

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 24, 2023

Case No. FL-2021-00033

Gary Ruskin 4096 Piedmont Ave. #963 Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Ruskin:

As we noted in our letter dated December 23, 2022, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Since our last letter, the Department of State ("Department") has processed in excess of 1,500 pages of material potentially responsive to your request. The Department has identified an additional 20 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined that 14 records may be released in part and 6 records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The records that were withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1). All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Laurel Lum, Trial Attorney, at laurel.h.lum@usdoj.gov or (202) 305-8177. Please refer to the case number, FL-2021-00033, and the civil action number, 20-cv-08415, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Diamonece Hickson

Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch

Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
 - 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMSEXP	Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)
CIA PERS/ORG	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT CONTROL	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)
FS ACT	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505

- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
 - (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

Page 01 to Page 04
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(1)

Page 05 to Page 12
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(1)

Page 13 to Page 23
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)

Page 24 to Page 30
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(1)

Page 31 to Page 37 Withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(1)

Page 38 to Page 39
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(1)

- SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:13 AM

To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>

Subject: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

Please advise of your voluntary submissions as soon as possible.

A-00000473257

REMINDER: Please help us to serve you better by copying the EAP-PRESS office distro when corresponding with individual members of the press team. Thank you for your cooperation.

EAP/PM/S: MK/D/MED/CHINA: Per today's Wash Post, can State confirm the existence of cables highlighting concerns about procedures at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab? Does the USG see any link between the labs research and safety protocols, and the emergence of Wuhan as the epicenter of the COVID-19 virus?

We plan to respond with the following:	(b)(5)
Please let us know if you strongly reco	

EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: Please send updated lines on the DPRK's missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.

FL-2021-	00033	A-00000473228	"UNCLASSIFIED"	01/24/2023 Page 42
From:	(b)(6)			
1101111	(b)(6)			
To:				
		G-Taskings-DL <eap-pg< td=""><td>-Taskings-DL@state.gov></td><td></td></eap-pg<>	-Taskings-DL@state.gov>	
	(b)(6)			
CC:				
	<u> </u>			
Subject:	RE: Ap	ril 14 EAP Press Guidan	ce Taskings	
Date:	Tue, 14	4 Apr 2020 13:50:45 +0	0000	
(b)(6)				
(b)(5)		Thar	nks.	
(b)(6)				
(b)(6)				
[(1.)(0)		SENSITIVE BU	TUNCLASSIFIED.	
From: (b)(6)	144 202	0.0.24.444	DeContr	olled
Sent: Tuesday, Apri To: (b)(6)	1 14, 202	0 9:24 AM		EAP-PG-Taskings-
DL <eap-pg-tasking< td=""><td>gs-DL@st</td><td>ate.gov></td><td></td><td>LAI -I O-Taskings-</td></eap-pg-tasking<>	gs-DL@st	ate.gov>		LAI -I O-Taskings-
Cc: (b)(6)				
(b)(6)	4 E A D D	College Testing		
Subject: Re: April 1	4 EAP Pre	ess Guidance Taskings		
(b)(6)				
I noticed that	the piec	ce referred to the De	partment as having "r	no comment" on the
story. (b)(6)				
(b)(5)				
C	_			
(b)(6) Assistant Legal Advis	er for			
Management Affairs (b)(6)	5 101			
(b)(6)				

FL-2021-00033 A-	00000473228	"UNCLASSIFIED"	01/24/2023 Page 43
From: (b)(6)			
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:0	 0 AM		
To: (b)(6)		-Taskings-DL < <u>EAP-PG-Task</u>	kings-DL@state.gov>;
(b)(6)	<u></u>		·
Cc: (b)(6)	<u>'</u>		
(b)(6)			
Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press G	uidance Taskings		
Hi (b)(The link to the WaPo	article is below.	Just FYI, the line came fi	rom SPOX.
Washington Post Opinion Co	olumnist Josh Ro	gin reports	
	SENSITIVE BUT	UNCLASSIFIED	
From: (b)(6)			
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020	8:54 AM		
To:(b)(6)		EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <	EAP-PG-Taskings-
$\underline{DL} \underline{\hat{a}} state.gov >$; (b)(6)	•		
Ce: 1(b)(6)		<u>L</u>	inesBM@state.gov>;
(h)(6)	(b)(6)	•	
Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Pr	ess Guidance Task	angs	
(b)(6)			
Good morning. (b)(5)			
(b)(5)			
(b)(5) (b)(5)			Is there a mass
story already out there suggest	ing this?)		Is there a press
story arready out there suggest	ing tins.)		
(b)(6)			
Thank for any thoughts.			
(b)(6)			
	SENSITIVE BUT	UNCLASSIFIED.	
From: A(b)(6)			
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020			
To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <			
Subject: April 14 EAP Press (Juidance Taskings		

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A-00000473228

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We plan to respond with the following:	(b)(5)
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Please let us know if you strongly reco	mmend a different approach.

EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: Please send updated lines on the DPRK's missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.

Sender:	(b)(6)	
Recipient:	EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <eap-pg-taskings-dl@state.go (b)(6)</eap-pg-taskings-dl@state.go 	v>;

Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thank for any thoughts.

(b)(6)

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Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:13 AM

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Please let us know if you strongly recommend a different approach.

EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: Please send updated lines on the DPRK's missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.

FL-2021-00033 A-00000472430 "UNCLASSIFIED" 01/24/2023 Page 47

Sender: (b)(6)	(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	skings-DL <eap-pg-taskings-dl@state.gov>;</eap-pg-taskings-dl@state.gov>	

"UNCLASSIFIED"

01/24/2023 Page 48

FL-2021-00033

A-00000472378

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EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: Please send updated lines on the DPRK's missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.

Sender:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
	(b)(6)]
Recipient:	(b)(6)		

Here is the Ref A cable too:

- 5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.
- 6. (SBU) The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with

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Sender:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
Recipient:	(b)(6)		

FL-2021	-00033	A-00000472467	"UNCLASS	IFIED"	01/24/2023 Page 52
From:	(b)(6)		(b)(6)		
То:	(b)(6)				
Subject:	Re: 2018	Cable on Visit to the W	uhan Virology Ir	nstitute	
Date:	Wed, 11	Mar 2020 15:28:52 +00	00		
I did forward it o	n to some	e EAP DASes. Mostly	just a bunch o	of wow resp	oonses.
Get Outlook for	iOS	•		-	
From: (b)(6)		(b)(6)			
Sent: Wednesday,	March 11	, 2020 11:27:27 AM			
To:(b)(6)					
Subject: RE: 2018	Cable on \	isit to the Wuhan Virol	ogy Institute		
Nice – did you sen	d to anyor	ne else? Excellent work			nd NIH folks) DeControlle
		SENSITIVE BU	F UNCLASSIFIL	DeControl	ied
From: (h)(6)		(b)(6)			
Sent: Wednesday,	March 11	., 2020 11:23 AM			
To: (b)(6)	Calala	\ \(\text{C} = \text{C} \ \text{C} \ \text{C} = \text{C} \ \text{C} \ \text{C} \ \text{C} = \text{C} \ \text{C} \ \text{C} = \text{C} \	In an a base of the state		
Subject: FW: 2018	Cable on	Visit to the Wuhan Viro	logy Institute		
tracked down a co	ру. Тоо b	cables my team and I o ad no one paid attentio a different place today	n to the point v		ntil very recently and just ng to make with these
virus research, is as operator of the	a key part just-laund ore opport	Comment: China's Wu ner for the United Stat ched Biosafety Level 4 unities for expert exchange	es in protecting (or "P4") lab -	global heal the first su	th security. Its role ich lab in China
(b)(5)				End S	ummary with

Here is the Ref A cable too:

Comment.

- 5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.
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SCINSII	IVC	DUI	UNCL	\sqrt{A}	THEFT

Sender:	(b)(6)	
Recipient:	(b)(6)	

FL-2021-0	0033 A-00000473433	3 "UNCLASSIFIED"	01/24/2023 Page 54
From: (b)(6	5)		
To			
То:			
Subject: Re	e: 2018 Cable on Visit to t	the Wuhan Virology Institute	
Date: W	/ed, 11 Mar 2020 15:28:5	2 +0000	
I did forward it on t	to some EAP DASes. N	Mostly just a bunch of wow	resnonses
Get Outlook for iO		restry fuse a canon or wow	responses.
From: (b)(6)			
Sent: Wednesday, M	larch 11, 2020 11:27:27 A	.M	
To: (b)(6)	ble on Visit to the Wuhan	Virology Institute	
Subject: RE: 2018 Ca	ble on visit to the wuhan	i virology institute	
Nice – did you send t	to anyone else? Excellent	work by (b)(6)	(and NIH folks)
		DeC	Controlled
	-SENSITIV	E BUT UNCLASSIFIED	
From: (b)(6)			
	1arch 11, 2020 11:23 AM		_
To:(b)(6)			
Subject: FW: 2018 Ca	able on Visit to the Wuha	n Virology Institute	
I actually forgot abou	ut these cables my team a	and I did in Beijing back in 201	8 until very recently and just
	-	tention to the point we were	
cables! The world co	ould be a different place t	oday if they had.	
1 -(apii) a	11 G 4 GI	1 XX 1	1111 1 .
		's Wuhan Institute of Virolog d States in protecting global	
		evel 4 (or "P4") lab the firs	
		exchange, especially in light	
trained staff (Ref A)			
(b)(5)			
(b)(5)	_ I	En	d Summary with

Comment.

Here is the Ref A cable too:

- 5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.
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	SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED	-
Sender:	(b)(6)	
Recipient:		

FL-	2021-00033	A-00000473333	"UNCLASSIFIED"	01/24/2023 Page 56
From:	(b)(6)	(b)	0(6)	
To:	(b)(6)			
Subject:		le on Visit to the Wuhar	Virology Institute	
Date:		2020 13:59:00 +0000		
Dutei	rion, so riar	2020 13.33.00 10000		
Bigger than	this? Great. I	needed another reas	on to stay up late at nig	ht
From: (h)(A)				
	y, March 30, 20)20 9:40 AM		
To:(b)(6)				
Subject: Re: 2	2018 Cable on \	isit to the Wuhan Virol	ogy Institute	
Man I hope	not, cuz I hav	e been briefing a lot o	f high level people on a	n even bigger issue
concerning I	C supply chai	ins. I hope I am either	wrong or listened to.	
Get Outlook	for iOS		_	
From:(b)(6)				
Sent: Monday	y, March 30, 20)20 9:35:55 AM		
To: (h)(6)				
Subject: Re: 2	2018 Cable on \	isit to the Wuhan Virol	ogy Institute	
Geez. I shall	call you Cass	andra from now on.	Thanks for forwarding.	
From:(b)(6)				
	March 27, 2020	0 5:18 PM		
To: (b)(6)				
Subject: FW:	2018 Cable on	Visit to the Wuhan Viro	logy Institute	_
		DeControlle	d	
1 (CDLI) C	mmawy with (Commonte Chinala Wa	han Institute of Virology	a alabal laadar in
	•		han Institute of Virology es in protecting global he	
			(or "P4") lab the first	
			ange, especially in light of	
	(Ref A). (b)(5)		ange, especially in fight c	or the last shortage or
(b)(5)	(5)(0)	,		
h\/F\			<u> </u>	
b)(5)			End	Summary with

Comment.

5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

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		SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIE	D
Sender:	(b)(6)		
Recipient:			

Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 11:23 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

01/24/2023 Page 59

I actually forgot about these cables my team and I did in Beijing back in 2018 until very recently and just tracked down a copy. Too bad no one paid attention to the point we were trying to make with these cables! The world could be a different place today if they had.

1. (SBU) Summary with Comment: China's Wuhan Institute of Viro	ology, a global leader in
virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting glob	oal health security. Its role
as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab the	first such lab in China
opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in l	ight of the lab's shortage of
trained staff (Ref A). (b)(5)	
(b)(5)	
(b)(5)	End Summary with
Comment.	

Here is the Ref A cable too:

5. (SBU). During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>;
Recipient	(b)(6)	@state.gov>

as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of
trained staff (Ref A).

(b)(5)

End Summary with

Comment.

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

<18-BEIJING-138.eml.pdf> <18-WUHAN-38.eml.pdf>

Sender: "McConnell, Kirk (Armed Services)" (b)(6)

Recipient: (b)(6)

From:	(b)(6)
То:	
Subject:	RE: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute
Date:	Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:27:27 +0000
5	DeControlled SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
From: (b)(6)	(b)(6)
	March 11, 2020 11:23 AM (b)(6) (b)(6)
_	Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute
	out these cables my team and I did in Beijing back in 2018 until very recently and just y. Too bad no one paid attention to the point we were trying to make with these

"UNCLASSIFIED"

01/24/2023 Page 63

1. (SBU) Summary with Comment: China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of

trained staff (Ref A). (b)(5)

FL-2021-00033

A-00000472770

(b)(5)

(b)(5) End Summary with

Comment.

Here is the Ref A cable too:

- 5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.
- 6. (SBU) The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with

ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like disease. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal human

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interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention. It is interesting that WIV scientists are allowed to study the SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from bats while they are precluded from studying human-disease causing SARS coronavirus in their new BSL-4 lab until permission for such work is granted by the NHFCP.

	SENSUIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED	
Sender:	(b)(6)	
Recipient:		

FL-	2021-00033	A-00000472662	"UNCLASSIFIED"	01/24/2023 Page 65
Fuomi	(b)(6)			
From: To:				
Subject:	Re: 2018 Cab	le on Visit to the Wuhan	Virology Institute	
Date:		2020 12:37:20 +0000	Theregy institute	
The prescien	ce in that cab	le is amazing/scary		
Sent from m	y iPad			
On Mon 10	2020 at 9.25	(b)(6)		
On Mar 10, 2	2020, at 8:35	AM,		wrote:
Here is the Re		DeControlled		
serious shorta	age of appropr		wiv laboratory, they no as and investigators need	ted that the new lab has a ed to safely
use of the ner five-year study province with study results that a SARS- blocks of the strongly sugg importantly, ACE2, the ht SARS-like co a public healt and study of interface criti- that WIV scie are precluded	w BSL-4 facility, Drs. Shi and funding suppose were published like coronavir pandemic SA gest that the highest the researchers or particularly and particularly	ity is demonstrated by a ad Cui Jie (and their resonant from NIAID/NIH, Und in PLoS Pathogens or uses isolated from horse RS-coronavirus genome ghly pathogenic SARS-s also showed that various identified for SARS coron bats can be transmit this makes the continuous man merging coronavirus ou wed to study the SARS	earch team) widely samp JSAID, and several Chimaline on Nov. 30, 2017 (1) eshoe bats in a single cave that caused the human of coronavirus originated in the same same same same same same same sam	e origins of SARS. Over a led bats in Yunnan nese funding agencies. The led, and it demonstrated to contain all the building outbreak. These results in this bat population. Most uses can interact with
		SENSITIVE BUT	UNCLASSIFIED	

From:(b)(6) Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:10 AM To: (b)(6) (b)(6)

Cc: EAP-J-Office-DL < EAP-J-Office-DL@state.gov>

Subject: FW: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

I actually forgot about this cable until very recently and just tracked down a copy.

1. (SBU) Sun	nmary v	with Con	nment: China	a's Wuhan Ir	stitute of Viro	ology, a global leader in
virus research	n, is a ke	y partner	for the Unite	ed States in p	protecting glob	oal health security. Its role
as operator of	f the just	t-launche	d Biosafety I	Level 4 (or "I	24") lab the	first such lab in China
opens up ever	n more o	pportuni	ties for exper	t exchange,	especially in l	ight of the lab's shortage of
trained staff (Ref A).	(b)(5)				
(b)(5)		(/(-/				
(b)(5)						End Summary with
Comment.						_
			SENSITI	VE BUT UNC	LASSIFIED	
<mime-attac< td=""><td>hment></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></mime-attac<>	hment>					
Sender:	(b)(6)					
Recipient:						

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01/24/2023 Page 67

FL-2021-00033

Comment.

A-00000472645

- 5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.
- 6. (SBU)-The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with

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	SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	

From:		(b)(6)	
To:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
Subject:	Re: 2018 Cable on Visit to	the Wuhan Vir	ology Institute
Date:	Tue, 10 Mar 2020 12:48:3	3 +0000	

Too bad I couldn't get anyone to listen even with front channel cables and letters from the Ambassador to the NSC.

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (h)/(A) @state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:44:00 AM
To: (b)/(6) @state.gov>

Subject: RE: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

Wow...just wow.

CENTREME DITTINGLACE	TELED
SENSITIVE DUT UNCLASS	HILD

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:35 AM

DeControlled

To:(b)(6)

Subject: FW: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

Here is the Ref A cable too:

5. (SBU) During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

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interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention. It is interesting that WIV scientists are allowed to study the SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from bats while they are precluded from studying human-disease causing SARS coronavirus in their new BSL-4 lab until permission for such work is granted by the NHFCP.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED	<u> </u>
From:(h)(6)	
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:10 AM	
To: (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
Cc: EAP-J-Office-DL < EAP-J-Office-DL@state.gov>	
Subject: FW: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute	
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(b)(5)	
/L\/F\	
(b)(5)	End Summary with
Comment.	
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- BENSTITUE BOT UNCLASSITIED) _
Sender: (b)(6))
Sender: (b)(6) Recipient:	