



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 24, 2022

Case No. FL-2021-00033

Gary Ruskin
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Ruskin:

As we noted in our letter dated September 26, 2022, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Since our last letter, the Department of State ("Department") has processed in excess of 1,400 pages of material potentially responsive to your request. The Department has identified an additional 63 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined 13 records may be released in part and 50 records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. The records that were withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1). All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Laurel Lum, Trial Attorney, at laurel.h.lum@usdoj.gov or (202) 305-8177. Please refer to the case number, FL-2021-00033, and the civil action number, 20-cv-08415, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Diamonece Hickson", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Diamonece Hickson
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

Withheld pursuant to exemption

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From:	"SMART Archive" <>
To:	SMART Core <>
Subject:	Zim Notes - November 6, 2015
Date:	Fri, 06 Nov 2015 09:55:12 GMT

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MRN: 15 HARARE 1536
Date/DTG: Nov 06, 2015 / 060954Z NOV 15
From: AMEMBASSY HARARE
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, ECON, ZI
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: Zim Notes - November 6, 2015

On the Political/Social Front

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **VP and First Lady Square Off...** The rivalry between Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and First Lady Grace Mugabe has heated up as both appear to have ambitions to succeed the increasingly frail Robert Mugabe as president of the country. The front runners have been touring the country to drum up the support needed to lead the party in the post-Mugabe era. Support is being sought from all quarters, including from charismatic local preachers who lead large congregations. Mnangagwa recently visited an apostolic sect in Manicaland known as a popular destination for party bigwigs seeking spiritual and political support. Grace visited Harare's biggest charismatic evangelical church, Prophetic Healing Ministries (PHD), to bolster her own credentials. Grace has also led several rallies in key areas across the country and has more scheduled in Masvingo and Mashonaland East province. Her stop in Mashonaland East will no doubt further inflame factional politics within the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. Factional tensions in the province led to Mnangagwa ally and provincial chairperson Joel Biggie Matiza fending off a vote of no confidence against him last weekend and then promptly firing party officials affiliated with the pro-Grace Generation 40 faction who had conspired to try to force him out. Mnangagwa will reportedly counter by hitting the campaign trail himself. Supporters of both factions are agitated and insults continue back and forth in the state-owned media. The succession battle is expected to peak at the party's December conference in Victoria Falls. Zim Notes editors are pulling up chairs and getting the popcorn ready for what should be an epic showdown.
2. ~~(SBU)~~ **Zimbabwe Moving Backwards According to Tsvangirai...** Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai addressed members of the diplomatic corps at the party headquarters of the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) on November 4. He said that the country is facing a deepening national crisis characterized by food shortages, closures of businesses, and lack of electricity, all while the ruling party is preoccupied with succession. Tsvangirai condemned the recent violence at an MDC-T meeting in Harare South perpetrated by Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) supporters, and criticized the police for their "dereliction of duty" in failing to provide security for MDC-T supporters. Tsvangirai also criticized the first lady for her recent rallies in which she encouraged rural communities not to allow opposition parties into their communities. He said this incites violence


when people want peace, underlining his belief that Zimbabwe is sliding backwards into repression. Tsvangirai then outlined the way forward, emphasizing three points. First, the country must implement the constitution and realign government institutions to the constitution, he said. Second, the political opposition must unite around a national convergence conference with like-minded opposition parties and civil society. He said such a conference is scheduled for November 28 and that it will focus on key reform issues, including electoral reforms, upon which political parties must work together. Third, a team comprised of members from opposition political parties will approach the Southern African Development Community (SADC) chairperson to get their view on elections. SADC, he explained, has ultimate responsibility for overseeing the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis because it is beyond the ability of any opposition party to bring about a solution without outside support.

Economic and Business News

3. ~~-(SBU)~~ **Only the Wicked Do Not Repay...** Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Governor Dr. John Mangudya burnished his reformist credentials during the Ambassador's November 3 farewell call, citing Zimbabwe's need to rebuild investor confidence, to restore market value to land, and to manage sovereign risk through repayment of debt arrears. Mangudya provided only limited details regarding the mechanisms to be used in settling arrears to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and African Development Bank, but said President Mugabe and his cabinet are now on board with repaying the government's debts and re-engaging with the west. The governor said, "We need to repay our debts," and, quoting Psalms 37:21, told the Ambassador that "[only] the wicked borrow and do not repay." Mangudya readily agreed that certain reforms must accompany any financial re-engagement with the international community, including improvements to the rule of law and contract enforcement, anti-corruption efforts, and transparency in the financial system and the appointment of officials to parastatals and to government positions. The lack of details surrounding the plan to repay \$1.9 billion in debt owed to the international financial institutions (IFIs) suggests the government does not yet have a confirmed source of funding, but Zim Notes editors at least find Mangudya's ongoing support for necessary economic reforms encouraging.
4. ~~-(SBU)~~ **Telecommunications Provider Showcases New Technologies...** Zimbabwe's largest provider of telecommunication services, Econet, launched its "Beyond the Phone" platform with a week-long exposition at the Harare International Conference Centre. Products showcased at the expo included EcoCash – Tap & Go, Econet Connected Home, Mobile Wi-Fi, Technites, Econet Connected Car, EcoHealth – Connected Health and Steward Bank – Agent Banking. Econet has seen its revenue decline 18 percent year on year and the launch of adjacent technology platforms is an attempt by the company to reverse its flagging profits and diversify its business into areas that offer strong upside growth potential. Econet CEO Douglas Mboweni was bullish on the prospects of the new technologies, confiding in Zim Notes editors that, "These spaces are wide open and Econet is uniquely positioned to claim them." If expo participant interest is an indicator of potential success it would seem that EcoHealth – Connected Health could find a home in the marketplace. The technology uses 3G data to send blood pressure and blood sugar level readings to a patient's doctor in real time from the privacy of one's home. For a \$20 initiation fee and \$7 per month, the user receives a GSM-enabled combined blood pressure and blood sugar monitor and 10 paper blood sugar strips monthly. When the user tests him or herself the results are sent to the user's designated medical professional via email or SMS, creating a recorded history and permitting rapid response by the physician in the case of need. There is no contract and failure to pay the monthly fee results in the device being remotely disabled. Expo goers appeared quite keen on the idea with a queue of people waiting to check out the new technology. Though the new technologies may be exciting for end-users and provide Econet with a badly needed revenue bump, Zim Notes editors would settle for improved cell and mobile data coverage by any of the country's telecommunications providers.

Cartoon of the Week

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(*The Herald*, November 4, 2015)

Quote of the Week

"We urge the police to investigate and not to arrest in order to investigate. It is unhelpful and smacks of repression to arrest editors and journalists on issues that are not criminal but is part of their legitimate work, in this particular case, to expose the rot in our society."

- The Zimbabwe National Editors' Forum (ZINEF) in a statement condemning the arrest of three journalists for reporting GOZ officials' links to elephant poaching.

(*The Herald*, November 4, 2015)

Signature: Wharton

Drafted By: HARARE: (b)(6)
Cleared By: POL/ECON: (b)(6) (Harare)
Approved By: EXEC: (b)(6) (Harare)
Released By: HARARE: (b)(6) (Harare)
Info: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; CIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE; Elliott, Virginia L.S ROUTINE; Fitrell, Troy D ROUTINE; SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE ROUTINE

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

From:	"SMART Archive" <>
To:	SMART Core <>
Subject:	Mongolia: Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Remain Concerns
Date:	Fri, 23 Jun 2017 05:57:39 GMT

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MRN: 17 ULAANBAATAR 284
Date/DTG: Jun 23, 2017 / 230556Z JUN 17
From: AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ECON, ETRD, ECIN, PGOV, SHLH, WHO, MN
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 17 ULAANBAATAR 242
B) 16 ULAANBAATAR 154
C) 17 ULAANBAATAR 182
D) 16 ULAANBAATAR 580
E) 17 ULAANBAATAR 190
Subject: Mongolia: Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Remain Concerns

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** A May 2017 assessment of Mongolian biosafety and biosecurity by the World Health Organization-led Joint External Evaluation found Mongolia to have “limited capacity.” The international experts recommended Mongolia adopt standard operating procedures, appoint dedicated biosafety laboratory officers, conduct regular training programs, and improve the transportation of samples to laboratories. Visits to the National Center for Zoonotic Disease and the State Central Veterinary Laboratory determined that the facilities lack basic biosafety measures, despite handling dangerous pathogens such as anthrax and brucellosis. While the Mongolia government is making upgrades to its human health laboratory, it has not yet adopted adequate biosafety and biosecurity measures. Engagement with the Mongolian government to improve its biosafety and biosecurity presents an opportunity to have a lasting impact on health and security goals. **End summary.**

JEE Identifies Biosafety and Biosecurity as a Priority Area

2. ~~(SBU)~~ An international team of Joint External Evaluation (JEE) experts identified in its May 2017 assessment that Mongolia has significant gaps in ensuring that pathogens are identified, secured, and monitored appropriately. The JEE assessment accordingly assigned Mongolia a biosafety and biosecurity rating of “limited capacity” (ref A). [Note: JEE, conducted jointly

between the host government and external experts, evaluates 19 technical areas within the country's health system, including policy, surveillance, emergency response, and the laboratory system. JEE technical areas are assigned a numerical rating from zero (no capacity) to four (demonstrated capacity). End note.] (b)(6) a World Health Organization (WHO) technical officer and JEE participant, told post on June 14 that biosafety and biosecurity is especially important in Mongolia due to frequent handling and testing of dangerous pathogens. He stated that Mongolia's laboratory system suffers from inadequately defined responsibilities and little cooperation among laboratories at both the national-level and provincial-level. Noting that the Mongolia government recognizes its laboratory system weaknesses, (b)(6) expressed hope the WHO and other organizations could build Mongolia's capacity in biosafety and biosecurity. (b)(6), laboratory quality manager at the Institute of Veterinary Medicine (IVM), explained to post during a laboratory visit on June 9 the many laboratory deficiencies and that based on her understanding of the JEE criteria, the JEE experts should have given Mongolia's biosafety and biosecurity capacity a "zero."

3. (SBU) JEE experts recommended Mongolia update laboratory biosafety and biosecurity standard operating procedures (SOP), identify a dedicated biosafety officer in laboratories, and develop a national biosafety and biosecurity training program. (b)(6) biosafety manager at the National Center for Communicable Diseases (NCCD), concurred with the assessment, noting to post on June 12 that current biosafety and biosecurity SOPs provided by the Ministry of Health (MOH) are outdated and insufficient. In addition, he said that although NCCD had one biosafety manager responsible for seven constituent laboratories, the veterinary and zoonotic disease laboratories do not have dedicated managers to oversee and improve biosafety practices. IVM laboratory quality manager (b)(6) agreed on the need for training, stating that the laboratory staff rarely receives formal training on biosafety. She added that more experienced laboratory employees typically focus on informally teaching newer laboratory staff to pickup proper biosafety procedures, rather than developing new SOPs. (b)(6) MOH officer in charge of laboratories, shared with post on June 11 that the JEE results are consistent with the Mongolian government's self-assessment and that the MOH is reviewing existing biosafety and biosecurity standards, including infrastructure, human resources, and training, based on JEE recommendations.

4. (SBU) The JEE assessment also revealed the need to improve the transportation of samples, including potentially dangerous pathogens, to the laboratories. According to (b)(6) samples collected from the field are currently transported to Ulaanbaatar-based laboratories using ad hoc transportation and often hand-carried by individuals without proper training and equipment, risking a biohazard accident. (b)(6) commented that the MOH must work with the Ministry of Road and Transportation and logistics companies to develop a secure mechanism to transmit samples. He also requested U.S. assistance for training on how to more securely transport samples from remote areas to the NCCD.

Animal Health and Zoonotic Disease Laboratories Lack Basic Biosafety Measures

5. (SBU) National Center for Zoonotic Disease (NCZD) (b)(6) told post on June 13 that the biosafety and biosecurity gaps identified during the July 2016 Naval Medical Research Center and Defense Threat Reduction Agency visit are still relevant (ref B). He

highlighted that inadequate laboratory facilities, including poor ventilation systems, aging biosafety cabinets, and lack of isolation rooms, is a significant health hazard for laboratory staff and potentially the public. According to (b)(6) the NCZD laboratory is unable to conduct necessary tests due to biosafety concerns, impacting its ability to detect and respond to zoonotic diseases. He added that the Mongolian government is not devoting sufficient resources to zoonotic diseases and that the country has "perfect conditions" for future outbreaks. While the NCZD lacks the resources for an ongoing surveillance program, (b)(6) noted that provincial-level laboratories are conducting ad hoc surveillance activities.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ During a June 13 visit, (b)(6) and (b)(6) related to post that the State Central Veterinary Laboratory (SCVL), which has the country's only biosafety level three (BSL-3) facility, is upgrading its biosafety and biosecurity. Moving away from its current practice of tracking agents separately by section, SCVL plans to develop a comprehensive inventory system to register, store, and track agents collectively as an institution. [Note: According to (b)(6) SCVL can process up to 110 animal and zoonotic diseases, including anthrax, plague, brucellosis, rabies, foot and mouth disease, and avian influenza. End note.] In addition, (b)(6) emphasized the need to strengthen the network of provincial-level veterinary laboratories across the country to minimize the transportation of samples, increase the speed and quality of tests, and allow SCVL to focus on more advanced tests. He added that the impending legal changes expected in animal health and the proposed overhaul of veterinary services provide a unique opportunity to improve provincial-level laboratories (ref C). Moreover, (b)(6) viewed the aging laboratory facility itself as a biosecurity threat, noting that the ventilation and sewage systems are not secure. He also identified the rapid urban development around the SCVL as another cause for concern. Despite relatively strict access controls to SCVL facilities, post observed that the rooms and refrigerators storing anthrax and other pathogens were unlocked and unmonitored by security cameras.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ During a June 9 visit to the IVM, (b)(6) identified maintenance of laboratory equipment as the facility's main challenge for biosafety. For example, (b)(6) noted that biosafety cabinets may not be fully functional as filters are not regularly changed and could potentially cause an accident. She said that the laboratory regularly handles dangerous pathogens, including anthrax and brucellosis. Despite the presence of such pathogens, post observed refrigerators storing pathogens in the hallway of the laboratory and near a backdoor open and unmonitored.

Human Health Laboratory to Be Upgraded, But Concerns Remain

8. ~~(SBU)~~ (b)(6) expressed optimism that NCCD's biosafety and biosecurity will improve with the construction of a new BSL-3 laboratory, scheduled for completion in mid-2018. He noted that the new facility will house all seven constituent laboratories and have the necessary security measures for pathogens. However, (b)(6) expressed concerns over the operation of the new laboratory, including providing biosafety SOPs and training, and requested U.S. assistance in this area. (b)(6) NCZD (b)(6) and a member of the taskforce for the new NCCD laboratory, also voiced concern that MOH's inexperience in constructing and equipping a BSL-3 laboratory could compromise the quality of the new laboratory.

9. ~~(SBU)~~ **Comment:** The Mongolian government has repeatedly requested U.S. assistance to improve the country's laboratory system, including its biosafety and biosecurity (refs B and D). The recently completed JEE reconfirmed the importance and urgent need to upgrade the biosafety and biosecurity measures in Mongolia's animal and human health laboratories. Given Mongolia's ambitious plans to build up the Russia-Mongolia-China economic corridor through China's One Belt One Road initiative, Mongolia is poised to serve as an important connection route linking Asia and Europe (ref E). Increased U.S. assistance would not only ensure infectious disease outbreaks are not transmitted through the new links, but greater U.S. engagement would also provide a place to monitor intercontinental traffic predominately traveling through Russia. **End comment.**

Signature: MICALLER

Drafted By: ULAANBAATAR: (b)(6)

Cleared By: ECON: (b)(6)

DAO: (b)(6)

Approved By: EXEC: (b)(6)

Released By: ULAANBAATAR: (b)(6)

Info: DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; PACOM
IDHS HONOLULU HI *ROUTINE*; MOSCOW, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; SEOUL,
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Date/DTG: Jul 07, 2015 / 071236Z JUL 15
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E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, TBIO, PREL, ECON, KFLU, KGHI, HHS, NIH, CDC, CH
Captions: SENSITIVE
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Subject: Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong Pushes for Health Cooperation on Both Domestic and International Fronts

OGA-012-14

.. ~~(SBU)~~ SUMMARY: The United States and China enjoy a long history of cooperation on public health and biomedical research. However, the politics and structure of the Chinese government have limited Chinese counterparts' health cooperation options with the United States and other global partners. The June 24 bilateral meeting between Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Burwell and Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong, and the U.S.-China Symposium on Ebola, Research, and Global Health Security, hosted at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), highlighted how critical the bilateral partnership is for both countries as they engage in global health efforts. Chinese and U.S. health officials, researchers, and public health experts used the recent response to the Ebola outbreak to demonstrate successes and areas for potential collaboration, particularly in biomedical research and the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). Participants agreed that the United States and China have much in common in our principles and aspirations for global health work, despite differences in traditions and systems, and our cooperation in

global health has great potential. In addition, Secretary Burwell and National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) Minister Li Bin signed an updated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases. END SUMMARY

2. (U) Potential Areas for Increased Cooperation:

Pointing to Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong's request to U.S. Ambassador to China Max Baucus for intensified collaboration on health, HHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell laid out areas for increased cooperation during a 25-minute bilateral discussion held at the NIH:

3. ~~(SBU)~~ Global Health Security

Burwell commented that the Ebola crisis underscored that many countries need assistance to build the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. She highlighted the important work both countries did in West Africa, and reaffirmed that the United States will continue this type of work, including supporting 30 countries to achieve GHSA targets. Liu agreed that the United States and China should continue their strong health collaboration, strengthening joint work between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. CDC) and Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), as they did for the 2013 H7N9 influenza outbreak. Liu related how Chinese and U.S. military worked side by side to off-load and deliver Chinese supplies that arrived by plane in Liberia. Noting that China has "300 medical schools and 58,000 disease monitoring stations," she agreed that the United States and China should work together to help lower and middle income countries defend against infectious disease threats.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ GHSA, Beyond Bureaucratic Challenges

The high-level bilateral meeting proved essential in overcoming bureaucratic stove-piping in the Chinese government and securing Chinese participation in the upcoming GHSA Ministerial. The health lead in the Chinese government, the NHFPC, has repeatedly noted their difficulty in committing to efforts like the GHSA because of difficulty working across Ministries in the Chinese system. In particular, the NHFPC lacks resources to implement such initiatives, authority to work across sectors, and funding to work in other countries, as this funding is controlled by the Ministry of Commerce. Initially, NHFPC privately told HHS that China would not send anyone to the September GHSA Ministerial meeting in Seoul and that they needed more clarity on the GHSA. However, Burwell elevated the topic in her meeting with Vice Premier Liu, who oversees the NHFPC, and NHFPC Minister Li Bin, by highlighting her own plans to attend the Seoul meeting and emphasizing that Chinese participation would be a sign of our ongoing relationship and joint leadership. Liu responded with the support NHFPC had previously said they needed: high-level

endorsement of bilateral cooperation on global health security in front of Minister Li, other ministries, and the China CDC Director. Liu also gave a carefully worded statement that "We will consider who is best to represent China [at the Seoul meeting]." Furthermore, while China CDC sits in the NHFPC, it does have resources to work on a technical level with the United States and partners in other countries. During a CDC Directors' meeting and at the Symposium, the U.S. CDC and China CDC identified several ways they could work together to advance the GHSA in post-Ebola recovery, capacity development, and infectious diseases more broadly.

5. ~~(SBU)~~ Biomedical Research

Liu thanked the U.S. government for hosting the meeting at the NIH, emphasizing China's strong interest in biomedical research partnership. She noted that she had just come from a visit to Houston, Texas, where she presented MD Anderson Cancer Center with an award for their international science and technology cooperation. She highlighted the importance of science and technology education and collaboration under her leadership, and that it is a part of the U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE).

6. ~~(SBU)~~ Domestic Health Care Systems and Other Topics


Vice Premier Liu emphasized that both countries have common responsibilities in improving the health and well-being of their people, and this is why she proposed adding the health pillar to the U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE). She pointed to the 100 Hospitals Managers Exchange as one example of how we can improve health in both countries. Liu also stated that China wants to learn from U.S. experience with insurance, pharmaceutical costs, and reducing facility redundancies. Burwell agreed and suggested two areas for further discussion: 1) emerging threats like Ebola, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and influenza; and 2) healthcare costs, access, and quality, including new models of care and best practices.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ U.S. China Symposium on Ebola, Research, and Global Health Security

Following the bilateral meeting, Burwell and Liu opened the U.S.-China Symposium on Ebola, Research, and Global Health Security. Liu highlighted China's remarkable progress, while reminding the audience of China's developing status and its goal of becoming a "moderately prosperous" nation. Although she had supported global health security collaboration during the bilateral meeting, Liu's statements at the symposium were more general. Her priorities for collaboration with the United States include training high-caliber medical professionals, global health research in areas such as new drugs and diagnostics, technology, and disaster response. She supported

cooperation with the World Health Organization and new initiatives in developing countries, including strengthening institutions and professional training in Africa. She also noted China's experience with traditional Chinese medicine as a particular national strength, comparing it to U.S.-strength in Western medicine.

8. ~~(SBU)~~ Minister Li Bin focused on the Ebola response and future collaboration. She introduced an NHFPC-produced video about China's response to the Ebola outbreak [The video can be seen here: http://youtu.be/AQ_8nIwos8w], which highlighted World Health Organization and African recognition of China's response to Ebola and emphasizing U.S.-China cooperation. She then outlined four areas for future bilateral collaboration: 1) emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, as demonstrated by the MOU renewal; 2) strengthening U.S. and Chinese efforts to support Africa and other countries in implementing the WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs); 3) continued exchanges for clinical and medical education and research; and 4) enhancing emergency response capacity globally. (Comment: Both the video and Li's recommendations appeared directed at the Chinese leadership, particularly Liu, and suggest that NHFPC is lobbying leadership to obtain the mandate and funds to collaborate further with the United States. End comment.)
9. ~~(SBU)~~ NIH Director Francis Collins highlighted the two countries' collaboration in advancements in cancer and infectious disease. He acknowledged China's contributions to genomic understanding, including to the human genome project and most recently, The Cancer Genome Atlas. He praised the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences president for his leadership of the Global Alliance for Chronic Diseases, highlighted our shared priority to lower the burden of non-communicable diseases, and suggested that future opportunities for cooperation could include the BRAIN Initiative and the Precision Medicine Initiative.
10. ~~(SBU)~~ Burwell and Li concluded the session by signing the renewal of an MOU on Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases, supporting U.S.-China cooperation on scientific discovery, evidence-based policy-making and practice, health system and workforce capacity building, and efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to emerging and re-emerging health threats.



11. ~~(SBU)~~ The Symposium continued with technical presentations and discussions on areas for future collaboration. U.S. and Chinese representatives from the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, China CDC, NIH, and CDC demonstrated the role of research and capacity building in responding to emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases and achieving global health security. China CDC highlighted its contributions of Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) labs, resources, staff, and research for the Ebola response, and U.S. CDC provided more detail on the role of GHSA in providing a roadmap for IHR implementation.
12. ~~(SBU)~~ Conclusions and Future Directions
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science, Space, and Health Jonathan Margolis led the closing panel discussion, which focused on next steps for U.S.-China collaboration in biomedical research and global health security. The panelists identified several priority areas for research collaboration, including in Ebola drug and vaccine research and coordination of multiple long-term scientific studies. China CDC Director Wang Yu noted that while China has a long history of sending medical teams to developing countries, they now realize the importance of building public health systems and would like to work with U.S. CDC, these countries, and other partners to do this effectively. Margolis closed by highlighting that our two systems have many common principles and visions for outcomes, such as a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats, and that we can move forward on that basis. Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences Director Cao Xuetao concluded that the work on Ebola and other U.S.-China health cooperation will be a good platform for future bilateral cooperation.
13. ~~(SBU)~~ Bilateral Meeting Participants
Joining Liu at the bilateral discussion were Minister of the

National Health and Family Planning Commission, Li Bin; Minister of Education Yuan Guiren; Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council Jiang Xiaojuan; the Director of the China CDC, Wang Yu; Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology Wang Zhigang; Deputy Chief of Mission Wu Xi; as well as other officials from the NHFPC and the Ministries of Education, and Foreign Affairs. U.S. participants joining Secretary Burwell included HHS Assistant Secretary for Global Affairs Jimmy Kolker, NIH Director Francis Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science, Space, and Health Jonathan Margolis, CDC Division for Global Health Protection Director Jordan Tappero, HHS Health Attaché to China Ken Earhart, CDC China Country Director Ron Moolenaar, NIH National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Director Anthony Fauci, and other HHS participants.

Signature: Kerry

Drafted By: HHS/OS/OGA: (b)(6)
Cleared By: HHS/OS/OGA: (b)(6)
HHS/NIH: (b)(6)
HHS/CDC: (b)(6)
HHS/CDC: (b)(6)
HHS/CDC: (b)(6)
HHS HEALTH ATTACHE: (b)(6)
OES/S: (b)(6)
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MRN: 18 WUHAN 38
Date/DTG: Apr 19, 2018 / 190551Z APR 18
From: AMCONSUL WUHAN
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, PGOV, CN, PREL, TBIO, KGHI, CDC, EAID, KHIV, IN, JP, TW, TSPL, PINS, SENV
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 18 BEIJING 138
B) 17 BEIJING 2458
C) 11 MUMBAI 630
D) 17 TOKYO 716
E) 13 SEOUL 790
Subject: China Virus Institute Welcomes More U.S. Cooperation on Global Health Security

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary with Comment:** China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global pandemic will originate in China, the United States should prioritize expanding our already significant cooperation with this institute. This should include partnering with the institute on basic science research and the Global Virome Project (Ref B), and possibly trilateral U.S.-China-EU projects, building on the institute's strong ties with France. **End Summary with Comment.**

2. (U) Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers and staff gave an overview of the lab and current cooperation with the United States to visiting Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counsellor Rick Switzer and Consulate Wuhan Consul General Jamie Fouss in late March. In the last year, the institute has also hosted visits from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation, and experts from the University of Texas Medical Branch in

Galveston. The institute reports to the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing.

P4 Lab is Open and Transparent, Officials Emphasize

3. ~~(SBU)~~ The Wuhan P4 lab, referring to labs with the highest level of safety precautions, became fully operational and began working with live viruses early this year. Institute officials said they believed it is the only operational P4 lab in Asia aside from a U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC)-supported facility in Pune, India (Ref C). China plans to stand up a second P4 lab in Harbin. Institute officials said Japan's biosafety labs are "old" and lack cutting-edge equipment, so they consider Japan's labs to be "P3 Plus" (*Note: the Japanese government says it has one P4-level lab in the Tokyo suburbs, though its activities are limited, and Japan is building a new P4 lab in Nagasaki, see Ref D. Taiwan operates at least one P4 lab. South Korea was close to opening a P4 lab as of last year, see Ref E. End Note.*) Wuhan's lab is located about 20 miles from the city center in Zhengdian district, and the institute plans to gradually consolidate its other training, classroom and lab facilities at that location.

4. (U) Officials described the lab as a "regional node" in the global biosafety system and said it would play an emergency response role in an epidemic or pandemic. The lab's English brochure highlighted a national security role, saying that it "is an effective measure to improve China's availability in safeguarding national bio-safety if [a] possible biological warfare or terrorist attack happens."

5. ~~(SBU)~~ Institute officials said there would be "limited availability" for international and domestic scientists who had gone through the necessary approval process to do research at the lab. They stressed that the lab aimed to be a "worldwide, open platform" for virology. They said they welcomed U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) experts, noting that the Chinese Academy of Sciences was not strong on human disease expertise, having only focused on it in the last 15 years, after the SARS outbreak. A Wuhan-based French consulate official who works on science and technology cooperation with China also emphasized that the lab, which was initiated in 2004 as a France-China joint project, was meant to be "open and transparent" to the global scientific community. "The intent was to set up a lab to international standards, and open to international research," he said. French experts have provided guidance and biosafety training to the lab, which will continue, the French official said. Institute officials said that France provided the lab's design and much of its technology, but that it is entirely China-funded and has been completely China-run since a "handover" ceremony in 2016.

6. (U) In addition to French assistance, experts from the NIH-supported P4 lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston have trained Wuhan lab technicians in lab management and maintenance, institute officials said. The Wuhan institute plans to invite scientists from the Galveston lab to do research in Wuhan's lab. One Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher trained for two years at the Galveston lab, and the institute also sent one scientist to U.S. CDC headquarters in Atlanta for six months' work on influenza.

NIH-Supported Research Revises SARS Origin Story

7. (U) NIH was a major funder, along with the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), of

SARS research by the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Shi Zhengli and Cui Jie. The researchers spent five years of investigation and genome sequencing to show that a population of bats in a cave in Yunnan Province harbored a virus with all the "building blocks" of SARS. This lends weight to the theory that SARS originated in bat populations before jumping first to civet cats (likely via bat feces) and then to humans, after people transported the civet cats from Yunnan to Guangdong Province animal markets. The results were published late last year in *Nature* and other publications. Shi said that U.S. scientist Peter Daszak, a leading expert on emerging diseases and president of the New York-based EcoHealth Alliance, was a "strong partner." Daszak's team has provided support in statistical modeling to assess the risk of more coronaviruses like SARS crossing over to human populations.

Ready to Help with the Global Virome Project

8. (U) Institute officials expressed strong interest in the Global Virome Project (GVP), and said Chinese funding for the project would likely come from Chinese Academy of Sciences funding already earmarked for One Belt, One Road-related initiatives. The GVP aims to launch this year as an international collaborative effort to identify within ten years virtually all of the planet's viruses that have pandemic or epidemic potential and the ability to jump to humans. "We hope China will be one of the leading countries to initiate the Global Virome Project," one Wuhan Institute of Virology official said. China attended a GVP unveiling meeting in January in Thailand and is waiting for more details on the initiative. The officials said that the Chinese government funds projects similar to GVP to investigate the background of viruses and bacteria. This essentially constituted China's own Virome Project, officials said, but they noted the program currently has no official name.

9. ~~(SBU)~~ The Wuhan Institute of Virology's Shi Zhengli is the China Country Coordinator for the USAID-funded PREDICT project, which is designed to show "proof of concept" and be a forerunner to the Global Virome Project. Li Hongying, with the EcoHealth Alliance (a New York City-based NGO that is working with the University of California, Davis to manage the PREDICT project), recently planned to visit Wuhan to meet with Shi. Li noted that China has expressed interest in building the GVP database, which would put China in a leadership position. Other countries have confidence in China's ability to build such a database, but are skeptical on whether China could remain transparent as a "gatekeeper" for this information, she said. Li expressed frustration with the slow progress so far in launching GVP, noting that the effort lacked funding sources, needed to hire a CEO, and would have to boost its profile at G7, G20 and other high-level international meetings.

U.S.-China Workshop Explores Research Partnerships

10. (U) The Institute also has ongoing collaboration with the U.S. National Science Foundation, including a just-concluded workshop in Shenzhen, involving about 40 scientists from the United States and China, on the topic of the "Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases." Co-sponsored by the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the Chinese lead for this workshop was the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Hu Zhihong, and the U.S. co-chair was the University of Oklahoma's Xiao Xiangming. The workshop explored opportunities for U.S.-China research cooperation in areas like using "big data" to predict emerging infectious

diseases, climate change's effect on vector-borne diseases, and pathogen transmission between wildlife, domestic animals and humans.

11. ~~(SBU)~~ Some workshop participants also expressed skepticism about the Global Virome Project's (GVP) approach, saying that gaining a predictive understanding of viruses with pandemic potential would require going beyond the GVP's strategy of sample collection, to take an "ecological" approach that considers the virome beyond vertebrate systems to identify mechanisms driving pathogen evolution. A follow-on workshop will be held in June at the University of Berkeley. NSF and NSFC hope to jointly announce a funding call for collaborative projects later this year.

Signature: FOUSS

Drafted By: WUHAN [redacted] (Wuhan)
Cleared By: ESTH [redacted] (Beijing)
NSF [redacted] (Beijing)
USAID [redacted] (Beijing)
HHS/NIH [redacted] (Beijing)
ESTH [redacted] (b)(6) (Beijing)
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Date:	Wed, 8 Jan 2014 16:32:39 -0500

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MRN: 14 STATE 2302
Date/DTG: Jan 08, 2014 / 082132Z JAN 14
From: SECSTATE WASHDC
Action: BEIJING, AMEMBASSY *IMMEDIATE*; GENEVA, USMISSION *IMMEDIATE*
For Addressee(s) Only
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CH
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: Bilateral Meeting with China on Biological Weapons Convention Issues

Summary: Members of the Chinese delegation to the BWC Meeting of States Parties (MSP), led by MFA Deputy Director-General for Arms Control and Disarmament Li Yang, met with their U.S. counterparts December 9 in Geneva to discuss BWC and related issues. Li was well-briefed and conversant with the issues, and maintained a positive, constructive tone throughout, even when raising Chinese concerns. He emphasized his belief that, while China was taking appropriate steps to manage biological threats, the United States had done more in this area than other countries, and China could usefully learn from our experience. He also described nonproliferation cooperation as a "bright spot" in the bilateral relationship. The discussion identified a number of areas where Chinese and U.S. views converge, lending credibility to Li's suggestion that the United States and China could together play a leading role in shaping the future of the BWC. (Comment: This did not stop China from supporting Non-Aligned Movement efforts to weaken the MSP report during backroom negotiations later in the week. End comment.) Li conveyed concern over how China is depicted in the BWC portion of the annual Compliance Report to Congress, and asked about future Chinese membership in the Australia Group. The meeting ended with an offer from the Chinese side to host the next round of consultations in Beijing in the spring of 2014. End Summary

Looking Back to the Seventh Review Conference (RevCon) and Ahead to the Eighth

The Deputy Head of the U.S. Delegation to the MSP, Chris Park, provided an overview of U.S. thinking on this issue. He noted that, while we did not obtain all of our objectives at the

Seventh BWC RevCon (2011), we did get an agenda for the 2012-2015 intersessional process that includes all the topics we wanted. The challenge now is to make progress on these topics in spite of the limited time available in BWC intersessional meetings, the wide-ranging agenda, and the challenges of consensus-based negotiations in such a large group. Park outlined our priorities – strengthening national implementation of the BWC, increasing confidence in compliance through voluntary transparency measures and efforts to strengthen the CBM system, improving international capabilities to detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks, and promoting sound, balanced oversight of dual-use science. Given the difficulty of negotiating strong enough language on “common understandings and effective action” in meeting reports, meaningful progress will also require interested States Parties to pursue practical cooperation on issues of mutual interest between meetings. Such efforts have merit on their own, but could also serve as the basis for well-developed, broadly supported proposals for action at the Eighth RevCon.

Li agreed regarding the time limitation and other constraints and asked whether we have proposed this approach to the Chair and the ISU. Park said we discussed it with them and don’t consider it something that requires formal action, but rather view it as an approach that complements the existing process. Li replied that China was “practical” and had no problem with that approach but opined that the willingness of some developing countries to go along with it might depend on their satisfaction with the assistance and cooperation they are getting. Noting the MSP presentations by Iraq and Malaysia on the assistance they are receiving from the United States, Park suggested that the convergence of concerns about international public health and national security has changed the dynamic on this issue, as developed countries increasingly see such cooperation as both in their interest and relevant to the BWC. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, he added, have different agendas, some of which are quite political in nature. The satisfaction of many NAM states with the cooperation they are experiencing does not seem to deter this faction from making generic and/or unyielding proposals for BWC reports. Li said that, in general, States Parties have high expectations for the Eighth RevCon and concluded that, working together, the United States and China can play more of a role, including by jointly making proposals to other BWC Parties.

National Implementation

Li stated that China, as a victim of biological weapons (BW) during World War II, “hates” them more than any other country, making the BWC particularly important to it. Li went on to describe the steps China has taken to implement the Convention domestically, highlighting an MFA-led interagency coordination process that includes some ten agencies, including the ministries of national defense, agriculture, and public health. Chinese laws, regulations, and other measures, he said, include criminalization measures, safety and security requirements for laboratories and dangerous pathogens, strengthening emergency and public health response measures, and a national legal system for export controls (here he praised our bilateral cooperation on CBW and nuclear control issues). He described these measures as “operating smoothly,” though China could and should do more. He proudly noted that China has submitted BWC confidence-building measures (CBMs) since 1988, and reported on its BSL-3 facilities before it was required by the CBM system as a gesture of transparency. Li also noted that China had received “good recommendations” from other States Parties – including the United States –

in setting up these systems, which he saw as demonstrating the value of bilateral exchanges. Del reps commended China's effective and science-based handling of the ongoing H7N9 influenza outbreak and briefly described U.S. implementation of the Convention, including recent efforts to address the issue of dual-use research of concern (DURC).

Joint Efforts to Strengthen Implementation

Biosafety/Biosecurity: Praising the United States for our biorisk management efforts, Li discussed China's own efforts and identified areas for potential cooperation including standards for the operation of laboratories, strengthening controls over the packaging and transport of pathogens, "qualification approval" for those carrying out research on biology, and other efforts to reduce the risk of the misuse of such research. Park expressed interest in exchanging information on our respective biorisk management practices.

National Implementation: Li noted that "some Western countries" want a new approach to national implementation, as reflected in France's peer review proposal. He characterized Russia's "misgivings" about the proposal as having to do with a need for "experts" for the peer reviews, most of which would have to come from the developed world, meaning developed and developing countries would not be on an equal footing. Li added that China has concerns, too, and wondered whether it would have qualified experts for such exercises. Park said that the United States has some related concerns, and cannot support any kind of committee that would make judgments on whether Parties' implementation was compliant with the Convention. The recent trial exercise in France, in which both the U.S. and China participated, however, was focused heavily France's sharing of information and the lessons it had learned about its own system. Park added that the exercise was more useful than he expected in increasing understanding of exactly how France implements certain obligations, and could potentially both strengthen implementation through the sharing of best practices and increase trust, but should not be viewed as a tool for determining compliance. Li pointed out that many Parties, including China, wish to return to negotiations on a verification protocol, but he acknowledged that not all agree and suggested we need other ways to move "forward" on national implementation and compliance.

Cooperation and Assistance: Park indicated U.S. interest in working with China to provide appropriate assistance to other Parties, and asked whether China has considered using its 2014 chairmanship of APEC to encourage APEC members that have not done so to complete their implementation of the WHO International Health Regulations, in light of the potential economic impacts of disease outbreaks and China's H7N9 success story. Li replied that this was a very interesting idea and promised to report it to Beijing. Without providing details, he said that China does participate in regional cooperation on BWC-related matters. Li praised the United States for our wide-ranging cooperation with others, but asked why some developing countries perceive a tightening of U.S. controls on cooperation in the life sciences. (Comment: (b)(5))

(b)(5)

(b)(5) End comment.) Park speculated that it could be because our Select Agent Regulations can apply even overseas and, as cooperation grows, more labs may be affected. Perhaps we should consider how better to explain the relevant regulations and their rationale.

CBMs: Li said that China is encouraging other Parties to submit CBMs but that it has a “redline” against making CBMs compulsory. Park replied that we agree on the latter point, and noted that we recently demarched a range of Parties who have not submitted CBMs this year. Li said that China has discussed CBMs with the other “BRIC” countries and is thinking of doing more in this area.

Bilateral Cooperation

Export Controls: Li stated that China had learned a lot at the recent Australia Group (AG) “outreach dialogue” talks in Budapest, and noted that since 2004, there have been six rounds of exchanges on AG issues. Li asserted that China’s export controls are essentially the same as those of AG members (e.g., in terms of their control lists, catch-all controls, licensing systems, and end-user certificate requirements). Since China’s controls are the same as others, Li wanted to know U.S. views regarding the possibility of China joining the AG, adding that China’s continued exclusion may create the perception that its export controls are not up to the AG’s standard. Park replied that he did not know our position on Chinese membership but committed to ask for an answer from Washington. Ji Zhaoyu – who participated in the Budapest dialogue – later indicated that China believed the United States was creating obstacles to Chinese membership.

DURC: Park described U.S. oversight efforts and expressed a desire for a dialogue with China and others on the issue. Li called DURC a “pressing task” and briefly described China’s process for approving DURC projects and efforts to make scientists and others aware of the concern. This process includes governmental review before publication of certain research and efforts to build awareness of the issue among scientists. Praising U.S. public awareness efforts, he said China has a long way to go in this area, and BWC Parties should coordinate on DURC issues.

U.S. Compliance Report: Li approached the issue very gingerly, describing efforts to cultivate a new nonproliferation “culture” as a “bright spot” in the U.S.-China relationship. However, he complained, the compliance report’s annual conclusions regarding China go against this trend, are not “based on the factual situation,” and are something “we’re not willing to see.” China sought a “new relationship on nonproliferation,” he added, and “our expectation is that the U.S. will stop this kind of description.” Park replied that we were legally required to make this report to Congress, that it was not a reflection of our bilateral relationship, and that we very much wanted to cooperate with China on nonproliferation. He noted that we had shared U.S. concerns about Chinese compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention through bilateral channels, and those concerns were subsequently resolved, demonstrating the value of open discussion on such matters. He stressed that the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance had lead responsibility for the report and should be China’s main interlocutor on this point.

Future Consultations: Li, who viewed the meeting as a long-deferred follow-on to bilateral consultations held in Washington in 2008, ended by inviting a U.S. delegation to Beijing in the spring for follow-up consultations on BWC issues. Park replied the invitation was very welcome and said we would respond in due course.

Signature: Kerry

Drafted By: ISN_BPS: (b)(6)

Cleared By: ISN/BPS: (b)(6)

AVC/CBW: (b)(6)

EAP/CM: (b)(6)

Approved By: ISN: (b)(6)

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Subject:	Angola: COVID-19: Cases Rise to 96, State of Calamity Extended through June 24
Date:	Thu, 11 Jun 2020 12:17:56 GMT

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MRN: 20 LUANDA 454
Date/DTG: Jun 11, 2020 / 111215Z JUN 20
From: AMEMBASSY LUANDA
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PREL, SHLH, TBIO, KHIV, KNCV, CDC, AO
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: 20 Luanda 432
Subject: Angola: COVID-19: Cases Rise to 96, State of Calamity Extended through June 24

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Key Points:

- From May 26 to June 9, the Government announced 26 new cases of COVID-19, bringing the total caseload to 96.
- On June 3, the Government extended the current State of Calamity through June 24.
- On June 8, the Chinese Ambassador to Angolan defended the quality of the 260,000 tons of biosafety material purchased from China.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ **Cases Rise to 96 with 38 Recoveries, Testing Capacity Increases:** In the two week period from May 26 to June 9, the Angolan Government (GRA) announced that 26 people tested positive for COVID-19, bringing the total caseload to 96. The newest five cases are imported, resulting from an Angolan government sponsored May 18 repatriation flight from Russia of over 250 Angolan students. These people went directly into quarantine from the airplane upon arrival, and because of low testing capacity, results are only being made available now. On June 8, the GRA announced that 14 people had recovered from COVID-19, bringing total recoveries to 38, with four deaths and 68 active cases. On June 8, the GRA also announced that 12,155 samples had been taken to date and that 780 people remained in government quarantine centers. On June 7, the GRA announced the arrival of 14,000 of the 60,000 Abbott reagents for COVID-19 testing they procured with funds from a World Bank loan. The Abbott reagents will allow the Ministry of Health to increase COVID-19 testing capacity from the current level of 90 tests per day to 600 tests per day.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ **Government Extends "State of Calamity":** On June 3, the Angolan Council of Ministers extended the national State of Calamity (reftel) until June 25. The extension came as the GRA gradually reopens Angolan economic activities. On June 8, in compliance with the State of Calamity, the GRA instituted several changes, including:

- Businesses increased staffing from 50 percent to 75 percent of staffing totals.
- Public transportation increased from 50 percent to 75 percent of capacity.
- Restaurants could remain open beyond 3:30 p.m. until 10:30 p.m.
- Museums and theaters could reopen to the public.
- Construction work was allowed to resume.

Luanda was set to be reopened at 11:59 on June 9 to routine incoming and outgoing personal overland travel; however, on June 9, the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Interior officials indefinitely postponed the opening of Luanda, citing ongoing COVID-19 transmission in the nation's capital.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ **Chinese Ambassador Defends Chinese Materials:** In a June 8 interview on national television, Chinese Ambassador to Angola Gong Tao defended the quality of the 260,000 tons of COVID-19 biosafety materials and equipment thus far received by Angola – out of a total of 380,000 tons of biosafety gear purchased by the GRA from China. The Chinese Ambassador asserted that the masks, protective gear, and equipment followed rigorous safety standards, and that any suggestions to the contrary were likely coming from outsiders. He declined to identify the outsiders.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Signature: FITE

Drafted By: LUANDA:(b)(6)
Cleared By: HHS/CDC/GHT:(b)(6)
 EXEC/LEG:(b)(6)
Approved By: EXEC:Fite:(b)(6)
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~~-SBU-~~

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To:	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>; Beijing EXEC Staffers <BeijingEXEC@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
Date:	Mon, 4 Sep 2017 21:11:54 -0400

OK. Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 5, 2017 08:53
To: (b)(6) (Beijing); Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

(b)(6)

Political Minister Counselor Bill Klein will now take the meeting. He is serving as A/DCM today.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

U.S. Embassy Beijing

Tel: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Official
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From: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 8:23 AM
To: Beijing EXEC Staffers
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing
Importance: High

Hi EXEC,

We received the following emails from our visitors. We have planned a 3pm meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon. However, Dr. George Gao, Director-General of China CDC, will not be able to come because NHFPC-National Health and Family Planning Commission requested him to go for their

meeting. So they recommended Dr. Weijun Chen, Vice President, Beijing Genomics Institute, to join the meeting with the Ambassador this afternoon.

Not sure if this would be appropriate for switching a major visitor at this time?

(b)(6) will be traveling back from Hangzhou to Beijing this morning.

Thank you very much!

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing (b)(6)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Hongying Li [mailto:(b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Monday, September 04, 2017 11:30 PM
To: (b)(6) Beijing
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (GH/HIDN)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6)

Please only add Dr. Weijun Chen, because Dr. Zhang just texted me about a family emergency that he has to be in the hospital tomorrow afternoon.

Please Wechat anytime if any question or slides downloading issues.

Thanks,

Hongying

On Sep 4, 2017, at 10:36 PM, Hongying Li (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

George Gao will have to attend another meeting with the Ministry of Health at 3pm, so unfortunately cannot join our meeting at the Embassy. However, he has recommended Dr. Yongzhen Zhang to represent China CDC to attend the meeting to pass his message. Also, we had a meeting with the Beijing Genomics Institute today, and Dennis has invited their Vice President, Dr. Weijun Chen, to join our meeting and the briefing for Ambassador. Other attendees, (b)(6) are keeping the same schedule as before.

Below please find the ID information about these two scientists:

First Name	Last Name	Chinese ID	Title
Yongzhen	Zhang	(b)(6)	Director, Department of Zoonoses, National Institute for Communicable Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC

Weijun
Institute

Chen

(b)(6)

Vice President, Beijing Genomics

Sorry for this last-minute change. I will also try to get their bios to send to you tomorrow morning. Please let me know if this can be approved. Thank you

Best Regards,
Hongying

On Aug 29, 2017, at 9:53 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Hi Hongying,

Well-noted. It is OK to add one more person. But we want to clarify the participants for the following marked in yellow:

1. A.Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-13:15: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.
2. (b)(6) wants (b)(6) and Peter to join since it is US internal discussion for managing.
2. B.Health Working Group Meeting 13:30-14:50: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it's an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.
*All of the 6 persons you mentioned below are welcomed to join, plus (b)(6)
3. C.Briefing for Ambassador 15:00-16:00: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price's visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.
4. (b)(6) wants (b)(6) Peter, George Gao, and SHI Zhenglin to join due to the limited space.
5. D.Early Dinner Reception at Development Counselor's Residence 16:30-18:00: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.
*All of the 6 persons you mentioned below are welcomed to join, plus Dennis.

Therefore, there are some logistic details to consider. For example, (b)(6) and Peter may arrive at the south gate of US Embassy at 11:45am; while the 6 of you can arrive at 13:15. When the 4 of them go to the Ambassador's office, the rest of you can still stay at the conference room (Mammoth Cave Conference Room) during 15:00-16:00? When their meeting with the Ambassador finishes, all of you can walk to (b)(6) residence which is not far from the Embassy compound. Please see the attached location map for (b)(6) residence.

And for entering US Embassy, I think you know all the details since you have been here before. Pls. tell them to bring an original pictured ID/passport and avoid too many electronic items. If you have a PPT presentation for the 13:30 health working group meeting, please let me know so that I can arrange in advance.

And for the meeting with the Ambassador, we have the bios for (b)(6) Peter, and George Gao, but we do not have that for Prof. SHI Zhenglin, can you provide? We need to pass on to the Ambassador's office.

Thank you very much!

(b)(6)

USAID/Beijing

US Embassy Beijing

Phone: (b)(6) 3097 Fax: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)@state.gov

<http://www.usaid.gov> <http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/usaid.html>

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Hongying Li [mailto:(b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1:26 AM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6),

Plan changes everyday... We are adding another person to the meeting. Dr. Guangjian Zhu, China Field Coordinator of Ecohealth Alliance.

Last Name	First Name	Passport or Chinese ID	Organization
Gao	Fu	(b)(6)	Director, China CDC/Professor, CAS
Daszak	Peter		President, EcoHealth Alliance
Shi	Zhengli		Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS
Watson	Brooke		Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance
Zhu	Guangjian		China Field Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance
Li	Hongying		China Programs Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance
Contact Cell: (b)(6)		(Hongying Li)	

Thanks,
Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 4:58 PM, Hongying Li (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6),

Apologies for these repeated emails. But just arrived in Beijing and found my phone number doesn't work any more.

So please use my new phone number: (b)(6) as the contact cell, or you can find me anytime on Wechat (b)(6). Thank you.

Best,

Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 3:40 PM, Hongying Li (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi Ellen,

Just got confirmation from George to attend the meetings on Sept. 5. So the updated information is as the follows:

Last Name	First Name	Passport or Chinese ID	Organization
Gao	Fu	(b)(6)	Director, China CDC/Professor, CAS
Daszak	Peter		President, EcoHealth Alliance
Shi	Zhengli		Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS
Watson	Brooke		Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance
Li	Hongying		China Program Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance
Contact Cell: (b)(6)		(Hongying Li)	

Just in case, the email address of George and his assistant are: George Gao: (b)(6) and his assistant Ms. Yu Bai: (b)(6)

Thank you.

Best,

Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 11:47 AM, Hongying Li (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org wrote:

Hi (b)(6),

Of course! Peter's email is (b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org, please feel free to send the invites.

And thank you very much for sharing the meeting agenda, all sounds great, and I have forwarded it to George Gao and his assistant.

Per your previous request, below is the ID information of our attendees (except for George):

Last Name	First Name	Passport or Chinese ID No.	Organization
Daszak	Peter	(b)(6)	President, EcoHealth Alliance
Shi	Zhengli		Professor, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS
Watson	Brooke		Research Scientist, EcoHealth Alliance
Li	Hongying		China Program Coordinator, EcoHealth Alliance

Contact Cell: (b)(6) (Hongying Li)

Since I will be with them, so please feel free to contact me if there is any questions or issues need to be addressed.

(b)(6) will arrive in Beijing on Saturday at 5:20pm, his flight no. is CX5992, and he said he can take a taxi from the airport to the hotel, so no need to arrange pickup transportation. During other time in Beijing, I will take care of them.

Let me know if any further information I can provide, hope George will confirm his attendance soon. Thank you very much!

Best,

Hongying

On Aug 28, 2017, at 10:38 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Can you kindly provide Peter's email address so that I can send the meeting invites to this calendar? I will also copy you. Thanks,

(b)(6) USAID/Beijing

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

Sent: Monday, August 28, 2017 9:19 AM

To: Hongying Li

Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) GH/HIDN; (b)(6) (Beijing)

Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi, Hongying,

We know you are planning the trip so we'd like to share with you the below activities we've proposed to (b)(6). If you have any questions, just let us know.

On Sept.5:

1. Working Lunch for USAID/CDC/HHS/ESTH 12:00-1:00: focus on global health security portion of development assistance to discuss how GVP can be wrapped into US-China development cooperation.
2. Health Working Group Meeting 1:30-3:00: the participants of this meeting is broader than the previous working lunch and it's an update on the Global Virome Project (GVP) to learn what China is thinking and doing on zoonotic diseases and getting ahead of future pandemics and its new relationship with the BRI.

3. Briefing for Ambassador 3:00-4:00: to connect the discussions surrounding Secretary Price's visit on pandemic disease and global health security with US and Chinese initiatives on the ground in Beijing.
4. Reception at Development Counselor's apartment: with colleagues from some of the multilateral and bilateral Missions to Beijing who are interested in cooperation with China in global health security in the developing world.

We are very glad that George Gao and some other scientists would join (b)(6) to the Embassy. Please share with them the agenda as well. Kindly let us know which activities George and Chinese scientists will attend and we'll make preparations accordingly.

Thanks and best,

(b)(6)

USAID Beijing

Tel: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

Mobile: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)@state.gov

From: Hongying Li [mailto:(b)(6)@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 10:03 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)
Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)
Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6),

Very nice to hear from you!

(b)(6) will stay at the Kerry Hotel Beijing, close to the Embassy, and I will get his flight info. and send to you if he needs the pick up. (I will also be in Beijing with them, so it should be fine)

There may be 1-2 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences attending the meeting at the US Embassy, so will confirm with (b)(6) to finalize the attendee list and send you the passport information by this Friday.

Will write back to you soon. Thank you!

Best,

Hongying

On Aug 23, 2017, at 4:41 AM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Hi Li Hongying,

Since Peter will come together with (b)(6) for meetings inside the US Embassy Beijing on September 5th afternoon, can you pass on the passport information for Peter? As usual, I need:

- his full name as same as on the passport
- contact cell

Which hotel have you booked (b)(6)? And I think we do not need to arrange airport pick-up or sending for him since Eco-Health Alliance will cover?

Thank you very much!

(b)(6)

USAID/Beijing

US Embassy Beijing

Phone: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)@state.gov

<http://www.usaid.gov> <http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/usaid.html>

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2017 3:07 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing)

Subject: Re: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

Hi (b)(6),

Thanks for all the information for (b)(6)!

On the point of scheduling, what information would be helpful to know? Dennis and (b)(6) will likely arrive in Beijing on Sunday, 9/3. The hope is that they will spend Monday having various other GVP-related meetings, including meeting with George Gao (Chinese Academy of Sciences), who is one of the GVP Steering Committee members. They have reserved 9/5 for Embassy meetings and are currently available for dinner that evening. The plan is for them to travel to Hong Kong the morning of 9/6.

Much like with the Beijing GVP meeting, Hongying Li (EcoHealth Alliance) is handling the coordination of the visit ((@ecohealthalliance.org) and I would be happy to connect the two of you if that would be helpful.

Additionally, as you get a sense of whether or not the 5th will work for the Embassy meetings and if a dinner will work, please let us know and we can work with Hongying to ensure that the rest of the schedule is built around that.

Thanks again,

(b)(6)

Emerging Threats Division
Office of Infectious Disease
Bureau for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Desk: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)@usaid.gov

On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 10:17 AM, (b)(6)@usaid.gov> wrote:

(b)(6) the letter for (b)(6) would be perfect

Thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Emerging Threats Program
U.S. Agency for International Development
Office: (b)(6)
Mobile: (b)(6)

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 9:56 PM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

>

> Hi (b)(6)

>

> We would very much like to provide assistance for your Chinese visa application. But after viewing your draft letter that requires (b)(6) to endorse, I have questions on doing so.

>

> Usually, if you travel on your personal passport, you are not doing business trips, but for tourism purpose, right? If so, it seems inappropriate for (b)(6) to send you the following invitation letter. Instead, he can send you a letter for tourism purpose; or you do not need any letter for a tourism visa to China?

>

> Do you have a chance to renew your diplomatic passport? Is it OK to send an eCC by quoting your personal passport number? Anyway, we need an eCC for building access.

>

> Even when you travel by your diplomatic passport, our Visa-Let would only mention that you will travel to China for doing consultations with US Embassy Beijing. We usually do not mention details since we are afraid that the Chinese Embassy may require more information or a

Chinese receiving institution to issue a formal invitation letter that we have nowhere to ask for. Please see a sample as attached.

>

> Please check with someone in DC who handles your visa application.

>

> One more question is on your Agenda to Beijing. (b)(6) plans to arrange an inter-agency meeting and a possible meeting with the Ambassador on the afternoon of Sept. 5, followed by a dinner hosted by (b)(6). What about your other meetings in Beijing and how long will you stay in Beijing? Thank you very much!

>

> (b)(6), USAID/Beijing

>

>

> This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

>

>

> From: (b)(6) (Beijing)

> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 7:38 AM

> To: (b)(6) (GH/HIDN); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)

> Subject: RE: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

>

> Sure. We understand the problem. We will get the letter back to you today.

>

> From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)@usaid.gov]

> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2017 1:35 AM

> To: (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (GH/PRH/RTU:AAAS)

> Subject: A request: Regarding my upcoming travel to Beijing

>

> (b)(6), greetings from Washington. Quick request. In processing my visa for China I need a letter from you (because i am using my personal passport; my diplomatic passport has less than 6 months remaining but still has some very valuable and active visas for other countries). I have drafted a letter below. Could you modify as you wish and send it back on official letter head? Thanks

>

>

> d

>

>

>

>

> (b)(6)

>

> Emerging Threats Division

> Bureau for Global Health

> U.S. Agency for International Development

>

> Dear Dr. Carroll,

>

> I would like to invite you to come to Beijing the week of September 3 in order to follow up the discussions held earlier this year between USAID and the China Centers for Disease Control, the Beijing Genomics Institute and the China Academy of Science on the Global Virome Project (GVP). The government of China has continued to express their interest in an expanded partnership on GVP; your visit would be an important opportunity to further develop the details of such a partnership.

>

>

Sincerely,

>

>

>

>

(b)(6)

>

USAID Development Counselor

>

U.S. Embassy

>

>

>

>

>

> Official

> UNCLASSIFIED

>

> <winmail.dat>

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Hongying Li, MPH 李泓莹

China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance

460 West 34th Street – 17th floor

New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)

(b)(6) (China mobile)

Hongying Li (Skype)

(b)(6) (WeChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.

Hongying Li, MPH 李泓莹
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance

460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(b)(6) (U.S. mobile)

(b)(6) (China mobile)

Hongying Li (Skype)

(b)(6) (WeChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge scientific research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science, we develop solutions that prevent pandemics and promote conservation.

<081218 NEC Map.ppt><USAID Development Counselor House.ppt>

Sender:	(b)(6) (Beijing)" (b)(6)@state.gov>
	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient:	Beijing EXEC Staffers <BeijingEXEC@state.gov>;
	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown
Date:	Tue, 28 Apr 2020 16:45:25 +0000

Includes Nature article addressing potential for pandemic.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:59 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Attached is the Nature article I referenced below.

Relevant Summary: The laboratory in Wuhan is on the cusp of being cleared to work with the world's most dangerous pathogens. The move is part of a plan to build between five and seven biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) labs across the Chinese mainland by 2025, and has generated much excitement, as well as some concerns. ***Some scientists outside China worry about pathogens escaping***, and the addition of a biological dimension to geopolitical tensions between China and other nations. But Chinese microbiologists are celebrating their entrance to the elite cadre empowered to wrestle with the world's greatest biological threats.

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:46 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Sir,

Here is the best I could come up with on short notice:

(b)(5)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 10:28 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Sir,

Per our call I will get you my initial thoughts this morning and will reach out to NIAID to try to get more details.

Best,

(b)(6)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:38:51 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

(b)(6)

Working a question from the 7th floor on China's broader virus research efforts. Figured I'd start with you.

Some questions like:

(b)(5)

Feel free to call. I understand you probably don't have all the data (I have a request out to INR as well) but maybe you can point us to those who do.

Thanks

Dave

David R. Stilwell

Ass't Secretary East Asia Pacific

(b)(6)

Sender:	"Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)	@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)	@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown
Date:	Thu, 23 Apr 2020 16:18:52 +0000

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:18 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Sounds good thank you

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On April 23, 2020 at 12:08:36 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

(b)(6) (b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:02 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

(b)(6)

Do you prefer (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please let me know ASAP.

(b)(6)

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Here are the 4 questions S asked (for upcoming 1200-1230 meeting).

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Sir,

Here is the best I could come up with on short notice:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 10:28 AM

To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Sir,

(b)(5)

Best,

(b)(6)

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Stilwell, David R <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:38:51 AM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

(b)(6)

(b)(5) Figured I'd start with you.

Some questions like:

(b)(5)

Feel free to call. I understand you probably don't have all the data (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks

Dave

David R. Stilwell

Ass't Secretary East Asia Pacific

(b)(6)

Sender:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
	(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Stilwell, David R" (b)(6)@state.gov>
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Tobin , Elizabeth (b)(6)
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on March 31, 2020
Date:	Wed, 1 Apr 2020 12:53:01 +0000

Here's the new line: (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@pacom.mil>

Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 6:57 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



ALCON,

Aloha and good day. Here is a summary of daily MOFA press conference. The highlights include:

- Coronavirus (COVID-19) updates (as of this writing):
 - PRC National Health Commission: 81,518 confirmed cases (+79), 3314 deaths (+9), 76,000+ recovered cases; 854,307 confirmed cases (+69,000), 42,016 deaths (+4243) in total, globally. PRC authoritative media noted: national college exams are postponed to July; more states in a “loose lockdown” in the US as the orders came after POTUS made a “dramatic course reversal” announcing the social distancing guidelines extended to 30 April; cited White House’s leading health expert’s comments insisting that US will be “much better prepared” if the second wave of coronavirus is going to hit; PRC’s premier “vowed to provide assistance to countries affected by the COVID-19.”
 - 185,279 confirmed cases (+21,482), 3780 deaths (+639, surpassed China’s death toll) in the US; WH released the models that show coronavirus’ future course, at least 100,000 deaths being predicted; POTUS commented that it is going to be a “very, very painful two weeks”; CDC reviewing guidelines in the use of masks; World Bank warns COVID-19 could bring recession to countries in East Asia and the Pacific – pushing 11 million+ people into poverty.
- MFA was critical at a claim that China is to blame for the pandemic outbreak, being accused for covering up the accountability of the infected and conducting the disinformation campaign. MFA portrayed such “jarring noises” as “quite discordant” with the concurrent pandemic and the unity to fight it. MFA showcased China’s timely response by reiterating the sequence of events that the Chinese government took in which MFA also mentioned that China was in communication internally and externally with the WHO and other countries, to include the US, by the end of December and early January. MFA stated that China has “set an example and bought precious time” for the world in which claimed that China was lauded for such “transparent and responsible attitude” by the international community. The spokesperson added accusing the US side for trying to shift “the biggest blame of the century to China and make it the biggest scapegoat.” MFA added that China is willing to share the experience on COVID-19 while upholding the “vision of a community with a shared future for mankind” and urged to those to abandon “political bias and arrogance.”
- In response to the POTUS’ advisor and the director of trade and manufacturing policy comments on China’s COVID-19 cover-up, MFA flatly described such remarks as “lies that are not worth refuting.” MFA reiterated “the truth” in a timeline of the Chinese government’s conduct in which claimed that China was in communication with the WHO and the US in a timely manner. The spokesperson added portraying his remarks as wanting to “muddy the water, shift blame and undermine China-US cooperation” and urged the director to “grasp the gist of the phone call” between POTUS and Xi. Of note, during the COVID-2 (2002) epidemic that originated from Hong Kong, China reportedly was accused of delaying the revelation of the outbreak for three months at a minimum.
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That is all.

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on March 31, 2020

2020/03/31

*** Question: Some officials in a handful of countries including the US have been trying to blame China for the pandemic outbreak, accusing China of covering up the actual caseload of the infected and disseminating disinformation on COVID-19. They also said that they will reckon with China after the pandemic passes. What is your response?

*** Answer: At present, COVID-19 is ravaging across the world, especially in Europe and the US. People of all countries have called for unity to fight the pandemic, but still some people have made jarring noises from time to time, quite discordant with the current atmosphere of unity against the pandemic. I want to stress a few points.

As the coronavirus is novel virus unseen in the past, its detection, research, testing and confirmation naturally requires time. According to reports, on December 27, 2019, Zhang Jixian, director of the Department of Respiratory and Critical Care at Hubei Hospital of Integrated Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine, reported the first three suspected cases. On December 29, Hubei and Wuhan health committees instructed related centers for disease control and prevention and hospitals to carry out epidemiological investigation. On December 30 Wuhan Municipal Health Committee issued an "urgent notice on the treatment of pneumonia of unknown cause". On December 31, the NHS sent an expert group to Wuhan to investigate on site. On January 3, 2020, China started to send timely updates to WHO and other countries, including the US. On January 11, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention put online five whole genome sequences of the novel coronavirus and shared data with the world and WHO. On January 23, Wuhan was put under lockdown and unprecedented comprehensive, thorough and rigorous measures were taken. The Chinese government took decisive and strong measures at the earliest time possible and the Chinese people have been united as one in this fight against the pandemic, which ensured the life, safety and health of the Chinese people to the highest extent.

WHO estimates that the decisive, effective and timely measures taken by the Chinese government prevented the infection of tens of thousands of people. Many countries also think China's practice offers

explicable precedence. Our open, transparent and responsible attitude has been highly acclaimed by the international community.

We have no intention to judge other countries' response to the pandemic. But while China set an example and bought precious time for the world with huge efforts and sacrifice, as WHO, foreign leaders, experts and media say, did a certain country make full use of the time to enhance preparedness? I think its government knows that very well, and its people can feel it too.

Since January 3 China has been notifying the US of epidemic-related information on a regular basis. On January 7, the US CDC and its embassy in China issued warnings on traveling to Wuhan. On January 25, the US announced the decision to close its consulate in Wuhan and withdraw all staff. On February 2, the US government banned entry of all Chinese nationals and foreigners who had been to China in the past 14 days. Now so many days have passed, and some in the US still claim China should be held responsible for the COVID-19 in the US. Don't they feel guilty or ashamed? They are trying to shift the biggest blame of the century to China and make it the biggest scapegoat. However, such an attempt is just impossible as the blame is too heavy to be shifted. Sorry, it won't work.

The pandemic is in some way like a magical mirror that exposes a person's morality and character to the fullest extent. The virus knows no ideology, border or race. The destinies of all countries are closely intertwined. No one can make up for lost time by slandering others or shifting the blame. The only way to defeat the virus is through solidarity and cooperation.

At the G20 virtual summit last week, President Xi put forward propositions on overcoming the difficulties hand in hand. Upholding the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind, China would like to share our experience on COVID-19, conduct international cooperation, and provide as much help as we can to countries in need. That is what we say and what we do. We hope certain individuals will, like the CPC and the Chinese government, put people's life, health and safety first, abandon political bias and arrogance, and focus on international cooperation in pandemic response.

*** Question: In a recent interview, White House trade adviser Navarro accused China of a cover-up that has set the world back six weeks, saying China saw human-to-human transmission cases as early as mid-December. I wonder if you have any comment?

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What is the truth? The truth is, since the epidemic broke out, we have always been open, transparent and responsible. We notified WHO and the international community of related information in a timely manner, shared genome sequencing findings of the virus at the earliest time possible, responded to other countries' concerns, conducted international cooperation and provided help to others. The sacrifice made by the Chinese people has bought valuable time for global anti-epidemic response.

Since the beginning of January, China has been sending regular updates to WHO and other countries, the US included. How can the US politician allege that China's delay set the world back six weeks? What is his intention? He just wanted to muddy the water, shift the blame and undermine China-US cooperation as well as global cooperation in fighting COVID-19. No one with a sense of justice will fall for his words.

We advise Mr. Navarro to try and grasp the gist of the phone call between Chinese and US presidents on March 27. He should stop smearing China and undermining China-US relations, and work to advance rather than harm the two peoples' interests.

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*** Answer: Since the epidemic broke out, China, in an open, transparent and responsible manner, has been providing timely updates to WHO and countries around the world including the US. We have also been doing our best to provide support and assistance to countries in need. All this has been widely applauded by the international community. Some US officials are accusing China of disinformation campaigns, I wonder if they could point out what information is not true? Were they referring to the effective containment China has achieved, or the assistance it has provided to other countries?

As to how the US has been dealing with this crisis, there has been abundant media coverage in the US and the American people have seen it with their own eyes. The Chinese people are following with concern the development of the situation and sincerely hope the US will overcome the epidemic as soon as possible to safeguard American people's health and safety.

After the outbreak, China has been racing against time to fight the virus and contain its spread. Even as we speak, many Chinese businesses are working around the clock to produce medical supplies and reinforce other countries' combat. We don't have the interest or the time to launch any despicable "disinformation campaign".

President Xi Jinping, upon invitation, held a telephone conversation with President Trump last Friday. The two heads of state agreed that under current circumstances, China and the US should stand united and fight COVID-19. The remarks you mentioned clearly run counter to the consensus of the two leaders. We hope they will focus on containing the spread of the virus at home and contribute to China-US cooperation in responding to the pandemic.

Question: A Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer collided with a Chinese fishing boat in waters of the East China Sea on late March 30. Do you have more details on the incident?

Answer: According to competent department, there was a collision around 19:30 yesterday in the East China Sea, east of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, involving a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese SDF vessel. The collision damaged the Chinese fishing boat and caused lower back injury in one fisherman. China Coast Guard is still dealing with this on site as we speak. The cause of the collision is under investigation.

I want to point out that the collision occurred in the coastal waters of China. The Chinese side has expressed concern to the Japanese side over the Japanese SDF warship sailing in the relevant waters and endangering the safety of the Chinese vessel.

We are in communication with the Japanese side over this and hope they will cooperate to determine the cause as soon as possible and prevent such incidents from happening again.

*** Question: As COVID-19 spreads all around the world, countries have an enormous need for N95 respirators and other medical supplies. Some people think China is hoarding medical products instead of assisting other countries. Do you have a comment on that?

*** Answer: That's not at all true.

China's fight against COVID-19 isn't over yet. We are under heavy pressure to guard against imported cases and a rebound in indigenous cases, and so there is a huge demand for medical supplies. It is the government's top priority to prevent and control the epidemic at home and safeguard people's health. Ensuring the health of 1.4 billion Chinese people is in itself a great contribution to global public health security.

That said, we are also providing medical supplies to countries in need. Here are some figures for you. First, the Chinese government has provided 120 countries and four international organizations with surgical masks, N95 respirators, protective suits, nucleic acid test kits, ventilators and other assistance.

Second, local governments donated medical items to their sister cities in more than 50 countries. Chinese companies made donations to over 100 countries and international organizations.

Third, some countries requested via diplomatic channels Chinese assistance in their commercial procurement, and we recommended qualified exporters for them. To date, 30 countries and two international organizations have signed purchase contracts with Chinese exporters on masks, protective suits, nucleic acid test kits, etc. Buyers from many other countries are also discussing procurement with Chinese enterprises.

As our businesses resume work and production, I believe they will give more material support to the international community. The Chinese government will continue providing support and convenience for foreign procurement. We hope to see and welcome greater cooperation with foreign companies to help stabilize the global industrial chain of medical supplies.

You mentioned there is now a great demand for N95 respirators in other countries, I think you all know that there is a shortage of them in China as well. We have been reserving them for frontline medical workers whose posts make them most vulnerable. The general public, including Chinese leaders, all wear ordinary masks, as I'm sure you've noticed in news footage.

Question: According to reports, four Chinese students in Spain were confirmed to have contracted COVID-19. How has the Chinese embassy in Spain been helping them? How are these students now?

Answer: The CPC Central Committee attaches great importance to and cares deeply about the health and safety of Chinese citizens overseas. Our diplomatic missions overseas have been in close contact with the students in their host countries.

After four Chinese students were infected, our embassy in Spain and consulate-general in Barcelona have been closely following their conditions. They urged the Spanish side to ensure they are receiving all medical treatment they need, and also brought in Chinese doctors to offer advice online. We will continue to watch over them and offer every assistance possible.

Questioni: US President Donald Trump said that China has sent some medical supplies to the US to help fight COVID-19. Can you confirm this information and share some more details?

Answer: As I just said, President Xi Jinping held a telephone conversation with President Trump last Friday. President Xi said that the Chinese people sincerely hope that the US will contain the spread of the pandemic at an early date and minimize its impact on the American people. Under the current circumstances, China and the US should unite in the fight against the virus. Health departments and epidemic experts of the two sides have all along been in communication. Last night, Minister Ma Xiaowei of China's National Health Commission and US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar spoke over the phone to exchange ideas on the two countries' pandemic prevention and control efforts. Some provinces and cities and local businesses have already donated medical supplies to the US side. We have noted that some US media have reported that a commercial charter flight has taken a batch of epidemic control materials it purchased from China to the US. China understands the current difficulties the US is facing and stands ready to offer support within our capability.

We also hope that some US officials will act in accordance with the consensus reached between the two heads of state by phone and work to create enabling conditions for the two sides' joint fight against the pandemic.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

INDOPACOM China Strategic Focus Group

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Subject:	FW: Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on March 31, 2020
Date:	Tue, 31 Mar 2020 23:44:25 +0000

(b)(5)

- Coronavirus (COVID-19) updates (as of this writing):
 - PRC National Health Commission: 81,518 confirmed cases (+79), 3314 deaths (+9), 76,000+ recovered cases; 854,307 confirmed cases (+69,000), 42,016 deaths (+4243) in total, globally. PRC authoritative media noted: national college exams are postponed to July; more states in a "loose lockdown" in the US as the orders came after POTUS made a "dramatic course reversal" announcing the social distancing guidelines extended to 30 April; cited White House's leading health expert's comments insisting that US will be "much better prepared" if the second wave of coronavirus is going to hit; PRC's premier "vowed to provide assistance to countries affected by the COVID-19."
 - 185,279 confirmed cases (+21,482), 3780 deaths (+639, surpassed China's death toll) in the US; WH released the models that show coronavirus' future course, at least 100,000 deaths being predicted; POTUS commented that it is going to be a "very, very painful two weeks"; CDC reviewing guidelines in the use of masks; World Bank warns COVID-19 could bring recession to countries in East Asia and the Pacific – pushing 11 million+ people into poverty.

From: (b)(6)@pacom.mil>

Subject: Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on March 31, 2020

ALCON,

Aloha and good day. Here is a summary of daily MOFA press conference. The highlights include:

- Coronavirus (COVID-19) updates (as of this writing):
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2020/03/31

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Very Respectfully,

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INDOPACOM China Strategic Focus Group

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(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(h)(6)@state.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (h)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 21:24:01 +0000

Hi (b)(6)

A/S Stilwell needs to talk to you as soon as possible. Please call us at (b)(2)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~ DeControlled

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:00 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (h)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

Hi (b)(6) The link to the WaPo article is below. Just FYI, the line came from SPOX.

Washington Post Opinion Columnist Josh Rogin reports

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:54 AM
To: (h)(6)@state.gov>; EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

(b)(6)

Good morning. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Thank for any thoughts.

(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:13 AM
To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>
Subject: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

Please advise of your voluntary submissions as soon as possible.

REMINDER: Please help us to serve you better by copying the EAP-PRESS office distro when corresponding with individual members of the press team. Thank you for your cooperation.

EAP/PM/S: MK/D/MED/CHINA: Per today's Wash Post, can State confirm the existence of cables highlighting concerns about procedures at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab? Does the USG see any link between the labs research and safety protocols, and the emergence of Wuhan as the epicenter of the COVID-19 virus?

We plan to respond with the following: (b)(5)

Please let us know if you strongly recommend a different approach.

EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: Please send updated lines on the DPRK's missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.

Sender: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient: (b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Buangan, Richard L (b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov>; Keshap, Atul (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute
Date:	Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:55:04 +0000

(b)(5)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

DeControlled

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:32 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov
(b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: EAP-J-Office-DL <EAP-J-Office-DL@state.gov>; EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>
Subject: RE: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

Here is the Ref A cable too [18 BEIJING 138]:

5. ~~(SBU)~~ During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, Drs. Shi and Cui Jie (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronavirus isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like disease. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention. It is interesting that WIV scientists are allowed to study the SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from bats while they are precluded from studying human-disease causing SARS coronavirus in their new BSL-4 lab until permission for such work is granted by the NHFCP.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:10 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov

(b)(6) @state.gov (b)(6) @state.gov>

Cc: EAP-J-Office-DL <EAP-J-Office-DL@state.gov>

Subject: FW: 2018 Cable on Visit to the Wuhan Virology Institute

I actually forgot about this cable [18 WUHAN 38] until very recently and just tracked down a copy.

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary with Comment:** China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4") lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) **End Summary with
Comment.**

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: (b)(6) @state.gov>

Recipient: Stilwell, David R (b)(6) @state.gov>;
(b)(6) @state.gov>