NG THE THREAT OF R FT VALLEY FEVER THROUGH ECOLOGY, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SOC O-ECONOMICS
BASE PER OD
UNDERSTAND NG RIFT VALLEY FEVER IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
UNDERSTAND NG RIFT VALLEY FEVER IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. CHANGE OF ACO TO ONR
REDUC NG THE THREAT FROM HIGH-RISK PATHOGENS CAUSING FEBRILE ILLNESS N LIBERIA
UNDERSTAND NG THE R SK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC D SEASE EVERGENCE IN WESTERN AS A
CRIMEAN-CONGO HEMORRHAGIC FEVER: REDUCING AN EMERGING HEALTH THREAT N TANZAN A.
STRATEGIC COORDINATION TO STRENGTHEN AFRICOM: ONE HEALTH AND VETERINARY PROGRAMS FOR GLOBAL HEALTH ENGAGEMENT STRENGTHENING MULTI-SECTORAL APPROACHES TO B ODEFENSE AND BIOSURVE LLANCE IN THE CAUCASUS
REDUC NG THE THREAT OF M DDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS AND AVIAN INFLUENZA IN JORDAN&STRENGTHENING REGIONAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE CAPAC TY

Federal grant data assembled by independent researchers shows that the charity has received more than $123 million fro the government – and that one of its biggest funders is the Department of Defense, funneling almost $39million to the organization since 2013

0:00 / 5:52

Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020 with the description: 'Understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.'

The grant was categorized as 'scientific research - combating weapons of mass destruction.'

The majority of the DoD funding came from the DTRA, a military branch with a mission to 'counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and improvised threat networks.'

EHA also received $64.7 million from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), $13 million from Health and Human Services, which includes the National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control, $2.3 million from the Department of Homeland Security, and $2.6 million from the National Science Foundation.

A government funding figure of $3.4 million was widely reported, after White House chief medical advisor Anthony Fauci was questioned in a Senate hearing on how much money the National Institutes of Health sent to the Wuhan lab via its grants to EcoHealth Alliance in 2019.

But the total grant figures including Pentagon funding dwarf that number.

Researchers James Baratta and Mariamne Everett assembled grant filings from US government agencies to EHA, which were published on popular science site Independent Science News in December.

The site found EHA's declaration of its vast military funding is nestled deep in the 'Privacy Policy' section of its website, under the title 'EcoHealth Alliance Policy Regarding Conflict of Interest in Research'.

The news comes as the charity's chief, British-born scier Dr. Peter Daszak, was exposed in an alleged conflict of interest and back-room campaign to discredit lab leak theories

In the disclosure EHA says it is 'the recipient of various grant awards from federal agencies including the National Institute of Health, the National Science Foundation, US Fish and Wildlife Service, and the US Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense.'

It does not disclose the size of its DoD funding.

In 2014 the Obama administration outlawed gain of function research, such as the experiments funded by EHA, after concerns were raised among scientists that it could lead to a global pandemic from a genetically enhanced virus escaping a lab.

But EHA reportedly continued to legally fund the practice, using a loophole that allowed for the research in cases 'urgently necessary to protect the public health or national security.'

One notable EHA 'policy advisor' is David Franz, a former commander at the principal US government biowarfare and biodefense facility Fort Detrick.

Franz was an official in the United Nations Special Commission which inspected for bioweapons in Iraq.

Researchers at a number of top universities have recently penned a letter claiming that theories that COVID-19 escaped f a Wuhan lab 'remain viable'

While China has tried to insist the virus originated elsewhere, academics, politicians and the media have begun to contemplate the possibility it escaped from the WIV - raising suspicions that Chinese officials simply hid evidence of the early spread

The charity's head, Daszak, has been accused of orchestrating a behind-the-scenes 'bullying' campaign to ensure the blame for covid-19 did not fall on the Wuhan lab he funded.

The 55-year-old worked closely with the lab's so-called 'bat woman,' Shi Zhengli, in their studies of coronaviruses.

In February 2020 Daszak persuaded more than two dozen other scientists to sign off on a letter he had written to highly respected medical journal The Lancet, that was seen as so influential that it cowed most experts into refusing even to consider that the virus could have been man-made and escaped from the Wuhan institute.

Former high-level Clinton administration staffer Jamie Metzl, who now sits on the World Health Organization's advisory committee on human genome editing, told DailyMail.com that the Lancet letter 'was scientific propaganda and a form of thuggery and intimidation.'

Freedom of Information Act disclosures revealed Daszak tried to distance his charity from the letter to make it appear it was coming from 'a community supporting our colleagues.'

The charity chief told his fellow signatories in an email that the letter would not be sent under the EcoHealth logo 'and will not be identifiable as coming from any one organization or person.'

The joint letter, published in the journal on February 19 last year, praised the Chinese 'who continue to save lives and protect global health during the challenge of the Covid-19 outbreak' and added 'We stand together to strc condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that Covid-19 does not have a natural origin.'

Despite his close connections to the Chinese lab, Daszak was also picked by the World Health Organization (W to be part of its 13-member team that was tasked with finding the cause of the pandemic which began in Wuh city of some 11 million people in Central China.

Shi Zhengli (left), the so-called 'bat woman' and a coronavirus expert at the lab, insists there were no infections at the lab

Metzl told DailyMail.com the appointment was a 'massive and outrageous conflict of interest,' allowing a man had significant financial and reputational stakes in discrediting lab leak theories to investigate those theories.

Prominent scientists have criticized the WHO probe, which dismissed lab leak theories, as lackluster and incomplete.

In a Freedom of Information disclosure of Fauci's emails obtained by Buzzfeed last month, Daszak thanked the White House doctor for pushing back on the theory that covid-19 was man made.

'I just wanted to say a personal thank you on behalf of our staff and collaborators, for publicly standing up and stating that the scientific evidence supports a natural origin for COVID-19 from a bat-to-human spillover, not a lab release from the Wuhan Institute of Virology,' Daszak wrote in April 2020.

Fauci says the emails have been taken out of context.

EHA's most recent financial statements filed with the IRS say that around 90 per cent of its funding comes from government sources.

The 2019 report says Daszak was paid a total $410,801 for the year, including $311,815 base pay, $42,250 bonus, $24,500 deferred compensation and $32,236 nontaxable benefits.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has been collecting numerous coronaviruses from bats ever since the SARS outbreak in 2002.

They have also published papers describing how these bat viruses have interacted with human cells.

US Embassy staff visited the lab in 2018 and 'had grave safety concerns' over the protocols which were being observed at the facility.

The lab is just eight miles from the Huanan wet market which is where the first cluster of infections erupted in Wuhan.

The market is just a few hundred yards from another lab called the Wuhan Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (WHCDC).

The WHCDC kept disease-ridden animals in its labs, including some 605 bats.

Those who support the theory argue that Covid-19 could have leaked from either or both of these facilities and spread to the wet market.

Most argue that this would have been a virus they were studying rather than one which was engineered.

Last year a bombshell paper from the Beijing-sponsored South China University of Technology recounted how bats once attacked a researcher at the WHCDC and 'blood of bat was on his skin.'

The report says: 'Genome sequences from patients were 96% or 89% identical to the Bat CoV ZC45 coronavirus originally found in Rhinolophus affinis (intermediate horseshoe bat).'

It describes how the only native bats are found around 600 miles away from the Wuhan seafood market and that the probability of bats flying from Yunnan and Zhejiang provinces was minimal.

In addition there is little to suggest the local populace eat the bats as evidenced by testimonies of 31 residents and 28 visitors.

Instead the authors point to research being carried out within 300 yards at the WHCDC.

One of the researchers at the WHCDC described quarantining himself for two weeks after a bat's blood got on his skin, according to the report. That same man also quarantined himself after a bat urinated on him.

And he also mentions discovering a live tick from a bat - parasites known for their ability to pass infections through a hos animal's blood.

'The WHCDC was also adjacent to the Union Hospital (Figure 1, bottom) where the first group of doctors were infected during this epidemic.' The report says.

'It is plausible that the virus leaked around and some of them contaminated the initial patients in this epidemic, though solid proofs are needed in future study.'

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The more details that come out, the murkier the si...
by **Fran12** 535

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High-profile media personality is charged with raping a 13-year-old girl and allegedly telling her she should be GRATEFUL he was 'teaching her how to be a good lover'

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Food

Shackled skeleton discovered by workmen building a conservatory in Rutland is first to be discovered of a Roman slave who was thrown in a ditch 1,800 years ago and is an 'internationally significant' find

Science

Comments 456

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dmg media

From: (b)(6)
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Date: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:33:34 PM
Attachments: OSD004467-20-CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf

CT -- per Dr. Williams' recommendation, forwarding the same for your immediate review to determine answer for question 1 in the memo.

Let me know very soon to assist A&S in making the determination.

V/R

(b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
O (b)(6)
C

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:19
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
USARMY DTRA R AND D (USA) < (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(US
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

(b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
O (b)(6)
C

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List Task CS <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.task-cs@mail.mil>; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
OU
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

(b)(6)

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

JWIC

GOV

From (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.list.enterprise-solutions@mail.mil>
Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

(b)(5)

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours.CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Executive Secretary

OUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886

(b)(6) VOIP)

(NIPR (b)(6)

(SIPR

From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil <mailto:donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil> >
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil> >
Cc: <ES-DSD> <depsecdefnco@sd.mil <mailto:depsecdefnco@sd.mil> >; <ExecSec> <execsecCATMS@sd.mil <mailto:execsecCATMS@sd.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OASD LA Mailbox Coordinations <osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Admin <osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USP <osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-

policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil> > OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff
<osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil> >
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR: USA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_269ceade-d88b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord>
OPR Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCRs: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions:
N/A

Info Copies: ES-DSD <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , LA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , GC <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , ExecSec <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , PA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , USP <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord>

Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/>

From: (b)(6)
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:

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Potential pandemic bird flu modified to be more dangerous in new risky NIH research

By
Dilyana Gaytandzhieva
-
January 24, 2022
0
978

Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), putting his protective suit. Photo: NIH

The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has continued funding risky gain-of-function research (GoF) on potential pandemic pathogens, newly disclosed information reveals. The US government medical research agency has funded scientists to study avian influenza (bird flu) which does not transmit among humans. However, the NIH projects aim to make avian influenza viruses able to transmit among mammals and assess their pandemic potential as a possible threat to humans.

Gain-of-function (GOF) studies improve the ability of a pathogen to cause disease by increasing its virulence and transmissibility. These dangerous experiments have not been terminated even though COVID-19 has been suspected to be the result of such NIH-funded GoF research in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Instead of terminating all GoF research since the pandemic started NIH and its sub agency – the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), have continued their financial support for the following GoF studies: Transmissibility of Avian Influenza Viruses in Mammals (NIAID support ended in **August 2021**); Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS) (NIAID support ended in **March 2021**). The third one: Mimicking evolution to define mechanisms of airborne transmission of H7N9 viruses, started on 2nd September 2021 and is **ongoing**.

Transmissibility of avian influenza viruses in mammals

Project Number	Former Number	Contact PI/Project Leader	Awardee Organization
4R01AI069274-09	5R01AI069274-09	KAWAOKA, YOSHIHIRO	UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

Description

Abstract Text

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): Since 1997, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype have infected humans with high case fatality rates although no sustained human to human transmission has yet been reported. Currently, the molecular features and mechanisms that would confer human to human transmission of H5N1 viruses are not fully understood. Indeed, several attempts in the past to select transmissible H5 viruses with typical features of human transmission among mammals were not successful, suggesting that influenza virus transmissibility is determined by several current unknown factors. Recently, we succeeded in H5 virus isolates causing airborne transmission in the guinea pig model, and identified novel H5 HAs that acquired the ability to bind to human-type receptors. These novel H5 HAs alone or in support of virus transmission in ferrets, an established influenza virus transmission model. We hypothesized that acquisition of the ability to bind to human-type receptors, but acquired this ability after two passages of the virus in these animals, which resulted in the selection of additional mutations in HA. This raises the possibility that H5 viruses that do not transmit among ferrets may nevertheless have efficient respiratory droplet transmission. Based on this finding, we propose to develop the determinants of H5N1 virus transmission in mammals. In Aim 1, we plan to identify the Determinants that control H5N1 virus transmissibility in Mammals. To gain a better understanding of the mutations in HA that result in transmission, we will select transmissible viruses passaged in the HA proteins derived from different subclades that have caused human infections. Current study suggests that HA stability may contribute to virus transmissibility. Therefore, in Aim 2, we propose to identify mutations in HA that increase HA stability and then combine those mutations for their significance in virus transmissibility. The HA proteins of different pandemic and H5N1 viruses will then be characterized for their receptor binding specificity, their structural consequences, their effects in some genetic backgrounds, and their pathogenicity in mice and ferrets. Mutations in HA that allow avian influenza viruses to bind to human-type receptors are most likely a prerequisite for transmission among mammals. However, findings by us and others indicate that human-type receptor binding is not sufficient for virus transmission among ferrets, and that other viral genes also contribute to transmissibility. In Aim 2, to characterize the Contribution of Viral Genes Other than HA to H5N1 Virus Transmissibility, we plan to passage non-transmissible viruses of different genetic backgrounds in ferrets to select transmissible mutants. Selected mutations will be characterized for their biological effects using established assays for influenza virus, including receptor binding, HA stability, assessment of HA cleavability, and interferon antagonism (collaboration). These studies are expected to generate critical information about the molecular determinants and mechanisms of H5N1 virus transmissibility in mammals.

Project 4R01AI069274-09 Total funding: $605,206

H5N1, a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, does not transmit among mammals. The researchers aim to make the virus able to transmit in order to assess its pandemic potential.

According to the project's description, "no sustained human-to-human transmission has yet been reported. Several attempts in the past to select transmissible H5 viruses (which typically do not transmit among mammals) were not successful". That is why the researchers "plan to passage non-transmissible viruses of different genetic backgrounds in ferrets (an established influenza virus transmission model) to select transmissible mutants". Selected mutations will be characterized for their biological effects and the potential of H5N1 to transmit in mammals.

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE FOR INFLUENZA RESEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE (CEIRS)

Project Number	Contact PI/Project Leader	Awardee Organization
272201400008C-0-0-1	GARCIA-SASTRE, ADOLFO	ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AT MOUNT SINAI

Description

Abstract Text

To determine the molecular, ecological and environmental factors that influence the evolution, emergence, transmission and pathogenicity of influenza viruses, including studies on animal influenza viruses with pandemic potential and to characterize the immune response to influenza infection to improve understanding of the immune correlates of protection and cross protection.

Public Health Relevance Statement

Data not available.

Project 272201400008C-0-0-1 Total funding: $7,336,466

The project includes studies on animal influenza viruses with pandemic potential. No further information has been provided.

Mimicking evolution to define mechanisms of airborne transmission of H7N9 viruses

Project Number	Contact PI/Project Leader	Awardee Organization
1R21AI144135-01	SUTTON, TROY CLAVELL	PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY-UNIV PARK

Description

Abstract Text

The Asian lineage H7N9 avian influenza viruses (AIV) have caused >1500 human zoonotic infections with >35 deaths. These viruses have not spread in humans, however, there is a high potential for these viruses to evolve to transmit via the airborne route and cause a pandemic. Using ferrets, we previously evaluated the ability of the prototype Asian lineage virus, A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9), to undergo the continuous transmission of airborne transmission. In these studies, we found that the virus was able to transmit to 50-66% of respiratory contact ferrets during both rounds of transmission. In a subsequent deep sequence analysis, we identified 25 mutations in 90-99% of all variant viruses that transmitted. These mutations were in the hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and viral polymerase genes. As airborne transmission is associated with enhanced binding and replication in cells of the upper airways, we hypothesize that the identified mutations will alter the molecular properties of the virus to enhance replication in primary human nasal and tracheal epithelial cells. Our aims are: Aim 1. Determine the role of previously identified HA and NA mutations in an H7N9 virus with the A/PR/8 vaccine backbone. Viruses carrying the H7N9 HA and NA on the A/PR8 vaccine backbone will generated. Mutations will be introduced into the HA and NA gene segments and several properties including receptor binding preference, pH of fusion, thermostability, NA activity and changes in antibody recognition via immune serum will be evaluated. Aim 2. Evaluate the role of previously identified mutations in the viral polymerase. To assess the impact of mutations in the viral polymerase in vitro polymerase reconstitution assays will be performed. Specifically, the activity of the A/Anhui/1/2013 H7N9 polymerase with and without the identified mutations will be assessed. Aim 3. Determine if the introduction of previously identified mutations alters viral replication in primary human airway epithelial cells. To determine if the identified mutations impact viral replication, we will evaluate the replication kinetics of recombinant H7N9-A/PR8 viruses for their growth in primary human airway epithelial cells. Primary human cells will include nasal, tracheal, bronchial, and small airway epithelial cells. Collectively, these studies will determine the effect of the identified mutations on different molecular properties of the virus, while also determining if the mutations alter the viral tropism in human cells. Our findings will generate new insight on how AIV evolve to transmit via the airborne route and will yield critical knowledge required to interpret the evolution and assess the pandemic potential of H7N9 viruses.

Project 1R21AI144135-01 Total funding: $226,169

Source: NIAID

According to the description provided for Project 1R21AI144135-01: "The Asian lineage H7N9 avian influenza viruses (AIV)… have not spread in humans; however, there is a high potential for these viruses to evolve to transmit via the airborne route and cause a pandemic… Viruses carrying the H7N9 HA and NA on the A/PR8 vaccine backbone will be generated. Mutations will be introduced into the HA and NA gene segments…we will evaluate the replication kinetics of recombinant H7N9-A/PR8 viruses for their growth in primary human airway epithelial cells. Primary human cells will include nasal, tracheal, bronchial, and small airway epithelial cells." The researchers want to make the virus able to transmit via the airborne route in order to assess the pandemic potential of H7N9 viruses.

These last NIH-funded experiments are just a small part of many controversial lab studies approved by the agency. One of them was the risky bat coronavirus research in China which is under investigation in the US for a possible link to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite repeated denials from NIAID director Dr. Antony Fauci including before Congress, NIH finally acknowledged last year that US did fund GoF research on bat coronaviruses in Wuhan from where the pandemic started and spread across the world. The $3.7 million grant was awarded to the US non-profit organization EcoHealth Alliance. In a letter to U.S. House of Representatives

NIH states that EcoHealth Alliance violated Terms and Conditions of NIH grant AI110964 and failed to report all its activities in China. According to the NIH letter, a "limited experiment" was conducted in order to test if "spike proteins from naturally occurring bat coronaviruses circulating in China were capable of binding to the human ACE2 receptor in a mouse model."

This is much bigger than Dr. Fauci – it involves the entire US government: US Congressman

Following the release of a House Intelligence Committee report stating that "significant circumstantial evidence" supports the lab leak hypothesis, Rep. Mike Gallagher urged members of Congress and members of the media to more closely scrutinize additional US funding streams that sent taxpayer dollars to EcoHealth Alliance. According to the congressman, "If you start to do basic research, it quickly becomes apparent that this is much bigger than Dr. Fauci – it involves the entire US government".

EcoHealth Alliance has received **$112.1 million** in total in US government funding since 2003, according to information obtained from the US federal contracts registry. Among its main sponsors are NIH through NIAID and the Pentagon through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The projects' objectives are discovery and assessment of viruses with pandemic potential mainly in Africa and Asia.

NIH grants:

Federal Grant Awards for Ecohealth Alliance Inc.

Name	Awardee	Dollars Obligated	Award Date	Updated At
U01AI153420	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$1.2m	9/15/2020	7/1/2021

STUDY OF NIPAH VIRUS DYNAMICS AND GENETICS IN ITS BAT RESERVOIR AND OF HUMAN EXPOSURE TO NIV ACROSS BANGLADESH TO UNDERSTAND PATTERNS OF HUMAN OUTBREAKS

U01AI151797	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$3.1m	6/1/2020	6/11/2021

UNDERSTANDING RISK OF ZOONOTIC VIRUS EMERGENCE IN EID HOTSPOTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

R01AI110964	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$3.7m	6/1/2014	9/14/2021

UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE

R56TW009502	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$300.0k	9/17/2012	9/14/2012

COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES

R01AI079231	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$2.6m	9/18/2008	8/7/2012

RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS

K08AI067549	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$442.8k	9/15/2007	9/14/2010

RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA

R01TW005869	Ecohealth Alliance Inc.	$3.7m	8/1/2002	7/27/2012

THE ECOLOGY, EMERGENCE AND PANDEMIC POTENTIAL OF NIPAH VIRUS IN BANGLADESH

Pentagon grants:

Federal Grant Awards for Ecohealth Alliance Inc.

Name	Awardee	Dollars Obligated	Award Date	Updated At
HDTRA1210023	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$253.4k	7/20/2021	7/19/2021
PREDICTING BIOTHREAT IMPACTS FROM EARLY STAGE DATA VIA TRANSFER LEARNING.				
HDTRA1010029	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$5.0m	9/29/2020	9/29/2020
REDUCING THE THREAT OF MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS AND AVIAN INFLUENZA IN JORDAN & STRENGTHENING REGIONAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE CAPACITY				
HDTRA1010026	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$5.0m	9/25/2020	9/24/2020
BIOSURVEILLANCE FOR SPILLOVER OF HENIPAVIRUSES AND FILOVIRUSES IN RURAL COMMUNITIES IN INDIA				
HDTRA1010018	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$5.0m	7/1/2020	6/30/2020
CRIMEAN CONGO HEMORRHAGIC FEVER: REDUCING AN EMERGING HEALTH THREAT IN TANZANIA				
HDTRA1010016	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$4.9m	6/1/2020	5/27/2020
REDUCING THE THREAT FROM HIGH-RISK PATHOGENS CAUSING FEBRILE ILLNESS IN LIBERIA				
HDTRA1910035	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$5.0m	8/19/2019	3/24/2020
REDUCING THE THREAT OF RIFT VALLEY FEVER THROUGH ECOLOGY, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SOCIO ECONOMICS				
HDTRA1710064	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$6.6m	10/27/2017	3/23/2020
UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA				
HDTRA1710037	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$1.6m	5/1/2017	5/25/2018
SEROLOGICAL BIOSURVEILLANCE FOR SPILLOVER OF HENIPAVIRUSES AND FILOVIRUSES AT AGRICULTURAL AND HUNTING HUMANANIMAL INTERFACES IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA				
HDTRA1110029	Ecohealth Alliance Inc	$4.9m	5/28/2014	5/25/2018
UNDERSTANDING RIFT VALLEY FEVER IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA				

Source:

govtribe.com

Coronavirus research in controversial Pentagon biolab in Georgia

EcoHealth Alliance has implemented a number of military biological research programs for the Pentagon. In 2017 the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) tasked EcoHealth Alliance with a $6.5 million project to collect and isolate coronaviruses in 5,000 bats in Western Asia. The duration of the program is 5 years (2017-2022) with the Lugar Center, the Pentagon biolaboratory in the Republic of Georgia, being the local laboratory for this genetic research.

The project's objectives are: 1. Capture and non-lethally sample 5,000 bats; 2. Collect 20,000 samples (i.e. oral, rectal swabs and/or feces, and blood) and screen for CoVs using consensus PCR at regional labs in Georgia and Jordan. According to the project presentation, Eco Health Alliance already sampled 270 bats of 9 species in three Western Asian countries: 90 individual bats in Turkey (Aug 2018), Georgia (Sept 2018), and Jordan (Oct 2018).



EcoHealth Alliance and Georgian scientists processing bats for a $6.5 million Pentagon project in Western Asia (photo: Facebook, Kendra Phelps, Eco Health Alliance, October 2018)

The Lugar Center which is the partner laboratory for this research is a $180 million Pentagon biolaboratory in Georgia's capital Tbilisi. It has been operated by a special US Army Unit –

USAMRU-G, whose personnel have been given diplomatic immunity to research viruses without being diplomats.

The Lugar Center is the $180 million Pentagon-funded biolaboratory in Georgia's capital Tbilisi.

A diplomatic car with a registration plate of the US Embassy to Tbilisi in the car park of the Lugar Center. US scientists working at the Pentagon laboratory in Georgia drive diplomatic vehicles as they have been given diplomatic immunity. Photos: Dilyana Gaytandzhieva

The Lugar Center has become notorious in the last years for controversial activities, laboratory incidents and scandals surrounding the US drug giant Gilead's Hepatitis C program in Georgia which has resulted in at least 248 deaths of patients. The cause of death in the majority of cases has been listed as unknown, internal documents have shown.

There is no public information about the results of the research performed by EcoHealth Alliance at the Lugar Center for the Pentagon neither what viruses have been discovered and what genome experiments have been performed.

$5,000 for bat on the black market

The State Security Committee of South Ossetia raised awareness about the EcoHealth Alliance bat research project in neighboring Georgia after a Georgian national Khvicha Mgebrishvili was detained on 3 July 2020 near the village of Adzisar in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia for violating the state border. During the interrogation by South Ossetian KGB border officers, he explained that he was interested in a colony of bats in the villages of Artseu and Grom in the Tskhinvali region. According to Mgebrishvili, he intended to capture the so-called "Bat cocoons" and sell them in Georgia for $5,000 each. These species are listed in the Red Book and hunting them is punishable by prison in South Ossetia.

Local authorities accused neighboring Georgia of suspicious activities stating that "the Lugar Center for Public Health Research has shown increased interest in the population of South Ossetian bats since 2012". As always the Lugar Center and the US Embassy in Tbilisi denied all allegations as fake news and a conspiracy theory.

In response to all scandals surrounding the Lugar Center and the growing distrust among Georgians the US Embassy in Tbilisi has launched a propaganda campaign to educate the local population with animated movies on social media and Georgian TV channels. All information concerning the Lugar Center apart from the official government narrative has been branded as "fake news", "disinformation" and "conspiracy theories". The Lugar Center has been given by Western media as an example in the fight against the novel coronavirus even though COVID-ravaged Georgia ranks seventh in the world among the countries with the highest number of deaths per million as of this month.

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- TAGS
- bird flu
- gain of function research
- NIH

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Previous articleUK Defense ministry document reveals Skripals blood samples could have been manipulated
Next articleDocuments expose US biological experiments on allied soldiers in Ukraine and Georgia

Dilyana Gaytandzhieva
http://armswatch.com/
Dilyana Gaytandzhieva is a Bulgarian investigative journalist, Middle East correspondent and founder of Arms Watch. Over the last years she has published a series of revealing reports on weapons supplies to terrorists in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Her current work is focused on documenting war crimes and illicit arms exports to war zones around the world.

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: 50 U.S.C. 3734
Date: Friday, February 11, 2022 4:37:09 PM

(b)(6) thanks ACK receipt.

We should probably sync with Dr. Pope on Monday to ensure he is comfortable with the approach, and also to ensure he notifies the DASD's and they are comfortable, too.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2022 4:33 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: 50 U.S.C. 3734
Importance: High

Per DTRA GC: This e-mail should not be forwarded outside of the CTR and Contracting chains of command.

DTRA OGC determined (b)(5)
(b)(5)

BT has for action: to work with the grants officer to develop a review process to ensure compliance.

Proposed language: (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Email below and original attached for record keeping without my additions.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Department Chief

Biological Threat Reduction

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

Desk (b)(6)

From (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 11, 2022 3:48 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: 50 U.S.C. 3734

(b)(6) in short, notwithstanding DTRA GC's continued strict interpretation of .S.C. 3734, the final language used in the UN organization grants is a

(b)(5)

This e-mail should not be forwarded outside of the CTR and Contracting chains of command.

Background:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

V/r

(b)(6)

Associate General Counsel

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

UNET:

(b)(6)

SNET:

(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx
Date: Monday, August 15, 2022 9:03:41 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx

Sir,

Good Morning. Attached is the tasker spreadsheet for today's meeting.

(b)(6)

v/r

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?pagetype=entityrecord&etc=10030&id=%7bC0418529-119B-EC11-8166-00505690330б%7d&sitemappath=Tasker%7cTasker_MyWork%7cnav_Taskers&extraqs=&ncwWindow=true&histKey=227933012#167581166		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota		(b)(6)	2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#580315874	I:\Shared\CT\Front Office\0202-Arms Control Policy and Negotiations\0202-03 CTR\Tasks\TMT\CT_TMT Tasks\FOIA Requests\FOIA Case Number 22-063	
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight	(b)(6)	10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#144015026	I:\Shared\CT\Front Office\0202-Arms Control Policy and Negotiations\0202-03 CTR\Tasks\TMT\CT_TMT Tasks\FOIA	
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension to 4/18 approved	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B1729EC7-4EA1-EC11-8167-00505690330б%7D		

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx
Date: Monday, August 8, 2022 8:31:03 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx

Sir,

Attached is the task tracker for today's meeting.

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?pagetype=entityrecord&etc=10030&id=%7bC0418529-119B-EC11-8166-00505690330b%7d&sitemappath=Tasker%7cTasker_MyWork%7cnav_Taskers&extraqs=&ncwWindow=true&histKey=227933012#167581166		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#580315874	\\Shared\CT\Front Office\0202-Arms Control Policy and Negotiations\0202-03 CTR\Tasks\TMT\CT_TMT Tasks\FOIA Requests\FOIA Case Number 22-063	
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#144015026	\\Shared\CT\Front Office\0202-Arms Control Policy and Negotiations\0202-03 CTR\Tasks\TMT\CT_TMT Tasks\FOIA	
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC		11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension to 4/18 approved	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B1729EC7-4EA1-EC11-8167-00505690330b%7D		

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG; (b)(6)
DTRA CT (USA)
Subject: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx
Date: Monday, August 1, 2022 9:17:16 AM
Attachments: CTR ETMS2 Task Tracker_18July22v1.xlsx

Sir,

Good Morning. Attached is the weekly task tracker for our meeting today.

(b)(6)

Contractor, Amyx Inc., Team Noblis

CTR DAG TMT Tasker Lead

DTRA CT

(b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requestor	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Begin Suspense to CT PO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	FOIA Case Number: 22-C-0007	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Legend
Green: on target
Amber: remain on compliant, may need extension

STID	Task Subject/FOIA Number	FOIA Topic	FOIA Requester	FOIA POC	Task Received in CTR DAG	Original Suspense Date	Dept Suspense to CT FO	DTRA DAG Suspense	CT Completion Date	Assigned Programs	CT Dept POC	Extension Requests/ Comments	Tasker Link	CT Archive Doc Link	
DTRA-220302-RJ4M	FOIA Case #22-C-005	Syrian Sanctions regulations Information to Provide assistance to the Government of Syria.	US Dept of Energy	(b)(6)	3/4/2022	3/14/2022	3/11/2022	3/14/2022	3/8/2022	CT-SE	(b)(6)	Closed/No redactions recommended.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?pagetype=entityrecord&etc=10030&id=%7bC0418529-1198-EC11-8166-005056903306%7d&sitemappath=Tasker%7cTasker_MyWork%7cnav_Taskers&extraqs=&ncwWindow=true&histKey=227933012#167581166		
DTRA-220203-ZMSD	FOIA Case Number 20-063	EcoHealth and BT Containment/ Metabiota			2/3/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	3/4/2022	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions. Extension granted to 3/4	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#580315874	I:\Shared\CT\Front Office\0202-Arms Control Policy and Negotiations\0202-03 CTR\Tasks\TMT\CT_TMT Tasks\FOIA Requests\FOIA Case Number 22-063	
DTRA-211019-MJU7	FOIA Case Number 22-009	All Communications EcoHealth	Empower Oversight		10/19/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	11/2/2021	Rolling submissions	CT-BT		Approved for rolling submissions.	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx#144015026	I:\Shared\CT\Front Office\0202-Arms Control Policy and Negotiations\0202-03 CTR\Tasks\TMT\CT_TMT Tasks\FOIA	
DTRA-220311-W6Q7	FOIA Case Number 22-C-007	Classification of Doc for DoD GC	DoD GC	(b)(6)	11-Mar	4/6/2022	4/18/2022	4/18/2022		(b)(6)		3/11 requested extension to 4/18 approved	https://dtra.tmt.army.mil/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&pagetype=entityrecord&id=%7B1772 9EC7-4FA1-EC11-8167-005056903306%7D		

Legend:
Green: on target
Amber: concern on completion, may need extension

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Subject: CWMD/China Policy chop on Response to Congressional letter on WIV
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 6:49:05 PM
Attachments: OSD002210-21 CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf
OSD004467-20 - USD(RE) signed - complete package.pdf
TAB B - DTRA Input on EcoHealth Letter response + CWMD_20210528.docx

Rob,

I told (b)(6) yesterday that I would send the Policy edits on the WIV response letter. As an interim update, China Policy clears the edits I've made – for whatever reason, the track changes reflect only "author". The edits are from me.

I still await OGC IA clearance (I've left them messages yesterday and today) – and expect that input sometime tomorrow. This is not considered cleared until we get OGC's input.

For your case of reference, I also attach the Congressional correspondence (I didn't get it from DTRA, but through other channels). Generally, Policy tries to mirror the language used in the original inquiry. I also attach the 2020 package that Policy had not cleared on, but is important to have on hand for the totality of the picture/inquiry. China Policy and OGC IA received all these documents as part of their review. Letting you know I will separately share the attached with TRAC.

More to follow once I hear back from OGC tomorrow.

Best, (b)(6)

(b)(6) I Director, CTR Policy I Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global (b)(6)
<mailto
<mailto

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 012 of 187

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

March 15, 2021

The Honorable Lloyd Austin
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Austin:

We write regarding federal funding awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc. (EcoHealth), a New York-based non-profit organization with a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).

As *New York Magazine* recently reported, EcoHealth funneled federal grant funding awarded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to researchers at the WIV.[1] This is deeply concerning given the WIV is a possible origin site of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lab has significant ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military biological research.

It is also troubling that, according to government records, published research papers, and significant reporting, this is not the first time EcoHealth transferred taxpayer funding to a CCP lab. EcoHealth has partnered with the WIV since 2004, as discovered by the *Wall Street Journal*.[2] Additionally, between 2015 and 2019, the WIV received approximately $598,500 from EcoHealth for a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases-funded study on the risk of bat coronavirus emergence. Further, a 2015 WIV research project, which utilized Gain of Function (GOF) research on bats in China, was partially funded by EcoHealth through a grant awarded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.[3]

Government spending data shows that from 2013 to the present, the DOD has awarded approximately $35 million in funding to EcoHealth in the form of contracts and grants.[4] Significantly, in 2017, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth to study the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia.

As you know, the CCP runs the WIV. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the CCP replaced the former WIV head with China's top biowarfare expert, Major General Chen Wei. The WIV facility houses a Biosafety Level IV laboratory, which is the only maximum-security biosafety containment lab in China, and has a history of safety concerns even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.[5] For example, in 2018, two Department of State cables raised concerns regarding safety at the WIV, highlighting "a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators

[1] https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/coronavirus-lab-escape-theory.html
[2] https://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-presses-u-s-nonprofit-for-information-on-wuhan-virology-lab-11597829400
[3] https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985
[4] https://www.usaspending.gov/search/?hash=e86d1a3de7d3bcdd538f4489363297d0
[5] https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Final-Minority-Report-on-the-Origins-of-the-COVID-19-Global-Pandemic-Including-the-Roles-of-the-CCP-and-WHO-9.20.20-Coverpage.pdf

OSD002210-21/CMD003378-21

needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."[6] In recent weeks, the Department of State confirmed that several researchers at the WIV became sick with COVID-19-like symptoms in the fall of 2019, and since 2017, the WIV has engaged in classified research with the Chinese military.[7]

Given the similarities between previously federally funded research at the WIV and the DOD grant funding awarded to EcoHealth, we respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. How much funding awarded to EcoHealth through DOD has been given to or used in collaboration with the WIV?
2. Was EcoHealth authorized by DOD to transfer taxpayer funding to the WIV? If so, how much funding was provided the Chinese WIV, and for what purposes?
3. Was the grant funding awarded to EcoHealth for GOF research?
4. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, has DOD reconsidered, paused, or cancelled work with EcoHealth or the WIV?
5. Has any other DOD grant, contract, or subcontract been used to fund work at the WIV?

Thank you for your consideration of our request. We look forward to hearing from you.

Very respectfully,

Guy Reschenthaler
Member of Congress

Matt Gaetz
Member of Congress

Jeff Van Drew
Member of Congress

Michael Cloud
Member of Congress

Tom Tiffany
Member of Congress

Louie Gohmert
Member of Congress

Dr. James R. Baird
Member of Congress

W. Gregory Steube
Member of Congress

Bill Posey
Member of Congress

Brian Babin
Member of Congress

Scott Perry
Member of Congress

Fred Keller
Member of Congress

---

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] https://2017-2021.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/index.html

Ronny L. Jackson
Member of Congress

RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3030

ACTION MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

FROM: (b)(6) Acting, DDRE(R&T)

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Inquiry Regarding Funding to EcoHealth Alliance

- On April 30, 2020, Representative Reschenthaler sent an inquiry to the Secretary of Defense (TAB B) regarding a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

- EcoHealth Alliance has conducted research into zoonotic disease origins under grants from the National Institutes of Health. As part of this research, it has collaborated in the past with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, located in the People's Republic of China, on cataloging bat viruses.

- No portion of any funds granted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Biological Threat Reduction Program to EcoHealth Alliance supported work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other activity in China.

- A response letter is attached at TAB A

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the congressional response letter at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by (b)(6) Blake, Acting, DD(RT&L) (b)(6) (OSD004467-20)

TAB A

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3030

RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

July 6, 2020

The Honorable Guy Reschenthaler
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Reschenthaler:

Thank you for your letter dated April 30, 2020, regarding a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense (DoD) to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. I am responding on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

The 2017 grant awarded $6.5 million to EcoHealth Alliance for scientific research into combating weapons of mass destruction. In your letter, you stated that EcoHealth Alliance has a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology in the People's Republic of China. No portion of any funds granted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) to EcoHealth Alliance supported work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other activity in China.

For grants awarded in support of the BTRP, the program engages with applicants early in the project development process to ensure that they understand there can be no transfer of funds to parties other than those authorized as sub-recipients by the Department. The Department's program managers carefully review grant proposals to ensure that no prohibited activities (technical or financial) are included as part of any funded projects. Finally, the Department performs regular oversight of all grant awards through required reporting to ensure that research is conducted as authorized.

Thank you for your dedication to the Armed Forces and unwavering support of our Service members across the globe. The Department will continue to dedicate its efforts to ensure the best force protection against the most dangerous threats facing our Nation and our Warfighters.

My point of contact is Commander (b)(6) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

Michael D. Griffin

TAB B

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
[illegible] Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC [illegible]
[illegible]

April 30, 2020

The Honorable Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Esper:

Thank you for your strong leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic and for your efforts to repatriate Americans abroad, counter adversaries like Venezuela and Iran, and keep our servicemembers safe during this unprecedented crisis. I write to bring your attention to a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc., an organization that has a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which reports suggest may be linked to the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak.

In 2017, DOD awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth Alliance under Assistance Listing 12.351 – Scientific Research – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The description of this grant is listed as "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia." On March 23, 2020, EcoHealth Alliance received their final payment in the amount of $1,509,531 for the continuation of their research, which is projected to be completed in October 2022.

As you are likely aware, on April 24, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) cut all grant funding for EcoHealth Alliance after reports circulated that the organization sent US taxpayer dollars to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. It is my understanding that the NIH grant was for research on coronaviruses spread from bats to humans. Given the similarities between EcoHealth Alliance's NIH research and the description of the 2017 DOD grant, I respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC)?
2. If no, what, if any, steps is DOD taking to determine whether department grant funding was utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?
3. If yes, what is the DOD doing to ensure American dollars can no longer be utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?

OS0044[illegible]20CM0[illegible]

Given the Chinese Communist Party's cover up of the global threat posed by COVID-19, it is critical we ensure taxpayer dollars are not being used to support their activities. I appreciate your commitment to our national security, our servicemembers, and their families.

Thank you for your consideration of my request.

Very Respectfully,

Guy Reschenthaler
Member of Congress

TAB C

See Attached

Consolidated Coordination Sheet
CMD005368-20 – 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Coordinating Office	Coordinator's Name and Duty Title	Date	Comments
OGC	Mike Glennon OGC (A&L)	6/5/20	OK as revised
LA	Jonathan Fay	6/8/20	Concur w/ edits
A&S	Kirk S. Hunter Deputy Chief of Staff Defense Threat Reduction Agency	6/10/20	Concur w/ comments
DD(RTL)/BRO	Bindu Nair, Director, Basic Research Office (b)(6) Digitally signed by (b)(6) Date: 2020.06.29 15:07:17 -04'00'		
DD(RT&L)	Douglas Blake, Acting, DD(RT&L) (b)(6) Digitally signed by (b)(6) Date: 2020.06.30 09:22:31 -04'00'		
DDRE(R&T)	JihFen Lei, Acting DDRE(R&T) (b)(6) Digitally signed by (b)(6) Date: 2020.07.05 17:23:02 -04'00'		

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(b)(5) ; (b)(6)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 025 of 187

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5) ; (b)(6)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From:	Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To:	Robert Pope
Subject:	DTRA (CTR and RD) Grants to Eco Health Alliance.xlsx
Date:	Monday, November 1, 2021 9:45:00 AM
Attachments:	DTRA (CTR and RD) Grants to Eco Health Alliance.xlsx

From: (b)(6)

To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US); (b)(6)

Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT WAR CORE; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: DTRA RCEO-SECA Weekly Activity Report (WAR) 19-23 Oct

Date: Saturday, October 24, 2020 10:51:16 AM

Attachments: WAR RCEO-SECA 19-23 Oct 2020.docx

Dr. Pope,

Please see attached for the RCEO-SECA WAR covering 19-23 October. Please note there will not be a WAR next week, but the report will resume the week of Nov 2-7.

V/r

(b)(6)

Chief, Africa Regional Office
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
U.S. Embassy - Pretoria

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

(b)(5)

Page 029 of 187

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES
DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Subject: FW: EchoHealth Alliance grant review
Date: Monday, November 29, 2021 1:48:24 PM
Attachments: EcoHealth Alliance Audit Guidance_for coord_oi+srv+brc+aj.docx

FYI - minor, mostly administrative comments from Policy on NCB's memo.

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 29, 2021 12:55 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EchoHealth Alliance grant review
(b)(6)

Thanks for the chance to review. A few thoughts from me and my team.

Best,

(b)(6)

Director, Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 1:23 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

After the holiday is fine!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 1:21 PM
To: (b)(6)
<m
RE
<m
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6)

Thanks for sharing. I'll probably need to get back to you after the holiday if that's not too late.

Have a happy thanksgiving!

Best,

(b)(6)

Director, Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)

(b)(6)

Fron (b)(6)
<ma
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6) Hope you are both well. I mentioned doing a review of the EHA grants to ensure that they are using the money in accordance with the parameters outlined in the grant documents. (b)(5)
(b)(5)
Attached is a draft memo that we pulled together. Let me know if you have any questions/concerns.

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

SUBJECT: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Reviews

(b)(5)

CUI

Page 034 of 187

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: (b)(6)
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT Senior Staff
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: FW: Final ARC transmitted to Hill
Date: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 12:40:04 PM
Attachments: ENCL_FY21 CTR Annual Report to Congress_Final.pdf

Team, see attached.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 11:51 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Final ARC transmitted to Hill

(b)(6)

Sending along the final version of the ARC as transmitted to the Hill. I refer to it frequently, so it was easy to find in our files!

Best,

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: FW: Final ARC transmitted to Hill
Date: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 12:45:00 PM
Attachments: ENCL_FY21 CTR Annual Report to Congress_Final.pdf

(b)(6) - Please have your team work with Graphics in AL to see when we can get printed, bound copies of this year's ARC. I think we also still need last year's ARC printed and bound, since I think we received it after the transition to maximum telework. I think we should be able to reference a standard number of copies we've had printed in prior years. Thank you.

(b)(6) - Please have your team hang this on our DTRA1 page as the current ARC and retire last year's to the archive portion of our DTRA1 ARC collection.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 12:40 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT Senior Staff
<dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-senior-staff@mail.mil>
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: Final ARC transmitted to Hill

Team, see attached.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 11:51 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Final ARC transmitted to Hill

(b)(6)

Sending along the final version of the ARC as transmitted to the Hill. I refer to it frequently, so it was easy to find in our files!

Best,

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: For your records - CTR Notification to Congress on the Obligation of FY20 Funds
Date: Thursday, June 25, 2020 9:23:00 AM
Attachments: Tab B_FY20 Report To Congress Obligation of CTR_Funds_01292020.docx
2nd Notification to Congress of FY2020 Concerning the Obligation of CTR Funds_final transmittal letters delivered to Congress.pdf
Importance: High

(b)(6)

As promised during our last mentoring meeting, here's an example of a CTR notification to Congress that is required before we can use our appropriated funds.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 2:56 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>;
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT Senior Staff
<dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-senior-staff@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: For your records - CTR Notification to Congress on the Obligation of FY20 Funds
Importance: High

FYSA.

The Congressional Notification did not make it in today's courier to the Hill. Our 15 day wait period will begin tomorrow, pushing our authority to execute date by just one day, 20 February 2020.

V/R (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 1:13 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: For your records - CTR Notification to Congress on the Obligation of FY20 Funds

(b)(6)

For your records transmittal letters and the report going out on tomorrow's courier run to the Hill concerning the obligation of CTR Funds.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Policy Advisor
Barbaricum LLC
OUSD Policy | Homeland Defense & Global Security | Countering WMD
Room 5C746, Pentagon
Office: (b)(6)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
To:
Cc: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: Grant Award by BTRP to EcoHealth Alliance 051120
Date: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 2:38:58 PM
Attachments: Grant Award by BTRP to EcoHealth Alliance 051120.docx

(b)(6) attached per your SEPCOR request.

r/

(b)(6)

CTR Director's Action Group Lead
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Booz | Allen | Hamilton
Main (b)(6)
Desk
Mob
NIPR
SIPR

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:13 AM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Subject: Grant Award by BTRP to EcoHealth Alliance 051120

(b)(6)

Attached is BTRP's response to the questions regarding the EcoHealth Alliance grant and Wuhan.

(b)(6)

1. Has any portion of DoD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DoD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC)?

No portion of any funds granted by the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) to EcoHealth Alliance supported work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other laboratory in the PRC.

2. If no, what, if any, steps is DoD taking to determine whether department grant funding was utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?

For grants awarded in support of the BTRP, the program engages with applicants early in the project development process to ensure there is clear understanding of the limitations regarding use of funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) directorate, including the prohibition of CTR funds in support of any activities in the PRC. We also carefully review grant proposals to ensure that no prohibited activities (technical or financial) are included as part of any funded projects. Finally, we provide routine project execution oversight above and beyond what is required for research grant awards.

3. If yes, what is the DoD doing to ensure American dollars can no longer be utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?

Question #3 is not applicable.

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HAC-D PSM RFI: FY21 CTR Obligations Notification
Date: Tuesday, March 9, 2021 8:06:41 AM
Attachments: Congressional Letters CTR FY21 Notification.pdf
Encl_FY21 Final CTR Notification Report_Final.pdf

FYI - this is in Policy's lane to answer, pretty simple to do so. I will let (b)(6) know. (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 9, 2021 8:00 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HAC-D PSM RFI: FY21 CTR Obligations Notification

FYI - please let us know if we can support the answer to this question. Seems pretty simple answer. Thx (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 9:19 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: HAC-D PSM RFI: FY21 CTR Obligations Notification

View by HTML

(b)(6)

What would that response be for HAC-D PSM (b)(6) for the recent FY21 CTR obligations notifications?

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 4:42 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: HAC-D PSM RFI: FY21 CTR Obligations Notification

FYI

I plan to coordinate wit (b)(6) on the response.

v/r

(b)(6)

Fron (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 4:39 PM

To (b)(6)

<m

PO

<m

Cc

<m

Subject: HAC-D PSM RFI: FY21 CTR Obligations Notification

(b)(6)

We received the following RFI from HAC-D PSM (b)(6) in response to the recent FY21 CTR obligations notifications

He is requesting a simple answer-nothing extensive.

Ref: 2/17 Notification of Propsoed FY21 Obligations for DoD cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program Funds

1) Since the title 10 333 "train and equip" account provides authority to counter-weapons of mass destruction, and State has its own Counter CBRN authorities and funding streams, could you remind me briefly how these CTR programs are coordinated within the building and across the interagency to avoid duplication of effort? I may known at one point, but as in so many things these days it appears I've forgotten. Nothing extensive - just a thumbnail sketch would be helpful. Or if it's in a prior budget document somewhere just point me in that direction.

Let me know if you have any questions.

v/r

(b)(6)

Congressional Appropriations Liaison (3D755)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Offi

Cell

Wo

Tea

NIP

SIP

<ma

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HASC ISO CWMD Hearing Thank Note & QFRs
Date: Friday, May 14, 2021 11:39:00 AM
Attachments: 20210513 - ltr ISO Williams Thank You.pdf
Dr.Williams_QFRs.docx
QFRs (Complete list for all Witnesses).docx

FYSA -- the attachments.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 11:26 AM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DTRA CMD GP <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.dtra-cmd-gp@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DAG Team <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.dag-team@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.la-govt@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Directors <dtra.belvoir.org.list.dtra-directorate-directors@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Deputy Directors <dtra.belvoir.org.list.dtra-directorate-deputy-directors@mail.mil>
Subject: HASC ISO CWMD Hearing Thank Note & QFRs

Sir,

Please find attached a thank you letter and your QFRs (x4) for from last week's HASC ISO CWMD hearing. Also attached for awareness is the complete list of QFRs for all witnesses. Question #4 fo (b)(6) addresses the EcoHealth Alliance question. We are currently drafting the response for the March 15th letter from (b)(6) (b)(6) (+12) and will have for your review next week before passback to OSD.

V/r,
(b)(6)

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6035
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

May 13, 2021

Dr. Ryhs Williams
Acting Director
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Dear Dr. Williams:

Thank you for appearing before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations on May 4, 2021. Your participation added a valuable perspective to the subcommittee's understanding of the Department of Defense strategy, policy, and programs for countering weapons of mass destruction for fiscal year 2022. As you know, the entire hearing was transcribed and will be published as part of the hearing record.

Enclosed you will find a copy of questions which have been submitted for the record. As this information is of great value to the subcommittee, we ask that your responses be provided to (b)(6) (b)(6) of the committee staff, by Friday, June 25, 2021. The responses should be provided electronically to (b)(6) If the subcommittee has not received your responses by this date, the hearing publication will be printed with an appropriate notation.

Again, I greatly appreciate your participation.

Sincerely,

Ruben Gallego
Chairman
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations

RG:zbt
Enclosure

QFR submitted by Larsen, Rick
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
3) You started to address how DTRA works to upskill servicemembers to ensure they understand the uses of emerging technologies generally and in the field. Could you provide a more comprehensive explanation of this effort?

No Answer

QFR submitted by Bacon, Don
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
9) For your respective organizations, what do you see as the most critical unresolved technical challenges in the countering weapons of mass destruction mission space?

No Answer

QFR submitted by Bacon, Don
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
10) The University of Nebraska hosts a DoD University Affiliated Research Center, the National Strategic Research Institute, which is the only DoD UARC focused specifically on the CWMD mission area including Nuclear Detection and Forensics, Detection of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Consequence Management. What actions on currently underway to leverage this UARC in support of DoD's CWMD strategy and what more should be done to fully leverage this capability and investment?

No Answer

QFR submitted by Franklin, C. Scott
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
16) Dr. Williams, what are the financial strains you foresee on CWMD programs as a result of COVID-19?

No Answer

QFR submitted by Larsen, Rick
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
3) You started to address how DTRA works to upskill servicemembers to ensure they understand the uses of emerging technologies generally and in the field. Could you provide a more comprehensive explanation of this effort?

No Answer

QFR submitted by Bacon, Don
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
9) For your respective organizations, what do you see as the most critical unresolved technical challenges in the countering weapons of mass destruction mission space?

No Answer

QFR submitted by Bacon, Don
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022
Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for: Dr. Rhys Williams
10) The University of Nebraska hosts a DoD University Affiliated Research Center, the National Strategic Research Institute, which is the only DoD UARC focused specifically on the CWMD mission area including Nuclear Detection and Forensics, Detection of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Consequence Management. What actions on currently underway to leverage this UARC in support of DoD's CWMD strategy and what more should be done to fully leverage this capability and investment?

No Answer

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc: [redacted]
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject: FW: HASC ISO CWMD Hearing Thank Note & QFRs
Date: Friday, May 14, 2021 2:28:00 PM
Attachments: 20210513 - ltr ISO Williams Thank You.pdf
Dr.Williams_QFRs.docx
QFRs (Complete list for all Witnesses).docx

(b)(6) -- Please start drafting a response for the QFR below on EcoHealth Alliance. The question went to Jennifer Walsh at Policy, but they will be looking to us to provide the majority of the material for the answer. (b)(5) (b)(5) Anticipate an EIS tasker on this soon. Wanted to give you an opportunity to get started, as QFR responses are generally quick-turn.

==========

QFR submitted by Kelly, Trent; Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations

Question for: The Honorable Jennifer Walsh

4) According to USA Spend, DTRA has provided EcoHealth Alliance grants for research to support its Biodefense mission. EHA in recent years has chosen the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a research partner in recent years through an NIH grant. As noted in the State Department Fact Sheet of 1/15/21, the Wuhan Institute of Virology has troubling links to the Chinese military. Is EHA still a grantee of DTRA? What type of risk analysis does DTRA do to ensure that its research dollars are wittingly or unwittingly funding a malign actor such as China? Has EHA's relationship with the WIV and China disqualified it as the partner of choice for DOD and DTRA?

==========

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) [redacted]
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 11:26 AM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA) (b)(6) [redacted]
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DTRA CMD GP <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.dtra-cmd-gp@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DAG Team <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.dag-team@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.la-govt@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Directors <dtra.belvoir.org.list.dtra-directorate-directors@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Deputy Directors <dtra.belvoir.org.list.dtra-directorate-deputy-directors@mail.mil>
Subject: HASC ISO CWMD Hearing Thank Note & QFRs

Sir,

Please find attached a thank you letter and your QFRs (x4) for from last week's HASC ISO CWMD hearing. Also attached for awareness is the complete list of QFRs for all witnesses. Question #4 for Ms. Walsh addresses the EcoHealth Alliance question. We are currently drafting the response for the March 15th letter from Rep. Reschenthaler (+12) and will have for your review next week before passback to OSD.

V/r,

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 10:58:00 AM
Attachments: For Reference-Prior Cong RFI incoming on EcoHealth Alliance (30-Apr-2020).pdf
For Reference-Prior Cong RFI response on EcoHealth Alliance (13-May-2020).docx
20200430 TAB B_OSD004467-20-CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf
20200514 TAB A_OUSD AS Response to Rep Reschenthaler_CTR_Final.docx

Craig,

I want to keep your office in the loop on the Wuhan-related questions, because they may also affect A/ASD Vann coming out of yesterday's hearing.

DTRA received a query from Bill Gertz at the Washington Times yesterday. Unfortunately, CT didn't receive the query until this morning and Gertz already published his story. We'll provide a response to PA so they can close the loop with Gertz (I'll send to you SEPCOR).

We also have the tasker to help contribute to the response to the most recent Congressional query on this topic. The team is working the response now and I'll share our draft when they get it to me.

Also, for background, I've attached the previous (2020) Congressional queries and draft responses on the topic. If your office has the signed responses for ASD Lord, we would welcome those to ensure we stay consistent in our messaging to the Hill.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:46 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

ALCON,

Please see attached for responses CTR assisted in drafting in response to previous Congressional RFIs WRT EcoHealth Alliance. I've included the RFIs for reference as well. Thanks to (b)(6) for digging up these documents. Standing by should anyone need anything else.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)
CTR Director's Action Group
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

CTR A&AS Contractor
Octant Associates, LLC | Booz Allen Hamilton
Corpo (b)(6)
NIPR:
Main:
Desk:
Mobil

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-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:17 AM
To: (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Importance: High

(b)(6) - Please see the Washington Times query below from Bill Gertz -- both the summary in DTRA/PA's note and the actual questions from Bill Gertz at the bottom of this chain. We need to answer this today, the earlier the better.

DAG -- Please send to all on this note the answers we used on the 1-2 previous occasions we've responded to Congressional queries on this topic so we're consistent with those messages and don't have to reinvent them.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Good day all,
We received the below inquiry from the Washington Post regarding Dr. William's testimony yesterday. If I recall correctly, these questions have already been addressed in another effort...please see below excerpt:

"I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan

Institute of Virology."

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Gertz (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Bill Gertz

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz | direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: Bill Gertz (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

Bill Gertz
(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz | direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: UK Article on DTRA funding of Virus
Date: Monday, June 7, 2021 8:11:00 AM
Attachments: The Pentagon funneled $39million to a China lab that funded Wuhan lab - Daily Mail Online.pdf

FYSA, here's the Daily Mail article.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA) <rhys.m.williams.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 7:36 AM
To: Kuliasha, Michael A SES DTRA RD (USA) <(b)(6) ; Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: UK Article on DTRA funding of Virus

Plus Rob and Hunter - see attached.

Mike,
Thanks. This is not the first time this has arisen. I was asked about it during recent congressional testimony (I've cut/pasted the draft response that is going back to the Hill this week). The EHA work was funded by CTR and has been reviewed very closely to assure that funding was properly conducted and overseen.

Rhys

QFR submitted by Kelly, Trent
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal Year 2022 Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Question for The Honorable Jennifer Walsh: According to USA Spending, DTRA has provided EcoHealth Alliance grants for research to support its Biodefense mission. EHA in recent years has chosen the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a research partner in recent years through an NIH grant. As noted in the State Department Fact Sheet of 1/15/21, the Wuhan Institute of Virology has troubling links to the Chinese military. Is EHA still a grantee of DTRA? What type of risk analysis does DTRA do to ensure that its research dollars are wittingly or unwittingly funding a malign actor such as China? Has EHA's relationship with the WIV and China disqualified it as the partner of choice for DOD and DTRA?
While the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has provided funding to EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), no portion of any funds awarded by DTRA to EHA are for work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) or for any other activity in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
DTRA will continue to execute the requirements-based Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) missions with sound program management practices. For each grant DoD awards to support CTR's biological threat reduction mission, the Program engages with applicants early in the project development process to ensure they understand there can be no transfer of funds to parties other than those DoD authorizes as sub-recipients. DoD CTR's program managers, who are certified DoD acquisition professionals, carefully review each grant proposal to ensure that no prohibited activities (technical or fiscal) are included as any part of a funded project. Additionally, DoD performs regular oversight of all grants through required financial and technical reporting, meetings with stakeholders, and site visits to ensure that research is conducted only as authorized.

Rhys Williams, PhD
Director (acting)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

-----Original Message-----
From: Kuliasha, Michael A SES DTRA RD (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 6:56 AM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA DIR (USA (b)(6) ; Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: UK Article on DTRA funding of Virus

Rhys/Ron:

(b)(6) came across this article that alleges that DTRA was involved in funding gain of function experimentation at the Wuhan lab that created the Corona virus. For your SA.

Mike

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 7, 2021 6:29 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Article

Sir,

Here it is.

(b)(6)

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android < Caution-https://go.onelink.me/107872968?pid=InProduct&c=Global_Internal_YGrowth_AndroidEmailSig__AndroidUsers&af_wl_ym&af_sub1=Internal&af_sub2=Global_YGrowth&af_sub3=EmailSignature >

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Sent: Sun, Jun 6, 2021 at 15:01

Subject: Hmmmm.....

So, I warned the PAO and the front office and Chem/Bio about this before I left DTRA. An intrepid blogger had discovered this connection in late January 2020 and posted it on a popular blog (Zerohedge) along with grant numbers, certifying officials, etc.)

In short, DTRA was funding gain of function experimentation in bat coronaviruses in Wuhan. I suspect, even the money that went from NIH may have originated from DTRA.

DTRA may get its 15 minutes of fame.

Perhaps you would like to alert DTRA PAO. The link is to the RedState blog article which has a link to the Daily Mail (UK) article.

Money quote from RedState:

"Research papers published by the two on coronaviruses identify the grant funding as having come from USAID and PREDICT. But that limited attribution didn't reveal that the funding distributed through PREDICT had, in part, come from the Defense Department — specifically the DOD "Defense Threat Reduction Agency.""

Why Was the US Department of Defense Funding Bioweapons Research at Wuhan? RedState < Caution-https://redstate.com/shipwreckedcrew/2021/06/06/why-was-the-us-department-of-defense-funding-bioweapons-research-at-wuhan-n391796 >

From the Daily Mail:

Sub headline that reads:

* Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020

The article states, "Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020 with the description: 'Understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia."

The Pentagon funneled $39million to a charity that funded Wuhan lab Daily Mail Online < Caution-https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9652287/The-Pentagon-funneled-39million-charity-funded-Wuhan-lab.html >

<Caution-https://s.yimg.com/ing/storm/assets/enhancerV2/23/logos/dailymail.png>

The Pentagon funneled $39million to a charity that funded Wuhan lab

Josh Boswell

Federal data seen by DailyMail.com reveals The Pentagon gave $39 million to charity EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), w...

I would NOT assume anyone in PAO is doing anything about this or is even aware. I would urge you to make them at least aware, and (b)(6) as well.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG; (b)(6) (b)(6)
Cc: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Date: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:33:34 PM
Attachments: OSD004467-20-CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf

CT -- per Dr. Williams' recommendation, forwarding the same for your immediate review to determine answer for question 1 in the memo.

Let me know very soon to assist A&S in making the determination.

V/R

(b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
O: (b)(6)
C:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:19
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(U
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

(b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
O: (b)(6)
C:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List Task CS <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.task-cs@mail.mil>; (b)(6)
OSD OUSD A (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
OU
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

(b)(6)

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

JWICS

GOV

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) ; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.list.enterprise-solutions@mail.mil>
Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours.CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Executive Secretary

OUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886

(b)(6) (OIP)

(NIPR) (b)(6)

(SIPR)

From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil <mailto:donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil> >
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil> >
Cc: <ES-DSD> <depsecdefnco@sd.mil <mailto:depsecdefnco@sd.mil> >; <ExecSec> <execsecCATMS@sd.mil <mailto:execsecCATMS@sd.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OASD LA Mailbox Coordinations <osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Admin <osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USP <osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-

policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff <osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil> >
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR: USA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_269ceade-d88b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord>
OPR Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCRs: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions:
N/A

Info Copies: ES-DSD <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , LA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , GC <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , ExecSec <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , PA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord> , USP <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn_ava_tasker&id_3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype_entityrecord>

Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/>

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]
Date: [redacted]
Attachments: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Subject: Fwd: Request initial coordination review by Nov 30: Annual Report to Congress
Date: Thursday, November 19, 2020 3:10:02 PM
Attachments: 20201106_FY21 Annual Report to Congress_Coordination Draft.docx

FYI

From: (b)(6)
<mailt
Date: Wednesday, November 18, 2020 at 5:06:06 PM
To (b)(6)
<n
(b)(6)
Co (b)(6)
<n
(b)(6)
Subject: Request initial coordination review by Nov 30: Annual Report to Congress

Good afternoor (b)(6) bsence),

Attached for your initial coordination is the draft FY21 CTR Annual Report to Congress. Thank you to DTRA for the programmatic input you've already provided, and for taking a fresh look at how the information is presented - we're excited by how the document is taking shape! In the attached, we've added a Policy Introduction section and provided some initial feedback on DTRA's programmatic section.

As agreed at last week's Directors' Enterprise meeting, we're requesting an initial coordination round with a suspense of November 30. We'll work through all comments received and then task the document in CATMS for SES-level coordination.

(b)(6) is our SME POC for the ARC and I've copie (b)(6) for visibility given she will manage the final coordination with OSD Legislative Affairs and delivery to the Hill.

Hope you are both keeping warm despite today's Arctic blast!

Best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Deputy Director, CTR Policy

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Subject: Fwd: Reuters Questions
Date: Thursday, December 8, 2022 2:43:37 PM
Attachments: Reuters Media Query BTRP_CT Reviewed.docx

Sir

(b)(6) wants you to take a look at the attached response to media query. These questions were staffed b (b)(6) and (b)(6) has approved but they want your final say before responding.

I will do the final PA review before sending.

Thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Date: Thursday, December 8, 2022 at 9:00:16 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) "DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG" <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >, "DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers" <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >
Subject: RE: Reuters Questions

(b)(6)

Here are draft answers cleared by the CT Front Office. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Regards
(b)(6)
Science Division Chief, Biological Threat Reduction Program
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Phone: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 8, 2022 1:23 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto
(b)(6)

(US (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

<mailto (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >

Subject: Re: Reuters Questions

Thank you!!!

(b)(6) is tweaking the final answer no based on (b)(6) eedback. You should have it in a few minutes.

From: (b)(6)

<mail (b)(6)

Date: Thursday, December 8, 2022 at 10:19:50 AM

To: (b)(6)

<mailto:

COOP T

<mailto:

<mailto:

Cc:

(b)(6) >, "DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG" <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >, "DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers" <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >

Subject: RE: Reuters Questions

Thank you -- just wanted to make sure and see if there was anything PA could do to assist, the reporter pinged us again to see if we had a reply (I bought us a little more time) (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From (b)(6)

<mailto (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, December 7, 2022 6:00 PM

To (b)(6)

<mailto

COOP T

<mailto

<mailto

Cc

<mailto (b)(6) >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >

Subject: Re: Reuters Questions

Hi (b)(6) — the team is putting the final touches on this. Will have it (b)(6) for review tomorrow.

(b)(6)

From (b)(6)

(b)(6)
<mai
<mai
Date: Wednesday, December 7, 2022 at 1:53:38 PM
To (b)(6)
<mailto
<mailto
<mailto
<mailto
<mailto
Cc
<mailto
<mailt (b)(6) >, "DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG" <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >, "DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers" <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >
Subject: RE: Reuters Questions

Just following up to see if any assistance was needed, if the questions/answers are undergoing the CT vetting process, or if there was anything else I can do to assist -- please don't hesitate to ask (b)(6)

#DeterPreventPrevail

(b)(6) / Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)
<m
Facebook / YouTube / @doddtra

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
<mailto: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Sent: Thursday, December 1, 2022 5:05 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
<mailto:
Cc:
<mailto:
<mailto:
<mailto:
<(b)(6) >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >
Subject: RE: Reuters Questions

It goes without saying, but I will say it: please send the final draft to me and Dr. Pope before it gets sent back. Thx, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
<mail (b)(6)
<mail
Sent: Thursday, December 1, 2022 4:25 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto
Cc:
<mailto
<mailto
Tu
<mailto
(b)(6) mail.mil
<n
<n
DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >; DTRA
Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers
<dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >
Subject: Reuters Questions

(b)(6)

Reuters direct email is below but it's pretty straight forward with the questions and deadline. I also simplified it in a word document attached for easier response and review (track changes and such). I can make sure we do a proper OPSEC/PA review before sending her the completed responses. If all this is finalizing while I'm on travel, (b)(6) is up to speed and can assist and close the loop.

Thanks everyone!

As I mentioned, I am working on a series of stories on zoonotic spillover. We have done some global risk modeling, focused on bat viruses. The Indian state of Kerala, where there have been three Nipah outbreaks since 2018, is one of the hotspots identified in the analysis. Kerala Chief Minister Vijayan mentioned in a written response to my questions that DTRA is funding a research project there on "Bio Surveillance of Spillover of Henipaviruses," which is awaiting approval from ICAR.

My questions concern the details of that project:

* Could you please explain what the project will entail? What kinds of biosurveillance, by who, where, for what purpose?

* What was the impetus for the project?

* What are the project goals and intended outcomes?

* What is the timeline?

* What is the cost of the program, how is it being funded?

* Could I get a breakdown by country and pathogen of where DTRA is funding and/or conducting research? Also an overall figure for BTRP funding (if that's the appropriate program)?

* We've talked to scientists whose work on henipaviruses has received DARPA funding. How does DTRA's research program differ from DARPA's?

Thanks. Could I get this information by COB Wednesday of next week? I'm here in DC so in the same time zone if a call or Zoom is possible.

This timeline will allow me to incorporate the new information into the draft, check back with you to make sure I've characterized it accurately, and get it to my editor by my Friday deadline.

Thanks and best regards,

(b)(6)

Caution-https://www.linkedin.com/in/newshawk/ >

Reuters

(b)(6)

As I mentioned, I am working on a series of stories on zoonotic spillover. We have done some global risk modeling, focused on bat viruses. The Indian state of Kerala, where there have been three Nipah outbreaks since 2018, is one of the hotspots identified in the analysis. Kerala Chief Minister Vijayan mentioned in a written response to my questions that DTRA is funding a research project there on "Bio Surveillance of Spillover of Henipaviruses," which is awaiting approval from ICAR.

My questions concern the details of that project:

Could you please explain what the project will entail? What kinds of biosurveillance, by who, where, for what purpose?

This project aims to enhance disease monitoring and detection (i.e., biosurveillance) capacity for high-priority zoonotic diseases in Uttar Pradesh and Kerala. The prime awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, will work with India's King George's Medical University and Kerala Veterinary and Animal Sciences University (KVASU) to identify wildlife hosts for henipaviruses and filoviruses and characterize their proximity to and interaction with human populations. The team will also conduct biosurveillance in wildlife, livestock, and humans to detect exposure to, or infection with, these viruses.

What was the impetus for the project?

The Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction program (DoD/CTR) focuses on biological threat reduction to protect the U.S. homeland, U.S. forces, and allies and partners from deliberate, accidental, or naturally occurring biological threats capable of causing biological incidents of national or international significance. The Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), which is part of the DoD/CTR program, supports biosurveillance activities like this project in India to improve ability to provide early and accurate warning of biological threats and report biological incidents to appropriate national, regional, and international authorities.

What are the project goals and intended outcomes?

This project uses a One Health approach to reduce the threat of future outbreaks by enhancing capacity at partner institutions to conduct targeted biosurveillance of filoviruses and henipaviruses in wildlife, domestic animals and high-risk rural human populations. The team will develop a local capacity in Kerala, India for zoonotic spillover detection and characterization. The team will effect this through field and hospital-based sampling, diagnostic analyses of samples, and disseminating results within India's local and federal government bodies to best inform future policies.

What is the timeline?

The project began in September 2020 and is a five-year effort.

What is the cost of the program, how is it being funded?

The total cost of this project is $4.9 million, funded by BTRP. BTRP utilizes a competitive grants process to collaborate with partner nations on transparent biosurveillance studies.

Could I get a breakdown by country and pathogen of where DTRA is funding and/or conducting research? Also an overall figure for BTRP funding (if that's the appropriate program)?

BTRP engages with over 30 countries, and, as mentioned, one of BTRP's implementation approaches utilizes a competitive grants process to solicit proposals that collaborate with partner nations on transparent biosurveillance studies. The goal of BTRP with all engaged countries is to improve sustainable capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report significant disease outbreaks by instituting a culture of long-term cooperation and scientific responsibility for such programs.

BTRP's overall funding authorization for FY 2022 was $225,000,000. The competitive grants process (to include the project with India) is a small portion of this overall budget.

We've talked to scientists whose work on henipaviruses has received DARPA funding. How does DTRA's research program differ from DARPA's?

You will need to speak with DARPA about their funding and what type of scientific work they conduct on henipaviruses. However, as part of DoD CTR's WMD non-proliferation mission, the goal of BTRP's program is to improve international collaboration to detect, diagnose, and report significant disease outbreaks, and to advance partner nation sustainment through a culture of long-term cooperation and scientific responsibility for such programs. BTRP funding is used to strengthen partner capability using established methods and equipment to detect, diagnose, and report disease outbreaks according to international standards. BTRP funds studies focused on disease outbreak detection, diagnosis, and prevention, and not on traditional research and development.

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: Reif, Kingston A SES (USA)
Subject: NCB(TRAC)-Directed Review of DTRA CTR Grants to EcoHealth Alliance
Date: Thursday, January 13, 2022 3:23:00 PM
Attachments: EcoHealth Alliance Review--signed.pdf

Kingston,

Providing for your situational awareness, in case your staff has not briefed you on this.

CTR over the years has provided grants to the NGO EcoHealth Alliance to assist in biosurveillance studies. Over the past couple of years, the media and Congress have raised questions about EcoHealth Alliance's work with China, with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and whether EcoHealth Alliance has conducted gain-of-function research.

DoD has answered several Congressional queries in which we have shown that no CTR funds to EcoHealth Alliance have gone to China or to any gain-of-function research.

I assess tha (b)(6) request for this review is to fulfill TRAC's mandate to provide acquisition oversight for the CTR program and to provide additional data for any follow-on Congressional queries to demonstrate that DTRA sufficiently oversees work conducted by EcoHealth Alliance for CTR.

I asked the DTRA Inspector General to take the lead for this review within DTRA so my team is not grading its own work. He just provided a status update that indicates their review is proceeding well.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 2, 2021 8:58 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: EHA Review memo--signed
(b)(6)
-hope that you are well! As mentioned yesterday, attached is the signed EHA review memo. We accepted all your comments, which made the memo better-thank you!
(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: Johnson, Richard C SES (USA); (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: Query from Senator Roger Marshall Re: DTRA"s Funding to EcoHealth Alliance
Date: Friday, July 9, 2021 11:42:00 AM
Attachments: TAB B - DTRA Input on EcoHealth Letter response_R&E FINAL.docx
OSD004467-20 - USD(RE) signed - complete package.pdf
NYP article.pdf
RFI Sen Marshall funding of EcoHealth-Guidance.docx

Richard, (b)(6)

FYSA, OSD LA sent a tasker to DTRA to answer an RFI from Senator Roger Marshall seeking details of DTRA's funding of a program titled "Scientific Research – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction."

From OSD LA: Staff from Sen. Roger Marshall's office requested that the DoD provide him with information explaining its role funding EcoHealth Alliance $41.91 million since Fiscal Year 2008. He is requesting specific details about the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding of $33.85 million for a program titled "Scientific Research – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction." He is also requesting all information related to the Department of Defense awarding grants or funding directly or indirectly to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan, China.

The query apparently stems from the attached New York Post article from 1 July.

It is not clear from the tasking whether either of your offices also received this. The CTR Directorate's internal suspense to the DTRA Front Office is noon on Tue 13 July and DTRA's suspense to OSD is Thu 15 July. Our intent is to draft a succinct, just-the-facts response along the lines of the two prior Congressional responses to Rep Reschenthaler (atch). We will get that to your offices for review early next week. R&E sent the two prior responses to Congress; it is not clear from the OSD LA tasking to DTRA whether R&E will respond on behalf of the Department for this query, as well.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Pentagon gave millions to EcoHealth Alliance for weapons research program

07/01/2021 | by Samuel Chamberlain | New York Post
https://nypost.com/2021/07/01/pentagon-gave-millions-to-ecohealth-alliance-for-wuhan-lab

The Defense Department doled out millions of dollars to the same nonprofit that funneled federal grant money to the Wuhan Institute of Virology for bat coronavirus research with most of the Pentagon money going toward murky research on countering biological weapons.

New York City-based EcoHealth Alliance has already come under scrutiny for redirecting funds from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to the Chinese lab, from where many believe COVID-19 leaked to set off the worst pandemic in a century.

But federal spending data shows that EcoHealth has a long and profitable relationship with the Pentagon, receiving $41.91 million in awards since fiscal year 2008. That's more than three times the next-largest amount awarded to it by any other agency over the same period ($13.17 million from the Department of Health and Human Services).

Of the $41.91 million, $37.61 million was awarded to EcoHealth Alliance by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which describes its mission as "to protect the United States and its allies by enabling the DoD and international partners to detect, deter, and defeat WMD and threat networks."

Beginning in fiscal year 2014, the DTRA began awarding funding to EcoHealth for a work program labeled "Scientific Research Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction". After three straight years in which awards were fewer than $1 million, the amounts sent to the program jumped considerably. In fiscal year 2017, $2.34 million of the $2.91 million EcoHealth received from DTRA went toward the weapons research. In 2018, 2019 and 2020, 100 percent of DTRA's awards to EcoHealth went toward the program — $4.24 million, $2.99 million, and an eye-popping $21.33 million, respectively.

The final total: $33.85 million — 90 percent of EcoHealth's awards from DTRA and 81 percent of its total Pentagon awards — over seven years for a single program.

By comparison, emails obtained earlier this month by the conservative group Judicial Watch found that EcoHealth was allocated approximately $7.5 million over 11 years from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to carry out its study "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence". The Wuhan Institute of Virology was to have received around $1.5 million of that sum before the Trump administration pulled the plug on the grant in April of last year.

The DTRA awards to EcoHealth Alliance may be small compared to the $700 billion Pentagon budget, but according to Dr. Richard Ebright, "by the standards of biomedical research, it is an enormous sum."

Ebright, a professor of chemistry and chemical biology at Rutgers University and lab director at the school's Waksman Institute of Microbiology, told the Post that such awards from the defense

and intelligence communities are distributed "outside the normal processes" for such research, with no transparency and oversight beyond what can be provided by members of Congress.

In this shadowy, near-impenetrable world, Ebright explained, EcoHealth acts as one of many "funding subcontractors" directing money from a "blank check written by [government] program officers who often go on to be employed" by the same non-profits to whom they once doled out taxpayer cash.

Furthermore, though it is impossible to determine whether any of the $33.85 million went to the Wuhan Institute of Virology or other labs in China, Ebright noted "almost all" of such research takes place outside the United States out of what he called an "ill-conceived" belief the government is able to keep tabs on the work if it directly funds it.

The Pentagon did not respond to the Post's request for comment on its awards to EcoHealth Alliance. The DTRA did not respond to requests for more information about the "Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction" research program. Calls and emails to EcoHealth Alliance requesting comment also went unanswered.

EcoHealth Alliance President Dr. Peter Daszak has kept a low profile in recent months. Earlier this year, he reportedly blew off questions from House Republicans about the organization's ties to the Wuhan lab, what information the nonprofit had about the lab's research on bat viruses and the lab's virus database. Last week, the UN-backed commission examining the origins of the pandemic quietly noted on its website that Daszak had been "recused from Commission work on the origins of the pandemic."

The lack of information about the relationship between the Pentagon and EcoHealth Alliance, as well as EcoHealth's established ties to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, have made some Republican lawmakers sit up and take notice.

"EcoHealth Alliance a group that knowingly misled the world about what may have happened in Wuhan, China—should not receive another dime from taxpayers until it fully complies with the law and answers questions about what was really going on at the Wuhan Institute," Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) told the Post in a statement last week.

"I plan to offer an amendment to the Senate's annual defense bill that would immediately cut off and prohibit additional funding from DOD to EcoHealth until the group provides answers about their work with Communist China's Wuhan Institute, including an itemized breakdown of how much U.S. taxpayer money was paid to the lab."

For now, the flow of government money to EcoHealth Alliance has slowed to a trickle. After receiving $24.8 million in awards in fiscal year 2020 — the vast majority of it as the $21.33 million award from DTRA — the non-profit has been awarded just $1.51 million this fiscal year, all from the Department of Health and Human Services.

TITE: RFI Senator Roger Marshall seeking details of DTRA's funding of a program titled "Scientific Research – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction"

ISSUED: 07/08/2021

SUSPENSE: 07/15/2021

OPR: LA

OCR: AL, CT, RD

GUIDANCE: Staff from Sen. Roger Marshall's office requested that the Department of Defense provide him with information explaining its role funding Eco Health Alliance $41.91 million since Fiscal Year 2008. He is requesting specific details about the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding of $33.85 million for a program titled "Scientific Research Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction." He is also requesting all information related to the Department of Defense awarding grants or funding directly or indirectly to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan, China." The following article was included in the request: https://nypost.com/2021/07/01/pentagon-gave-millions-to-ecohealth-alliance-for-wuhan-lab/

ACTION: Generate a response to Congressional staff.

APPROVAL: DTRA Chief of Staff

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt (b)(6)
Subject: RE: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.
Date: Monday, August 30, 2021 8:42:00 AM

(b)(6) -- Sorry; I'm just seeing this now, as I was on leave on Friday afternoon. This language works great for CTR, as it prohibits work in China, but does not prohibit us from working with performers such as EcoHealth Alliance elsewhere.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 2:47 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt
<dtra.belvoir.dir.list.la-govt@mail.mil> (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Gentlemen,

R&E just sent us a short fused informal review request.

BLUF: HASC staff are crafting an amendment with the text below and are looking for DoDs informal view on it (concur, non-concur, any suggestions). We anticipate this amendment will be proposed during committee markups next Wednesday, hence the short turn request. Seems straightforward to me.

SEC. 7xx. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to conduct bio-medical, infectious disease, gene editing, genetics, virus, or military medical research in China, including by way of a third-party entity, or with an entity determined by the Secretary of Defense to be owned or controlled by the government of China.

Please let us know your thoughts.
V/r,
(b)(6)

Chief of Legislative Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Nair, Bindu R SES OSD OUSD R&E (USA) <bindu.r.nair.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 2:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
<michele.m.perry4.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: HASC NDAA informal view: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Dear DTRA Team,

See below for a quick turn request from Congress. Let me know if you have any edits/concerns and/or if you wish to have a short phone call. Please let A&S know that I am requesting your support - I didn't remember who to copy.

Best,

(b)(6)

Good afternoon,

We just received this hot tasker for an informal view of the below amendment. This is apparently being drafted right now on the Hill, so a response as quickly as possible would be great. We need a concur or non-concur and a few sentences justifying why. Thank you!!!

SEC. 7xx. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to conduct bio-medical, infectious disease, gene editing, genetics, virus, or military medical research in China, including by way of a third-party entity, or with an entity determined by the Secretary of Defense to be owned or controlled by the government of China.

V/r,

(b)(6)

Senior Legislative Analyst

Strategic Analysis, Inc.

OUSD(R&E), Research, Technology, and Laboratories

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:58 PM

To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: FW: HOT - informal view from (b)(6) for Dr. Nair - FW: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Importance: High

Hello (b)(6)

This is a very high priority request, and please work with Dr. Nair on a response by COB today if possible.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Congressional & Public Affairs Analyst | Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, Research & Technology - DDR&E(R&T) |
Email (b)(6)
<mail
Phone

From (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:49 PM

To (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: HOT - informal view from (b)(6) for Dr. Nair - FW: !!! HASC NDAA
Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Importance: High

Hi Dr. Nair (b)(6)

Please see below from (b)(6) on a request for views. Between Basic Research and PD Biotech, can you please provide a concur/nonconcur, or comments on the notional language below?

Language is being drafted AS WE SPEAK so this is very hot, and we need to reply by Monday at 1pm.

Thanks,

v/r

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:37 PM

To: OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E List USD-FO Congressional
<osd.pentagon.ousd-r-e.list.usd-fo-congressional@mail.mil
<mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-r-e.list.usd-fo-congressional@mail.mil> >;
Coleman, Ricardo E CIV (USA) <ricardo.e.coleman.civ@mail.mil
<mailto:ricardo.e.coleman.civ@mail.mil> >

Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Team,

Quick turn HASC NDAA Informal View request below the tear line from (b)(6)
Please make sure the Director of Basic Research sees/approves.

This looks like a pretty easy one.

(b)(6)

For R&E RT input please -- please include Director of Basic Research input.

SEC. 7xx. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to conduct bio-medical, infectious disease, gene editing, genetics, virus, or military medical research in China, including by way of a third-party entity, or with an entity determined by the Secretary of Defense to be owned or controlled by the government of China.

Bindu R. Nair, Ph.D.

Director, Basic Research

OUSD (R&E)/ RT/ RTL

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: 50 U.S.C. 3734
Date: Friday, February 11, 2022 4:37:09 PM

(b)(6) thanks ACK receipt.

We should probably sync with Dr. Pope on Monday to ensure he is comfortable with the approach, and also to ensure he notifies the DASD's and they are comfortable, too.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2022 4:33 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: 50 U.S.C. 3734
Importance: High

Per DTRA GC: This e-mail should not be forwarded outside of the CTR and Contracting chains of command.

DTRA OGC determined (b)(5)
(b)(5)

BT has for action: to work with the grants officer to develop a review process to ensure compliance.

Proposed language: (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Email below and original attached for record keeping without my additions.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Department Chief

Biological Threat Reduction

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

Desk: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2022 3:48 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: 50 U.S.C. 3734

(b)(6) in short, notwithstanding DTRA GC's continued strict interpretation of 50 U.S.C. 3734, the final language used in the UN organization grants is a

(b)(5)

This e-mail should not be forwarded outside of the CTR and Contracting chains of command.

Background:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

V/r

(b)(6)

Associate General Counsel

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

UNET:

(b)(6)

SNET:

(b)(6)

ATTORNEY CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying attachments may constitute attorney work product and/or client advice, which are legally privileged. This information is for official use only. It should not be released to unauthorized persons, and should be maintained in a separate file. If you are not the intended recipient of this information, any disclosure, copying, distribution, or the taking of any action in reliance on this information is prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify me.

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:18:00 AM

(b)(6) is sending the notes. He may not have added you. We fly from here to Seoul and then to Dulles, arriving Friday morning.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:17 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Oh right! For some reason, I was not getting any of your JOC check in emails this trip.

V/R,
(b)(6)
Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Dire (b)(6)
CTR
NIP

"This electronic transmission may contain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) information that must be protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 (see AFI 33-332). Do not release outside of DoD channels without the consent of the originator's office. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of the message."

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Thanks. We're at the Hanoi airport now.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:13 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP TIIRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Copy Sir. I will let you get some rest, and safe travels back to the USA!

V/R,

(b)(6)
Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Dire (b)(6)
CTR
NIPF

"This electronic transmission may contain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) information that must be protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 (see AFI 33-332). Do not release outside of DoD channels without the consent of the originator's office. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of the message."

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP TIIRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

I think just the two of us.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
Fro (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 10:53 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP TIIRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Sir,

This will be on your calendar for next Tuesday. Besides you and (b)(6) who else needs to attend this meeting?

V/R,

(b)(6)

Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Dire (b)(6)
CTR
NIP

"This electronic transmission may contain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) information that must be protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 (see AFI 33-332). Do not release outside of DoD channels without the consent of the originator's office. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of the message."

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP TIIRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 10:41 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Thank you.

Fr (b)(6)
<mailto (b)(6)
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 at 7:35:05 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:a
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Good Morning,

Thank you, I am tracking and will get this on the calendar next week.

V/R,

(b)(6)

Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor

Execut (b)(6)
Direct
CTR N
NIPR:

"This electronic transmission may contain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) information that must be protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 (see AFI 33-332). Do not release outside of DoD channels without the consent of the originator's office. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of the message."

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 4:35 PM
To: (b)(6)
>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
C (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

(b)(6) for scheduling.

(b)(6) Dr. Pope is TDY this week, but will return on Monday. (b)(6) will set this up for us.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 2:56 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Dr. Pope,

I request to have time with you next week to provide a progress update on the EHA review, per the TRAC memo. From the IG's perspective mainly, but inclusive of the entire effort.

Sir, if your calendar (o (b)(6) is available any day except Thursday next week, that would be great for me. I'll adjust my calendar to make the time and meeting fit CT's needs.

V/R,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Inspector General
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 2, 2021 2:29 PM
To(b)(6)
Cc
<mailto
<mailto
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6) - We received the formal task from NCB for this review. Do you have a suggestion what element(s) of DTRA are most appropriate to assist CT with this?

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From:(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2021 8:25 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA(b)(6)
<(b)(6)
Cc:(b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

Dr. Pope,

I'll get my Team together to review the details then get back to you shortly. It makes sense to not grade your own homework. The challenge is finding the right mix from DTRA to facilitate your needs. Thanks for letting me know!

V/R,
(b)(6)

Inspector General

Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

From iPhone

From: "Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)" (b)(6)
<(b)(6)
Date: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 at 5:46:49 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: EcoHealth Alliance grant review
(b)(6)

Please see the attached draft tasking from NCB for DTRA to conduct a review of a select set of EcoHealth Alliance grants to verify that the funds were used for their intended purpose. My sense is the DTRA IG, Comptroller, Contracting Office, or some combination would be able to conduct this review so it isn't CT grading our own procedures. Is this something your office would want to lead when the formal tasking arrives?

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 5:44 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
(b)(6)

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6)

Sending on (b)(6) behalf as he has started his Thanksgiving leave.

We look forward to a review of a selected set of DTRA CTR EHA grants -- likely conducted by DTRA's IG, Comptroller, Contracting Office, or some combination thereof.

We've added a few suggested edits via tracked changes in the attached that would provide additional clarity in a couple of areas.

(b)(5)

Have a Happy Thanksgiving.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
<mai (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 1:11 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
<mai (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

FYI - we knew this one in-coming soon, but it looks close to being finalized. Any concerns or questions?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
<mai
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
<ma
Subject: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6) -Hope you are both well. I mentioned doing a review of the EHA grants to ensure that they are using the money in accordance with the parameters outlined in the grant documents. Given the large proportion of grants awarded to EHA and the fact that most are awarded near or at the maximum amount I think it's worth doing a review to make sure that the money is being spent for the intended purposes. This coupled with the increased attention from the Hill makes it ripe in my mind for a focused review. Attached is a draft memo that we pulled together. Let me know if you have any questions/concerns.

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:15:00 AM

Thanks. We're at the Hanoi airport now.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:13 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Copy Sir. I will let you get some rest, and safe travels back to the USA!

V/R,

(b)(6)
Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Direct (b)(6)
CTR N
NIPR:

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-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

I think just the two of us.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) [redacted] >
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 10:55 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) < (b)(6) [redacted]
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Sir,

This will be on your calendar for next Tuesday. Besides you and (b)(6) [redacted], who else needs to attend this meeting?

V/R,

(b)(6) [redacted]
Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Direct (b)(6) [redacted]
CTR [redacted]
NIPR [redacted]

"This electronic transmission may contain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) information that must be protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 (see AFI 33-332). Do not release outside of DoD channels without the consent of the originator's office. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of the message."

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 10:41 AM
To: (b)(6) [redacted]
Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Thank you.

From: " (b)(6) [redacted]
(b)(6) [redacted]
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 at 7:35:05 PM
To: " (b)(6) [redacted]
<mailto:r [redacted]
(b)(6) [redacted] "Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)"
[redacted]
Cc: (b)(6) [redacted]
<mailto: [redacted]
(b)(6) [redacted]
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Good Morning,

Thank you, I am tracking and will get this on the calendar next week.

V/R,

(b)(6)

Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Direc(b)(6)
CTR
NIPR

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-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6) >
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 4:35 PM
To: (b)(6)
>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

(b)(6) for scheduling.

(b)(6) Dr. Pope is TDY this week, but will return on Monda (b)(6) vill set this up for us.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
Fron (b)(6)
(b)(6) >
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 2:56 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
<mailto
<mailto
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Dr. Pope,

I request to have time with you next week to provide a progress update on the EHA review, per the TRAC memo. From the IG's perspective mainly, but inclusive of the entire effort.

Sir, if your calendar (b)(6)) is available any day except Thursday next week, that would be great for me. I'll adjust my calendar to make the time and meeting fit CT's needs.

V/R,
(b)(6)

Inspector General
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 2, 2021 2:29 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6) We received the formal task from NCB for this review. Do you have a suggestion what element(s) of DTRA are most appropriate to assist CT with this?

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2021 8:25 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

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V/R,
(b)(6)

Inspector General
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

From iPhone

From: "Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)" <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Date: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 at 5:46:49 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
<mailto:
CT (US
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6)

Please see the attached draft tasking from NCB for DTRA to conduct a review of a select set of EcoHealth Alliance grants to verify that the funds were used for their intended purpose. My sense is the DTRA IG, Comptroller, Contracting Office, or some combination would be able to conduct this review so it isn't CT grading our own procedures. Is this something your office would want to lead when the formal tasking arrives?

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Cooperative Threat Reduction

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From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 5:44 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto
Cc
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6)

Sending on (b)(6) behalf as he has started his Thanksgiving leave.

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We've added a few suggested edits via tracked changes in the attached that would provide additional clarity in a couple of areas.

(b)(5)

Have a Happy Thanksgiving.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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From: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 1:11 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)

(b)(6)

<ma

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

FYI - we knew this one in-coming soon, but it looks close to being finalized. Any concerns or questions?

(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6)
<(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
<mai
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6) -Hope you are both well. I mentioned doing a review of the EHA grants to ensure that they are using the money in accordance with the parameters outlined in the grant documents. Given the large proportion of grants awarded to EHA and the fact that most are awarded near or at the maximum amount I think it's worth doing a review to make sure that the money is being spent for the intended purposes. This coupled with the increased attention from the Hill makes it ripe in my mind for a focused review. Attached is a draft memo that we pulled together. Let me know if you have any questions/concerns.

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:01:00 AM

I think just the two of us.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 10:53 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Sir,

This will be on your calendar for next Tuesday. Besides you and (b)(6), who else needs to attend this meeting?

V/R,

(b)(6)
Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Direc (b)(6)
CTR
NIPR

"This electronic transmission may contain FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) information that must be protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 (see AFI 33-332). Do not release outside of DoD channels without the consent of the originator's office. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of the message."

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 10:41 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Thank you.

From: (b)(6)
<mailto (b)(6)
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 at 7:35:05 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto: (b)(6) >, "Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)"
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:a (b)(6)

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Good Morning,

Thank you, I am tracking and will get this on the calendar next week.

V/R,
(b)(6)
Noblis Esi
CTR A&AS Support Contractor
Executive Assistant in support of the CTR Director
Direc (b)(6)
CTR
NIPR

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From: (b)(6)
<mailto (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 4:35 PM
To: (b)(6)
>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
<(b)(6)
>
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

(b)(6) for scheduling.

(b)(6) Dr. Pope is TDY this week, but will return on Monday (b)(6) vill set this up for us.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 2:56 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

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Sir, if your calendar (or (b)(6) is available any day except Thursday next week, that would be great for me. I'll adjust my calendar to make the time and meeting fit CT's needs.

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Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

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<(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 2, 2021 2:29 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
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Cooperative Threat Reduction

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Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2021 8:25 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:
<mailto:
(b)(6)

Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

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Inspector General
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

From iPhone

From: "Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)" (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Date: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 at 5:46:49 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:j
Cc:
(b)(6)

Subject: FW: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6)

Please see the attached draft tasking from NCB for DTRA to conduct a review of a select set of EcoHealth Alliance grants to verify that the funds were used for their intended purpose. My sense is the DTRA IG, Comptroller, Contracting Office, or some combination would be able to conduct this review so it isn't CT grading our own procedures. Is this something your office would want to lead when the formal tasking arrives?

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Cooperative Threat Reduction

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From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 5:44 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
(b)(6)

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6)

Sending on (b)(6) behalf as he has started his Thanksgiving leave.

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To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
<m
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Subject: FW: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

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(b)(6)

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To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092
Date: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 2:56:25 PM

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092
Date: Monday, May 2, 2022 12:43:18 PM

Dr. Pope,

Consider the below as our read ahead for tomorrow's discussion.

V/R,

(b)(6)

=======

OIG # 21-092: Review EcoHealh Alliance Grants IAW DASD TRAC Memo (dtd 2-Dec-21)

DASD Threat Reduction and Arms Control (TRAC) requested a review of three out of seven grants awarded to EHA with a final report provided by the end of FY22 with the following objectives:

1.) To review all grant financial records for consistency with specific grant purposes and for compliance with legal requirements;

2.) To review all experimental records for proper and ethical data handling, reporting, and dissemination requirements and;

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OIG PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS FOR EXTERNAL CONSIDERATION (i.e., RESPONSE TO DASD-TRAC):

(b)(5)

OIG PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS FOR INTERNAL CONSIDERATION (i.e., RESPONSE TO DTRA, et al.):

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

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Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

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From: "(b)(6)
<mailto:(b)(6)>
Date: Thursday, April 28, 2022 at 1:56:25 AM
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Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(O) (b)(6)
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Inspector General
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
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From: Reif, Kingston A SES (USA)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092
Date: Friday, May 6, 2022 2:38:23 PM

Thanks Dr. Pope!

Kingston

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 6, 2022 7:31 AM
To: Reif, Kingston A SES (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: EcoHealth Alliance Grant Review (re: Progress Update) #21-092

Kingston FYSA, here are the main points of the in-process update I received this week from the DTRA IG's review of three selected EcoHealth Alliance grants. We're discussing the improvements we need to make to address preliminary findings 1 and 3.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Review EcoHealh Alliance Grants IAW DASD TRAC Memo (dtd 2-Dec-21)

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OIG PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

(b)(5)

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To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance grant review
Date: Wednesday, November 24, 2021 9:04:00 AM

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V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 1:11 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

FYI - we knew this one in-coming soon, but it looks close to being finalized. Any concerns or questions?
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
<mailto:(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2021 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: EchoHealth Alliance grant review

(b)(6) Hope you are both well. I mentioned doing a review of the EHA grants to ensure that they are using the money in accordance with the parameters outlined in the grant documents. Given the large proportion of grants awarded to EHA and the fact that most are awarded near or at the maximum amount I think it's worth doing a review to make sure that the money is being spent for the intended purposes. This coupled with the increased attention from the Hill makes it ripe in my mind for a focused review. Attached is a draft memo that we pulled together. Let me know if you have any questions/concerns.

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION: 9 August 2021 CT Ops Meeting Notes
Date: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 10:01:00 AM

Thank you.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 10:01 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION: 9 August 2021 CT Ops Meeting Notes

Problem is meeting notes were sent out Friday afternoon leaving folks confused. I will send out a note indicating that the 15 Sep suspense is suspended pending additional information and DTRA FO Guidance.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff, CT

(b)(6)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 9:59 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION: 9 August 2021 CT Ops Meeting Notes

We are not requiring the 15 Sep deadline for the vaccine attestation form. The Ops Meeting notes come from last Thursday; Dr. Williams decided to suspend the suspense on Friday.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

From (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 9:57 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION: 9 August 2021 CT Ops Meeting Notes

Rob,

Please see highlighted note below. I was under the impression that we are not requiring this 15 Sep deadline until DTRA publishes its guidance. There is confusion in the ranks over whether or not this requirement is valid.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff, CT

(b)(6)

From (b)(6)
<mai
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2021 4:32 PM
To (b)(6)
<n
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<trang.m.dinh.ctr@mail.mil <mailto:trang.m.dinh.ctr@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT Program Assistants <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-program-assistants@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-program-assistants@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT Senior Staff <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-senior-staff@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-senior-staff@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-PI Overseas Team <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-pi-overseas-team@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-pi-overseas-team@mail.mil> > (b)(6)

(b)(6)

* Contracting

  * NSTR.

* General Counsel

  * NSTR.

* Intel Support

  * Delivered CTSC CW update from Malaysia, doing one for Thailand-read-ahead expected by 10 SEP.
  * Five additional RFS' for African nations underway.
  * Basic WMD information also provided to (b)(6) for Jordan and Iraq.

* Security

  * NSTR.

* Strategic Communications and Public Affairs

  * Not present.

* Legislative Affairs

  * Senate will be back next week.
  * House will debate NDAA 20SEPT.
  * SECDEF will testify at end of SEP on Afghanistan with SASC and HASC
  * HASC/SASC Gen Milley testimony 22SEPT.
  * HASC markup included five CTR-related items, including EcoHealth Alliance. The provided RFI may go some way towards answering these items. There is no prohibition on working with EcoHealth Alliance.

* CT Front Office

  * NSTR.

* CT A&AS Program Management

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA); (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Cc: (b)(6) Newman, Carl I CIV DTRA CT (USA)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:20:14 AM

Sir,

We will send to all the past answers ASAP.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)
CTR Director's Action Group
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Octant Associates, LLC | Booz Allen Hamilton
Corporate email: (b)(6)
NIPR: (b)(6)
Main:
Desk:
Mobil

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, sensitive and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you received this communication in error, please do not distribute but delete the original message. Please notify the sender by email at the address shown. Thank you for your compliance.

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:17 AM
To: (b)(6); DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Importance: High

(b)(6) -- Please see the Washington Times query below from Bill Gertz -- both the summary in DTRA/PA's note and actual questions from Bill Gertz at the bottom of this chain. We need to answer this today, the earlier the better.

DAG -- Please send to all on this note the answers we used on the 1-2 previous occasions we've responded to Congressional queries on this topic so we're consistent with those messages and don't have to reinvent them.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Good day all,

We received the below inquiry from the Washington Post regarding Dr. William's testimony yesterday. If I recall correctly, these questions have already been addressed in another effort...please see below excerpt:

"I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology."

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Ge (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

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A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

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Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Bill Gertz

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: Bill Gert (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

Bill Gertz
(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA); DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:19:40 AM

Received, sir.

v/r,
(b)(6)
Department Chief
Biological Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:17 AM
To (b)(6) >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
<dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Importance: High

(b)(6) -- Please see the Washington Times query below from Bill Gertz -- both the summary in DTRA/PA's note and the actual questions from Bill Gertz at the bottom of this chain. We need to answer this today, the earlier the better.

DAG -- Please send to all on this note the answers we used on the 1-2 previous occasions we've responded to Congressional queries on this topic so we're consistent with those messages and don't have to reinvent them.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6) >; Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

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We received the below inquiry from the Washington Post regarding Dr. William's testimony yesterday. If I recall correctly, these questions have already been addressed in another effort...please see below excerpt:

"I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology."

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Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Gertz (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

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Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Bill Gertz

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: Bill Gertz (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

Bill Gertz
(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz direct (b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Friday, May 7, 2021 10:56:51 AM

(b)(6) stopped by this morning. He was not happy with (b)(6). I told him to send her my way if she hounds his staff anymore. Ridiculous.

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 5:00 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Now (b)(6) s tasking DTRA PA directly.

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 4:52 PM
To (b)(6)
(U
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Thank you - I appreciate your partnership. Please advise how DTRA PA informs and seeks guidance from OSD PA about media inquiries that are related to the DoD CTR Program and that specifically ask for insight into strategies related to the DoD CTR Program.

Best, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 4:37 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you (b)(6) We will continue coordinating appropriately going forward and will include CWMD Policy for media queries. We appreciate you support.
V/r,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWICS

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: [illegible]
To: (b)(6)
(US
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you again for coordinating the draft response with CWMD Policy. (b)(6) clears, as edited in the attached and copied below for ease of reference. Rationale: this responds to the exact question posed.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: Yes, we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Separately, CWMD Policy would like OSD PA to clarify the coordination process for media inquiries related to the DoD CTR Program and any of the underlying programs. I've cc'ed OSD Leg Af to likewise clarify the coordination process for Congressional inquiries related to the DoD CTR Program and any of the underlying programs. In each instance, CWMD Policy needs to be included in the clearance process.

Many thanks,

(b)(6)
JD, LLM | Director, CTR Policy | Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global Security (b)(6)
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 12:50 PM
To: (b)(6)
OU
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hell (b)(6)

Please find attached the actual query that we received on Tuesday evening from Bill Gertz (b)(6) on my team acknowledged to Mr. Gertz that we received his query, however, we have not provided any information to him. Because similar media queries have come up in the past, we asked Dr. Rob Pope, DTRA's CTR director, to prep responses to align with our previous statements in open source on the topic. Dr. Pope recommended short, factual responses, which are in alignment with responses prior to the Congressional queries on this topic.

I am also attaching the following: the email from Mr. Gertz, the media query sheet(an internal PAO document here at DTRA) and the responses that were prepared in case we engaged.

Yesterday morning, I advised my Public Affairs team to stand down and to coordinate wit (b)(6), our OSD PA portfolio manager as we normally do. Moving forward, we do not plan to provide any information to Mr. Gertz.

I hope this paints a clearer picture of the query activity. I welcome any additional questions and concerns.

V/r,

(b)(6)

Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWIC:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 11:02 AM
To: (b)(6)
CIV (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hell (b)(6)

Will comply. Am bringing this request to the attention to (b)(6) the DTRA PA Chief for leadership coordination.

Please stand by...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 10:55 AM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Darnell, update: please have DTRA send the actual press inquiry AND the proposed response to CWMD Policy for coordination.

Best, Kim

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 10:53 AM
To: (b)(6)
PA
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you (b)(6) DASD CWMD asks that DTRA formally send the proposed DTRA responses to CWMD Policy for coordination.

Will you relay that message to DTRA leadership?

Many thanks,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 9:36 AM
To (b)(6)
CI
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Good day all,
In response to your additional questions:

Q: Is it because DTRA has received additional media inquiries?
A: Yes, the reporter sent an inquiry for additional information to the DTRA PA mailbox

Q: Is it because DTRA wants to be prepared for expected inquiries?
A: No, DTRA has already prepared/vetted responses to this subject matter from a previous inquiry

Q: Is there a Washington Post inquiry? Or did someone mix up the Washington Times and the Washington Post?
A: No, there is not an inquiry from the Washington Post; the email subject line was incorrect...the inquiry was from the Washington Times

DTRA's response:

Q1: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

A1: No.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: The grant was made by DoD's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Will standby for additional questions...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 6:43 PM
To: (b)(6)
US
Co (b)(6)
D
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hello,

Additional questions from DASD CWMD:

- Why is DTRA providing a response to the Washington Times Online article? (it seems to us that the responses Dr Williams and Dr Vann provided at the May 4 hearing answered the question from Congressional representatives)

- Is it because DTRA has received additional media inquiries?

- Is it because DTRA wants to be prepared for expected inquiries?

- Is there a Washington Post inquiry? Or did someone mix up the Washington Times and the Washington Post?

CWMD Policy needs to understand what the response is intending to do, and we also need to review whatever DTRA puts together.

Thank you (b)(6)

Fron (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 6:24 PM
To: (b)(6)
A I
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hi (b)(6)

Adding DTRA PA here.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6) >
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 at 6:00:20 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

CWMD Policy needs to chop on the DTRA response.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
<mailto:

(b)(6) >

Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

H (b)(6)

I've received no queries to that effect. I've cc'd (b)(6) who works our DTRA portfolio – she says there's a response in the works to that piece.

(b)(6)

Department of Defense Spokesman

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

1400 Defense Pentagon (2D961), Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:34 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

<mailto:

Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) hecking to see if you've received any media enquiries related to this Washington Times Online article, "'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds"

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

| Director, CTR Policy | Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense

& Global Security (b)(6)
<mai (b)(6)
<mai

From: (b)(6)
<mailt (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 2:31 PM
To (b)(6)
<mailto
Cc: (b)(6)
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) this is the first I've heard of it.

Best,

(b)(6) Lt Col, USAF

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Legislative Affairs

Com (b)(6)

Mob

NIPR

SIPR

From: " (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 at 2:21:28 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) >
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Has OSD LegAf fielded any questions related to this article?

Many thanks (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) < (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:54 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYSA -- Today's article from Bill Gertz (included in today's Defense Morning Clips):

==========
'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds
Washington Times Online, May 4 (1751) Bill Gertz

Pentagon officials offered a qualified denial Tuesday when questioned on whether any of the nearly $40 million in defense money given to a non-government organization may have been used for research at the Chinese military-linked Wuhan Institute of Virology, a suspected potential origin point for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Rys Williams, acting director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Brandi Vann, acting assistant defense secretary for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, told a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing that all the funds they reviewed from DTRA and other government sources did not go to the Chinese institute following reviews of grants to EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based NGO that worked closely with the WIV.

"We have done a thorough look at all of our programmatic activities to ensure that at least the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding to this NGO was not provided, to the best of our knowledge, into the Wuhan Institute of Virology," Mr. Williams told the House panel that focuses on special operations.

Mr. Williams said DTRA reviews all activities related to NGOs "to make sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized and in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the federal acquisition process but equally in policy as well."

Ms. Vann, the acting assistant defense secretary, added that other defense agencies involved in nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) programs reviewed funding of EcoHealth Alliance research and found no links to the Chinese lab.

"We also across the NCB did a thorough review to identify any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory, and we have not identified any," she said in response to questioning from Mississippi Rep. Trent Kelly, the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee. "It is something that we continue to watch to ensure that our investments are not going to places where they should not be," she noted.

Mr. Kelly asked the two defense officials "what kind of risk assessment or risk analysis we've conducted and how the Wuhan Institute of Virology became the partner of choice for U.S. government agencies, given its ties to the PLA," he said, using the acronym for People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military.

A State Department fact sheet made public in January for the first time disclosed that the WIV was engaged in covert biological weapons research with the PLA. Chinese officials at the WIV have denied the institute works with the PLA.

According to the fact sheet, the WIV is engaged in "secret military activity."

"Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing," the fact sheet said. "For many years the

United States has publicly raised concerns about China's past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention."

The collaboration at the institute includes both publication and secret military projects including classified research and laboratory animal experiments. The work between WIV and PLA has been underway since 2017.

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress last month that U.S. intelligence agencies believe the pandemic began either through a leak from a Chinese laboratory or from an animal host. Many scientists and mainstream news outlets for months dismissed all suggestions the virus could have come from a lab as a conspiracy theory.

A list of grants and contracts for EcoHealth Alliance posted on the website of Independent Science News shows DTRA and the Pentagon provided the group with $38.9 million since 2014. DTRA's funding included $6.49 million between 2017 and 2020 for what the agency called "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia."

According to DTRA, the grant was used for research aimed at "combating or countering weapons of mass destruction" and was to be carried out between 2017 and 2022. It is not clear if the work is ongoing.

The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) provided EcoHealth Alliance with $3.7 million in funding from 2014 to 2019, and the National Institutes of Health gave the group $2.5 million between 2009 and 2012. The NIAID funds went to a program called "understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence."

A spokesman for EcoHealth Alliance did not return an email and phone call seeking comment.

EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak has worked closely with WIV virologist Shi Zhengli, known as the "Bat Woman of Wuhan" for her work on bat viruses and has been a vocal critic of the Wuhan lab transmission theory. He was also part of the World Health Organization team that investigated the virus origin earlier this year that called the lab theory "extremely unlikely" and not worth pursuing. Critics say the WHO report was influenced by the Chinese government that sought to play down the lab leak theory.

China, according to the Trump and Biden administrations, has engaged in disinformation in a bid to deflect criticism from its handling of the outbreak's earliest days. The Chinese government refused to provide virus samples to international virus hunters and initially hid the infectiousness of the virus from the world.

More than 3 million people have died since the pandemic broke out in Wuhan in December 2019.

==========

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute
Date: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 7:56:00 AM

Good; thank you. I'll speak with DASD Johnson.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 7, 2021 10:57 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) stopped by this morning. He was not happy with (b)(6) I told him to send her my way if she hounds his staff anymore. Ridiculous.

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) <robert.s.pope12.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 5:00 PM
To: Long, Randolph W CIV DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) <randolph.w.long.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Now (b)(6) s tasking DTRA PA directly.

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 4:52 PM
To (b)(6)
(U
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Thank you - I appreciate your partnership. Please advise how DTRA PA informs and seeks guidance from OSD PA about media inquiries that are related to the DoD CTR Program and that specifically ask for insight into strategies related to the DoD CTR Program.

Best, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 4:37 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) >; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you (b)(6) We will continue coordinating appropriately going forward and will include CWMD Policy for media queries. We appreciate you support.
V/r,
(b)(6)

Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) Work)
Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWICS

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 2:39 PM
To: (b)(6)
(US
(b)(6)

Cc: R (b)(6) ; DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List
SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) < (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you again for coordinating the draft response with CWMD Policy. DASD Richard Johnson clears, as edited in the attached and copied below for ease of reference. Rationale: this responds to the exact question posed.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: Yes, we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Separately, CWMD Policy would like OSD PA to clarify the coordination process for media inquiries related to the DoD CTR Program and any of the underlying programs. I've cc'ed OSD Leg Af to likewise clarify the coordination process for Congressional inquiries related to the DoD CTR Program and any of the underlying programs. In each instance, CWMD Policy needs to be included in the clearance process.

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) I Director, CTR Policy I Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global Security (b)(6)
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 12:50 PM
To: (b)(6)
OUS
(b)(6)
C (b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Times Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hell (b)(6)
Please find attached the actual query that we received on Tuesday evening from Bill Gertz. (b)(6) on my team acknowledged to Mr. Gertz that we received his query, however, we have not provided any information to him. Because similar media queries have come up in the past, we asked Dr. Rob Pope, DTRA's CTR director, to prep responses to align with our previous statements in open source on the topic (b)(5)
(b)(5)
I am also attaching the following: the email from Mr. Gertz, the media query sheet(an internal PAO document here at DTRA) and the responses that were prepared in case we engaged.
Yesterday morning, I advised my Public Affairs team to stand down and to coordinate with (b)(6) our OSD PA portfolio manager as we normally do. Moving forward, we do not plan to provide any information to Mr. Gertz.
I hope this paints a clearer picture of the query activity. I welcome any additional questions and concerns.
V/r,
(b)(6)

Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR
JWIC

-----Original Message-----
Fro (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 11:02 AM
T (b)(6)
C
(b)(6)
C (b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hello (b)(6)
Will comply. Am bringing this request to the attention to (b)(6) the DTRA PA Chief for leadership coordination.

Please stand by...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 10:55 AM
To: (b)(6)
PA
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6), update: please have DTRA send the actual press inquiry AND the proposed response to CWMD Policy for coordination.

Best, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 10:53 AM
To: (b)(6)
PA
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTI
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Thank you, (b)(6) DASD CWMD asks that DTRA formally send the proposed DTRA responses to CWMD Policy for coordination.

Will you relay that message to DTRA leadership?

Many thanks,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 6, 2021 9:36 AM
To: (b)(6)
CIV
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Good day all,
In response to your additional questions:

Q: Is it because DTRA has received additional media inquiries?
A: Yes, the reporter sent an inquiry for additional information to the DTRA PA mailbox

Q: Is it because DTRA wants to be prepared for expected inquiries?
A: No, DTRA has already prepared/vetted responses to this subject matter from a previous inquiry

Q: Is there a Washington Post inquiry? Or did someone mix up the Washington Times and the Washington Post?
A: No, there is not an inquiry from the Washington Post; the email subject line was incorrect...the inquiry was from the Washington Times

DTRA's response:

Q1: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?
A1: No.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: The grant was made by DoD's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Will standby for additional questions...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 6:43 PM
To: (b)(6)
US
Cc: (b)(6)
DT
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

Hello,

Additional questions from DASD CWMD:

- Why is DTRA providing a response to the Washington Times Online article? (it seems to us that the responses Dr Williams and Dr Vann provided at the May 4 hearing answered the question from Congressional representatives)

- Is it because DTRA has received additional media inquiries?

- Is it because DTRA wants to be prepared for expected inquiries?

- Is there a Washington Post inquiry? Or did someone mix up the Washington Times and the Washington Post?

CWMD Policy needs to understand what the response is intending to do, and we also need to review whatever DTRA puts together.

Thank you (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 6:24 PM
To (b)(6)
A
Cc (b)(6)
DT
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

H (b)(6)
Adding DTRA PA here.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<mail (b)(6)
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 at 6:00:20 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:c
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

CWMD Policy needs to chop on the DTRA response.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<mailto: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
Cc:
<mailto:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

H (b)(6)

I've received no queries to that effect. I've cc'd (b)(6) who works our DTRA portfolio – she says there's a response in the works to that piece.

(b)(6)

Department of Defense Spokesman

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

1400 Defense Pentagon (2D961), Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 5:34 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto
Cc
<mailto

Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6) checking to see if you've received any media enquiries related to this Washington Times Online article, "'Best of our knowledge': Pentagon officials deny Wuhan Institute of Virology given defense funds"

Many thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) | Director, CTR Policy | Office of the Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & Global Security | (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 2:31 PM
To (b)(6)
<mailto
Cc
<mailto
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6), this is the first I've heard of it.

Best,

(b)(6)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Legislative Affairs

Con

Mob

NIP

SIP

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<(b)(6)
Date: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 at 2:21:28 PM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6) >

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

(b)(6)

Has OSD LegAf fielded any questions related to this article?

Many thanks (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) >

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:54 AM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT-BT Taskers <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-bt-taskers@mail.mil> >; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil <mailto:dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil> >

Subject: RE: HOT -- Washington Post Question Re: DTRA, EcoHealth Alliance, and the Wuhan Institute

FYSA -- Today's article from Bill Gertz (included in today's Defense Morning Clips):

==========

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Washington Times Online, May 4 (1751) Bill Gertz

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"We have done a thorough look at all of our programmatic activities to ensure that at least the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's funding to this NGO was not provided, to the best of our knowledge, into the Wuhan Institute of Virology," Mr. Williams told the House panel that focuses on special operations.

Mr. Williams said DTRA reviews all activities related to NGOs "to make sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized and in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the federal acquisition process but equally in policy as well."

Ms. Vann, the acting assistant defense secretary, added that other defense agencies involved in nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) programs reviewed funding of EcoHealth Alliance research and found no links to the Chinese lab.

"We also across the NCB did a thorough review to identify any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory, and we have not identified any," she said in response to questioning from Mississippi Rep. Trent Kelly, the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee. "It is something that we continue to watch to ensure that our investments are not going to places where they should not be," she noted.

Mr. Kelly asked the two defense officials "what kind of risk assessment or risk analysis we've conducted and how the Wuhan Institute of Virology became the partner of choice for U.S. government agencies, given its ties to the PLA," he said, using the acronym for People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military.

A State Department fact sheet made public in January for the first time disclosed that the WIV was engaged in covert biological weapons research with the PLA. Chinese officials at the WIV have denied the institute works with the PLA.

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"Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing," the fact sheet said. "For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China's past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention."

The collaboration at the institute includes both publication and secret military projects including classified research and laboratory animal experiments. The work between WIV and PLA has been underway since 2017.

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress last month that U.S. intelligence agencies believe the pandemic began either through a leak from a Chinese laboratory or from an animal host. Many scientists and mainstream news outlets for months dismissed all suggestions the virus could have come from a lab as a conspiracy theory.

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According to DTRA, the grant was used for research aimed at "combating or countering weapons of mass destruction" and was to be carried out between 2017 and 2022. It is not clear if the work is ongoing.

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A spokesman for EcoHealth Alliance did not return an email and phone call seeking comment.

EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak has worked closely with WIV virologist Shi Zhengli, known as the "Bat Woman of Wuhan" for her work on bat viruses and has been a vocal critic of the Wuhan lab transmission theory. He was also part of the World Health Organization team that investigated the virus origin earlier this year that called the lab theory "extremely unlikely" and not worth pursuing. Critics say the WHO report was influenced by the Chinese government that sought to play down the lab leak theory.

China, according to the Trump and Biden administrations, has engaged in disinformation in a bid to deflect criticism from its handling of the outbreak's earliest days. The Chinese government refused to provide virus samples to international virus hunters and initially hid the infectiousness of the virus from the world.

More than 3 million people have died since the pandemic broke out in Wuhan in December 2019.

==========

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: (b)(6)
To:
(USA); Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: READ ME NOW-PRIORITY ACTIONS - FW: Program execution
Date: Monday, March 9, 2020 3:08:21 PM
Importance: High

Below is an update for the current PR packages in queue:

If Certifiers and Contracting could keep me updated, I'd appreciate it so that I am able to provide updates to CT Leadership.

HDTRA1619782-027(CLIN Swap FY18/19) and HDTRA1034193 - STEP Option Period 3 - $20.55M (Funds Certified 6 March 2020)
HDTRA1930168-001 - Grant Foot & Mouth Virus Stereotypes - $193,666.09 (Funds Certified 5 March 2020)
HDTRA1034176 - ROK NIAC IO to INL - $1,388,000 - (Funds Realignment necessary; pending certification)
HDTRA1828467-004 - Vietnam Region 1 - $6,096,401 (Funds Certified 5 March 2020)
HDTRA1034233 - A&AS Option Year 4 - $15,214,754.60 (Funds Certified, 9 Mar 20)
HDTRA1034201 - Grant EcoHealth Alliances, Malaysia - $1,565,534 (Pending Certification as of 5 March 2020)

(b)(5)

V/R, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 10:17 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: READ ME NOW-PRIORITY ACTIONS - FW: Program execution
Importance: High

FYSA.

Just came out of a meeting with (b)(6) in reference to what can be accelerated and obligated by next Friday, 13 March 2020.

The following are the priorities that will be coming through and need to be processed immediately:

BTRP - STEP (b)(6)
PPP - Vietnam (b)(6) funds already certified) A&AS - ALL (b)(6) s coordinating with Depts now to see

what is out there and available; to include prior year unobligated funds) TRLS (Potentially; will know by noon)

Please be prepared to work these actions immediately upon receipt and coordinate with your programs closely to get these packages in.

V/R (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 4:33 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT Senior Staff <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-senior-staff@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG <dtra.belvoir.ct.list.ct-dag@mail.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Program execution

FYI
(b)(6) please send the latest updates on execution. Include our projected plan. I will take the lead on working with you to craft a few slides for the DIR through Dr. Pope.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Oxford, Vayl S SES DTRA J0 (US) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 4:24 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Directors <dtra.belvoir.org.list.dtra-directorate-directors@mail.mil>; DTRA Ft Belvoir Org List DTRA Directorate Deputy Directors <dtra.belvoir.org.list.dtra-directorate-deputy-directors@mail.mil> (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List DTRA CMD GP <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.dtra-cmd-gp@mail.mil>
Subject: Program execution

(b)(5)

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding
Date: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:03:00 PM

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:03 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Dr. Pope,

I've confirmed that the SASC PSM is looking for a response to his inquiry. Will plug this into TMT for a short turn response.

Thanks,
(b)(6)
Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 10:36 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Dr. Pope,

Shortly after your call on 2 Nov with (b)(6) to discuss the FY22 House NDAA provision on EcoHealth funding, SASC Minority PSM (b)(6) contacted us seeking similar input. Checking with him to see if a phone call between you two would suffice or if he'd need a more formal response. If the latter is necessary, I spun up the attached based on our appeal of this provision. Will advise on his preference.

Thanks,
(b)(6)
Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2021 3:33 PM
To (b)(6)
Cc
Subject: Re: DTRA contact

Thanks!
(b)(6)

Can you please assist us in getting feedback from DTRA on this provision? Would it have any negative impact and, if so, to what extent?:

SEC. 6485. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE, INC.

No funds authorized under this Act may be made available for any purpose to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

Thank you!
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding
Date: Monday, November 15, 2021 4:15:28 PM

(b)(6)

I provided some background and a suggested edit to (b)(6) prior to his issuing the tasker, so the lift should be minimal. He wasn't tracking that we already had carefully worded and vetted language on EHA/PRC that may warrant inclusion in his proposed response -- up to you all.

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:04 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
Fro (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:03 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Dr. Pope,

I've confirmed that the SASC PSM is looking for a response to his inquiry. Will plug this into TMT for a short turn response.

Thanks,
Steve

(b)(6)

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

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Thanks,

(b)(6)

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2021 3:33 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: DTRA contact

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Can you please assist us in getting feedback from DTRA on this provision?
Would it have any negative impact and, if so, to what extent?:

SEC. 6485. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE, INC.

No funds authorized under this Act may be made available for any purpose to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

Thank you!

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding
Date: Monday, November 15, 2021 4:24:07 PM

I misread your email. I thought you said YOU would like to participate in the review. Either way, I am happy to review as well. But he is aware that anything going to the Hill needs signoff from someone in the FO and the relevant Department chief.

Sorry, a bit scattered today with (b)(6) triage.

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 4:23 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Sir,

Yes -- he intends to run it by you -- I reminded that anything going to the Hill needs CTR leadership signoff. I think he was just asking for feedback before he issued the tasker in TMT.

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 4:20 PM
To (b)(6)
Cc
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

(b)(6)

Thank you. If he wants us to vet a final product in response to the request from the Hill, I would like you to participate in the review.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

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R/
(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:04 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:03 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Dr. Pope,

I've confirmed that the SASC PSM is looking for a response to his inquiry.
Will plug this into TMT for a short turn response.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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(b)(6)
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(b)(6)
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Thanks,
(b)(6)
Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2021 3:33 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: DTRA contact

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Can you please assist us in getting feedback from DTRA on this provision?
Would it have any negative impact and, if so, to what extent?:

SEC. 6485. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE, INC.

No funds authorized under this Act may be made available for any purpose to
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

Thank you!
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding
Date: Thursday, November 18, 2021 8:30:09 AM

Sir,

The EHA response is in the senior leadership approval process upstairs in the FO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

" My uninformed answer is that there

(b)(5)

Of the amendments pending on the Senate side, Sen. Ernst has proposed language (3991) prohibiting any funds to EHA with language identical to the House prohibition on same.

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2021 12:50 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy, WILCO.

I'm on the list to get a TMT license through PI -- I can't see these (or any

taskers) so didn't know it had been completed. Apologies. I did offer some input to Steve at an earlier stage and will be sure I connect with the DAG on items like this.

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2021 12:48 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

I chopped on and answer yesterday in TMT. Please check with (b)(6) on the status of correspondence with the staffer and any planned follow up.

From: (b)(6)
<mailto (b)(6)
Date: Wednesday, November 17, 2021 at 10:24:03 AM
To: "Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)"
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc:
(b)(6) > >,
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Circling back on this -- did we ever get an answer back upstairs? NDAA cloture vote is today, though EHA language can always come out in conference...

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 4:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
<mailto:l
Cc:
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Yes, I'll want to see the final, after you and BTRP have reviewed.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
<mailto: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 4:24 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

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R/

(b)(6)
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Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Sir,

Yes -- he intends to run it by you -- (b)(5)
(b)(5)

R/

(b)(6)

Senior Policy Advisor
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
Noblis, Inc.
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To: (b)(6)
<mailto:
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(b)(6)
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Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CTR A&AS Contractor
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(b)(6)

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(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 2:04 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
<mai
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
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(b)(6)
Legislative Liaison
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

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(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2021 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SASC feedback on EcoHealth Funding

Copy.

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Rob

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Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

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(b)(6)
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Defense Threat Reduction Agency
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Thank you!

(b)(6)

From:	Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
To:	DTRA Ft Belvoir CT List CT DAG
Subject:	Town Hall Notes
Date:	Wednesday, June 9, 2021 12:04:00 PM
Attachments:	CT Town Hall - 9 June 2021.docx EcoHealth Alliance Message.docx

Here are my speaking notes from the Town Hall. They may help your production of the document for the workforce.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: (b)(6)
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: WAT snapshot comparison as of 6 September 2022
Date: Tuesday, September 6, 2022 4:20:48 PM
Attachments: WAT Snapshot Comparison_6 Sep 2022_for distribution.xlsx

Dr. Pope,

I've attached the latest WAT comparison. This compares WAT data as of 29 August to WAT data as of 6 September.

Please let us know if there are any questions.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

Budget Analyst and CTR Finance Integrator, SI-FMOO

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

CTB-19-327f	CT-BP	FY20	Ream & Kampong Speau Mil Labs FY20. De-obligation	-$6,905.00	-$6,905.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/30/2022	9/30/2022
CTB-20-148c	CT-BP	FY21	FRCALL16-6-2-0076; One Health Approaches to Transboundary Disease Surveillance and Molecular Epidemiologic Analysis of Brucellosis in Tanzania and Rwanda (LANL) Year 1. NCE	$0.00	$0.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/15/2022	9/15/2022
CTB-20-1518	CT-BP	FY21	FAO Early Warning. Base Year	$5,763,235.12	$5,763,235.12	Planned	Not Awarded	9/30/2022	9/30/2022
CTB-20-205	CT-BP	FY21	FRBAA14-6-2-0600; Reducing the threat of viral spillover from wildlife in the Philippines; Base Period, Years 1-3 (EcoHealth Alliance)	$2,899,899.12	$2,899,899.12	Planned	Not Awarded	9/30/2022	9/30/2022
CTB-20-217b	CT-BP	FY20	UZ Biosciences Engagement Program - Phase II. De-obligation	-$6,974.55	-$6,974.55	Planned	Not Awarded	9/16/2022	9/16/2022
CTB-21-1331	CT-BP	FY22	CDC 2022	$1,840,491.00	$1,840,491.00	Awarded	9/1/2022	9/30/2022	-
CTB-21-1357a	CT-BP	FY21	USDA/APHIS Agreement. De-obligation	-$239,524.36	-$239,524.36	Planned	Not Awarded	9/1/2022	9/9/2022
CTB-22-1245a	CT-BP	FY20	WOAH (OIE) Twinning. Base	$470,261.00	$470,261.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/15/2022	9/15/2022
CTB-22-1313	CT-BP	FY22	SNL FY22	$25,792,351.00	$25,792,351.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/30/2022	9/30/2022
CTB-22-1329	CT-BP	FY22	FRCALL16-6-2-0074_R: The Mediterranean and Black Sea Flyway: Transboundary Determinants of Avian Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (LANL) - Year 2	$249,999.98	$249,999.98	Planned	Not Awarded	9/15/2022	9/15/2022
CTB-22-1334	CT-BP	FY22	(AGR TM) - USACE FY23 PoP with FY22 Funds	$727,169.00	$727,169.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/9/2022	9/9/2022
CTB-22-1345	CT-BP	FY20	vector-borne disease in northern Kenya (SCBI) Years 1-3.	$2,702,578.00	$2,702,578.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/9/2022	9/9/2022
CTB-22-1345a	CT-BP	FY22	FRCALL16-6-2-0116; Mitigating the risk of vector-borne disease in northern Kenya (USAMRIID) Year 1	$115,116.92	$115,116.92	Planned	Not Awarded	9/9/2022	9/9/2022
CTB-22-1347	CT-BP	FY21	FRBAA14-6-2-0553; Reducing security risks from the intersectionality of wildlife trafficking and biosafety from zoonotic pathogens in Africa?s Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (University of MD) - Year 1-3	$1,192,059.93	$927,770.63	Planned	Not Awarded	9/30/2022	9/30/2022
CTB-22-1347a	CT-BP	FY20	FRBAA14-6-2-0553; Reducing security risks from the intersectionality of wildlife trafficking and biosafety from zoonotic pathogens in Africa?s Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (University of MD) - Year 1-3.	$1,807,940.07	$2,072,229.37	Planned	Not Awarded	9/30/2022	9/30/2022
CTB-22-1371	CT-BP	FY20	FMD RRL MORU REA2	$507,000.00	$507,000.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/15/2022	9/15/2022
CTB-22-1371a	CT-BP	FY21	NIAH Equip / MORU	$855,880.08	$855,880.08	Planned	Not Awarded	9/15/2022	9/15/2022
CTB-22-1371c	CT-BP	FY21	FMD RRL MORU REA2	$38,000.00	$38,000.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/15/2022	9/15/2022
CTB-22-1373b	CT-BP	FY20	Liberia NRL Construction - FY20 Funds	$2,639,114.00	$2,639,114.00	Planned	Not Awarded	9/23/2022	9/23/2022

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 17:12:23 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: RE: Coordination on EcoHealth Alliance Inc. Congressional Inquiry

Hi Dr. Hann,

Your recollection is correct. However, the DOD response in current format does not actually address Echo Health Alliance directly. Rather, each question is answered in the context of WIV. i.e. all answers are consistent with format that looks like the following: "No portion of any DoD-funded projects authorizes transfer of taxpayer funding for work at, or in collaboration with the WIV."

Kind regards,
(b)(6)

Staff Director, Strategic Communication & Outreach
Chemical/Biological Technologies Department
Research & Development Directorate
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
COR: HDTRA1-12-D-0004
COR: HDTRA1-19-C-0004
COR: HDTRA1-15-D-0004

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2021 1:03 PM
To (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Coordination on EcoHealth Alliance Inc. Congressional Inquiry

(b)(6)
I'm good with the information and response with one question. Doesn't CBI (or CBA maybe?) have a planned effort with EHA? I seem to recall that was a concern last time we went through this.
Thanks,
Dr. Hann

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2021 12:37 PM
To (b)(6) >; Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
(A
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Coordination on EcoHealth Alliance Inc. Congressional Inquiry

Alcon,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Kind regards,
(b)(6)

Staff Director, Strategic Communication & Outreach Chemical/Biological Technologies Department Research & Development Directorate Defense Threat Reduction Agency
COR: HDTRA1-12-D-0004
COR: HDTRA1-19-C-0004
COR: HDTRA1-15-D-0004

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2021 12:13 PM
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(AJ
(b)(6)
Subject: Coordination on EcoHealth Alliance Inc. Congressional Inquiry
Importance: High

SHORT TURN REQUEST

Good morning Dr. Hann (b)(6)

Task was just assigned in TMT, which none of the leadership have access to yet, LA was assigned DTRA lead and it was requested by USD(R&E) for DTRA to coordinate/comment on the one page letter response to Congress on EcoHealth Alliance Inc. (TAB A) found in Action Attachments via the coordination sheet (TAB C).

Carl /CB had reviewed previous request on this subject, if all is ok and RD has no concerns/ issues I can close with RD concurrence accordingly. If Carl or you would like to add anything further, track changes are fine, we have a short turn to close and submit comments/coord by the 15h

V/r

(b)(6)

SAIC

RD Front Office

(b)(6)

Technical Analyst

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 15:58:53 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today
Attachments: CBM Bat Research.docx

Dr. Hann,
Attached is an informal summary of all of CBM's bat work pulled from ROB reports. Note that some of the work from CTR is being attributed to CBM on this ROB report. No CBM funding supported EcoHealth Alliance or the Wuhan Institute of Virology. This appears to be CTR funding.
v/r
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:42 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
CO
(US
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

CTR already working on their answers (attached).

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:10 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
CO
(U
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Team,
I recall answering this question almost a year ago and that CTR was the funder for the work that is mentioned below (I could have faulty memory). I did note when scanning my emails that we funded a basic research grant with the company around Aug 2020(?), but gave strict requirements on no collaboration with China (Botto/Hannan). Please follow-up with PA on a response and CC me.
Thanks,
Dr. Hann

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Good day all,
We received the below inquiry from the Washington Post regarding Dr. William's testimony yesterday. If I recall correctly, these questions have already been addressed in another effort...please see below excerpt:

"I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology."

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

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Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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CBM Bat Research (pulled from ROB Report):

CB10003 (Froude/Geneva Foundation):
Title : Deep Characterization of Rousettus aegyptiacus immune system: Use of bats/nonhumanprimates to compare immune response during asymptomatic/symptoma
Abstract: The goal is to characterize R. aegyptiacus and non-human primate (NHP) immune response during filovirus infection using state-of-the-art genomic technologies. The work plan will include: a) Generation of whole genome and transcriptome sequence and annotation; b) Generation of RNA-seq pipelines, multiplex quantitative real-time PCR, recombinant proteins and antibody-based tools for measuring immune responses; c) Dissection of master regulators of innate immune signaling utilizing fine-scale molecular immunology studies; d) Comparison of bat and NHP immune responses to virus infection.

CB10756 (Trefry/CDC):
Title : Effect of ecological stress on filovirus, paramyxovirus and orthonairovirus shedding in Egyptian rousette bats
Abstract: The Egyptian rousette bat (ERB; Rousettus aegyptiacus) is a natural reservoir host of multiple viruses known to cause severe disease in humans. These ERB pathogens include Marburg virus (MARV, family Filoviridae, genus Marburgvirus; a WMD pathogen), Sosuga virus (SOSV, family Paramyxoviridae, unclassified rubulavirus-like virus) and Kasokero virus (KASV, family Nairoviridae, genus Orthonairovirus). It is unclear if ERBs exposed to ecological stressors, such as virus co-infection and nutritional stress, experience exacerbated viral shedding, consequently increasing the potential risk of virus spillover to humans. Therefore, the objective of this proposal is to experimentally infect ERBs with MARV and then determine if bats exposed to virus co-infection with SOSV, KASV, nutritional stress and/or combinations of these ecological stressors exhibit increased viral shedding. We will answer these questions by conducting controlled virus shedding studies using captive-born ERBs. We hypothesize that MARV-infected ERBs exposed to one or more of these ecological stressors will exhibit increased viral shedding compared to control bats.

CB3539 (Wolfe/LLNL):
Title : The role of RNA virus quasispecies
Abstract: I don't have an abstract handy

CB3907 (Triplet-Smith / Mount Sinai School of Medicine): Bats are reservoirs of several WMD-relevant
Title : Filovirus Genes Preserved in Mammalian Genomes
Abstract: zoonotic viruses, including Ebola viruses (EBOVs) and Marburg viruses (MARVs). Fatal filovirus virus infection is associated with systemic virus replication that is not controlled by host immunity. We have demonstrated that filovirus evasion of innate immunity is required for virulence. Intriguingly, recent studies identified genes encoding homologues to filoviral VP35 and NP proteins in the genome of the microbat, Myotis lucifugus. Viral VP35 inhibits host innate immunity by blocking production of interferon (IFN)- ⍰⍰⍰. VP35 and NP are also essential components of the viral RNA replication complex. Our Preliminary Data demonstrates that a recombinant microbat VP35, like its viral counterpart, can inhibit host IFN-⍰⍰⍰ responses; and it was proposed that the endogenous VP35 and NP will interfere with the filovirus replication machinery. We hypothesize that, in bats, filoviruses will suppress innate immunity incompletely, such that infection is controlled but not eliminated; and that innate immune responses and filovirus replication are modulated by the endogenous filoviral VP35 and NP. To address

these hypotheses, we will (1) profile bat innate immune responses to viral infection; (2) assess the function of viral and endogenous bat filoviral proteins; (3) define the biochemical and structural properties of microbat VP35 and NP by determining their relationship to viral counterparts; and (4) characterize interaction between the bat innate immune system and filovirus proteins that antagonize innate immunity.

CB4102 (Triplett / Georgia State Univ): The objective is to (1) define the Rousettus aegyptiacus
Title : Comparative Immunology of Rousettus aegyptiacus reservoir with filoviruses
Abstract: (Egyptian fruit bat) innate immune transcriptome. (2) Express key bat innate signaling proteins for antibody generation and structural studies. (3) Develop RT-PCR and antibody reagents to bat innate immunity. (4) Compare filovirus interferon antagonist function in bat versus human cells. (5) Define the innate immune response of bat and human cells to infection with wild- type and mutant Ebola viruses.

CB10447 (Froude / Georgia State University (was Mount Sinai School of Medicine)
Title : Comparative Immunology of Rousettus aegyptiacus reservoir with filoviruses and I think is the same project continues in CB4102
Abstract: I don't have an abstract handy

Potential CTR Work

In stuff that I don't think is our that keeps showing up on the ROB report for CBM I found

Marty Stokes (CTR) project involving bats with EcoHealth Alliance. No project name or details except FRBAA14-6-2-0050_R

"Pathogen Surveillance for Viral Zoonoses" funded my Marty Stokes (CTR) involving bats. It doesn't have a CB# just the contract HDTRA1-17-C-0004 with Chulalongkorn University (Thailand)

"Arthropod-borne Viruses Associated with the Chiroptera of Uganda: Isolation and characterization" funded my Mary Lancaster FRCALL12-6-2-0007 to the CDC

Marty Stokes also funded Metabiota for some bat related work contract mod HDTRA1-14-C-0104 Metabiota

Lance Brooks AECOM, HDTRA1-08-D-0006, TO1 to Univ Buffalo, Ministry of Health (MOH), Almaty Kazakhstan

From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 15:00:39 +0000
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
(b)(6)
(USA)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

(b)(6)

We recommend short, factual responses to the Washington Times questions, in alignment with responses to prior Congressional queries on this topic:

Q1: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?
A1: No.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: The grant was made by DoD's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) >; Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

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Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
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(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

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(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:31:17 +0000
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Attachments: OSD004467-20-CONGRESSIONAL INCOMING.pdf, smime.p7s

Team.

Sending this right out in case anyone is still at their laptop.

The task will be coming, but it is marked URGENT.

Thank you,
V/r,
(b)(6)

Deputy Chief for the NCR
Enabling Capabilities Department
Research and Development Directorate
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTRC RM 3312
8725 John J. Kingman Rd
Fort Belvoir VA 22060
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:27 PM
To: (b)(6)
R A
(b)(6) Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (US)
(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc
(b)(6)
(U
Subject: RE: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO

ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

(b)(6)
We'll review. I have also CC'd Rob Pope as this might have been a CTR funded project.

Steve - for action, please.

Rhys

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(US
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: CATMS010520206YF4P8 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

RD Leaders,

Request your immediate attention on this congressional inquiry to determine if there are any DTRA equities in question one:

"Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the PRC?"

We're trying to get a quick response back through the chain so A&S can turn the task to the right DOD entity.

Thank you,

(b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 16:09
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) >; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List Task CS <dtra.belvoir.dir.list.task-
cs@mail.mil>; Perry, Michele M CIV DTRA J0 (US) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
OU
Subject: URGENT REVIEW: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD\Lee, Erika | SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

URGENT REVIEW REQUESTED:

NCB Team,

Please take a look at the attached congressional memo and let me know if it belongs to us. NEED a response ASAP. Thanks.

v/r

(b)(6)

Sr Analyst, DUSD(A&S)

Room 3E1062

3015 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3015

NIPR (b)(6)

SIPR:

JWIC

GOV

From (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:01 PM
To (b)(6)
(b)(6) ; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S List Enterprise Solutions <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.list.enterprise-solutions@mail.mil>
Cc: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: (U) Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Request NCB and Sustainment take a quick look at this task (copy attached).

It is a congressional regarding a DoD Grant to EcoHealth Alliance. (Same organization the President just shut down NIH Grant)

If A&S has not been involved in this Grant let me know and if you know who may have been involved (Army?) let me know.

I want to try to make the 24 hour rule and get this assigned to someone else if it is not ours.CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Executive Secretary

OUSD Acquisition & Sustainment

Pentagon 3D886

(b)(6)

(NIPR (b)(6)

(SIPR

From: Admin, CATMS <donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil <mailto:donotreply.crmsetup@mail.mil> >
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:24 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO <osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-a-s.mbx.as-cmo@mail.mil> >
Cc: <ES-DSD> <depsecdefnco@sd.mil <mailto:depsecdefnco@sd.mil> >; <ExecSec> <execsecCATMS@sd.mil <mailto:execsecCATMS@sd.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OASD LA Mailbox Coordinations <osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.oasd-la.mbx.coordinations@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Admin <osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.pa.mbx.admin@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USP <osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.mbx.usp@mail.mil> >; OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff <osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ogc.list.correspondence-staff@mail.mil> >
Subject: Tasker(s) Assigned by CMD (b)(6) SUSP 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC) | CATMS010520206YF4P8 | 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE

Either a new Tasker has been assigned to you or an existing Tasker assignment has been updated with additional information. Click the appropriate link to your assignment in either the OPR or OCR list below to access your copy of the Tasker.

Priority: Normal
Category: General
Action: None

Subject: 2017 GRANT AWARD BY DOD TO ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
Task Initiator: CMD
Response Type: RDC-Reply Direct by OSD or DoD Component Head
Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)

OPR: USA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=269ceade-d88b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>
OPR Suspense: 05/22/2020 03:59 (UTC)
OPR Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

For Release: No
For Response: No

OCRs: N/A
OCR Suspense: N/A
OCR Instructions:
N/A

Info Copies: ES-DSD <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord> , LA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord> , GC <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord> , ExecSec <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord> , PA <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord> , USP <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/main.aspx?etn=ava_tasker&id=3269f3a1-d38b-ea11-8119-0050569e5a8f&pagetype=entityrecord>

Original Instructions:
"REQUIRED COORDS: LA, GC"

TMT Home <https://crm.osd.mil/CATMS1/>

GUY RESCHENTHALER
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
531 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515–3814
(202) 225-2065

DISTRICT OFFICES

April 30, 2020

The Honorable Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Esper:

Thank you for your strong leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic and for your efforts to repatriate Americans abroad, counter adversaries like Venezuela and Iran, and keep our servicemembers safe during this unprecedented crisis. I write to bring your attention to a 2017 grant awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) to EcoHealth Alliance Inc., an organization that has a history of collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which reports suggest may be linked to the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak.

In 2017, DOD awarded a $6.5 million grant to EcoHealth Alliance under Assistance Listing 12.351 – Scientific Research – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The description of this grant is listed as "understanding the risk of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia." On March 23, 2020, EcoHealth Alliance received their final payment in the amount of $1,509,531 for the continuation of their research, which is projected to be completed in October 2022.

As you are likely aware, on April 24, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) cut all grant funding for EcoHealth Alliance after reports circulated that the organization sent US taxpayer dollars to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. It is my understanding that the NIH grant was for research on coronaviruses spread from bats to humans. Given the similarities between EcoHealth Alliance's NIH research and the description of the 2017 DOD grant, I respectfully request answers to the following questions:

1. Has any portion of DOD funding granted to EcoHealth Alliance or any other DOD grant recipient been given to or used in collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any research laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC)?
2. If no, what, if any, steps is DOD taking to determine whether department grant funding was utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?
3. If yes, what is the DOD doing to ensure American dollars can no longer be utilized by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or another research laboratory in the PRC?

OSD004467-20/CMD005368-20

Given the Chinese Communist Party's cover up of the global threat posed by COVID-19, it is critical we ensure taxpayer dollars are not being used to support their activities. I appreciate your commitment to our national security, our servicemembers, and their families.

Thank you for your consideration of my request.

Very Respectfully,

Guy Reschenthaler
Member of Congress

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 15:58:53 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today
Attachments: CBM Bat Research.docx

Dr. Hann,
Attached is an informal summary of all of CBM's bat work pulled from ROB reports. Note that some of the work from CTR is being attributed to CBM on this ROB report. No CBM funding supported EcoHealth Alliance or the Wuhan Institute of Virology. This appears to be CTR funding.
v/r
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:42 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
CC
(U
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

CTR already working on their answers (attached).

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:10 AM
To (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
CC
(U
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Team,
I recall answering this question almost a year ago and that CTR was the funder for the work that is mentioned below (I could have faulty memory). I did note when scanning my emails that we funded a basic research grant with the company around Aug 2020(?), but gave strict requirements on no collaboration with China (Botto/Hannan). Please follow-up with PA on a response and CC me.
Thanks,
Dr. Hann

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) <(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Good day all,
We received the below inquiry from the Washington Post regarding Dr. William's testimony yesterday. If I recall correctly, these questions have already been addressed in another effort...please see below excerpt:

"I need to know about DTRA funding of the NGO EcoHealth Alliance that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology."

A funding chart on the EcoHealth Alliance website shows just under $40 million spent by DTRA and DoD and that some of the work included "UNDERSTANDING THERISK OF BAT-BORNE ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE IN WESTERN ASIA" and "UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE."

Dr. Williams at the House hearing today said: "We have done a thorough look at all of our programmaticactivities to ensure that at least at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency'sfunding to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into theWuhan Institute of Virology."

Q: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?

Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

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Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

Bill Gertz
202-674-2902

_____
National Security Correspondent
@BillGertz direct 202-636-3274
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

The information contained in this electronic transmission is intended for the exclusive use of the individuals to whom it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged and confidential, the disclosure of which is prohibited by law. If the reader of this transmission is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. In addition, any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this e-mail and any attachments is strictly forbidden.

CBM Bat Research (pulled from ROB Report):

CB10003 (Froude/Geneva Foundation):
Title : Deep Characterization of Rousettus aegyptiacus immune system: Use of bats/nonhumanprimates to compare immune response during asymptomatic/symptoma
Abstract: The goal is to characterize R. aegyptiacus and non-human primate (NHP) immune response during filovirus infection using state-of-the-art genomic technologies. The work plan will include: a) Generation of whole genome and transcriptome sequence and annotation; b) Generation of RNA-seq pipelines, multiplex quantitative real-time PCR, recombinant proteins and antibody-based tools for measuring immune responses; c) Dissection of master regulators of innate immune signaling utilizing fine-scale molecular immunology studies; d) Comparison of bat and NHP immune responses to virus infection.

CB10756 (Trefry/CDC):
Title : Effect of ecological stress on filovirus, paramyxovirus and orthonairovirus shedding in Egyptian rousette bats
Abstract: The Egyptian rousette bat (ERB; Rousettus aegyptiacus) is a natural reservoir host of multiple viruses known to cause severe disease in humans. These ERB pathogens include Marburg virus (MARV, family Filoviridae, genus Marburgvirus; a WMD pathogen), Sosuga virus (SOSV, family Paramyxoviridae, unclassified rubulavirus-like virus) and Kasokero virus (KASV, family Nairoviridae, genus Orthonairovirus). It is unclear if ERBs exposed to ecological stressors, such as virus co-infection and nutritional stress, experience exacerbated viral shedding, consequently increasing the potential risk of virus spillover to humans. Therefore, the objective of this proposal is to experimentally infect ERBs with MARV and then determine if bats exposed to virus co-infection with SOSV, KASV, nutritional stress and/or combinations of these ecological stressors exhibit increased viral shedding. We will answer these questions by conducting controlled virus shedding studies using captive-born ERBs. We hypothesize that MARV-infected ERBs exposed to one or more of these ecological stressors will exhibit increased viral shedding compared to control bats.

CB3539 (Wolfe/LLNL):
Title : The role of RNA virus quasispecies
Abstract: I don't have an abstract handy

CB3907 (Triplet-Smith / Mount Sinai School of Medicine): Bats are reservoirs of several WMD-relevant
Title : Filovirus Genes Preserved in Mammalian Genomes
Abstract: zoonotic viruses, including Ebola viruses (EBOVs) and Marburg viruses (MARVs). Fatal filovirus virus infection is associated with systemic virus replication that is not controlled by host immunity. We have demonstrated that filovirus evasion of innate immunity is required for virulence. Intriguingly, recent studies identified genes encoding homologues to filoviral VP35 and NP proteins in the genome of the microbat, Myotis lucifugus. Viral VP35 inhibits host innate immunity by blocking production of interferon (IFN)- ⍰⍰⍰. VP35 and NP are also essential components of the viral RNA replication complex. Our Preliminary Data demonstrates that a recombinant microbat VP35, like its viral counterpart, can inhibit host IFN-⍰⍰⍰ responses; and it was proposed that the endogenous VP35 and NP will interfere with the filovirus replication machinery. We hypothesize that, in bats, filoviruses will suppress innate immunity incompletely, such that infection is controlled but not eliminated; and that innate immune responses and filovirus replication are modulated by the endogenous filoviral VP35 and NP. To address

these hypotheses, we will (1) profile bat innate immune responses to viral infection; (2) assess the function of viral and endogenous bat filoviral proteins; (3) define the biochemical and structural properties of microbat VP35 and NP by determining their relationship to viral counterparts; and (4) characterize interaction between the bat innate immune system and filovirus proteins that antagonize innate immunity.

CB4102 (Triplett / Georgia State Univ): The objective is to (1) define the Rousettus aegyptiacus
Title : Comparative Immunology of Rousettus aegyptiacus reservoir with filoviruses
Abstract: (Egyptian fruit bat) innate immune transcriptome. (2) Express key bat innate signaling proteins for antibody generation and structural studies. (3) Develop RT-PCR and antibody reagents to bat innate immunity. (4) Compare filovirus interferon antagonist function in bat versus human cells. (5) Define the innate immune response of bat and human cells to infection with wild- type and mutant Ebola viruses.

CB10447 (Froude / Georgia State University (was Mount Sinai School of Medicine)
Title : Comparative Immunology of Rousettus aegyptiacus reservoir with filoviruses and I think is the same project continues in CB4102
Abstract: I don't have an abstract handy

Potential CTR Work

In stuff that I don't think is our that keeps showing up on the ROB report for CBM I found

Marty Stokes (CTR) project involving bats with EcoHealth Alliance. No project name or details except FRBAA14-6-2-0050_R

"Pathogen Surveillance for Viral Zoonoses" funded my Marty Stokes (CTR) involving bats. It doesn't have a CB# just the contract HDTRA1-17-C-0004 with Chulalongkorn University (Thailand)

"Arthropod-borne Viruses Associated with the Chiroptera of Uganda: Isolation and characterization" funded my Mary Lancaster FRCALL12-6-2-0007 to the CDC

Marty Stokes also funded Metabiota for some bat related work contract mod HDTRA1-14-C-0104 Metabiota

Lance Brooks AECOM, HDTRA1-08-D-0006, TO1 to Univ Buffalo, Ministry of Health (MOH), Almaty Kazakhstan

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:29:10 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: TASKER READY FOR CLOSURE: DTRA-220630-PR2N - OMB review NonD/DItem 319, DHS Report on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats
Attachments: CBRN Report 2021 - OMB Review 06.27.2022.docx, smime.p7s

DTRA-220630-PR2N - OMB review NonD/DItem 319, DHS Report on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats
SUS: NLT 1400 05 JUL 2022
OPR: RD-CB
Release Level: RD DIR

BLUF: Per (b)(6) CB does not have input to this task. EAL. Neg Inputs from NT and OP per CB

Good morning,
Notification of RED TAG tasker, suspense is set for NLT 1400 on Tuesday the 5th of July RD is requested to review 144page document IAW guidance provided.
Action: Attached for review a draft DHS (CWMD) annual report on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats. Please have one of your Director top 3 sign off so CS can send to ExDir for approval.
Attached are all associated documents for reference/review/action
Thank you for your attention

(b)(6)
Project/Research Analyst
Research & Development Directorate
A&AS Contract Support for RD Chief of Staff
Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER)
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 12:43:21 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
DIR (USA); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA RD (USA); DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt; (b)(6)
Subject: RE: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.
Attachments: smime.p7s

Sir,

Copy all, thank you for the feedback!

V/r,
(b)(6)

Chief of Legislative Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Offic (b)(6)
Cell:

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 8:43 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K
Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

(b)(6) - Sorry; I'm just seeing this now, as I was on leave on Friday afternoon. This language works great for CTR, as it prohibits work in China, but does not prohibit us from working with performers such as EcoHealth Alliance elsewhere.

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 2:47 PM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR List LA Govt
<dtra.belvoir.dir.list.la-govt@mail.mil> (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Gentlemen,

R&E just sent us a short fused informal review request.

BLUF: HASC staff are crafting an amendment with the text below and are looking for DoDs informal view on it (concur, non-concur, any suggestions). We anticipate this amendment will be proposed during committee markups next Wednesday, hence the short turn request. Seems straightforward to me.

SEC. 7xx. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to conduct bio-medical, infectious disease, gene editing, genetics, virus, or military medical research in China, including by way of a third-party entity, or with an entity determined by the Secretary of Defense to be owned or controlled by the government of China.

Please let us know your thoughts.
V/r,
(b)(6)

Chief of Legislative Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Offi (b)(6)
Cell:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 2:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Dear DTRA Team,

See below for a quick turn request from Congress. Let me know if you have any edits/concerns and/or if you wish to have a short phone call. Please let A&S know that I am requesting your support - I didn't remember who to copy.

Best,

(b)(6)

Good afternoon,

We just received this hot tasker for an informal view of the below amendment. This is apparently being drafted right now on the Hill, so a response as quickly as possible would be great. We need a concur or non-concur and a few sentences justifying why. Thank you!!!

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V/r,

(b)(6)

Senior Legislative Analyst

Strategic Analysis, Inc.

OUSD(R&E), Research, Technology, and Laboratories

Christopher.p.dockrey.ctr@mail.mil

(b)(6) Cell - Best to use during telework)

Office)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:58 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: HOT - informal view from Bess for Dr. Nair - FW: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Importance: High

Hello (b)(6)

This is a very high priority request, and please work with Dr. Nair on a response by COB today if possible.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Congressional & Public Affairs Analyst | Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, Research & Technology - DDR&E(R&T) |
Email: ricardo.e.coleman.civ@mail.mil
<mailto:(b)(6) Mobile: (b)(6) | Desk Phone: (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
<(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:49 PM

To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: HOT - informal view from Bess for Dr. Nair - FW: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Importance: High

Hi (b)(6)

Please see below from Bess on a request for views. Between Basic Research and PD Biotech, can you please provide a concur/nonconcur, or comments on the notional language below?

Language is being drafted AS WE SPEAK so this is very hot, and we need to reply by Monday at 1pm.

Thanks,

v/r

(b)(6)

From (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 1:37 PM

To: OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E List USD-FO Congressional <osd.pentagon.ousd-r-e.list.usd-fo-congressional@mail.mil <mailto:osd.pentagon.ousd-r-e.list.usd-fo-congressional@mail.mil> >;
(b)(6)

Subject: !!! HASC NDAA Informal View: 961 PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR BIOMEDICAL AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CHINA.

Team,

Quick turn HASC NDAA Informal View request below the tear line from Bess.
Please make sure the Director of Basic Research sees/approves.

This looks like a pretty easy one.

(b)(6)

For R&E RT input please -- please include Director of Basic Research input.

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(b)(6)

Director, Basic Research

OUSD (R&E)/ RT/ RTL

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 19:40:40 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: RE: CONGRESSIONAL Concerns over nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance Inc Relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology - CATMS16032021A3KGDQ

thank you sir

V/r

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 3:33 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
US
Subject: RE: CONGRESSIONAL Concerns over nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance Inc Relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology - CATMS16032021A3KGDQ

(b)(6)

Looks good. Go with it.

Dr. Hann

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 3:22 PM
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
US
Subject: CONGRESSIONAL Concerns over nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance Inc Relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology - CATMS16032021A3KGDQ

Dr. Hann

CB reviewed the request and provided the below information back, if you have no other concerns I can close this for RD.

RDCB has one completed project funded at $565K in FY17, the Global Rapid Identification Tool System (GRITS); and one project pending, with planned funding at $253K in FY21.

RDCB has done a thorough look at past project activities and to the best of our knowledge funding was not associated with work done at Wuhan Institute of Virology.

TASK Action:

Action: Request you review and provide answers to the best of DTRAs ability to the congressional in regards to the DoD funding awarded to EcoHealth Alliance Inc

V/r

(b)(6)

SAIC

RD Front Office

(b)(6)

Technical Analyst

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 16:08:35 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Sir

Negative from CBA. We have not been involved in any of this type of research.

Respectfully

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:42 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
CO
(US
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

CTR already working on their answers (attached).

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From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:10 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
CO
(US
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Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) <(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

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Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 4:01 PM
To: DTRA Ft Belvoir SI List SI-PA Govt <dtra.belvoir.si.list.si-pa-govt@mail.mil>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

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Q: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(6)

Subject: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

Today at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing Mr. Williams discussed DTRA's efforts to screen its investments in EcoHealth Alliance and its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

I'm writing a story on this and would like some additional details on when this review was done and other details about the review. Need any information today.

(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com/ >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 15:02:59 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
DIR (USA)
Cc: Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA);
Brown, Carl R CIV DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Many thanks Dr. Pope!

Will keep you updated on our progress.

Many thanks!

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:01 AM
To (b)(6)
DI
Cc: Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) < (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) < (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

(b)(6)

We recommend short, factual responses to the Washington Times questions, in alignment with responses to prior Congressional queries on this topic:

Q1: What about the funding that was done for the bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence and bat coronavirus emergence? Was that work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where it is known that they conducted extensive bat coronavirus research?
A1: No.

Q2: Is it DTRA's conclusion that none of its grant money to EcoHealth Alliance was used at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
A2: The grant was made by DoD's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and we find that no portion of such grant funds were used to support work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any other laboratory in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

V/r,
Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES
Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
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Will standby for further guidance...

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR: HDTRA121C0025 - Shield Analysis Technologies LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

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(b)(6)

National Security Correspondent
(b)(6)
TheGertzFile.com < Caution-http://thegertzfile.com >

3600 New York Ave NE | Washington DC, 20002

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Date: May 4, 2021 at 1:23:00 PM EDT

To: dtra-pa@mail.mil < Caution-mailto:dtra-pa@mail.mil >

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 15:00:18 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
Cc: Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA);
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today

Copy - thank you, Sir.

(b)(6)
Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWICS

-----Original Message-----
From: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 10:40 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) < (b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Comments by DTRA Acting Director Williams today
(b)(6)

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Rob

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Director
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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 9:39 AM
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) < (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
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Cc: Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA);
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Sent: Wed, 5 May 2021 13:38:48 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
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Sent: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 15:43:35 +0000
To: Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA); Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA); (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Musgrave, David L (Dave) SES DTRA OB (USA) (b)(6) (b)(6) ; Lutinski, Hunter F SES DTRA SI (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Coronavirus Lab Escape Theory - DTRA mentioned.....
Attachments: smime.p7s

+ Mr. Lutinski, (b)(6)

Thank you Dr. Hann and thank you Dr. Pope.
We will monitor and provide an alert if there are any media queries that come in. So far, there are none, however sometimes there is a delay after an article is posted/reprinted, so we will watch for the next few days. OSD PA is monitoring as well.
I appreciate the support.
V/r,

(b)(6)

Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
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To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) < (b)(6)
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Cc: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) < (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Coronavirus Lab Escape Theory - DTRA mentioned.....

+ (b)(6)

(b)(6) Thank you for highlighting. We answered some questions on this last year and can assist PA with any queries as needed.

V/r,

Rob

Robert S. Pope, Ph.D., SES

Director

Cooperative Threat Reduction

From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) <(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:56 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) ; Pope,
Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA) (b)(6)
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Cc: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Coronavirus Lab Escape Theory - DTRA mentioned.....

Team,

Below is a very interesting article making the case that the COVID pandemic was caused by an accidental lab release (VERY long read). Additionally, the article makes at least two comments identifying DTRA funding that supported research at the Wuhan BSL-4 lab related to bats and bat carried diseases.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/coronavirus-lab-escape-theory.html

I had my team go back through the records to see if it was RD-CB, but found no info related to that work. We did find references to CBEP work with EcoHealth Alliance on the DTRA server that might be what they are talking about:

https://dtra1portal.unet.dtra.mil/sites/Search_Center/Pages/results.aspx?k=E
coHealth%20Alliance#k=EcoHealth%20Alliance

I wanted to provide this to you in case there are follow-up questions at some point. I know back in Apr/May timeframe we had to identify any DTRA finding that might have gone to Wuhan, so this may not be news to anyone.

v/r,

Ron Hann

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 15:00:50 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Cc: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6) ; Musgrave, David L (Dave) SES DTRA OB (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Coronavirus Lab Escape Theory - DTRA mentioned.....

Many thanks Dr. Hann...will set in motion the formulation of applicable responses.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
COR HDTRA120C0027 - ODRG LLC.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA) <(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:56 AM
To: (b)(6)
(US
(b)(6) ; Pope, Robert S SES DTRA COOP THRT REDUCT (USA)
(b)(6) ; Musgrave, David L (Dave) SES DTRA OB (USA)
(b)(6)
Subject: Coronavirus Lab Escape Theory - DTRA mentioned.....

Team,

Below is a very interesting article making the case that the COVID pandemic was caused by an accidental lab release (VERY long read). Additionally, the article makes at least two comments identifying DTRA funding that supported research at the Wuhan BSL-4 lab related to bats and bat carried diseases.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/coronavirus-lab-escape-theory.html

I had my team go back through the records to see if it was RD-CB, but found no info related to that work. We did find references to CBEP work with EcoHealth Alliance on the DTRA server that might be what they are talking about:

https://dtra1portal.unet.dtra.mil/sites/Search_Center/Pages/results.aspx?k=EcoHealth%20Alliance#k=EcoHealth%20Alliance

I wanted to provide this to you in case there are follow-up questions at some point. I know back in Apr/May timeframe we had to identify any DTRA finding that might have gone to Wuhan, so this may not be news to anyone.

v/r,

Ron Hann

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 15:16:03 +0000
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA); (b)(6)
DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance

(b)(6)

Thanks for the update. I think we spelled it out pretty clearly in the email I sent yesterday so everything is looking up.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2020 11:13 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: EcoHealth Alliance

(b)(6)

I had a nice conversation with (b)(6) this AM about EcoHA. He agreed that we can go forward with award if we add a stipulation in the contract that they "cannot work with China", and provide a close monitoring of the project. He will also have FBI brief CB about issues involving China, and intends to have the FBI brief EcoHA about issues the DoD has with performers working with China. So, the bottom line is that we can move forward with the award.

(b)(6)

Chief, Basic Research

Chemical & Biological Technologies Department

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Fri, 8 May 2020 14:17:44 +0000
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA R AND D (USA); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: For Review - DTRA's COVID Support Placemat
Attachments: DTRA COVID Draft4 05082020.pdf

Reachback & CB Leaders,

Could you please take a quick look at the attached product and let me know if you see any issues. More guidance from the boss:

" It's designed to be a placemat that can be given to press on DTRA COVID-19 activities. I don't need a graphics or happy to glad review. I need a quick turn on if there is anything fundamentally wrong."

Please let me know what you think and have a great day!
(b)(6)

V/R,

(b)(6)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:05 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
US
D (
Subject: FW: DTRA's COVID Support

(b)(6)
See below/attached. I'd like a quick review by Reachback and CB on this PA product. It's designed to be a placemat that can be given to press on DTRA COVID-19 activities. I don't need a graphics or happy to glad review. I need a quick turn on if there is anything fundamentally wrong - I don't see anything, but need others eyes to look at it as well.

RW

Rhys M. Williams, PhD
Director, Research and Development
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
703-767-1302

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:41 AM
To: Williams, Rhys M SES DTRA R AND D (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: DTRA's COVID Support

Good day Dr. Williams,
Attached you will find the most up-to-date version of the COVID placemat. This product has been cleared by (b)(6) (b)(6) (CTR).

Many thanks for your input/review!

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 7:35 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: RE: DTRA's COVID Support

Attached

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 7:26 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: FW: DTRA's COVID Support

Hey (b)(6) ,good morn
Can you please remove Panama and Peru?

Should be gtg

Many thanks

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)

Detect…Deter…Defeat!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 6:57 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: DTRA's COVID Support

(b)(6)
Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
(Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWIC:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 6:05 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: DTRA's COVID Support

Hi (b)(6) sorry for the delay. The only thing that jumps out at me is the reference to Panama and Peru. From a CTR perspective, we do not do any work in South America. Unless these two countries belong to RD or OB, or someone else in DTRA, then please delete.

Everything else looks good!

Thanks, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 9:55 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: DTRA's COVID Support

Good morning (b)(6)
Please take a look and let me know your thoughts.

(b)(6)
Chief, Public Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
(b)(6) (Work)
Work Cell)
NIPR: (b)(6)
SIPR:
JWIC:

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 14:22:44 +0000
To: Hann, Ronald K Jr SES DTRA RD (USA)
Subject: New Roll-out of Execution Database
Attachments: FY23 baseline BA1 budget tasker.xlsx, smime.p7s

Dr H,
Please see attached. We will be shortly sending this out to the divisions: it will aid in making funding decisions for FY23 new starts and help divisions with execution in the future.

(b)(6)
Chief, Basic Research
Chemical & Biological Technologies Department
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(b)(6)