

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 24, 2023

Case No. FL-2021-00033

Gary Ruskin 4096 Piedmont Ave. #963 Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Ruskin:

As we noted in our letter dated February 24, 2023, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State has identified an additional 25 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined 13 records may be released in part and 12 records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The records withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1). A list of the document identification numbers for the records withheld in full is attached to this letter. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Christopher M. Lynch, Trial Attorney, at Christopher.M.Lynch@usdoj.gov or (202) 353-4537. Please refer to the case number, FL-2021-00033, and the civil action number, 20-cv-08415, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Diamonece Hickson

Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch

Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

Denied in Full Document IDs:

- B-00002002419
- B-00002002378
- B-00002002376
- B-00002002364
- B-00002002346
- B-00002002282
- B-00002002276
- B-00002002275
- B-00002002274
- B-00002002251
- B-00002002243
- B-00002002201

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
 - 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMSEXP Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)
CIA PERS/ORG Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT CONTROL Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)
FS ACT Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004
INA Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)
IRAN Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505

- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
 - (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

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"UNCLASSIFIED"

03/24/2023 Page 1

(b)(1)

Page 02 to Page 12		
Withheld pursuant to exemption		
(b)(1)		

	1 - 1
From:	"Feith, David"
То:	(b)(6) CIV DIA (US)' (b)(6) Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.sgov.gov>; Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) Tobin, Liza CIV (b)(6) Elnigar Iltebir (h)(6)
CC:	Keshap, Atul (b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: (b)(1)
Date:	Wed, 8 Jul 2020 02:30:28 +0000

Very interesting indeed, (b)(1)	Many	thanks.
+ (b)(6) and others.		
David Feith		
Deputy Assistant Secretary		
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)		
U.S. Department of State		
(b)(6)		

--Original Message---(b)(1)

Page 14 to Page 22		
Withheld pursuant to exemption		
(b)(1)		

(b)(1)		

Action Post:

NONE

Dissemination Rule:

POL, SCO_ACTION

SECRET//NOFORN

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Official

SECRET -

Classified By: David Feith - DAS, Office: EAP/FO, Agency: U.S. Department of

State

Declassify On: 7/8/2045 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.

Sender:	"Feith, David"	
Recipient:	(b)(6) CIV DIA (US)(b)(6) Stilwell, David R (b)(6) Kanapathy, Ivan (b)(6) Tobin, Liza CIV (b)(6) Elnigar Iltebir (b)(6) Keshap, Atul (b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) (b)(6)	

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b)(1)		

Page 26 to Page 28	
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(b)(1)	

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(b)(1)		

Page 30 to Page 31	
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(b)(1)	

FL-2021-00033 B-00002002364 "UNCLASSIFIED" 03/24/2023 Page 32

(b)(1)		

Page 33 to Page 35		
Withheld pursuant to exemption		
(b)(1)		

(b)(1)		

Page 37	
Withheld pursuant to exemption	
(b)(1)	

From:	(b)(6)	
To:	(b)(6)	
Subject:	FW: (b)(1)	
	(b)(1)	
Date:	Tue, 14 Jul 2020 19:46:40 -0400	

(b)(6) Let's discuss before responding.

Official___

-SECRET-

Classified By: Stilwell - EAP, Office: A/S, Agency: U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 7/14/2030

Reasons: (Derived) Classification derived from previous message(s)

From: Stilwell, David R

Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2020 4:44 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D
Subject: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Beijing'ers

(b)(5)

Thanks

Dave

(b)(1)			

Page 39 to Page 46	
Withheld pursuant to exemption	
(b)(1)	

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(b)(1)		

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Official

SECRET//NOFORN

Classified By: Stilwell - EAP, Office: A/S, Agency: U.S. Department of State

Declassify On: 7/14/2030 Reasons: Derived Per DSCG.


Sender: (b)(6)
Recipient:

(b)(1)	


Page 49 to Page 58		
Withheld pursuant to exemption		
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	(b)(1)
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(b)(1)



FL-2021-00033 B-00002002274

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Page 68 to Page 69		
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(b)(1)		

Page 71 to Page 74		
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(b)(1)	

Page 76 to Page 77		
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(b)(1)		

Page 79 to Page 93		
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(b)(1)		

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From: SMART Archive

Sent: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 01:32:53 GMT

To: SMART Core

Subject: Kuala Lumpur End of Day for October 13, 2015

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MRN: 15 FTR 33144

Date/DTG: Oct 15, 2015 / 150132Z OCT 15

From: Black, Alasha CD
To: SMART Archive

E.O.: 13526

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, OFDP, EAGR, KDSH, NPG, MY

Captions: OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

Subject: Kuala Lumpur End of Day for October 13, 2015

END OF DAY

10/15/2015

EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

(SBU) Religious Speaker Sentenced Nine Years for Fighting with ISIL: On October 9 the High Court sentenced 31 year old free-lance religious speaker Zulqarnain Ghaz Abdul Ghani to nine years in prison, following his guilty plea for traveling to Syria to fight with ISIL. He was convicted under the new Section 130J of the Penal Code (amended this past April) for "travelling to, through or from Malaysia for the commission of terrorist acts in a foreign country," which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years. According to press reports, Zulqarnain arrived in Turkey in April 2014 and entered Syria shortly thereafter to support ISIL. He was initially tasked with providing treatment and food for injured ISIL militants. Subsequently, Zulqarnain was taught to handle weapons and fought alongside the militants for three months before he was shot in the arm. Despite being given medical care in Syria, he returned to Malaysia in August 2014 for further treatment. Authorities arrested him in July this year. His case marks the first conviction in Malaysia for committing a terrorist act in a foreign conflict.

-(SBU)-Anwar Ibrahim's Lawyers and Daughter Brief Foreign Diplomats: Jailed opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's lawyers (and People's Justice Party Members of Parliament) Surendran and Sivarasa Rasiah, and Anwar's daughter Nurul Izzah briefed members of the diplomatic corps on Monday, October 12. The following were the key highlights:

Federal Court Review and Fresh Application to the Pardon's Board: Anwar's legal team has filed a review to the February 15 Federal Court judgment that upheld the Appellate court decision to sentence him to five years in prison for sodomy. Although a fresh panel of Federal Court judges would review the case, it is very rare for the Federal Court to overturn its own judgment. Anwar's lawyers are pressing ahead nevertheless, calling for the review by claiming that Anwar is a "victim of political conspiracy." The Federal Court will hear an application by Anwar's lawyers to introduce fresh evidence to substantiate their contention that there was a political conspiracy to convict Anwar on November 16. No date for the Federal Court's review of its decision has been set. Nurul Izzah mentioned the family is considering filing a fresh application to the Pardon's Board, which rejected Anwar's petition for pardon on March 16.

- Health Condition Stalemate: The GOM has agreed to the family's orthopedic consultant's recommendation that Anwar undergo surgery to address his chronic right shoulder injury (sustained two years ago prior to Anwar's imprisonment) following local and international pressure. However, prison doctors have insisted Anwar only needs one month of hospitalization after the surgery, while the family insists six months of hospitalization and rehabilitation is necessary and is continuing to negotiate with the medical authorities involved.
- Lack of Access: Unlike during Anwar's prior incarceration from 1998 to 2004, authorities are restricting his legal team's visit to one hour per week. His lawyers described this new directive as harassment and a denial of Anwar's constitutional rights. Furthermore, prison authorities are closely monitoring the lawyers' movements and discussions with Anwar.
- **International Pressure:** Nurul Izzah thanked the dipcorps for the support and encouraged continued pressure on the GOM to free her father, whom she described is a "political prisoner" or to place him under house arrest. Nurul also revealed that Georgetown and John Hopkins Universities have offered medical treatment for Anwar if he is freed.

—(SBL)_MOSTI Will Not Confirm Reports of New Nuclear Bill in Parliament by December: Local media outlet *Malaysian Reserve* reported an unnamed source claiming the Prime Minister's Department will present a revised Atomic Energy Regulatory Bill to Parliament on December 1, two days before the close of the upcoming parliamentary session. The controversial bill is expected to pave the way for civil nuclear energy and construction of reactors in Malaysia. Contacts at the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MOSTI) and Malaysia Nuclear Power Corp, which oversees implementation of nuclear policy, both expressed surprise at the headline. Neither would confirm if the report or December date were accurate, saying only that the bill was under review by the Attorney General's office and its passage was part of 11th Malaysia Plan. With polls indicating the majority of Malaysians show concern over nuclear safety, GOM officials in June told INR DAS Kang that they would first need to build public support for nuclear power before introducing such legislation to parliament.

(SBU) Malaysia and Indonesia to Establish Cartel-like Council of Palm Oil Producing Countries: After a meeting in Jakarta with Indonesian President Joko Wikodo on October 11, Prime Minister Najib announced that Malaysia and Indonesia had reached a consensus on establishing the Council of Palm Oil Producing Countries (CPOPC), an organization designed to "stabilize" the price of palm oil in international markets. Najib said that the countries would unveil the leadership of the organization at the ASEAN Summit in November. Manipulation of supply and demand would help the two countries, which together produce over 80 percent of the world's palm oil; curb the fall of prices over the last year. Reports say that the new body will establish global standards and work to counter palm oil's negative image abroad, but it is unclear what effects this would have on an industry that many environmental NGOs claim is unsustainable -- the cause of widespread deforestation and the current haze covering much of Malaysia.

(U) USAID-Funded Environmental NGO Reaches out to Palm Oil Industry on Health Risks of Forest Disturbance: NGO EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak and team met on October 9 with a host of companies connected to the palm oil industry, including Coca-Cola, Johnson and Johnson, Sime Darby and the Malaysian Palm Oil Board, to introduce the Infectious Disease Emergence and Economics of Altered Landscapes Program (IDEEAL). This USAID-funded project seeks to use scientific modeling to estimate the economic cost of infectious disease on forest disturbances. The IDEEAL team will soon publish its findings and sought feedback from industry on its results and modeling. The team stressed the importance of not hunting or eating wildlife on palm oil plantations to

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avoid the spread of emerging diseases such as SARS and Ebola and offered to conduct outreach sessions with companies to train them on health issues. Members of the palm oil industry were very positive about cooperation, emphasizing that the health angle was a new aspect they had not previously considered for operations.

Drafted By: KUALA LUMPUR (b)(6)

Released By: KUALA LUMPUR

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

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From: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)**To:** Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) (h)(6) Subject: RE: Wuhan labs **Date:** Fri, 17 Apr 2020 15:06:36 +0000

Call complete. Mr Baier was happy with the pdf and explanation we sent.

From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 11:00 AM To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)Subject: Re: Wuhan labs

Morgan you've seen these from Sunday's timeline email? (Obviously doesn't include subsequent cables/Rogin material.)

New timeline elements in the attached:

--2013--

Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus 96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.

--2019--

February 20: Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: "batanimal and bat-human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks."

December 30: Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher Shi Zhengli (known as "bat-woman" for her research) is called by the Institute's director and summoned back to Wuhan from a conference in Shanghai to study samples of the novel coronavirus. "Could they have come from our lab?" Shi feared.

--2020--

January 7: Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology recalled in a March 11 interview with Scientific American that by January 7 her team found that the novel coronavirus's sequence did not match any of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. "That really took a load off my mind," she said. But the novel sequence was 96% identical to one her team had sampled previously in Yunnan.

January 24: Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas biocontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by February 6: Researchers from South China University of Technology publish a study concluding that "the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories." The paper is soon withdrawn because it "was not supported by direct proofs," according to author Botao Xiao. "No scientists have confirmed or refuted the paper's findings," scholar Yanzhong Huang wrote on March 5.

February 16: The Wuhan Institute of Virology issues a public denial that its former researcher Huang Yanling is "patient zero," as speculated on Chinese social media based on changes to the Institute's website and Huang's unknown whereabouts. Institute researcher Shi Zhengli writes on social media that she "guaranteed with her own life" that the outbreak was unrelated to the lab. [In 2004, China suffered a SARS outbreak due to a lab leak that killed one person and infected nine. PRC authorities blamed negligence and punished five senior officials at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention.]

(b)(6)
Senior Advisor
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6) (o)
(c)
(b)(6)
On April 17, 2020 at 10:50:11 AM EDT, Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) wrote:
God bless you
Sent from an IPhone
- (b)(c)
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:47:51 AM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Wuhan labs
On it now. Finished within two hours
Frame Outagus Margan D (b)(6)
From: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:40 AM
To:(b)(6)
Cc:(b)(6)
Subject: Re: Wuhan labs

Hi friends! Just checking in on this. Possible to get today? Media really hammering Stilly on some assertions he made and I want to back him up.

Sent from an IPhone

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	From:(b)(6)	
		16, 2020 7:09:20 PM
	To: Ortagus, Morgan	
	Cc: (b)(6)	
	Subject: Re: Wuhan	abs
	I don't but I can easil	y compile one for you by tomorrow morning.
1	h)/6)	
[(b)(6)	
	Policy Planning Staff	
	Office of the Secreta U.S. Department of S	•
		state
(t	o)(6) (o)	
•	On Apr 16, 2020, at 7	7:05 PM, Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) wrote:
	o)(6) - do you happ labs?	en to have a central doc of all of the circumstantial evidence against the Wuhan
•	Thanks!	
	Morgan	
	Sent from an IPhone	
	Sender:	"Stilwell, David R"
		(b)(6)
	Recipient:	Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)
		(h)(e)

From:	(b)(6)
То:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Wuhan labs
Date:	Fri, 17 Apr 2020 15:42:03 +0000

all, I am at this moment working on a comprehensive labs leaking document. Will be done very shortly.

(b)(6)

From: Stilwell, David R(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 11:38 AM

To: (b)(6)

(h)(6)

Subject: RE: Wuhan labs

Yes, he has the COVID Origins paper out of China and I'm sure you sent him the timeline earlier this week.

(b)(6)

Can you make sure he has the latest timeline with the Shi Zhengli story?

Thanks Dave

From: (h)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 11:31 AM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: Wuhan labs

Great, so Bret has all up-to-date materials?

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 11:23 AM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Wuhan labs

+(h)(6) PDF referred to here by A/S is the Xiao Botao study referred to in Feb 6 entry on our timeline.

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03/24/2023 Page 101

(b)(6)	
Senior Advisor	
Bureau of East	Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Departme	t of State
\ /\ /	o) c)
(b)(6)	
On April 17, 20	20 at 11:06:37 AM EDT, Stilwell, David R (b)(6)
Call complete	Mr Baier was hanny with the ndf and evolanation

wrote:

From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 11:00 AM

To: Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)

Cc: Stilwell, David R (h)(6)

Subject: Re: Wuhan labs

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(b)(6) Senior Advisor		
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)		
U.S. Department of State		
		
(b)(6) (c)		
(b)(6)		
On April 17, 2020 at 10:50:11 AM EDT, Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) wrote:		
God bless you		
God Siess you		
Sent from an IPhone		
From: (b)(6)		
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:47:51 AM		
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)		
Cc: (b)(6)		
Subject: Re: Wuhan labs		
On it now. Finished within two hours		
From: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)		
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:40 AM		
To:[h)/6)		
Cc: (b)(6)		
Subject: Re: Wuhan labs		

Hi friends! Just checking in on this. Possible to get today? Media really hammering Stilly on some assertions he made and I want to back him up.

Sent from an IPhone

From: (b)(6)	
Sent: Thursday, April	16, 2020 7:09:20 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan	D (b)(6)
Cc:(b)(6)	
Subject: Re: Wuhan I	abs
	y compile one for you by tomorrow morning.
(b)(6)	
x	
(b)(6)	
Policy Planning Staff	
Office of the Secretar	ry
U.S. Department of S	tate
(o) (c)	
On Apr 16, 2020, at 7	7:05 PM, Ortagus, Morgan D(b)(6) wrote:
	en to have a central doc of all of the circumstantial evidence against the Wuhan
labs?	
Thanks!	
Morgan	
Sent from an IPhone	C
Sender:	(b)(6)
	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)
Recipient:	(b)(6)
	Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)
	(0)(0)

From:	"EAP-Staffers Mailbox" (b)(6)		
То:	(b)(6) EAP-Staffers Mailbox (h)(6) EAP-FO-Staffer-DL (h)(6)		
CC:	(b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D <u>{(b)(6)</u> (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) (b)(6)]	
Subject:	RE: WIV Cable		
Date:	Sat, 4 Apr 2020 16:42:22 +0000		

Received and tasked in OnePaper!

Thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (h)(6)	
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 10:03 PM	
To: EAP-Staffers Mailbox (b)(6)	EAP-FO-Staffer-DL (h)(6)
(b)(6)	
Cc: (b)(6)	Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)
(P)(E)	Buangan, Richard L
(b)(6)	
Subject: Fwd: WIV Cable	
Staffers, Please task to CM an AM (b)(5)	
(b)(5)	

Memo must provide policy justification (hence CM tasking). Must have EAP/P clearance. Due Tuesday at noon. Can be done entirely on the low side.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Special Assistant

Office of the Assistant Secretary

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 9:55 PM

To:(b)(6)
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants;(b)(6) Buangan, Richard L; EAP-Press
Subject: Re: WIV Cable
ExecSec Kenna,
Understood, will do. Thank you.
(b)(6)
Special Assistant
Office of the Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
(b)(6)
From:[(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 9:16:21 PM
To: (h)(6)
Cc: (h)(6) S_SpecialAssistants (h)(6)
(b)(6) Buangan, Richard L(h)(6) EAP-Press (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cable
EAP to S via the line pls. Thank you.
Sent from my iPhone
Sent from my n none
On Apr 3, 2020, at 8:57 PM, (b)(6)
wrote:
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
Deputy Executive Secretary
U.S. Department of State
O.S. Department of State
Sent from my iPhone
Sem nom my n none
On Apr 3, 2020, at 6:56 PM, (b)(6) wrote:
(4)(0)
S Special Colleagues (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(5)

b)(6)

(b)(6)(b)(6)

(b)(5)

From: "Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)

Date: April 3, 2020 at 18:26:16 EDT

To: "Ortagus, Morgan D" (h)(6)
Cc: "Fritz, Jonathan D" (b)(6) "Buangan, Richard L"(h)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: WIV Cable
For the Rogin story. Actual cables attached.
(b)(5)
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 5:15 PM
To: (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) Keshap, Atul (b)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cable
Here are the most relevant elements:
From 2018 Cables:
1. (SBU) Summary with Comment: China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in
virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role
as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab the first such lab in China
opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of
trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global
pandemic will originate in China (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5) End Summary with
Comment.

5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

6. (SBU) The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like disease. From

a public health pers	pective, (b)(5)	
(b)(5)		T4 :- :44:
are precluded from	are allowed to study the SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from studying human-disease causing SARS coronavirus in their new a work is granted by the NHFCP.	
Get <u>Outlook for iOS</u>		
From:(b)(6) Sent: Friday, April 3	2020 5:14:18 PM	
To: Stilwell, David R		
(h)(<u>6)</u>		
Cc: (b)(6)	Keshap, Atul (b)(6)	_
Subject: Re: WIV Ca	ble	
Attached. They're a	so on an email from a few days ago with $(b)(6)$ others.	
(b)(6)		
Senior Advisor		
	n and Pacific Affairs (EAP)	
U.S. Department of		
(b)(6) (o)		
(c)	\neg	
(b)(6)		
On April 3, 2020 at !	5:11:51 PM EDT, Stilwell, David R (b)(6) wrote:	
First one to get me	a soft copy of (b)(6)Wuhan cables gets a Samoa Cookie.	
drs		
David R. Stilwell		
Ass't Secretary East	Asia Pacific	
(b)(6)		
~10 WIIIIAN 20	aml = 46	
<18-WUHAN-38. <18-BEIJING-138	*	
Sender:	"EAP-Staffers Mailbox" (b)(6)	
	(b)(6)	
	EAP-Staffers Mailbox (b)(6)	
Recipient:	EAP-FO-Staffer-DL (h)/6)	
Recipient:	(b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)	
	(b)(6)	

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Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)

"Stilwell, David R'(b)(6)	
Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)	
: RE: WIV Cable	
Fri, 3 Apr 2020 22:54:36 +0000	

"We're on each others' team. . ."

From: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 6:36 PM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov>
Cc: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)
(h)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cable
Looks good to me. Can we get this is a more formal memo format (b)(6) so that I can send it up to S
√ (b)(5)
Sent from an IPhone
From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 6:26:15 PM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) Subject: FW: WIV Cable
For the Rogin story. Actual cables attached.
Hopefully we can get them released $(b)(5)$
From:(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 5:15 PM
To:(b)(6) @state.gov>; Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) Keshap, Atul (b)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cable

Here are the most relevant elements:

From 2018 Cables:

1. (SBU) Summary with Comment: China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global

Get Outlook for iOS

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Feith, David (b)(6) Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 5:14:18 PM To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6) (b)(6)Cc: (b)(6) Subject: Re: WIV Cable

(b)(6)

Senior Advisor

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)

U.S. Department of State

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(b)(6)	(o) (c)
(b)(6)	

On April 3, 2020 at 5:11:51 PM EDT, Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov wrote: First one to get me a soft copy o(b)(6) Wuhan cables gets a Samoa Cookie. drs

David R. Stilwell Ass't Secretary East Asia Pacific (202) 647-9596

Sender:	"Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)	
Recipient:	Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)	

From:	(b)(6)	(Wuhan)(b)(6)		
To:	(b)(6)	(Wuhan) (b)(6)		
Subject:	RE: Updating the Consulate Gazette			
Date:	Mon, 5 Mar 2018 20	0:07:30 -0500		

Thanks, (b)(6) What link do you use? I think we're using different links.

Regards,

(b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Wuhan)

Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2018 9:05 AM

To: (b)(6) (Wuhan)

Subject: RE: Updating the Consulate Gazette

Monday, March 5th, 2018

EXEC

1. Ambassador Branstad has agreed to give remarks at the 3rd Annual U.S.-Central China Business Summit in Zhengzhou on Friday a.m., April 13. He plans to come to Zhengzhou on Thursday afternoon April 12; may come earlier if we find good programming for him.

POL/ECON

1. We are working on a visit for ESTH Counselor Rick Switzer from the Embassy, our top priority is to visit the P4 Lab run by the Wuhan Institute of Virology; we also hope to see the finless porpoise tank and meet with the Institute of Hydrobiology, get a meeting about Wuhan's quantum computing network, and visit a 5G base station.

MGT/HR

- 1. 3 positions of NIV Visa Assistant were advertised last week and the VA will be closed on March 13th.
- 2. 9 new positions, including 4 positions in Cons and 5 positions in MGT, to be advertised in next couple of weeks.

3. (b)(6) will come to Wuhan on April 9th and do MBC training for the consulate on April 10th and 11th, as well as EER and Award training on 12th. Please kindly reserve your time for the trainings.

GSO

- 1. Annual Inventory check is been closed by the good result of 0 item missing.
- 2. Review the renovation plan with the landlord of Citadines and measure the dimension on site this Tuesday on March 6^{th} .
- 3. Preparation for delivering the training of e2 travel order and Ariba purchase request.
- 4. Draft the GSO Departure Manual, will public on GSO SharePoint once it's been finalized.

RSO

- 1. RSO and Management will send out a notice with further details, but on Thursday, March 22, we will have a consulate all-hands at the construction site at 12:00. The purpose is to physically test some of the different ideas for visa applicant flow. Unless necessary, sections should refrain from scheduling any events during this time. CLO will schedule a lunch afterwards. The Consulate will be closed during the event.
- 2. Additional details to follow, but the Consulate will have mandatory fire training on Wednesday, March 28, at 14:00. Hubei PSB Fire has graciously agreed to send an instructor.
- 3. Invitation will go out after the Monday all-hands. This Wednesday at 10:00, the Fentanyl Working Group will meet. The meeting will be open to all consulate staff. RSO will provide a briefing on Fentanyl. We will also discuss some ideas on how the consulate can research and start combating the fentanyl problem.
- 4. American staff: RSO will send a security notice this week reminding American staff to complete their Missing Persons Information Card, a new requirement for all USDH personnel to be in compliance with the President's Order regarding kidnapping prevention.

FCS

- 1. March 7-8, FCS outreach meetings in Henan, with Chinese partners for April business summit, including Henan CCPIT DDG, cold chain project owners in Xuchang city, Henan medical equipment association and Henan Environmental Protection Bureau. (POC: (b)(6)
- 2. March 9th via a webinar, FCS will brief healthcare business opportunities in Central China to U.S.-based companies.

3. March 9th, FCS is taking Honeywell to meet with Wuhan Road Management Divison based on Honeywell's request. The purpose of the meeting is to promote Honeywell's asphalt products.

PAS

- 1. March 10th, 2018 CG (b)(6) lecture on international humanitarian aid at 403 Intl' Arts Center.
- 2. March 18th, 2018 (b)(6) Lecture on Tiger Mom at Zall Bookstore.
- 3. In touch with US China People's Frindship Association Minnesota Chapter, and establish contact with its Chinese partners in the Changsha-St.Paul Gift Exchage Project in memory of their 30th annivery of sisiter cities.
- 4. Chenzhou City is still working on proposing potential venue partners for P2H photo exhibiton and is expect to reply us at mid March.
- 5. American Film Showcase U.S. Consulate Movie Screening Series is under planning, staring with the design of resource brochure for potential partners and for promotion in the future.
- 6. For more latest & detailed pulic diplomancy (cultural and educational) events planning, please refer to this <u>link</u>.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Wuhan)

Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2018 8:36 AM

To: (U) (b)(6) (Trade); (Wuhan); (b)(6) (Wuhan); (b)(6) (Wuhan); (b)(6) (Wuhan); (b)(6) (Wuhan); (b)(6) (Wuhan); (b)(6)

Subject: Updating the Consulate Gazette

Only one section filled in anything in this week's Consulate Gazette. The Open Country Team Meeting at 9:30. PLEASE add something about what your section is doing before 9:00 so I have something to talk about.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

Consul General 总领事

Phone:	(b)(6)	
U.S. Co	onsulate General Wuhan, China	a
美国驻	武汉总领事馆	
x z	×	

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Sender:	(b)(6)	(Wuhan)(b)(6)
Recipient:		(Wuhan)(b)(6)

From:	(b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)
	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: MOE is looking for you
Date:	Mon, 25 Sep 2017 22:53:54 -0400

The first two names were on the list that MoE sent me on Sept. 18, and MoE was told at that time they would need to go through MFA.

The third name is not on any lists I've seen.

(b)(6)

Acting Public Affairs Officer

U.S. Embassy Beijing Tel: (86-10) 8531-4179

E-Mail: (b)(6)

Official - Transitory

UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 8:05 AM

To: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)

Subject: Re: MOE is looking for you

Agreed (b)(6) I just want to make sure it is MFA before I see Fang Jun tomorrow.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 6:28 PM

To:(b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)

Subject: Re: MOE is looking for you

There is little we can do when the problem is their own MFA!

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 6:23 AM

To: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)

Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Subject: Re: MOE is looking for you

They never reached out to me, but they did reach out to HHS yesterday evening. I passed it along to Consular, but as you noted they did so far too late for anyone to help them.

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 23:24

To: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)

Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing) Subject: RE: MOE is looking for you

So surprise, the MOE wanted to contact me about visas. Three people who are supposed to attend the Health event on the 27th still don't have their visas. Why they didn't reach out to you (b) is beyond me. The three people are:

(b)(6)			

This will probably be OBE tomorrow morning, but just in case, can you raise this with Consular?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

From: (h)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 9:26 AM

To:(b)(6)

Subject: MOE is looking for you

Dear (b)(6)

I hope it is ok that I emailed your contact information to our MOE colleagues. The DDG Fang Jun wants to talk to you. They wanted to know if you were in NY, but I didn't know. I told them that email was probably the easiest way to reach you.

FL-2021-00033 A-00000473060 "UNCLASSIFIED" 03/24/2023 Page 119

Regards,

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

Sender:	(b)(6)	(Beijing)(b)(6)	
Recipient:	(b)(6) (b)(6)	(Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)	
	(b)(6)	(Beijing) (b)(6)	

Once day, but for now I have 46 months until I am eligible for a full pension – but who's counting.

How is everyone holding up? I hope all is well. Must be tough being in Kabul. I am sure not hesitate to ask.

Take care over there my brother!

(b)(6)

From:(b)(6)	(Kabul(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 3,	2020 11:09 AM
To: (b)(6)	

Subject: Re: FW: How did covid-19 begin? Its initial origin story is shaky. from The Washington Post

We need to get you back in the private sector and publishing.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer
On April 3, 2020 at 10:58:05 AM EDT, (b)(6) wrote:
Looks like the media is starting to report on this more factually — I wonder who set them
straight. If they get my cables they'll also know it was essentially predicted in 2018. They are
unclassified and FIOA-able so I suspect at some point they'll come out.
From 2018 Cables:
1. (SBU) Summary with Comment: China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in
virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role
as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab the first such lab in China
opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of
trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global
pandemic will originate in China, (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(h)/F)
(b)(5) End Summary with
Comment.

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(b)(5)						
(6)(3)						

(b)(5)			
To: EAP-J-Office- Subject: Fw: How Post	did covid-19 begin? Its initial o	origin story is shaky. from The Washington	
From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, April			
To: EAP-CM-Offi		EAP-FO-Principals-DL(b)(6)	_
(b)(6)	INR-China-Small Gro		_

Subject: How did covid-19 begin? Its initial origin story is shaky. from The Washington Post

David Ignatius runs through the possible origins...

 $\frac{https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-did-covid-19-begin-its-initial-origin-story-is-shaky/2020/04/02/1475d488-7521-11ea-87da-77a8136c1a6d_story.html$

April 2, 2020 at 6:56 p.m. EDT

The story of how the novel <u>coronavirus</u> emerged in Wuhan, China, has produced a nasty propaganda battle between the United States and China. The two sides have traded some of the sharpest charges made between two nations since the Soviet Union in 1985 falsely <u>accused</u> the CIA of manufacturing AIDS.

U.S. intelligence officials don't think the pandemic was caused by deliberate wrongdoing. The outbreak that has now swept the world instead began with a simpler story, albeit one with tragic consequences: The prime suspect is "natural" transmission from bats to humans, perhaps through unsanitary markets. But scientists don't rule out that an accident at a research laboratory in Wuhan might have spread a deadly bat virus that had been collected for scientific study.

"Good science, bad safety" is how Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) put this theory in a Feb. 16 tweet. He ranked such a breach (or natural transmission) as more likely than two extreme possibilities: an accidental leak of an "engineered bioweapon" or a "deliberate release." Cotton's earlier loose talk about bioweapons set off a furor, back when he first raised it in late January and called the outbreak "worse than Chernobyl."

President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added to the bile last month by describing the coronavirus as the "<u>Chinese virus</u>" and the "<u>Wuhan virus</u>," respectively. China dished wild, irresponsible allegations of its own. On March 12, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lijian Zhao charged in a <u>tweet</u>: "It might be [the] US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan." He <u>retweeted</u> an <u>article</u> that claimed, without evidence, that U.S. troops might have spread the virus when they attended the World Military Games in Wuhan in October 2019.

China retreated on March 22, when Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai <u>told</u> "Axios on HBO" that such rumors were "crazy" on both sides. A State Department spokesman said Cui's comment was "<u>welcome</u>," and Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged in a March 27 phone call to "focus on cooperative behavior," a senior administration official told me.

To be clear: U.S. intelligence officials think there's no evidence whatsoever that the coronavirus was created in a laboratory as a potential bioweapon. Solid scientific research demonstrates that the virus wasn't engineered by humans and that it originated in bats.

But how did the outbreak occur? Solving this medical mystery is important to prevent future pandemics. What's increasingly clear is that the initial "origin story" — that the virus was spread by people who ate contaminated animals at the <u>Huanan Seafood Market</u> in Wuhan — is shaky.

Scientists have identified the culprit as a bat coronavirus, through genetic sequencing; bats weren't sold at the seafood market, although that market or others could have sold animals that had contact with bats. The Lancet <u>noted</u> in a January study that the first covid-19 case in Wuhan had no connection to the seafood market.

There's a competing theory — of an accidental lab release of bat coronavirus — that scientists have been puzzling about for weeks. Less than <u>300 yards</u> from the seafood market is the Wuhan branch of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Researchers from that facility and the nearby Wuhan Institute of Virology have posted articles about collecting bat coronaviruses from around China, for study to prevent future illness. Did one of those samples leak, or was hazardous waste deposited in a place where it could spread?

<u>Richard Ebright</u>, a Rutgers microbiologist and biosafety expert, told me in an email that "the first human infection could have occurred as a natural accident," with the virus passing from bat to human, possibly through another animal. But Ebright cautioned that it "also could have occurred as a laboratory accident, with, for example, an accidental infection of a laboratory worker." He noted that bat coronaviruses were studied in Wuhan at Biosafety Level 2, "which provides only minimal protection," compared with the top BSL-4.

Ebright described a December video from the Wuhan CDC that shows staffers "collecting bat coronaviruses with inadequate [personal protective equipment] and unsafe operational practices." Separately, I reviewed two Chinese articles, from 2017 and 2019, describing the heroics of Wuhan CDC researcher Tian Junhua, who while capturing bats in a cave "forgot to take protective measures" so that "bat urine dripped from the top of his head like raindrops."

And then there's the Chinese study that was curiously withdrawn. In February, a site called ResearchGate published a brief article by Botao Xiao and Lei Xiao from Guangzhou's South China University of Technology. "In addition to origins of natural

recombination and intermediate host, the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories," the <u>article</u> concluded. Botao Xiao <u>told</u> the Wall Street Journal in February that he had withdrawn the paper because it "was not supported by direct proofs." Accidents happen, human or laboratory. Solving the mystery of how covid-19 began isn't a blame game, but a chance for China and the United States to cooperate in a crisis, and prevent a future one.

Read more from <u>David Ignatius's archive</u>, <u>follow him on Twitter</u> or <u>subscribe to his</u> <u>updates on Facebook</u>.

<18-WUHAN-38.eml.pdf>

<18-BEIJING-138.eml.pdf>

Sender:	(b)(6)	(Kabul)" (b)(6)
Recipient:	(b)(6)	

virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global pandemic will originate in China, (b)(5)

b)(5)

(b)(5)End Summary with

Comment.

Here is the Ref A cable too:

- 5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.
- 6. (SBU) The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like

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(b)(5)		
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(b)(E)	1	
(b)(5)		

SENSITIVE BUT UNCL ASSIFIED

<18-BEIJING-138.eml.pdf>

<18-WUHAN-38.eml.pdf>

 Sender:
 (b)(6)

 Recipient:
 (b)(6)

(Kabul) (b)(6)

From:	"Taylor, Mary Elizabeth"
To:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Brechbuhl, Thomas U (h)(6)
CC:	Fritz Jonathan D (4) (0)
cc.	(b)(6)
Subject:	Re: FOIA and WIV Cable
Date:	Wed, 10 Jun 2020 01:50:35 +0000
To: Taylor, Mary Eliz Cc: Brechbuhl, Thor (b)(6) Subject: FOIA and V (b)(5)	y of State s (H) d R (b)(6) e 9, 2020 9:27:39 PM zabeth (b)(6) mas U (b)(6) WIV Cable The virus leak is a direct result of top-down pressure for China to be seen as a vaccines and virus science. They're in a hurry so they take shortcuts; that's why this (b)(5)

Dave

Comment.

(b)(5)		Enc	d Summary with
(b)(5)			
pandemic will originate in Ch	ina (b)(5)		
trained staff (Ref A). Given the		likelihood that th	ne next global
opens up even more opportun			
as operator of the just-launche			•
1. (SBU) Summary with Convirus research, is a key partne		_	
From 2018 Cables:		er car i	11111
Here are the most relevant ele	ments:		
Subject: Re: WIV Cable			
Cc: (h)(6)	Keshap,	Atul (b)(6)	
(b)(6)			·
To: (b)(6)	Stilwell, David R (h)(6)	Fritz, Jonathan D
Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 5:15	PM		
From:(b)(6)			

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(b)(5)
It is interesting

that WIV scientists are allowed to study the SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from bats while they are precluded from studying human-disease causing SARS coronavirus in their new BSL-4 lab until permission for such work is granted by the NHFCP.

03/24/2023 Page 129

Get <u>Outlook for iOS</u>				
From: (h)(6) Sent: Friday, April 3,				
To: Stilwell, David R	(b)(6) Fritz, Jonathan D $(b)(6)$			
(b)(6)				
Cc: (b)(6)	Keshap, Atul (b)(6)			
Subject: Re: WIV Cal	ole			
Attached. They're als	so on an email from a few days ago with $(b)(6)$ others.			
 (b)(6)				
Senior Advisor				
	and Pacific Affairs (EAP)			
U.S. Department of S	·			
(b)(6) (o) (c)				
On April 3, 2020 at 5:11:51 PM EDT, Stilwell, David R (b)(6) wrote: First one to get me a soft copy of (h)'s Wuhan cables gets a Samoa Cookie. drs				
David R. Stilwell				
Ass't Secretary East	Asia Pacific			
(b)(6)				
(/(/				
Sender:	"Taylor, Mary Elizabeth"			
	Stilwell, David R (h)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
Dociniont:	Brechbuhl, Thomas U (h)(6)			
Recipient:	Fritz, Jonathan D (h)/6)			

(b)(6)

From:	(b)(6) (Beijing)'(b)(6)
То:	(b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6) (b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)
CC:	Beijing EXEC Staffers(b)(6)
Subject:	RE: E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5) Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on October 10, 2017
Date:	Wed, 27 Sep 2017 21:48:24 -0400

Great, I will notify HHS. Thank you!

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2017 9:42 AM **To:**(b)(6) (Beijing); Fritz, Jonathan D (Beijing)

Cc: Beijing EXEC Staffers

Subject: RE: E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5) Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on

October 10, 2017

(b)(6 - chiming in here because I think (h)(6) busy with some other stuff.

Green light on these additions at CDC. No need to wrap the Cummins trip in at this point.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2017 9:34 AM

To: Fritz, Jonathan D (Beijing) **Cc:** Beijing EXEC Staffers

Subject: RE: E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5) Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on

October 10, 2017

Hi Jonathan,

Just an update from HHS. If we add both the influenza lab tour and the emergency center tour, the China CDC visit would be extended to about an hour and 45 minutes.

(b)(6)

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UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2017 9:17 AM

To: Fritz, Jonathan D (Beijing) Cc: Beijing EXEC Staffers

Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on Subject: RE: E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5)

October 10, 2017

Hi Jonathan,

Just heard back from HHS and FCS. Here are some add-on options This is

/L\/E\

- Tour of China CDC's influenza laboratory which is a WHO collaborating center
- Tour of China CDC's emergency preparedness center
- Tour of nearby Cummins-Foton Engine Factory. The factory is a 50-50 joint venture between Cummins and Beigi Foton. According to FCS, (h)(4)

(h)(A) Secretary Kerry visited the factory in 2014, and CDA Rank visited the facility in March 2017.

(b)(6)

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Fritz, Jonathan D (Beijing)

Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2017 11:41 AM

To: (b)(6) (Beijing) Cc: Beijing EXEC Staffers

Subject: Re: E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5) Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on

October 10, 2017

Not exactly sure where China CDC is located, but would like to explore possibility of pairing this event with another in the vicinity to make max use of this travel. Perhaps a company visit? Other important gov't offices out there?

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

(Beijing) From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2017 11:34 AM

To: Fritz, Jonathan D (Beijing) Cc: Beijing EXEC Staffers

Subject: E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5) Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on October

10, 2017

FL-2021-00033 A-00000472829

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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Jonathan,

(b)(5) to meet with the new director of the China CDC on October 10, 2017 (the day after Columbus Day) at the China CDC campus. (b)(5) the travel between the Embassy and the China CDC Campus is 45 minutes to an hour each way and believes that, including travel time, the event will occupy about three hours on the (b)(5) schedule.

Below please find an e-action memo.

(b)(6)



E- ACTION MEMORANDUM UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Ambassador Terry Branstad

THROUGH A/DCM – Jonathan Fritz

FROM: HHS -(b)(6)

CDC - (b)(6)

DATE: September 27, 2017

SUBJECT: (b)(5) Meeting with Dr. George Gao at China CDC

on October 10, 2017

Issue for Decision

(b)(5) meet with Dr. George Gao, the new Director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), on October 10, 2017, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., at the China CDC Campus, 155 Changbai Road Changping District, Beijing.

Background

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HHS estimates that the travel between the Embassy and the China CDC Campus is 45 minutes to an hour each way and believes that, including travel time, the event will occupy about three hours on the (b)(5) schedule (1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.).

Recommendation

FL-2021-00033

That (b)(meet with Dr. Gao at the China CDC Campus on October 10, 2017.

Drafted by: HHS – (b)(6)
Cleared by: CDC – ESTH HHS –

Official - SBU_ UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	(b)(6) Beijing)(b)(6)	
	(b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)	
Recipient:	Fritz, Jonathan D (Beijing) (h)/6)	
	Beijing EXEC Staffers (b)(6)	