Mr. Sainath Suryanarayanan, PhD
U.S. Right to Know
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Suryanarayanan:

As noted in our letter dated January 23, 2023, we are processing your request under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Thus far, the Department of State has located 33 responsive records subject to the FOIA. Upon review, we have determined that 8 records may be released in part and 25 records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The records that were withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 5, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1) and (b)(5). All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.
We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, at savith.iyengar@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number, FL-2022-00075, and the civil action number, 22-cv-04359, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Diamonece Hickson
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.
The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:

1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
1.4(b) Foreign government information
1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

- ARMSEXP Armes Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)
- CIA PERS/ORG Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
- EXPORT CONTROL Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)
- FS ACT Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004
- INA Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)
- IRAN Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505

(b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Personal privacy information

(b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
   (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
   (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
   (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
   (D) disclose confidential sources
   (E) disclose investigation techniques
   (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

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Withheld pursuant to exemption
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Withheld pursuant to exemption

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(6)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(1); (b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(E)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption
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(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1)
From: "Buangan, Richard L\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>
To: Feith, David\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>

Keshap, Atul\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Masonis, Melinda J\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>

CC: \(\text{(b)(6)}\)

Subject: RE: CLEARANCE REQUEST: WIV/COVID Origins Statement
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 12:25:47 +0000

David,

\(\text{(b)(5)}\); \(\text{(b)(6)}\)

Richard

From:\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 9:59 PM
To: Buangan, Richard L\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>;\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Yu, Miles\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Ortagus, Morgan D\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Stilwell, David R\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Feith, David\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Fritz, Jonathan D\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>; Masonis, Melinda J\(\text{(b)(6)}\)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: CLEARANCE REQUEST: WIV/COVID Origins Statement

Hi Richard & Co,

Thanks for your note.

\(\text{(b)(5)}\)

\(\text{(b)(5)}\)
(b)(5)

Please make these edits and send me a clean copy for final review.

Many thanks,

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 12, 2021, at 8:11 PM, Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

(b)(5)

Hi (b)(6)

Below is Miles and David The text is pasted below for easy viewing.

Thanks,

Richard

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

Background
(U) EAP will work with SPOX on rollout plan of this statement.

Recommendation

(b)(5)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sender: &quot;Buangan, Richard L&quot;</th>
<th>Recipient: Feith, David; Keshap, Atul; Fritz, Jonathan; Stilwell, David R; Masonis, Melinda J</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)
EAP: David R. Stilwell []

Drafted: EAP Front Office

Clearances:
(b)(6) EAP/FO: Atul Keshap ()
EAP/FO: Richard Buangan ()
EAP/EO: Jonathan Fritz ()
D: Robert Palladino ()
P: Rick Waters ()
T: Chris Ford (ok)
S/P: Miles Yu ()
SPOX: Morgan Ortagus
Am I living in an alternate universe?

Get Outlook for iOS

From: Feith, David
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 10:24:28 AM
To: Ortagus, Morgan D; Buangan, Richard L; Stilwell, David R
Cc: Eckels-Currie, Kelley
Subject: FW: Wuhan statement

Morgan,

Welcome your review if possible of course, sorry for delay. Thanks as ever.

---

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Feith, David
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 9:46 AM
To: Yu, Miles; Eckels-Currie, Kelley; Buangan, Richard L
Cc: Buangan, Richard L
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Team (with cc’ed) –

Sharing this DRAFT memo, including statement and fact sheet text

This isn’t yet final because

Also pasted below.

Appreciate your read. Thanks much.
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)
Great. Please send me the final draft when it's ready to read.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2021, at 7:39 AM, Feith, David <b>(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Many thanks all. The and Kelley

(b)(5); (b)(6)

Thanks again all, really appreciate everyone’s collaboration here in difficult circumstances.

+ Richard.

--

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

On January 13, 2021 at 7:21:02 AM EST, <b>(b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Good morning. 

Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 13, 2021, at 6:41 AM, Yu, Miles(b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

Dr. M Miles Yu
Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Washington. DC
(b)(6)

Send from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2021, at 1:34 AM, Eckels-Currie, Kelley(b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

Take a look at the attached. There’s still some duplicative language in here, but I want to get your feedback on the overall approach.

K

Kelley E. Currie
Ambassador-at-Large
Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI)
Department of State
Washington DC 20520
(b)(6)

<COVID declass draft S statement MY DF CB.docx>

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<td>Buangan, Richard L(b)(6)@state.gov</td>
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DeControlled

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: [b](6)@state.gov>
To: [b](6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Wuhan statement
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 20:40:41 +0000


From: [b](6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 3:37 PM
To: [b](6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Wuhan statement

Staffers,

Please send this attachment to the following individuals for urgent clearance:

D – Robert Palladino
P – Rick Waters
T – Marshall Billingslea @state.gov>

Please ask for their clearance by 4:30p this afternoon.

Thanks,

Richard

From: Feith, David [b](6) @state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 3:20 PM

SENsitive But UnClassified
To: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: Wuhan statement

Richard – attached as discussed – (b)(5)

(b)(5); (b)(6)

AVC called and asked for new acting T Marshall Billingslea to clear, asked for it to be sent to (b)(6) and Tom Dinanno.

Thanks much --

---

SENSEITVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 3:10 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (h)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (h)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Sounds good, thank you David

---

SENSEITVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 3:09 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (h)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (h)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Many thanks (b)(5)

Thanks again --

---

SENSEITVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 1:47 PM
To: Feith, David (h)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell,
Reattaching edit to ensure it goes through.

A few notes:

- (b)(5)
- (b)(5)
- (h)(5)
- (b)(5)

One question for you in CAPS, in the text.

(b)(5)

Thank you!

Best,

(b)(6)
Yes, thanks, re-attached here with some small tweaks to memo background language. Thanks.

Great. Is this the final draft you want me to clear?

Kelley, thanks for the great edits and the call.

Please see attached as discussed, which I’ve cleaned up but with highlights of the key areas we discussed. Thanks all.

David
(b)(5)

Happy to discuss further when I’m in the office.

Thanks

K

Kelley E. Currie
Ambassador-at-Large
Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI)
Department of State
Washington DC 20520

From: Feith, David
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 7:39:03 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Eckels-Currie, Kelley; Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard L
Subject: Re: Wuhan statement

Many thanks all. The 2nd Kelley

Thanks again all, really appreciate everyone’s collaboration here in difficult circumstances.

+ Richard.
David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

On January 13, 2021 at 7:21:02 AM EST, (b)(6) @state.gov wrote:

Good morning.

(b)(5) Thank you!

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2021, at 6:41 AM, Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov wrote:

This is much better. I can live with this version.

Dr. M Miles Yu
Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Washington DC

Send from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2021, at 1:34 AM, Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6) @state.gov wrote:

Take a look at the attached. There’s still some duplicative language in here, but I want to get your feedback on the overall approach.

K

Kelley E. Currie
Ambassador-at-Large
Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI)
Department of State
Washington DC 20520

<COVID declass draft S statement MY DF CB.docx>

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<th>Sender:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient:</td>
<td>(b)(6) @state.gov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov
To: EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Wuhan statement

FYI

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov
To: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov; Fritz, Jonathan D (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: Wuhan statement

Richard – attached as discussed.

AVC called and asked for new acting T Marshall Billingslea to clear, asked for it to be sent to (b)(6) and Tom Dinanno.

Thanks much --

From (b)(6)@state.gov
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Sounds good, thank you David
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 3:09 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu,
Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell,
David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(5)
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Many thanks!

Thanks again --

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 1:47 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell,
David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(5)
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Reattaching edit to ensure it goes through.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 1:46 PM
To: Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6)@state.gov; Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6)@state.gov; Stilwell,
David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(5)
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Back to you.

A few notes:
One question for you in CAPS, in the text.

(b)(5)

Thank you!

Best,

(b)(6)

---

From: Felth, David (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 12:38 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6) @state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) @state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) @state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Yes, thanks, re-attached here with some small tweaks to memo background language. Thanks.

(b)(5)

---

From: (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 12:14 PM
To: Felth, David (b)(6) @state.gov; Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6) @state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) @state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) @state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement

Great. Is this the final draft you want me to clear?

---

From: Felth, David (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:55 AM
To: Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; Yu, Miles (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: Buangan, Richard L (b)(6) @state.gov; Ortagus, Morgan D (b)(6) @state.gov; Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: RE: Wuhan statement
Kelley, thanks for the great edits and the call.

Please see attached as discussed, which I've cleaned up but with highlights of the key areas we discussed.

+ A/S, Morgan.

Thanks all.

---

From: Eckels-Currie, Kelley
To: Feith, David; Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard
Cc: Feith, David; Yu, Miles; Buangan, Richard
Subject: Re: Wuhan statement

Happy to discuss further when I'm in the office.

Thanks
K

Kelley E. Currie
Ambassador-at-Large
Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI)
Department of State
Washington DC 20520
Thanks again all, really appreciate everyone’s collaboration here in difficult circumstances.

+ Richard.

David Feith
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
U.S. Department of State

On January 13, 2021 at 7:21:02 AM EST @state.gov wrote:
Good morning...Thank you!

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2021, at 6:41 AM, Yu, Miles @state.gov wrote:
This is much better. I can live with this version.

Dr. M Miles Yu
Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Washington, DC
Send from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2021, at 1:34 AM, Eckels-Currie, Kelley (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

Take a look at the attached. (b)(5) but I want to get your feedback on the overall approach.

K

Kelley E. Currie
Ambassador-at-Large
Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI)
Department of State
Washington DC 20520

Sender: (b)(6) (b)(6)@state.gov
Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov
Just so you know. Hail Mary long ball throw!

From: (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 7:41 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G @state.gov; Turner, Bruce l @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: Re: Draft China Cable

Please add and T to any edits or comments you have.

Senior Adviser AVC
SSD/AVC

From: (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 7:32 PM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov; DiNanno, Thomas G @state.gov; Turner, Bruce l @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov
Subject: Re: Draft China Cable

Messrs et Mdmes:

Senior Adviser AVC
SSD/AVC
FYI - This is going to take a little while and mentioned that Marshall will not get to it until the morning. Expect to be in tomorrow at O'Dark Thirty. Assuming I can escape and evade through the roadblocks.

Senior Adviser AVC
SSD/AVC

I will give that a shot but it is very difficult given the excessive limitations of WORD on this GO Browser. If that is not the preferred approach, call me and let me know ASAP.

Senior Adviser AVC
SSD/AVC

Please see this version of the cable. I was able to accept most of the State edits received on the previous version.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

Director, Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State

(b)(6)
(b)(6) @state.gov

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<td>Feith, David (b)(6) @state.gov&gt;</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5); (b)(6)
FYI, this was a nice birthday present. ☑

Director, Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Currently Teleworking
From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 3:30 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Turner, Bruce (b)(6)@state.gov; Asher, David (b)(6)@state.gov; Billingslea, Marshall S
(b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov
(b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Draft China Cable

Attached is a clean version of the cable that incorporates (b)(6) edits. This version incorporates most of the edits received from State offices. This version of the cable has not been sent to the interagency.

Thanks.

Director, Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Currently Teleworking
From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 2:20 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Turner, Bruce (b)(6)@state.gov; Asher, David (b)(5)@state.gov
(b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov
(b)(6)@state.gov; Feith, David (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Draft China Cable

My edits and reply comments in the attached. (b)(5)

Senior Adviser AVC
SSD/AVC (b)(6)
From: [b](6)@state.gov
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 1:25 PM
To: [b](6)@state.gov; Turner, Bruce [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov;
[b](6)@state.gov; Asher, David [b](6)@state.gov
Subject: Fwd: Draft China Cable

[b](6)

David Asher said you wanted the most current version of the China cable.

[b](6)

Director, AVC/VPO

[b](6)@state.gov

From: [b](6)@state.gov
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:06:48 AM
To: DiNanno, Thomas [b](6)@state.gov; Turner, Bruce [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov;
[b](6)@state.gov; Asher, David [b](6)@state.gov
Subject: Draft China Cable

[b](5)

Please see this version of the cable. I was able to accept most of the State edits received on the previous version. This version still has a few outstanding questions that I'd like your thoughts on.

Thanks,

[b](6)

Director, Office of Verification, Planning, and Outreach
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State

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Beyond my final manuscript on Bayesian analysis of COVID-19 origin.
I understand you already found the archived Secretary Pompeo’s statement as well as DOS fact sheet about WIV activities. Attached are "web"-like version that I just shared with my colleagues.
At the AVC-hosted VTC panel discussion, I remember someone in the audience (from another bureau or agency) asked whether Bayesian analysis had been used in this (or other?) discipline. In the nuclear explosion monitoring mission area, we do use it, or use a rule-based voting scheme to assess if a detected seismic event was natural (e.g., earthquake) or man-made (e.g., explosion).
For example, one of the rules is that, if among all the seismic monitoring stations, one has reported a negative (i.e., downward) first motion on the seismogram, no matter how many stations reported a positive (upward) first motion, the event must be an earthquake. This kind of voting scheme can easily be re-written in a sequential weighting process, in a typical Bayesian analysis format...
Many thanks for your efforts.

AVC R&D procurement coordinator

Sent: Monday, January 25, 2021 6:58 PM

To: [b](6)@state.gov>; Asher, David [b](6)@state.gov>; [b](6)

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Subject: Archived S statement & fact sheet re WIV - a "web"-like version

AVC/VTT OD back in 2008-2012 once told me all DOS web postings have a life span of several years before they are archived. He could be right back then and wrong now - it seems such archiving could take place (or has occurred) promptly on the date of inauguration, as the banner of the "2017-2021 Archive Web" so indicates.
I have already received a copy of the Fact Sheet and Secretary Pompeo’s statement of Jan 15, 2021, from several of us. But those printed PDFs somehow do not look quite like what we saw on the web.
Attached please find a version which, with a higher likelihood, would be closer to what our eyes or brains might remember...

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The United States has repeatedly called for a transparent and thorough investigation into the origin of COVID-19. Understanding the origin of this pandemic is essential for global public health, economic recovery, and international security.

To assist the vital work of the World Health Organization (WHO) investigative team that arrived in China this week, the United States government is today sharing new information concerning the activities inside China’s government laboratories in 2019.

In particular, we urge the WHO to press the government of China to address the following:

1. **Illnesses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):** The United States government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli’s public claim that there was “zero infection” among the WIV’s staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.

2. **WIV Research on “RaTG13” and “gain of function”:** Starting in at least 2016, WIV researchers studied RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). Since the outbreak, the WIV has not been transparent nor consistent about its work with RaTG13 or other similar viruses, including possible “gain of function” experiments to enhance transmissibility or lethality.

3. **Secret WIV Links to Military Research:** Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
The COVID-19 pandemic was avoidable. Any responsible country would have invited world health investigators to Wuhan within days of an outbreak. China instead refused offers of help – including from the United States – and punished brave Chinese doctors, scientists, and journalists who tried to alert the world to the dangers of the virus. Beijing continues today to withhold vital information that scientists need to protect the world from this deadly virus, and the next one.

The United States reiterates the importance of unfettered access to virus samples, lab records and personnel, eyewitnesses, and whistleblowers to ensure the credibility of the WHO’s final report. Until the CCP allows a full and thorough accounting of what happened in Wuhan, it is only a matter of time until China births another pandemic and inflicts it on the Chinese people, and the world.

**Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology**

**TAGS**
- Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- China
- CoronavirusCOVID-19
- Global Health Office of the Spokesperson
- The Secretary of State
- World Health Organization


For more than a year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic's origin, choosing instead to devote enormous resources to deceit and disinformation. Nearly two million people have died. Their families deserve to know the truth. Only through transparency can we learn what caused this pandemic and how to prevent the next one.

The U.S. government does not know exactly where, when, or how the COVID-19 virus—known as SARS-CoV-2—was transmitted initially to humans. We have not determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan, China.

The virus could have emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals, spreading in a pattern consistent with a natural epidemic. Alternatively, a laboratory accident could resemble a natural outbreak if the initial exposure included only a few individuals and was compounded by asymptomatic infection. Scientists in China have researched animal-derived coronaviruses under conditions that increased the risk for accidental and potentially unwitting exposure.

The CCP's deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world. The previously undisclosed information in this fact
sheet, combined with open-source reporting, highlights three elements about COVID-19’s origin that deserve greater scrutiny:

1. Illnesses inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):

   - The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli’s public claim that there was “zero infection” among the WIV’s staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.

   - Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one.

   - The CCP has prevented independent journalists, investigators, and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the WIV, including those who were ill in the fall of 2019. Any credible inquiry into the origin of the virus must include interviews with these researchers and a full accounting of their previously unreported illness.

2. Research at the WIV:

   - Starting in at least 2016 – and with no indication of a stop prior to the COVID-19 outbreak – WIV researchers conducted experiments involving RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). The WIV became a focal point for international coronavirus research after the 2003 SARS outbreak and has since studied animals including mice, bats, and pangolins.

   - The WIV has a published record of conducting “gain-of-function” research to engineer chimeric viruses. But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including “RaTG13,” which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.
WHO investigators must have access to the records of the WIV’s work on bat and other coronaviruses before the COVID-19 outbreak. As part of a thorough inquiry, they must have a full accounting of why the WIV altered and then removed online records of its work with RaTG13 and other viruses.

3. Secret military activity at the WIV:

- Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

- Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.

- The United States and other donors who funded or collaborated on civilian research at the WIV have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.

Today’s revelations just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19’s origin in China. Any credible investigation into the origin of COVID-19 demands complete, transparent access to the research labs in Wuhan, including their facilities, samples, personnel, and records.

As the world continues to battle this pandemic – and as WHO investigators begin their work, after more than a year of delays – the virus’s origin remains uncertain. The United States will continue to do everything it can to support a credible and thorough investigation, including by continuing to demand transparency on the part of Chinese authorities.

**TAGS**

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs  China  Coronavirus  COVID-19  Global Health  Office of the Spokesperson
Bruce and Laura,

I want to close the loop on the China COVID demarche that we drafted. (b)(5) (b)(5); (b)(6)

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Director, AVC/VPO

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