From: Mouton, Charles P.
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 7:31 PM
To: Urban, Randall J.
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Thanks for the update.

Charles

From: Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 8:20 AM
To: Mouton, Charles P. <cpmouton@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: NCoV isolate

Keeping you in the loop.

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
> **Date:** January 26, 2020 at 12:49:19 AM CST
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, Margaret Hamburg (b)(6) Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>, "Shi, Pei yong" <peshi@UTMB.EDU>, "Raimer, Ben G." <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>, "Ksiazek, Thomas G." <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>, "Niesel, David W." <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>, "Urban, Randall J." <rurban@UTMB.EDU>, "Weaver, Scott" <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
> **Subject: Re: NCoV isolate**
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Great idea Jim,
>
> Since this is urgent Micah and I have drafted text of a letter (that includes text explaining the dialogue) that could be sent to CCDC and CAS. Feel free to modify.
>
> Have also looped in John Boright, the executive director of the NAS and John Hildebrand, the NAS foreign secretary. Peggy might want to include Victor Dzau in the next email.
>
> FYI Micah and I are in India right now and will be online for the 12 hours or so.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Ben

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 8:12 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

I think we have done all we can. The National Academy has communicated directly with the Chinese Academy requesting isolates and we'll see how that goes. The decision to share isolates will likely come from the highest levels of government in China and all the pressure we can muster is already being applied. It's more likely that we will get an isolate from CDC from the Washington case and that is already in the works. We are also working hard to recreate the virus from the sequence published, but that will take some time and is costly, technically demanding and time consuming.

Internally we are working on Pei Yong's vaccine platform and will start screening for antiviral candidates ASAP. Diagnostics have been published and I think pathology is getting ready. We have volunteered support to DSHS on diagnostics and have heard back that it is not needed (yet). I've been in communication with Mike Mastrangelo about regional coordination. I hope we have plenty of masks and other ppe should things take off.

I was supposed to be out the next two weeks but canceled my trip and will be here focusing on the nCoV response. Let me know if you need anything.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 26, 2020, at 6:26 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> Jim. What do i need to do to get the ball moving on this issue?
>
> Ben
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Jan 26, 2020, at 10:09 AM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
> >
> > BEI is Biodefense and emerging infections research resources repository.
> >
> > Don't you think the the letter should originate from NASEM rather than from UTMB?
> >
> > Thanks. Jim
> >
> > Sent from my iPhone

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On Jan 26, 2020, at 9:29 AM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

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All,
I'm modifying the thread slightly to include Peggy's preferred address and some of the e-mails that she may have missed. Note that both Diane Griffin and John Hildebrand have weighed in in favor of the idea to send such a letter.
Also, sorry to be ignorant, but what is a BEI partner?
Micah

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:25 AM
To: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Thanks, Tom and Dave

Hi Ben,
I have included Tom's suggestion. Please use this version.

Best,
Pei-Yong

-----Original Message-----
From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:19 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Tom Ksiazek <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Scott C. "Curtis" Weaver

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<sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Concur with Jim and Pei Yong's thoughts/edits. Dave

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:18 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Margaret Hamburg (b)(6) Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

In this paragraph

The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

Should probably be modified

The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as home to the virus in its capacity as the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses and as a BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:11 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>

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Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Margaret Hamburg (b)(6) Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Hi Ben,

Please see my edits of the letter. I just spoke to Zhiming. I agree with Jim that we should not mention Zhiming's name in this letter.

Please send it to George Gao and President Bai.

Thanks.

- Pei-Yong

On Jan 26, 2020, at 00:49, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Great idea Jim,

Since this is urgent Micah and I have drafted text of a letter (that includes text explaining the dialogue) that could be sent to CCDC and CAS. Feel free to modify.

Have also looped in John Boright, the executive director of the NAS and John Hildebrand, the NAS foreign secretary. Peggy might want to include Victor Dzau in the next email.

FYI Micah and I are in India right now and will be online for the 12 hours or so.

Kind regards,

Ben

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<Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg.docx>

On Jan 26, 2020, at 7:56 AM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

Ben, Diane, Peggy
I'm sure you have been following the emergence of the new Coronavirus in China and beyond with concern. While much is being done to prepare nations for possible cases, the global scientific community remains hampered by the lack of access to an isolate of the new virus. Sequences data has been provided, but despite repeated inquiries isolates have not been made available although Chinese front line scientists appear to be eager to share.

With this background, may I suggest that we explore an Academy to Academy request to share the isolates? Within a very few days this will likely be a moot point given that cases are now occurring outside China and isolation attempts are underway. The window for Chinese global leadership is rapidly closing. Our dialogue over the past several years has focused in the very situation we now face and it seems appropriate for the academies to work together to help address this growing threat.

We have volunteered to use UTMB's stature as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist the Chinese in distribution of any isolates they wish to share. Repeating this offer more formally by the NASEM to CAS may help the Chinese government appreciate the global importance of harnessing the world's scientific capacity to help address this

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emerging threat.

Can we urgently draft an official letter for Diane or Peggy's signature?

Thanks for your consideration and help.

Jim

Sent from my iPhone

<Edited letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 26 2020.docx>

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From: df@wh.iov.cn
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 1:33 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong;zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: Request for new coronavirus isolates

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof.Peiyong,
Nice to hear from you.

Yes we glad to share the virus isolate with UTMB for research collaborate. I suggest you send a formal request letter to our institute. And a MTA is needed, you can use your UTMB MTA and fill the information, and I suggest you to discuss with Prof.Zhengli for the detail research content for collaboration. Our strain is nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512).
You can send your documents to me, I will try to get export permittion for this.

With best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-01-27 02:58
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi@wh.iov.cn
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Request for new coronavirus isolates
Dear Zhengli and Fei,

Happy Chinese New Year and congratulations for your amazing work on the new coronavirus!

We are writing to see if you are willing to collaborate with UTMB on studying the nCoV through sharing the viral isolates. We understand that, since many labs are currently isolating the viruses through imported cases, the window of leadership for Chinese scientists is closing rapidly. We greatly appreciate your rapid response to this request.

Best regards from Galveston,

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Pei-Yong

Pei-Yong Shi, Ph.D.
I.H. Kempner Professor of Human Genetics
Vice Chair for Innovation and Commercialization
Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, Texas 77555
Phone: 409-772-6370
Email: peshi@utmb.edu

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_057537

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 7:54 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn;zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Lawal, Adeola
Subject: RE: Request for new coronavirus isolates
Attachments: Request letter Jan 27 2020.pdf

Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Thanks you for the rapid response to our request. Please see the attached request letter. As indicated in the letter, this collaboration will use the viral isolate to test vaccine, therapeutics, and viral pathogenesis.

I'm copying our Technology Transfer Office to send you the MAT for signatures.

Hi Ade,
Would you please email UTMB's MTA for this request to Professor Fei Deng (df@wh.iov.cn)?

Sender: Professor Fei Deng, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
Receiver: Pei-Yong Shi and James LeDuc, UTMB
Reagent: New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)
Scope of work: UTMB scientists will use the viral isolate to test vaccine, therapeutics, and viral pathogenesis

Since this is an urgent matter, please help with the process as soon as possible.

Thanks!

Pei-Yong

Pei-Yong Shi, Ph.D.
I.H. Kempner Professor of Human Genetics
Vice Chair for Innovation and Commercialization
Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, Texas 77555
Phone: 409-772-6370
Email: peshi@utmb.edu

From: df@wh.iov.cn <df@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 1:33 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Request for new coronavirus isolates

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Dear Prof.Peiyong,
Nice to hear from you.

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Yes we glad to share the virus isolate with UTMB for research collaborate. I suggest you send a formal request letter to our institute. And a MTA is needed, you can use your UTMB MTA and fill the information, and I suggest you to discuss with Prof.Zhengli for the detail research content for collaboration. Our strain is nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512).
You can send your documents to me, I will try to get export permittion for this.

With best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-01-27 02:58
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi@wh.iov.cn
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Request for new coronavirus isolates

Dear Zhengli and Fei,

Happy Chinese New Year and congratulations for your amazing work on the new coronavirus!

We are writing to see if you are willing to collaborate with UTMB on studying the nCoV through sharing the viral isolates. We understand that, since many labs are currently isolating the viruses through imported cases, the window of leadership for Chinese scientists is closing rapidly. We greatly appreciate your rapid response to this request.

Best regards from Galveston,
Pei-Yong

Pei-Yong Shi, Ph.D.
I.H. Kempner Professor of Human Genetics
Vice Chair for Innovation and Commercialization
Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, Texas 77555
Phone: 409-772-6370
Email: peshi@utmb.edu

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utmb Health
Biochemistry &
Molecular Biology

Pei-Yong Shi, Ph.D.
I.H. Kempner Professor of Human Genetics
108 Basic Science Building
301 University Boulevard
Galveston, Texas 77555-0645

January 27, 2020

Professor Fei Deng, Ph.D.,
Professor Zhengli Shi, Ph.D.,
Wuhan Institute of Virology
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Wuhan, China

Dear Professor Deng and Professor Shi,

Congratulations to you and your collaborators for the remarkable work on the new coronavirus! Although great progress has been made, more collective efforts are urgently need to contain the spread of the virus and to develop countermeasures.

We are writing to seek your collaboration with the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) on studying the new coronavirus through sharing the viral isolate (strain IVCAS 6.7512). Our goal is to use the viral isolate for testing vaccine, therapeutics, and viral pathogenesis. We understand that, since many labs are currently isolating the viruses through imported cases, the window of leadership for Chinese scientists is closing rapidly. We greatly appreciate your rapid response to this request.

We look forward to a productive collaboration.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Pei-Yong Shi, Ph.D.
I.H. Kempner Professor of Human Genetics
Vice Chair for Innovation and Commercialization
Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology
University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston
Texas, USA

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 9:24 AM
To: Kadlec, Robert (OS/ASPR/IO)
Subject: FW: NCoV isolate
Attachments: Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 27 2020.docx

Bob, that attached letter, modified as suggested by Peggy below, should go out today to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Concurrently, we are developing an MTA with Wuhan to share the virus directly with us. We have positive communications back from Wuhan that they agree to sharing the virus (not sure if the folks agreeing are in a decision making position).

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

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I am fine with it except that we might want to modify sentence in first paragraph and say " global scientific community remains hampered by inadequate access to isolates of the new virus" instead of saying"lack of access to an isolate" because there are now isolates and opportunities to get isolates from other countries, including US.

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 27, 2020, at 8:39 AM, Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu> wrote:

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Do we think that it is ready?

Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
Baltimore, MD 21205
410-955-3459
dgriffi6@jhu.edu

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 8:02 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

And when this is ready Diane should send it to Bai Chunli [using clbai@cas.cn, JH-cao@cashq.ac.cn, sunhui@cashq.ac.cn] and Gao Fu [using gaof@im.ac.cn]

Probably want to cc Peggy and Jim and maybe John Hildebrand and John Boright

Kind regards,

Ben

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 6:27 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: FW: NCoV isolate

Jim,
Connecting you back to the discussion here. See below.
Micah

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 5:01 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Jim,
Any thoughts on my question below. I am fine with letter as is, but does Iswem like situation has evolved a bit but still crucial to encourage Chinese to share isolates.

Peggy
Sent from my iPhone

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From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 7:06 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Micah, Peggy, Jim et al - I think that the letter is fine to send. I agree that the situation is changing, but it is still going to be important to compare the viruses that emerge in other countries with Chinese isolates over time.

Diane

Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
Baltimore, MD 21205
410-955-3459
dgriffi6@jhu.edu

> On Jan 27, 2020, at 2:10 AM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> Peggy,
> Perhaps I closed down discussion too early. Please feel free to reopen with Jim Le Duc. You can include others, but I would focus on the people you want to hear from.
> Also, we might want to note the MOU signed between UTMB and Chinese virology research organizations as the rationale for promoting UTMB as the partner. But that's up to you and Diane to decide.
>
> Micah
>
> > On Jan 27, 2020, at 9:20 AM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
> >
> > Hello. I think it is a strong letter. However, has the argument shifted somewhat? Given that cases are occurring in many places now the opportunity to gather isolates does not depend on Chinese, however the ability to get full understanding of the virus and it's evolution would be greatly advanced by expanded sharing of isolates.
> >
> > Peggy
> >
> > Sent from my iPhone
> >
> > > On Jan 26, 2020, at 9:29 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Diane and Peggy,

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Here is a clean copy for your review, we are working to get you the correct email addresses and email routing for Gao Fu and Bai Chunli.

Micah notes that at the top of the letter, we say that work is hampered by the lack of an *isolate*. Lower down, we refer to sharing *isolates*. Should this be consistently plural?

Kind regards,

Ben

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 11:30 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Here is a version with these changes and a few other small edits.

Ben

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 9:08 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Ben,
We'll have to do some minor editing on the letter to correct typos from our original draft (replace focused in with focused on, near the end), to make it read a little better ("China has taken important lead to identify" just isn't good English), and some formatting according to Diane and Peggy's preferences. I would suggest unbolding the text and possibly formatting it more like a regular letter with return address, but that decision is up those who sign it.
Micah

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:25 AM
To: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand

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<jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Thanks, Tom and Dave

Hi Ben,
I have included Tom's suggestion. Please use this version.

Best,
Pei-Yong

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 9:21 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Benjamin Rusek <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>; John Boright <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

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...and think Tom's point strengthens the letter as well. dave

> On Jan 26, 2020, at 9:17 AM, Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU> wrote:
>
> In this paragraph
>
> The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.
>
> Should probably be modified
>
> The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as home to the virus in its capacity as the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses and as a

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BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

> On Jan 26, 2020, at 00:49, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Great idea Jim,
>
> Since this is urgent Micah and I have drafted text of a letter (that includes text explaining the dialogue) that could be sent to CCDC and CAS. Feel free to modify.
>
> Have also looped in John Boright, the executive director of the NAS and John Hildebrand, the NAS foreign secretary. Peggy might want to include Victor Dzau in the next email.
>
> FYI Micah and I are in India right now and will be online for the 12 hours or so.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Ben
>
> <Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg.docx>
>
> > On Jan 26, 2020, at 7:56 AM, LeDuc, James W.

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<jwleduc@utmb.edu>
wrote:

Ben, Diane, Peggy
I'm sure you have been following the emergence of the new Coronavirus in China and beyond with concern. While much is being done to prepare nations for possible cases, the global scientific community remains hampered by the lack of access to an isolate of the new virus. Sequences data has been provided, but despite repeated inquiries isolates have not been made available although Chinese front line scientists appear to be eager to share.

With this background, may I suggest that we explore an Academy to Academy request to share the isolates? Within a very few days this will likely be a moot point given that cases are now occurring outside China and isolation attempts are underway. The window for Chinese global leadership is rapidly closing. Our dialogue over the past several years has focused in the very situation we now face and it seems appropriate for the academies to work together to help address this growing threat.

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We have volunteered to use UTMB's stature as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist the Chinese in distribution of any isolates they wish to share. Repeating this offer more formally by the NASEM to CAS may help the Chinese government appreciate the global importance of harnessing the world's scientific capacity to help address this emerging threat.

Can we urgently draft an official letter for Diane or Peggy's signature?

Thanks for your consideration and help.

Jim

Sent from my iPhone

<Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 27 2020.docx>

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The National Academies of
SCIENCES • ENGINEERING • MEDICINE

RE: Sharing of isolates of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus

Dr. Gao Fu
Director-General,
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Dr. Bai Chunli
President, Academician
Chinese Academy of Sciences

We are writing to urge the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), either together or in coordination, to share isolates of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019 nCoV) with experts in other countries for collaborative analysis and furtherance of public health. We are still relatively early in the outbreak, China is leading the response and has taken important steps to identify and contain the outbreak and to share the sequence data of 2019 nCoV, but the global scientific community remains hampered by the lack of access to an isolate of the new virus. China has the opportunity to show global leadership in response to such cases, but the window for doing so is closing rapidly.

As you know, over the past five years, we along with Dr. James Le Duc, Dr. David Franz, Dr. Pei-Yong Shi, and other representatives of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) have worked with both of you and other Chinese scientists to organize a series of dialogue meetings on disease research, combating emerging infections, collaboration and data sharing, and laboratory management. The dialogue meetings have been well attended by leading scientists from NASEM, CAS, CCDC, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. The meetings have enabled scientists from China and the United States to exchange research findings, best practices, and lessons learned, and to establish new collaborative partnerships in areas identified during the meetings. Our dialogue has focused on the very situation we now face, and it seems appropriate for us to work together to help address this situation.

The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as home to the virus in its capacity as the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses and as a Biodefense and Emerging Infections Research Resources Repository partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

We hope that you will embrace this approach to share isolates and that China will not miss this opportunity for leadership.

Sincerely,

Diane E. Griffin
Vice President, NAS

Margaret Hamburg
Foreign secretary, NAM

(b)(6)

...

Additional points of contact:

James Le Duc Ph.D.
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
jwleduc@utmb.edu, 1.409.266.6500

Benjamin J. Rusek, Senior Program Officer
U.S. National Academy of Sciences
brusek@nas.edu 1.202.334.3975

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 9:24 AM
To: Kadlec, Robert (OS/ASPR/IO)
Subject: FW: NCoV isolate
Attachments: Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 27 2020.docx

Bob, that attached letter, modified as suggested by Peggy below, should go out today to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Concurrently, we are developing an MTA with Wuhan to share the virus directly with us. We have positive communications back from Wuhan that they agree to sharing the virus (not sure if the folks agreeing are in a decision making position).

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

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I am fine with it except that we might want to modify sentence in first paragraph and say " global scientific community remains hampered by inadequate access to isolates of the new virus" instead of saying"lack of access to an isolate" because there are now isolates and opportunities to get isolates from other countries, including US.

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 27, 2020, at 8:39 AM, Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu> wrote:

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Do we think that it is ready?

Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
Baltimore, MD 21205
410-955-3459
dgriffi6@jhu.edu

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 8:02 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

And when this is ready Diane should send it to Bai Chunli [using clbai@cas.cn, JH-cao@cashq.ac.cn, sunhui@cashq.ac.cn] and Gao Fu [using gaof@im.ac.cn]

Probably want to cc Peggy and Jim and maybe John Hildebrand and John Boright

Kind regards,

Ben

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 6:27 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: FW: NCoV isolate

Jim,
Connecting you back to the discussion here. See below.
Micah

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 5:01 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Jim,
Any thoughts on my question below. I am fine with letter as is, but does Iswem like situation has evolved a bit but still crucial to encourage Chinese to share isolates.

Peggy
Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124716

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 7:06 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Micah, Peggy, Jim et al - I think that the letter is fine to send. I agree that the situation is changing, but it is still going to be important to compare the viruses that emerge in other countries with Chinese isolates over time.

Diane

Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
Baltimore, MD 21205
410-955-3459
dgriffi6@jhu.edu

> On Jan 27, 2020, at 2:10 AM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> Peggy,
> Perhaps I closed down discussion too early. Please feel free to reopen with Jim Le Duc. You can include others, but I would focus on the people you want to hear from.
> Also, we might want to note the MOU signed between UTMB and Chinese virology research organizations as the rationale for promoting UTMB as the partner. But that's up to you and Diane to decide.
>
> Micah
>
> > On Jan 27, 2020, at 9:20 AM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
> >
> > Hello. I think it is a strong letter. However, has the argument shifted somewhat? Given that cases are occurring in many places now the opportunity to gather isolates does not depend on Chinese, however the ability to get full understanding of the virus and it's evolution would be greatly advanced by expanded sharing of isolates.
> >
> > Peggy
> >
> > Sent from my iPhone
> >
> > > On Jan 26, 2020, at 9:29 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Diane and Peggy,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124717

Here is a clean copy for your review, we are working to get you the correct email addresses and email routing for Gao Fu and Bai Chunli.

Micah notes that at the top of the letter, we say that work is hampered by the lack of an *isolate*. Lower down, we refer to sharing *isolates*. Should this be consistently plural?

Kind regards,

Ben

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 11:30 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Here is a version with these changes and a few other small edits.

Ben

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 9:08 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin (dgriffi6@jhmi.edu) <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Ben,
We'll have to do some minor editing on the letter to correct typos from our original draft (replace focused in with focused on, near the end), to make it read a little better ("China has taken important lead to identify" just isn't good English), and some formatting according to Diane and Peggy's preferences. I would suggest unbolding the text and possibly formatting it more like a regular letter with return address, but that decision is up those who sign it.
Micah

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:25 AM
To: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124718

<jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Thanks, Tom and Dave

Hi Ben,
I have included Tom's suggestion. Please use this version.

Best,
Pei-Yong

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 9:21 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Benjamin Rusek <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>; John Boright <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

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...and think Tom's point strengthens the letter as well. dave

> On Jan 26, 2020, at 9:17 AM, Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU> wrote:
>
> In this paragraph
>
> The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.
>
> Should probably be modified
>
> The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as home to the virus in its capacity as the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses and as a

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BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

> On Jan 26, 2020, at 00:49, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Great idea Jim,
>
> Since this is urgent Micah and I have drafted text of a letter (that includes text explaining the dialogue) that could be sent to CCDC and CAS. Feel free to modify.
>
> Have also looped in John Boright, the executive director of the NAS and John Hildebrand, the NAS foreign secretary. Peggy might want to include Victor Dzau in the next email.
>
> FYI Micah and I are in India right now and will be online for the 12 hours or so.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Ben
>
> <Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg.docx>
>
> > On Jan 26, 2020, at 7:56 AM, LeDuc, James W.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124720

<jwleduc@utmb.edu>
wrote:

Ben, Diane, Peggy
I'm sure you have been following the emergence of the new Coronavirus in China and beyond with concern. While much is being done to prepare nations for possible cases, the global scientific community remains hampered by the lack of access to an isolate of the new virus. Sequences data has been provided, but despite repeated inquiries isolates have not been made available although Chinese front line scientists appear to be eager to share.

With this background, may I suggest that we explore an Academy to Academy request to share the isolates? Within a very few days this will likely be a moot point given that cases are now occurring outside China and isolation attempts are underway. The window for Chinese global leadership is rapidly closing. Our dialogue over the past several years has focused in the very situation we now face and it seems appropriate for the academies to work together to help address this growing threat.

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We have volunteered to use UTMB's stature as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist the Chinese in distribution of any isolates they wish to share. Repeating this offer more formally by the NASEM to CAS may help the Chinese government appreciate the global importance of harnessing the world's scientific capacity to help address this emerging threat.

Can we urgently draft an official letter for Diane or Peggy's signature?

Thanks for your consideration and help.

Jim

Sent from my iPhone

<Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 27 2020.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124722

The National Academies of
SCIENCES • ENGINEERING • MEDICINE

RE: Sharing of isolates of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus

Dr. Gao Fu
Director-General,
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Dr. Bai Chunli
President, Academician
Chinese Academy of Sciences

We are writing to urge the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), either together or in coordination, to share isolates of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019 nCoV) with experts in other countries for collaborative analysis and furtherance of public health. We are still relatively early in the outbreak, China is leading the response and has taken important steps to identify and contain the outbreak and to share the sequence data of 2019 nCoV, but the global scientific community remains hampered by the lack of access to an isolate of the new virus. China has the opportunity to show global leadership in response to such cases, but the window for doing so is closing rapidly.

As you know, over the past five years, we along with Dr. James Le Duc, Dr. David Franz, Dr. Pei-Yong Shi, and other representatives of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) have worked with both of you and other Chinese scientists to organize a series of dialogue meetings on disease research, combating emerging infections, collaboration and data sharing, and laboratory management. The dialogue meetings have been well attended by leading scientists from NASEM, CAS, CCDC, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. The meetings have enabled scientists from China and the United States to exchange research findings, best practices, and lessons learned, and to establish new collaborative partnerships in areas identified during the meetings. Our dialogue has focused on the very situation we now face, and it seems appropriate for us to work together to help address this situation.

The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as home to the virus in its capacity as the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses and as a Biodefense and Emerging Infections Research Resources Repository partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

We hope that you will embrace this approach to share isolates and that China will not miss this opportunity for leadership.

Sincerely,

Diane E. Griffin
Vice President, NAS

Margaret Hamburg
Foreign secretary, NAM

(b)(6)

...

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Additional points of contact:

James Le Duc Ph.D.
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
jwleduc@utmb.edu, 1.409.266.6500

Benjamin J. Rusek, Senior Program Officer
U.S. National Academy of Sciences
brusek@nas.edu 1.202.334.3975

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 10:35 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: NCoV isolate

Just fyi

From: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 9:11 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Thank you Jim

Ben

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 26, 2020, at 8:11 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

I think we have done all we can. The National Academy has communicated directly with the Chinese Academy requesting isolates and we'll see how that goes. The decision to share isolates will likely come from the highest levels of government in China and all the pressure we can muster is already being applied. It's more likely that we will get an isolate from CDC from the Washington case and that is already in the works. We are also working hard to recreate the virus from the sequence published, but that will take some time and is costly, technically demanding and time consuming.

Internally we are working on Pei Yong's vaccine platform and will start screening for antiviral candidates ASAP. Diagnostics have been published and I think pathology is getting ready. We have volunteered support to DSHS on diagnostics and have heard back that it is not needed (yet). I've been in communication with Mike Mastrangelo about regional coordination. I hope we have plenty of masks and other ppe should things take off.

I was supposed to be out the next two weeks but canceled my trip and will be here focusing on the nCoV response. Let me know if you need anything.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 26, 2020, at 6:26 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Jim. What do i need to do to get the ball moving on this issue?

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Ben

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 26, 2020, at 10:09 AM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> BEI is Biodefense and emerging infections research resources repository.
>
> Don't you think the the letter should originate from NASEM rather than from UTMB?
>
> Thanks. Jim
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Jan 26, 2020, at 9:29 AM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:
> >
> > **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
> >
> > All,
> > I'm modifying the thread slightly to include Peggy's preferred address and some of the e-mails that she may have missed. Note that both Diane Griffin and John Hildebrand have weighed in in favor of the idea to send such a letter.
> > Also, sorry to be ignorant, but what is a BEI partner?
> > Micah
> >
> > ---
> >
> > **From:** Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
> > **Sent:** Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:25 AM
> > **To:** Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
> > **Cc:** Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008897

<jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Thanks, Tom and Dave

Hi Ben,
I have included Tom's suggestion. Please use this version.

Best,
Pei-Yong

-----Original Message-----
From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:19 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg (b)(6) Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Tom Ksiazek <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Scott C. "Curtis" Weaver <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

Concur with Jim and Pei Yong's thoughts/edits. Dave

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:18 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Margaret Hamburg (b)(6) Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: NCoV isolate

In this paragraph

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The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

Should probably be modified

The University of Texas Medical Branch has volunteered to serve as home to the virus in its capacity as the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses and as a BEI partner to assist China in distribution of any isolates you wish to share. NASEM would be willing to facilitate another arrangement if you wish.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 10:11 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Margaret Hamburg (b)(6) Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Niesel, David W. <dniesel@UTMB.EDU>; Urban, Randall J. <rurban@UTMB.EDU>; Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: NCoV isolate

Hi Ben,

Please see my edits of the letter. I just spoke to Zhiming. I agree with Jim that we should not mention Zhiming's name in this letter.

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Please send it to George Gao and President Bai.

Thanks.

- Pei-Yong

On Jan 26, 2020, at 00:49, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

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Great idea Jim,

Since this is urgent Micah and I have drafted text of a letter (that includes text explaining the dialogue) that could be sent to CCDC and CAS. Feel free to modify.

Have also looped in John Boright, the executive director of the NAS and John Hildebrand, the NAS foreign secretary. Peggy might want to include Victor Dzau in the next email.

FYI Micah and I are in India right now and will be online for the 12 hours or so.

Kind regards,

Ben

<Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg.docx>

On Jan 26, 2020, at 7:56 AM, LeDuc, James W.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008900

<jwleduc@utmb.edu>
wrote:

Ben, Diane, Peggy
I'm sure you have
been following the
emergence of the new
Coronavirus in China
and beyond with
concern. While much
is being done to
prepare nations for
possible cases, the
global scientific
community remains
hampered by the lack
of access to an isolate
of the new
virus. Sequences data
has been provided,
but despite repeated
inquiries isolates have
not been made
available although
Chinese front line
scientists appear to be
eager to share.

With this background,
may I suggest that we
explore an Academy
to Academy request
to share the
isolates? Within a
very few days this
will likely be a moot
point given that cases
are now occurring
outside China and
isolation attempts are
underway. The
window for Chinese
global leadership is
rapidly closing. Our
dialogue over the past
several years has
focused in the very
situation we now face
and it seems
appropriate for the
academies to work

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together to help address this growing threat.

We have volunteered to use UTMB's stature as both home to the virus reference center and as a BEI partner to assist the Chinese in distribution of any isolates they wish to share. Repeating this offer more formally by the NASEM to CAS may help the Chinese government appreciate the global importance of harnessing the world's scientific capacity to help address this emerging threat.

Can we urgently draft an official letter for Diane or Peggy's signature?

Thanks for your consideration and help.

Jim

Sent from my iPhone

<Edited letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 26 2020.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008902

From: (b)(6)
Sent: 1/28/2020 8:12:35 AM
To: Menachery, Vineet [vimenach@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: Inquiry concerning the nCoV-2019, WIV-1 CoV and the Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr. Menachery,

My name is (b)(6) and like so many other concerned citizens of the world and a layman student of climate science, ecology & biology, I have done some basic research into the recent and unfortunate spread of the novel coronavirus originating in China.

I wanted to contact you because firstly, you are a knowledgeable person and work for a top-tier institution as regards to epidemiological research; secondly, because you are English-speaking (my limitation); and lastly, because you are connected to a researcher from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a woman by the name of Zhengli-Li Shi.

I had come across a 2015 paper titled "SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronavirus pose threat for human emergence," research that, as far as I can rudimentarily understand, was published (and possibly conducted?) at the University of North Carolina. According to an article from the-scientist.com, this experiment was conducted to engineer a SARS virus containing a protein of coronavirus found on China-native bats. Both you & Zhengli-Li Shi are among those listed as researchers in this experiment.

A seperate study in which you participated in, published in March of 2016 and titled "SARS-like WIV1-CoV poised for human emergence" shows additional evidence of the WIV1 coronavirus being transmissable from Chinese horseshoe bats to humans. In the Acknowledgements to this study it is written "We thank Dr. Zhengli-Li Shi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology for access to bat CoV sequences and plasmid of WIV1-CoV spike protein."

As an aside, Dr. George Fu Gao, current Director of China's CDC, is quoted from an article titled 'George Fu Gao: the past and future of Ebola', published in a 2015 issue of National Science Review (after being asked if SARS originated from bats), "Indeed. With regard to the origin of SARS virus, Zhengli Shi's team at Wuhan Institute of Virology of CAS were the first to report, in the journal Nature, the isolation of a strain of virus from horseshoe bats (named 'WIV1') that is very similar to SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV). They also showed that WIV1 binds to the SARS-CoV receptor, thus providing direct evidence that bat-to-human transmission is plausible." Additionally, and to come full circle, I do believe that Zhengli-Li Shi is taking part in studying the present-day novel coronavirus outbreak.

In a January 2020 publication of yours, titled "Return of the Coronavirus: 2019-nCoV" and published in the Viruses 2020 journal, you and your colleagues comment that:

"Notably, several of these residues are also conserved relative to WIV1- and WIV16-CoV, two bat strains closely related to SARS-CoV and known to use human ACE2 [17,34]. Initial structural modeling suggest that the 2019-nCoV may be able to use human ACE2 as a receptor, although its affiinity may be reduced relative to the epidemic SARS-CoV strains [35].

A subsequent report demonstrated that the receptor binding domain of 2019-nCoV was capable of binding ACE2 in the context of the SARS-CoV spike protein [36]. In addition, another rapid report links demonstrates 2019-nCoV uses ACE2 receptors from human, bat, civets, and swine [30]. Together, the modeling, pseudotyping, and infection data provide strong evidence for human ACE2 being the receptor for 2019-nCoV."

With these bits and prices here and, given your connections, I summarily want to ask: do you believe it is possible that knowledge in the global scientific field, and knowledge within the Chinese academic & governmental circles, has been quite extensive and involved concerning a potential outbreak such as the 2019 novel coronavirus? and I mean this very specific coronavirus in particular? Another way of asking it is, is the WIV1-CoV in direct relation to the nCoV-2019?

Further, would you be willing to concede the possibility that this latest coronavirus was isolated and/or manufactured within the Wuhan Institute of Virology (as part of many years of research), and spread outside of the lab through human negligence?

Please let me know if you desire webpage links to the various bits of information I provided above. I appreciate the time you take to read my inquiry, and do wait with patience for your response.

With thanks,

(b)(6)

Produced in Native

Timeline of key 2019-nCoV events



FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2020 4:00 PM
To: Diane Griffin
Subject: RE: Letter to President Bai with regard to nCov isolate sharing

Thanks very much. Ben forwarded to me as well. Great news. I hope it leads to sharing quickly. We have been working with Dr Shi and her colleagues in Wuhan as well. They have agreed to provide the isolate and have sent a request to Beijing for permission to send. Maybe the requests together will get some action.

Thanks for your help in pushing this through.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2020 3:47 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fw: Letter to President Bai with regard to nCov isolate sharing

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Just to make sure you got this. . . .

Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
Baltimore, MD 21205
410-955-3459
dgriffi6@jhu.edu

From: George GAO <gaof@im.ac.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2020 2:39 PM
To: Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008881

Cc: jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; clbai@cas.cn <clbai@cas.cn>; sunhui@cashq.ac.cn <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; jwleduc@nas.edu <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Letter to President Bai with regard to nCov isolate sharing

We are happy to share and President Bai will write you soon.

发自我的iPhone

在 2020年1月29日，02:50，Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu> 写道：

Dear Colleagues,

Please find a letter to President Bai Chunli and Dr. Gao Fu, with regard to an urgent request.

John Boright
On behalf of Diane Griffin and Margaret Hamburg
<Letter to CCDC CAS re nCoV isolate sharing Griffin and Hamburg Jan 28 2020.pdf>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008882

From: df@wh.iov.cn
Sent: Sunday, February 2, 2020 7:44 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Cc: LeDuc, James W.; Ksiazek, Thomas G.; yzm; zlshi
Subject: Re: RE: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof.Peiyong,
I contact with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing everyday, they don't reply me until today. But I'm preparing all documents for application when the custom system is open for me to upload the application.
Hope I can get progress.
Thank you for concering it.

Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-02 21:20
To: df@wh.iov.cn
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Ksiazek, Thomas G.; Yuan Zhiming; 石正丽
Subject: RE: RE: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)
Hi Fei,

Any update on the isolate shipment? Since this is a public health emergency, I hope the approval will be dealt with urgency. Isolate sharing will definitely expedite countermeasure development.

Please let us know if there is anyone or any regulatory agency we should contact to speed up the process.

Thank you and all our best wishes!

Pei-Yong

Pei-Yong Shi, Ph.D.
I.H. Kempner Professor of Human Genetics
Vice Chair for Innovation and Commercialization
Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126338

University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, Texas 77555
Phone: 409-772-6370
Email: peshi@utmb.edu

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2020 6:51 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: RE: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)

Thanks, Fei

Please let us know if there is anything we could facilitate the process. We greatly appreciate your effort.

All our best wishes from Galveston!

- Pei-Yong

From: df@wh.iov.cn <df@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2020 4:30 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: RE: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I contacted with Wuhan custom, then they send our application message to the General Administration of Customs in Beijing. Today I asked them the progress, they said they should ask for the General Office of the State Council. So please wait for the fedback with me.

Best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-01-28 21:41
To: df@wh.iov.cn; Lawal, Adeola; LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: FW: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)
Thanks, Fei
Best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126339

• Pei-Yong

From: df@wh.iov.cn <df@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 11:17 PM
To: Lawal, Adeola <adlawal@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: FW: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)

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MTA received.
I submit it to institute committe and try to sign it ASAP.
I will contact custom for export procedure.

Best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Lawal, Adeola
Date: 2020-01-28 06:51
To: df@wh.iov.cn; Shi, Pei yong; LeDuc, James W.
Subject: FW: MTA to receive New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512)

Greetings,

Please see attached MTA in support of our request to receive the following materials: New coronavirus 2019 isolate: nCoV-2019 (IVCAS 6.7512), from your institute. We look forward to getting this MTA in place.

Best wishes,

Ade Lawal, JD
Associate Legal Officer
UTMB Office of Technology Transfer
409.772.0369

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126340

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:32 PM
To: Diane Griffin;LeDuc, James W.;Benjamin Rusek;Micah Lowenthal;John Boright;John Hildebrand
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
> **Date:** February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
> **To:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> **Cc:** mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
> **Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV**
>
> Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
> Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM
>
> Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,
>
> Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008527

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008528

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:32 PM
To: Diane Griffin; LeDuc, James W.; Benjamin Rusek; Micah Lowenthal; John Boright; John Hildebrand
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

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All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

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> **To:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> **Cc:** mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
> **Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV**
>
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> Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124611

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124612

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin;LeDuc, James W.;Benjamin Rusek;Micah Lowenthal;John Boright;John Hildebrand
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

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All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

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Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008526

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin; LeDuc, James W.; Benjamin Rusek; Micah Lowenthal; John Boright; John Hildebrand
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

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Sent from my iPhone

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Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124690

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 7:51 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Benjamin Rusek <BRusek@nas.edu>; Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>; John Boright <JBoright@nas.edu>; John Hildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Agreed!

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 5:33 AM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

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Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126267

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 7:51 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Benjamin Rusek <BRusek@nas.edu>; Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>; John Boright <JBoright@nas.edu>; John Hildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Agreed!

Sent from my iPhone

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> All best,
> Peggy
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>
> > **From:** "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
> > **Date:** February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
> > **To:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> > **Cc:** mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
> > **Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV**

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008836

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 7:51 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Benjamin Rusek <BRusek@nas.edu>; Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>; John Boright <JBoright@nas.edu>; John Hildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Agreed!

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 5:33 AM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051139

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 7:51 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Benjamin Rusek <BRusek@nas.edu>; Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>; John Boright <JBoright@nas.edu>; John Hildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Agreed!

Sent from my iPhone

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Sent from my iPhone

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Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124734

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:53 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn;zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Yuan Zhiming;wangyy@wh.iov.cn;Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051475

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:53 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.; Yuan Zhiming; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126386

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126387

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 9:02 AM
To: Diane Griffin;Hamburg, Margaret;Benjamin Rusek (BRusek@nas.edu);Micah Lowenthal (mlowenth@NAS.EDU)
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 8:53 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Yuan Zhiming <yzm@wh.iov.cn>; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008830

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008831

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 9:02 AM
To: Diane Griffin; Hamburg, Margaret; Benjamin Rusek (BRusek@nas.edu); Micah Lowenthal (mlowenth@NAS.EDU)
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 8:53 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Yuan Zhiming <yzm@wh.iov.cn>; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Fei and Zhengli,

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From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124732

From: Menachery, Vineet
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 9:13 AM
To: Weaver, Scott;LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Brocard, Anne-Sophie;Ntiforo, Corrie
Subject: FYI

Hi All,

With the recent emergence of the 2019-nCoV, a paper I published as a post-doc has been getting a lot of attention online: https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985

In the paper we predicted the emergence potential of SARS-like viruses circulating in bats. The paper also includes authors from the Wuhan Institute of Virology including Zheng Li Shi. There has been rumors of nCoV being an escaped virus from their institute. There is no evidence to support this.

Both I and Dr. Baric have been receiving increasing emails about the paper and the contributions of the Wuhan group. While emails to me have been fairly cordial, Dr. Baric warned that some of his have been more threatening. I have not responded to these emails and at this time, do not intend to respond.

If I do find any specific threats or emails that worry me, who should I forward them to? When we published the paper in 2015, we also received threats that were processed through UNC public safety. They subsided quickly and were relatively few in number.

Thanks for you attention on this matter,

Vineet D. Menachery

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001480

From: LeDuc, James W. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=937DF08E29C4439E88A04BABFFB162AD-JWLEDUC]
Sent: 2/4/2020 9:23:20 AM
To: Menachery, Vineet [vimenach@UTMB.EDU]; Weaver, Scott [sweaver@UTMB.EDU]
CC: Brocard, Anne-Sophie [anbrocar@utmb.edu]; Ntiforo, Corrie [contifor@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: RE: FYI

Hi Vineet,

Thanks for bringing this to our attention. If you will forward any threatening emails to me, I will coordinate with our campus police and local FBI. We have excellent relations with both groups.

Your Nature paper was shared with me yesterday by colleagues at the NAS, so it is clearly getting a lot of well-deserved attention. Good Job!

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 9:13 AM
To: Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Brocard, Anne-Sophie <anbrocar@utmb.edu>; Ntiforo, Corrie <contifor@UTMB.EDU>
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Thanks for you attention on this matter,

Vineet D. Menachery

From: Brocard, Anne-Sophie
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 9:34 AM
To: Tarpley, Jack
Subject: FW: FYI

Hi Jack

For your information as the RO. Dr. Vineet is one of our Select agent PIs.

Thanks

Sophie

Anne-Sophie Brocard, Ph.D., RBP, SM(NRCM), CBSP, CHMM, ASP, CSP
Biosafety Program Director
Institutional Biosafety Officer
Alternate Responsible Official
Environmental Health and Safety
Assistant Professor of Pathology
University of Texas Medical Branch

301 University Blvd, TX 77555-1111
P 409.772.8472 M (b)(6)
F 409.772.8921 E anbrocar@utmb.edu
https://www.utmb.edu/ehs/biosafety/
https://www.facebook.com/UTMBBiosafety/
https://www.linkedin.com/company/utmb---international-biosafety-training-center/

Working together to work wonders. TM

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From: Jim LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Date: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 9:23 AM
To: "Menachery, Vineet" <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>, "Weaver, Scott" <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: "Brocard, Anne-Sophie" <anbrocar@utmb.edu>, Corrie Ntiforo <contifor@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: FYI

Hi Vineet,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_059253

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Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 9:13 AM
To: Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Brocard, Anne-Sophie <anbrocar@utmb.edu>; Ntiforo, Corrie <contifor@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FYI

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Vineet D. Menachery

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_059254

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_059255

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 12:04 PM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg'; Diane Griffin; LeDuc, James W.; Lowenthal, Micah; Boright, John; JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
>
> Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.
>
> Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.
>
> All best,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124642

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124643

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 12:04 PM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg';Diane Griffin;LeDuc, James W.;Lowenthal, Micah;Boright, John;JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
>
> Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.
>
> Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.
>
> All best,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008523

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008524

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Cc: Peggy Hamburg;LeDuc, James W.;Lowenthal, Micah;Boright, John;JohnHildebrand
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I am but agree that we should send a note so please include me

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 7:07 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009200

From: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Cc: Peggy Hamburg; LeDuc, James W.; Lowenthal, Micah; Boright, John; JohnHildebrand
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I am but agree that we should send a note so please include me

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 7:07 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123895

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123896

specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123897

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 12:49 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Cc: Diane Griffin;LeDuc, James W.;Lowenthal, Micah;Boright, John;JohnHildebrand
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009201

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009202

specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009203

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 12:49 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Cc: Diane Griffin; LeDuc, James W.; Lowenthal, Micah; Boright, John; JohnHildebrand
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123921

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123922

specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123923

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 1:46 PM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg'
Cc: Diane Griffin;LeDuc, James W.;Lowenthal, Micah;Boright, John;JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Just a thank you email response to their email sounds fine to me. Jim can then follow up re specifics for sharing and distribution and other issues if necessary.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 1:49 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Peggy,
>
> Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.
>
> Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Ben
>
> Benjamin Rusek

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009191

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
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Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009192

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009193

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 1:46 PM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg'
Cc: Diane Griffin; LeDuc, James W.; Lowenthal, Micah; Boright, John; JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 1:49 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Peggy,
>
> Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.
>
> Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Ben
>
> Benjamin Rusek

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123892

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123893

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123894

From: df@wh.iov.cn
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 5:57 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong;zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;yzm;wangyy;Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks for your information.
We are trying to discuss this with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing directly.
I will keep on contacting with you.

Best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-04 22:52
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Yuan Zhiming; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV
Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051110

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051111

From: df@wh.iov.cn
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 5:57 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong; zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.; yzm; wangyy; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Thanks for your information.
We are trying to discuss this with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing directly.
I will keep on contacting with you.

Best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-04 22:52
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Yuan Zhiming; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV
Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126333

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126334

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 6:41 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn;zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;yzm;wangyy;Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: RE: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Fei,
Thanks for the update. We look forward to further progress.
Best,
- Pei-Yong

From: df@wh.iov.cn <df@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 5:57 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Thanks for your information.
We are trying to discuss this with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing directly.
I will keep on contacting with you.

Best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-04 22:52
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Yuan Zhiming; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV
Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051471

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051472

President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051473

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 6:41 AM
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.; yzm; wangyy; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: RE: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Fei,
Thanks for the update. We look forward to further progress.
Best,
- Pei-Yong

From: df@wh.iov.cn <df@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 5:57 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Thanks for your information.
We are trying to discuss this with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing directly.
I will keep on contacting with you.

Best wishes,
Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-04 22:52
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Yuan Zhiming; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV
Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126388

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126389

President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126390

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 9:21 AM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg'
Cc: 'Diane Griffin';LeDuc, James W.;Lowenthal, Micah;Boright, John;JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Did this go out?

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 2:46 PM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Just a thank you email response to their email sounds fine to me. Jim can then follow up re specifics for sharing and distribution and other issues if necessary.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 1:49 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Hi Peggy,

Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.

Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)

Kind regards,

Ben

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
>
> Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.
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> Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.
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> All best,
> Peggy
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
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>
> > **From:** "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
> > **Date:** February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
> > **To:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> > **Cc:** mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008521

<peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>

Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008522

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 9:21 AM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg'
Cc: 'Diane Griffin'; LeDuc, James W.; Lowenthal, Micah; Boright, John; JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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To: 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
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Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124639

Hi Peggy,

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
>
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> Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.
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> All best,
> Peggy
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > **From:** "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
> > **Date:** February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
> > **To:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> > **Cc:** mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124640

<peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>

Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124641

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 9:55 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin;'Peggy Hamburg'
Cc: 'Diane Griffin';LeDuc, James W.;Boright, John;JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Peggy, Diane,
Re protocol, we think it's fine to respond to their e-mail with an e-mail.
It might make sense to do a letter of thanks after the actual sharing has been accomplished, but probably not before.
Best,
Micah

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 10:21 AM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'James LeDuc' <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Did this go out?

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 2:46 PM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Just a thank you email response to their email sounds fine to me. Jim can then follow up re specifics for sharing and distribution and other issues if necessary.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 1:49 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Any protocol issues we need to know can it be an email or do we need a formal letter, even if scanned and sent

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 4, 2020, at 1:04 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Peggy,
>
> Yes a brief thank you note sent by you sounds good. Diane may be traveling.
>
> Reply all to the original message is fine but please use Jim's correct email address (jwleduc@utmb.edu) when you respond. (Mine (brusek@nas.edu) also seems to have changed below so please correct that as well.)
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> Kind regards,
>
> Ben
>
> Benjamin Rusek
> The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
> 1-202-334-3975
>
> **From:** Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
> **Sent:** Monday, February 03, 2020 11:36 PM
> **To:** Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; James LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
> **Subject:** Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV
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> One question....how should we respond? I assume that a brief thank you note from Diane and myself, also copying Jim LeDuc?
>
> Peggy
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:
> >
> > Hello. This is good news....and seemed to be a most surprisingly straightforward process. Let's see how the next steps go.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009195

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009196

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009197

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 9:55 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin; 'Peggy Hamburg'
Cc: 'Diane Griffin'; LeDuc, James W.; Boright, John; JohnHildebrand
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 10:21 AM
To: 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'James LeDuc' <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>
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Did this go out?

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123925

Jim, keep u up to date on how this all unfolds. Hopefully some good work can proceed swiftly.

All best,
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123926

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123927

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, February 6, 2020 12:47 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Cc: Aneela Javed
Subject: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan
Attachments: PEER QuestionList.pdf; CV Revised.doc

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof. Dr. Thomas Ksiazek

Greetings from Islamabad, Pakistan. I hope you are doing well and still remember me, we met in Wuhan at the **Second China-U.S. Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security**. After completing my PhD under the supervision of **Prof Dr. Zheng Li Shi**, I am currently working as Assistant Professor in National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. During our meeting in Wuhan, we discussed about the potential collaboration between Pakistani and US scientists, I was just informed through our Research Department about the PEER Program, where both US and Pakistani Sceintitis may collaborate.

I am writing to you with respect to one of my collaborative projects-intend to submit. it will be an honour for us to partner with you.

We are thinking for capacity building of Pakistani Research Institutions for infectious Disease investigation. However, it requires a US partner having current active grants form specific USA funding agencies. The deadline is the 10th of February. Please see the attached pdf for US partner requirements (I have highlighted the US partner requirements in yellow) and also the link for eligibility criteria for US partners. The deadline for preproposal submission is 10th of February.

https://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/PEER/PGA_147199

PEER applicants are required to partner with a U.S. Government (USG)-supported researcher who currently receives funding from or is employed by one of the following agencies:

- **Agricultural Research Service (ARS)**
- **National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)**
- **National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)**
- **National Institutes of Health (NIH)**
- **National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)**
- **National Science Foundation (NSF)**
- **Smithsonian Institution**
- **United States Forest Service (USFS)**
- **United States Geological Survey (USGS)**

Please let us know if you are kindly willing for this. I have also attached my CV for your kind consideration. Looking forward to hearing from you.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010345

Kind Regards
Dr. Ali Zohaib, DVM, MPVM (China), PhD (CAS, China)
Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences (ASAB),
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010346

Dr. Ali Zohaib

Assistant Professor
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology
Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences,
National University of Scienes and Technology (NUST), Islamabad
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Page 0129

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 0130

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, February 6, 2020 2:18 PM
To: Weaver, Scott
Subject: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan
Attachments: PEER QuestionList.pdf; CV Revised.doc

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof. Dr. Scott

Greetings from Islamabad, Pakistan. I hope you are doing well and still remember me, I once applied for Postdoc position in your group but unfortunately there were no funds available at that time.
After completing my PhD under the supervision of **Prof Dr. Zheng Li Shi**, I am currently working as Assistant Professor in National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. I was just informed through our Research Department about the PEER Program, where both US and Pakistani Sceintitis may collaborate.

I am writing to you with respect to one of my collaborative projects-intend to submit. it will be an honour for us to partner with you.

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- **National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)**
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- **United States Geological Survey (USGS)**

Please let us know if you are kindly willing for this. I have also attached my CV for your kind consideration. Looking forward to hearing from you.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002412

Kind Regards
Dr. Ali Zohaib, DVM, MPVM (China), PhD (CAS, China)
Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences (ASAB),
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002413

Dr. Ali Zohaib

Assistant Professor
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology
Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences,
National University of Scienes and Technology (NUST), Islamabad
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Page 0135

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 0136

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: LeDuc, James W. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=937DF08E29C4439E88A04BABFFB162AD-JWLEDUC]
Sent: 2/9/2020 12:39:49 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg [peggy@hbfam.net]
Subject: Re: Crucial information re. 2019-nCoV

Hi Peggy

Yes I have seen these arguments and recognize that serious folks are questioning the coincidences noted. My initial thoughts are that the outbreak shares many characteristics with sars and that the explanations provided so far and the scientific observation are all consistent with that scenario. The coronavirologist at the center of the bat and other host work is world class and has participated in all of our NAS-CAS meetings and she is very well respected. I have a great deal of trust in her. The Chinese are working with current isolates in the new bsl4 lab (and a recently returned post doc from our lab is leading much of the work). I don't know if they were doing the bat coronavirus work in the bsl4 (I don't think they were) or in their bsl3 lab at the new facility or in their labs closer to the city. The bsl4 lab is a 45 min drive from the university campus in town. I'm working with our colleagues to get some clarity as to where work was done and a better idea if this might have been an accidental release. I do not suspect something nefarious but we can't rule out an accidental release quite yet.

There is a second bsl4 lab in Harbin where we held our last meeting that works on agricultural pathogens and a third bsl4 lab in Kunming that has yet to open.

I'm working hard to get more information and will keep you posted. Please don't share quite yet.

This whole episode demonstrates the immense value of the dialogue you helped establish. Good job!

Best wishes. Jim
Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 8, 2020, at 5:48 PM, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net> wrote:

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello. All well? Hope progress is being made in obtaining the isolates. Do keep us in the loop! I was amazed by how responsive Prof Bai was....do you think they were planning to make them available already?

I am curious if you know the gentleman below? The note was sent to a friend of mine who is the editor of a major magazine. Not sure why he sent...but of course these ideas are circulating. Frankly, I feel like we can't completely rule out though I am sure you are much closer to the actual viral information etc. the lab has had some Biosecurity issues in past I gather, though my sense is that people feel pretty food about both the quality of the science and the biosafety/Biosecurity there.

Any thoughts?
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

From: (b)(6)

Date: 8 February 2020 at 10:41:39 GMT-7

Subject: Crucial information re. 2019-nCoV
Reply-To: (b)(6)

While fringe theories circulate about the origin of 2019-nCoV, **five established points** warrant further investigation:

1. The most rigorous study so far (published in The Lancet) shows the **first** known case was **not** exposed to the Huanan Market. (Layman summary of the study.) That patient was diagnosed **Dec 1**. It's not until **Dec 10** that patients exposed to the market appear. Infectious disease physician Dr. Daniel Lucey believes the market was a locus of *transmission but not the source* and that "*China must have realized the epidemic **did not** originate in that Wuhan Huanan seafood market*". Microbiologist Dr. Lin Xiaoxu concurs, while senior research analyst at Freedom House, Sarah Cook, notes the CCP exerting its influence to control information on the outbreak, including its origin.

2. For weeks, China has refused to allow W.H.O. and C.D.C. experts into the country.

3. As this list shows, the **only** facility in China with a biosafety level 4 (i.e. designed for researching the most dangerous known pathogens) is located in Wuhan - the virus **epicentre**. This may just be a coincidence, but...

4. The fact that the Wuhan institute of Virology was researching **novel bat coronavirus** in the very place an apparently bat-borne coronavirus emerged, is a 'coincidence' that stretches credibility.

5. In **2017**, international scientists expressed concern about the lab in Wuhan, particularly China's lack of expertise/transparency in handling deadly pathogens.

Note:
Some 'debunking' articles, such as this WaPo piece, conflate spurious claims with warranted questions and deprecate a cogent explanation by associating it with irrelevant speculation.

Conspiracy theories about 'bioweapons' are red herrings: While it is true that in March 2019, Canada authorised the transfer of lethal viruses to China (prompting alarm from bio-warfare

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experts and Taiwan) and in July 2019, scientists from the Wuhan National Biosafety lab were expelled from a Canadian BSL-4 lab for "policy breach", these facts have **no bearing** on 2019-nCoV's origin since a virus doesn't have to be 'synthetic' to leak from a laboratory.

As molecular biologist Dr. Richard Ebright observes, data on 2019-nCoV are "*consistent with entry into the human population as either a natural accident **or** a laboratory accident*."

While the market origination theory is all but scientifically debunked, Occam's razor suggests an interpretation with more sufficient explanatory power.

Bibliography:

Science Insider report:
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/wuhan-seafood-market-may-not-be-source-novel-virus-spreading-globally

Wikipedia's list of the world's BSL-4 labs:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety_level#List_of_BSL-4_facilities

2018 Paper on novel bat coronavirus from Wuhan Institute of Virology:
https://jvi.asm.org/content/92/13/e00116-18

2018 article from The Scientist on another bat coronavirus study by the Wuhan facility:
https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/bats-identified-as-source-of-pig-killing-coronavirus-in-china-30035

2017 Nature article mentioning safety concerns re. the lab (disclaimer added Jan 2020):
https://www.nature.com/news/inside-the-chinese-lab-poised-to-study-world-s-most-dangerous-pathogens-1.21487

Vox's layman summary of the study by Chinese professors published in Lancet:
https://www.vox.com/2020/1/27/21082354/coronavirus-outbreak-wuhan-china-early-on-lancet

WaPo's 'debunking' piece:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/29/experts-debunk-fringe-theory-linking-chinas-coronavirus-weapons-research/

7 Feb NYT article on China's refusal of W.H.O. and C.D.C assistance.

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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/health/cdc-coronavirus-china.html

CBC article on Winnipeg Lab "breach" by Wuhan scientists: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/national-microbiology-lab-scientist-investigation-china-1.5307424

Interview with infectious disease physician Dr. Daniel Lucey: https://sciencespeaksblog.org/2020/01/25/wuhan-coronavirus-2019-ncov-qa-6-an-evidence-based-hypothesis/

Op-Ed by senior research analyst at Freedom House, Sarah Cook: https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-02-03/coronavirus-china-media-censorship-propaganda

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This e-mail may contain confidential material. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. It may also contain personal views which are not the views of The Economist Group. We may monitor e-mail to and from our network.

Sent by a member of The Economist Group. The Group's parent company is The Economist Newspaper Limited, registered in England with company number 236383 and registered office at The Adelphi, 1-11 John Adam Street, London, WC2N 6HT. For Group company registration details go to http://legal.economistgroup.com

From: LeDuc, James W. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=937DF08E29C4439E88A04BABFFB162AD-JWLEDUC]
Sent: 2/9/2020 6:45:06 PM
To: Broad, William [wjb@nytimes.com]
Subject: Re: Accidental release?

Bill

Thanks for the note. Suffice to say that I have spoken to folks in the intel community about the possibility that the epidemic is the result of a lab release and my position has been that I think it's highly unlikely that this is either nefarious or accidental release. These concerns continue however and I'm in the process of working with my colleagues in Wuhan to systematically assess all possible events that might suggest a lab association. I do not yet have a plan developed to share with them but hope to later today. In the meantime I continue to believe that this is a natural emergence of a new coronavirus give the similarities to SARS, the novel sequence of the virus, my knowledge and respect for Dr Shi, the world-class coronavirologist in Wuhan, and my knowledge of the labs and the safety procedures they have in place. Nonetheless I hope to convince them to conduct a very thorough assessment and to make the finding public ASAP. Happy to chat if you like. My cell is (b)(6) Probably best not to have my name associated with the story quite yet.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 9, 2020, at 11:02 AM, Broad, William <wjb@nytimes.com> wrote:

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Jim: Andy Weber suggested you would be good to talk to. We keep hearing that the USG is investigating whether the China virus was an accidental release, possibly as early as November, from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and are trying to figure out if that's true. We know something of the unclassified USG focus from an exchange of letters between OSTP and NAS (attached). But we're in the dark on whether USG intel side is doing a deeper investigation in parallel. We'd be most grateful for any guidance and would of course be happy to leave your name out of it. Bill

William J. Broad

Science Department

620 8th Avenue
New York, NY, 10018

My phone: 212-556-7144

My articles:

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/william_j_broad/index.html

<OSTP Coronavirus Request to NASEM_02.06.2020.pdf>
<NASEM Response to OSTP re Coronavirus_February 6, 2020.pdf>

Investigation into the possibility that the nCoV was the result of a release from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (main campus or new BSL3/BSL4 facilities).

The questions below deal with the period 1 October 2019 to the present:

Where is coronavirus research conducted?

What level of biocontainment?

How many different laboratories actually handle live virus?

Where are coronavirus stocks stored?

Is there an inventory record of each isolate of each coronavirus kept? If so, are there any discrepancies between the record and actual current inventory number (i.e., is there evidence to suggest that virus stocks may have been stolen or used without proper record?)

Physical Security

Is there controlled access to the laboratories and freezers where coronavirus stocks are held? (Locked doors; card-key access; biometric readers; others?) Were any breaches in security noted/access to the facility by unauthorized individuals?

Is the laboratory constantly monitored by security personnel (24/7)? If not, can you briefly summarize your physical security program during the period in question?

Is there any evidence to suggest a mechanical failure in biocontainment during the time in question?

-were biological safety cabinets used and appropriately certified?

-Exhaust air filtration systems working correctly?

-Autoclaves and waste stream disinfection systems working properly?

-Animal husbandry and management?

Virus Stocks (You may wish to explain that many novel coronaviruses are known only from their sequence and are not able to replicate in culture)

When was the nCoV first handled in your laboratory?

What was the source of that virus? (patient specimen or field collected animal or other?)

During the period in question, what other coronaviruses (that replicate in culture) are stored/handled in your laboratories?

What are the coronaviruses in your possession that are most closely related to nCoV based on genetic sequences and are able to replicate in culture?

Is anyone on your team conducting gain of function studies, recombination studies or any other studies that may have resulted in the creation of the nCoV?

Personnel

How many people have access to the coronavirus stocks and laboratory?

Senior investigators? Junior investigators? Technical support staff? Post-docs? Students? Animal handlers? Janitors and other cleaning staff? Building support personnel? Others?

Is there any evidence to suggest that a disgruntled employee may have had access to the coronavirus stocks? (Recently fired or reprimanded individual(s))

Does the Institute have an occupational health clinic where employees and students can go to seek medical care? If so, was there any indication of unusual illness similar to that seen for nCoV among Institute staff? If yes, when were cases first seen relative to the nCoV outbreak.

Does a serum bank exist for staff and students working on infectious agents? If yes, could the current serum and the most recent banked sera be serologically tested for antibody to nCoV in an effort to document seroconversion? (If positive, this would not be able to differentiate between community acquired and occupational acquired infection, but absence of evidence of infection would be helpful in ruling out the lab as a source of infection.)

Have any of individuals working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (main campus or BSL4 campus) been infected with the nCoV? Family members of employees?

If yes, when was the date of onset of illness for the first case recognized? (How does this date compare with the progress of the epidemic; that is, was this among the first cases recognized or later after the outbreak was well underway? How does this compare to the first recognition of nCoV in the greater Wuhan community?)

Where the individuals infected involved in coronavirus research?

Geography

(These questions deal with any association between the physical location of the lab(s) and the districts in Wuhan where the illness was first seen. The assumption is that someone suffering an occupational exposure would go to their local hospital for treatment.)

Where and when were the first Wuhan (or Hubei Province) residents infected with the nCoV first identified (hospital or clinic name/date of earliest cases)?

Do staff members of the Institute reside in the district serviced by this (these) hospital/clinic (s)?

Were any Institute staff member seen for clinical illness at this/these hospital (s) during the time in question?

Do staff members of the Wuhan Institute of Virology frequent the sea food/live market first associated with the nCoV outbreak?

Did any staff member visit the market in the weeks prior to it being closed?

If so, how many staff frequent the market? How often would they visit the market during the period of interest?

Investigation into the possibility that the nCoV was the result of a release from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (main campus or new BSL3/BSL4 facilities).

The questions below deal with the period 1 October 2019 to the present:

Where is coronavirus research conducted?

What level of biocontainment?

How many different laboratories actually handle live virus?

Where are coronavirus stocks stored?

Is there an inventory record of each isolate of each coronavirus kept? If so, are there any discrepancies between the record and actual current inventory number (i.e., is there evidence to suggest that virus stocks may have been stolen or used without proper record?)

Physical Security

Is there controlled access to the laboratories and freezers where coronavirus stocks are held? (Locked doors; card-key access; biometric readers; others?) Were any breaches in security noted/access to the facility by unauthorized individuals?

Is the laboratory constantly monitored by security personnel (24/7)? If not, can you briefly summarize your physical security program during the period in question?

Is there any evidence to suggest a mechanical failure in biocontainment during the time in question?

-were biological safety cabinets used and appropriately certified?

-Exhaust air filtration systems working correctly?

-Autoclaves and waste stream disinfection systems working properly?

-Animal husbandry and management?

Virus Stocks (You may wish to explain that many novel coronaviruses are known only from their sequence and are not able to replicate in culture)

When was the nCoV first handled in your laboratory?

What was the source of that virus? (patient specimen or field collected animal or other?)

During the period in question, what other coronaviruses (that replicate in culture) are stored/handled in your laboratories?

What are the coronaviruses in your possession that are most closely related to nCoV based on genetic sequences and are able to replicate in culture?

Is anyone on your team conducting gain of function studies, recombination studies or any other studies that may have resulted in the creation of the nCoV?

Personnel

How many people have access to the coronavirus stocks and laboratory?

Senior investigators? Junior investigators? Technical support staff? Post-docs? Students? Animal handlers? Janitors and other cleaning staff? Building support personnel? Others?

Is there any evidence to suggest that a disgruntled employee may have had access to the coronavirus stocks? (Recently fired or reprimanded individual(s))

Does the Institute have an occupational health clinic where employees and students can go to seek medical care? If so, was there any indication of unusual illness similar to that seen for nCoV among Institute staff? If yes, when were cases first seen relative to the nCoV outbreak.

Does a serum bank exist for staff and students working on infectious agents? If yes, could the current serum and the most recent banked sera be serologically tested for antibody to nCoV in an effort to document seroconversion? (If positive, this would not be able to differentiate between community acquired and occupational acquired infection, but absence of evidence of infection would be helpful in ruling out the lab as a source of infection.)

Have any of individuals working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (main campus or BSL4 campus) been infected with the nCoV? Family members of employees?

If yes, when was the date of onset of illness for the first case recognized? (How does this date compare with the progress of the epidemic; that is, was this among the first cases recognized or later after the outbreak was well underway? How does this compare to the first recognition of nCoV in the greater Wuhan community?)

Where the individuals infected involved in coronavirus research?

Geography

(These questions deal with any association between the physical location of the lab(s) and the districts in Wuhan where the illness was first seen. The assumption is that someone suffering an occupational exposure would go to their local hospital for treatment.)

Where and when were the first Wuhan (or Hubei Province) residents infected with the nCoV first identified (hospital or clinic name/date of earliest cases)?

Do staff members of the Institute reside in the district serviced by this (these) hospital/clinic (s)?

Were any Institute staff member seen for clinical illness at this/these hospital (s) during the time in question?

Do staff members of the Wuhan Institute of Virology frequent the sea food/live market first associated with the nCoV outbreak?

Did any staff member visit the market in the weeks prior to it being closed?

If so, how many staff frequent the market? How often would they visit the market during the period of interest?

Investigation into the possibility that the nCoV was the result of a release from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (main campus or new BSL3/BSL4 facilities).

The questions below deal with the period 1 October 2019 to the present:

Where is coronavirus research conducted?

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Where are coronavirus stocks stored?

Is there an inventory record of each isolate of each coronavirus kept? If so, are there any discrepancies between the record and actual current inventory number (i.e., is there evidence to suggest that virus stocks may have been stolen or used without proper record?)

Physical Security

Is there controlled access to the laboratories and freezers where coronavirus stocks are held? (Locked doors; card-key access; biometric readers; others?) Were any breaches in security noted/access to the facility by unauthorized individuals?

Is the laboratory constantly monitored by security personnel (24/7)? If not, you could briefly summarize your physical security program during the period in question.

Is there any evidence to suggest a mechanical failure in biocontainment during the time in question?

-were biological safety cabinets used and appropriately certified?

-Exhaust air filtration systems working correctly?

-Autoclaves and waste stream disinfection systems working properly?

-Animal husbandry and management?

-Waste stream integrity (think of FMD leak in UK a few years ago)

Virus Stocks (You may wish to explain that many novel coronaviruses are known only from their sequence and are not able to replicate in culture)

When was the nCoV first handled in your laboratory?

What was the source of that virus? (patient specimen or field collected animal or other?)

During the period in question, what other coronaviruses (that replicate in culture) are stored/handled in your laboratories?

What are the coronaviruses in your possession that are most closely related to nCoV based on genetic sequences and are able to replicate in culture?

Is anyone on your team conducting gain of function studies, recombination studies or any other studies that may have resulted in the creation of the nCoV?

Personnel

How many people have access to the coronavirus stocks and laboratory?

Senior investigators? Junior investigators? Technical support staff? Post-docs? Students? Animal handlers? Janitors and other cleaning staff? Building support personnel? Others?

Is there any evidence to suggest that a disgruntled employee may have had access to the coronavirus stocks? (Recently fired or reprimanded individual(s), for example.)

Does the Institute have an occupational health clinic where employees and students can go to seek medical care? If so, was there any indication of unusual illness similar to that seen for nCoV among Institute staff? If yes, when were cases first seen relative to the nCoV outbreak.

Does a serum bank exist for staff and students working on infectious agents? If yes, could a current serum and the most recent banked sera be serologically tested for antibody to nCoV in an effort to document seroconversion? (If positive, this would not be able to differentiate between community acquired and occupational acquired infection, but absence of evidence of infection would be helpful in ruling out the lab as a source of infection.)

Have any of individuals working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (main campus or BSL4 campus) been infected with the nCoV? Family members of employees?

If yes, when was the date of onset of illness for the first case recognized? (How does this date compare with the progress of the epidemic; that is, was this among the first cases recognized or later after the outbreak was well underway? How does this compare to the first recognition of nCoV in the greater Wuhan community?)

Where the individuals infected involved in coronavirus research?

Geography

(These questions deal with any association between the physical location of the lab(s) and the districts in Wuhan where the illness was first seen. The assumption is that someone suffering an occupational exposure would go to their local hospital for treatment.)

Where and when were the first Wuhan (or Hubei Province) residents infected with the nCoV first identified (hospital or clinic name/date of earliest cases)?

Do staff members of the Institute reside in the district serviced by this (these) hospital/clinic (s)?

Were any Institute staff members seen for clinical illness at this/these hospital (s) during the time in question?

Do staff members of the Wuhan Institute of Virology frequent the sea food/live market first associated with the nCoV outbreak?

Did any staff member visit the market in the weeks prior to it being closed?

If so, how many staff frequent the market? How often would they visit the market during the period of interest? Have any become infected with nCoV?

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

fyi

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 1:18 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124608

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:
>
> Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
> Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM
>
> Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,
>
> Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.
>
> The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.
>
> I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.
>
> With best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124609

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124610

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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fyi

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 1:18 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008468

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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>
> The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.
>
> I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.
>
> With best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008469

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

No response this morning from Zhiming regarding the investigations of the possible role of the lab in the release of the nCoV.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126141

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126142

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126143

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

No response this morning from Zhiming regarding the investigations of the possible role of the lab in the release of the nCoV.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051343

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051344

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051345

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 1:18 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124725

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124726

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124727

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

No response this morning from Zhiming regarding the investigations of the possible role of the lab in the release of the nCoV.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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fyi

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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To: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008679

With best regards,

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President
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President
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Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008680

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Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008681

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:52 AM
To: Chao Shan
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Chao,
Disappointing email.

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

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Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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fyi

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126399

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126400

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:52 AM
To: Chao Shan
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Chao,
Disappointing email.

- Pei-Yong

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Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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fyi

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To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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> Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051804

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051805

From: Chao Shan (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 9:08 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Pei-Yong,
The possible reason is Dr. Yuan was busy whole day to prepare the report of animal model for Ministry of Science and Technology. He is also coordinating some materials for the lab due to restricted transportation in Hubei currently.
I think he will get back to Dr. LeDuc when he is available. We may need your help to explain a little bit to Dr. LeDuc.
Cheers,
Chao

获取 Outlook for iOS

发件人: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
发送时间: Monday, February 10, 2020 10:51:54 PM
收件人: Chao Shan (b)(6)
主题: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Chao,
Disappointing email.

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FYI

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Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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fyi

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
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Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

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Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

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> Chunli Bai
> President
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> The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_018699

From: Chao Shan (b)(6)
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Hi Pei-Yong,
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I think he will get back to Dr. LeDuc when he is available. We may need your help to explain a little bit to Dr. LeDuc.
Cheers,
Chao

获取 Outlook for iOS

发件人: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
发送时间: Monday, February 10, 2020 10:51:54 PM
收件人: Chao Shan (b)(6)
主题: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126322

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

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> With best regards,
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> Chunli Bai
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> Chinese Academy of Sciences
> The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126323

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 9:54 AM
To: Chao Shan
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Thanks, Chao
I will stand by.
Pei-Yong

Get Outlook for Android

From: Chao Shan (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 9:07:41 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Pei-Yong,
The possible reason is Dr. Yuan was busy whole day to prepare the report of animal model for Ministry of Science and Technology. He is also coordinating some materials for the lab due to restricted transportation in Hubei currently.
I think he will get back to Dr. LeDuc when he is available. We may need your help to explain a little bit to Dr. LeDuc.
Cheers,
Chao

获取 Outlook for iOS

发件人: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
发送时间: Monday, February 10, 2020 10:51:54 PM
收件人: Chao Shan (b)(6)
主题: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Chao,
Disappointing email.

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126545

FYI

No response this morning from Zhiming regarding the investigations of the possible role of the lab in the release of the nCoV.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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fyi

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 1:18 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126546

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:
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> Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
> Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM
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> Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.
>
> The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.
>
> I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.
>
> With best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126548

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 9:54 AM
To: Chao Shan
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Thanks, Chao
I will stand by.
Pei-Yong

Get Outlook for Android

From: Chao Shan (b)(6)
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To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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I think he will get back to Dr. LeDuc when he is available. We may need your help to explain a little bit to Dr. LeDuc.
Cheers,
Chao

获取 Outlook for iOS

发件人: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
发送时间: Monday, February 10, 2020 10:51:54 PM
收件人: Chao Shan (b)(6)
主题: FW: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_018700

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Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_018701

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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> With best regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_018703

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 11:27 AM
To: Plante, Kenneth S.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

As discussed. See mention of UTMB in the string below.

Thanks, Jim

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 12:24 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Micah

Begin forwarded message:

From: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 10, 2020 at 1:18:45 AM EST
To: "Hamburg, Margaret" <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008677

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008678

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 11:27 AM
To: Plante, Kenneth S.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

As discussed. See mention of UTMB in the string below.

Thanks, Jim

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 12:24 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Micah

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Date: February 10, 2020 at 1:18:45 AM EST
To: "Hamburg, Margaret" <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, peggy <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124728

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124729

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I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124730

From: Plante, Kenneth S.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 11:29 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Thank you for the heads up Jim

Kenneth Plante PhD.
Associate Director, Curator
World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses
Department of Microbiology and Immunology
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd. Rte. 0609
Galveston, TX 77555
O-(409) 747-2432
C-(b)(6)
F-(409) 747-2429
https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva/

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 11:26 AM
To: Plante, Kenneth S. <ksplante@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

As discussed. See mention of UTMB in the string below.

Thanks, Jim

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 12:24 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Micah

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126093

<gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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With thanks and best regards,
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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126094

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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126095

From: Plante, Kenneth S.
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 11:29 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Thank you for the heads up Jim

Kenneth Plante PhD.
Associate Director, Curator
World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses
Department of Microbiology and Immunology
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd. Rte. 0609
Galveston, TX 77555
O-(409) 747-2432
(b)(6)
F-(409) 747-2429
https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva/

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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To: Plante, Kenneth S. <ksplante@UTMB.EDU>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_052398

<gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_052399

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_052400

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:15 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Well it seemed too easy....hiopedully there will be avenues to obtain the isolates. Do let me know how this all unfolds....

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 9, 2020 at 10:18:45 PM PST
To: "Hamburg, Margaret" <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, "Hildebrand, John G - (jhildebr)" <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124658

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124659

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

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With best regards,

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124660

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:15 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, "Hildebrand, John G - (jhildebr)" <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Chunli Bai
President
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The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

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To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008454

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008455

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 7:08 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Thanks for your help, Peggy. We have the US isolate now and have begun research activities. We are also in the process of getting the strain from Australia, although it looks like there is very little genomic difference between any of the isolates sequenced to date. We have repeatedly offered the Chinese an opportunity to lead internationally, but unfortunately their government has been reluctant. In retrospect, we (the global PH community) were fortunate that the scientists who first isolated the virus posted the sequence information before the government realized the severity of the situation.

Best wishes, Jim

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:15 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
> **Date:** February 9, 2020 at 10:18:45 PM PST
> **To:** "Hamburg, Margaret" <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> **Cc:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, "Hildebrand, John G - (jhildebr)" <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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President
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From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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>
> Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124799

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

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With best regards,

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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124800

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 7:08 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Thanks for your help, Peggy. We have the US isolate now and have begun research activities. We are also in the process of getting the strain from Australia, although it looks like there is very little genomic difference between any of the isolates sequenced to date. We have repeatedly offered the Chinese an opportunity to lead internationally, but unfortunately their government has been reluctant. In retrospect, we (the global PH community) were fortunate that the scientists who first isolated the virus posted the sequence information before the government realized the severity of the situation.

Best wishes, Jim

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:15 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

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> **To:** "Hamburg, Margaret" <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> **Cc:** dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, "Hildebrand, John G - (jhildebr)" <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
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Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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>
> Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008674

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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With best regards,

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008675

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:12 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Jim,
So glad that you are in the midst of all of this. I had hoped that we had made more progress in terms of more collaboration and transparency with our Chinese colleagues, but certainly some progress....

Where you part of the recent NASEM meeting on viral origin requested by OSTP. I think I understood that you were...you certainly should have been. I was wondering if you found it useful.

Wondering if in this modern era we should try to develop a framework for actually making it"routine" in a serious outbreak context that samples get shared and an expert scientific group to examine questions of origin and evolution.

Would welcome your thoughts.

Stay in touch.
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 11, 2020, at 5:08 AM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thanks for your help, Peggy. We have the US isolate now and have begun research activities. We are also in the process of getting the strain from Australia, although it looks like there is very little genomic difference between any of the isolates sequenced to date. We have repeatedly offered the Chinese an opportunity to lead internationally, but unfortunately their government has been reluctant. In retrospect, we (the global PH community) were fortunate that the scientists who first isolated the virus posted the sequence information before the government realized the severity of the situation.

Best wishes, Jim

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:15 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124665

Well it seemed too easy....hiopedully there will be avenues to obtain the isolates. Do let me know how this all unfolds....

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
> **Date:** February 9, 2020 at 10:18:45 PM PST
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> **Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV**
>
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> ---
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> Chunli Bai
> President
> Chinese Academy of Sciences
> President
> The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124666

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
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Dear Professor Bai,

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124667

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Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124668

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:12 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Well it seemed too easy....hiopedully there will be avenues to obtain the isolates. Do let me know how this all unfolds....

Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 9, 2020 at 10:18:45 PM PST
To: "Hamburg, Margaret" <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "Lowenthal, Micah" <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, "Hildebrand, John G - (jhildebr)" <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008457

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:
>
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> Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM
>
> Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,
>
> Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.
>
> The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and

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distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008459

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:20 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Great idea about sharing isolates as a routine step in outbreak response. This will be a difficult sell but worth the effort. I have been engaged with the WHO discussions on sharing virus isolates and frankly have not been impressed. Maybe I was part of the wrong group.

Thanks, Jim

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:12 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Jim,
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Wondering if in this modern era we should try to develop a framework for actually making it"routine" in a serious outbreak context that samples get shared and an expert scientific group to examine questions of origin and evolution.

Would welcome your thoughts.

Stay in touch.
Peggy

Sent from my iPhone

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Best wishes, Jim

From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 8:15 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008959

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The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

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Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008960

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:20 AM
To: Hamburg, Margaret
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Stay in touch.
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Best wishes, Jim

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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Chunli Bai

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
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From: Hamburg, Margaret
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To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
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Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124796

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The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124797

From: Hamburg, Margaret [MHamburg@nas.edu]
Sent: 2/11/2020 1:51:30 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. [jwleduc@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Work to do....

Sent from my iPhone

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> **From:** Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:12 AM
> **To:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV
>
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>
> Stay in touch.
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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
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From: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>
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Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Stay in touch.
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Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124646

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124647

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124648

From: Weaver, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 8:47 PM
To: Ali Zohaib
Subject: Re: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

Dear Dr. Zohaib,

Sorry for the delay in responding but I was traveling. It looks like this deadline has passed but let me know if there is still an opportunity.

Best wishes

Scott

Scott C. Weaver, Ph.D.
John Sealy Distinguished University Chair in Human Infections and Immunity
Professor and Chair, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
Director, Institute for Human Infections and Immunity (http://www.utmb.edu/ihii/)
Scientific Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Director, Western Gulf Center of Excellence for Vector-Borne Diseases (https://www.utmb.edu/wgcvbd)
Director, World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses (https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva)
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, Texas 77555-0610
Office telephone 409-266-6500
Laboratory telephones 409-747-2440 and 747-2425

utmb Health
Institute for Human Infections & Immunity

Western Gulf Center of Excellence for Vector-Borne Diseases

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Date: Thursday, February 6, 2020 at 2:20 PM
To: Scott Weaver <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof. Dr. Scott

Greetings from Islamabad, Pakistan. I hope you are doing well and still remember me, I once applied for Postdoc position in your group but unfortunately there were no funds available at that time.
After completing my PhD under the supervision of **Prof Dr. Zheng Li Shi**, I am currently working as Assistant Professor in National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. I was just informed

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009882

through our Research Department about the PEER Program, where both US and Pakistani Sceintitis may collaborate.

I am writing to you with respect to one of my collaborative projects-intend to submit. it will be an honour for us to partner with you.

We are thinking for capacity building of Pakistani Research Institutions for infectious Disease investigation. However, it requires a US partner having current active grants form specific USA funding agencies. The deadline is the 10th of February. Please see the attached pdf for US partner requirements (I have highlighted the US partner requirements in yellow) and also the link for eligibility criteria for US partners. The deadline for preproposal submission is 10th of February.

https://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/PEER/PGA_147199

PEER applicants are required to partner with a U.S. Government (USG)-supported researcher who currently receives funding from or is employed by one of the following agencies:

- **Agricultural Research Service (ARS)**
- **National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)**
- **National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)**
- **National Institutes of Health (NIH)**
- **National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)**
- **National Science Foundation (NSF)**
- **Smithsonian Institution**
- **United States Forest Service (USFS)**
- **United States Geological Survey (USGS)**

Please let us know if you are kindly willing for this. I have also attached my CV for your kind consideration. Looking forward to hearing from you.

Kind Regards
Dr. Ali Zohaib, DVM, MPVM (China), PhD (CAS, China)
Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences (ASAB),
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)
Call
Send SMS
Add to Skype
You'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009883

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 11:50 PM
To: Weaver, Scott
Subject: Re: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof. Dr. Scott

Much thanks for your reply. Dr. Dennis Bente from your department has helped me to secure the letter on time with you. I have already applied with your kind support and the support of Dr. Dennis Bente for PEER Program. I hope everything will be smooth. I will keep you posted regarding the updates.

Dr. Scott, Pakistan is the world's 6th most populous country; however, infrastructure for infectious disease research especially in virology is limited. I have been discussing with Dr. Bente for capacity building of infectious disease research in Pakistan. I hope we can work together on some proposals to secure funds. Thanks

Kind Regards
Dr. Ali Zohaib, DVM, MPVM (China), PhD (CAS, China)
Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences (ASAB),
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)

From: Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 7:47 AM
To: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

Dear Dr. Zohaib,

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Best wishes

Scott

Scott C. Weaver, Ph.D.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010100

John Sealy Distinguished University Chair in Human Infections and Immunity
Professor and Chair, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
Director, Institute for Human Infections and Immunity (http://www.utmb.edu/ihii/)
Scientific Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Director, Western Gulf Center of Excellence for Vector-Borne Diseases (https://www.utmb.edu/wgcvbd)
Director, World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses (https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva)
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, Texas 77555-0610
Office telephone 409-266-6500
Laboratory telephones 409-747-2440 and 747-2425

utmb Health
Institute for Human Infections & Immunity

Western Gulf Center of Excellence for Vector-Borne Diseases

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Date: Thursday, February 6, 2020 at 2:20 PM
To: Scott Weaver <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

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https://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/PEER/PGA_147199

PEER applicants are required to partner with a U.S. Government (USG)-supported researcher who currently receives funding from or is employed by one of the following agencies:

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- **National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)**
- **National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)**
- **National Institutes of Health (NIH)**
- **National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)**

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- National Science Foundation (NSF)
- Smithsonian Institution
- United States Forest Service (USFS)
- United States Geological Survey (USGS)

Please let us know if you are kindly willing for this. I have also attached my CV for your kind consideration. Looking forward to hearing from you.

Kind Regards
Dr. Ali Zohaib, DVM, MPVM (China), PhD (CAS, China)
Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences (ASAB),
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)
Call
Send SMS
Add to Skype
You'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010102

From: df@wh.iov.cn
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 3:34 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong; zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.; yzm; wangyy; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

No prompt reply from the Custom until today. President Bai is trying to push it in Beijing. Please wait for a while.

With best

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-05 20:41
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
CC: LeDuc, James W.; yzm; wangyy; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: RE: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Hi Fei,
Thanks for the update. We look forward to further progress.
Best,

- Pei-Yong

From: df@wh.iov.cn <df@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 5:57 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks for your information.
We are trying to discuss this with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing directly.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

I will keep on contacting with you.

Best wishes,

Fei

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-04 22:52
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
CC: LeDuc, James W.; Yuan Zhiming; wangyy@wh.iov.cn; Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Fei and Zhengli,

Please see the response from President Bai. Zhiming and Yanyi were copied on the original email. Let us know anything we could help to facilitate the isolate transfer.

Best regards,

- Pei-Yong

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn>
Date: February 3, 2020 at 11:20:56 PM EST
To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126313

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126314

From: df@wh.iov.cn
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 3:34 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong;zlshi
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;yzm;wangyy;Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best

Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

From: Shi, Pei yong
Date: 2020-02-05 20:41
To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
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Subject: RE: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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- Pei-Yong

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Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
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Thanks for your information.
We are trying to discuss this with the General Administration of Customs in Beijing directly.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

I will keep on contacting with you.

Best wishes,

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Dr. Fei Deng
Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Tel/Fax:0086-27-87198465
Email: df@wh.iov.cn

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To: df@wh.iov.cn; zlshi
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Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 8:39 AM
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Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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To: dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, MHamburg <MHamburg@nas.edu>
Cc: mlowenth <mlowenth@nas.edu>, Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>, jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>, jhilderbr <jhilderbr@arizona.edu>, BRsek <BRsek@nas.edu>, jboright <jboright@nas.edu>, clbai <clbai@cas.cn>, zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>, gaof <gaof@im.ac.cn>, jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, sunhui <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>, wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>, yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009189

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009190

From: Weaver, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 7:57 AM
To: Ali Zohaib
Subject: Re: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

Thanks for the clarification. I am glad that the application was submitted.

Scott

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Date: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 at 11:49 PM
To: Scott Weaver <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

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Dear Prof. Dr. Scott

Much thanks for your reply. Dr. Dennis Bente from your department has helped me to secure the letter on time with you. I have already applied with your kind support and the support of Dr. Dennis Bente for PEER Program. I hope everything will be smooth. I will keep you posted regarding the updates.

Dr. Scott, Pakistan is the world's 6th most populous country; however, infrastructure for infectious disease research especially in virology is limited. I have been discussing with Dr. Bente for capacity building of infectious disease research in Pakistan. I hope we can work together on some proposals to secure funds. Thanks

Kind Regards
Dr. Ali Zohaib, DVM, MPVM (China), PhD (CAS, China)
Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

Atta-ur-Rahman School of Applied Biosciences (ASAB),
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)
Call
Send SMS
Add to Skype
You'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype

From: Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 7:47 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010096

To: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

Dear Dr. Zohaib,

Sorry for the delay in responding but I was traveling. It looks like this deadline has passed but let me know if there is still an opportunity.

Best wishes

Scott

Scott C. Weaver, Ph.D.

John Sealy Distinguished University Chair in Human Infections and Immunity

Professor and Chair, Department of Microbiology and Immunology

Director, Institute for Human Infections and Immunity (http://www.utmb.edu/ihii/)

Scientific Director, Galveston National Laboratory

Director, Western Gulf Center of Excellence for Vector-Borne Diseases (https://www.utmb.edu/wgcvbd)

Director, World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses (https://www.utmb.edu/wrceva)

University of Texas Medical Branch

Galveston, Texas 77555-0610

Office telephone 409-266-6500

Laboratory telephones 409-747-2440 and 747-2425

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Ali Zohaib (b)(6)
Date: Thursday, February 6, 2020 at 2:20 PM
To: Scott Weaver <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Request for the project Collaboration, Pakistan

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https://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/PEER/PGA_147199

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- **Agricultural Research Service (ARS)**

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010098

- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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- National Institutes of Health (NIH)
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- National Science Foundation (NSF)
- Smithsonian Institution
- United States Forest Service (USFS)
- United States Geological Survey (USGS)

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Assistant Professor (Virology)
Department of Healthcare Biotechnology

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National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)
Academic Block-1, Main NUST Campus,
Sector: H-12, ISLAMABAD
Ph# (b)(6)
Call
Send SMS
Add to Skype
You'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010099

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI
Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 9:09 PM
To: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Cc: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>; dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear President Bai,

Thank you very much for following up with this additional information. We are disappointed, of course, but understand the value of sharing within the context of the WHO framework. Such viral isolate sharing is a crucial aspect of the international collaboration needed to combat this devastating outbreak, as well as to address future threats.

We look forward to working with you on efforts to contain this virus and continue to offer our assistance as needed.

With best regards,

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:
>
> Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008460

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:
>
> Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008461

Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008462

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 5:38 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Maybe I can get a permanent NAS email account… inbox is filling up there.

Thanks for sharing.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI
Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 9:09 PM
To: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Cc: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>; dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear President Bai,

Thank you very much for following up with this additional information. We are disappointed, of course, but understand the value of sharing within the context of the WHO framework. Such viral isolate sharing is a crucial aspect of the international collaboration needed to combat this devastating outbreak, as well as to address future threats.

We look forward to working with you on efforts to contain this virus and continue to offer our assistance as needed.

With best regards,

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

CAS is still much interested in working with the international community on the specifics for isolates sharing under the guidance of NHC. It is our sincere hope that, with joint international efforts, the spread of the virus will be contained soon.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
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Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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With best regards,

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Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008956

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 5:38 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Subject: RE: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Thanks for sharing.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FYI
Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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Cc: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>; dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124780

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124781

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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With best regards,

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President
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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124782

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 5:41 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FYI
Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 9:09 PM
To: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Cc: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>; dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126138

On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

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We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126139

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

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President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_126140

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 5:41 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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FYI
Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 9:09 PM
To: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Cc: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>; dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear President Bai,

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With best regards,

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008951

On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

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With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
President
The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

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With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008952

On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008953

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 5:41 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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To: president-office <president-office@cas.cn>
Cc: Hamburg, Margaret <MHamburg@nas.edu>; dgriffi6 <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; jwleduc <jwleduc@nas.edu>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; clbai <clbai@cas.cn>; George_Gao（高福）_Fu <gaof@im.ac.cn>; zhangyp <zhangyp@cashq.ac.cn>; jh-cao <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; Sunhui@cashq.ac.cn; wangyy <wangyy@wh.iov.cn>; yzm <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With best regards,

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124709

On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

We have just been advised that the National Health Commission of China (NHC), the Chinese governmental agency for health, will take the lead in coordinating discussions and collaborations with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the sharing of 2019nCov isolates under WHO framework. As you may undertand, in addition to the U.S., many other countries have also made requests on isolates sharing from China.

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From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124710

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Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

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The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124711

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 5:41 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

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Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_051328

On Feb 9, 2020, at 10:18 PM, president-office <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

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The Alliance of International Science Organiztions (ANSO)

From: Hamburg, Margaret
Date: 2020-02-06 23:02
To: president-office@cas.cn
CC: dgriffi6; Lowenthal, Micah; peggy; jwleduc; JohnHildebrand; Rusek, Benjamin; Boright, John; clbai; gaof; zhangyp; jh-cao; liyin; sunhui; wangyy; yzm
Subject: Re: sharing of isolates of 2019nCoV

Dear Professor Bai,

Thank you so much for your very prompt and constructive response. We are deeply grateful for your willingness to help facilitate this important scientific collaboration. The health of the public will benefit in both our countries and around the globe.

We also want to extend our deepest sympathy to you and your country at this difficult time. Needless to say, we are eager to work closely with you to advance efforts to contain the spread of this virus.

With thanks and best regards,
I
Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Sent from my iPhone

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On Feb 3, 2020, at 11:32 PM, "president-office@cas.cn" <president-office@cas.cn> wrote:

Diane E. Griffin, Vice President, NAS,
Margaret Hamburg, Foreign Secretary, NAM

Dear Prof. Griffin and Prof. Hamburg,

Thank you for your concerns on the recent outbreak of the 2019 novo-coronavirus epidemic. Upon receiving your letter dated January 28, my colleagues have discussed with Dr. George Fu Gao and other experts and we are willing to share isolates of the 2019 nCoV with the international community. We believe this is critical to engaging joint international efforts to contain the spread of the virus.

The National Biosafety Laboratory Wuhan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is prepared and willing to work with The University of Texas Medical Branch and other international research institutions on the specifics for the sharing and distribution of the isolates. We are in the process of getting it ready.

I look forward to hearing your further advice on this matter.

With best regards,

Chunli Bai

Chunli Bai
President
Chinese Academy of Sciences
The Alliance of International Science Organizations (ANSO)

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Infection with Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Causes Pneumonia in the Rhesus Macaques

Chao Shan[1#*], Yanfeng Yao[1#], Xinglou Yang[1#], Ge Gao[1], Yun Peng[1], Yiwu Zhou[2], Lian Yang[3], Jia Wu[1], Xue Hu[1], Huajun Zhang[1], Xiaoxiao Gao[1], Cheng Peng[1], Juan Min[1], Ying Chen[1,4], Wei Pang[5], Zhengfei Hu[5], Yongtang Zheng[5], Zhengli Shi[1*], Zhiming Yuan[1*]

1 Center for Biosafety Mega-Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, People's Republic of China.

2 Department of Forensic Medicine, Tongji Medical College of Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 13 Hangkong Road, Wuhan, Hubei, People's Republic of China

3 Department of Radiology, Union Hospital, Tongji Medical College, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, People's Republic of China.

4 University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People's Republic of China.

5 Laboratory of Molecular Immunopharmacology, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Kunming, Yunnan, People's Republic of China.

*Correspondence: Zhiming Yuan (yzm@wh.iov.cn), Zhengli Shi (zlshi@wh.iov.cn), Chao Shan (shanchao@wh.iov.cn)

[#]These authors contributed equally

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Abstract

The 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak is a major challenge for public health. Infection with 2019-nCoV has been associated with serious acute respiratory syndrome with large numbers hospitalization and mortality. However, the dynamics of viral infection, replication and shedding are poorly understood in non-human primate model. Here we show that rhesus macaques are highly susceptible to infection by 2019-nCoV. After intratracheal inoculation, the first peak of viral RNA was observed in oropharyngeal swab on day 1 after infection, mainly from input of the inoculation, while the second peak occurred on day 5 post infection which indicated the on-site replication in throat. Viral RNA was also detected in nasal and anal swabs. Histological lesions were found from infected animals which indicated the diffuse interstitial pneumonia. We also identified 2019-nCoV RNA in respiratory tract tissues, including trachea, bronchus and lung. The virus was also reisolated from oropharyngeal swab, lung, and feces. The non-human primate model described here provides a valuable platform to study 2019-nCoV pathogenesis and evaluate vaccine and therapeutics.

Key words: Novel Coronavirus, non-human primate model, Pneumonia

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Many coronaviruses such as SARS and MERS are broadly distributed in humans and other mammals. Coronaviruses belong to the family Coronaviridae and possess a single strand, positive-sense RNA genome ranging from 26 to 32 kilobases in length. In December, 2019, a cluster of cases of pneumonia were reported in people associated with the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, Hubei Province. The subsequently research from lower respiratory tract samples indicated a novel coronavirus, which was named 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused coronavirus diseases (COVID-19). The common clinical features for COVID-19 include fever, cough, myalgia, fatigue, dyspnea, lymphopenia, and pneumonia, less common symptoms including sputum production, headache and haemoptysis and diarrhea. As of February 16, 2020, a total of 68,592 cases had been reported in at least 21 countries with more than 10,000 in severe condition and 1,666 deaths. Due to the urgency of the situation, World Health Organization declared that the outbreak of 2019-nCoV in China constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).

Animal models are essential for the evaluation of potential treatments or vaccine development. Here we report a nonhuman primate disease model for 2019-nCoV. We experimentally infected rhesus macaques (RM) using 2019-nCoV isolation from clinical bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) and we evaluated the dynamics of 2019-nCoV in the blood, swabs and respiratory tract tissues of rhesus macaques.

Six rhesus macaques between the ages of 6 and 12 years with mix gender were inoculated with 7×10^6 50% tissue-culture infectious doses (TCID50) of 2019-nCoV through intratracheal route. The oropharyngeal swab, nasal swab, anal swab and blood were evaluated post infection (Fig. 1a). No obvious clinical signs were observed during

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the study course except one animal showed reduced appetite. Both body temperature (Fig. 1b) and weight (Fig. 1c) did not show any change from day 1 to day 14 post infection.

The chest radiograph was obtained on day 0, 1, 3 and 6 post infection. As shown in Fig. 2a (left panel), normal lung was presented before infection, while patchy glass-ground opacity was observed in right lung on day 1 post infection (Fig. 2a middle left panel). On day 3 post infection, multiple glass-ground opacity in right lung was found (Fig. 2a, middle right panel) and the density decreased slightly on day 6 (Fig. 2a, right panel) while the scope of right lung lesions increased from day 3 to day 6. After the animals were euthanized, necropsy was performed. Postmortem examinations showed a variable degree of consolidation, edema, hemorrhage and congestion in bright red lesions throughout the lower respiratory tract which indicated the diffuse interstitial pneumonia (Fig.2b). Confocal microscopy analysis of lesions site indicated the positive viral NP protein was examined (Fig. 2c).

To examine the viral replication dynamics in the RM, the blood, oropharyngeal swab, nasal swab and anal swab were collected on day 1-6, 9, 11 and 14 post infection from remaining RMs. Two peaks were observed on day 1 and day 5 post infection in most animals from throat samples (Fig 3b). The first peak viral load on day 1 in RM1-RM5 from oropharyngeal swab is the range 2.08×10^4-2.85×10^7 copies/ml, while the second peak in oropharyngeal swab was achieved on day 5 after infection with viral load 1.03×10^7-3.60×10^7 copies/ml, with the exception of one monkey RM5 that exhibited the lowest viral RNA, which started to increase on day 5 after infection. The viral RNA levels in throat fell rapidly after day 6 and reached undetectable levels in remaining animals by

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day 9. The nasal swabs also showed positive viral RNA in 3 out of 6 RMs (Fig. 3c). We also evaluated the anal viral level from day 1 to day 14 post infection (Fig. 3d).. Three out of six RMs exhibited detectable viral RNA with RM1 showed the longest viral shedding. Overall, the viral RNA was detected from upper respiratory tract after infection. The two peaks in throat represent the original input and viral replication in the throat. The viral RNA positive from anal swab suggested that the infection in alimentary canal occurred.

After necropsy, the tissues and organs were harvested for quantification of viral RNA. Quantitative reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR) analysis was performed in respiratory tract tissues and organs. The data revealed the widespread presence of 2019-nCoV in the respiratory tract (Fig. 4a-b). The amount of the viral RNA is ranging from 3.0×10^4-1.5×10^7 copies/g in trachea and bronchus tract on both day 3 and 6 post infection. In the lung, viral RNA was detected in the lung with titer up to 2.0×10^7 copies/g and mainly localized in the lower infection site of lung. Upon necropsy, the area of lung lobe affected by lesions was estimated by pathologist. Histopathological analysis showed damage areas surrounding small bronchus, with the most serious injury in the inferior lobe of the right lung. Thickened alveolar walls with fibroblast proliferation were observed in majority alveoli. Pulmonary hyaline-membrane formation, hemorrhage and edema can be seen in the alveoli (Fig. 4 c-e). These results suggested that 2019-nCoV could infect the respiratory tract resulting in diffuse interstitial pneumonia in rhesus macaque.

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To confirm the disease was caused by 2019-nCoV. The virus was also reisolated from lung tissues, oropharyngeal swab and feces. The alignment consensus showed isolated viruses are >99% identical as the original input (Fig. 5).

Collectively, 2019-nCoV caused acute localized-to-widespread pneumonia in all animals. This animal model establishes the causal relationship between 2019-nCoV and respiratory disease in rhesus macaques reminiscent of the respiratory disease observed in humans, thus fulfilling Koch's postulates. The model enables detailed studies of the pathogenesis of this illness and may play a critical component in the evaluation of therapeutic drug and vaccine.

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From: Slack [notification@slack.com]
Sent: 2/18/2020 2:29:22 PM
To: Menachery, Vineet [vimenach@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: [Slack] Notifications from the SARS2 workspace for February 18th, 2020 at 2:29 PM

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You have a new direct message in SARS2 (sars2.slack.com)

From your conversation with Matt Frieman



Matt Frieman February 18th at 2:25 PM
I talked to Ralph for a long time last night, He sounds beat. His ACE2 mice are breeding up but not ready for anyone to have. He said he sat in Fauci's office talking about the outbreak and chimeras. Clearly he is in other kinds of meetings than what we are invited to! I joked about his link link to WIV, he wasnt very amused. He said that Zhi's paper was not approved by the Chinese govt and that she may be arrested for it. Thats not a good look for anyone. So we just go ahead and keep our heads down and get this virus working. Will see where we get!

Open in Slack

Reply

Snooze these notifications for: an hour, eight hours, a day, three days, or the next week. Or, turn email notifications off. For more detailed preferences, see your account page.

SARS2
Workspace URL: sars2.slack.com
Email: vimenach@UTMB.EDU

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Sign In

Made by Slack Technologies, Inc
500 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105 United States

Our Blog ◦ Policies

From: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃) <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
To: Peter Hotez
Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena;Tseng, Chien-Te K.;Du Lanying_NYBC
Subject: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020
Attachments: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020.pdf

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We suggest to change "SARS-CoV-2" to HCoV-19. We submitted the manuscript to Lancet at 0:30am today and 30 min later, an editor called us and told us that the manuscript was accepted. He asked us to wait in our office and he would send us the proofs and 3 forms in 30 min. This morning, the paper is online. This is the rapidest speed - only about 10 hours from submission to be online! Hope WHO may take our suggestion.

Shibo

A distinct name is needed for the new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan

Shibo Jiang[1], Zhengli Shi[2], Yuelong Shu[3], Jingdong Song[4], George F Gao[4], Wenjie Tan[4], Deyin Guo[5,*]

[1] School of Basic Medical Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China

[3] School of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen, China

[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China

[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

An outbreak of unusual respiratory disease, initially dominated with pneumonia in Wuhan, China is caused by infection of a novel coronavirus, 2019-nCoV, first named by the World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO webpage). On 11 February 2020, WHO renamed the disease as “coronavirus disease 2019” (COVID-19) (WHO webpage) and on the same day, the Coronavirus Study Group (CSG) of the International Committee on

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Virus Taxonomy (ICTV) posted a manuscript at *bioRxiv* to suggest designating 2019-nCoV as "severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)" based on the phylogenetic analysis of related coronaviruses[1]. CSG claimed that they did not intend to make any reference to SARS when introducing yet another virus name derived from the term "SARS". However, "SARS" is a disease name, and if the new virus is called SARS-CoV-2, it actually implies for SARS, especially for scientists without knowledge of virology and the public domain. In addition, it is also not consistent with the disease name COVID-19 christened by the WHO. 2019-nCoV, as a natural virus, is different from all other SARS-like or SARS-related coronaviruses which are characterized mainly by their genome sequence information. As of 17 February 2020, 2019-nCoV caused 71,331 human infections and 1,775 deaths in China and 24 other countries, and is distinct from SARS-CoV in biological, epidemiological and clinical features. Together, naming 2019-nCoV as "SARS-CoV-2" is truly misleading. For such an epidemic virus with apparent international concern, it deserves its own unique name.

2019-nCoV is still evolving and it is too early to predict the outcome of the current outbreak. Some experts predicted that 2019-nCoV may evolve to a low pathogenic but high transmissible coronavirus, which might return every winter, like seasonal flu[2]. If this is the case, the name of SARS-CoV-2 may have adverse effect on the social stability and economic development in epidemic countries, and even the world. People may become very panic when they think the re-occurrence of SARS or "SARS-2". Foreign travelers and investors may not want to go to a country with an epidemic or even sporadic cases of "SARS-2". People may also believe that like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV will not come back after the end of this outbreak. Therefore, they will not have to be prepared for prevention of 2019-nCoV infection in the near future and may loosen the alertness of the world.

Based on the special clinical, virological and epidemiological characteristics and the uncertainty of the novel coronavirus, to avoid the misleadingness and confusion, and to help scientists and the public for better communication, we, a group of virologists working in China, would suggest renaming 2019-nCoV as human coronavirus 2019 (HCoV-19). Such a name distinguishes 2019-nCoV from SARS-CoV and keeps it consistent with the WHO name of the disease, COVID-19.

References

1. Gorbalenya AE et al., Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus – The species and its viruses, a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. BioRxiv 2020.02.07.937862; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862
2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

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From: Tseng, Chien-Te K.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 7:11 AM
To: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃);Peter Hotez
Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena;Du Lanying_NYBC
Subject: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Congratulations on a job well-done, Shibo!

From: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃) <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
To: Peter Hotez <hotez@bcm.edu>
Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena <bottazzi@bcm.edu>; Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Du Lanying_NYBC <ldu@nybc.org>
Subject: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China

[3] School of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen, China

[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China

[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

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An outbreak of unusual respiratory disease, initially dominated with pneumonia in Wuhan, China is caused by infection of a novel coronavirus, 2019-nCoV, first named by the World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO webpage). On 11 February 2020, WHO renamed the disease as "coronavirus disease 2019" (COVID-19) (WHO webpage) and on the same day, the Coronavirus Study Group (CSG) of the International Committee on Virus Taxonomy (ICTV) posted a manuscript at *bioRxiv* to suggest designating 2019-nCoV as "severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)" based on the phylogenetic analysis of related coronaviruses[1]. CSG claimed that they did not intend to make any reference to SARS when introducing yet another virus name derived from the term "SARS". However, "SARS" is a disease name, and if the new virus is called SARS-CoV-2, it actually implies for SARS, especially for scientists without knowledge of virology and the public domain. In addition, it is also not consistent with the disease name COVID-19 christened by the WHO. 2019-nCoV, as a natural virus, is different from all other SARS-like or SARS-related coronaviruses which are characterized mainly by their genome sequence information. As of 17 February 2020, 2019-nCoV caused 71,331 human infections and 1,775 deaths in China and 24 other countries, and is distinct from SARS-CoV in biological, epidemiological and clinical features. Together, naming 2019-nCoV as "SARS-CoV-2" is truly misleading. For such an epidemic virus with apparent international concern, it deserves its own unique name.

2019-nCoV is still evolving and it is too early to predict the outcome of the current outbreak. Some experts predicted that 2019-nCoV may evolve to a low pathogenic but high transmissible coronavirus, which might return every winter, like seasonal flu[2]. If this is the case, the name of SARS-CoV-2 may have adverse effect on the social stability and economic development in epidemic countries, and even the world. People may become very panic when they think the re-occurrence of SARS or "SARS-2". Foreign travelers and investors may not want to go to a country with an epidemic or even sporadic cases of "SARS-2". People may also believe that like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV will not come back after the end of this outbreak. Therefore, they will not have to be prepared for prevention of 2019-nCoV infection in the near future and may loosen the alertness of the world.

Based on the special clinical, virological and epidemiological characteristics and the uncertainty of the novel coronavirus, to avoid the misleadingness and confusion, and to help scientists and the public for better communication, we, a group of virologists working in China, would suggest renaming 2019-nCoV as human coronavirus 2019 (HCoV-19). Such a name distinguishes 2019-nCoV from SARS-CoV and keeps it consistent with the WHO name of the disease, COVID-19.

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References

1. Gorbalenya AE et al., Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus – The species and its viruses, a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. BioRxiv 2020.02.07.937862; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862
2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

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From: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃) <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 7:27 AM
To: Tseng, Chien-Te K.
Cc: Peter Hotez;Bottazzi, Maria Elena;Du Lanying_NYBC
Subject: Re: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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Thanks you all for your support!

Shibo

-----原始邮件-----
发件人:"Tseng, Chien-Te K." <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>
发送时间:2020-02-19 21:10:52 (星期三)
收件人: "Shibo Jiang (姜世勃)" <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>, "Peter Hotez" <hotez@bcm.edu>
抄送: "Bottazzi, Maria Elena" <bottazzi@bcm.edu>, "Du Lanying_NYBC" <ldu@nybc.org>
主题: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena <bottazzi@bcm.edu>; Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Du Lanying_NYBC <ldu@nybc.org>
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*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

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References

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2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

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From: Tseng, Chien-Te K.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;LeDuc, James W.;Menachery, Vineet;Makino, Shinji
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Another new name (HCoV-19) pushed by Chinese scientists for SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19...

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Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
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[1] School of Basic Medical Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China

[3] School of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen, China

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[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

An outbreak of unusual respiratory disease, initially dominated with pneumonia in Wuhan, China is caused by infection of a novel coronavirus, 2019-nCoV, first named by the World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO webpage). On 11 February 2020, WHO renamed the disease as "coronavirus disease 2019" (COVID-19) (WHO webpage) and on the same day, the Coronavirus Study Group (CSG) of the International Committee on Virus Taxonomy (ICTV) posted a manuscript at *bioRxiv* to suggest designating 2019-nCoV as "severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)" based on the phylogenetic analysis of related coronaviruses[1]. CSG claimed that they did not intend to make any reference to SARS when introducing yet another virus name derived from the term "SARS". However, "SARS" is a disease name, and if the new virus is called SARS-CoV-2, it actually implies for SARS, especially for scientists without knowledge of virology and the public domain. In addition, it is also not consistent with the disease name COVID-19 christened by the WHO. 2019-nCoV, as a natural virus, is different from all other SARS-like or SARS-related coronaviruses which are characterized mainly by their genome sequence information. As of 17 February 2020, 2019-nCoV caused 71,331 human infections and 1,775 deaths in China and 24 other countries, and is distinct from SARS-CoV in biological, epidemiological and clinical features. Together, naming 2019-nCoV as "SARS-CoV-2" is truly misleading. For such an epidemic virus with apparent international concern, it deserves its own unique name.

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Based on the special clinical, virological and epidemiological characteristics and the uncertainty of the novel coronavirus, to avoid the misleadingness and confusion, and to help scientists and the public for better

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communication, we, a group of virologists working in China, would suggest renaming 2019-nCoV as human coronavirus 2019 (HCoV-19). Such a name distinguishes 2019-nCoV from SARS-CoV and keeps it consistent with the WHO name of the disease, COVID-19.

References

1. Gorbalenya AE et al., Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus – The species and its viruses, a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. BioRxiv 2020.02.07.937862; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862
2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

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From: Tseng, Chien-Te K.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:06 PM
To: Comer, Jason E.;Brasel, Trevor
Cc: Drelich, Aleksandra
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Unintentionally left out both of you..

From: Tseng, Chien-Te K.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Makino, Shinji <shmakino@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Another new name (HCoV-19) pushed by Chinese scientists for SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19...

From: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃) <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
To: Peter Hotez <hotez@bcm.edu>
Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena <bottazzi@bcm.edu>; Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Du Lanying_NYBC <ldu@nybc.org>
Subject: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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We suggest to change "SARS-CoV-2" to HCoV-19. We submitted the manuscript to Lancet at 0:30am today and 30 min later, an editor called us and told us that the manuscript was accepted. He asked us to wait in our office and he would send us the proofs and 3 forms in 30 min. This morning, the paper is online. This is the rapidest speed - only about 10 hours from submission to be online! Hope WHO may take our suggestion.

Shibo

A distinct name is needed for the new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_056670

Shibo Jiang[1], Zhengli Shi[2], Yuelong Shu[3], Jingdong Song[4], George F Gao[4], Wenjie Tan[4], Deyin Guo[5,*]

[1] School of Basic Medical Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China
[3] School of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen, China
[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

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References

1. Gorbalenya AE et al., Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus – The species and its viruses, a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. BioRxiv 2020.02.07.937862; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862
2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:59 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong;Xiao, Shu-Yuan (sxiao@bsd.uchicago.edu)
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

fyi

From: Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Makino, Shinji <shmakino@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Another new name (HCoV-19) pushed by Chinese scientists for SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19...

From: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃) <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
To: Peter Hotez <hotez@bcm.edu>
Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena <bottazzi@bcm.edu>; Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Du Lanying_NYBC <ldu@nybc.org>
Subject: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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Shibo

A distinct name is needed for the new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002707

Shibo Jiang[1], Zhengli Shi[2], Yuelong Shu[3], Jingdong Song[4], George F Gao[4], Wenjie Tan[4], Deyin Guo[5,*]

[1] School of Basic Medical Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China
[3] School of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen, China
[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

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2019-nCoV is still evolving and it is too early to predict the outcome of the current outbreak. Some experts predicted that 2019-nCoV may evolve to a low pathogenic but high transmissible coronavirus, which might return every winter, like seasonal flu[2]. If this is the case, the name of SARS-CoV-2 may have adverse effect on the social stability and economic development in epidemic countries, and even the world. People may become very panic when they think the re-occurrence of SARS or "SARS-2". Foreign travelers and investors may not want to go to a country with an epidemic or even sporadic cases of "SARS-2". People may also believe that

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Based on the special clinical, virological and epidemiological characteristics and the uncertainty of the novel coronavirus, to avoid the misleadingness and confusion, and to help scientists and the public for better communication, we, a group of virologists working in China, would suggest renaming 2019-nCoV as human coronavirus 2019 (HCoV-19). Such a name distinguishes 2019-nCoV from SARS-CoV and keeps it consistent with the WHO name of the disease, COVID-19.

References

1. Gorbalenya AE et al., Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus – The species and its viruses, a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. BioRxiv 2020.02.07.937862; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862
2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002709

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:59 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong;Xiao, Shu-Yuan (sxiao@bsd.uchicago.edu)
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

fyi

From: Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Makino, Shinji <shmakino@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Another new name (HCoV-19) pushed by Chinese scientists for SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19...

From: Shibo Jiang (姜世勃) <shibojiang@fudan.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
To: Peter Hotez <hotez@bcm.edu>
Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena <bottazzi@bcm.edu>; Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Du Lanying_NYBC <ldu@nybc.org>
Subject: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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Shibo

A distinct name is needed for the new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_057661

Shibo Jiang[1], Zhengli Shi[2], Yuelong Shu[3], Jingdong Song[4], George F Gao[4], Wenjie Tan[4], Deyin Guo[5,*]

[1] School of Basic Medical Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China
[3] School of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen, China
[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
*Email: guodeyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn

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References

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_057663

From: XIAO, SHU-YUAN [BSD] <Shu-Yuan.Xiao@uchospitals.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 2:20 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Shi, Pei yong
Subject: Re: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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Very interesting.

From: Jim LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Date: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 1:59 PM
To: "Shi, Pei yong" <peshi@UTMB.EDU>, Xiao_hospital <Shu-Yuan.Xiao@uchospitals.edu>
Subject: FW: RE: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

fyi

From: Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Makino, Shinji <shmakino@UTMB.EDU>
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Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 1:21 AM
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Cc: Bottazzi, Maria Elena <bottazzi@bcm.edu>; Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Du Lanying_NYBC <ldu@nybc.org>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002866

A distinct name is needed for the new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan

Shibo Jiang[1], Zhengli Shi[2], Yuelong Shu[3], Jingdong Song[4], George F Gao[4], Wenjie Tan[4], Deyin Guo[5,*]

[1] School of Basic Medical Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China
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From: XIAO, SHU-YUAN [BSD] <Shu-Yuan.Xiao@uchospitals.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 2:32 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Shi, Pei yong
Subject: Re: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

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Can't catch up when writing papers, we have to keep updating

From: Xiao_hospital <Shu-Yuan.Xiao@uchospitals.edu>
Date: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 2:20 PM
To: Jim LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "Shi, Pei yong" <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Jiang S_HCoV-19_not SARS-CoV-2_Lancet_2020

Very interesting.

From: Jim LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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Shibo

A distinct name is needed for the new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan

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[2] Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China

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[4] China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China

[5] School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

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An outbreak of unusual respiratory disease, initially dominated with pneumonia in Wuhan, China is caused by infection of a novel coronavirus, 2019-nCoV, first named by the World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO webpage). On 11 February 2020, WHO renamed the disease as "coronavirus disease 2019" (COVID-19) (WHO webpage) and on the same day, the Coronavirus Study Group (CSG) of the International Committee on Virus Taxonomy (ICTV) posted a manuscript at *bioRxiv* to suggest designating 2019-nCoV as "severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)" based on the phylogenetic analysis of related coronaviruses[1]. CSG claimed that they did not intend to make any reference to SARS when introducing yet another virus name derived from the term "SARS". However, "SARS" is a disease name, and if the new virus is called SARS-CoV-2, it actually implies for SARS, especially for scientists without knowledge of virology and the public domain. In addition, it is also not consistent with the disease name COVID-19 christened by the

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WHO. 2019-nCoV, as a natural virus, is different from all other SARS-like or SARS-related coronaviruses which are characterized mainly by their genome sequence information. As of 17 February 2020, 2019-nCoV caused 71,331 human infections and 1,775 deaths in China and 24 other countries, and is distinct from SARS-CoV in biological, epidemiological and clinical features. Together, naming 2019-nCoV as "SARS-CoV-2" is truly misleading. For such an epidemic virus with apparent international concern, it deserves its own unique name.

2019-nCoV is still evolving and it is too early to predict the outcome of the current outbreak. Some experts predicted that 2019-nCoV may evolve to a low pathogenic but high transmissible coronavirus, which might return every winter, like seasonal flu[2]. If this is the case, the name of SARS-CoV-2 may have adverse effect on the social stability and economic development in epidemic countries, and even the world. People may become very panic when they think the re-occurrence of SARS or "SARS-2". Foreign travelers and investors may not want to go to a country with an epidemic or even sporadic cases of "SARS-2". People may also believe that like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV will not come back after the end of this outbreak. Therefore, they will not have to be prepared for prevention of 2019-nCoV infection in the near future and may loosen the alertness of the world.

Based on the special clinical, virological and epidemiological characteristics and the uncertainty of the novel coronavirus, to avoid the misleadingness and confusion, and to help scientists and the public for better communication, we, a group of virologists working in China, would suggest renaming 2019-nCoV as human coronavirus 2019 (HCoV-19). Such a name distinguishes 2019-nCoV from SARS-CoV and keeps it consistent with the WHO name of the disease, COVID-19.

References

1. Gorbalenya AE et al., Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus – The species and its viruses, a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. BioRxiv 2020.02.07.937862; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862
2. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/06/coronavirus-wuhan-china-recurring-winter-illness-flu/4665482002/

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From: Broad, William <wjb@nytimes.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:16 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

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Jim:

If you have time, I'd love to chat about what you've heard on the Chinese reaction to the crazy charges that have been leveled against them. On Feb. 11, eight days ago, I wrote both Zhiming Yuan and Zheng-Li Shi but got no reply. I'm eager for any color or details you've heard, especially from your counterpart. Below is the letter I wrote him.

Thanks,

Bill

Dear Dr. Zhiming Yuan:

I'm writing to get your reaction to numerous blogs and news articles claiming that 2019-nCoV leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology or, more specifically, the National Biosecurity Lab. Did you even have stocks of 2019-nCoV before the outbreak? Having coauthored the book *Germs*, visited Fort Detrick and its biolabs many times, and watched your work at a distance through your collaborations with UTMB, I understand the great importance of your investigations to public safety and am very interested in your response to the criticism. Many thanks for your time.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Broad

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Science Department

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My articles:

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/william_j_broad/index.html

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:24 PM
To: Broad, William
Subject: RE: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

Bill, I can't do it today but could tomorrow. That said, I have not had any reply to my offer to help clarify the situation. Not sure I have much to add. I suspect that their ability for formal communications on this and other nCoV issues is severely limited.

Jim

From: Broad, William <wjb@nytimes.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:16 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

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My articles:

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From: Adcox, Kenith
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Adcox, Kenith
Subject: RE: Threatening emails

Dr. LeDuc, I wanted to follow up with you on this item. Have there been any other concerning emails? We have been monitoring this situation closely and all seems to be quite on our end. Please let me know though if anything should come up. Ken

Kenith Adcox
Chief of Police
UTMB Police Department
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77555-0101
O: 409.772.0650 C: (b)(6)
F: 409.772.0524
E: keadcox@utmb.edu

"Working together to work wonders"

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 9:26 AM
To: Adcox, Kenith <keadcox@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Threatening emails
Importance: High

Chief, please see note below from one of our faculty members regarding threatening emails. I have asked that he forward to me and I'll pass along to you. Can you please loop in our local FBI agents as well? We have tried to keep them engaged on all security issues.

Let me know if you'd like to discuss off-line.

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

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From: Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2020 9:13 AM
To: Weaver, Scott <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Brocard, Anne-Sophie <anbrocar@utmb.edu>; Ntiforo, Corrie <contifor@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FYI

Hi All,

With the recent emergence of the 2019-nCoV, a paper I published as a post-doc has been getting a lot of attention online: https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985

In the paper we predicted the emergence potential of SARS-like viruses circulating in bats. The paper also includes authors from the Wuhan Institute of Virology including Zheng Li Shi. There has been rumors of nCoV being an escaped virus from their institute. There is no evidence to support this.

Both I and Dr. Baric have been receiving increasing emails about the paper and the contributions of the Wuhan group. While emails to me have been fairly cordial, Dr. Baric warned that some of his have been more threatening. I have not responded to these emails and at this time, do not intend to respond.

If I do find any specific threats or emails that worry me, who should I forward them to? When we published the paper in 2015, we also received threats that were processed through UNC public safety. They subsided quickly and were relatively few in number.

Thanks for you attention on this matter,

Vineet D. Menachery

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From: Broad, William <wjb@nytimes.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:37 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

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When would be a good time to call?

William J. Broad

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On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 4:23 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Bill, I can't do it today but could tomorrow. That said, I have not had any reply to my offer to help clarify the situation. Not sure I have much to add. I suspect that their ability for formal communications on this and other nCoV issues is severely limited.
>
> Jim

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Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:16 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

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Jim:

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Thanks,

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Sincerely,

Bill

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007458

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:18 PM
To: Broad, William
Subject: Re: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

Between About 8:30-9:15 am or after 10:00-noon CT. Not sure about afternoon times.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

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Jim

From: Broad, William <wjb@nytimes.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 3:16 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

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

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008664

From: LeDuc, James W. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=937DF08E29C4439E88A04BABFFB162AD-JWLEDUC]
Sent: 2/19/2020 8:19:09 PM
To: Adcox, Kenith [keadcox@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: Re: Threatening emails

I haven't heard of anything recently. Will let you know if I do. Thanks for the follow up.

Jim

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 19, 2020, at 3:35 PM, Adcox, Kenith <keadcox@utmb.edu> wrote:

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> **Kenith Adcox**
> Chief of Police
> UTMB Police Department
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> O: 409.772.0650 C. (b)(6)
> F: 409.772.0524
> E: keadcox@utmb.edu
>
> <image001.png>
>
> **From:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 4, 2020 9:26 AM
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> **Importance:** High
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Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 5:50 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

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Thanks. I'll call 8:30. The (b)(6) number? Mine is (b)(6)

William J. Broad

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William J. Broad

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and Zheng-Li Shi but got no reply. I'm eager for any color or details you've heard, especially from your counterpart. Below is the letter I wrote him.

Thanks,

Bill

Dear Dr. Zhiming Yuan:

I'm writing to get your reaction to numerous blogs and news articles claiming that 2019-nCoV leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology or, more specifically, the National Biosecurity Lab. Did you even have stocks of 2019-nCoV before the outbreak? Having coauthored the book *Germs*, visited Fort Detrick and its biolabs many times, and watched your work at a distance through your collaborations with UTMB, I understand the great importance of your investigations to public safety and am very interested in your response to the criticism. Many thanks for your time.

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William J. Broad



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From: Broad, William <wjb@nytimes.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 8:38 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Chinese reaction to the coronavirus charges

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Tried in your 8:30 slot, and will try again. FYI, if you're tied up, I'll try again in the later slot.

William J. Broad

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William J. Broad

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Thanks,

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

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The NASEM U.S. - China Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, and Global Health Security

The ongoing outbreak of COVID-19 and Dr. Zhengli Shi's presentations on coronaviruses

Over the past five years representatives of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) have worked with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) and other Chinese life science and public health organizations to organize a series of dialogue meetings on infectious-disease research, combating emerging infections, life-science collaboration and data sharing, and high containment biological laboratory management. The dialogue meetings, hosted by institutes in China and the United States, have been well attended by leading scientists from NASEM, CAS, CCDC, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences.[1] The meetings have enabled scientists from China and the United States to exchange research findings on diseases of mutual concern to China and the United States, to share best practices and lessons learned for managing and operating high containment biological laboratories, and to establish new collaborative research and institutional partnerships.

Each meeting included sessions on coronaviruses, with experts from China and the U.S.[2] presenting research findings. One of the Chinese participants **Dr. Zhengli Shi**,[3] is a well know virologist and coronavirus expert. Her research focuses on Swine Acute Diarrhea Syndrome Coronavirus (SADS-CoV), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) , and SARS-associated Coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and the study of interspecies as well as animal-to-human transmission originating in camels, bats, mice, swine, and other animals. Dr. Shi has also built one of the world's largest databases of bat-related viruses. In 2005, she and Dr. Cui Jie found that the SARS virus likely originated in bats, a finding that has implications for the emergence of SARS-like coronaviruses or related viruses (Li et al., 2005). Recently Dr. Shi led a study with several other scientists on antiviral agents to combat COVID-19 and found that remdesivir and chloroquine are highly effective in the control of the virus in vitro. They recommended that the compounds be assessed in human patients suffering from COVID-19. Clinical trials of remdesivir have started, led by the American pharmaceutical company Gilead (Grady, 2020).

During the NASEM U.S. - China dialogue meetings Dr. Shi made some extraordinary predictions related to the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic. The following memo summarizes the presentations she gave at each dialogue meetings from 2015 to 2019 and highlights key statements.

First China-U.S. Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, and Global Health Security (September 2015, Beijing, China)

Presentation Title: **Bat coronaviruses associated with human diseases**

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[1] Key NASEM participants: Dr. Diane Griffin (Vice President NAS, Johns Hopkins University), Dr. Margaret Hamburg (NAM Foreign Secretary), Dr. James Le Duc (Director, Galveston National Laboratory), Dr. David Franz (former commander USAMRIID), Dr. Pei-Yong Shi (Galveston National Laboratory). Key Chinese participants: Dr. Fu Gao (Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention), Dr. Chunli Bai (President, Academician, Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS), Dr. Zhiming Yuan (director of the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory of the CAS), and Dr. Zhigao Bu (Director of the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences).

[2] Dr. Linda Saif (Professor, The Ohio State University) and Dr. Ralph Baric (Professor Department of Epidemiology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

[3] Dr. Shi is director of the Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) of the CAS. She holds a PhD from Montepellier II University, Masters degrees from the WIV, and a bachelors from Wuhan University.

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Dr. Shi presented research on a bat-transmissible coronavirus and spoke about the evolution and pathogenesis of diverse SARS-like coronaviruses (SL CoVs) in bats found by her research team in China. She explained that rhinolophid bats carry genetically diverse SL-CoVs, some of which are direct ancestors of SARS-CoV and have the potential to cause direct interspecies transmission to humans, and bats are likely natural reservoirs of MERS-CoV or an ancestral MERS-like CoV. **She warned that disease outbreaks resulting from spillover of bat coronaviruses will continue to occur in the future due to human activity increasingly overlapping the habitats of bats.** Therefore, she said, it is necessary to maintain a long-term coronavirus surveillance in bats, as well as in other wildlife and livestock animals, and that laboratory-based studies (receptor specificity, pathogenesis and animal infection) will help to conduct better risk assessment and to reveal the potential intermediate hosts.

Second China-U.S. Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security (May 2017, Wuhan, China)

Presentation Title: **Pathogenicity analysis of bat SARS-like coronaviruses**

Dr. Shi spoke about her continuing research on the evolution and pathogenesis of bat SARS-like coronavirus (SL CoV) and **said that bat SL CoV could be the next pandemic**. Her current research focus is on the pathogenesis of SL CoV in transgenic mice, noting that the virus replicates very well in mice and in human tissue. The virus can easily enter human cells but she said that in the animal model the virus has less pathogenesis. **Her research shows that some bat SL CoVs have potential interspecies transmission to other animals and humans.** She added that continued surveillance of bat SL CoV, as well as the examination of human behavior risk for infection and serological survey are needed.

Third U.S. China Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security (January 2018, Galveston, Texas, USA)

Presentation Title: **Coronaviruses associated with human and animal diseases in China - From SARS to SADS**

Dr. Shi discussed SARS and swine acute diarrhea syndrome (SADS) coronaviruses and their different hosts, the animal origin of SARS, the natural host, the possible intermediate host (likely the civet cat) and the end host. Chimeric viruses expressing the S protein of the bat SARS-like coronavirus SHC014 strain can effectively replicate in human airway epithelial cells and infected mouse lungs, achieving replication levels comparable to SARS-CoV. She said at that time there were 6 humans who had tested positive for the coronavirus, based on the study of individuals who live around bat caves. She **discussed what to do if SARS spills over to humans again, a key concern for China, including taking measures such as the generation and use of antibodies to neutralize infections.** She discussed SADS noting that bats are the natural reservoirs of a diverse set of coronaviruses, some bat coronaviruses have potential for spilling to humans, and this would be a problem because many coronaviruses have a high fatality rate in humans. She once again recommended surveillance and pathogenesis studies of bat coronaviruses. **She added that early diagnosis methods, treatment, and prevention should be prepared in advance for future emerging infectious diseases caused by bat coronaviruses.**

Fourth U.S.-China Dialogue and Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, Global Health Security and meeting on ***Responsible Conduct in the Use of Gene Editing in Viral Infectious Disease Research*** (2019, Harbin, China)

Presentation Title: **Risks of MERS-cluster coronaviruses in China**

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Dr. Shi provided information on MERS-related coronavirus and cases in China. MERS shares a number of genomic similarities with SARS virus, including the importance of the viral spike protein that binds to cellular receptors as part of viral entry. For MERS, the human cellular receptor to which the spike binds is DPP4. There are multiple MERS-related coronaviruses, including strains in clades A and B that cause human infection, camel MERS-related coronaviruses, including strains in clades A and B that cause human infection, camel MERS viruses, and bat MERS-related coronaviruses including the related bat coronavirus HKU4. Dr. Shi's laboratory explored diversity in the MERS spike binding domain for its roles in interspecies infection ability. A recombinant MERS containing the spike binding domain from HKU4 could replicate in human cells. **She noted that many strains of MERS-related coronaviruses are prevalent in multiple bat host species in China and said that the potential for interspecies transmission highlights the need for long-term surveillance of this group of viruses.**

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CDC on COVID-19 Origin

"The SARS-CoV-2 virus is a betacoronavirus, like MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV, both of which have their origins in bats. The sequences from U.S. patients are similar to the one that China initially posted, suggesting a likely single, recent emergence of this virus from an animal reservoir. Early on, many of the patients in the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China had some link to a large seafood and live animal market, suggesting animal-to-person spread. Later, a growing number of patients reportedly did not have exposure to animal markets, indicating person-to-person spread. Person-to-person spread has been reported outside China, including in the United States and other countries. Chinese officials report that sustained person-to-person spread in the community is occurring in China. In addition, other destinations have apparent community spread, meaning some people have been infected who are not sure how or where they became infected. (CDC, 2020)."

References (Zhengli Shi in bold)

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From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Sunday, March 8, 2020 8:20 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Vox article

Hi Jim,
Thanks. We could talk now if you have time. I am in office.
Pei-Yong

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From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, March 8, 2020 8:05:21 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Vox article

Let's discuss Monday.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Yuan Zhiming <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
> **Date:** March 8, 2020 at 12:10:31 AM CST
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: 回复： Vox article**
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Dear Jim,
>
> Nice to hear from you and hope everything goes well with you and your colleagues. As you could know, we have been experienced hard time during the epidemic, fighting the virus and fighting the rumors. We are in the hurricane center of rumors, however we still do as sechulled. Thanks for your positive and pertinen remarks to our lab and our works and I am sure some people will understand finally what we have done the preparation of new emerging diseases. What is why we are here.
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> In these days, I am thinking about the possilbe long-term negative effects of the rumor on the necessarity,role, functioning of high level biosafety labor. Whethere the novel coronavirus is related to the lab or not, I am sure it is not, some administratives and pubulic might regard the lab as a dangerour place, and finally limit its operation. Which will surely confllict with the mission of the platform, and finally impact the global health security. We construct the lab for fighting the disease, we have stick management for preventing the pathogens from lab. we

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accumulate the knoweldge and develope the technology for preparing the now pathogens, that is what we do.

I do not know, it is suitable or not to write a paper to tell the scientific community and public why we need the P4, how to manage the P4, and what we can do for new emerging diseases.

Anyway, thanks for your courage and support.

Regards

Zhiming

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==========

From: LeDuc, James W.
Date: 2020-03-05 22:50
To: Yuan Zhiming; zlshi
CC: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: Vox article

Dear Zhiming and Zhengli,

I hope you are both well during this very difficult time.

The link below is to an article just published that may be of interest to you.

With all good wishes for your personal health and safety as we all work together to control the new virus.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
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From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 04, 2020 8:49 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Hi Jim,
The story went up today. Thanks so much for your help with it, and let me know if you see any inaccuracies to fix or updates I should make.
Very best, and hope to stay in touch,
Eliza
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/4/21156607/how-did-the-coronavirus-get-started-china-wuhan-lab

On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 3:06 PM Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com> wrote:

> Sure, will do.
>
> On Feb 28, 2020, at 12:16 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> Better to call after about 4 pm CT. We're kinda busy...
>
> Thanks, Jim
>
> **From:** Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
> **Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 1:07 PM
> **To:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Keusch, Gerald T <keusch@bu.edu>
> **Subject:** Re: Wuhan
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Thanks for the connection, Jerry.
> And thanks so much for the quick response, Jim. I will give you a call in about an hour.
> Best,
> Eliza
>
> On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 10:50 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> > Hi Jerry,
> >
> > Thanks for the introduction and happy to meet you, Eliza. I'm happy to chat about this issue at your convenience. My direct office line is (b)(6)

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Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Keusch, Gerald T <keusch@bu.edu>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 11:48 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Subject: Wuhan

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Hi Jim,

I was talking to Eliza Barclay from Vox (copied above) who was referred to me by our friend Peter Daszak. Eliza is working on a story to address the various conspiracy theories being bandied about on the origin of the Covid19 virus. One of the issues, of course, was the Wuhan laboratory as a source – whether accidental or deliberate – and the questions being raised about it biosecurity and biosafety protocols. I said that I was absolutely confident that they had proper protocols and trained people in place, in part because I am was aware that GNL had connections with that lab, had trained many of their staff, and that you have been there.

Eliza will follow up and if you have the time she would like to talk with you. She is trying to gather the scientific argument and be able to translate it for a general audience to be able to distinguish between evidence and conspiracy.

Hope all is well.

Jerry

Gerald T. Keusch, M.D.
Professor of Medicine and International Health
Boston University School of Medicine
Associate Director, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories

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

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Anyway, thanks for your courage and support.

Regards

Zhiming

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President of Wuhan Branch
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From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 04, 2020 8:49 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Keusch, Gerald T <keusch@bu.edu>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 11:48 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Subject: Wuhan

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Associate Director, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories

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620 Albany Street
Boston, MA 02118

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<~WRD363.jpg>

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

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From: Shi, Pei yong [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=8906C46397AE48488FCC55537DC5D6D3-SHI, PEI YO]
Sent: 3/8/2020 9:52:39 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong [peshi@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: RE: Vox article

Hi Jim,

When you get a chance, let's talk today.

Thanks!

- Pei-Yong

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, March 8, 2020 8:20 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Vox article

Hi Jim,
Thanks. We could talk now if you have time. I am in office.
Pei-Yong

Get Outlook for Android

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, March 8, 2020 8:05:21 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Vox article

Let's discuss Monday.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: Yuan Zhiming <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Date: March 8, 2020 at 12:10:31 AM CST
To: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: 回复: Vox article

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Anyway, thanks for your courage and support.

Regards

Zhiming

==========

Yuan Zhiming, Ph. D.
Professor of Wuhan Institute of Virology
President of Wuhan Branch
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Wuhan 430071, China
Tel: 86-27-87198195(O)
86-27-87197242(L)
Fax: 86-27-87199480

==========

From: LeDuc, James W.
Date: 2020-03-05 22:50
To: Yuan Zhiming; zlshi
CC: Shi, Pei yong
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(m) (b)(6)

From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 04, 2020 8:49 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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<~WRD363.jpg>

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

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

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 10:03 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Items-of-Interest--12 March 2020--COVID-19--Take 1

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FYI--

Jim

From Johns Hopkins WSSE Dashboard: 11 March 2020 at 2300 EDT

Total Confirmed

126,135

Total Deaths

4,630

Confirmed Cases by Country/Region/Sovereignty

80,932 China

12,462 Italy

9,000 Iran

7,755 Korea, South

2,284 France

2,277 Spain

1,966 Germany

1,311 US

696 Cruise Ship

652 Switzerland

639 Japan

629 Norway

516 Denmark

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503 Netherlands

500 Sweden

459 United Kingdom

314 Belgium

262 Qatar

246 Austria

195 Bahrain

178 Singapore

149 Malaysia

128 Australia

117 Canada

109 Israel

99 Greece

94 Czechia

85 Iceland

74 United Arab Emirates

72 Kuwait

71 Iraq

62 India

62 San Marino

61 Lebanon

60 Egypt

59 Finland

59 Portugal

59 Thailand

57 Slovenia

52 Brazil

49 Philippines

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48 Taiwan*

47 Romania

45 Saudi Arabia

43 Ireland

38 Vietnam

34 Indonesia

31 Poland

24 Georgia

23 Chile

22 Costa Rica

20 Russia

20 Algeria

19 Argentina

19 Pakistan

19 Croatia

18 Oman

17 Ecuador

16 Estonia

15 Albania

13 Peru

13 South Africa

13 Hungary

12 Serbia

11 Azerbaijan

11 Brunei

10 Slovakia

10 Latvia

9 Colombia

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9 Belarus

8 Maldives

8 Panama

8 Mexico

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina

7 North Macedonia

7 Afghanistan

7 Bulgaria

7 Luxembourg

7 Tunisia

6 Morocco

6 Cyprus

6 Malta

5 French Guiana

5 New Zealand

5 Dominican Republic

5 Paraguay

4 Senegal

3 Lithuania

3 Cambodia

3 Bangladesh

3 Moldova

3 Martinique

2 Bolivia

2 Cameroon

2 Burkina Faso

2 Jamaica

2 Nigeria

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2 Honduras

2 Sri Lanka

1 Monaco

1 Turkey

1 Mongolia

1 Togo

1 Armenia

1 Ukraine

1 Liechtenstein

1 Andorra

1 Reunion

1 Bhutan

1 Nepal

1 Congo (Kinshasa)

1 Holy See

1 Cote d'Ivoire

1 Jordan

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

Coronavirus crisis hits ice-locked Arctic research expedition

A team member on the huge project has tested positive for the virus, delaying the air mission.

Nature

Giuliana Viglione

11 March 2020

The coronavirus outbreak has reached the Arctic — and is imperilling a massive international scientific project, after a team member tested positive for the virus.

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00724-y

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This Is the Pentagon's Guidance for Virus-Related PCS Delays

11 Mar 2020

Military.com | By Amy Bushatz

Delays to household-goods shipments for those moving are a matter of when, not if, according to a pair of guideline memos sent to military move officials and contractors in the wake of global pandemic worries.

As of Wednesday, only moves by Army personnel to and from Italy and South Korea have been officially put on hold until early May due to concerns about the novel coronavirus, formally known as COVID-19. The other military services are considering a similar stop movement order.

The memos, issued March 9 by U.S Transportation Command, govern the changes for delayed soldiers and their families, but are expected to be extended as-is to the other services, should the need arise.

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/03/11/pentagons-guidance-virus-related-pcs-delays.html

How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?

Nature

March 11, 2020

Roy M Anderson

Governments will not be able to minimise both deaths from coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and the economic impact of viral spread. Keeping mortality as low as possible will be the highest priority for individuals; hence governments must put in place measures to ameliorate the inevitable economic downturn. In our view, COVID-19 has developed into a pandemic, with small chains of transmission in many countries and large chains resulting in extensive spread in a few countries, such as Italy, Iran, South Korea, and Japan.

Most countries are likely to have spread of COVID-19, at least in the early stages, before any mitigation measures have an impact.

What has happened in China shows that quarantine, social distancing, and isolation of infected populations can contain the epidemic.

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30567-5/fulltext?utm_source=Nature+Briefing&utm_campaign=73233d85fb-briefing-dy-20200311&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c9dfd39373-73233d85fb-43263929#%20

'Deeply concerned' WHO declares COVID-19 pandemic

Mary Van Beusekom | News Writer | CIDRAP News|

Mar 11, 2020

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The World Health Organization (WHO) today declared COVID-19 a pandemic, pushing the threat beyond the global health emergency it had announced in January.

In the WHO's daily briefing, Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, PhD, said that the label should galvanize the world to fight. However, "describing the situation as a pandemic does not change WHO's assessment of the threat posed by the virus, it doesn't change what WHO is doing, and it doesn't change what countries should do," he said.

The novel coronavirus, the first known to cause a pandemic, has infected more than 118,000 people and killed more than 4,000 in 114 countries, numbers expected only to rise. The WHO is "deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity and the alarming levels of inactivity," Ghebreyesus said. "In the past 2 weeks, the number of cases of COVID-19 outside China has increased 13-fold, and the number of countries has tripled."

WHO: Still possible to turn tide

Tedros and other WHO officials in the briefing, however, emphasized that the organization believes that containment is still possible and called for countries to focus on control rather than on mitigation in the healthcare system. "This is not an escape clause to mitigation," said Michael Ryan, MD, executive director of emergency response. "The difficulty is that, if you do not try to suppress this, it can overwhelm your health system."

Tedros cautioned against focusing on numbers, pointing out that some countries have had some success with aggressive containment strategies. "More than 90% of cases are in just four countries, and two of those countries, China and South Korea, have significantly declining epidemics," he said. Eighty-one countries have reported no cases, and 57 have reported fewer than 10, he added.

He urged countries to avoid apathy. "We cannot say this loudly enough or clearly enough or often enough—that all countries can still change the course of this pandemic," he said. "If countries detect, test, treat, isolate, trace, and mobilize their people in the response, those with a handful of cases can prevent those cases from becoming clusters and those clusters from becoming community transmission. Even countries with clusters can turn the tide against this virus."

Ryan implored people to put aside the blame and come together in solidarity. "Iran and Italy are on the frontline now, they're suffering, but I guarantee that other countries will be in that situation soon," he said.

Countries, Tedros said, need to educate people on how to protect themselves, mobilize their public health teams, and ready their medical workforce for the onslaught of cases and the need for intensive care. Consider Italy, he said, where 900 people are in intensive care, requiring healthcare workers to work long hours in personal protective equipment.

"We have called every day for countries to take urgent and aggressive action," Ghebreyesus said. "We have rung the alarm bell loud and clear."

Cases, deaths surge around the world

In its daily situation report, the WHO outlined how COVID-19 continues its spread, with Bolivia, Burkina Faso, and Jamaica reporting their first cases. The agency announced a global tally of 118,326 confirmed cases (4,627 new since yesterday) and 4,292 deaths (280 new). The Johns Hopkins online COVID-19 tracker lists 125,108 confirmed cases this afternoon and 4,550 deaths.

New Chinese cases continue to decrease, with just 31 new infections reported today, according to the WHO situation report. Outside of China, there have been 37,371 cases (4,596 new), and 1,130 deaths (258 new).

Yesterday the International Federation of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and WHO issued new guidance on protecting schoolchildren from the virus. The document offers advice on practical actions and checklists for administrators, children, parents, and teachers.

Cases mount in Iran, Europe

In hard-hit Iran, where officials announced 881 new cases and 54 new deaths today, the senior vice-president and two other cabinet members have tested positive for COVID-19, according to today's *South China Morning Post*. Elsewhere in the Middle East, reported cases have grown to 262 in Qatar and 189 in Bahrain, the newspaper reported.

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Italy reported 168 new deaths, bringing the total there to 631. The country has identified at least 12,462 total cases, making it second only to China.

Spain, the second hardest-hit European country, reported 615 new cases and 8 more deaths, bringing its case total to 1,639 and the deaths to 36, according to the WHO, but the Johns Hopkins tracker lists 2,277 cases and 54 deaths.

French health officials reported 15 new coronavirus deaths today, bringing that country's number of deaths to 48, according to Reuters. The total number of confirmed cases has also risen to 2,281, up from 497 on Tuesday.

The United Kingdom announced the death of an eighth patient and 83 new cases, raising its total to 456 cases, according to Public Health England. The BBC reports that a junior health minister, Nadine Dorries, is in self-quarantine at home since being diagnosed as having COVID-19.

South Korea, where the epidemic had been declining, reported 242 new cases and 6 more deaths, according to the WHO, for a tally of 7,755 and 60.

Sweden, Bali announce first deaths

Sweden reported its first death today, according to Reuters. The older patient, who had an underlying disease, had been in intensive care at a Stockholm-area hospital.

Sweden has confirmed about 460 cases of the virus since the end of January. One other COVID-19 patient is being treated in intensive care in the same area, the regional health authority said. Today the Public Health Agency asked the Swedish government to ban gatherings of more than 500 people to try to contain the disease.

A 53-year-old British traveler hospitalized in Bali has died, which is a first for the country, according to Reuters. Health officials said that the woman had diabetes, high blood pressure, an overactive thyroid, and lung disease, all risk factors for death.

Lebanon has reported a second death, in a 53-year-old man, the *South China Morning Post* reports. The country's health ministry said that 37% of its cases have originated in Britain, Egypt, Iran, and Switzerland.

Economic stimulus, workforce staffing, cancelations, restrictions

In the United Kingdom, Chancellor Rishi Sunak has pledged adequate resources for the National Health Service (NHS), a "temporary coronavirus business interruption loan scheme" to support small businesses, coverage of the cost of sick pay for businesses with as many as 250 employees, and sick day benefits for self-employed workers, the BBC reported.

In a move similar to that of the US Federal Reserve last week, the Bank of England also announced that it cut interest rates from 0.75% to 0.25% today to help the economy weather the pandemic.

Sir Simon Stevens, NHS chief executive, announced plans to invite "up to 18,000 third year undergraduate nurses to help out on the frontline." Public Health England, which has conducted more than 25,000 tests for the virus, is scaling up to be able to test 10,000 people a day, according to the news agency.

Meanwhile, Brexit talks involving about 150 delegates scheduled for next week may not happen, Cabinet Minister Michael Gove said in *The Guardian*.

Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte announced Wednesday that the country would set aside the equivalent of $28.3 billion to tackle the crisis. Meanwhile, Albania, Malta, and Spain have halted all inbound flights from Italy. Air Canada and British Airways have also halted all flights to Italy, while Austria, Malta, and Slovenia have closed their borders to Italy, according to NPR.

Spanish officials announced Wednesday that they have closed all state-run museums, including the Prado, Reuters reported. Madrid had already closed schools and halted large gatherings, as have the Rioja region and Basque Country.

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Saudi Arabia, which has banned travel to and from 14 countries and canceled pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, announced today that all cinemas are closed until further notice, according to the *South China Morning Post*. Kuwait has announced a 2-week shutdown of the country.

Israel, which has reported 77 cases, announced an equivalent of a $2.8 billion package to stabilize the economy, doubling a previously announced fund to help businesses and the healthcare system, the *South China Morning Post* reported.

Meanwhile, China continues its slow recovery. Local officials in China have begun relaxing travel restrictions it imposed in January. The Japanese automaker Nissan said today that it would restart manufacturing at two plants in China, including one in Hubei providence, according to NPR.

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/03/deeply-concerned-who-declares-covid-19-pandemic

US COVID-19 cases top 1,000; cities cancel mass gatherings

Stephanie Soucheray | News Reporter | CIDRAP News|

Mar 11, 2020

"Bottom line, it's going to get worse."

Those were the words of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Director Anthony Fauci, MD, today during a House Oversight Committee hearing discussing the coronavirus response. His comments came just hours after cases in the United States crossed the 1,000-case mark.

During questioning, Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D–New York, asked Fauci if the coronavirus pandemic will get worse before it improves in the United States.

"We will see more cases and things will get worse than they are right now," he said. Fauci also warned lawmakers that the novel virus was at least 10 times more lethal than the seasonal flu.

Mass gatherings canceled

Throughout the country, officials from cities and regions with community spread put a temporary ban on mass gatherings, including parades, sporting events, and conventions.

In San Francisco, Mayor London Breed issued a statement saying the city's health officer is banning all events with more than 1,000 people effective until Apr 21. That city currently has 14 cases and evidence of community spread.

"This is necessary to slow the spread of COVID-19, and builds on our previous public health recommendations," Breed tweeted.

Santa Clara County, the site of the first community spread case in the United States, has also canceled mass gatherings of more than 1,000 people. The county has had 45 cases, and 1 death from COVID-19.

Yesterday the *New York Post* reported three Transportation Security Administration agents from San Jose International Airport had tested positive for the novel coronavirus.

In the most drastic step taken in Washington state, the site of the nation's deadliest COVID-19 outbreak, Governor Jay Inslee today said three counties with ongoing COVID-19 transmission—King, Snohomish, and Pierce—will be banned from having gatherings of more than 250 people.

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"This is an unprecedented public health situation and we can't wait until we're in the middle of it to slow it down," Inslee said during press conference. "We've got to get ahead of the curve. One main defense is to reduce the interaction of people in our lives."

Yesterday, King County said 10 local long-term care facilities had cases, the hardest-hit being the Life Care Center in Kirkland. Washington state has also reported 23 new deaths.

Texas confirms community spread

In Texas, the Department of State Health Services issued a statement on what is likely the state's first case of community spread in Montgomery County. Texas has reported 21 cases, but until today all had been linked to international travel. Montgomery County had several cases who had contracted the virus during a Nile river cruise in Egypt.

"From the very start, the state of Texas has anticipated the possibility of community spread of COVID-19, and the proactive strategies we have in place were developed with this very scenario in mind," said Governor Greg Abbott in a press release. "State personnel are trained and equipped to respond to this situation, and are actively working to mitigate the impact of community spread."

Community spread was also behind four new cases announced in Oregon. The cases come from Polk, Marion, Umatilla, and Deschutes counties, and bring Oregon's total to 19.

New York sees 43 more cases

In New York state, Governor Andrew Cuomo said today there were 43 additional COVID-19 cases, bringing the state's total to 216. Cuomo encouraged social distancing measures, including working from home, during a press briefing from Albany, and said all state employees asked to quarantine will be paid during the 2-week period.

Cuomo also confirmed New York state will begin contracting private labs to test for the coronavirus. He said he has had discussions with 28 private labs so far.

Walmart also said all hourly employees will get paid leave if forced to quarantine because of the coronavirus. According to the Associated Press, the nation's largest private employer announced the decision after an employee in a Kentucky store tested positive for the virus earlier this week.

South Dakota, Michigan report first cases

Two states reported initial COVID-19 cases today. South Dakota said the state had identified five presumptive positive cases, all travel related, including one fatality.

In Michigan, two cases in the Detroit-Metro area were recorded, one in Oakland County and another in Wayne County. Governor Gretchen Whitmer said in a statement that the Oakland County patient had a history of international travel, and the Wayne County patient had a history of domestic travel.

As of this afternoon, the Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 tracking map showed 1,135 cases in the United States, including at least 31 deaths.

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/03/us-covid-19-cases-top-1000-cities-cancel-mass-gatherings

To slow COVID-19 spread, California county turns to mitigation

Chris Dall | News Reporter | CIDRAP News|

Mar 11, 2020

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In what is likely a harbinger of things to come as the number of COVID-19 cases rises across the country, Sacramento County announced Mar 9 that it is shifting its efforts to slow the spread of the virus from containment to community mitigation.

That means that people who've come into contact with someone who has the pandemic coronavirus will no longer have to quarantine themselves for 14 days, according to a county news release. The recommendation applies to members of the general public as well as to healthcare workers and first responders.

People who develop respiratory symptoms are urged to stay home and manage their symptoms with over-the-counter medications, unless difficulty breathing or lethargy develops, or symptoms improve and then get worse.

The county is also recommending that vulnerable populations, including older county residents and people with underlying health conditions or weakened immune systems, consider staying home and avoiding crowded social gatherings to prevent the disease.

In an interview with the *Sacramento Bee*, Peter Beilenson, MD, head of Sacramento County's Department of Health Services, said the move is an acknowledgement that the novel coronavirus is in the community, and that trying to contain it through quarantines and contact tracing is no longer feasible.

"Once you get a certain number of cases, it's hard to contact-trace back the way you tried originally," Beilenson told the paper. "So we move to mitigation, which is basically trying to mitigate the risk to those who are most at risk: the elderly and those with chronic underlying conditions."

California is where the initial US evacuees from Wuhan were quarantined, and where the first US case of COVID-19 community spread was identified. As of yesterday, the state had 157 positive cases, according to the California Department of Public Health, and more than 10,300 people are self-monitoring around the state. Sacramento County has 10 confirmed COVID-19 cases.

From containment to mitigation

With the number of COVID-19 infections steadily rising across the country and more cases expected nationwide, the discussion around containment versus mitigation is taking on new urgency. Some experts say that at this point, the coronavirus is likely in the community in many parts of the country, and containing it is no longer an option.

Therefore, the focus needs to be on measures at the population level that slow the rate at which people get infected and prevent the healthcare system from being overwhelmed.

"We certainly are past containment. We have to think about aggressive steps at mitigation," former Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, MD, said in an interview with *USA Today*. "My concern now is we're not taking aggressive enough steps at mitigation to prevent a broader epidemic."

Gottlieb suggested that shutting down movie theaters and other places where you have a large number of people congregating indoors could be an option.

Tara Smith, PhD, a professor of epidemiology at Kent State University, says other affected communities will likely be looking at the mitigation approach.

"I suspect this is something we will see implemented in local communities in other affected communities in the coming days—at least, aspects of it," Smith said. "I think it will be important to emphasize social distancing whenever possible: avoiding large public gatherings, working from home if you're able."

But Smith also said she would encourage those who have a known exposure to a COVID-19 patient to self-quarantine if they are able, given the reports that individuals may be able to infect others very early in their infection, even before it causes symptoms. For example, a recent study by German scientists found that the novel coronavirus begins producing high viral loads that can be spread through breathing even before a person develops symptoms.

"I think we're past stopping the outbreak, but we can slow it," she said.

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Too soon to give up on containment?

Jonathan Eisen, PhD, a professor in the department of medical microbiology & immunology at the University of California-Davis, said that while he's not opposed to mitigation measures, and understands that focusing on containment will stretch resources, he thinks it's too soon to give up on containment.

"I'm not convinced that the time is right to switch from containment to mitigation, especially when recommendations from the head of the WHO and other places say it's not an either/or, it's both," he said. "I think you can still use containment in some circumstances. Within the county, there may be pockets that containment will be useful for," he added, referring to quarantine and contract tracing.

But Eisen also said he thinks the county's mitigation plan should be much more aggressive, noting that it doesn't make any specific recommendations against large gatherings, and that the recommendations on schools that have had COVID-19 exposure and on telecommuting aren't strong enough.

The county news release say workplaces and businesses "may consider implementing telecommuting and teleconferencing for their employees, where appropriate and feasible," and that schools that have a COVID-19 exposure or case should be in contact with the local health department and County Office of Education about the appropriate next steps.

Elsewhere in California, Santa Clara County's public health department has issued a mandatory orderrequiring the cancellation of mass gatherings starting today, and Yolo County "strongly recommends" cancellation of non-essential large gatherings. In Seattle's King County, one of the US epicenters of COVID-19, public health officials are recommending that people consider postponing community events and large gatherings through the end of the month.

And today Washington Governor Jay Inslee announced restrictions on gatherings of more than 250 people in King, Shohomish, and Pierce counties.

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/03/slow-covid-19-spread-california-county-turns-mitigation

SARS-CoV-2 Detected in Multiple Sample Types

Mar 11, 2020

GenomeWeb

Staff reporter

NEW YORK – The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be detected to varying degrees in lung wash, biopsy, nasal, sputum, feces, and blood samples from infected individuals, but not in urine, according to new research from investigators at China's National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing Ditan Hospital, and the Qingdao Municipal Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

In a letter published online in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* on Wednesday, the researchers outlined efforts to understand which clinical specimens can harbor the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes the coronavirus disease COVID-19.

Using this approach, the researchers detected SARS-CoV-2 RNA in 72 of 104 sputum samples, five of eight nasal swab samples, and 126 of 398 pharyngeal swab samples. While the virus was not found in any of the 72 urine samples tested, it did turn up in 29 percent of the 153 fecal samples assessed, prompting follow-up culturing and electron microscopy analyses on four fecal samples to search for live viruses.

"Importantly," they reported, "the live virus was detected in feces, implying that SARS-CoV-2 may be transmitted by the fecal route."

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The most pronounced rates of positivity came from the so-called bronchoalveolar lavage samples, collected by washing and retrieving fluid samples from part of a patient's lung through the mouth or nose.

https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/sars-cov-2-detected-multiple-sample-types#.XmmYUEBFxMs

Kadlec details role coordinating coronavirus response across HHS, federal government

Wednesday, March 11, 2020 by Kim Riley

Homeland Preparedness News

Dr. Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), on Wednesday confirmed his duties as the top emergency preparedness official coordinating the COVID-19 coronavirus response from both the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the federal government.

"As far as my role in this activity at this point in time, I have four principle functions," Kadlec told members of the U.S. House Oversight and Reform Committee earlier today during its hearing entitled: Coronavirus Preparedness and Response.

https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/45546-kadlec-details-role-coordinating-coronavirus-response-across-hhs-federal-government/

'We're behind the curve': U.S. hospitals confront the challenges of large-scale coronavirus testing

ScienceInsider

By Jon Cohen

Mar. 11, 2020

China and South Korea continue to report drops in their cases of the respiratory disease COVID-19, and there's an increasing realization that, as the World Health Organization (WHO) has insisted for several weeks, countries that aggressively confront their outbreaks of the coronavirus causing it can make powerful inroads to slow the spread. Again and again, the key to success has been widescale testing for the virus' RNA in people and then isolation—either by choice or mandate—of the infected and their contacts.

In the United States, in contrast, COVID-19 cases are climbing at an alarming rate, and people who have received tests for the virus, SARS-CoV-2, remain few and far between. (No official number exists, but fewer than 5000 people in the United States had received a test as of 9 March, according to **an *Atlantic* article** that attempted to tally the total.) The White House coronavirus task force has insisted that early problems created by a **faulty test** distributed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have been overcome and that the U.S. government has increased production of functioning diagnostic kits.

Read more...

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In Coronavirus Assay Validation for Emergency Use, Labs Encounter Multiple Pain Points

Mar 11, 2020

GenomeWeb

NEW YORK – Labs developing their own assays for SARS-CoV-2 virus detection in patients are coming across unexpected bottlenecks and hurdles as they rush toward US Food and Drug Administration emergency use authorization.

Nationally, some labs that are in the assay validation process are facing reagent supply shortages and lack of instrument access, as well as increased staffing needs. Individual labs are doing their best to overcome these obstacles, guided by frequent regulatory guidance updates from FDA, in order to make testing for coronavirus COVID-19, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus, available at local levels quickly.

https://www.genomeweb.com/pcr/coronavirus-assay-validation-emergency-use-labs-encounter-multiple-pain-points#.XmmXnUBFxMs

Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, UCSF, Stanford Partner to Boost Bay Area Coronavirus Testing

Mar 11, 2020

GenomeWeb

staff reporter

NEW YORK – The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative and Biohub said on Tuesday they are working with the University of California, San Francisco and Stanford University to increase the Bay Area's novel coronavirus testing capacity by investing in molecular diagnostic platforms from GenMark Diagnostics.

The organizations have formed a so-called COVID-19 task force to invest in two GenMark ePlex sample-to-answer molecular diagnostic platforms, one for a CLIA lab at the UCSF Helen Diller Medical Center in Parnassus Heights and one for a CLIA lab at UCSF's Primary Care clinic in China Basin, according to a CZI spokesperson.

https://www.genomeweb.com/microarrays-multiplexing/chan-zuckerberg-initiative-ucsf-stanford-partner-boost-bay-area-coronavirus#.XmmZNkBFxMs

Coronavirus Test from GenMark Diagnostics Submitted to FDA for Emergency Use Authorization

Mar 11, 2020

GenomeWeb

Staff reporter

NEW YORK – GenMark Diagnostics said on Wednesday that it has submitted its ePlex SARS-CoV-2 test for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) by the US Food and Drug Administration.

If the FDA concludes the company has met the agency's criteria for issuance of an EUA, GenMark will begin shipping test kits to customers for routine clinical use.

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GenMark's coronavirus assay runs on its ePlex sample-to-answer molecular diagnostic system, which is based on competitive DNA hybridization and electrochemical detection technology.

https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/coronavirus-test-genmark-diagnostics-submitted-fda-emergency-use-authorization#.XmmZoUBFxMs

CDC developing serologic tests that could reveal full scope of U.S. coronavirus outbreak

STAT

By ANDREW JOSEPH @DrewQJoseph

MARCH 11, 2020

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is developing tests that could provide public health officials crucial information about how broadly the coronavirus has spread in the United States, even among mild cases or people without symptoms, the agency's director said Wednesday.

The serologic tests, which are different from the ones used to diagnose active infection, would allow researchers to test the blood of people who were not confirmed cases of Covid-19 in communities where the virus spread. They would be designed to look for signs that people have mounted an immune response after being exposed to the virus.

CDC Director Robert Redfield told Congress that the agency is working on two of these types of tests

https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/11/cdc-developing-serologic-tests-that-could-reveal-full-scope-of-u-s-coronavirus-outbreak/?utm_source=STAT+Newsletters&utm_campaign=a26d987159-Daily_Recap&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8cab1d7961-a26d987159-149543429

A proposal of an alternative primer for the ARTIC Network's multiplex PCR to improve coverage of SARS-CoV-2 genome sequencing

Kentaro Itokawa, et al.

Posted March 10, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?].

Abstract

A group of biologists, ARTIC Network, has proposed a multiplexed PCR primer set for whole genome analysis of the novel corona virus, SARS-CoV-2, soon after the epidemics of this pathogen was revealed. The primer set seems to have been adapted already by many researchers worldwide and contributed for the high-quality and prompt genome epidemiology of this potential pandemic virus. We have also seen the great performance of their primer set and protocol; the primer set was able to amplify all desired PCR products with fairy small amplification bias from clinical samples with relatively high viral load. However, we observed acute drop of reads derived from two particular PCR products, 18 and 76, out of the 98 designated products as sample's viral load decreases. We suspected the reason for this low coverage issue was due to dimer formation between primers used to amplify those two PCR products.

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Here, we propose replacing just one of those primers, nCoV-2019_76_RIGHT(-), to a newly designed primer. The result of the replacement of primer showed improvement in coverage at both regions targeted by the products, 18 and 76. We expect this simple modification will extend the limit for whole SARS-CoV-2 genome analysis to samples with lower viral load and enhance genomic epidemiology of this pathogen.

https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.10.985150v1.abstract?%3Fcollection=

How China's "Bat Woman" Hunted Down Viruses from SARS to the New Coronavirus

Scientific American

By Jane Qiu on March 11, 2020

Wuhan-based virologist Shi Zhengli has identified dozens of deadly SARS-like viruses in bat caves, and she warns there are more out there

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/

EMA says shortages due to coronavirus 'cannot be excluded'

Evaluating the situation, the EMA has formed an Executive Steering Group to address the impact of the coronavirus outbreak on the supply of medicines... Read

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From: ASM NewsDigest <news@asmusa.org>
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 2:40 PM
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Subject: 'We're behind the curve': U.S. hospitals confront the challenges of large-scale coronavirus testing

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Monday, March 16, 2020

'We're behind the curve': U.S. hospitals confront the challenges of...

MARCH 11, 2020

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TWiV 591: Coronavirus update with Ralph Baric

MARCH 15, 2020

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TWiV 590: COVID-19 and coronavirus - we have mail

MARCH 08, 2020

The TWiV trio continues in-depth coverage of COVID-19 and SARS-CoV-2, including discussion on genome mutation and circulating lineages, handwashing, facemasks, cruise ship outbreaks, the South Korean... READ MORE

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TWiP 181: Daniel's drive-through

MARCH 14, 2020

Dickson, Daniel and Vincent solve the case of the Two Volunteers With Watery Diarrhea, discuss diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 in the New York area, and reveal an approach to preventing honeybee colony... READ MORE

Medscape

Early GI Symptoms in COVID-19 May Indicate Fecal Transmission

MARCH 12, 2020

SARS-CoV-2 RNA and nucleocapsid proteins identified in stool and saliva from COVID-19 patients suggests possible fecal-oral transmission. Medscape Medical News READ MORE

Forbes - Science

Why Geography Is A Key Part Of Fighting The COVID-19 Coronavirus...

MARCH 05, 2020

How the discipline of geography is helping in the fight against Coronavirus READ MORE

Scientific American

How China's "Bat Woman" Hunted Down Viruses from SARS to the New Coronavirus

MARCH 11, 2020

Shi Zhengli, known as China's “bat woman” for her virus-hunting expeditions in bat caves, releases a fruit bat after taking blood and swab samples from it. READ MORE

Smithsonian Magazine

Why Is Washing Your Hands So Important, Anyway?

MARCH 06, 2020

A dive into the science behind why hand-washing and alcohol-based hand sanitizer work so well READ MORE

Futurity Research News

‘Nanodrills’ kill diseased cells in minutes

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MARCH 05, 2020

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STAT News

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MARCH 15, 2020

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

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Subject: SCIENCE: Is this the Earth's tipping point?

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SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT VIEW ONLINE

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TODAY'S BIG QUESTION:

WHAT KIND OF FUTURE WILL THIS PLANET HAVE IN STORE?

Wednesday, March 25, 2020

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PHOTOGRAPH BY JEFF WILLIAM, NASA

*By Victoria Jaggard, **SCIENCE** Executive Editor*

It's not easy being an optimist during a crisis. As I sit hunkered down in my house, a pandemic raging around the globe, I'm thinking about whether my parents are safe and if my elderly cat will be OK without his next vet appointment, rather than imagining a bright future for humankind.

Luckily, **Emma Marris** is the optimist we need right now, at least when it comes to

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the ongoing crisis of climate change. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of Earth Day, Marris looks out on today's landscape of environmental issues and sees how much better things have actually gotten since 1970, as well as the possible improvements on the horizon for the next 50 years. Writing for next month's issue of *National Geographic*, Marris points out the incredible groundswell in public consciousness and the technological advances that together might bring some balance back to the planet.

The counterpoint to this rosy view is whether technology will replace nature rather than allow it to blossom. In her more pessimistic vision, **Elizabeth Kolbert** makes the case that we've already pushed the planet to a tipping point, and many of the solutions on offer "mean we could continue indefinitely along on our current path—altering the atmosphere, draining wetlands, emptying the oceans, and clearing the skies of life." It's a scary prospect, she says, to rely on solutions that don't really address the underlying problems.

Today's coronavirus situation includes a microcosm of this ideological divide. Early reports based on satellite data show significant drops in emissions from cities that have gone into lockdown and scaled back on manufacturing, such as Beijing and Los Angeles. It's a fascinating glimpse at how much pollution comes from our "normal" daily operations, and some optimists think it could spur action to keep that output low in the long run. But the pessimists are quick to note that emissions will more likely surge again when the pandemic passes and industry kicks back into gear to make up for lost time.

I find myself wishing for a word in between "optimist" and "pessimist"—something that encapsulates the need to take global problems seriously while focusing on solutions over gloom or panic. (Readers, got any ideas?) Maybe I'll simply call myself a cheerful realist, and I'll be grateful when people like Marris and Kolbert (their full essays are available to subscribers below) eloquently remind us how far we've come, and what we stand to lose if we don't act with urgency.

Subscriber exclusives:
Why we'll succeed in saving the planet from climate change
Why we won't avoid a climate catastrophe
Your actions alone can't save the planet–but these habits can help
Behind the concept of this month's issue

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YOUR INSTAGRAM PHOTO OF THE DAY



VIDEO BY AARON HUEY, @ARGOTNAUTPHOTO NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC

Fighting world-class stress: Nurses from across the University of Washington system in Seattle pause for a brief yoga and stretching session during drive-thru testing for COVID-19. Here's **Aaron Huey**'s video, which has been viewed 6.2 million times in the past four days.

Related: Six leading physicians explain what we know about treating COVID-19 in the ER and at home

Are you one of our 133 million Instagram followers? (If not, follow us now.)

TODAY IN A MINUTE

Striped bass, now contaminated: That's the case on North Carolina's Cape Fear River, Nat Geo's **Sarah Gibbens** reports. The contaminant: PFAS, a family of long-lasting chemicals found in many consumer products and fire-fighting foams. A new study shows the North Carolina stripers have the highest rates of PFAS documented in North American fish.

Herd immunity: Britain's initial plan to fight COVID-19 involved trying to suppress it gradually, rather than trying to stamp it out entirely. The U.K. chose not to shut down large gatherings or introduce stringent social distancing measures. When it became evident that herd immunity would overwhelm hospitals in the virus's first wave, Britain changed tactics. But, as **Cathleen O'Grady** writes for Nat Geo, herd immunity may yet have a role in defusing the coronavirus in the long run.

Pulsing in Yellowstone: Right in the center of the U.S. national park, Steamboat Geyser, the world's tallest active geyser, has been erupting at a record-breaking pace since March 2018. It is part of an area larger than Chicago that has been inflating and deflating by several inches in erratic bursts. It's not like the supervolcano it is

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043631

sitting on is going to blow—it hasn't done that for 640,000 years, and this pulsing has gone on for two decades—but a new study offers clues to this weirdness, **Robin George Andrews** reports for Nat Geo.

'Bat woman': That's how people refer to Wuhan-based virologist **Shi Zhengli**, who has explored bat caves in China for years and identified dozens of deadly SARS-like viruses. "Bat-borne coronaviruses will cause more outbreaks," she tells **Jane Qiu,** reporting for *Scientific American*. "We must find them before they find us."

THIS WEEK IN THE NIGHT SKY



ILLUSTRATION BY ANDREW FAZEKAS

Venus and Uranus take center stage: The planet Venus has been dominating the southwestern evening sky for months, and this week it reaches its widest separation from the sun. View our sister planet through a telescope and you'll notice that it will look like a miniature version of a half-lit moon. On Friday and Saturday nights, look for the waxing crescent moon to pose with Venus, creating a great photo opportunity. As we head into April, continue to watch Venus brighten even more as it begins to swing closer to the sun again. Just after dusk on Thursday, look for the crescent moon to guide you to the ice giant planet Uranus. The planet will be visible as a very faint green-blue star only seven degrees south of the moon. —*Andrew Fazekas*

THE BIG TAKEAWAY



PHOTO BY NASA

An astronaut's hope: NASA's **Chris Cassidy** is about to go into quarantine, but his isolation is normal for an astronaut preparing for six months in space. "The real weird part is everybody else also being in quarantine," Cassidy tells Nat Geo's **Michael Greshko** before he joins the International Space Station for his third trip. When he returns to Earth, he hopes the world will have defeated COVID-19. "In all likelihood, I'll come back to Earth in October, and knock on wood, the pandemic will

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be kind of behind us, and people will start trying to get back to normal existence, much like in the months after 9/11."

IN A FEW WORDS

You're sort of floating out there in a vast nothingness, and the only thing you can see and touch and grab a hold of is the spacecraft ... everything worked out OK, and when I was all done, I thought, Gee, I wish I had found something so that I could have been out there a little longer.

Alfred Worden, 1932-2020

Spacewalking NASA astronaut, poet

DID A FRIEND FORWARD THIS TO YOU?

On Thursday, **Rachael Bale** covers the latest in animal news. If you're not a subscriber, sign up here to also get **Whitney Johnson** on photography, **Debra Adams Simmons** on history, and **George Stone** on travel.

THE LAST GLIMPSE

PHOTOGRAPH BY AMY SACKA

Frozen? No: A surfer catches a wave on an ice-free Lake Superior outside of Duluth, Minnesota, on the last day of 2019. Lake Superior, which depends on winter

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ice cover, saw only 20 percent of the lake frozen at the height of winter. Superior is the second-fastest warming lake in the world; its water is warming up more quickly than the air around it.

Read: The Great Lakes depend on winter ice cover. There's less of it now.

This newsletter has been curated and edited by David Beard, with photo selections by Eslah Attar. Have an idea, a link, a good book we should read during self-quarantine? We'd love to hear from you at david.beard@natgeo.com. Thanks for reading, and have a safe and sane week ahead.

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, April 4, 2020 9:30 PM
To: Menachery, Vineet
Subject: Re: Verity

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U.S.-led, Shi Zhengli's experiment with genetically modified viruses with Ralph Baric. Fort detrick? University of north Carolina....Harvard indictments?

On Sat, Apr 4, 2020, 9:17 PM (b)(6) wrote:

> We know about your involvement....

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:28 AM
To: Watts, Doug
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

Thanks Doug. The video is quite disturbing, for sure. We have been working with Zheng-Li Shi for several years through the US National Academy of Sciences-Chinese Academy of Sciences dialogue. She's an excellent scientist and a charming person.

Fortunately, we are all well here and the hospital has yet to have a major surge of cases. We seem ready, but you never know.

Thanks again, and stay safe,

Jim

From: Watts, Doug <dwatts2@utep.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2020 10:37 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Hi Jim.

I hope you and family are doing well in these troubling times, couldn't find your email address when I sent this information to others at UTMB – watch this video, certainly very ugly food for thought

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bXWGxhd7ic

All the best and stay safe

Doug

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001756

From: Watts, Doug <dwatts2@utep.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 11:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Good Morning Jim,

Interesting that you are working with Dr. Shi, wonder if she is aware of this video, something like this regardless of wheterh true or not could create some unwanted troublesome days ahead as if we don't have a crisis like we have never experienced before. Better get ready to try and keep the health dept moving forward, been a jungle thus far.

Best of health, stay safe

Doug

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bXWGxhd7ic

All the best and stay safe

Doug

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001827

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 12:48 PM
To: Watts, Doug
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

We have diagnostic testing up and running with an EUA approved PCR and improved extraction method that eliminates the reagents bottleneck. Let me know if you want details. We've done about 6K tests so far, running about 9% pos for UTMB specimens, and about 20-25% for samples from Houston hospitals.

Dr Shi has already had a bunch of problems inside China, although when we last communicated with her things seemed to be improving.

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Doug

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Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Doug

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From: Watts, Doug <dwatts2@utep.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 1:11 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Kirken, Robert;Savina, Ivette
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Thanks Jim,

Yes, we need help, the local dept of public health is asking UTEP to help with diagnostic testing of human patient samples from clinically presumptive diagnosed SARS COV2, but we are not CLIA certified at UTEP. Your lab must have been CLIA certified at UTMB outside of the UTMB hospital CLIA lab, and my question, do we have to apply to be considered for CLIA approval ,and if so, do we follow the on-line guidance or is there a more rapid way to do this? Yes, Would love to have your EUA approved PCR and improved extraction method that eliminates the reagents bottleneck. Amazing that you all have been so successful, are you testing for the Houston area? Is Dr. Shi here in the US?

Thanks a million.

Doug

From: LeDuc, James W. [mailto:jwleduc@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 11:48 AM
To: Watts, Doug <dwatts2@utep.edu>
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2020 11:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Good Morning Jim,

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Interesting that you are working with Dr. Shi, wonder if she is aware of this video, something like this regardless of wheterh true or not could create some unwanted troublesome days ahead as if we don't have a crisis like we have never experienced before. Better get ready to try and keep the health dept moving forward, been a jungle thus far.

Best of health, stay safe

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bXWGxhd7ic

All the best and stay safe

Doug

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Sent: 4/9/2020 1:22:35 PM
To: Pyles, Richard B. [rbpyles@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: FW: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

Rick, you may remember Doug Watts who was here at UTMB in Pathology until about the time of Hurricane Ike. He is now running the BSL3 lab at UTEP and is a good guy and very long-time friend. Please

From: Watts, Doug <dwatts2@utep.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2020 1:11 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Kirken, Robert <rkirken@utep.edu>; Savina, Ivette <isavina@utep.edu>
Subject: RE: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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Jim

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Subject: FW: Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bXWGxhd7ic

All the best and stay safe

Doug

From: Ian Birrell (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 3:28 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: re

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Prof LeDuc

Thanks for letting me grab your briefly today. Since you were clearly rushed, thought I should check you are happy with the quote in my piece on Shi Zhengli:

'She is a superb scientist and very nice person,' said James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory, a high-security biocontainment centre in Texas. 'She has been very open and collaborative for the decade I've worked with her.'

Feel free to tweak or add anything if you want.

And could I also check my chronology if you happen to know it by heart: that she first completed the genome sequencing on Jan 2, then first published her data here on Jan 23:
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.01.22.914952v2.full.pdf
before it was formally published in Nature early Feb.

Many thanks again, especially when you must be so rushed.

Best wishes, Ian

Tel: 0044 (0) 7710 740039
Website: ianbirrell.com
Twitter: @ianbirrell
Instagram: @ianbirrell1

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 5:06 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Very scary. You must watch this
Attachments: Origin of SARS-CoV-2 Mar2020.pdf; COVID-19 and Zhengli Shi's presentations at the NASEM U.S. China dialogues.docx

Yes, I just received the link this morning from Doug Watts. I don't believe that the virus originated from the lab in Wuhan and I think the attached paper makes a strong argument that it came from nature, a conclusion with which I concur.

We have been working with Zheng Li Shi through a dialogue established between the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Dr Shi has presented at each of these meetings starting with the first in Beijing in 2015, and her message has consistently been that these bat coronaviruses hold the ability to infect humans through the hACE2 receptor. She's a very talented scientist and a charming person. Our meetings have included Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, two of the premier coronavirologist in the US and the discussions have always been open and frank. See attached summary prepared by NAS at the end of February, 2020 as the pandemic was unfolding. **PLEASE DO NOT FORWARD.**

I can't argue with the comments against the Chinese communist party. It's too bad that the global pandemic is being conflated with the challenges the world faces from the Chinese communist party. They are both important issues, but I'm not convinced that they are linked.

Hope you and Connie are staying well through all this,

Jim

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2020 4:33 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Very scary. You must watch this

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Jim,

This is gaining credibity. What do you think?

Phil

-----Original Message-----
From: Scott Halstead <halsteads@erols.com>
To: Russell, Phil (b)(6) Brandt, Walter (b)(6)
Sent: Thu, Apr 9, 2020 10:44 am
Subject: Very scary. You must watch this

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bXWGxhd7ic

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The NASEM U.S. - China Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, and Global Health Security

The ongoing outbreak of COVID-19 and Dr. Zhengli Shi's presentations on coronaviruses

Over the past five years representatives of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) have worked with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) and other Chinese life science and public health organizations to organize a series of dialogue meetings on infectious-disease research, combating emerging infections, life-science collaboration and data sharing, and high containment biological laboratory management. The dialogue meetings, hosted by institutes in China and the United States, have been well attended by leading scientists from NASEM, CAS, CCDC, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences.[1] The meetings have enabled scientists from China and the United States to exchange research findings on diseases of mutual concern to China and the United States, to share best practices and lessons learned for managing and operating high containment biological laboratories, and to establish new collaborative research and institutional partnerships.

Each meeting included sessions on coronaviruses, with experts from China and the U.S.[2] presenting research findings. One of the Chinese participants **Dr. Zhengli Shi**,[3] is a well know virologist and coronavirus expert. Her research focuses on Swine Acute Diarrhea Syndrome Coronavirus (SADS-CoV), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) , and SARS-associated Coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and the study of interspecies as well as animal-to-human transmission originating in camels, bats, mice, swine, and other animals. Dr. Shi has also built one of the world's largest databases of bat-related viruses. In 2005, she and Dr. Cui Jie found that the SARS virus likely originated in bats, a finding that has implications for the emergence of SARS-like coronaviruses or related viruses (Li et al., 2005). Recently Dr. Shi led a study with several other scientists on antiviral agents to combat COVID-19 and found that remdesivir and chloroquine are highly effective in the control of the virus in vitro. They recommended that the compounds be assessed in human patients suffering from COVID-19. Clinical trials of remdesivir have started, led by the American pharmaceutical company Gilead (Grady, 2020).

During the NASEM U.S. - China dialogue meetings Dr. Shi made some extraordinary predictions related to the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic. The following memo summarizes the presentations she gave at each dialogue meetings from 2015 to 2019 and highlights key statements.

First China-U.S. Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, and Global Health Security (September 2015, Beijing, China)

Presentation Title: **Bat coronaviruses associated with human diseases**

---

[1] Key NASEM participants: Dr. Diane Griffin (Vice President NAS, Johns Hopkins University), Dr. Margaret Hamburg (NAM Foreign Secretary), Dr. James Le Duc (Director, Galveston National Laboratory), Dr. David Franz (former commander USAMRIID), Dr. Pei-Yong Shi (Galveston National Laboratory). Key Chinese participants: Dr. Fu Gao (Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention), Dr. Chunli Bai (President, Academician, Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS), Dr. Zhiming Yuan (director of the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory of the CAS), and Dr. Zhigao Bu (Director of the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences).

[2] Dr. Linda Saif (Professor, The Ohio State University) and Dr. Ralph Baric (Professor Department of Epidemiology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

[3] Dr. Shi is director of the Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) of the CAS. She holds a PhD from Montepellier II University, Masters degrees from the WIV, and a bachelors from Wuhan University.

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Dr. Shi presented research on a bat-transmissible coronavirus and spoke about the evolution and pathogenesis of diverse SARS-like coronaviruses (SL CoVs) in bats found by her research team in China. She explained that rhinolophid bats carry genetically diverse SL-CoVs, some of which are direct ancestors of SARS-CoV and have the potential to cause direct interspecies transmission to humans, and bats are likely natural reservoirs of MERS-CoV or an ancestral MERS-like CoV. **She warned that disease outbreaks resulting from spillover of bat coronaviruses will continue to occur in the future due to human activity increasingly overlapping the habitats of bats.** Therefore, she said, it is necessary to maintain a long-term coronavirus surveillance in bats, as well as in other wildlife and livestock animals, and that laboratory-based studies (receptor specificity, pathogenesis and animal infection) will help to conduct better risk assessment and to reveal the potential intermediate hosts.

Second China-U.S. Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security (May 2017, Wuhan, China)

Presentation Title: **Pathogenicity analysis of bat SARS-like coronaviruses**

Dr. Shi spoke about her continuing research on the evolution and pathogenesis of bat SARS-like coronavirus (SL CoV) and **said that bat SL CoV could be the next pandemic**. Her current research focus is on the pathogenesis of SL CoV in transgenic mice, noting that the virus replicates very well in mice and in human tissue. The virus can easily enter human cells but she said that in the animal model the virus has less pathogenesis. **Her research shows that some bat SL CoVs have potential interspecies transmission to other animals and humans.** She added that continued surveillance of bat SL CoV, as well as the examination of human behavior risk for infection and serological survey are needed.

Third U.S. China Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security (January 2018, Galveston, Texas, USA)

Presentation Title: **Coronaviruses associated with human and animal diseases in China - From SARS to SADS**

Dr. Shi discussed SARS and swine acute diarrhea syndrome (SADS) coronaviruses and their different hosts, the animal origin of SARS, the natural host, the possible intermediate host (likely the civet cat) and the end host. Chimeric viruses expressing the S protein of the bat SARS-like coronavirus SHC014 strain can effectively replicate in human airway epithelial cells and infected mouse lungs, achieving replication levels comparable to SARS-CoV. She said at that time there were 6 humans who had tested positive for the coronavirus, based on the study of individuals who live around bat caves. She **discussed what to do if SARS spills over to humans again, a key concern for China, including taking measures such as the generation and use of antibodies to neutralize infections.** She discussed SADS noting that bats are the natural reservoirs of a diverse set of coronaviruses, some bat coronaviruses have potential for spilling to humans, and this would be a problem because many coronaviruses have a high fatality rate in humans. She once again recommended surveillance and pathogenesis studies of bat coronaviruses. **She added that early diagnosis methods, treatment, and prevention should be prepared in advance for future emerging infectious diseases caused by bat coronaviruses.**

Fourth U.S.-China Dialogue and Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, Global Health Security and meeting on ***Responsible Conduct in the Use of Gene Editing in Viral Infectious Disease Research*** (2019, Harbin, China)

Presentation Title: **Risks of MERS-cluster coronaviruses in China**

Dr. Shi provided information on MERS-related coronavirus and cases in China. MERS shares a number of genomic similarities with SARS virus, including the importance of the viral spike protein that binds to cellular receptors as

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part of viral entry. For MERS, the human cellular receptor to which the spike binds is DPP4. There are multiple MERS-related coronaviruses, including strains in clades A and B that cause human infection, camel MERS-related coronaviruses, including strains in clades A and B that cause human infection, camel MERS viruses, and bat MERS-related coronaviruses including the related bat coronavirus HKU4. Dr. Shi's laboratory explored diversity in the MERS spike binding domain for its roles in interspecies infection ability. A recombinant MERS containing the spike binding domain from HKU4 could replicate in human cells. **She noted that many strains of MERS-related coronaviruses are prevalent in multiple bat host species in China and said that the potential for interspecies transmission highlights the need for long-term surveillance of this group of viruses.**

***

CDC on COVID-19 Origin

"The SARS-CoV-2 virus is a betacoronavirus, like MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV, both of which have their origins in bats. The sequences from U.S. patients are similar to the one that China initially posted, suggesting a likely single, recent emergence of this virus from an animal reservoir. Early on, many of the patients in the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China had some link to a large seafood and live animal market, suggesting animal-to-person spread. Later, a growing number of patients reportedly did not have exposure to animal markets, indicating person-to-person spread. Person-to-person spread has been reported outside China, including in the United States and other countries. Chinese officials report that sustained person-to-person spread in the community is occurring in China. In addition, other destinations have apparent community spread, meaning some people have been infected who are not sure how or where they became infected. (CDC, 2020)."

References (Zhengli Shi in bold)

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009250

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Sent: Friday, April 10, 2020 9:51 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Very scary. You must watch this

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Jim,

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This reminds me of the efforts by Matt Messelson and many colleagues to coverup up the Sverdeslosk anthrax outbreak. They succeeded for many years aided and abetted by many in academia until Ken Alibek defected and the truth came out.

I bought the wet market story for months but now am very skeptical of anything information coming from the Chinese government.

Phil

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I can't argue with the comments against the Chinese communist party. It's too bad that the global pandemic is being conflated with the challenges the world faces from the Chinese communist party. They are both important issues, but I'm not convinced that they are linked.

Hope you and Connie are staying well through all this,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Jim

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Jim,

This is gaining credibity. What do you think?

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From: Scott Halstead <halsteads@erols.com>
To: Russell, Phil (b)(6) Brandt, Walter (b)(6)
Sent: Thu, Apr 9, 2020 10:44 am
Subject: Very scary. You must watch this

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bXWGxhd7ic

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Sent: 4/10/2020 10:02:48 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Very scary. You must watch this

I agree that it is certainly possible that a lab accident was the source of the epidemic and I also agree that we can't trust the Chinese government. I sent a rather detailed plan to investigate the possibility that the lab might have been the source of the outbreak to Zhiming Yuan early in the event, but never heard back from him. It's good that folks are pressing the issue, but we need to strike a balance such that we are not in an adversarial situation. That's why we have focused on the NAS-CAS linkage as an appropriate forum.

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Sent: 4/10/2020 12:57:14 PM
To: Dave Franz [davidrfranz@gmail.com]
Subject: RE: Potential topics for discussion with Russian colleagues.

Thanks Dave. I don't know what to make of Rita's lack of engagement with us, especially if she is calling for an ID work group meeting in less than 2 weeks.

If we have a dialogue with the Russians, I think we should focus on the current COVID-19 pandemic and raise a few serious scientific issues such as a strategy for vaccine development and production for a global need. I think that there is a lot we do not know about immunity to this virus and we need to be very careful as we design and test vaccines.

Also, basic public health questions about how effective—or not—certain interventions have been and how sustainable they are. Contact tracing is the current big challenge and the question about individual rights to privacy versus society need to interrupt transmission in the context of cell phone GPS tracking and other modern tools that have been used in other parts of the world.

There is also emerging information on genetic variability of the virus and what the impact might be on transmission and disease.

Pasted below is a string of email between Phil Russell and me following his viewing of the video we discussed yesterday. Read from the bottom up. This is not going away—and it probably shouldn't.

Happy Easter,

Jim

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Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2020 4:33 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Very scary. You must watch this

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Jim,

This is gaining credibity. What do you think?

Phil

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 10, 2020 12:39 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Potential topics for discussion with Russian colleagues.

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Jim, This is what I sent Rita. Neither she nor Micah have acknowledged it, so I'm just going to leave it at that. See the blue type at the bottom. This is what Rita sent our to the nuc CISACers plus me. Matt Bunn, in one of his responses suggested that I put something together, thus this list. I was trying to stay away from a focused discussion on their response to the pandemic…but maybe that was being too cautious. As I said, if we forward it to 'expert' in CISAC, it would probably change significantly. …but not a peep from anyone except Dick Garwin who wrote me and then asked me to call him this morning, which I did. He didn't say anything about this, but just wanted to know what I had going on these days and what I thought a bout a couple of things. d

P.S. Note at the bottom Rita has proposed an ID meeting for 4/22; you know as much as I do about that. If we were going to do that, I would think we might start putting a list of participants together.

Begin forwarded message:

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Potential topics for discussion with Russian colleagues.
Date: April 8, 2020 at 5:55:26 PM EDT
To: Rita Guenther <RGuenther@nas.edu>
Cc: "Bunn, Matthew" <Matthew_Bunn@hks.harvard.edu>, James Timbie (b)(6) Linton Brooks (b)(6) Jill Hruby (b)(6) Robert Latiff <rlatiff@nd.edu>, Richard Mies (b)(6) "Richard L. Garwin" <rlg2@us.ibm.com>, Raymond Jeanloz <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>, Steve Fetter <sfetter@umd.edu>, Micah Lowenthal <mlowenth@nas.edu>, "Cervenka, Nicole" <NCervenka@nas.edu>, Rose Gottemoeller <gottemoeller@stanford.edu>

Colleagues, Matt suggested I draft something from the bio subgroup.

I don't know how much involvement CISAC leadership is seeking from the 'bio'… or "Infectious Disease" Working Group. Each of us is officially, or unofficially in my case, spending a lot of time on the pandemic. Because they are probably nearly overwhelmed with work, we may not get a lot of time from the other four or five members of the bio subpanel just now, but I'm happy to coordinate a short paper with a list of suggested topics for collaboration if Rita and Micah are interested. I've taken a first cut at some bullets below, but the list might change significantly if I run it by the real experts.

Russia, as of yesterday, has reported about 40% as many 'tests' as the US and about 2% as many cases. My sense would be to start with a few rather generic, yet relevant, topics that don't get into the fine details of their response to or reporting of COVID19 pandemic. Some potential examples:

- Observations from the current COVID19 pandemic relevant to planning and preparations for a future highly contiguous and virulent influenza pandemic
- The effect of climate change on vector-borne infectious disease

- Timely recognition and public health response to emerging diseases
- Antimicrobial resistance
- Laboratory safety, security, regulation and progress in infectious disease research
- Human and Animal Health relationships. Zoonotic disease and the "One Health" concept.
- The Biotech Revolution: Safety, security and progress
- Managing the Health Impacts of natural disasters

I welcome thoughts of comments from anyone…and, Rita, let me know if you want me to continue down this or another track.

Stay well all, dave

Proposed Working Groups:
New START and arms control
Cyber Security
Space Security
Infectious Disease
China and Strategic Stability

Proposed Schedule of Virtual Meetings ('plenary' and 'working group' meetings):
4/15: Beyond New START (non-strategic weapons, verification, monitoring, trade-offs, etc.) – Plenary Meeting
4/22: Infectious Disease – Working Group Meeting
4/29: Cyber – Plenary Meeting
5/6: Possible Working Group Meeting (this date falls over the Russian May Holidays, so this may not be feasible for most Russians)
5/13: Space – Plenary Meeting
5/20: Possible Working Group Meeting
5/27: Strategic Stability and Arms Control – Plenary Meeting
6/3: Possible Working Group Meeting
6/10: China and Strategic Stability – Plenary Meeting
(FYI: The IMEMO Primakov Readings, a major conference which includes arms control issues, is scheduled for June 15-17)

<Bunn Further Reactions to Sergei Rogov paper RG comments.docx>

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: wsj

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Jim
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(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)

Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words
14 April 2020
Washington Post.com
WPCOM
English
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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

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Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

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Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

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"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

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WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

[redacted]

[redacted] The linked image cannot be displayed. The file

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Sent: 4/14/2020 9:56:52 AM
To: james.areddy@wsj.com
Subject: RE: wsj
Attachments: ~WRD000.jpg

James,

Thank you for sharing the report below. I had not seen this previously and I find it quite interesting, especially the comment about our laboratory working to help train scientists and building engineers from the new BSL4 laboratory. We clearly recognized this need but unfortunately, were unable to identify funding to support our efforts.

I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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

Editorial-Opinion

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Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

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As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying

it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.
"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.
There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

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From: LeDuc, James W. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=937DF08E29C4439E88A04BABFFB162AD-JWLEDUC]
Sent: 4/14/2020 10:08:59 AM
To: james.areddy@wsj.com
Subject: RE: wsj
Attachments: ~WRD000.jpg

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I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

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

Editorial-Opinion

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The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

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State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

A woman wearing a protective suit at a hospital in Wuhan, China. (Aly Song/Reuters)

By
Josh Rogin
Columnist

April 14, 2020 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the

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last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

AD

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

AD

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in

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animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

AD

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

AD

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

AD

"The idea that it was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

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AD

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AD

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Read more:

David Ignatius: How did covid-19 begin? Its initial origin story is shaky.

Marc A. Thiessen: China should be legally liable for the pandemic damage it has done

Isaac Stone Fish: Why do we keep treating China as a source of reliable information?

Xinyan Yu: My hometown showed us how a pandemic begins. Could it also show us how one ends?

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From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....
Attachments: Origin of Wuhan Coronavirus.pdf

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

By **Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News**

's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.



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

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

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ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



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

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

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See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N'' latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

''Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates,'' said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. ''That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data.''

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. ''Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk,'' said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

''I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses,'' said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. ''And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts.''

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

''Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future,'' said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. ''In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats.''

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

''This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies,'' said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. ''Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread.''

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: wsj

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James T. Areddy

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Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

Director

Galveston National Laboratory

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Galveston, TX 77555-0610

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(m) (b)(6)

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(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)

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

Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan **lab** studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the **lab**, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan **lab** was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV **lab** and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the **lab**'s work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new **lab** has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely

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operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

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"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

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"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

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[redacted]

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 4:27 PM
To: james.areddy@wsj.com
Subject: RE: wsj

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
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

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Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 4:48 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

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

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In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the

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WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.
"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)
The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.
"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.
There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about

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the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The

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Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

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From: jwleduc@UTMB.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 4:50 PM
To: james.areddy@wsj.com
Subject: Re: wsj

She gave the presentation.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 14, 2020, at 4:48 PM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

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activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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<image004.jpg>

<image005.jpg>

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I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

Director

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001185

To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

Hi. We spoke several weeks ago when I did a story for The Wall Street Journal about BSL-4 labs. Since then the Washington Post has had two stories suggesting fears in USA that there could have been an accident in Wuhan. I'm curious to know what you think about these reports?

(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)



Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan **lab** studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV **lab** and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the **lab**'s work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new **lab** has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan **lab** further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

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The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

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"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

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Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky.

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Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this **lab** was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai **lab** that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

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

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 4:50 PM
To: james.areddy@wsj.com
Subject: Re: wsj

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Sent from my iPhone

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



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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM

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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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

Editorial-Opinion

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Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

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English

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As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

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The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky.

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Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this **lab** was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai **lab** that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan **lab**, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal

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

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 8:28 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah;Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)
Subject: RE: Shi

Given all the attention to Dr Shi and the Wuhan lab, I think it would benefit our efforts to have some publically available links that shows our sustained engagement. Can we at least post the agenda and titles of the dialogue? Or are the reports to our sponsors available publically? We created a unique science-based exchange that is very relevant today; we just need to find a way to share what we have accomplished. Added Dave for his perspective/comments.

Let me know if you want to discuss. I'm free from about 10:30 am CT--or at least less busy!

Thanks, Jim

-----Original Message-----
From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 10:07 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Shi

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Hi Jim,

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Micah do you have thoughts? I wrote the memo about Dr. Shi's statements at the dialogue meetings to show that she has been warning about a coronavirus pandemic for years but the statements and the document would most certainly be taken out of context if posted on the web.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

-----Original Message-----
From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:39 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>

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Subject: Shi

Ben, are the abstracts or agendas from our NAS-CAS dialogue available on the academy website? Given today's story it would be good to have them accessible to show that Dr Shi had been warning about the possibility of a novel coronavirus for some time. Please send me the link if available.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001755

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 10:25 AM
To: Micah Lowenthal
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Benjamin Rusek
Subject: Re: Shi

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Agree with Jim. This is a window of opportunity of the whole engagement enterprise. Can we do anything on the CISAC site, if not NASEM? It would be nice to have something to which we could refer reporters and others of interest. dave

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Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
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Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

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The Washington Post

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

OPINION SECTION **By Josh Rogin** **April 14, 2020 at 6:00 a.m. EDT**

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

[[this paper seems near conclusive that the virus did not originate in a lab:
The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC, Garry RF. Nat Med. 2020 Apr;26(4):450-452. doi: 10.1038/s41591-020-0820-9.]

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

[[what is a science diplomat? Why not a real virologist, high containment expert?]

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

[[if someone like Tom Ksiazek and/or Jim LeDuc had been the visitors would all this have been the same?]]

[[work with caged live bats, or with bat tissues from field capture work?]]

[[the similar article in the semi-conspiracy-theory website says that US$3.7M granted to Wuhan for bat work – true?]]

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

[[has UTMB / GNL issued public statement(s) on this? Details? Working with NIH?]]

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials'

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visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

[[Important... true... so? This seems like good reason for doing the work and for supporting it...]]

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

[[This looks like deliberate obfuscation by a conspiracy-theory zealot – accusation of taking risks does not link to moratorium – obfuscating implication that there was gain of function work done – corrupt author...]]

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

[[so, who the hell is this guy, Xiao, just an ill-informed social scientist making a noise, as is so common...]]

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

[[another obfuscating construction, but in quotes from Xiao, the nobody – WCDC doing BSL2 work at BSL2 (probably 2.9) does not link to government silence...]]

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

[[this is a delicate matter here – there are lots of people who see the US Government through the lens of the State Department and its public media stuff – and not the lens of the hard-assed medical research agencies – State Dept tribalism, like Trump tribalism, is not about to be knocked by some simple denial that the pandemic is the fault of WIV, with US health agency complicity – how to best deal with this?]]

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

[[will the $3.7M grant keep coming up?]]

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Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak.

[["Inside the Trump administration" = more conspiracy quackery – feed for the base but others are susceptible I see…]]

According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

[[classic style for corrupt writing…]]

"The idea that it was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

[[classic style for corrupt writing… continued…]]

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

[[what did it sell?]]

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

[[why not say that US labs are doing fine with the isolates that they do have?]]

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

[[is this yet another tack used by conspiracy-theory practitioners, the interviewee re-supporting the writer's position?]]

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future." [[Xiao, again, and again…]]

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From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 11:07 AM
To: Dave Franz
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Rusek, Benjamin;Raymond Jeanloz
Subject: RE: Shi

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dave, Jim, Ben,
I have added Raymond. Raymond and I are on a nuclear arms control call with Russians for a while, but perhaps you could give your thoughts on potential value and downsides to our sharing more on the NASEM International Networks and Cooperation welbsite. Initial thoughts.

1. We all agree that what you've established is unique and valuable.
2. Public benefit of sharing: We can share that there are interactions going on and even the topics. In the current environment, this would prompt many more questions from many more people about details of the participants, presentations, and discussions. Should we include a statement that says that the list of meetings and topics is all that will be shared publicly? Where do we draw the line? The ground rules between CISAC and its counterparts has generally been that we acknowledge the discussions and topics, but none of the contents of the presentations and discussions are shared publicly.
3. Downsides for the dialogue: Our counterparts may be subject to greater scrutiny, internally and externally. They might see it as a risk to talk with us further. I don't know how private they consider our meetings to have been. As you know there has been a lot of vilification of Shi Zhengli.
4. There are increasing inquiries about your assessments of how the Wuhan lab has been run, including whether the bat coronavirus experiments were responsible to conduct and whether the safety practices there are adequate. There cannot be an NASEM position on this matter, but you two are uniquely positioned to draw conclusions about those matters. We'd be glad to facilitate conversations with USG officials to share your personal judgments. We can discuss whether it's wise to share your judgments publicly.

Again, just my initial thoughts.
Micah

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 11:25 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Shi

Agree with Jim. This is a window of opportunity of the whole engagement enterprise. Can we do anything on the CISAC site, if not NASEM? It would be nice to have something to which we could refer reporters and others of interest. dave

> On Apr 15, 2020, at 9:56 AM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> I'm tied up until probably 2pm EDT. Let me give this a little more thought and suggest an approach.
> Micah

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008418

-----Original Message-----
From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 9:28 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Shi

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Let me know if you want to discuss. I'm free from about 10:30 am CT--or at least less busy!

Thanks, Jim

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 10:07 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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Subject: RE: Shi

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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Sent from my iPhone

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008420

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 11:14 AM
To: Lowenthal, Micah
Cc: Dave Franz;LeDuc, James W.;Rusek, Benjamin
Subject: Re: Shi

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Micah: Many thanks for the excellent summary. And, just to reassure all involved, any public discussion of interactions would be about NASEM -- not CISAC -- sponsoring (having sponsored) the activities from the US side.

Raymond

On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 9:06 AM Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

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>
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Micah do you have thoughts? I wrote the memo about Dr. Shi's statements at the dialogue meetings to show that she has been warning about a coronavirus pandemic for years but the statements and the document would most certainly be taken out of context if posted on the web.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

-----Original Message-----
From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:39 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Shi

Ben, are the abstracts or agendas from our NAS-CAS dialogue available on the academy website? Given today's story it would be good to have them accessible to show that Dr Shi had been warning about the possibility of a novel coronavirus for some time. Please send me the link if available.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008417

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 11:48 AM
To: Micah Lowenthal
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Benjamin Rusek;Raymond Jeanloz
Subject: Re: Shi

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Thanks Micah,

1-I put the welfare of your Chinese colleagues at the top of the list. It seems that it would be helpful for people to know that we have been working together and have 'open' lines of communication with our colleagues, without a lot of granularity, BUT if our saying that will, in any way, come back to harm them, we can't. I trust Pei Yong's judgment in this regard.

2-I'm not sure what you mean by "your assessments of how the Wuhan lab has been run". I don't know that we've had any view on the downtown lab, which I believe is the one in question. It's a lot lot harder to let something get away from a BSL-4 than from a BSL-2.

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Sorry, not a crisp answer, dave

> On Apr 15, 2020, at 12:06 PM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:
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To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Shi

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Let me know if you want to discuss. I'm free from about 10:30 am CT--or at least less busy!

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Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 10:07 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Shi

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 11:53 AM
To: Raymond Jeanloz
Cc: Micah Lowenthal;LeDuc, James W.;Benjamin Rusek
Subject: Re: Shi

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Oh, I get it! Bad idea I had about CISAC. Thanks, dave

On Apr 15, 2020, at 12:13 PM, Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu> wrote:

Micah: Many thanks for the excellent summary. And, just to reassure all involved, any public discussion of interactions would be about NASEM -- not CISAC -- sponsoring (having sponsored) the activities from the US side.

Raymond

On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 9:06 AM Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

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>
> I have added Raymond. Raymond and I are on a nuclear arms control call with Russians for a while, but perhaps you could give your thoughts on potential value and downsides to our sharing more on the NASEM International Networks and Cooperation website. Initial thoughts.
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008408

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 10:07 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008409

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:43 PM
To: Dave Franz
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Rusek, Benjamin;Raymond Jeanloz
Subject: RE: Shi

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Thanks, Dave.
Re 1: There are people in both countries who would view with suspicion the fact we have been working together and have 'open' lines of communication with our colleagues in China. I don't think that we should let those people dictate what we decide to do—we know that our actions are proper and valuable—but I do think that we should take actions with eyes open. Pei-Yong can give good insight about the institute level. I think that Iain may be able to help with the larger context, including U.S.-China relations in both countries.
Re 2: I meant the BSL-4 lab, which the Rogin opinion piece claims raised major concerns with Embassy officials (I have no idea whether that is accurate).
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008404

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From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 9:28 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Shi

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1-202-334-3975

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(b)(6)

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008406

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:59 PM
To: Micah Lowenthal
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Subject: Re: Shi

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Let's see what Jim says when he gets on.

Interesting about the DoS comments, if they were talking about the BSL-4. What could they tell, buy watching through the windows…and that's got to be the most access they had. Doesn't make sense to me. I question their qualifications to make critical comments about the BSL-4 under the circumstances that Zhming or someone else let them in.

Unrelated to our current discussion, it would be nice to find out from DoS or Rogin what lab they visited. Maybe our BEP colleagues know.

On Apr 15, 2020, at 1:42 PM, Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

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To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
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To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Shi

Ben, are the abstracts or agendas from our NAS-CAS dialogue available on the academy website? Given today's story it would be good to have them accessible to show that Dr Shi had been warning about the possibility of a novel coronavirus for some time. Please send me the link if available.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Sent: 4/15/2020 1:21:29 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. [tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU]; Murphy, Frederick A. [famurphy@UTMB.EDU]
CC: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan

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From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan

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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32284615
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Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

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From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
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To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Tesh, Robert (b)(6) LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Take care and be well, dave

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David R. Franz
(b)(6)

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Sent: 4/15/2020 3:09:07 PM
To: (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: Wuhan

(b)(6)

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James Le Duc, PhD
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[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [and internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (The Fink Report) and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.] [P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

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Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554

Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.

I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a You tube video.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

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From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 3:34 PM
To: Dave Franz
Subject: RE: Wuhan

Dave,
Great to hear from you... I have forwarded your note re (b)(6) to (b)(6) ... all (b)(6) (b)(6) keep close touch, have grand reunions...
I will never forget Kazan / Tatarstan on the Volga...
\Fred

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(b)(6)
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(Tel) 301 968 4798
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From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 3:26 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6) LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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> On Apr 15, 2020, at 2:25 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU> wrote:
>
> Hi Fred,
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Stay safe!

Jim

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan

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The Chinese central government has clamped down on investigations and work on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up. However, after SARS and the small lab escape they had, they pretty much shut down SARS work in China, maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks don't believe it was.

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I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world public health and science than Chinamen hiding behind every tree. Not that there isn't some level of industrial espionage occurring, but we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. **The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2**. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32284615
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: 15 April, 2020 11:03
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: Wuhan

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These friends are (b)(6)
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Here is my annotation on the WP Opinion Piece:
<< File: State Dept problems China containment labs WP 14Apr highlight annotate.docx >>
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013031

(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013032

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 4:24 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Fred,

I'm still sorry we didn't get a FREE Strain 19 vaccination while we were there. :-). I have a dear friend there, (b)(6) who said they had 11 cases of coronavirus in Kazan city when the total Russian count from JHU was 17. Interestingly, she also said they had scientists from VECTOR in Novosibirsk helping with the cases. A lot of good memories! My last trip was Oct '13, just before Putin went into Crimea. Our CISAC committee is just now beginning to arrange renewed communication on ID issues by Zoom. Still a few old friends and hope to make some new ones.

All best wishes, dave

On Apr 15, 2020, at 4:34 PM, Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

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Great to hear from you... I have forwarded your note re (b)(6) to (b)(6) (b)(6) .. all (b)(6) keep close touch, have grand reunions...
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From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 3:26 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6) LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Fred,

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Dave Franz here. It's been a long time. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.

I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a Youtube video.
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Take care and be well, Dave

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Stay safe!

Jim

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013026

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan

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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32284615
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Sent: 15 April, 2020 11:03
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: Wuhan

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013027

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<< File: State Dept problems China containment labs WP 14Apr highlight annotate.docx >>
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
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(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Smith, Thomas
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 8:45 PM
To: Yin (Whitney), Yuhui W.;Lee, James C.
Subject: From WP

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

Full coverage of the coronavirus pandemic

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

Sign up for our Coronavirus Updates newsletter to track the outbreak. All stories linked in the newsletter are free to access.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."
The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

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The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for “rectification.” Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It’s crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don’t know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

“I don’t think it’s a conspiracy theory. I think it’s a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered,” he said. “To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future.”

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_011831

Sent: 4/16/2020 9:16:43 AM
To: Murphy, John [JMurphy@USChamber.com]; Terence Murphy (NCBI) [terence.murphy@nih.hhs.gov]
Subject: FW: Wuhan Lab As Source

Today:
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in English lessons for all these twists. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health guys who worked around the world thought of State Dept health folk… never got their feet wet…

Anyhow, (b)(6) (mostly) and (b)(6) (seems to be losing his edge/focus) (b)(6) having served in US Embassy in Beijing for several years and real China buffs asked about this, as good Republicans seeming to be caught up in the story. I figured that several FH folks were into this chatter. I emailed friends who would know about all this – at least on article stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan…

(b)(6)

Re: After this story, similar to the one you pointed out a few days ago, showed up in the Opinion Section of the WP, I asked three colleagues for some real background. Here are three responses from people who know more than I do about the Wuhan Institute of Virology and BSL4 in China. Three of the best guys I've known over the years.
\Fred

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Fred,

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The Chinese central government has clamped down on lab research on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up, but it may just be a matter of biosafety. After SARS was shown to require maximum biocontainment, they pretty much shut down all SARS work in China – maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks we talk with say it was for an abundance of caution.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world of public health and science than the notion of Chinese scientists hiding behind every tree. Public health is not really much of a place for industrial espionage, but of course health care is (diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, all competitive in commerce). But, in terms of international public health, per se, we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

\Tom

Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD
tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations
Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX
[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led US response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

*Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. **The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2**. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

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Stay safe!

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Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
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Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 10:03 AM
To: Murphy, John @USChamber.com;Murphy, Terence (NCBI) (terence.murphy@nih.hhs.gov);Murphy, Rick A (rick@marketvaluationgroup.com);Murphy, Tim (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

Today: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in English lessons for all these twists that defy logic. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health guys who worked around the world thought of State Dept health folk… never got their feet wet… And, at least one of these articles stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan…

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Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
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David Franz, DVM, PhD
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VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
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Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

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served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]

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From: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 11:00 AM
To: Menachery, Vineet
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Dr. Menachery,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus came from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab.

—Do you have any insights into how this scenario might have played out or how likely it is that SARS-CoV-2 somehow escaped from that high-security virus lab in Wuhan?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

Future, 11 West 42nd Street, 15th Floor, New York, NY 10036

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www.futureplc.com



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From: Carlos Pascual <Carlos.Pascual@ihsmarkit.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 12:48 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: FW: Wuhan and the State Dept - Washington Post

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Jim – Don't know if you have seen this yet. Galveston National Lab is mentioned. Reactions? Carlos

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Global Opinions

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

By Josh Rogin
April 14, 2020 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and

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health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous. As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments. As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said. There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved. Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on." No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

"The idea that it was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.
As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

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Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus. The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with sample of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.
The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said. "I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009735

From: Tim Murphy (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Subject: Re: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Interesting stuff Dad - Thanks for forwarding!

T

(b)(6)

(b)(6) c
e-mail - (b)(6)
web site - (b)(6)

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Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent access to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that

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the Chinese discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time.

Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554
[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of Div of Viral Diseases, and then became the Director at UTMB.]

Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time since we were in Kazan and Kirov. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.
I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6). I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a You tube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 1:33 PM
To: Carlos Pascual
Subject: RE: Wuhan and the State Dept - Washington Post

I've been on the phone for 2 days straight answering questions about this. We can discuss on the call tomorrow if you like.

From: Carlos Pascual <Carlos.Pascual@ihsmarkit.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 12:48 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Wuhan and the State Dept - Washington Post

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Jim – Don't know if you have seen this yet. Galveston National Lab is mentioned. Reactions? Carlos

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Global Opinions

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

By Josh Rogin
April 14, 2020 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

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What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous. As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments. As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said. There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved. Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on." No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

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"The idea that it was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.
As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus. The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with sample of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.
The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said. "I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future

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From: Carlos Pascual <Carlos.Pascual@ihsmarkit.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Wuhan and the State Dept - Washington Post

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Would appreciate whatever you can share tomorrow. Thanks.

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 1:33 PM
To: Carlos Pascual <Carlos.Pascual@ihsmarkit.com>
Subject: RE: Wuhan and the State Dept - Washington Post

[CAUTION] EXTERNAL EMAIL

I've been on the phone for 2 days straight answering questions about this. We can discuss on the call tomorrow if you like.

From: Carlos Pascual <Carlos.Pascual@ihsmarkit.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 12:48 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Wuhan and the State Dept - Washington Post

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Jim – Don't know if you have seen this yet. Galveston National Lab is mentioned. Reactions? Carlos

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Global Opinions

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

By Josh Rogin
April 14, 2020 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about

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inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous. As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments. As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said. There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved. Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

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"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on." No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

"The idea that it was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.
As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus. The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with sample of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.
The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said. "I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future

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From: Murphy, John <JMurphy@USChamber.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 2:19 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Subject: RE: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

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Thanks, I appreciate this. One of our China focused staff is a little too into this stuff. I don't know why folks have an inclination to think a nasty bug has to have been engineered by humans

From: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 11:03 AM
To: Murphy, John <JMurphy@USChamber.com>; Murphy, Terence (NCBI) (terence.murphy@nih.hhs.gov) <terence.murphy@nih.hhs.gov>; Murphy, Rick A (rick@marketvaluationgroup.com) <rick@marketvaluationgroup.com>; Murphy, Tim (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

Today: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in English lessons for all these twists that defy logic. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health guys who worked around the world thought of State Dept health folk… never got their feet wet… And, at least one of these articles stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan…

Anyhow, (b)(6) (mostly) and (b)(6) (less so, sorry to say he is losing his focus) (b)(6) having served in the US Embassy in Beijing for several years and real China buffs, asked about this, as good Republicans seemingly caught up in the story. I figured that several FH folks were into this chatter – but I have had very few phone chats/emails from the inmates lately. So, I emailed friends who would know about all this –

\Dad

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(b)(6)

Re: After this story, similar to the one you pointed out a few days ago, showed up in the Opinion Section of the WP, I asked three colleagues for some real background. Here are three responses from people who know more than I do about the Wuhan Institute of Virology and BSL4 in China. Three of the best guys I've known over the years.
\Fred

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Fred,

As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al* in Nature-Medicine that you cite, pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and he/she was patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, and don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the coronaviruses identified in bats cannot be grown in culture…there are a few exceptions; but most of what you see in publications has been done by PCR and NGS sequencing, all such work not requiring any containment. [How safe it is in the bat caves is another matter!]

The Chinese central government has clamped down on lab research on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up, but it may just be a matter of biosafety. After SARS was shown to require maximum biocontainment, they pretty much shut down all SARS work in China – maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks we talk with say it was for an abundance of caution.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world of public health and science than the notion of Chinese scientists hiding behind every tree. Public health is not really much of a place for industrial espionage, but of course health care is (diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, all competitive in commerce). But, in terms of international public health, per se, we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

\Tom

Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD
tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations
Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX

[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led US response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

*Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. **The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2**. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

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Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments and would add that through the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin [Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and vice president, National Academy of Medicine, NAS]. We have held joint meetings about annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL). During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both world-class coronavirus authorities. Even in the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi discussed bat-associated coronaviruses that likely had the potential ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments at that time, although it was not at BSL4 since the BSL4 lab only opened officially in 2017 or so..

Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent access to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that the Chinese discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time.

Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554
[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of Div of Viral Diseases, and then became the Director at UTMB.]

Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time since we were in Kazan and Kirov. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.
I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a You tube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

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Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013012

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 3:11 PM
To: Murphy, John
Subject: RE: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

Ah, the age when anyone can be an expert...

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: Murphy, John <JMurphy@USChamber.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 3:19 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

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Thanks, I appreciate this. One of our China focused staff is a little too into this stuff. I don't know why folks have an inclination to think a nasty bug has to have been engineered by humans

From: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 11:03 AM
To: Murphy, John <JMurphy@USChamber.com>; Murphy, Terence (NCBI) (terence.murphy@nih.hhs.gov) <terence.murphy@nih.hhs.gov>; Murphy, Rick A (rick@marketvaluationgroup.com) <rick@marketvaluationgroup.com>; Murphy, Tim (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Wuhan Lab As Source of Coronavirus NO

Today: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in English lessons for all these twists that defy logic. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health guys who worked around the

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world thought of State Dept health folk… never got their feet wet… And, at least one of these articles stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan…

Anyhow, (b)(6) (mostly) and (b)(6) (less so, sorry to say he is losing his focus) (b)(6) having served in the US Embassy in Beijing for several years and real China buffs, asked about this, as good Republicans seemingly caught up in the story. I figured that several FH folks were into this chatter – but I have had very few phone chats/emails from the inmates lately. So, I emailed friends who would know about all this –

\Dad

(b)(6)

Re: After this story, similar to the one you pointed out a few days ago, showed up in the Opinion Section of the WP, I asked three colleagues for some real background. Here are three responses from people who know more than I do about the Wuhan Institute of Virology and BSL4 in China. Three of the best guys I've known over the years.
\Fred

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Fred,

As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al* in Nature-Medicine that you cite, pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and he/she was patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, and don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the coronaviruses identified in bats cannot be grown in culture…there are a few exceptions; but most of what you see in publications has been done by PCR and NGS sequencing, all such work not requiring any containment. [How safe it is in the bat caves is another matter!]

The Chinese central government has clamped down on lab research on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up, but it may just be a matter of biosafety. After SARS was shown to require maximum biocontainment, they pretty much shut down all SARS work in China – maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks we talk with say it was for an abundance of caution.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world of public health and science than the notion of Chinese scientists hiding behind every tree. Public health is not really much of a place for industrial espionage, but of course health care is (diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, all competitive in commerce). But, in terms of international public health, per se, we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

\Tom

Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013006

tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations
Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX

[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led US response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

*Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. **The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2**. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

---

Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments and would add that through the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin [Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and vice president, National Academy of Medicine, NAS]. We have held joint meetings about annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL). During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both world-class coronavirus authorities. Even in the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi discussed bat-associated coronaviruses that likely had the potential ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments at that time, although it was not at BSL4 since the BSL4 lab only opened officially in 2017 or so..

Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent access to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that the Chinese discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time.

Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013007

Galveston, TX 77554
[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of Div of Viral Diseases, and then became the Director at UTMB.]

Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time since we were in Kazan and Kirov. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.
I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a You tube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013008

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 3:20 PM
To: Dave Franz
Subject: RE: Wuhan

Dave,
The strain 19 story deserves to be written down in full – published in the New Yorker – nah…
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 5:24 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Fred,

I'm still sorry we didn't get a FREE Strain 19 vaccination while we were there. :-). I have a dear friend there (b)(6) (b)(6) who said they had 11 cases of coronavirus in Kazan city when the total Russian count from JHU was 17. Interestingly, she also said they had scientists from VECTOR in Novosibirsk helping with the cases. A lot of good memories! My last trip was Oct '13, just before Putin went into Crimea. Our CISAC committee is just now beginning to arrange renewed communication on ID issues by Zoom. Still a few old friends and hope to make some new ones.

All best wishes, dave

On Apr 15, 2020, at 4:34 PM, Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

Dave,
Great to hear from you… I have forwarded your note re (b)(6) r to (b)(6) (b)(6) . all (b)(6) keep close touch, have grand reunions…
I will never forget Kazan / Tatarstan on the Volga…
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

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From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 3:26 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Tesh, Robert (b)(6)
(b)(6) LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.

I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a Youtube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

On Apr 15, 2020, at 2:25 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

Hi Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments (of course!) and would add that through the US National Academy of Science working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin. We have held joint meetings about annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the GNL. During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both solid, serious scientists. Even during the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi was discussing bat-associated coronaviruses that likely held the ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments, although it was not at BSL4 since that lab only opened officially in 2017 or so.

Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent access to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

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Stay safe!

Jim

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan

Fred,

As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and they were patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the viruses identified in bats have not been able to be grown…there are a few exceptions; but most that you see in publications are done by PCR and NGS sequencing.

The Chinese central government has clamped down on investigations and work on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up. However, after SARS and the small lab escape they had, they pretty much shut down SARS work in China, maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks don't believe it was.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world public health and science than Chinamen hiding behind every tree. Not that there isn't some level of industrial espionage occurring, but we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. **The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2**. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32284615
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013002

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: 15 April, 2020 11:03
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: Wuhan

Tom, Jim,

I know you are very busy, but I could use your advice re the WP article that the CoV came from the Wuhan lab. Although I am in lockdown, of course, emails from good friends here are asking about the WP article and the conspiracy theory website that has carried the same/similar article.

These friends are (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Reasonable folk, Republicans, but we don't talk politics. They really know and care about China, but I think they are easily led toward some of the conspiracy theory stuff. Led by (b)(6) they are really into this story and ready to believe the stuff about the source of the virus. I need some advice / fodder to deal with this, as the stuff spreads around here – several retired ambassadors live here (stuffy, arrogant types). Does GNL / UTMB have public statements on all this? Counterpoints?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Here is my annotation on the WP Opinion Piece:
<< File: State Dept problems China containment labs WP 14Apr highlight annotate.docx >>
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

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David R. Franz

(b)(6)

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_013004

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 3:40 PM
To: Dave Franz
Subject: RE: Wuhan

Dave,
Right after I sent the last email, I wondered what might be in my family memoir, unchanged since 2004… Indeed, a page… If I reversed the dialogue, you saying one thing and me the other, forgive me – this memoir was only meant for my family – if you wish you can correct it and we'll send it to Tom and Jim just for fun… I always think of Joel when this kind of stuff comes up…

(b)(6)

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\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

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Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 5:24 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Stay safe!

Jim

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012997

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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Subject: RE: Wuhan

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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32284615
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

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Sent: 15 April, 2020 11:03
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Here is my annotation on the WP Opinion Piece:
<< File: State Dept problems China containment labs WP 14Apr highlight annotate.docx >>
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

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From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 3:52 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Amazing Fred,

I just looked through my back-up drive to see if I had a trip report. The one I found for Kazan was a different trip. I can't remember what I said and what you said. I'm sure Tom and Jim would enjoy that story; fine to share. Best, dave

I was recalling that I asked about 'reactogenicity' but may have been another time….actually when someone, I believe, associated with the Academy of Military Medicine in St Petersburg, told us about giving vaccinia by inhalation. I don't want to do that either. :-)

Dave

> On Apr 16, 2020, at 4:40 PM, Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU> wrote:
>
> Dave,
> Right after I sent the last email, I wondered what might be in my family memoir, unchanged since 2004… Indeed, a page… If I reversed the dialogue, you saying one thing and me the other, forgive me – this memoir was only meant for my family – if you wish you can correct it and we'll send it to Tom and Jim just for fun… I always think of Joel when this kind of stuff comes up…

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012989

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 5:24 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Fred,

I'm still sorry we didn't get a FREE Strain 19 vaccination while we were there. :-). I have a dear friend there,(b)(6) who said they had 11 cases of coronavirus in Kazan city when the total Russian count from JHU was 17. Interestingly, she also said they had scientists from VECTOR in Novosibirsk helping with the cases. A lot of good memories! My last trip was Oct '13, just before Putin went into Crimea. Our CISAC committee is just now beginning to arrange renewed communication on ID issues by Zoom. Still a few old friends and hope to make some new ones.

All best wishes, dave

On Apr 15, 2020, at 4:34 PM, Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

Dave,
Great to hear from you... I have forwarded your note re(b)(6) to (b)(6) ... all (b)(6) keep close touch, have grand reunions...
I will never forget Kazan / Tatarstan on the Volga...
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 3:26 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6) LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Wuhan

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Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.

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I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a Youtube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

On Apr 15, 2020, at 2:25 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

Hi Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments (of course!) and would add that through the US National Academy of Science working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin. We have held joint meetings about annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the GNL. During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both solid, serious scientists. Even during the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi was discussing bat-associated coronaviruses that likely held the ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments, although it was not at BSL4 since that lab only opened officially in 2017 or so.

Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent access to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that they discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time.

Stay safe!

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Jim

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:33 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan

Fred,

As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and they were patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the viruses identified in bats have not been able to be grown…there are a few exceptions; but most that you see in publications are done by PCR and NGS sequencing.

The Chinese central government has clamped down on investigations and work on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up. However, after SARS and the small lab escape they had, they pretty much shut down SARS work in China, maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks don't believe it was.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world public health and science than Chinamen hiding behind every tree. Not that there isn't some level of industrial espionage occurring, but we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. **The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2**. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32284615
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: 15 April, 2020 11:03
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Tesh, Robert (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: Wuhan

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Tom, Jim,

I know you are very busy, but I could use your advice re the WP article that the CoV came from the Wuhan lab. Although I am in lockdown, of course, emails from good friends here are asking about the WP article and the conspiracy theory website that has carried the same/similar article.

These friends are Jon and Emily Reynolds – Jon F-105 pilot shot down over Hanoi, 7 years in the Hilton with John McCain, later PhD (Duke), rose to O7, he and his wife spent years in US Embassy in Beijing, Air Attaché, having spent two years in Taipei learning Chinese (! Emily still takes advanced Chinese lessons) – Jon also served in Secretary of the Air Force as #2. Reasonable folk, Republicans, but we don't talk politics. They really know and care about China, but I think they are easily led toward some of the conspiracy theory stuff. Led by Emily, they are really into this story and ready to believe the stuff about the source of the virus. I need some advice / fodder to deal with this, as the stuff spreads around here – several retired ambassadors live here (stuffy, arrogant types). Does GNL / UTMB have public statements on all this? Counterpoints?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Here is my annotation on the WP Opinion Piece:
<< File: State Dept problems China containment labs WP 14Apr highlight annotate.docx >>
\Fred

Frederick A. Murphy
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(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

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David R. Franz

(b)(6)

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

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From: Lee, James C. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=271C5850195C4E949FD72C9738BEFB7C-LEE, JAMES]
Sent: 4/16/2020 5:50:53 PM
To: Smith, Thomas [thosmith@UTMB.EDU]; Yin (Whitney), Yuhui W. [ywyin@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: Re: From WP

I remember that the 'ghost' bragged about being a member of the advisory group to travel to Wuhan to help them establish the BS-4 lab. He also traveled quite a few time back to Wuhan. When the ghost declared to me that his postdoc got a wonderful job in China, I wondered then whether that was a job in Wuhan. Otherwise I don't think he would be so excited. My theory at that time was that he was establishing another foot hold in China to do research that he is not supposed to do in the States.

Does the ghost has a sister? Could the lead researcher be related to him?

From: Smith, Thomas <thosmith@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 9:45 PM
To: Yin (Whitney), Yuhui W. <ywyin@UTMB.EDU>; Lee, James C. <jclee@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: From WP

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

Full coverage of the coronavirus pandemic

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

Sign up for our Coronavirus Updates newsletter to track the outbreak. All stories linked in the newsletter are free to access.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."
The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

From: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 7:42 AM
To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Subject: Fwd: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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Dear Fred

As you know in this era of post truth, I tend to be skeptical about conspiracy theories but this story about the pseudo -origin of COVID -19 in the Wuhan fish market is certainly strange . The nearly 100 % similarity in the spike sequence of the viral S protein in the two coronaviruses reminds me of the 99.5% similarity found by Gallo between an HIV spike protein in the American and French viruses

Shi Zhengli has published in top Western scientific journals but does it exclude that an experimental coronavirus escaped by accident (by not observing the level 4 security) from the Wuhan Institute with the CCP , as usual , suppressing all relevant data and incriminating information

I wonder what is the perception of the US experts ?

Marc

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: sally <sally@white-mischief.com>
Date: 2020/04/17 12:10 (GMT+00:00)
To: Zanne Forrester <zanne@forrester-interiors.com>
Subject: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

https://youtu.be/3bXWGxhd7ic

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

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From: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:06 AM
To: Weaver, Scott
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Weaver,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab.

—As part of the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" in the lab (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
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T +1 212 703 5849
M +(b)(6)

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

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From: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:10 AM
To: Makino, Shinji
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Makino,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab.

—As part of the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" in the lab (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

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M (b)(6)

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

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From: Weaver, Scott
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:11 AM
To: Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Raul,

I will continue to ignore these unless you advise otherwise.

Scott

From: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Date: Friday, April 17, 2020 at 8:08 AM
To: Scott Weaver <sweaver@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Weaver,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab.

—As part of the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" in the lab (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

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Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_003260

From: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:19 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Ksiazek,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab. I saw your research into reverse transcription PCR on SARS and thought you might have some insights into these questions.

—Also as director of the High Containment Lab Operations at the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" WIV (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

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—Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

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M (b)(6)

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

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:41 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim
I'm having no luck tracking down that presentation that Shi Zhengli made by searching US and China sources, or contacting the organizers.

Have you spent much time with her? We are trying to write a profile on her and it would be beneficial to hear from you. I'm more interested in her contribution to the science of bats and coronavirus. (That might not be your specialty area.) I wonder if you saw her in Wuhan in her lab and what you might have observed, including live animals she might have kept.
If you have views on safety lapses I am definitely interested in that too. But finding those isn't really my primary goal.

Separately, there are reports about U.S. government funding that made its way to Wuhan Institute of Viriology, apparently some of it through Galveston. Is there something you can tell me about that such as amounts and time period and goals? Perhaps it was related to the two researchers from the institute your group trained and/or trips made to the institute by your team.

Can we speak today?

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal
+86 1370 1700 594

james.areddy@wsj.com
james.areddy@shng-news.com (中文)
(b)(6)
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:50 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
> She gave the presentation.
>
> Sent from my iPhone

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On Apr 14, 2020, at 4:48 PM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

James T. Areddy

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james.areddy@shng-news.com (中文)
[redacted]
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

[redacted]

[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

Zheng Li has been working on bat-associated coronaviruses since just after the original SARS outbreak in 2003. For at least the last 5 years she has been reporting the bat-associated coronaviruses may have the ability to infect humans and that we should be watching for their possible emergence as human activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

It's really fascinating. Here's an interview with the reporter on that story where he describes how the State Dept was concerned two years ago about procedures in Wuhan early
on. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgnT2YK3BBI&feature=youtu.be He calls the link between the lab and the outbreak as a 'circumstantial' case. But do you know if Shi Zhengli's focus on bat coronavirus was a worry back a few years ago?

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal.

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james.areddy@wsj.com
james.areddy@shng-news.com (中文)
[redacted]
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp





On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 11:09 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> James,
>
> Thank you for sharing the report below. I had not seen this previously and I find it quite interesting, especially the comment about our laboratory working to help train scientists and building engineers from the new BSL4 laboratory. We clearly recognized this need but unfortunately, were unable to identify funding to support our efforts. I do believe that between our efforts on a lab-to-lab basis and the overarching dialogue maintained by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have had a positive impact, although admittedly limited.
>
> I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the

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Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

Director

Galveston National Laboratory

University of Texas Medical Branch

Galveston, TX 77555-0610

(t) 409-266-6500

(f) 409-266-6810

(m) (b)(6)

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

Hi. We spoke several weeks ago when I did a story for The Wall Street Journal about BSL-4 labs. Since then the Washington Post has had two stories suggesting fears in USA that there could have been an accident in Wuhan. I'm curious to know what you think about these reports?

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(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)

<image001.jpg>

Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan **lab** studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the **lab**, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan **lab** was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV **lab** and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the **lab**'s work on bat

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coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

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There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was

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quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan **lab**, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal

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Sent: 4/17/2020 9:10:13 AM
To: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) [vanregen@unistra.fr]
Subject: RE: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

Marc,
Don't tell me you are falling for the conspiracy theory zombies? My response in the form of an email to two neighbors and my sons follows …
Gallo's first HIV virus was from France/Pasteur… and the final proof that the two viruses were the same was not done by Gallo but by an impartial referee lab, a few years later… part of the lawsuit – Gallo is a crook, but he has done very well indeed ever since – his Institute in Baltimore is huge, >300 staff……
\Fred

To my sons – 4/16/2020:

Today: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion section piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology – WIV – and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion section piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in advanced English courses and Logic courses for all these twists that defy logic but in the hands of smart people can be very effective in turning corrupt opinion into "factual" (fact-based) argument. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning the WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health virologists who worked around the world thought of State Dept health folk back in my day… State Dept people never got their feet wet… And, at least one of these articles stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan – true, and trained its top researchers – good …

My sons, my friends and neighbors, (b)(6) **, having served in the US Embassy in Beijing for several years and being real China buffs (both speak Chinese), asked about this, and as good Republicans they were seemingly caught up in the story. I figured that the true Trumpers here in Fox Hill would be deep into this chatter, but I have had very few phone chats/emails from the inmates lately. So, I emailed three friends who know about all this – three of the best international health guys I've ever known, each quite knowledgeable about the WIV, one having helped design the Wuhan lab and train its lead staff….**

\Dad \Fred

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Re: After this story, similar to the one you pointed out a few days ago, showed up in the Opinion Section of the WP, I asked three colleagues for some real background. Here are three responses from people who know more than I do about the Wuhan Institute of Virology and BSL4 in China. Three of the best guys I've known over the years.
\Fred

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Fred,

As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al* in Nature-Medicine that you cite, pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and he/she was patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, and don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before all this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the coronaviruses identified in bats cannot be grown in culture…there are a few exceptions; but most of what you see in publications has been done by PCR and NGS sequencing, all such work not requiring any containment. [How safe it is in the bat caves is another matter!]

The Chinese central government has clamped down on lab research on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up, but it may just be a matter of biosafety. After SARS was shown to require maximum biocontainment, they pretty much shut down all SARS work in China – maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks we talk with say it was for an abundance of caution.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world of public health and science than the notion of Chinese scientists hiding behind every tree. Public health is not really much of a place for industrial espionage, but of course health care is (diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, all competitive in commerce). But, in terms of international public health, per se, we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

\Tom

Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD
tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations
Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX
[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led the US response teams to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

***Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf**

Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments and would add that through the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin [Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and vice president, National Academy of Medicine, NAS]. We have held joint meetings annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL). During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both world-class coronavirus authorities, as well as Tom and myself who have been deep into SARS, MERS, Nipah, Ebola, etc. Even in the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi discussed bat-associated coronaviruses that likely had the potential ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments at that time, although it was not at BSL4 since the BSL4 lab only opened officially in 2017. Today, the Wuhan lab BSL4 is as good as ours.

Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent scientist status to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that the Chinese discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time, but of course that is different from the accusations you cite.

Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554
[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Disease and then Director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases (under newer name and organization, and then moved to Galveston and became the Director at UTMB.]

Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time since we were in Kazan and Kirov. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.

I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a You tube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:42 AM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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Dear Fred

As you know in this era of post truth, I tend to be skeptical about conspiracy theories but this story about the pseudo -origin of COVID -19 in the Wuhan fish market is certainly strange . The nearly 100 % similarity in the spike sequence of the viral S protein in the two coronaviruses reminds me of the 99.5% similarity found by Gallo between an HIV spike protein in the American and French viruses

Shi Zhengli has published in top Western scientific journals but does it exclude that an experimental coronavirus escaped by accident (by not observing the level 4 security) from the Wuhan Institute with the CCP , as usual , suppressing all relevant data and incriminating information

I wonder what is the perception of the US experts ?

Marc

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: sally <sally@white-mischief.com>
Date: 2020/04/17 12:10 (GMT+00:00)
To: Zanne Forrester <zanne@forrester-interiors.com>
Subject: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

https://youtu.be/3bXWGxhd7ic

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

From: Murphy, Frederick A.
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 9:48 AM
To: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC)
Subject: RE: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

Marc,
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My sons, my friends and neighbors, (b)(6) having served in the US Embassy in Beijing for several years and being real China buffs (both speak Chinese), asked about this, and as good Republicans they were seemingly caught up in the story. I figured that the true Trumpers here in Fox Hill would be deep into this chatter, but I have had very few phone chats/emails from the inmates lately. So, I emailed three friends who know about all this –

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three of the best international health guys I've ever known, each quite knowledgeable about the WIV, one having helped design the Wuhan lab and train its lead staff….

\Dad \Fred

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)
Re: After this story, similar to the one you pointed out a few days ago, showed up in the Opinion Section of the WP, I asked three colleagues for some real background. Here are three responses from people who know more than I do about the Wuhan Institute of Virology and BSL4 in China. Three of the best guys I've known over the years.
\Fred

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

Fred,

As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al* in Nature-Medicine that you cite, pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and he/she was patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, and don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before all this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the coronaviruses identified in bats cannot be grown in culture…there are a few exceptions; but most of what you see in publications has been done by PCR and NGS sequencing, all such work not requiring any containment. [How safe it is in the bat caves is another matter!]

The Chinese central government has clamped down on lab research on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up, but it may just be a matter of biosafety. After SARS was shown to require maximum biocontainment, they pretty much shut down all SARS work in China – maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks we talk with say it was for an abundance of caution.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world of public health and science than the notion of Chinese scientists hiding behind every tree. Public health is not really much of a place for industrial espionage, but of course health care is (diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, all competitive in commerce). But, in terms of international public health, per se, we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

\Tom

Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD
tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations

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Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX
[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led the US response teams to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

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Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments and would add that through the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin [Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and vice president, National Academy of Medicine, NAS]. We have held joint meetings annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL). During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both world-class coronavirus authorities, as well as Tom and myself who have been deep into SARS, MERS, Nipah, Ebola, etc. Even in the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi discussed bat-associated coronaviruses that likely had the potential ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments at that time, although it was not at BSL4 since the BSL4 lab only opened officially in 2017. Today, the Wuhan lab BSL4 is as good as ours.

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The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that the Chinese discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time, but of course that is different from the accusations you cite.

Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554

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[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Disease and then Director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases (under newer name and organization, and then moved to Galveston and became the Director at UTMB.]

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:42 AM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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strange . The nearly 100 % similarity in the spike sequence of the viral S protein in the two coronaviruses reminds me of the 99.5% similarity found by Gallo between an HIV spike protein in the American and French viruses

Shi Zhengli has published in top Western scientific journals but does it exclude that an experimental coronavirus escaped by accident (by not observing the level 4 security) from the Wuhan Institute with the CCP , as usual , suppressing all relevant data and incriminating
information

I wonder what is the perception of the US experts ?

Marc

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: sally <sally@white-mischief.com>
Date: 2020/04/17 12:10 (GMT+00:00)
To: Zanne Forrester <zanne@forrester-interiors.com>
Subject: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

https://youtu.be/3bXWGxhd7ic

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

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From: Burke, Donald S <donburke@pitt.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 9:54 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Fw: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

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Tom

FYI. I just sent this to my bosses here at Pitt for their information.

Do you know if a BSL exchange program did get set up. Was the Wuhan Inst of Virology involved?

Best, Don

From: Burke, Donald S <donburke@pitt.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 5:14 PM
To: Levine, Arthur Samuel; Gallagher, Patrick David
Subject: Fw: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

Art and Pat,

FYI. On my 2008 trip to China I visited the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where ironically enough I gave a lecture on "Predicting and Preventing Emerging Infectious Disease Epidemics." Per the email trail below, we considered a Pitt / WIV collaboration, but it never came together.

My correspondent and potential collaborator below, Zhengli Shi, is the bat virologist - sometimes called the bat-woman - who identified the COVID virus SARS-CoV-2. She had hosted by lecture and visit.
https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scientificamerican.com%2Farticle%2Fhow-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1%2F&data=02%7C01%7Ctgksiaze%40UTMB.EDU%7C4e8eeae63f30457a5de908d7e2df1ec6%7C7bef256d85db4526a72d31aea2546852%7C0%7C0%7C637227320233083564&sdata=HnK0uy7EQZe%2BkKcmAhjUspM7SAFj2gKWmUatoogekzY%3D&reserved=0

There are concerns, which I think are legitimate, that the virus may have accidentally escaped from the Wuhan lab. Not intentionally. Bio-bungling, as we used to call it, not bio-terrorism. Maybe the future would have been different had this Pitt / WIV collaboration had come to fruition. I don't have records if/how DA responded to my note, but nothing further came of it. I lost touch with the Wuhan lab after this exchange.

I thought you might find this all to be of interest.

Regards, Don

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From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 7:46 AM
To: Montelaro, Ronald C <rmont@pitt.edu>; Cole, Kelly Stefano <stefcole@pitt.edu>
Subject: FW: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

Ron, Kelly,

FYI. At this point in time, I'm just raising the possibility of future exchanges with Wuhan. If Tara is confirmed it is a safe bet that a formal exchange program will be launched. Then we'll have to decide if and how we become engaged.

Tom Ksiazek is at UTMB. He used to head the CDC's BSL4. The rest of the thread is self-explanatory.

Don

From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 7:37 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: BSL 4 in Wuhan

DA

I have not forgotten about our discussion in your office a few months ago about a possible exchange program of US and international scientists who work in high containment laboratories, with the idea that such a program could harmonize regulatory approaches, promote openness, and improve overall safety.

Recently Tom Ksiazek sent me a note because he had read in my last year's China trip blog about a BSL4 lab under construction in Wuhan, but in his inventory of BSL4 labs around the world he didn't have any prior information about this one (or any BSL4 labs in China, for that matter). Tom asked if I could provide any updated information about the Wuhan lab. Instead of asking directly about the BSL4 labI wrote a chatty note to the senior scientist Shi Zhengli who heads the BSL4 project for the Wuhan Institute of Virology (part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) proposing possible exchanges. Here is her response below. Seems that the BSL4 is well under way in Wuhan. Their group has done good work on SARS before, so my guess would be this will be their top priority.

If there will be an exchange program, this might be a useful connection. One of our Chinese post-docs at the Pitt Center for Vaccine Research worked on SARS at the Wuhan Inst of Virology a couple of years ago before coming to Pitt. Among our current ABSL-3 Pitt faculty team, only one person has recent experience in BSL-4 work (Amy Hartman, who worked on ebola at CDC before joining us). But there may be many ways to develop the relationship.

Best regards, Don

From: zlshi [zlshi@wh.iov.cn]
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 5:31 AM
To: Burke, Donald S; huzh
Subject: Re: Possible Pittsburgh - Wuhan exchange program

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Dear Don,

It's nice to hearing from you. Thank you very much for your information. We are definitely interested in developing a collaboration project between our Institutes, particularly on highly fatal pathogens. Please let us know if you have further information.

Our BSL/3/4 lab is slowly progressing, but promising. We realy need well trained scientists working in these biosafety containment in the near future.

Best regards,

Zhengli,

From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 8:42 AM
To: 'zlshi'; huzh
Subject: Possible Pittsburgh - Wuhan exchange program

Dear Drs. Zhihong Hu and Shi Zhengli,

Greetings from Pittsburgh! This is an exciting time for us, as our city is hosting the G-20 summit. Last evening your President Hu Jintao, along with other world leaders, had dinner with President Obama at the Phipps Conservatory, a garden museum just down the street from my home. Today they are meeting downtown to discuss the world economy.

https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.xinhuanet.com%2Fenglish%2F2009-09%2F25%2Fcontent_12108235.htm&data=02%7C01%7Ctgksiaze%40UTMB.EDU%7C4e8eeae63f30457a5de908d7e2df1ec6%7C7bef256d85db4526a72d31aea2546852%7C0%7C0%7C637227320233093557&sdata=uiArIeeSBKMDtIZ5lebZvg6f7q214lpHoD46gP4fOLg%3D&reserved=0

I write to you today to suggest the possibility of collaborations between our institutes. Our own ABSL-3 laboratory in our Center for Vaccine Research has been operational for more than a year now, and we are approved to handle several select restricted agents. Currently we are working on H5N1, H1N1, Rift Valley Fever, tularemia, and tuberculosis, and will be adding other pathogens soon. Our primate aerobiology challenge system and CT/PET scanning are working well. How have you been progressing on building your BSL-3/4 laboratory in Wuhan?

I have heard that the US government may be launching an international high containment lab scientist exchange program soon, and I would be interested to build a relationship between the University of Pittsburgh and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. At this stage, it is very preliminary. But I did want to find out if you might be interested to explore the possibilities.

Best regards, Don

Donald S. Burke, M.D.
Dean, Graduate School of Public Health
Director, Center for Vaccine Research
University of Pittsburgh
(412) 624-3001

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From: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 11:09 AM
To: Murphy, Frederick A.
Subject: Re: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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Dear Fred

Many thanks for all this information . Of course I did not believe that Shi Zhengli was engineering a new coronavirus hybrid but I wondered whether COVID -19 really originated from the fish market since there seems to some chinese evidence (?) that a certain % of the first cases had no known link with the market . Of course this does not prove anything
I understand that 20 (?) million Americans believe that the twin towers were sabotaged by the CIA to justify the invasion of Irak , so truth and politics are certainly
strange bedfellows . A strong dislike for the CCP and its poilitical leaders may lead in the West to a similar rejection of Trump and of the Americans who voted for him although the results of the November elections are less certain that the permanent control of China by its Communist / Capitalistc hybrid system

Marc

De: "Murphy, Frederick A." <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
À: "vanregen" <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Envoyé: Vendredi 17 Avril 2020 16:47:57
Objet: RE: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

Marc,
Don't tell me you are falling for the conspiracy theory zombies? My response in the form of an email to two neighbors and my sons follows …
Gallo's first HIV virus was from France/Pasteur… and the final proof that the two viruses were the same was not done by Gallo but by an impartial referee lab, a few years later… part of the lawsuit – Gallo is a crook, but he has done very well indeed ever since – his Institute in Baltimore is huge, >300 staff……
\Fred

To my sons – 4/16/2020:

Today: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

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Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion section piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology – WIV – and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion section piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in advanced English courses and Logic courses for all these twists that defy logic but in the hands of smart people can be very effective in turning corrupt opinion into "factual" (fact-based) argument. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning the WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health virologists who worked around the world thought of State Dept health folk back in my day… State Dept people never got their feet wet… And, at least one of these articles stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan – true, and trained its top researchers – good …

My sons, my friends and neighbors, (b)(6) having served in the US Embassy in Beijing for several years and being real China buffs (both speak Chinese), asked about this, and as good Republicans they were seemingly caught up in the story. I figured that the true Trumpers here in Fox Hill would be deep into this chatter, but I have had very few phone chats/emails from the inmates lately. So, I emailed three friends who know about all this – three of the best international health guys I've ever known, each quite knowledgeable about the WIV, one having helped design the Wuhan lab and train its lead staff….

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Fred,

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Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
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Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

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Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

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Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:42 AM
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-------- Original message --------
From: sally <sally@white-mischief.com>
Date: 2020/04/17 12:10 (GMT+00:00)
To: Zanne Forrester <zanne@forrester-interiors.com>
Subject: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012981

https://youtu.be/3bXWGxhd7ic

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012982

Sent: 4/17/2020 11:39:56 AM
To: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) [vanregen@unistra.fr]
Subject: RE: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

Marc,
I try to read about the power of tribalism, the reasons that the Trump base is so loyal when it is obvious that he is a fake, but in the end I never feel that I have conquered the subject. Even his recent tweet, "Happy Good Friday" to his religious right base did not move the polls. Why?
On the other hand, his handling of COVID just knocked ~6% off his favorability rating, down to 43% – but 43% is about 20% higher than I think reasonable... goes along with the % of US pop that does not believe in evolution... I'm ready to colonize Mars, cold though it may be...

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) (b)(6)
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:09 PM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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Dear Fred

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strange bedfellows . A strong dislike for the CCP and its poilitical leaders may lead in the West to a similar rejection of Trump and of the Americans who voted for him although the results of the November elections are less certain that the permanent control of China by its Communist / Capitalistc hybrid system

Marc

De: "Murphy, Frederick A." <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
À: "vanregen" <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Envoyé: Vendredi 17 Avril 2020 16:47:57
Objet: RE: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

Marc,

Don't tell me you are falling for the conspiracy theory zombies? My response in the form of an email to two neighbors and my sons follows …
Gallo's first HIV virus was from France/Pasteur… and the final proof that the two viruses were the same was not done by Gallo but by an impartial referee lab, a few years later… part of the lawsuit – Gallo is a crook, but he has done very well indeed ever since – his Institute in Baltimore is huge, >300 staff……
\Fred

To my sons – 4/16/2020:

Today: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/politics/us-intelligence-virus-started-chinese-lab/index.html

Throughout the past week (with roots going much further back), starting with conspiracy-theory websites, then as opinion section piece in WP, now CNN, stories of how the coronavirus was engineered in a Wuhan lab (Wuhan Institute of Virology – WIV – and the public health lab) have gotten bolder and bolder. The WP opinion section piece is a lesson in obfuscation by linking cause/effect matters that have nothing to do with each other, and by gaining certainty from a worthless "expert" interviewee. I do not remember the words used in advanced English courses and Logic courses for all these twists that defy logic but in the hands of smart people can be very effective in turning corrupt opinion into "factual" (fact-based) argument. All this stuff about State Dept "diplomat scientists" warning the WH of problems in Wuhan lab, etc., reminds me of what the real international health virologists who worked around the world thought of State Dept health folk back in my day… State Dept people never got their feet wet… And, at least one of these articles stated that UTMB had helped/advised on the design of the BSL4 lab in Wuhan – true, and trained its top researchers – good …

My sons, my friends and neighbors, (b)(6), having served in the US Embassy in Beijing for several years and being real China buffs (both speak Chinese), asked about this, and as good Republicans they were seemingly caught up in the story. I figured that the true Trumpers here in Fox Hill would be deep into this chatter, but I have had very few phone chats/emails from the inmates lately. So, I emailed three friends who know about all this – three of the best international health guys I've ever known, each quite knowledgeable about the WIV, one having helped design the Wuhan lab and train its lead staff….

\Dad \Fred

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Re: After this story, similar to the one you pointed out a few days ago, showed up in the Opinion Section of the WP, I asked three colleagues for some real background. Here are three responses from people who know more than I do about the Wuhan Institute of Virology and BSL4 in China. Three of the best guys I've known over the years.
\Fred

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/

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As you know there have been no end to the stories on the origin of the virus. The paper by Andersen et al* in Nature-Medicine that you cite, pretty much puts an end to the stories that the virus was cooked up in the lab. Other scenarios are that they had the virus and that it escaped from the lab, another I have not seen mentioned is that someone got infected in the field and he/she was patient 0. I don't know, but don't think they were working with live bats, and don't think they would have been doing this in the BSL4. From Pei-Yong's discussions with the "bat lady", Dr. Shi, I don't believe that they had this virus in the lab before all this started. One thing that a lot of people don't appreciate is that most of the coronaviruses identified in bats cannot be grown in culture...there are a few exceptions; but most of what you see in publications has been done by PCR and NGS sequencing, all such work not requiring any containment. [How safe it is in the bat caves is another matter!]

The Chinese central government has clamped down on lab research on the origin of the virus, some might interpret that as part of a cover up, but it may just be a matter of biosafety. After SARS was shown to require maximum biocontainment, they pretty much shut down all SARS work in China – maybe that was part of a cover up, but most folks we talk with say it was for an abundance of caution.

I'm a lot more worried about the US status as a leader in world of public health and science than the notion of Chinese scientists hiding behind every tree. Public health is not really much of a place for industrial espionage, but of course health care is (diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, all competitive in commerce). But, in terms of international public health, per se, we're killing ourselves in terms of how we're seen by others.

\Tom

Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD
tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations
Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX
[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led the US response teams to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

***Andersen KG, Rambaut A, Lipkin WI, Holmes EC and Garry RF. 2020. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. Nat Med 26(4): 450-452.** https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9.pdf

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Fred,

I agree with Tom's assessments and would add that through the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) working in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have maintained a dialogue on emerging infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Dave Franz and I are very active in the group, as has been Diane Griffin [Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and vice president, National Academy of Medicine, NAS]. We have held joint meetings annually since 2015 in both China (Wuhan, Harbin, Beijing) and in the US, including here at the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL). During these discussions we have always had a session on coronaviruses and Zheng-Li Shi has participated in each meeting during which she has shared her most recent findings. The US side has been represented by Ralph Baric and Linda Saif, both world-class coronavirus authorities, as well as Tom and myself who have been deep into SARS, MERS, Nipah, Ebola, etc. Even in the first meeting in 2015, Dr Shi discussed bat-associated coronaviruses that likely had the potential ability to infect humans. I have no information on the lab conditions under which she conducted her experiments at that time, although it was not at BSL4 since the BSL4 lab only opened officially in 2017. Today, the Wuhan lab BSL4 is as good as ours.

Second, you may recall the training center that we established at UTMB with earmark funding from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson that ran until 2016. Using funds from that program and later my funding, we offered training in both biosafety and biocontainment lab operations to participants from around the world, including from the new lab in Wuhan. In addition, we supported two Chinese post-docs who went through the complete training program and gained independent scientist status to work in our BSL4. Both have returned to Wuhan and have been involved in standing up the new lab and designing their biosafety training program. We continue to maintain contact with these scientist and are implementing joint research projects.

The first I learned about the State Department reports of safety concerns from the Wuhan lab was in the Washington Post article. While we usually had some level of dialogue with folks in the embassy as we arranged our joint meetings, I do not recall the individuals mentioned in the article and I don't recall anyone from the embassy expressing concern about the safety of the lab in Wuhan. The comments that the Chinese discovered bat coronaviruses likely capable of infecting humans has been known for quite some time, but of course that is different from the accusations you cite.

Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554
[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Disease and then Director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases (under newer name and organization, and then moved to Galveston and became the Director at UTMB.]

Fred,

Dave Franz here. It's been a long time since we were in Kazan and Kirov. Tom and Jim have covered your question regarding our Chinese friends.
I only add that we also have a next-door neighbor who spent 73 months in the Hanoi Hilton. His name is (b)(6) (b)(6) I'm sure your friends will know (b)(6) I attach a You tube video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
[P.S. David and I had some great biodefense adventures in remote places in Russia – including Kirov (10 hour train ride from Moscow) and Kazan (500 miles from Moscow, in Tatarstan out on the Volga River).]

Frederick A. Murphy
(b)(6)
(Cell) [redacted]
(Tel) 301 968 4798
(Email) famurphy@utmb.edu

From: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC) <vanregen@unistra.fr>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:42 AM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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As you know in this era of post truth, I tend to be skeptical about conspiracy theories but this story about the pseudo -origin of COVID -19 in the Wuhan fish market is certainly strange . The nearly 100 % similarity in the spike sequence of the viral S protein in the two coronaviruses reminds me of the 99.5% similarity found by Gallo between an HIV spike protein in the American and French viruses

Shi Zhengli has published in top Western scientific journals but does it exclude that an experimental coronavirus escaped by accident (by not observing the level 4 security) from the Wuhan Institute with the CCP , as usual , suppressing all relevant data and incriminating information

I wonder what is the perception of the US experts ?

Marc

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: sally <sally@white-mischief.com>
Date: 2020/04/17 12:10 (GMT+00:00)
To: Zanne Forrester <zanne@forrester-interiors.com>
Subject: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

https://youtu.be/3bXWGxhd7ic

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To: VAN REGENMORTEL Marc (BSC)
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Marc

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À: "vanregen" <vanregen@unistra.fr>
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Objet: RE: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

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\Dad \Fred

(b)(6)

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Thomas G. Ksiazek, DVM, PhD
tgksiaze@utmb.edu
Professor, Department of Pathology 0610
Director, High Containment Laboratory Operations
Galveston National Laboratory 5.200E
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston TX

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012967

[Tom Ksiazek was formerly chief, CDC Special Pathogens Branch and director of CDC's BSL4 labs, and before that as COL US Army ran the BSL4 virus programs at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick. He led the US response teams to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 2115.]

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Stay safe!

Jim

James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory
Professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology
John Sealy Distinguished Chair in Tropical and Emerging Virology
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77554
[Jim LeDuc was also COL US Army at USAMRIID/Ft Detrick, later had my old job at CDC as Director of the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Disease and then Director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases (under newer name and organization, and then moved to Galveston and became the Director at UTMB.]

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKBs3aQQD7U

Take care and be well, Dave

David Franz, DVM, PhD
davidrfranz@gmail.com
VP/Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute
Director, National Agricultural Biosecurity Ctr, Kansas State U.
Deputy Dir , Ctr for Emergency Care Preparedness, U Alabama Birmingham School of medicine

[David Franz: COL (Ret) US Army – served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to this, he served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [an internationally ranked marksman, member of Army rifle team]. Dr. Franz was the Chief Inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the US-UK teams that site-visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts' Committee for biological weapons negotiations. He served as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism and as a charter member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biological Security (NSABB). He co-chaired the NAS study, Global Security Engagement (CTR 2.0) in 2009.]
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Frederick A. Murphy
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Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:42 AM
To: Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>
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Dear Fred

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012969

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I wonder what is the perception of the US experts ?

Marc

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: sally <sally@white-mischief.com>
Date: 2020/04/17 12:10 (GMT+00:00)
To: Zanne Forrester <zanne@forrester-interiors.com>
Subject: Watch "The first documentary movie on CCP virus, Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus" on YouTube

https://youtu.be/3bXWGxhd7ic

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012970

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:17 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin;'Dave Franz'
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Sharples, Fran;Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue

Hi Ben and all,
The letter looks good!
Zhengli Shi called me this morning. As a scientist, she looks forward to this type of communication/conference.
Cheers, Pei-Yong

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:13 PM
To: 'Dave Franz' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
Importance: High

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Thank you Dave and Jim, I have attached a revised draft. Jim I tried to work your points at the end into the bulleted list. **Bullet 1 under point 2 and bullet 4 under point 3 could use some attention.**

Pei-yong do you have thoughts before this goes to Peggy and Diane for review?

Also I asked Fran to take a look at the Chinese portal https://covid19.21wecan.com/ in case some of the questions we are asking have already been answered.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:33 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
Importance: High

I think it looks good Ben and Fran. Just a couple of comments for consideration:

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Non-technical: Be consistent in the acronyms for the academies (CAMS left out)
Last line of penultimate paragraph of letter body ("follow-on")

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Use what's useful, dave

On Apr 16, 2020, at 11:38 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

<Draft Letter to CCDC CAS re virtural dialgoue Griffin and Hamburg April 16 2020 v2.docx>

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008397

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 1:28 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong;Rusek, Benjamin;'Dave Franz'
Cc: Sharples, Fran;Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue

We may wish to have the most senior person possible from the NASEM to sign the letter given the sensitivity of the situation.

Jim

From: Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:17 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; 'Dave Franz' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue

Hi Ben and all,
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Zhengli Shi called me this morning. As a scientist, she looks forward to this type of communication/conference.
Cheers, Pei-Yong

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:13 PM
To: 'Dave Franz' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
Importance: High

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Also I asked Fran to take a look at the Chinese portal https://covid19.21wecan.com/ in case some of the questions we are asking have already been answered.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008921

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:33 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
Importance: High

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David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008922

From: Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 1:37 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Shi, Pei yong;Rusek, Benjamin;'Dave Franz'
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: Re: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue

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I would think Diane and Peggy fit that description.

Fran Sharples, PhD
Board on Life Sciences
National Academy of Sciences

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 2:28 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong; Rusek, Benjamin; 'Dave Franz'
Cc: Sharples, Fran; Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue

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Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:17 PM
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Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
Importance: High

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:33 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008392

David R. Franz

(b)(6)

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 1:40 PM
To: Sharples, Fran;Shi, Pei yong;Rusek, Benjamin;'Dave Franz'
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue

Pei-Yong, thoughts?

From: Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 1:37 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; 'Dave Franz' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Fran Sharples, PhD
Board on Life Sciences
National Academy of Sciences

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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To: Shi, Pei yong; Rusek, Benjamin; 'Dave Franz'
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008918

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:13 PM
To: 'Dave Franz' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Draft letter proposing virtual China bio dialogue
Importance: High

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Use what's useful, dave

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008919

On Apr 16, 2020, at 11:38 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

<Draft Letter to CCDC CAS re virtural dialgoue Griffin and Hamburg April 16 2020 v2.docx>

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008920

From: Yin (Whitney), Yuhui W.
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 5:20 PM
To: Smith, Thomas;Lee, James C.
Subject: Re: From WP

Almost exactly the same news were circulating furiously in Chinese social media when I was there in January, but the government insisted that the outbreak came from the Seafood Market. They went as far as passing a law in hasty to ban people from eating the wild animals! W.H.O was either naive or co-consperitors by claiming no obvious people-people transmission when Wuhan and the whole country was lockdown. Either the news was leaked out by the Americans or an insider of WIV leaked the info.

Whitney Yin, MD., Ph.D
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
BSB 3.110
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX77555
Tel: 409-772-9631
Email: ywyin@utmb.edu

From: Smith, Thomas <thosmith@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 7:45 PM
To: Yin (Whitney), Yuhui W. <ywyin@UTMB.EDU>; Lee, James C. <jclee@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: From WP

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

Full coverage of the coronavirus pandemic

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

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Sign up for our Coronavirus Updates newsletter to track the outbreak. All stories linked in the newsletter are free to access.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."
The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

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a one to two page briefing of the history of the GNL its the international reputation. Much of what you and Jim shared on the zoom call yesterday

The Galveston National Laboratory held its grand opening in November, 2008, shortly after Hurricane Ike, but fortunately the laboratory withstood the storm with no damage. The cost of constructions was approximately $175 million, with about two-thirds provided by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the remainder from the State of Texas, augmented with philanthropic donations. We have been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010 and we routinely handle virtually all dangerous pathogens. Some of our past accomplishments include contributing significantly to the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized.

We benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through the visionary support provided by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who was able to establish two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This center provided intense, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a WHO sponsored meeting in December, 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories were presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, we began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. Funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ran out in 2016, and by that time we had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from about 70 different countries (Connie, please confirm this number). Training was provided here at UTMB as well as at the host laboratory in country where we could reach a greater number of individuals and provide a learning experience for them within their own familiar laboratory setting.

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training here at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the full nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This

includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) Both of these young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty members and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. This second goal has significant security implications. Through our collaborations we have built solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings alternate between the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September, 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January, 2017. Importantly, during each of these meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zheng-Li Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and she is the one who discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues and in every session she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with an American scientist, but I do not have details and it is not someone from UTMB.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature given its high similarity to other know bat-associated coronaviruses.

I have visited the new BSL4 laboratory and toured it fully prior to it starting operations in 2017 or 2018. The facility was built in partnership with the French and is modeled after their BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

I do not know where Dr Shi has conducted her research on bat-associated coronaviruses; however, it clearly was not in the new BSL4 facility since it only began operations in 2017 or 2018 and she had been working on these viruses well prior to our first official dialogue meeting

in 2015 when she reported her findings. I suspect that she was using BSL3 facilities on the main WIV campus, but I do not know that for sure.

Bat-associated coronaviruses are difficult to grow in the laboratory in general, although the current pandemic SARS-2 virus does grow well in cell culture. I do not know how much of Dr Shi's work involved handling live virus or work in experimental animals.

I have been told by colleagues that Dr Shi swears that she did not have the new coronavirus in her laboratory prior to the start of the pandemic.

Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publically. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

A recent article in the South China Morning Post indicates that the first cases of the COVID-19 were identified in Hubei Province in mid-November, 2019.

(https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2020 7:41 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: wsj

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

PS....this new interview in China seems to make reference to you. https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1251435120281542656

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 9:41 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

Jim
I'm having no luck tracking down that presentation that Shi Zhengli made by searching US and China sources, or contacting the organizers.

Have you spent much time with her? We are trying to write a profile on her and it would be beneficial to hear from you. I'm more interested in her contribution to the science of bats and coronavirus. (That might not be your specialty area.) I wonder if you saw her in Wuhan in her lab and what you might have observed, including live animals she might have kept.
If you have views on safety lapses I am definitely interested in that too. But finding those isn't really my primary goal.

Separately, there are reports about U.S. government funding that made its way to Wuhan Institute of Viriology, apparently some of it through Galveston. Is there something you can tell me about that such as amounts and time period and goals? Perhaps it was related to the two researchers from the institute your group trained and/or trips made to the institute by your team.

Can we speak today?

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal
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(b)(6)
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:50 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

She gave the presentation.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 14, 2020, at 4:48 PM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

James T. Areddy

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[redacted]
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

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On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

Zheng Li has been working on bat-associated coronaviruses since just after the original SARS outbreak in 2003. For at least the last 5 years she has been reporting the bat-associated coronaviruses may have the ability to infect humans and that we should be watching for their possible emergence as human activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM

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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

It's really fascinating. Here's an interview with the reporter on that story where he describes how the State Dept was concerned two years ago about procedures in Wuhan early on. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgnT2YK3BBI&feature=youtu.be He calls the link between the lab and the outbreak as a 'circumstantial' case. But do you know if Shi Zhengli's focus on bat coronavirus was a worry back a few years ago?

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal

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



On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 11:09 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

James,

Thank you for sharing the report below. I had not seen this previously and I find it quite interesting, especially the comment about our laboratory working to help train scientists and building engineers from the new BSL4 laboratory. We clearly recognized this need but unfortunately, were unable to identify funding to support our efforts. I do believe that between our efforts on a lab-to-lab basis and the overarching dialogue maintained by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have had a positive impact, although admittedly limited.

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I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

Director

Galveston National Laboratory

University of Texas Medical Branch

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

Hi. We spoke several weeks ago when I did a story for The Wall Street Journal about BSL-4 labs. Since then the Washington Post has had two stories suggesting

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fears in USA that there could have been an accident in Wuhan. I'm curious to know what you think about these reports?

(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)

<image001.jpg>

Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan **lab** studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the **lab**, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan **lab** was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But

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Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

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"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.
There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with

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samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

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The Galveston National Laboratory held its grand opening in November, 2008, shortly after Hurricane Ike; fortunately, the laboratory withstood the storm with no damage. The cost of constructions was approximately $175 million, with about two-thirds provided by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the remainder from the State of Texas, augmented with philanthropic donations. We have been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010 and we routinely handle virtually all dangerous pathogens. Some of our past accomplishments include contributing significantly to the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized.

We benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through the visionary support provided by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who was able to establish two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This center provided intense, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a WHO sponsored meeting in December, 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories were presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, we began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. Funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time we had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from about 70 different countries (Connie, please confirm this number). Training was provided at UTMB as well as at the host laboratory in country where we could reach a greater number of individuals and provide a learning experience for them within their own familiar laboratory setting.

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the WIV, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored

work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) Both of these young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain in contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity, as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. Through our collaborations we have built solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine working in together with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings have been held in both the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January, 2017. Importantly, during each of these meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zheng-Li Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and her team discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues and in every session she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with an American scientist, but I do not have details and it is not someone from UTMB.

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Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publically. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

A recent article in the South China Morning Post indicates that the first cases of the COVID-19 were identified in Hubei Province in mid-November, 2019.

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A second area of engagement has been an ongoing dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine working in together with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings have been held in both the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January, 2017. Importantly, during each of these meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zheng-Li Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and her team discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues and in every session she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with an American scientist, but I do not have details and it is not someone from UTMB.

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(https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back

a one to two page briefing of the history of the GNL its the international reputation. Much of what you and Jim shared on the zoom call yesterday

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Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, we began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. Funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time we had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from about 70 different countries (Connie, please confirm this number). Training was provided at UTMB as well as at the host laboratory in country where we could reach a greater number of individuals and provide a learning experience for them within their own familiar laboratory setting.

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

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Commented [SPy1]: Her recent Nature paper clearly shows her team is handling virus and patient specimens, She is also surveying pets for SARS-CoV-2 infections

utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Introduction

The Galveston National Laboratory held its grand opening in November 2008, shortly after Hurricane Ike, but fortunately the laboratory withstood the storm with no damage. The cost of construction was approximately $175 million, with about two-thirds provided by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the remainder from the State of Texas, augmented with philanthropic donations. We have been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010 and our faculty are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. Some of our past accomplishments include contributing significantly to the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized and have had successful research programs for both SARS and MERS coronaviruses led by several members of our faculty.

The GNL Training Mission

We benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through the visionary support provided by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who was able to establish two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This center provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a WHO sponsored meeting in December 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories were presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

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Training Support for China

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In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the full nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) Both of these young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty members and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. This second goal has significant security implications. Through our collaborations we have built both professional relationships and solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing scientific dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings alternate between the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January of 2017.

Specific Coronavirus Discussions

Importantly, during each of these NAS/CAS meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zheng-Li Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and she is the one

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From: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:34 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Erdman Dean;Murphy, Frederick A.;LeDuc, James W.;Denison Mark;Shi, Pei yong;Rollin Pierre;Tesh Robert;Tseng, Chien-Te K.;Menachery, Vineet;Folks Thomas;Calisher Charles;Nichol Stuart;Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED);Franz David
Subject: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-latest-news/?p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098&tid=a_classic-iphone&no_nav=true#link-RTFRG73KVJAFXKAH6FQC7XQZ3M

1:19 a.m.

Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus



This photo taken on February 23, 2017 shows Chinese virologist Shi Zhengli inside the P4 laboratory in Wuhan, capital of China's Hubei province. (Johannes Eisele/Afp Via Getty Images)

The director of the research unit at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in the Chinese city at the center of the coronavirus outbreak, has rejected the "conspiracy theory" that the virus originated in his lab. In his first public remarks since the world became aware of the virus in January, Yuan Zhiming said that it was "impossible" that the virus began in his lab.

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"As people who carry out viral studies, we clearly know what kind of research is going on at the institute and how the institute manages viruses and samples," he told CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster's international arm. "As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us. We have a strict regulatory regimen and we have a code of conduct for research, so we are confident of that."

Yuan heads the top-security-level P4 lab at the Wuhan institute, which 2018 become the first lab in Asia equipped to handle "Class 4" pathogens like Ebola.

Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin last week wrote that American officials were expressing concerns about inadequate safety at the lab as far back as January 2018.

Shi Zhengli, a scientist at the institute known for her work on viruses that stem from bats, as this new coronavirus is thought too, also initially wondered if it had escaped from the lab.

If coronaviruses were the culprit, "could they have come from our lab?" she recalled thinking in an interview with Scientific American. (She concluded it had not.)

Conspiracy theories about the virus's origins have been rife, and have moved into official spheres. After President Trump repeatedly called the coronavirus the "Chinese virus," Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian suggested that the pathogen could have been planted in Wuhan by American soldiers who attended the World Military Games, held in the city last October.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009729

From: Dean Erdman (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 9:29 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

SARS-CoV was from a natural source. MERS-CoV was from a natural source. SARS-CoV-2 was from a natural source. SARS-CoV-X will be from a natural source.

On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 2:34 AM Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@utmb.edu> wrote:

> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-latest-news/?p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098&tid=a_classic-iphone&no_nav=true#link-RTFRG73KVJAFXKAH6FQC7XQZ3M
>
> **1:19 a.m.**
>
> **Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus**

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

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Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043825

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 10:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

I apologise for contacting you on a Sunday, but I wanted to double-check my notes.

Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

"I **can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."**

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
Dr. Le Duc has given me permission to quote his words and use his name.

WIV (Wuhan Institute of Virology) has been in place for years.
Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

I have maintained a training center in biosecurity at Galveston National Lab since 2008… through that training center we have had trainees (10,000) from all over the world including several individuals from China.

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I initiated contact w/BSL-4 labs internationally — I wanted to make sure we were sharing out experiences.

One unique things has been building the facilities - really you need hands-on training - you can't read the manual. It has to be hands-on training.

WIV was built by the French from Lyon - it was also designed by the French.

I have seen the BSL4 facility at WIV - It is a very high quality facility.

The BSL-4 lab at WIV only opened in 2017 or 2018 - they had been publishing high-quality studies on bat coronaviruses for years before that.
(*Amy note: according to CDC, WIV was certified BSL4 in 2017:* https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/5/18-0220_article)

As part of the training activities we have here at the Galveston National Lab, we have post doctoral fellows (people who have achieved their PhD and are gaining experience and getting published before taking a long-term position at a university or other research center) come here to work.
The training to work in BSL4 takes a long time - 100 hours — and is intensive. Both of the scientists from WIV who have spent time here generated high-quality research papers during their time here. So I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at that facility (WIV).

-over the past 5 years, our laboratory has participated with Chinese scientists working in bio containment
Sept 2015 was 1st meeting…
There have been several meetings… at each session we have talked about Coronaviruses

In 2015 dr Shi Zhengli gave a presentation re bat viruses - and warned that there was a potential for a reoccurrence of SARS-like viruses
She has been talking about this for 4 years. (*Amy note: so from before the BSL4 lab was up and running*)

*There are 2 physical labs of WIV. One downtown and a new facility 45 minute drive out of town, where the BSL4 lab is.

Regarding the association between the current coronavirus outbreak with the Wuhan Institute of Virology… i don't have a good answer there. I have a terrific amount of confidence in D. Shi Zhengli's work… she is absolutely certain that the virus did not originate in her lab.

The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan… it is coincidental that it started in the preeminent place that studies bat coronaviruses and it raises eyebrows… i can understand that

Interesting to see in the South China Morning Post that they point to 17 cases in Hubei… which backs up the timeline of cases by 2 weeks or longer…

You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News

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mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: jwleduc@UTMB.EDU
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:25 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: Fwd: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

Please see quotes below from interview Friday evening. Will likely be on NBC tomorrow. I declined an on camera interview. Need response asap. Thanks

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** "Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal)" <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
> **Date:** April 19, 2020 at 10:22:46 AM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?**

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Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

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"I **can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."**

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Director, Galveston National Laboratory

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Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
Dr. Le Duc has given me permission to quote his words and use his name.

WIV (Wuhan Institute of Virology) has been in place for years.
Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

I have maintained a training center in biosecurity at Galveston National Lab since 2008… through that training center we have had trainees (10,000) from all over the world including several individuals from China.

I initiated contact w/BSL-4 labs internationally — I wanted to make sure we were sharing out experiences.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002479

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You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002480

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:25 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: Fwd: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

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Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002634

From: Dean Erdman (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:25 PM
To: calisher, C (calisher@cybersafe.net)
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Murphy, Frederick A.;LeDuc, James W.;Denison Mark;Shi, Pei yong;Rollin Pierre;Tesh Robert;Tseng, Chien-Te K.;Menachery, Vineet;Folks Thomas;Nichol Stuart;Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED);Franz David
Subject: Re: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

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SA

On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 12:38 PM <calisher@cybersafe.net> wrote:

> The photo looks fake.
>
> I do not see how anyone could definitively state that the virus could not possibly have come from that lab. An incidental/accidental error infecting a lab worker who subsequently and asymptomatically shed virus could have occurred. I'm not suggesting that it did occur, only that it is possible.
>
> Charlie
>
> ---
>
> **From:** Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:34 AM
> **To:** Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Erdman Dean (b)(6) Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Denison Mark <mark.denison@vanderbilt.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Rollin Pierre (b)(6) Tesh Robert (b)(6) Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Folks Thomas (b)(6) Calisher Charles <calisher@cybersafe.net>; Nichol Stuart <stn1@CDC.GOV>; Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED) <ccs8@cdc.gov>; Franz David <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
> **Subject:** Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus
>
> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-latest-news/?p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098&tid=a_classic-iphone&no_nav=true#link-RTFRG73KVJAFXKAH6FQC7XQZ3M

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

1:19 a.m.

Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus



This photo taken on February 23, 2017 shows Chinese virologist Shi Zhengli inside the P4 laboratory in Wuhan, capital of China's Hubei province. (Johannes Eisele/Afp Via Getty Images)

The director of the research unit at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in the Chinese city at the center of the coronavirus outbreak, has rejected the "conspiracy theory" that the virus originated in his lab. In his first public remarks since the world became aware of the virus in January, Yuan Zhiming said that it was "impossible" that the virus began in his lab.

"As people who carry out viral studies, we clearly know what kind of research is going on at the institute and how the institute manages viruses and samples," he told CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster's international arm. "As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us. We have a strict regulatory regimen and we have a code of conduct for research, so we are confident of that."

Yuan heads the top-security-level P4 lab at the Wuhan institute, which 2018 become the first lab in Asia equipped to handle "Class 4" pathogens like Ebola.

Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin last week wrote that American officials were expressing concerns about inadequate safety at the lab as far back as January 2018.

Shi Zhengli, a scientist at the institute known for her work on viruses that stem from bats, as this new coronavirus is thought too, also initially wondered if it had escaped from the lab.

If coronaviruses were the culprit, "could they have come from our lab?" she recalled thinking in an interview with Scientific American. (She concluded it had not.)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009724

Conspiracy theories about the virus's origins have been rife, and have moved into official spheres. After President Trump repeatedly called the coronavirus the "Chinese virus," Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian suggested that the pathogen could have been planted in Wuhan by American soldiers who attended the World Military Games, held in the city last October.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009725

From: calisher@cybersafe.net
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:30 PM
To: 'Dean Erdman'
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Murphy, Frederick A.;LeDuc, James W.;'Denison Mark';Shi, Pei yong;'Rollin Pierre';'Tesh Robert';Tseng, Chien-Te K.;Menachery, Vineet;'Folks Thomas';'Nichol Stuart';'Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED)';'Franz David'
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SA = ?

Sinoatrial?

Sexaholics Anonymous?

Sturmabteilung?

Samurai Attack?

Charlie

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To: calisher, C (calisher@cybersafe.net) <calisher@cybersafe.net>
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@utmb.edu>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@utmb.edu>; Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@utmb.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Denison Mark <mark.denison@vanderbilt.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@utmb.edu>; Rollin Pierre (b)(6) Tesh Robert (b)(6) Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@utmb.edu>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@utmb.edu>; Folks Thomas (b)(6) Nichol Stuart <stn1@cdc.gov>; Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED) <ccs8@cdc.gov>; Franz David <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-latest-news/?p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098&tid=a_classic-iphone&no_nav=true#link-RTFRG73KVJAFXKAH6FQC7XQZ3M

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

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Tom Ksiazek

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009721

Sent from a portable device

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009722

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:53 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen;Raimer, Ben G.
Subject: Re: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

Good afternoon,

The first quote is better. I'm glad she gave you an option.

We can expect that many other news agencies will want to speak to you after NBC broadcasts its report.

Thank you Dr. LeDuc. I hope this part of pandemic story starts to die down. We'll see, there are a lot moving parts.

Best,

Raul
Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002532

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Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002533

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002534

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:56 PM
To: 石正丽;Yuan Zhiming
Cc: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: RE: 回复: RE: Fwd: Rubio

Thank you Zhengli and Zhiming for your comments and the reference publications. I did not receive the document I sent for your review so if you made comments on that, please resend. I'm afraid that this discussion will continue for some time regarding where early coronavirus work was being done, the role, if any, of the Wuhan CDC in research on bat-associated coronaviruses, and exactly when scientists at WIV first became aware of the new coronavirus and had possession of specimens in the WIV and where was that work done (level of biocontainment). Next week will be busy…

Best wishes, Jim

From: 石正丽 <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2020 11:30 PM
To: Yuan Zhiming <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: 回复: RE: Fwd: Rubio

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Dear James,

Thank you for your clarifying.

I've added some detailed information for your reference. I'm also sending you some papers published for your reference.

Best regards,

Zhengli,

-----原始邮件-----
发件人:"Yuan Zhiming" <yzm@wh.iov.cn>
发送时间:2020-04-19 10:55:33 (星期日)
收件人: "James LeDuc" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, zlshi <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

抄送: "Shi Peiyong" <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
主题: 回复: RE: Fwd: Rubio

Dear Jim,

Thanks for your informaiton. I really appreciate your help and your action, we need to let some people understand well the the mission of high-level biosafey lab. what we do, and how we do inside. We all know that the labs were built not for causing epidmic, but for proventing the epidemic, and the labs are managed according to interantional guildline and national accquirement, Wuhan's lab is among the others.

I will contact Zhengli to see what she can do for your report.

Regards

Zhiming

==========
Yuan Zhiming, Ph. D.
Professor of Wuhan Institute of Virology
President of Wuhan Branch
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Wuhan 430071, China
Tel: 86-27-87198195(O)
86-27-87197242(L)
Fax: 86-27-87199480
==========

From: LeDuc, James W.
Date: 2020-04-19 00:44
To: 石正丽
CC: Shi, Pei yong; Yuan Zhiming
Subject: RE: Fwd: Rubio
Dear Zhengli,

Thank you for your response. I understand completely and I certainly do not wish to compromise you personally or your research activities. Given our long history of collaborations between the GNL and the WIV, I have been approached repeatedly for details on our work. Attached is a draft summary that I will be providing to the leadership of our University of Texas system and likely to Congressional committees that are being formed now. Please review carefully and make any changes that you would like. I want this to be as accurate as possible and I certainly do not want to misrepresent any of your valuable contributions. I need to submit this on Monday, 20 April, so your prompt reply would be very much appreciated. I have copied Zhiming for his comments as well.

With best wishes,

Jim

From: 石正丽 <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>
Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2020 9:20 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Fwd: Rubio

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008966

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear James,

Thank you for your email and consideration our communication.

Due to the complicated situation, I don't think it's a right time to communicate by the call.

What I can tell you is that this virus is not a leaky from our lab or any other labs.It's a shame to make this scientific question so complicated.

I hope to talk with you whenever the COVID-19 is over and world is calme and believe in the science.

Best regards,

Zhengli,

-----原始邮件-----

发件人:"LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>

发送时间:2020-04-17 11:06:38 (星期五)

收件人: "zengli Shi" <zlshi@wh.iov.cn>

抄送:

主题: Fwd: Rubio

Hi Zheng-Li. I hope you are well as surviving all the COVID19 drama. I wonder if you would have time for a phone call sometime soon. Let me know a good number and time and I'll call. The email below is relevant.

I will certainly understand if you are not available but Pei-Yong keeps encouraging me to call.

With all good wishes.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008967

Jim.

My office line is 1 409 266 6516 or cell is (b)(6) if it's easier for you to call me.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Date: April 16, 2020 at 8:04:55 PM CDT
To: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Rubio

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I heard from someone in government this evening that Senator Rubio is starting to push for AN investigation regarding Wuhan lab. Just found it on the web at Forbes by Kenneth Repoza. Title of article is "eight senators call for investigation into coronavirus origins"

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:56 PM
To: Reyes, Raul;LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Campbell, Stephen;Raimer, Ben G.
Subject: RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

I agree the first quote is better.

Happy Sunday!

CH

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:53 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

Good afternoon,

The first quote is better. I'm glad she gave you an option.

We can expect that many other news agencies will want to speak to you after NBC broadcasts its report.

Thank you Dr. LeDuc. I hope this part of pandemic story starts to die down. We'll see, there are a lot moving parts.

Best,

Raul
Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

> On Apr 19, 2020, at 12:24 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> Please see quotes below from interview Friday evening. Will likely be on NBC tomorrow. I declined an on camera interview. Need response asap. Thanks
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > **From:** "Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal)" <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
> > **Date:** April 19, 2020 at 10:22:46 AM CDT
> > **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002527

Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

I apologise for contacting you on a Sunday, but I wanted to double-check my notes.

Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

"I **can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."**

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
Dr. Le Duc has given me permission to quote his words and use his name.

WIV (Wuhan Institute of Virology) has been in place for years.
Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

I have maintained a training center in biosecurity at Galveston National Lab since 2008… through that training center we have had trainees (10,000) from all over the world including several individuals from China.

I initiated contact w/BSL-4 labs internationally — I wanted to make sure we were sharing out experiences.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

One unique things has been building the facilities - really you need hands-on training - you can't read the manual. It has to be hands-on training.

WIV was built by the French from Lyon - it was also designed by the French.

I have seen the BSL4 facility at WIV - It is a very high quality facility.

The BSL-4 lab at WIV only opened in 2017 or 2018 - they had been publishing high-quality studies on bat coronaviruses for years before that.
(*Amy note: according to CDC, WIV was certified BSL4 in 2017:* https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/5/18-0220_article)

As part of the training activities we have here at the Galveston National Lab, we have post doctoral fellows (people who have achieved their PhD and are gaining experience and getting published before taking a long-term position at a university or other research center) come here to work.
The training to work in BSL4 takes a long time - 100 hours — and is intensive. Both of the scientists from WIV who have spent time here generated high-quality research papers during their time here. So I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at that facility (WIV).

-over the past 5 years, our laboratory has participated with Chinese scientists working in bio containment
Sept 2015 was 1st meeting…
There have been several meetings… at each session we have talked about Coronaviruses

In 2015 dr Shi Zhengli gave a presentation re bat viruses - and warned that there was a potential for a reoccurrence of SARS-like viruses
She has been talking about this for 4 years. (*Amy note: so from before the BSL4 lab was up and running*)

*There are 2 physical labs of WIV. One downtown and a new facility 45 minute drive out of town, where the BSL4 lab is.

Regarding the association between the current coronavirus outbreak with the Wuhan Institute of Virology… i don't have a good answer there. I have a terrific amount of confidence in D. Shi Zhengli's work… she is absolutely certain that the virus did not originate in her lab.

The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan… it is coincidental that it started in the preeminent place that studies bat coronaviruses and it raises eyebrows… i can understand that

Interesting to see in the South China Morning Post that they point to 17 cases in Hubei… which backs up the timeline of cases by 2 weeks or longer…

You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002529

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Dean Erdman (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:13 PM
To: calisher, C (calisher@cybersafe.net)
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Murphy, Frederick A.;LeDuc, James W.;Denison Mark;Shi, Pei yong;Rollin Pierre;Tesh Robert;Tseng, Chien-Te K.;Menachery, Vineet;Folks Thomas;Nichol Stuart;Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED);Franz David
Subject: Re: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

We have a case study of a real lab release of SARS-CoV in China in 2004. How did the Chinese government respond to that incident? Covered it up or reported it to WHO? https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/02/content_344755.htm

On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 12:38 PM <calisher@cybersafe.net> wrote:

> The photo looks fake.
>
> I do not see how anyone could definitively state that the virus could not possibly have come from that lab. An incidental/accidental error infecting a lab worker who subsequently and asymptomatically shed virus could have occurred. I'm not suggesting that it did occur, only that it is possible.
>
> Charlie

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:34 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Erdman Dean (b)(6) Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Denison Mark <mark.denison@vanderbilt.edu>; Shi, Pei yong

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

<peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Rollin Pierre (b)(6) Tesh Robert (b)(6)
Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Folks Thomas (b)(6) Calisher Charles <calisher@cybersafe.net>; Nichol Stuart <stn1@CDC.GOV>; Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED) <ccs8@cdc.gov>; Franz David <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-latest-news/?p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098&tid=a_classic-iphone&no_nav=true#link-RTFRG73KVJAFXKAH6FQC7XQZ3M

1:19 a.m.

Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus



This photo taken on February 23, 2017 shows Chinese virologist Shi Zhengli inside the P4 laboratory in Wuhan, capital of China's Hubei province. (Johannes Eisele/Afp Via Getty Images)

The director of the research unit at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in the Chinese city at the center of the coronavirus outbreak, has rejected the "conspiracy theory" that the virus originated in his lab. In his first public remarks since the world became aware of the virus in January, Yuan Zhiming said that it was "impossible" that the virus began in his lab.
"As people who carry out viral studies, we clearly know what kind of research is going on at the institute and how the institute manages viruses and samples," he told CGTN, the Chinese state

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broadcaster's international arm. "As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us. We have a strict regulatory regimen and we have a code of conduct for research, so we are confident of that."

Yuan heads the top-security-level P4 lab at the Wuhan institute, which 2018 become the first lab in Asia equipped to handle "Class 4" pathogens like Ebola.

Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin last week wrote that American officials were expressing concerns about inadequate safety at the lab as far back as January 2018.

Shi Zhengli, a scientist at the institute known for her work on viruses that stem from bats, as this new coronavirus is thought too, also initially wondered if it had escaped from the lab.

If coronaviruses were the culprit, "could they have come from our lab?" she recalled thinking in an interview with Scientific American. (She concluded it had not.)

Conspiracy theories about the virus's origins have been rife, and have moved into official spheres. After President Trump repeatedly called the coronavirus the "Chinese virus," Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian suggested that the pathogen could have been planted in Wuhan by American soldiers who attended the World Military Games, held in the city last October.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009718

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:13 PM
To: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal)
Subject: RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?
Attachments: 2013 Ge XY Nature-Isolation and characterization of a bat SARS-like coronavirus.pdf

Hi Amy,

Thank you for the opportunity to review the quotes you plan to use. I prefer the first quote if possible. There are a few areas in your notes that should be corrected if you plan on more detailed reporting—see below in red. The attached publication just documents that Dr She (last author) and her colleagues from different countries were noting that these bat-associated coronaviruses had characteristics that might allow them to be transmitted to humans.

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
(p) 409-266-6500
(p) 409-266-6516 direct
(m) (b)(6)

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 10:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

I apologise for contacting you on a Sunday, but I wanted to double-check my notes.

Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

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"I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
Dr. Le Duc has given me permission to quote his words and use his name.

WIV (Wuhan Institute of Virology) has been in place for years.
Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

I have maintained a training center in biosecurity at Galveston National Lab since 2008… through that training center we have had trainees (10,000) from all over the world including several individuals from China.

I initiated contact w/BSL-4 labs internationally — I wanted to make sure we were sharing our experiences.

One unique things has been building the facilities operations and maintenance - really you need hands-on training - you can't read the manual. It has to be hands-on training.

WIV was built by the French based on a model of the existing BSL4 laboratory Lyon that has been in operations for many years (>20 yrs) - it was also designed by the French.

I have seen the BSL4 facility at WIV - It is a very high quality facility.

The BSL-4 lab at WIV only opened in 2017 or 2018 - they had been publishing high-quality studies on bat coronaviruses for years before that.
(*Amy note: according to CDC, WIV was certified BSL4 in 2017:* https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/5/18-0220_article)

As part of the training activities we have here at the Galveston National Lab, we have post doctoral fellows (people who have achieved their PhD and are gaining experience and getting published before taking a long-term position at a university or other research center) come here to work.
The training to work in BSL4 takes a long time – nearly a year, including at least 100 hours of mentored training done at the side of highly experienced investigators — and is intensive. Both of the scientists from WIV who have spent time here generated high-quality research papers during their time here. So I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at that facility (WIV).

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-over the past 5 years, our laboratory has participated with Chinese scientists working in bio containment dialogue jointly sponsored by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Sept 2015 was 1st meeting…
There have been several meetings… at each session we have talked about Coronaviruses

In 2015 dr Shi Zhengli gave a presentation re bat viruses - and warned that there was a potential for a reoccurrence of SARS-like viruses
She has been talking about this for well over 4 years. (*Amy note: so from before the BSL4 lab was up and running*)—See attached scientific publication that reports this in 2013.

*There are 2 physical labs of WIV. One downtown and a new facility 45 minute drive out of town, where the BSL4 lab is.

Regarding the association between the current coronavirus outbreak with the Wuhan Institute of Virology… i don't have a good answer there. I have a terrific amount of confidence in D. Shi Zhengli's work as a scientist… she is absolutely certain that the virus did not originate in her lab.

The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan… it is coincidental that it started in the preeminent place that studies bat coronaviruses and it raises eyebrows… i can understand that

Interesting to see in the South China Morning Post that they point to 17 cases in Hubei… which backs up the timeline of cases by 2 weeks or longer…

You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002615

Sent: 4/19/2020 1:13:28 PM
To: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) [Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com]
Subject: RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?
Attachments: 2013 Ge XY Nature-Isolation and characterization of a bat SARS-like coronavirus.pdf

Hi Amy,

Thank you for the opportunity to review the quotes you plan to use. I prefer the first quote if possible. There are a few areas in your notes that should be corrected if you plan on more detailed reporting—see below in red.

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
(p) 409-266-6500
(p) 409-266-6516 direct
(m) (b)(6)

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 10:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

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Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

I apologise for contacting you on a Sunday, but I wanted to double-check my notes.

Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

"I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
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As part of the training activities we have here at the Galveston National Lab, we have post doctoral fellows (people who have achieved their PhD and are gaining experience and getting published before taking a long-term position at a university or other research center) come here to work.
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You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

From: Tseng, Chien-Te K. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=11E60213FE704E0EAEA1F9129736E010-TSENG, CHIE]
Sent: 4/19/2020 1:21:29 PM
To: Tseng, Lily [LTSENG@houstonisd.org]; Jennifer Yarbrough (b)(6) Monica Tseng (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

Accidently escape from the P4 lab at Wuhan Institute of Virology is more and more likely. This is considered the conservative side of response from my end. It could be much worse…

From: Dean Erdman (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:13 PM
To: calisher, C (calisher@cybersafe.net) <calisher@cybersafe.net>
Cc: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Denison Mark <mark.denison@vanderbilt.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Rollin Pierre (b)(6) Tesh Robert (b)(6) Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Folks Thomas (b)(6) Nichol Stuart <stn1@cdc.gov>; Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED) <ccs8@cdc.gov>; Franz David <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

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We have a case study of a real lab release of SARS-CoV in China in 2004. How did the Chinese government respond to that incident?
Covered it up or reported it to WHO? https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/02/content_344755.htm

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>
> I do not see how anyone could definitively state that the virus could not possibly have come from that lab. An incidental/accidental error infecting a lab worker who subsequently and asymptomatically shed virus could have occurred. I'm not suggesting that it did occur, only that it is possible.
>
> Charlie

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:34 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Erdman Dean

(b)(6) Murphy, Frederick A. <famurphy@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Denison Mark <mark.denison@vanderbilt.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Rollin Pierre (b)(6) Tesh Robert (b)(6) Tseng, Chien-Te K. <sktseng@UTMB.EDU>; Menachery, Vineet <vimenach@UTMB.EDU>; Folks Thomas (b)(6) Calisher Charles <calisher@cybersafe.net>; Nichol Stuart <stn1@CDC.GOV>; Spiropoulou Christina (CDC/CCID/NCZVED) <ccs8@cdc.gov>; Franz David <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-latest-news/?p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098&tid=a_classic-iphone&no_nav=true#link-RTFRG73KVJAFXKAH6FQC7XQZ3M

1:19 a.m.

Director of maximum-security Wuhan lab denies being source of coronavirus

This photo taken on February 23, 2017 shows Chinese virologist Shi Zhengli inside the P4 laboratory in Wuhan, capital of China's Hubei province. (Johannes Eisele/Afp Via Getty Images)

The director of the research unit at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in the Chinese city at the center of the coronavirus outbreak, has rejected the "conspiracy theory" that the virus originated in his lab. In his first public remarks since the world became aware of the virus in January, Yuan Zhiming said that it was "impossible" that the virus began in his lab.

"As people who carry out viral studies, we clearly know what kind of research is going on at the institute and how the institute manages viruses and samples," he told CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster's international arm. "As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us. We have a strict regulatory regimen and we have a code of conduct for research, so we are confident of that."

Yuan heads the top-security-level P4 lab at the Wuhan institute, which 2018 become the first lab in Asia equipped to handle "Class 4" pathogens like Ebola.
Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin last week wrote that American officials were expressing concerns about inadequate safety at the lab as far back as January 2018.
Shi Zhengli, a scientist at the institute known for her work on viruses that stem from bats, as this new coronavirus is thought too, also initially wondered if it had escaped from the lab.
If coronaviruses were the culprit, "could they have come from our lab?" she recalled thinking in an interview with Scientific American. (She concluded it had not.)
Conspiracy theories about the virus's origins have been rife, and have moved into official spheres. After President Trump repeatedly called the coronavirus the "Chinese virus," Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian suggested that the pathogen could have been planted in Wuhan by American soldiers who attended the World Military Games, held in the city last October.

Tom Ksiazek

Sent from a portable device

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:25 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi – Great, thanks for getting back to me during your weekend and taking the time to look through the notes so thoroughly!

Do you have a headshot handy that I can put up next to your statement? Or a photo of you at WIV?

Thanks again!
Best,
Amy
Mobile (b)(6)

From: LeDuc, James W. [mailto:jwleduc@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 7:13 PM
To: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

Hi Amy,

Thank you for the opportunity to review the quotes you plan to use. I prefer the first quote if possible. There are a few areas in your notes that should be corrected if you plan on more detailed reporting—see below in red. The attached publication just documents that Dr She (last author) and her colleagues from different countries were noting that these bat-associated coronaviruses had characteristics that might allow them to be transmitted to humans.

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
(p) 409-266-6500
(p) 409-266-6516 direct
(m) (b)(6)

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 10:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

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Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

I apologise for contacting you on a Sunday, but I wanted to double-check my notes.

Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

"I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
Dr. Le Duc has given me permission to quote his words and use his name.

WIV (Wuhan Institute of Virology) has been in place for years.
Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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*There are 2 physical labs of WIV. One downtown and a new facility 45 minute drive out of town, where the BSL4 lab is.

Regarding the association between the current coronavirus outbreak with the Wuhan Institute of Virology… i don't have a good answer there. I have a terrific amount of confidence in D. Shi Zhengli's work as a scientist… she is absolutely certain that the virus did not originate in her lab.

The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan… it is coincidental that it started in the preeminent place that studies bat coronaviruses and it raises eyebrows… i can understand that

Interesting to see in the South China Morning Post that they point to 17 cases in Hubei… which backs up the timeline of cases by 2 weeks or longer…

You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002524

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:31 PM
To: Eliza Barclay
Subject: RE: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology
Attachments: 2013 Ge XY Nature-Isolation and characterization of a bat SARS-like coronavirus.pdf

Hi Eliza,

In answer to your questions, I do not know if they were doing gain of function studies with bat-associated coronaviruses in Wuhan. The attached publication from 2013 attests to the longstanding program of research on this group of viruses in Wuhan with international collaborators.

Regarding the second question, I don't think that anyone can definitively state with certainty that the virus did not come from a laboratory, especially with the high rate of asymptomatic infections. **The key question for the Wuhan Institute of Virology is when they first obtained this specific virus, and so far I am unaware of the answer to this question. It could not have originated from their lab if they did not have it in their possession.** I like to think that we can take Zhiming Yuan at his word, but he works in a very different culture with pressures we may not fully appreciate.

Best wishes, Jim

From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2020 3:50 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Hi Dr. LeDuc,
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I'm writing because I am finally finishing up my follow-up article about the still-potent theory that the SARS-CoV-2 was being studied at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and accidentally escaped. I will acknowledge that while this is possible, there is still no evidence that it did happen, and the virology and emerging infectious disease scientific communities still think direct spillover is the more plausible origin.

Since you have worked with the folks at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, I wanted to ask two specific questions:

1) To your knowledge, were they doing gain-of-function work with bat coronaviruses there?

2) Here in this article we have Yuan Zhiming, the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, saying, "As people who carry out viral study, we clearly know what kind of research is going on in the institute and how [it] manages viruses and samples. As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us."

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/laboratory-wuhan-breaks-silence-deny-claims-coronvarius-originated-there-n1186856

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124811

In your opinion, can we take Yuan Zhiming at his word? I am inclined to, but wanted to ask you if there is any reason to not take him at his word.

Feel free to respond by email or I would be more than happy to discuss by phone this weekend or early next week if you prefer.

Thanks so much,
Eliza

--
Eliza Barclay • Science Editor



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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_124812

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Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:31 PM
To: Eliza Barclay
Subject: RE: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology
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https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/laboratory-wuhan-breaks-silence-deny-claims-coronvarius-originated-there-n1186856

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Eliza Barclay • Science Editor



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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002725

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:51 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

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Hi - I added the word "there" to your statement – just letting you know!

I **can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities <u>there</u> I have seen there are on par with leading labs globally.**

From: LeDuc, James W. [mailto:jwleduc@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 7:13 PM
To: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

Hi Amy,

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Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
(p) 409-266-6500
(p) 409-266-6516 direct
(m) (b)(6)

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 10:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002519

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Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

"I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

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Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

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Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

I have maintained a training center in biosecurity at Galveston National Lab since 2008… through that training center we have had trainees (10,000) from all over the world including several individuals from China.

I initiated contact w/BSL-4 labs internationally — I wanted to make sure we were sharing our experiences.

One unique things has been building the facilities operations and maintenance - really you need hands-on training - you can't read the manual. It has to be hands-on training.

WIV was built by the French based on a model of the existing BSL4 laboratory Lyon that has been in operations for many years (>20 yrs) - it was also designed by the French.

I have seen the BSL4 facility at WIV - It is a very high quality facility.

The BSL-4 lab at WIV only opened in 2017 or 2018 - they had been publishing high-quality studies on bat coronaviruses for years before that.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002520

(*Amy note: according to CDC, WIV was certified BSL4 in 2017:* https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/5/18-0220_article)

As part of the training activities we have here at the Galveston National Lab, we have post doctoral fellows (people who have achieved their PhD and are gaining experience and getting published before taking a long-term position at a university or other research center) come here to work.
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Sept 2015 was 1st meeting…
There have been several meetings… at each session we have talked about Coronaviruses

In 2015 dr Shi Zhengli gave a presentation re bat viruses - and warned that there was a potential for a reoccurrence of SARS-like viruses
She has been talking about this for well over 4 years. (*Amy note: so from before the BSL4 lab was up and running*)—See attached scientific publication that reports this in 2013.

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Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

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Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002521

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:59 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

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Regarding the association between the current coronavirus outbreak with the Wuhan Institute of Virology… i don't have a good answer there. I have a terrific amount of confidence in D. Shi Zhengli's work as a scientist… she is absolutely certain that the virus did not originate in her lab.

The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan… it is coincidental that it started in the preeminent place that studies bat coronaviruses and it raises eyebrows… i can understand that

Interesting to see in the South China Morning Post that they point to 17 cases in Hubei… which backs up the timeline of cases by 2 weeks or longer…

You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085361

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:59 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:51 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi - I added the word "there" to your statement – just letting you know!

I **can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities there I have seen there are on par with leading labs globally.**

From: LeDuc, James W. [mailto:jwleduc@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 7:13 PM
To: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

Hi Amy,

Thank you for the opportunity to review the quotes you plan to use. I prefer the first quote if possible. There are a few areas in your notes that should be corrected if you plan on more detailed reporting—see below in red. The attached publication just documents that Dr She (last author) and her colleagues from different countries were noting that these bat-associated coronaviruses had characteristics that might allow them to be transmitted to humans.

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
(p) 409-266-6500
(p) 409-266-6516 direct
(m) (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Perrette, Amy (Contractor-NBCUniversal) <Amy.Perrette@nbcuni.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 10:23 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Hi from Amy (NBC) - wanted to double check my notes from our Friday conversation - and especially that you are happy with the statement?

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello Dr. Le Duc - Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me Friday after what I know was a long and busy week (and with another one about to start!).

I apologise for contacting you on a Sunday, but I wanted to double-check my notes.

Also, you mentioned that I could use your name and quote you in lieu of an on-camera statement, so I wanted to put my notes in a way that worked as a statement but equally was accurate and felt correct to you!

Looking over our notes, I would suggest something like:

"I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

Or:

"The fact that the outbreak started in Wuhan, arguably where the preeminent research into bat coronaviruses takes place, does raise eyebrows. However, I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, some of whom have trained extensively with our lab in Texas, and that the facilities I have seen are on par with leading labs globally."

-James Le Duc, PhD
Director, Galveston National Laboratory

***Of course change the wording to suit - I was just pulling together my best recollection of our conversation into the shortest possible nugget.

Here are my full notes in case you want to add any further details:

_____

Notes from our phone conversation the evening of April 17, 2020:
Dr. Le Duc has given me permission to quote his words and use his name.

WIV (Wuhan Institute of Virology) has been in place for years.
Already in 80s the institute was there - and was already a premiere institute.

I have maintained a training center in biosecurity at Galveston National Lab since 2008… through that training center we have had trainees (10,000) from all over the world including several individuals from China.

I initiated contact w/BSL-4 labs internationally — I wanted to make sure we were sharing our experiences.

One unique things has been building the facilities operations and maintenance - really you need hands-on training - you can't read the manual. It has to be hands-on training.

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WIV was built by the French based on a model of the existing BSL4 laboratory Lyon that has been in operations for many years (>20 yrs) - it was also designed by the French.

I have seen the BSL4 facility at WIV - It is a very high quality facility.

The BSL-4 lab at WIV only opened in 2017 or 2018 - they had been publishing high-quality studies on bat coronaviruses for years before that.
(*Amy note: according to CDC, WIV was certified BSL4 in 2017:* https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/5/18-0220_article)

As part of the training activities we have here at the Galveston National Lab, we have post doctoral fellows (people who have achieved their PhD and are gaining experience and getting published before taking a long-term position at a university or other research center) come here to work.
The training to work in BSL4 takes a long time – nearly a year, including at least 100 hours of mentored training done at the side of highly experienced investigators — and is intensive. Both of the scientists from WIV who have spent time here generated high-quality research papers during their time here. So I can say with certainty that there are world-class scientists working at that facility (WIV).

-over the past 5 years, our laboratory has participated with Chinese scientists working in bio containment dialogue jointly sponsored by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Sept 2015 was 1st meeting…
There have been several meetings… at each session we have talked about Coronaviruses

In 2015 dr Shi Zhengli gave a presentation re bat viruses - and warned that there was a potential for a reoccurrence of SARS-like viruses
She has been talking about this for well over 4 years. (*Amy note: so from before the BSL4 lab was up and running*)—See attached scientific publication that reports this in 2013.

*There are 2 physical labs of WIV. One downtown and a new facility 45 minute drive out of town, where the BSL4 lab is.

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You know cats are susceptible to these viruses so it is also transmissible via cats.

Thank you so much Dr. Le Duc - as always, we appreciate your time and expertise!

Amy Perrette
Producer
NBC News
mobile: (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002607

utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Introduction

The Galveston National Laboratory held its grand opening in November 2008, shortly after Hurricane Ike; fortunately, the laboratory withstood the storm with no damage. The cost of construction was approximately $175 million, with about two-thirds provided by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the remainder from the State of Texas, augmented with philanthropic donations. We have been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010 and our faculty are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. Some of our past accomplishments include contributing significantly to the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized and we have successful research programs for both SARS and MERS coronaviruses led by several members of our faculty.

The GNL Training Mission

We benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through the visionary support provided by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who was able to establish two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This center provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a WHO sponsored meeting in December 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories was presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, we began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. The DoD funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time we had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from more about 70 different countries, as well as from universities, government agencies and industry personnel throughout the U.S. Training was provided in the training center and laboratories at UTMB as well as on-site at international locations where we could reach a greater number of personnel and provide a customized learning experience for trainees within their own familiar laboratory setting.

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Training Support for China

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training here at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the full nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) Both of these young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty members and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development for the new coronavirus.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. This second goal has significant security implications. Through our collaborations we have built both professional relationships and solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries. The director of the BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing scientific dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings alternate between the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January of 2017.

Specific Coronavirus Discussions

Importantly, during each of these NASEM/CAS meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zhengli Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than

four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and she is the one who discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues and in every session she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with an American scientist, but I do not have details and it is not someone from UTMB.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature given its high similarity to other know bat-associated coronaviruses. Bat-associated coronaviruses are difficult to grow in the laboratory in general, although the current pandemic SARS-2 virus does grow well in cell culture. I do not know how much of Dr Shi's work involved handling live virus or work in experimental animals.

I have been told by Dr Shi that she is confident that the virus did not escape from her laboratory.

Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publicly. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology Lab

I have visited the new BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan and toured it fully prior to it starting operations in 2017. The facility was built in partnership with the French and is modeled after their BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

I do not know where Dr Shi has conducted her research on bat-associated coronaviruses; however, it clearly was not in the new BSL4 facility since it only began operations in 2017 and she had been working on these viruses well prior to our first official dialogue meeting in 2015 when she reported her findings.

A recent article in the South China Morning Post indicates that the first cases of the COVID-19 were identified in Hubei Province in mid-November, 2019.

(https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back

a one to two page briefing of the history of the GNL its the international reputation. Much of what you and Jim shared on the zoom call yesterday

The Galveston National Laboratory held its grand opening in November, 2008, shortly after Hurricane Ike; fortunately, the laboratory withstood the storm with no damage. The cost of constructions was approximately $175 million, with about two-thirds provided by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the remainder from the State of Texas, augmented with philanthropic donations. We have been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010 and we routinely handle virtually all dangerous pathogens. Some of our past accomplishments include contributing significantly to the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized.

We benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through the visionary support provided by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who was able to establish two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This center provided intense, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a WHO sponsored meeting in December, 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories were presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, we began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. Funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time we had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from about 70 different countries (Connie, please confirm this number). Training was provided at UTMB as well as at the host laboratory in country where we could reach a greater number of individuals and provide a learning experience for them within their own familiar laboratory setting.

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the WIV, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored

work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) These young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain in contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into COVID-19 countermeasure development.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity, as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. Through our collaborations we have built solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries. The director of the BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October, 2018.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine working in together with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings have been held in both the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January, 2017. Importantly, during each of these meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zheng-Li Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and her team discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues and in every session she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she participated in an NIH project on bat coronavirus led by ~~a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with~~ an American scientist Peter Daszak from Ecohealth Alliance in New York, ~~but I do not have details and it is not someone from UTMB~~.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses.

I have visited the new BSL4 laboratory and toured it fully prior to it starting operations in 2017 or 2018. The facility was built in partnership with the French and is modeled after their BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures to any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

I do not know where Dr Shi has conducted her research on bat-associated coronaviruses; however, it clearly was not in the new BSL4 facility since that facility only began operations in

2017 or 2018 and she had been working on these viruses well prior to our first official dialogue meeting in 2015 when she reported her findings. I suspect that she was using BSL3 facilities on the main WIV campus, but I do not know that for sure.

Bat-associated coronaviruses are difficult to grow in the laboratory in general, although the current pandemic SARS-2 virus does grow well in cell culture. I do not know how much of Dr Shi's work involved handling live virus or work in experimental animals.

I have been told by Dr Shi swears that she did not have the new coronavirus in her laboratory prior to the start of the pandemic.

Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publically. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

A recent article in the South China Morning Post indicates that the first cases of the COVID-19 were identified in Hubei Province in mid-November, 2019.

([HYPERLINK "https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scmp.com%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fsociety%2Farticle%2F3074991%2Fcoronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back&data=02%7C01%7Cjwleduc%40UTMB.EDU%7C5ae1e3b684e245e9a2a108d7e15e4551%7C7bef256d85db4526a72d31aea2546852%7C0%7C0%7C637225667327335966&sdata=rbZ8YBDISnQ%2Bc%2BAqa2U2TI8gpRjNy9x3%2FpsYUxRSNcU%3D&reserved=0"]

Comment [石1]: We did cell culture in BSL2 and animal infection in BSL3

Comment [石2]: We only successfully cultured 3 bat coronaviruses all of them are related to SARS coronavirus with a genomic sequence identity of 95%-97%. These viruses are low pathogenic compared with SARS coronavirus according to the publication by Ralph Baric from North Carolina University at Chapel Hill, USA.

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 9:52 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: RE: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology
Attachments: For UT System nCoV and WIV-drf4.docx

Raul, this is the text he is referring to. We worked on this over the weekend for Sheila.

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 9:34 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology

I think we should carefully review the text prepared for the Chancellor and use it to answer many of these questions. Please read it again and let me know if there are any statements of concern. We may wish to cut it down considerably to remove any non-relevant comments.

thanks

From: Fifield, Anna <Anna.Fifield@washpost.com>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 6:11 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr Le Duc -- hello, I cover China for the Washington Post and am now researching a story about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, triggered by the various conspiracy theories about it and Yuan Zhiming's comments at the weekend about them. I'm looking to write a very sober and factual piece and I was hoping to talk to you about the Wuhan lab please -- your experience and involvement with it.

I was particularly struck by this line you told Vox: “I can tell you that lab in Wuhan is equivalent to any lab here in the US and Europe,” he said.

If you're willing to talk, please let me know how and when to reach you. I'm stuck in New Zealand at the moment (weirdly) so your afternoon is easiest.

thanks in advance
best
anna

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

--

Anna Fifield

Beijing Bureau Chief, The Washington Post

Currently in New Zealand on: +6427-358-2646

Or Whatsapp/Signal: (b)(6)

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Introduction

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Training Support for China

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training here at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the full nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) Both of these young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty members and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development for the new coronavirus.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. This second goal has significant security implications. Through our collaborations we have built both professional relationships and solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries. The director of the BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

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Importantly, during each of these NASEM/CAS meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zhengli Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than

four years before the start of the current pandemic! By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly trained scientists, fluent in English, French and of course her native Chinese, and she is the one who discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues and in every session she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with an American scientist, but I do not have details and it is not someone from UTMB.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature given its high similarity to other know bat-associated coronaviruses. Bat-associated coronaviruses are difficult to grow in the laboratory in general, although the current pandemic SARS-2 virus does grow well in cell culture. I do not know how much of Dr Shi's work involved handling live virus or work in experimental animals.

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Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publicly. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology Lab

I have visited the new BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan and toured it fully prior to it starting operations in 2017. The facility was built in partnership with the French and is modeled after their BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

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A recent article in the South China Morning Post indicates that the first cases of the COVID-19 were identified in Hubei Province in mid-November, 2019.

(https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 9:56 AM
To: Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology
Attachments: For UT System nCoV and WIV-drf4.docx

Probably only portions of the last two sections are relevant to the questions posed below.

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 9:52 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology

Raul, this is the text he is referring to. We worked on this over the weekend for Sheila.

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 9:34 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology

I think we should carefully review the text prepared for the Chancellor and use it to answer many of these questions. Please read it again and let me know if there are any statements of concern. We may wish to cut it down considerably to remove any non-relevant comments.

thanks

From: Fifield, Anna <Anna.Fifield@washpost.com>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 6:11 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: from the Washington Post re Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr Le Duc -- hello, I cover China for the Washington Post and am now researching a story about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, triggered by the various conspiracy theories about it and Yuan Zhiming's comments at the weekend about them. I'm looking to write a very sober and factual piece and I was hoping to talk to you about the Wuhan lab please -- your experience and involvement with it.

I was particularly struck by this line you told Vox: "I can tell you that lab in Wuhan is equivalent to any lab here in the US and Europe," he said.

If you're willing to talk, please let me know how and when to reach you. I'm stuck in New Zealand at the moment (weirdly) so your afternoon is easiest.

thanks in advance

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best
anna

--
Anna Fifield

Beijing Bureau Chief, The Washington Post

Currently in New Zealand on: +6427-358-2646

Or Whatsapp/Signal: (b)(6)

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Introduction

The Galveston National Laboratory held its grand opening in November 2008, shortly after Hurricane Ike; fortunately, the laboratory withstood the storm with no damage. The cost of construction was approximately $175 million, with about two-thirds provided by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the remainder from the State of Texas, augmented with philanthropic donations. We have been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010 and our faculty are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. Some of our past accomplishments include contributing significantly to the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized and we have successful research programs for both SARS and MERS coronaviruses led by several members of our faculty.

The GNL Training Mission

We benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through the visionary support provided by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who was able to establish two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This center provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a WHO sponsored meeting in December 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories was presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, we began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. The DoD funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time we had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from more about 70 different countries, as well as from universities, government agencies and industry personnel throughout the U.S. Training was provided in the training center and laboratories at UTMB as well as on-site at international locations where we could reach a greater number of personnel and provide a customized learning experience for trainees within their own familiar laboratory setting.

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Training Support for China

We specifically sought to engage with the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training here at the GNL, and we sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to their staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, we also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists at the GNL where they completed the full nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.) Both of these young scientists worked on cutting edge scientific projects in partnership with our faculty members and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and continue their independent research in the new facility. We maintain contact with them and continue to collaborate scientifically. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development for the new coronavirus.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, to not only engage in scientific collaborations, but to also offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. This second goal has significant security implications. Through our collaborations we have built both professional relationships and solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries. The director of the BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing scientific dialogue that is facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership we have held joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and more recently gene editing. Meetings alternate between the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. We hosted one of the meetings here at the GNL in January of 2017.

Specific Coronavirus Discussions

Importantly, during each of these NASEM/CAS meetings we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field, and at each session, Dr Zhengli Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these viruses to humans—more than

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(https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back

utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

An Overview of the Galveston National Laboratory Operations

Submitted by: Dr. James W. Le Duc, Director
20 April 20

Introduction

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The GNL been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010, and our faculty members are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially-trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. GNL scientists contributed significantly to both the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and the early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized, and we have successful research programs for both Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronaviruses, led by several members of our faculty.

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This Center provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations initially to our own staff, and later to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a World Health Organization (WHO) sponsored meeting in December 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories was presumably being built to conduct research on

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especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus, and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

Recognizing the global need for training and to share best practices for both the conduct of research within biocontainment and the operations of these highly complex buildings, the GNL began providing training for staff and leaders from many of these laboratories. The DoD funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time, the GNL had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters (some scientists participated in multiple trainings) for participants from about 70 different countries, as well as from universities, government agencies and industry personnel throughout the U.S. Training was provided in the training center and laboratories at UTMB as well as on-site at international locations where a greater number of personnel could be reached and could provide a customized learning experience for trainees within their own familiar laboratory setting.

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I have personally visited all three facilities, I know each director well, and all the directors have visited the GNL. Staff members from the Kunming and Wuhan labs have participated in training here at the GNL in Galveston, and the GNL sent a team to Kunming to provide on-site training to its staff in 2013 or 2014.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the GNL also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists, who completed the full nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. (This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4.)

Both young scientists worked on cutting-edge scientific projects in partnership with GNL faculty members, and the results of their work were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV in China, where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and where they continue their independent research in the new facility. Faculty and staff maintain contact and continue to collaborate scientifically with these two scientists. One is now heading the WIV BSL4 laboratory research program into countermeasure development for the new coronavirus.

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These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second, not only to engage in scientific collaborations, but also to offer a window of transparency into each other's programs. This second goal has significant security implications. Through our collaborations, we have built both professional relationships and solid friendships that allow us to talk frankly and honestly with each other, something that is especially important when there are political differences between countries. The director of the Wuhan BSL4 laboratory, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

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By way of background, Dr Shi is a superbly-trained scientist, fluent in English, French and, of course, her native Chinese. She is the research scientist who discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues; in every session, she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate. It is my understanding that she is a co-investigator on a coronavirus project with an American scientist, but I do not have details, and she is not collaborating with a researcher from UTMB.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. Bat-associated coronaviruses are difficult to grow in the laboratory in general, although the current pandemic SARS-2 virus does grow well in cell culture. I do not know how much of Dr Shi's work involved handling live virus or work in experimental animals.

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Dr. Shi has told me that she is confident that the virus did not escape from her laboratory. She was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publicly. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

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I have visited and fully toured the new BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, prior to it starting operations in 2017. The facility was built in partnership with the French, and it is modeled after the BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

I do not know where Dr Shi has conducted her research on bat-associated coronaviruses. Clearly, her research was not conducted in the new BSL4 facility since it only began operations in 2017, and she had been working on these viruses well prior to our first official dialogue meeting in 2015 when she reported her findings.

A recent article in the South China Morning Post indicates that the first cases of the COVID-19 were identified in Hubei Province in mid-November 2019.

(https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 11:13 AM
To: Menachery, Vineet
Subject: CORONAVIRUS

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi,

I am a tea merchant from India. Since lockdown I did some research on cure for coronavirus.
If your group is working to find cure for covid19, then I would like to assist you in your research.

CORONAVIRUS ORIGIN (now also popular in media)
Province : Yunnan
City : Kunming
Place : Shitou Cave
Animal : Horseshoe Bats
Virologist, Shi Zhengli also known as Bat women from Wuhan working on the Cure of Virus since 2004.

Will look forward for your soonest reply.

Best Regards,
(b)(6)

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From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 11:16 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Jim,

Thank you so much for your response. You mentioned the key question of when the Wuhan Institute of Virology first obtained this specific virus. According to this Scientific American article based on an extensive conversation with Dr. Shi Zhengli, the WIV got the first samples of the virus on December 30, sequenced the virus, and then checked it against sequences of viruses the lab had sampled and found it didn't match any of them.

I have emailed Dr. Shi Zhengli to verify this but have not heard back. It is too bad that she is not able to offer more information to the press on why she is sure her lab is not the source. She also apparently went on Chinese social media in February to defend herself, saying "'I swear with my life – [the virus] has nothing to do with the lab."

In any case, just thought I would share these details with you, as I intend to use them in my story. And if you have any thoughts on them, I'd love to hear them!

All best,
Eliza

On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 2:31 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Hi Eliza,
>
> In answer to your questions, I do not know if they were doing gain of function studies with bat-associated coronaviruses in Wuhan. The attached publication from 2013 attests to the longstanding program of research on this group of viruses in Wuhan with international collaborators.
>
> Regarding the second question, I don't think that anyone can definitively state with certainty that the virus did not come from a laboratory, especially with the high rate of asymptomatic infections. **The key question for the Wuhan Institute of Virology is when they first obtained this specific virus, and so far I am unaware of the answer to this question. It could not have originated from their lab if they did not have it in their**

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possession. I like to think that we can take Zhiming Yuan at his word, but he works in a very different culture with pressures we may not fully appreciate.

Best wishes, Jim

From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2020 3:50 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Hi Dr. LeDuc,

I hope you've been well during this wild time. I just saw your quote in the Washington Post article about the contamination at the CDC lab that hindered testing early on. What a tragedy!

I'm writing because I am finally finishing up my follow-up article about the still-potent theory that the SARS-CoV-2 was being studied at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and accidentally escaped. I will acknowledge that while this is possible, there is still no evidence that it did happen, and the virology and emerging infectious disease scientific communities still think direct spillover is the more plausible origin.

Since you have worked with the folks at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, I wanted to ask two specific questions:

1) To your knowledge, were they doing gain-of-function work with bat coronaviruses there?

2) Here in this article we have Yuan Zhiming, the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, saying, "As people who carry out viral study, we clearly know what kind of research is going on in the institute and how [it] manages viruses and samples. As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us."

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https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/laboratory-wuhan-breaks-silence-deny-claims-coronvarius-originated-there-n1186856

In your opinion, can we take Yuan Zhiming at his word? I am inclined to, but wanted to ask you if there is any reason to not take him at his word.

Feel free to respond by email or I would be more than happy to discuss by phone this weekend or early next week if you prefer.

Thanks so much,
Eliza

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Eliza Barclay • Science Editor



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Eliza Barclay • Science Editor

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Galveston National Laboratory's Role with International Laboratories; Including Chinese Laboratories

Dr. James W. Le Duc, Director
20 April 20

Introduction

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The GNL been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010, and our faculty members are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially-trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. GNL scientists contributed significantly to both the development of the now licensed vaccine for Ebola virus and the early discoveries on Zika virus. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized, and we have successful research programs for both Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronaviruses, led by several members of our faculty.

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Training Support for China

As part of this training mission, in 2013, the Galveston National Laboratory began to engage with the staff of the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin, where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

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These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second to engage in scientific collaborations. The director of the Wuhan BSL4 laboratory, Zhiming

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Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Galveston National Laboratory's Role with International Laboratories; Including Chinese Laboratories

Dr. James W. Le Duc, Director
20 April 20

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Chinese Response to New Virus: Good News/Bad News

By James W. Le Duc

Fast action and open communications by China is helping the world prepare for another potentially devastating infectious disease outbreak. While the situation is rapidly evolving, there is good news that may not make the headlines. Many will recall the dark days in the spring of 2003 when Asia and the world were threatened by the appearance of a new virus disease, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, which first appeared in southern China and quickly spread to other countries around the world, ultimately causing over 8000 cases with nearly 10% of those ending in death. SARS was caused by a novel coronavirus then unknown to medical science. There was no known cure, no diagnostic tests and little understanding of where it came from or how it was spread, although person-to-person transmission was obvious as health care workers treating the first cases were themselves among the early victims. Initially, China was reluctant to share information or alert the international community of the magnitude of the epidemic, leading to international criticism and a dangerous global health situation. Fortunately, China reversed its position, opened to collaborations with the WHO, U.S. and others, and the epidemic was eventually controlled.

Today, with another novel coronavirus discovered in China; the start is very different. In quick measure, Chinese health officials recognized that a new disease had emerged, quickly isolated patients, and instituted an impressive set of interventions in attempts to limit disease spread and characterize the new pathogen. Importantly, they have been transparent in sharing their findings with the world, thus allowing other nations to take precautions and be on the lookout for the new disease. Already, the genome of the new virus was sequenced and posted for easy access by international experts, allowing rapid exploration of possible treatments, development of diagnostics and epidemiological investigations.

China's ability to respond quickly and efficiently to this new threat is the result of nearly two decades of investments and collaborations to improve public health in China. The Chinese Centers for Disease Control incorporates many of the strengths of our own CDC, but is designed to meet the needs of a 1.4 billion plus population. In addition, China has invested in building a robust scientific capacity and partnered with containment laboratories such as ours to incorporate best practices when studying dangerous pathogens.

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The current outbreak demonstrates a welcome openness to health information sharing with the global community. To diagnose an outbreak early requires astute healthcare providers able to recognize when something new or unusual is occurring; however, clinical recognition alone is meaningless if there is no capacity to investigate cases or characterize the disease-causing agent.

For the last few years, our National Academy of Science, Engineering and Medicine has worked with the Chinese Academy of Sciences to build relationships and share information on emerging diseases and advancements in vaccines and treatments. In Galveston, we welcomed leading Chinese health officials to collaborate on biocontainment facility design, biosafety training and laboratory operations. This dialogue, along with U.S.-based educational opportunities for Chinese students, benefit us all.

China's response to the new coronavirus demonstrates their investments in physical laboratories and scientific collaborations over the past decade are paying dividends, not only to China, but the entire world. Control of a new disease efficiently transmitted person-to-person is nearly impossible as we witnessed during the 2009 novel influenza pandemic and much must still be done together during this quickly evolving situation.

The outbreak is still in the early stages, but it is now clear that the new virus may be transmitted person-to-person, although the efficiency of such transmission remains in question. A few hundred patients have been identified, deaths occurred and the disease has spread from the epicenter in Wuhan to major cities in China and other Asian countries. Our CDC is now screening travelers arriving from Wuhan at U.S. airports, and the WHO is set to consider a global emergency response. With millions about to travel for the Chinese New Year, avoiding a global catastrophe must be the current goal.

The good news is that, at a time when US-China relations are being tested on many fronts, relations within the public health and scientific research arenas remain open and positive, which lays a solid foundation for curtailing this latest threat.

James Le Duc, PhD, is the Director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and a professor in UTMB's Department of Microbiology and Immunology.

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Galveston National Laboratory

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

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From: Johnston, Alastair Iain <johnston@fas.harvard.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 5:03 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah;Rusek, Benjamin
Subject: Re: Question about scientific interpretation

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Jim

Thanks so much for the quick response. This is very helpful. Many thanks. And if I could bother you with one last (promise) question, what's your take on the emerging charge about a lab accident in Shi Zhengli's lab? The public information rests, not surprisingly, on some highly speculative claims about a missing researcher (patient 0), about a an article posted on researchgate by a Chinese scientist then withdrawn that references bat blood and pee transmission (I have the article and it has been largely misread), etc.

All best,

Iain

Alastair Iain Johnston 江忆恩
Professor
Title IX Liaison
Government Department
Harvard University

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Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 5:52 PM
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Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
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Hi Iain,

Great to hear from you. I would interpret the note as follows:

- "Atypical pneumonia" indicates to me that they are concerned that the cause is likely a respiratory pathogen and that it is causing serious illness.
- "Believed not SARS" indicates that they recall the history of SARS and are concerned that the new disease may share characteristics of SARS, including the possibility of widespread transmission. It also implies that they recognize that this may be a novel pathogen and that there may be little/no pre-existing immunity in the general population. i.e. general susceptibility.
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

I hope this helps. Best wishes,

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Johnston, Alastair Iain <johnston@fas.harvard.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 2:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Subject: Question about scientific interpretation

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Dear Jim.

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Thanks so much. There's no need to respond if you have no time.

All best, and thank you for your work at this critical time.

Iain

Alastair Iain Johnston 江忆恩
Professor
Title IX Liaison
Government Department
Harvard University

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Sent: 4/20/2020 5:10:31 PM
To: Johnston, Alastair Iain [johnston@fas.harvard.edu]
CC: Lowenthal, Micah [mlowenth@nas.edu]; Rusek, Benjamin [BRusek@nas.edu]
Subject: RE: Question about scientific interpretation

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

Galveston National Laboratory's Role with International Laboratories; Including Chinese Laboratories

Dr. James W. Le Duc, Director
20 April 20

Introduction

The Galveston National Laboratory (GNL) held its grand opening in November 2008. It is one of 14 laboratories based on university campuses in the U.S. that belong to the NIAID Biodefense Laboratory Network.

The GNL has been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010. Our faculty members are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially-trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized, and we have had longstanding research programs for both Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronaviruses.

The GNL Training Mission

The Galveston National Laboratory benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This Center provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to our own staff and to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a World Health Organization (WHO) sponsored meeting in December 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories was presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus, and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

The DoD funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time, the GNL had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from about 70 different countries, as well as from universities, government agencies and industry personnel throughout the U.S. Training was provided in the training center and laboratories at UTMB as well as on-site at international locations where a greater number of personnel could be reached and we could provide a customized learning experience for trainees within their own familiar laboratory setting.

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We continue to provide training to our own staff and faculty, but without dedicated funding we are now unable to provide training for international partners.

Training Support for China

In 2013 the Galveston National Laboratory began to engage with the staff of the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin, where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the WIV, the GNL also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists, who completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4. Both young scientists worked on cutting-edge scientific projects on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus in partnership with GNL faculty members, and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV in China, where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and where they continue their independent research in the new facility. Our faculty and staff maintain contact and continue to collaborate scientifically with these two scientists.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment anywhere in the world are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second to engage in scientific collaborations. The director of the Wuhan BSL4 laboratory, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing scientific dialogue facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership, the Galveston National Lab has participated in joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and, more recently, gene editing. Meetings alternate between the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. The Galveston National Lab hosted one of the meetings in Galveston in January 2018.

Specific Coronavirus Discussions

Importantly, during each of these NASEM/CAS meetings, we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field. At each of these sessions, Dr. Zhengli Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting, she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these

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viruses to humans. She is the research scientist who discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues; in every session, she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publicly. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology Lab

I have visited and toured the new BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, prior to it starting operations in 2017. The facility was built in partnership with the French and it is modeled after the BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

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utmb Health
Galveston National Laboratory

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 5:23 PM
To: Johnston, Alastair Iain
Cc: Lowenthal, Micah;Rusek, Benjamin
Subject: RE: Question about scientific interpretation

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Thanks, Jim

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All best,

Iain

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University of Texas Medical Branch

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Galveston, TX 77555-0610
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Public Health

How China's "Bat Woman" Hunted Down Viruses from SARS to the New Coronavirus

Wuhan-based virologist Shi Zhengli has identified dozens of deadly SARS-like viruses in bat caves, and she warns there are more out there

- By Jane Qiu on March 11, 2020

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Shi Zhengli, known as China's "bat woman" for her virus-hunting expeditions in bat caves, releases a fruit bat after taking blood and swab samples from it in 2004. Credit: Wuhan Institute of Virology

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BEIJING—The mysterious patient samples arrived at Wuhan Institute of Virology at 7 P.M. on December 30, 2019. Moments later, Shi Zhengli's cell phone rang. It was her boss, the institute's director. The Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention had detected a novel coronavirus in two hospital patients with atypical pneumonia, and it wanted Shi's renowned laboratory to investigate. If the finding was confirmed, the new pathogen could pose a serious public health threat—because it belonged to the same family of bat-borne viruses as the one that caused severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a disease that plagued 8,100 people and killed nearly 800 of them between 2002 and 2003. "Drop whatever you are doing and deal with it now," she recalls the director saying.

Shi—a virologist who is often called China's "bat woman" by her colleagues because of her virus-hunting expeditions in bat caves over the past 16 years—walked out of the conference she was attending in Shanghai and hopped on the next train back to Wuhan. "I wondered if [the municipal health authority] got it wrong," she says. "I had never expected this kind of thing to happen in Wuhan, in central China." Her studies had shown that the southern, subtropical areas of Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan have the greatest risk of coronaviruses jumping to humans from animals—particularly bats, a known reservoir for many viruses. If coronaviruses were the culprit, she remembers thinking, "could they have come from our lab?"

While Shi's team at the Chinese Academy of Sciences institute raced to uncover the identity and origin of the contagion, the mysterious disease spread like wildfire. As of this writing, about 81,000 people in China have been infected. Of that number, 84 percent live in the province of Hubei, of which Wuhan is the capital, and more than 3,100 have died. Outside of China, about 41,000 people across more than 100 countries and territories in all of the continents except Antarctica have caught the new virus, and more than 1,200 have perished.

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perished.

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The epidemic is one of the worst to afflict the world in recent decades. Scientists have long warned that the rate of emergence of new infectious diseases is accelerating—especially in developing countries where high densities of people and animals increasingly mingle and move about.

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The New Coronavirus Outbreak: What We Know So Far

"It's incredibly important to pinpoint the source of infection and the chain of cross-species transmission," says disease ecologist Peter Daszak, president of EcoHealth Alliance, a New York City–based nonprofit research organization that collaborates with scientists, such as Shi, around the world to discover new viruses in wildlife. An equally important task, he adds, is hunting down other related pathogens—the "known unknowns"—in order to "prevent similar incidents from happening again."

Tracing the Virus at Its Source

To Shi, her first virus-discovery expedition felt like a vacation. On a breezy, sunny spring day in 2004, she joined an international team of researchers to collect samples from bat colonies in caves near Nanning, the capital of Guangxi. Her inaugural cave was typical of the region: large, rich in limestone columns and—being a popular tourist destination—easily accessible. "It was spellbinding," Shi recalls, with milky-white stalactites hanging from the ceiling like icicles, glistening with moisture.

But the holidaylike atmosphere soon dissipated. Many bats—including several insect-eating species of horseshoe bats that are abundant in southern Asia—roost in deep, narrow caves on steep terrain. Often guided by tips from local villagers, Shi and her colleagues had to hike for hours to potential sites and inch through tight rock crevasses on their stomach. And the flying mammals can be elusive. In one frustrating week, the team explored more than 30 caves and saw only a dozen bats.

These expeditions were part of the effort to catch the culprit in the SARS outbreak, the first major epidemic of the 21st century. A Hong Kong team had reported that wildlife traders in Guangdong first caught the SARS coronavirus from civets, mongooselike mammals that are native to tropical and subtropical Asia and Africa.

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Before SARS, the world had little inkling of coronaviruses—named because, seen under a microscope, their spiky surface resembles a crown—says Linfa Wang, who directs the emerging infectious diseases program at Singapore's Duke-NUS Medical School. Coronavirues were mostly known for causing common colds. "The SARS outbreak was a game changer," says Wang, whose work on bat-borne coronaviruses got a swift mention in the 2011 Hollywood blockbuster *Contagion*. It was the first time a deadly coronavirus with pandemic potential emerged. This discovery helped to jump-start a global search for animal viruses that could find their way into humans.

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Shi was an early recruit of that worldwide effort, and both Daszak and Wang have since been her long-term collaborators. But how the civets got the virus remained a mystery. Two previous incidents were telling: Australia's 1994 Hendra virus infections, in which the contagion jumped from horses to humans, and Malaysia's 1998 Nipah virus outbreak, in which it moved from pigs to people. Both diseases were found to be caused by pathogens that originated in fruit-eating bats. Horses and pigs were merely the intermediate hosts.

In those first virus-hunting months in 2004, whenever Shi's team located a bat cave, it would put a net at the opening before dusk—and then wait for the nocturnal creatures to venture out to feed for the night. Once the bats were trapped, the researchers took blood and saliva samples, as well as fecal swabs, often working into the small hours. After catching up on some sleep, they would return to the cave in the morning to collect urine and fecal pellets.

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But sample after sample turned up no trace of genetic material from coronaviruses. It was a heavy blow. "Eight months of hard work seemed to have gone down the drain," Shi says. "We thought coronaviruses probably did not like Chinese bats." The team was about to give up when a research group in a neighboring lab handed it a diagnostic kit for testing antibodies produced by people with SARS.

There was no guarantee the test would work for bat antibodies, but Shi gave it a go anyway. "What did we have to lose?" she says. The results exceeded her expectations. Samples from three horseshoe bat species contained antibodies against the SARS virus. "It was a turning point for the project," Shi says. The researchers learned that the presence of the coronavirus in bats was ephemeral and seasonal—but an antibody reaction could last from weeks to years. So the diagnostic kit offered a valuable pointer as to how to hunt down viral genomic sequences.

Shi's team used the antibody test to narrow down locations and bat species to pursue in the quest for these genomic clues. After roaming mountainous terrain in the majority of China's dozens of provinces, the researchers turned their attention to one spot: Shitou Cave on the outskirts of Kunming, the capital of Yunnan—where they conducted intense sampling during different seasons throughout five consecutive years.

The efforts paid off. The pathogen hunters discovered hundreds of bat-borne coronaviruses with incredible genetic diversity. "The majority of them are harmless," Shi says. But dozens belong to the same group as SARS. They can infect human lung cells in a petri dish, cause SARS-like diseases in mice, and evade vaccines and drugs that work against SARS.

In Shitou Cave—where painstaking scrutiny has yielded a natural genetic library of bat viruses—the team discovered a coronavirus strain in 2013 that came from horseshoe bats and had a genomic sequence that was 97 percent identical to the one found in civets in Guangdong. The finding concluded a decade-long search for the natural reservoir of the SARS coronavirus.

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Cave nectar bat (*Eonycteris spelaea*) from Singapore. Credit: Linfa Wang

Viral Melting Pots

In many bat dwellings Shi has sampled, including Shitou Cave, "constant mixing of different viruses creates a great opportunity for dangerous new pathogens to emerge," says Ralph Baric, a virologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. And in the vicinity of such viral melting pots, Shi says, "you don't need to be a wildlife trader to be infected."

Near Shitou Cave, for example, many villages sprawl among the lush hillsides in a region known for its roses, oranges, walnuts and hawthorn berries. In October 2015 Shi's team collected blood samples from more than 200 residents in four of those villages. It found that six people, or nearly 3 percent, carried antibodies against SARS-like coronaviruses from bats—even though none of them had handled wildlife or reported SARS-like or other pneumonia-like symptoms. Only one had travelled outside of Yunnan prior to sampling, and all said they had seen bats flying in their village.

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Three years earlier, Shi's team had been called in to investigate the virus profile of a mineshaft in Yunnan's mountainous Mojiang County—famous for its fermented Pu'er tea—where six miners suffered from pneumonialike diseases (two of them died). After sampling the cave for a year the researchers discovered a diverse group of coronaviruses in six bat species. In many cases, multiple viral strains had infected a single animal, turning it into a flying factory of new viruses.

"The mineshaft stunk like hell," says Shi, who went in with her colleagues wearing a protective mask and clothing. "Bat guano, covered in fungus, littered the cave." Although the fungus turned out to be the pathogen that had sickened the miners, she says it would only have been a matter of time before they caught the coronaviruses if the mine had not been promptly shut.

With growing human populations increasingly encroaching on wildlife habitats, with unprecedented changes in land use, with wildlife and livestock transported across countries and their products around the world, and with a sharp increase in both domestic and international travel, new disease outbreaks of pandemic scale are a near mathematical certainty. This had been keeping Shi and many other researchers awake at night—long before the mysterious samples landed at the Wuhan Institute of Virology on that ominous evening last December.

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About a year ago, Shi's team published two comprehensive reviews about coronaviruses in *Viruses* and *Nature Reviews Microbiology*. Drawing evidence from her own studies—many of which were published in top academic journals—and from others, Shi and her co-authors warned of the risk of future outbreaks of bat-borne coronaviruses.

Racing against a Deadly Pathogen

On the train back to Wuhan on December 30 last year, Shi and her colleagues discussed ways to immediately start testing the patient samples. In the following weeks—the most intense and the most stressful time of her life—China's bat woman felt she was fighting a battle in her worst nightmare, even though it was one she had been preparing for over the past 16 years. Using a technique called polymerase chain reaction, which can detect a virus by amplifying its genetic material, the first round of tests showed that samples from five of seven patients contained genetic sequences known to be present in all coronaviruses.

Shi instructed her team to repeat the tests and, at the same time, sent the samples to another laboratory to sequence the full viral genomes. Meanwhile she frantically went through her own laboratory's records from the past few years to check for any mishandling of experimental materials, especially during disposal. Shi breathed a sigh of relief when the results came back: none of the sequences matched those of the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves. "That really took a load off my mind," she says. "I had not slept a wink for days."

By January 7 the Wuhan team determined that the new virus had indeed caused the disease those patients suffered—a conclusion based on results from polymerase chain reaction analysis, full genome sequencing, antibody tests of blood samples and the virus's ability to infect human lung cells in a petri dish. The genomic sequence of the virus—now officially called SARS-CoV-2 because it is related to the SARS pathogen—was 96 percent identical to that of a coronavirus the researchers had identified in horseshoe bats in Yunnan, they reported in a paper published last month in *Nature*. "It's crystal clear that bats, once again, are the natural reservoir," says Daszak, who was not involved in the study.

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In 2004, an international team of scientists takes blood and swab samples from bats at night in order to discover potential bat-borne pathogens. Credit: Wuhan Institute of Virology

The genomic sequences of the viral strains from patients are, in fact, very similar to one another, with no significant changes since late last December, based on analyses of 326 published viral sequences. "This suggests the viruses share a common ancestor," Baric says. The data also point to a single introduction into humans followed by sustained human-to-human transmission, researchers say.

Given that the virus seems fairly stable and that many infected individuals appear to have mild symptoms, scientists suspect the pathogen might have been around for weeks or even months before the first severe cases raised alarm. "There might have been mini outbreaks, but the virus burned out" before causing havoc, Baric says. "The Wuhan outbreak is by no means incidental." In other words, there was an element of inevitability to it.

To many, the region's burgeoning wildlife markets—which sell a wide range of animals such as bats, civets, pangolins, badgers and crocodiles—are perfect viral melting pots. Although humans could have caught the deadly virus from bats directly (according to several studies, including those by Shi and her colleagues), independent teams have suggested in preprint studies that pangolins may have been an intermediate host. These teams have reportedly uncovered SARS-CoV-2–like coronaviruses in these animals, which were seized in antismuggling operations in southern China.

On February 24 the nation announced a permanent ban on wildlife consumption and trade except for research or medicinal or display purposes—which will stamp out an industry worth $76 billion and put approximately 14 million people out of jobs, according to a 2017 report commissioned by the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Some welcome the initiative, whereas others, such as Daszak, worry that without efforts to change people's traditional beliefs or provide alternative livelihoods, a blanket ban may push the business underground. This could make disease detection even more challenging. "Eating wildlife has been part of the cultural tradition in southern China" for thousands of years, Daszak says. "It won't change overnight."

In any case, Shi says, "wildlife trade and consumption are only part of problem." In late 2016 pigs across four farms in Qingyuan county in Guangdong—60 miles from the site where the SARS outbreak originated—suffered from acute vomiting and diarrhea, and nearly 25,000 of the animals died. Local veterinarians could not detect any known pathogen and called Shi for help. The cause of the illness, called swine acute diarrhea syndrome (SADS), turned out to be a virus whose genomic sequence was 98 percent identical to a coronavirus found in horseshoe bats in a nearby cave.

"This is a serious cause for concern," says Gregory Gray, an infectious disease epidemiologist at Duke University. Pigs and humans have very similar immune systems, making it easy for viruses to cross between the two species. Moreover a team at Zhejiang University in the Chinese city of Hangzhou found the SADS virus could infect cells from many organisms in a petri dish, including rodents, chickens, nonhuman primates and humans. Given the scale of swine farming in many countries, such as China and the U.S., Gray says, looking for novel coronaviruses in pigs should be a top priority.

Although the Wuhan outbreak is the sixth one caused by bat-borne viruses in the past 26 years —the other five being Hendra in 1994, Nipah in 1998, SARS in 2002, MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) in 2012, and Ebola in 2014—"the animals [themselves] are not the problem," Wang says. In fact, bats help promote biodiversity and the health of their ecosystems by eating insects and pollinating plants. "The problem arises

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biodiversity and the health of their ecosystems by eating insects and pollinating plants. “The problem arises when we get in contact with them,” he says.

Fending Off Future Outbreaks

More than two months into the epidemic—and seven weeks after the Chinese government imposed citywide transportation restrictions in Wuhan, a megacity of 11 million—life feels almost normal, Shi says, laughing. “Maybe we are getting used to it. The worst days are certainly over.” The institute staffers have a special pass to travel from home to their laboratory, but they cannot go anywhere else. For more than a month, they had to subsist on instant noodles during their long hours in the lab because the institute’s canteen was closed.

The researchers found that the new coronavirus enters human lung cells using a receptor called angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2). The scientists have since been screening for drugs that can block it. They, as well as other research groups, are also racing to develop vaccines and test promising candidates. In the long run, the team plans to develop broad-spectrum vaccines and drugs against coronaviruses deemed risky to humans. “The Wuhan outbreak is a wake-up call,” Shi says.

Many scientists say the world should move beyond merely responding to deadly pathogens when they arise. “The best way forward is prevention,” Daszak says. Because 70 percent of animal-borne emerging infectious diseases come from wild creatures, “where we should start is to find all those viruses in wildlife globally and develop better diagnostic tests,” he adds. Doing so would essentially mean rolling out what researchers such as Daszak and Shi have been doing on a much bigger scale.

Such efforts should focus on high-risk viral groups in certain mammals prone to coronavirus infections, such as bats, rodents, badgers, civets, pangolins, and nonhuman primates, Daszak says. He adds that developing countries in the tropics, where wildlife diversity is greatest, should be the front line of this battle against viruses.

In recent decades, Daszak and his colleagues analyzed approximately 500 human infectious diseases from the past century. They found that the emergence of new pathogens tended to happen in places where a dense population had been changing the landscape—by building roads and mines, cutting down forests and intensifying agriculture. “China is not the only hotspot,” he says, noting that other major emerging economies, such as India, Nigeria and Brazil, are also at great risk.

Once potential pathogens are mapped out, scientists and public health officials can regularly check for possible infections by analyzing blood and swab samples from livestock, wild animals that are farmed and traded, and high-risk human populations, such as farmers, miners, villagers who live near bats, and people who hunt or handle wildlife, Gray says. This approach, known as “One Health,”, aims to integrate the management of wildlife health, livestock health, and human health. “Only then can we catch an outbreak before it turns into an epidemic,” he says, adding that the approach could potentially save the hundreds of billions of dollars such an epidemic can cost.

Back in Wuhan, China’s bat woman has decided to retire from the front line of virus-hunting expeditions. “But the mission must go on,” says Shi, who will continue to lead research programs. “What we have uncovered is just the tip of an iceberg.” Daszak’s team has estimated that there are as many as 5,000 coronavirus strains waiting to be discovered in bats globally. Shi is planning a national project to systematically sample viruses in bat caves—with much greater scope and intensity than her team’s previous attempts.

“Bat-borne coronaviruses will cause more outbreaks,” she says with a tone of brooding certainty. “We must find them before they find us.”

Read more about the coronavirus outbreak here.

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Galveston National Laboratory

Galveston National Laboratory's Role with International Laboratories; Including Chinese Laboratories

Dr. James W. Le Duc, Director
20 April 20

Introduction

The Galveston National Laboratory (GNL) held its grand opening in November 2008. It is one of 14 laboratories based on university campuses in the U.S. that belong to the NIAID Biodefense Laboratory Network.

The GNL has been fully operational at all levels of biocontainment (Biological Safety Level-2, BSL3 and BSL4) since 2010. Our faculty members are involved in basic and translational research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that require purpose-built containment facilities and specially-trained staff to handle these high consequence pathogens. We have been heavily involved in research and diagnostic testing on the new coronavirus since it was first recognized, and we have had longstanding research programs for both Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronaviruses.

The GNL Training Mission

The Galveston National Laboratory benefited greatly in building the GNL workforce through two projects funded through the Department of Defense (W81XWH-09-2-0053 and W81XWH-11-2-0148) that allowed us to establish the National Biocontainment Training Center at UTMB. This Center provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to our own staff and to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories. Parenthetically, during a World Health Organization (WHO) sponsored meeting in December 2017, representatives from more than 50 BSL4 laboratories were present. Each of these laboratories was presumably being built to conduct research on especially dangerous pathogens such as Ebola virus, and the need for high quality training from experienced instructors was obvious.

The DoD funding for the National Biocontainment Training Center ended in 2016, and by that time, the GNL had provided training through more than 10,000 encounters for participants from about 70 different countries, as well as from universities, government agencies and industry personnel throughout the U.S. Training was provided in the training center and laboratories at UTMB as well as on-site at international locations where a greater number of personnel could be reached and we could provide a customized learning experience for trainees within their own familiar laboratory setting.

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We continue to provide training to our own staff and faculty, but without dedicated funding we are now unable to provide training for international partners.

Training Support for China

In 2013 the Galveston National Laboratory began to engage with the staff of the BSL4 laboratories under construction in China, which included the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) laboratory located in the outskirts of Wuhan and affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A second BSL4 laboratory remains under construction in Kunming and is associated with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the third BSL4 laboratory is now fully operational in Harbin, where it serves the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

In addition to providing short-term training experiences to staff from the WIV, the GNL also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists, who completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to our BSL4 facilities. This includes mentored work at BSL3 and at least 100 hours of mentored training at BSL4. Both young scientists worked on cutting-edge scientific projects on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus in partnership with GNL faculty members, and their results were published in high-impact international scientific journals. Both have since returned to WIV in China, where they were instrumental in establishing their biosafety and biosecurity training program for the new BSL4 laboratory and where they continue their independent research in the new facility. Our faculty and staff maintain contact and continue to collaborate scientifically with these two scientists.

These training efforts had two primary goals: To ensure that all scientists working in biocontainment anywhere in the world are exposed to proven best practices in biosafety and biosecurity as well as in the safe and secure operations of these complex facilities; and second to engage in scientific collaborations. The director of the Wuhan BSL4 laboratory, Zhiming Yuan and I jointly published an editorial on the need for global collaboration among biocontainment laboratories in *Science* on 19 October 2018.

A second area of engagement has been an ongoing scientific dialogue facilitated by our U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Through this partnership, the Galveston National Lab has participated in joint meetings on emerging infectious diseases, biocontainment laboratory safety and security, and, more recently, gene editing. Meetings alternate between the US and China and have occurred about annually, with the first being held in Beijing in September 2015. The Galveston National Lab hosted one of the meetings in Galveston in January 2018.

Specific Coronavirus Discussions

Importantly, during each of these NASEM/CAS meetings, we have held a session on the coronaviruses with presentations by the foremost American leaders in this field. At each of these sessions, Dr. Zhengli Shi has presented her most recent work. During the September 2015 meeting, she described her studies of bat-associated coronaviruses and concluded that there was significant potential risk of transmission of some of these

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viruses to humans. She is the research scientist who discovered the link between bats and the original SARS virus that caused disease world-wide in 2003. She has participated in each of our dialogues; in every session, she has been fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. Dr Shi was among the first to identify the new virus, to determine its genetic sequence, and to share it publicly. She was also among the first to publish about the new virus in the international scientific literature.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology Lab

I have visited and toured the new BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, prior to it starting operations in 2017. The facility was built in partnership with the French and it is modeled after the BSL4 laboratory in Lyon, France. It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

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Subject: Fwd: GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

The Chronicle earlier today had asked about outrelationship with Wuhan.
I sent Nick the GNL document and now have these follow up questions.

Thanks,

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

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Raul,

Some follow-up questions for Dr. LeDuc:

- When you opened discussions with the Chinese labs in 2013, what did those discussions entail? Were all discussions related to biocontainment lab safety/security? Did UTMB make the overture to these labs or vice versa?
- Can you provide any more detail on the "short-term training experience" UTMB shared with the Wuhan lab?
- Can you tell me the names of the two Chinese scientists that worked on Crimean Congo fever research with UTMB and the time period they were in the US? And do you know which publications there work was published? What kind of scientific work do these scientists still collaborate with UTMB on?
- Do you have any material from the presentations Zhengli Shi gave on bat coronaviruses at the two NASEM/CAS meetings in 2015 and 2018 that you can share publicly?
- Based on Dr. LeDuc's visit to the BSL4 lab in Wuhan, and understanding of BSL4 labs in general, is there any possibility that a laboratory accident could have resulted in the virus being transmitted to humans?

If you could get back to me sometime tomorrow, that would be great. Appreciate the help as always.

Nick Powell
Galveston bureau reporter
Houston Chronicle

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C: (b)(6)
@nickpowellchron

From: Reyes, Raul
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To: Powell, Nicholas
Subject: [EXTERNAL] GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

Here you go Nick.

Best,

Raul

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To: Reyes, Raul
Subject: RE: GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

Wow. He's trying to make a big investigative story out of this. There are short answers to each question. I'll let Dr. Le Duc respond.

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Galveston bureau reporter
Houston Chronicle
C(b)(6)
@nickpowellchron

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 12:35 PM
To: Powell, Nicholas
Subject: [EXTERNAL] GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

Here you go Nick.

Best,

Raul

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Subject: Re: GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

Thanks .

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On Apr 21, 2020, at 5:27 PM, Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@utmb.edu> wrote:

Wow. He's trying to make a big investigative story out of this. There are short answers to each question. I'll let Dr. Le Duc respond.

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 5:06 PM
To: Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

The Chronicle earlier today had asked about outrelationship with Wuhan.
I sent Nick the GNL document and now have these follow up questions.

Thanks,

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Powell, Nicholas" <nick.powell@chron.com>
Date: April 21, 2020 at 4:55:12 PM CDT
To: "Reyes, Raul" <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Raul,

Some follow-up questions for Dr. LeDuc:

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- When you opened discussions with the Chinese labs in 2013, what did those discussions entail? Were all discussions related to biocontainment lab safety/security? Did UTMB make the overture to these labs or vice versa?
- Can you provide any more detail on the "short-term training experience" UTMB shared with the Wuhan lab?
- Can you tell me the names of the two Chinese scientists that worked on Crimean Congo fever research with UTMB and the time period they were in the US? And do you know which publications there work was published? What kind of scientific work do these scientists still collaborate with UTMB on?
- Do you have any material from the presentations Zhengli Shi gave on bat coronaviruses at the two NASEM/CAS meetings in 2015 and 2018 that you can share publicly?
- Based on Dr. LeDuc's visit to the BSL4 lab in Wuhan, and understanding of BSL4 labs in general, is there any possibility that a laboratory accident could have resulted in the virus being transmitted to humans?

If you could get back to me sometime tomorrow, that would be great. Appreciate the help as always.

Nick Powell
Galveston bureau reporter
Houston Chronicle
C: (b)(6)
@nickpowellchron

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 12:35 PM
To: Powell, Nicholas
Subject: [EXTERNAL] GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

Here you go Nick.

Best,

Raul

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010724

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 5:34 PM
To: Campbell, Stephen;LeDuc, James W.;Holubar, Connie J.;Lidstone, Sheila
Subject: Re: GNL Statement from Dr. LeDuc

Also, just FYI, the GDN had one follow up question but it was asking us to speculate on whether the virus could have come from the lab. Below is his question but I told the reporter that we don't speculate about this or any other matters.

One followup: Does Dr. Le Duc want to say anything on the possibility that the virus was accidentally released from the WIV lab? Does he think that's a possibility?

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 21, 2020, at 5:05 PM, Reyes, Raul <rareyes@utmb.edu> wrote:

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U.S. - China Bilateral Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, and Global Health Security

Since 2015, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) has organized a series of meetings on the challenges of emerging infections, laboratory safety, and global health security with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC), and other Chinese life science and public health organizations. Academy members and other top-flight American researchers in human and animal virology and immunology participated, including current and former directors of BSL-4 laboratories, former CDC, and former uniform military biodefense experts. They have met with China's BSL-4 laboratory directors and researchers from top universities and research centers across China. The topics discussed included basic and applied research on infectious diseases; the challenges of combating emerging infections; life-science collaboration and research-data sharing; high-containment biological laboratory management, safety and security; and responsible conduct in the use of gene editing in infectious disease research.

The meetings enabled scientists from the United States and China to discuss research findings on diseases of mutual concern to China and the United States, to share best practices and lessons learned for managing and operating high containment biological laboratories, and to establish new collaborative research and institutional partnerships. Connecting scientists in China and the United States allows those working to combat emerging infectious disease to identify and implement the best management, safety, and security standards in their laboratories, and to create research collaboration and training partnerships to improve laboratory safety and security and to further basic and applied science on emerging infectious diseases.

Ben Rusek, Senior Program Officer, PGA

DRAFT

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 8:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;David Franz
Cc: Raymond JEANLOZ;Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Balanced article on Zhengli Shi by the WSJ reporter who contacted Jim
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-bats-expert-says-her-wuhan-lab-wasnt-source-of-new-coronavirus-11587463204

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Importance: High

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
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consent to your voice, likeness, and any materials you provide, being recorded for use and dissemination, without payment of any compensation for such use, in any language, format, or media now known or later devised, and you release the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine from any and all claims, liability, or damages arising from any such use. The Academies will proceed in reliance upon such consent and release. If you do not consent to the foregoing, please do not join the session.

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 9:18 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;David Franz
Cc: Raymond JEANLOZ;Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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WSJ also published this: https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-and-the-laboratories-in-wuhan-11587486996
Can't even get link to WIV lab location right, it's not hard, coordinates are on Wikipedia.

Ben

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> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > Ben
> >
> > Benjamin Rusek
> > The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
> > 1-202-334-3975
> >
> > **From:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> > **Sent:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
> > **To:** Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
> > **Cc:** 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah

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<mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

Attached has some suggestions. Looks fine to me.

I had an hour plus telecon with the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations to discuss the Washington Post article about the possible leak from WIV and the State Department inspection and cable. 5-6 participants from their side and all engaged. I provided them with the attached summary before the meeting and we had a good discussion about our relationship. The NASEM-CAS ties were of interest to them and they seemed to appreciate our efforts at engagement. As much detail as you can provide on the posting will be useful I suspect.

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Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 3:04 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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Kind regards,

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

I made a new copy of the transcript of the NPR interview -- attached.

Raymond

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 8:46 AM Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

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Hi there,

Micah Lowenthal is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
https://nasem.zoom.us/j/95438044518?pwd=Nm9Ha2V3dXpJeS9oREpMenY0WFJEZz09
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009179

Sent: 4/22/2020 8:37:49 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin [BRusek@nas.edu]; David Franz [davidrfranz@gmail.com]
CC: Raymond JEANLOZ [jeanloz@berkeley.edu]; Lowenthal, Micah [mlowenth@nas.edu]
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

The House Committee had NOT seen the memo and quipped that the only one that had seen it was the reporter.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 8:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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arising from any such use. The Academies will proceed in reliance upon such consent and release. If you do not consent to the foregoing, please do not join the session.

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 8:55 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

Do either of you have a subscription to the WSJ? See below re links to recent articles. If you can, please print so I can read.

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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008872

Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008873

From: LeDuc, James W.
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To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

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> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > Ben

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

Attached has some suggestions. Looks fine to me.

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Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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Hi Jim and Dave,

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1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_052785

Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

I made a new copy of the transcript of the NPR interview -- attached.

Raymond

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 8:46 AM Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

> Hi there,
>
> Micah Lowenthal is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
>
> Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
> https://nasem.zoom.us/j/95438044518?pwd=Nm9Ha2V3dXpJeS9oREpMenY0WFJEZz09
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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_052786

Sent: 4/22/2020 8:57:51 AM
To: Howard, Anne B. [anhoward@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

Hi, Anne,

Does the library have a subscription to the WSJ?

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 8:55 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Cc: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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WSJ also published this: https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-and-the-laboratories-in-wuhan-11587486996
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Ben

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1-202-334-3975

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From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:04 AM
To: Howard, Anne B.
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

Hi, Anne,

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Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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Kind regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085396

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085397

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

I do, can collect and add to the database...and send a copy.

They had the NSC chief on talking about it -- NPR

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: 22 April, 2020 08:55
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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Hi Jim and Dave,

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Kind regards,

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Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008151

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:37 AM
To: Benjamin Rusek
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Raymond Jeanloz;Micah Lowenthal
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Nice article. Good of Peter to weigh in. d

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<mlowenth@nas.edu>
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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008119

From: Howard, Anne B.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:22 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

We are supposed to have a subscription but it's not working. I will continue to work on getting the articles for you.

Anne

From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:03 AM
To: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085439

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Hi Jim and Dave,

Here is the latest draft of the website text for your review.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

I made a new copy of the transcript of the NPR interview -- attached.

Raymond

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> Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
> https://nasem.zoom.us/j/95438044518?pwd=Nm9Ha2V3dXpJeS9oREpMenY0WFJEZz09
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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085440

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:50 AM
To: Howard, Anne B.
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

I did find it. Dr. Ksiazek has a subscription. Thanks for checking! I should have let you know as soon as he let us know.

Hope you are doing well. I've about had it with this coronavirus b.s. I'm bored with it. Extremely bored with it.

UG!

From: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:45 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Anne

From: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:21 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:03 AM
To: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

Hi, Anne,

Does the library have a subscription to the WSJ?

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 8:55 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Cc: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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> > Kind regards,
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> > Ben
> >
> > Benjamin Rusek
> > The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
> > 1-202-334-3975
> >
> > **From:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> > **Sent:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
> > **To:** Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
> > **Cc:** 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

<mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

Attached has some suggestions. Looks fine to me.

I had an hour plus telecon with the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations to discuss the Washington Post article about the possible leak from WIV and the State Department inspection and cable. 5-6 participants from their side and all engaged. I provided them with the attached summary before the meeting and we had a good discussion about our relationship. The NASEM-CAS ties were of interest to them and they seemed to appreciate our efforts at engagement. As much detail as you can provide on the posting will be useful I suspect.

Thanks, Jim

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Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 3:04 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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Ben

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To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
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Raymond

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 8:46 AM Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085432

Hi there,

Micah Lowenthal is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
https://nasem.zoom.us/j/95438044518?pwd=Nm9Ha2V3dXpJeS9oREpMenY0WFJEZz09
Password: 042020

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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085433

From: Howard, Anne B.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:59 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

Yes, it is quite inconvenient. Starting forget my prior life!

Anne

From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:50 AM
To: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

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UG!

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From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:03 AM
To: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

Hi, Anne,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085388

Does the library have a subscription to the WSJ?

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 8:55 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: NASEM China Bio discussion

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> > Ben
> >
> > Benjamin Rusek

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085391

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 11:03 AM
To: Howard, Anne B.
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

I don't want my prior life. I want to get a job watering plants at Home Depot.

From: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:59 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:50 AM
To: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

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Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
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From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
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To: Howard, Anne B. <anhoward@UTMB.EDU>
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Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085428

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

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<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085429

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 6:23 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Items-of-Interest--22 April 2020--COVID-19--Take 3

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI--

Jim

From Johns Hopkins WSSE Dashboard: 22 April 2020 at 1920 EDT

Total Confirmed

2,620,579

Confirmed Cases by Country/Region/Sovereignty

837,947 US

208,389 Spain

187,327 Italy

157,125 France

150,062 Germany

134,638 United Kingdom

98,674 Turkey

85,996 Iran

83,868 China

57,999 Russia

Total Deaths

182,903

Total Test Conducted in U.S.

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4,466,559

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

Hundreds of people volunteer to be infected with coronavirus

Support grows for a controversial 'human challenge' vaccine study — but no trial is yet planned.

Ewen Callaway

22 April 2020

Momentum is building to speed the development of coronavirus vaccines by intentionally infecting healthy, young volunteers with the virus. A grass-roots effort has attracted nearly 1,500 potential volunteers for the controversial approach, known as a human-challenge trial.

The effort, called 1Day Sooner, is not affiliated with groups or companies developing or funding coronavirus vaccines. But co-founder Josh Morrison hopes to show that there is broad support for human-challenge trials, which have the potential to deliver an effective coronavirus vaccine more quickly than standard trials.

Typical vaccine trials take a long time because thousands of people receive either a vaccine or a placebo, and researchers track who becomes infected in the course of their daily lives. A challenge study could in theory be much faster: a much smaller group of volunteers would receive a candidate vaccine and then be intentionally infected with the virus, to judge the efficacy of the immunization.

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01179-x

COVID-19: Number of children infected far more extensive than reported-USF Study

by Press Release

April 22, 2020

The number of children infected with the coronavirus is far more extensive than what is currently reported — a hidden detail that could vastly underestimate the demand on health care systems and pediatric intensive care units (PICUs).

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071487



Cumulative number of confirmed COVID-19 pediatric intensive care patients United States (March 18-April 6)
Image/mvps.org

A new study published in the "*Journal of Public Health Management and Practice*" from the University of South Florida (USF) and the Women's Institute for Independent Social Enquiry (WiiSE), estimates that for each child who requires intensive care for COVID-19, there are 2,381 children infected with the virus. This calculation follows a report from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention regarding its clinical study of over 2,100 children in China with COVID-19.

According to the North American registry, Virtual PICU Systems, 74 children in the U.S. were admitted to PICUs between March 18 and April 6, signaling an additional 176,190 children were likely infected during this timeframe. Children younger than 2 accounted for 30 percent of the cases, 24 percent were ages 2 to 11 and 46 percent of the PICU cases were children between ages 12 and 17. Researchers say that if as many as 25 percent of the U.S. population becomes infected with the coronavirus before the end of 2020, 50,000 children with severe illness will need to be hospitalized, with 5,400 of them critically ill and requiring mechanical ventilation. Clinical reports indicate the average length of stay for pediatric COVID-19 is 14 days. According to a national survey aimed to evaluate the U.S. pediatric critical care capacity and published in "Critical Care Medicine," there are approximately 5,100 PICU beds in the U.S.

http://outbreaknewstoday.com/covid-19-number-of-children-infected-far-more-extensive-than-reported-usf-study-66520/

Rapid development of an inactivated vaccine for SARS-CoV-2

Qiang Gao, et al.

Posted April 19, 2020

Abstract

Here we developed a pilot-scale production of a purified inactivated SARS-CoV-2 virus vaccine candidate (PiCoVacc), which induced SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibodies in mice, rats and non-human primates. These antibodies potently neutralized 10 representative SARS-CoV-2 strains, indicative of a possible broader neutralizing ability against SARS-CoV-2 strains circulating worldwide.

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Immunization with two different doses (3 μg or 6 μg per dose) provided partial or complete protection in macaques against SARS-CoV-2 challenge, respectively, without any antibody-dependent enhancement of infection. Systematic evaluation of PiCoVacc via monitoring clinical signs, hematological and biochemical index, and histophathological analysis in macaques suggests that it is safe. These data support the rapid clinical development of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines for humans.

https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.17.046375v1

Critical care cardiologists suited to help combat COVID-19

Katz J, et al. *J Am Coll Cardiol*. 2020;doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2020.04.029.

April 22, 2020

Critical care cardiologists may be uniquely experienced to help manage clinical manifestations of the virus that causes COVID-19 and supplement the staff of noncardiac and COVID-19-specific ICUs, according to a report published in the *Journal of the American College of Cardiology*.

Providers treating patients with COVID-19 may draw upon experience from critical care cardiologists to to improve health care delivery and implement telemedicine to optimize the efficacy and safety of clinicians working amid ICU capacity surges, the authors wrote.

https://www.healio.com/cardiology/practice-management/news/online/%7B8f98384e-ed56-4690-a320-b98456117ffc%7D/critical-care-cardiologists-suited-to-help-combat-covid-19

Novartis gets FDA approval for Phase III trial of hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19

Wednesday, April 22, 2020 by Dave Kovaleski

Homeland Preparedness News

Novartis is proceeding with a Phase III clinical trial to evaluate the use of hydroxychloroquine for the treatment of patients with COVID-19 disease.

The company got the go-ahead from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The trial will involve approximately 440 patients and be conducted at more than a dozen sites in the United States. The clinical trial drug supply will be provided by Sandoz, the generics and biosimilars division of Novartis.

Novartis will begin enrollment for this study within the next few weeks.

https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/47855-novartis-gets-fda-approval-for-phase-iii-trial-of-hydroxychloroquine-for-covid-19/

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The Chinese lab at the center of the coronavirus controversy

Axios

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian

China's highest-security virology center is at the center of debate, speculation and misinformation about how, where and when the novel coronavirus emerged.

Why it matters: Knowing the origin of the novel coronavirus is key to efforts to prevent future possible pandemics and will shape China's role in the post-pandemic world.

In the U.S., two similar-sounding theories link the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of the coronavirus. One is very unlikely; the other is plausible but unverified.

Theory 1: The coronavirus was created as part of a Chinese bioweapons research program allegedly linked to the WIV.

- Virologists have determined this is highly unlikely. By looking at a virus' genetic material, it is possible to tell if it has been engineered in a lab. The coronavirus shows no such signs, as the World Health Organization also emphasized on April 21.
- Some U.S. officials previously showed interest in this theory, but the scientific evidence debunking it has been persuasive.
    - There is also growing scientific evidence the virus originated in a bat and spread to humans via an intermediary animal, which would make it less likely it came from a lab.

Theory 2: The novel coronavirus was being studied at the WIV, and a lab accident resulted in the virus' accidental transmission to an employee who then unknowingly spread the virus in the city after leaving the institute premises.

- This is plausible, but as yet there is no direct evidence to support it.
- It isn't possible to tell from looking at the coronavirus' genetic sequence if it jumped from animal to human in a lab or in a wet market (or somewhere else). Confirmation would therefore have to come from contact tracing and related measures by Chinese authorities.
- This theory has gained significant traction within U.S. government circles.

Context: There is precedent in China — and other countries, including Singapore — where breaches in lab safety procedures resulted in disease outbreaks.

- In 2004, the coronavirus that causes SARS was accidentally leaked from a facility in Beijing, infecting nine people and killing one.
- **Yes, but:** That was a known pathogen studied in numerous labs around the world. The novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 was previously unknown to the scientific community.

What they're saying: Yuan Zhiming, the director of the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory and vice director of the WIV, denied the novel coronavirus had any connection to the lab in an April 18 interview with Chinese state broadcaster CGTN.

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- "There is no way this virus came from us," said Yuan. "People can't help but make associations, which I think is understandable. But it's bad when some are deliberately trying to mislead people."
- Shi Zhengli, a highly respected scientist who also works at the institute and who has long studied coronaviruses that come from bats, said in February that she could "guarantee on my life" that the novel coronavirus did not come from the lab, according to the Wall Street Journal.
- A version of the second theory, which claims that "patient zero" was an intern at the facility, has also made the rounds on the Chinese internet, prompting state news agency Xinhua to publish a Feb. 16 article stating that the person in question had never been infected.

Here are three key facts about the WIV:

1. It houses the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, which is China's only Biosafety Level-4 (BSL-4) lab. That means it is the only facility in China permitted to handle the most dangerous known pathogens, including the Ebola and Lassa viruses.

- It is the first of several BSL-4 labs that China is planning to build.
- BSL-4 labs are rare and confer a degree of prestige on the countries that have them. Taiwan has two such labs; Japan's first BSL4 lab wasn't approved to handle top-tier pathogens until 2015.
- By comparison, the U.S. has about a half-dozen BSL4 labs, with several more planned.

2. The lab is located just under 9 miles from the wet market where some scientists say the outbreak may have originated.

- Its proximity to the first known cluster of cases at the Huanan market has fueled speculationthe lab could somehow be involved.

3. The WIV is home to the Chinese scientists who sequenced the complete novel coronavirus genome in early January and who are now working on a vaccine.

- Scientists affiliated with the institute have studied coronaviruses for years, but it's not the only lab in China where coronaviruses are studied.

The bottom line: As China seeks to demonstrate scientific heft, a spillover event at China's most prestigious virology lab — and subsequent cover-up — would be "another nail in the coffin of Xi's personal reputation and the CCP's reputation on the global stage," Elizabeth Economy, director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said on a media call last week.

- "Globally, it would certainly be very harmful, Domestically, I think it would probably reinforce people's impressions who are already distrustful of the regime."

https://www.axios.com/wuhan-institute-of-virology-china-coronavirus-79ad2d32-9834-4099-8a94-5df501845e3d.html

WHO warns of long road ahead with COVID-19

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071491

Lisa Schnirring | News Editor | CIDRAP News|

Apr 22, 2020

The head of the World Health Organization (WHO) today said global COVID-19 activity is at different stages in different parts of the world and warned of a long road ahead with the virus.

The global COVID-19 total today reached 2,623,231 cases from 185 countries, along with 182,359 deaths, according to the Johns Hopkins online dashboard.

Worrying upward trends in a susceptible world

At a media telebriefing today, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreysus, PhD, the WHO's director-general, said most of the epidemics in Western Europe have stabilized or are declining. However, there are worrying upward trends in Africa, Central and South America, and Eastern Europe, though numbers are still relatively low.

Most countries are still in the early stages of their epidemics, but some already-affected locations are seeing a resurgence. "Make no mistake: we have a long way to go. This virus will be with us for a long time," Tedros said.

He said social distancing steps have suppressed transmission in many countries, but the virus is still extremely dangerous, and early evidence suggests that most of the world is still susceptible. "That means epidemics can easily re-ignite," he said.

Communication key to weathering long lockdowns

Another danger is complacency, and he said people are understandably frustrated with stay-at-home orders and the threat to their livelihoods. Though the WHO understands and shares the desire to return to normal life, there must be a "new normal" that is healthier, safer, and better prepared, Tedros said.

Key steps in the response, such as finding and testing all suspected cases, should still be the backbone of the response, and it's also important to engage and empower people, he said.

When asked about protests against stay-at-home orders, Mike Ryan, MD, who leads the WHO's health emergencies program, said his work in different outbreak settings, including Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, shows that a high level of trust between citizens and the government is key. "That's a valuable thing to have in the bank," he said. "They have to believe there's a plan, that there's a reason for doing this."

If plans and the rationale for response actions are murky, communications are vulnerable to be gamed and directed in counterproductive ways, Ryan said.

The process should be a two-way dialogue, which promotes transparency and ensures consistency so that people aren't hearing different messages, he said, adding that civil society should also play a role so that not all communications are purely governmental.

WHO flags response gaps

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Tedros said one of the WHO's tasks is to track countries' outbreak response progress, and though many who reported have strong capabilities, no single country has everything in place. For example, of countries reporting data to the WHO, 91% have the lab capacity to test for COVID-19, while 78% have response plans in place, and 76% have surveillance systems.

However, he said only 66% have clinical referral systems to care for COVID-19 patients. Less than half have community engagement plans, and less than half have infection prevention and control programs and standards for water, sanitation, and hygiene in health facilities.

"In other words, there are still many gaps in the world's defenses," Tedros said. "WHO will continue working with countries and the international community to close these gaps and build sustainable capacities for now and the future."

PAHO head urges nations to step up testing

Countries in the WHO Americas region need to speed up and expand testing, Carissa Etienne, MBBS, MSc, director of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) said yesterday at a media briefing. "We need a clearer view of where the virus is circulating and how many people have been infected in order to guide our actions," she said.

Though countries have been ready to test and detect cases since before the pandemic was declared, with cases increasing, many countries are struggling to keeping up, Etienne said. PAHO has already sent 500,000 tests to 34 countries and territories, and it is sending 1.5 million more this week and another 3 million next week.

Brazil is South America's hardest-hit country, with more than 43,000 cases reported so far. Other countries battling large outbreaks include Peru, Chile, and Ecuador.

European, Asian developments

In Europe, Pedro Sanchez, Spain's prime minister, asked lawmakers to extend the country's emergency measures for a third time, the BBC reported. While Spain is the world's second hardest-hit country, cases are starting to decline there, as in neighboring countries. The prime minister told Parliament that restrictions can probably begin slowly easing in the last half of May.

Spain has some of Europe's tightest restrictions, including an order that children be kept inside. However, the government announced yesterday that beginning Apr 26, children ages 14 and younger can go outside for walks.

Meanwhile, German regulators approved a plan for clinical trials to proceed on COVID-19 vaccines developed by BioNTech and Pfizer, Reuters reported. And early results from a serology study by a Geneva-based research group show that 5.5% were positive for SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibodies.

In Asian developments, Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, has restricted incoming travel today to slow the spread of the virus, after earlier ordering people from outside China or key epidemic areas to isolate, Reuters reported.

The province, on the Russian border, has been flagging infected residents coming from Russia, where virus activity is accelerating. China's National Health Commission today reported 30 new cases, 7 of them local cases from Heilongjiang province.

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Singapore's health ministry today reported 1,106 new cases, part of a surge mainly linked to foreign workers living in tightly packed dorms. Of today's new cases, 967 were linked to the dorms.

In Taiwan, health officials reported an outbreak on a Navy supply ship that had recently visited Palau, Bloomberg News reported. Twenty-eight sailors tested positive for COVID-19.

https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/04/who-warns-long-road-ahead-covid-19

Confirmation of COVID-19 in Two Pet Cats in New York

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service sent this bulletin at 04/22/2020 01:35 PM EDT

Washington, D.C. April 22, 2020 – The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) today announced the first confirmed cases of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19) infection in two pet cats. These are the first pets in the United States to test positive for SARS-CoV-2.

The cats live in two separate areas of New York state. Both had mild respiratory illness and are expected to make a full recovery. SARS-CoV-2 infections have been reported in very few animals worldwide, mostly in those that had close contact with a person with COVID-19.

https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDAAPHIS/bulletins/287d9a0

Coronavirus found in Paris sewage points to early warning system

Science Magazine

By Christa Lesté-Lasserre

Apr. 21, 2020 , 2:10 PM

***Science*'s COVID-19 reporting is supported by the Pulitzer Center.**

By sampling sewage across greater Paris for more than 1 month, researchers have detected a rise and fall in novel coronavirus concentrations that correspond to the shape of the COVID-19 outbreak in the region, where a lockdown is now suppressing spread of the disease. Although several research groups have reported detecting coronavirus in wastewater, the researchers say the new study is the first to show that the technique can pick up a sharp rise in viral concentrations in sewage before cases explode in the clinic. That points to its potential as a cheap, noninvasive tool to warn against outbreaks, they say.

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/coronavirus-found-paris-sewage-points-early-warning-system?utm_campaign=news_daily_2020-04-21&et_rid=277898084&et_cid=3295090#

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071494

Event Information: CTTI Webinar: Designing High-Quality COVID-19 Treatment Trials

English : New York Time

Event status: Not started

Date and time: Thursday, April 23, 2020 9:30 am Eastern Daylight Time (New York, GMT-04:00)
Change time zone

Duration: 1 hour 30 minutes

Description: As the research community races to identify safe and effective COVID-19 therapies, how can researchers accelerate trial design without sacrificing quality? Join us for a Clinical Trials Transformation Initiative (CTTI) webinar on April 23 at 9:30 a.m. ET discussing the current landscape of COVID-19 treatment trial designs and best practices for quickly launching trials that ensure both patient safety and reliable results.

https://dukemed.webex.com/mw3300/mywebex/default.do?nomenu=true&siteurl=dukemed&service=6&rnd=0.6953545786124672&main_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdukemed.webex.com%2Fec3300%2Feventcenter%2Fevent%2FeventAction.do%3FtheAction%3Ddetail%26%26%26EMK%3D4832534b0000000453cbe35bada9dc196d59c20c2fca3a80a0f3bfd6c6fbe2ee657534e6b1043666%26siteurl%3Ddukemed%26confViewID%3D158711389955826106%26encryptTicket%3DSDJTSwAAAAR8tkQaku9vnhMIosSl8Reg2u1_-289wieMyL5UkwOk9w2%26

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:24 AM
To: 'Dave Franz'
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Raymond Jeanloz;Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Short segment on NPR I heard this afternoon.
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/22/841925672/scientists-debunk-lab-accident-theory-of-pandemic-emergence

PS the letter should go out tomorrow morning (with signatures from Marcia McNutt and Victor Dzau along with Peggy and Diane). Sorry about the delay, hope it works.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 10:37 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Raymond Jeanloz <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

Nice article. Good of Peter to weigh in. d

> On Apr 21, 2020, at 9:53 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:
>
> Balanced article on Zhengli Shi by the WSJ reporter who contacted Jim
> https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-bats-expert-says-her-wuhan-lab-wasnt-source-of-new-coronavirus-11587463204
>
> > On Apr 21, 2020, at 8:42 PM, Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu> wrote:

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Thanks Jim, sounds like your session with the House subcommittee went well and I am glad to that they are generally supportive of engagement. (I assume that the subcommittee has access to the two cables cited by the wapo.) I like the utmb statement as well.

Thanks for the edits. I have attached what I think is the final version of the China dialogue blurb for the NASEM website. Can still use the bulleted list we created last week when/if we talk about the dialogue with gov folks.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 6:10 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion

Attached has some suggestions. Looks fine to me.

I had an hour plus telecon with the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations to discuss the Washington Post article about the possible leak from WIV and the State Department inspection and cable. 5-6 participants from their side and all engaged. I provided them with the attached summary before the meeting and we had a good discussion about our relationship. The NASEM-CAS ties were of interest to them and they seemed to appreciate our efforts at engagement. As much detail as you can provide on the posting will be useful I suspect.

Thanks, Jim

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2020 3:04 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Raymond JEANLOZ' <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: NASEM China Bio discussion
Importance: High

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Hi Jim and Dave,

Here is the latest draft of the website text for your review.

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 4:38 PM
To: Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; David Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: NASEM China Bio discussion

I made a new copy of the transcript of the NPR interview -- attached.

Raymond

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 8:46 AM Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu> wrote:

> Hi there,
>
> Micah Lowenthal is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
>
> Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or
> Android: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/95438044518?pwd=Nm9Ha2V3dXpJeS9oREpMenY0WFJEZz09
> Password: 042020
>
> Would you like to test your Zoom connection? Please click on the link below.
> https://nasem.zoom.us/test
>
> NOTICE: The Zoom service allows audio and any materials exchanged or viewed during the session to be recorded and shared. Please be aware that by participating in this activity, you consent to your voice, likeness, and any materials you provide, being recorded for use and dissemination, without payment of any compensation for such use, in any language, format, or media now known or later devised, and you release the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine from any and all claims, liability, or damages arising from any such use. The Academies will proceed in reliance upon such consent and release. If you do not consent to the foregoing, please do not join the session.

<U.S. China dialogue meetings v6.docx>

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David R. Franz

(b)(6)

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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.;LeDuc, James W.;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.
Subject: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

Related Stories

Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

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Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

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Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

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Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

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> **Subject:** GDN GNL/Wuhan story
>
> # Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

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LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training

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Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

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Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

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Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:27 PM
To: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com);Benjamin Rusek (BRusek@nas.edu);Raymond Jeanloz;Micah Lowenthal (mlowenth@NAS.EDU);Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

From the Houston Chronicle just posted.

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Subject: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

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Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed

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the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

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nick.powell@chron.com

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Past Articles from this Author:

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Subject: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
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GALVESTON

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People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

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“But sometimes accidents happen,” he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn’t just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in

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BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

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The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

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John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

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Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

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"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

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Thank you everyone,

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Raul

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:27 PM
To: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com);Benjamin Rusek (BRusek@nas.edu);Raymond Jeanloz;Micah Lowenthal (mlowenth@NAS.EDU);Shi, Pei yong
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By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

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Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed

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the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

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nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

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> I thought the story was very transparent and very well done. My husband brought the paper to me this morning and said "hey, there's a great story on the GNL on the front page today." He is not aware of our struggling with how best to handle this at all.

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Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

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“But sometimes accidents happen,” he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn’t just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in

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BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

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The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

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Raul

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:28 PM
To: Maryellen Leduc;Amy Davis (b)(6) Ferguson, Mara (b)(6) Courtney Morosetti (b)(6)
Subject: FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

More press

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

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"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

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As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

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the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

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"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

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nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

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From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

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GALVESTON

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But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

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“But sometimes accidents happen,” he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

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BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

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Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

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The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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- WhatsApp
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- Email
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Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

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Raul

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From: Lidstone, Sheila
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:40 PM
To: Reyes, Raul;Raimer, Ben G.;LeDuc, James W.;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.
Subject: RE: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

Again, excellent and transparent. Thanks, Dr. Le Duc. We are proud of you!

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

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Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed

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the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

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nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

- Galveston, Montgomery counties will not mandate face coverings
- UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
- State parks reopen, giving Texans a much-needed break from cabin fever

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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

> On Apr 23, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I thought the story was very transparent and very well done. My husband brought the paper to me this morning and said "hey, there's a great story on the GNL on the front page today." He is not aware of our struggling with how best to handle this at all.

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From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

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“But sometimes accidents happen,” he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn’t just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in

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BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

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The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

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Raul

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From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:41 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Pretty balanced from you. Do you know Ellen Nakashima from the Wash Post. Michael Callahan apparently gave her my name. I'll talk with her only on background , if it might be helpful and it would be comparable with what you say in the Houston Chronicle. Do we know if Zhengli worked BOTH on campus and in the BSL-4?

See below;

Hello, David,

I hope you are managing to stay safe and sane during these trying times.

Dr. Michael Callahan, whom I've been speaking to about various issues surrounding the USG response to the pandemic, suggested I reach out to you. I'm interested in sounding out experts in BSL-4 labs. Here's the issue. It's been pretty well established that Covid-19 wasn't bioengineered in a lab. But how plausible is the theory that the virus was ACCIDENTALLY released from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where a great amount of research was being done on coronaviruses and bat viruses?

As you've seen, the USG had concerns about the biosafety of the lab. And we know from open sources that since 2017 the lab participated in about 35 studies, published in English-language journals, pertaining to coronaviruses or other viruses carried by bats (or in a couple of cases, looking at other vectors carrying the same viruses). Scientists collected bats and guano not only in China but in Singapore and Malaysia (at least), but most of the work was laboratory based, using bats or bat tissues, cells and live viruses.

None of the studies point to bad science. They just illustrate the fact that that the Wuhan lab was doing a truly extraordinary amount of work with live bats and bat viruses.

I know Shi Zhengli has said the lab did no work on that virus strain before it was discovered. But is it possible that one of the other strains they were working on mutated there and got out? Is that a silly question?

What would the questions be that you would ask in order to determine that the virus was there and accidentally jumped, as opposed to originating somewhere else?

Would you be willing to speak to me about this? I'm not on deadline.

Thanks very much,
Ellen Nakashima
(b)(6)

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On Apr 23, 2020, at 5:26 PM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

From the Houston Chronicle just posted.

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely

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viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

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Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the

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genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

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As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

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While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost

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certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

- Galveston, Montgomery counties will not mandate face coverings
- UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
- State parks reopen, giving Texans a much-needed break from cabin fever

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Most Popular

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie

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J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

> On Apr 23, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I thought the story was very transparent and very well done. My husband brought the paper to me this morning and said "hey, there's a great story on the GNL on the front page today." He is not aware of our struggling with how best to handle this at all.
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
> **To:** Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** GDN GNL/Wuhan story
>
> # Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan
>
> - By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
> - 33 min ago
>
> - 0
>
> - Facebook
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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

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Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department

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of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

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Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

- Facebook
- Twitter
- WhatsApp

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009703

- SMS
- Email
-

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided

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and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

April 21, 2020

Gregory L. Fenves, President
Office of the President
University of Texas at Austin
110 Inner Campus Dr.
Stop G3400
Austin, TX 78712-3400

Re: Notice of 20 U.S.C. § 1011f Investigation and Record Request/University of Texas at Austin

Dear President Fenves:

Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. § 1011f) requires institutions of higher education (IHEs), including the University of Texas at Austin (UTA), to fully report statutorily defined gifts, contracts, and/or restricted and conditional gifts or contracts from or with a foreign source to the U.S. Department of Education (Department). These reports are posted at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/foreign-gifts.

According to UTA's Medical Branch (UTMB), it is responsible for the operation of the Galveston National Laboratory (GNL) under UTMB's Institute for Human Infections and Immunity. GNL, in turn, has substantial contractual relations with a maximum biocontainment laboratory (MCL) in Wuhan, China (Wuhan MCL) (also known as the Wuhan Institute of Virology) which is upon information and belief owned by the Chinese government's Chinese Academy of Sciences. *See* https://www.utmb.edu/gnl/news/2018/11/28/scientific-diplomacy-and-international-cooperation-key-say-bsl4-directors; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/coronavirus/wuhan-institute-virology-origin-coronavirus-or-conspiracy-nonsense-144082; https://www.foxnews.com/world/wuhan-laboratory-china-coronavirus-controversy. On November 28, 2018, GNL claimed in SCIENCE Magazine:

> We direct a newly constructed MCL in Wuhan, China (Z.Y.) and an established MCL in the United States (J.W.L), in Galveston, Texas. In preparation for the opening of the new China MCL, we engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility. Both labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements that will streamline future scientific and operational collaborations on dangerous pathogens, although funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve.

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https://www.utmb.edu/gnl/news/2018/11/28/scientific-diplomacy-and-international-cooperation-key-say-bsl4-directors.

Between June 6, 2014, and June 3, 2019, UTA reported approximately twenty-four contracts with various Chinese state-owned universities and ten contracts with Huawei Technologies, all purportedly worth a reported total of $12,987,896. It is not clear, however, whether UTA has in fact reported all gifts from or contracts with or relating to the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and/or all other foreign sources, including agents and instrumentalities of the government of the Peoples' Republic of China. Therefore, to verify UTA's compliance with Section 117 the Department requests that your Institution produce the following records within thirty (30) days. Unless otherwise noted, the relevant time frame for these requests is January 1, 2012 through the present.

1. True copies of each gift or donation agreement, contract, and/or conditional gift or donation agreement or contract to which your Institution and the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or the Chinese Academy of Sciences are parties.

2. True copies of each gift or donation agreement, contract, and/or conditional gift or donation agreement or contract with or between your Institution and any of the following:

    a. BGp Inc.
    b. Educational Advisors Deda Co. Ltd.
    c. Xi'an Jintong University
    d. University of Beijing
    e. University of Shanghai
    f. Dalian Auto Tech. Inc.
    g. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
    h. Tafel New Energy Tech Co. Ltd.
    i. Zhejiang Normal University
    j. ATEC Shenzhen Expressway Engineering
    k. Huawei Software Technologies Co. Ltd.
    l. Beijing Normal University
    m. Nanjing University
    n. China University of Mining and Technology
    o. Chengdu Technological University
    p. Sichuan University
    q. Southwest Jiaotong University
    r. Jilin University
    s. South China University of Technology
    t. China University of Petroleum
    u. Southwest Petroleum University
    v. Shandong University of Science and Technology
    w. The Communist Party of China, its agents, employees, representatives, and instrumentalities (including but not limited to the agents, employees, representatives, and instrumentalities of entities such as the Communist Party of

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China's Central Committee, Central Office, and Politburo Standing Committee; the General Office of the Central Military Commission; the Chinese Ministry of Education; the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology; the People's Liberation Army; the Chinese Ministry of State Security; the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Chinese Ministry of National Defense; the Central Bank of the People's Republic of China; and any People's Republic of China province, autonomous region, or municipality)

3. A complete list identifying and providing last known contact information for your Institution's faculty and staff (including full and part time employees and contractors) involved in the administration, direction, or scientific and/or other research cooperation, fund raising, or any other efforts involving (a) the Wuhan MCL; and/or (b) persons employed by or agents for any of the entities listed in section 2(a)-(w) above. The geographic location of your Institution's faculty and staff and/or of the persons employed by or agents for any of the listed entities is not determinative of your obligations hereunder (e.g. *all* employees, agents, lobbyists, and attorneys of or for the listed entities must also be identified and disclosed regardless of citizenship and place of residence). Provided contact information should include names, position(s) held, email addresses, mailing addresses, phone numbers, and a brief description of the administration, direction, scientific and/or other research cooperation, fund raising, and/or other efforts associated with the listed person.

4. A complete list identifying and providing last known contact information for your Institution's administrators, contractors, or other personnel with responsibility for and/or oversight of faculty and staff involved in any capacity with the Wuhan MCL. The geographic location of the administrators, contractors, or other personnel at the time of cooperation or other execution of efforts is in no way determinative of such involvement. Provided contact information should include names, specific responsibilities, position(s) held, email addresses, mailing addresses, and phone numbers.

5. All records (including but not limited to emails and true copies of contracts and/or gift or donation agreements) of, regarding, or relating to (a) the Wuhan MCL, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan MCL researcher Shi Zhengli, and Eric Yuan, Chief Executive Officer of Zoom Communications; and/or (b) any gift, contract, or conditional gift or contract from or with the Communist Party of China, its agents, employees, representatives, and instrumentalities.

6. All records (including but not limited to emails and true copies of contracts and/or gift or donation agreements) of, regarding, or related to gifts, contracts and/or restricted or conditional gifts or contracts to or with the Institution from or with any foreign source. The time frame for this request is January 1, 2016, to the present.

The Department requests that UTA produce records as follows.

- Searches for records in electronic form should include searches of all relevant mobile devices, hard drives, network drives, offline electronic folders, thumb drives, removable drives, records stored in the cloud, and archive files, including, but not limited to, backup tapes. Do not time stamp or modify the content, the create date, or the last date modified of any record and do not scrub any metadata. Electronic records should be produced in native format. For e-mails, please place responses in one .pst file per employee. For .pdf files, please provide searchable file format and not image file format.

- All email searches should be conducted by the agency's information technology department, or its equivalent, and not by the individuals whose records are being searched. Please provide the name and contact information of the individual(s) who conducted the search, as well as an explanation of how the search was conducted.

- To the extent practicable, please produce all records in a searchable electronic format and not hardcopies. Should you have any questions about the method or format of production please contact the undersigned to coordinate.

As used in this Notice of Investigation and Information Request:

"Agent" has its plain and ordinary meaning, indicating that a person, organization, or entity, is acting on behalf of another person, organization, or entity, whether that agency is disclosed or undisclosed.

"Contract" has the meaning given at 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(h)(1).

"Faculty" refers to all teaching positions at the university (including professors of all ranks, teachers, lecturers, and/or researchers whether in a classroom, laboratory, or other educational environment – whether physically or electronically present).

"Foreign source" has the meaning given at 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(h)(2).

"Gift" has the meaning given at 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(h)(3).

"Institution" has the meaning given at 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(h)(4) and for the purposes of this request includes all UTA campuses and facilities. Section 117 requires that when an institution receives the benefit of a gift from or a contract with a foreign source in the applicable amount, even if by an agent (e.g., employee) and through an intermediary (e.g., non-profit organization), it must disclose the gift or contract to the Department. Where a legal entity (e.g., centers, boards, foundations, research groups, partnerships, or non-profit organizations, whether or not organized under the laws of the United States and including, by way of example and not limitation, UTMB and GNL) operates substantially for the benefit or under the auspices of an IHE, there is a rebuttable presumption that when that legal entity receives money or enters into a contract with a foreign source, it is for the benefit of the institution, and, thus, must be disclosed.

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"Record" means all recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received, and including metadata, such as email and other electronic communication, word processing documents, PDF documents, animations (including PowerPoint™ and other similar programs) spreadsheets, databases, calendars, telephone logs, contact manager information, Internet usage files, network access information, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, financial statements, checks, wire transfers, accounts, ledgers, facsimiles, texts, animations, voicemail files, data generated by calendaring, task management and personal information management (PIM) software (such as Microsoft Outlook), data created with the use of personal data assistants (PDAs), data created with the use of document management software, data created with the use of paper and electronic mail logging and routing software, and other data or data compilations, stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. The term "recorded information" also includes all traditional forms of records, regardless of physical form or characteristics.

"Restricted or conditional gift or contract" has the meaning given at 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(h)(5).

"Staff" refers to all members of the university involved in administration of the university and its obligations and commitments (including deans of all ranks, administration officials, and support personnel).

"Wuhan MCL" refers to the maximum biocontainment laboratory in Wuhan, China, as referenced in GNL documents, and which may also be known as the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

If UTA asserts attorney-client or attorney-work product privilege for a given record, then it must prepare and submit a privilege log expressly identifying each such record and describing it so the Department may assess the claim's validity. Please note that no other privileges apply. UTA's record and data preservation obligations are outlined at Exhibit A.

Please note that Section 117(f), 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(f), provides that whenever it appears an IHE has failed to fully comply with the law, the Secretary of Education may, among other things, request that the Attorney General commence an enforcement action to compel compliance and to recover the full costs to the United States of obtaining compliance, including all associated costs of investigation and enforcement. Please further note there may also be other penalties triggered by the knowing and intentional submission of false reports and/or information.

The Department recognizes that the COVID-19 virus may have a significant impact on certain UTA operations. Nonetheless, the critical importance of the Department's investigation into the accuracy of UTA's foreign source reporting with respect to the Wuhan MCL and other Chinese Communist Party-related persons and entities is not diminished. Accordingly, the Department expects UTA's timely response to this investigation.

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This investigation is being directed by the Department's Office of the General Counsel. To arrange transmission of the requested information, or should you have any other questions, please contact:

Paul Moore
Office of the General Counsel
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Ave., S.W., Room 6E300
Washington, D.C. 20202
Paul.Moore@ed.gov

Sincerely yours,

4/21/2020

X Reed D. Rubinstein

Signed by: Reed Rubinstein

Reed D. Rubinstein
Principal Deputy General Counsel delegated
the authority and duties of the General Counsel

Attachment

EXHIBIT A

RECORD PRESERVATION REQUIREMENTS

This investigation requires preservation of all information from your institution's computer systems, removable electronic media, filing systems, and other locations relating to the matters that are the subject of the Notice of Investigation. You should immediately preserve all data and information about the data (i.e., backup activity logs and document retention policies) relating to records maintained in the ordinary course of business and that are covered by the Notice of Investigation. Also, you should preserve information available on the following platforms, whether in your possession or the possession of a third party, such as an employee or outside contractor: databases, networks, computer systems, including legacy systems (hardware and software), servers, archives, backup or disaster recovery systems, tapes, discs, drives, cartridges and other storage media, laptops, personal computers, internet data, personal digital assistants, handheld wireless devices, mobile telephones, paging devices, and audio systems (including voicemail). You should also preserve all hard copies of records regardless of location.

The laws and rules prohibiting destruction of evidence apply to electronically stored information in the same manner that they apply to other evidence. Accordingly, you must take every reasonable step to preserve relevant records. "Reasonable steps" with respect to these records include:

- Notifying in writing all potential custodians and IT personnel who may have relevant records of their preservation obligations under this investigation.
- Discontinuing all data and document destruction policies.
- Preserving all metadata.
- Preserving relevant records and/or hardware unless an exact replica of the file (a mirror image) is made.
- Preserving passwords, decryption procedures (and accompany software), network access codes, ID names, manuals, tutorials, written instructions, decompression or reconstruction software.
- Maintaining all other pertinent information and tools needed to access, review, and reconstruct necessary to access, view, and/or reconstruct all requested or potentially relevant electronic data.

You have an obligation to preserve all digital or analog electronic files in electronic format, regardless of whether hard copies of the information exist, with all metadata. This includes preserving:

- Active data (i.e., data immediately and easily accessible today).
- Archived/journaled data (i.e., data residing on backup tapes or other storage media).
- Deleted data (i.e., data that has been deleted from a computer hard drive but is recoverable through computer forensic techniques).
- Legacy data (i.e., data created on old or obsolete hardware or software).

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From: Raymond JEANLOZ <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:45 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Nice job -- Thanks so much!!

Raymond

On Thu, Apr 23, 2020 at 2:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> From the Houston Chronicle just posted.
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
> **To:** Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon
>
> # UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
>
> By Nick Powell
>
> Houston Chronicle
>
> •
>
> A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

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James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

Related Stories

Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

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"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all

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trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

- Galveston, Montgomery counties will not mandate face coverings
- UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

> On Apr 23, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I thought the story was very transparent and very well done. My husband brought the paper to me this morning and said "hey, there's a great story on the GNL on the front page today." He is not aware of our struggling with how best to handle this at all.
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
> **To:** Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** GDN GNL/Wuhan story

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Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

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"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

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While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was

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released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated

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from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen

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here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

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From: Courtney Morosetti (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 5:02 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I think this is a great article. I think you were very clear that there are dangers involved in your field of work. Accidents happen but don't jump to conclusions.
I'm sorry your under fire here. Seems like you handled yourself very well.
Good Luck. Hopefully people will realize this was not intentionally released by the Chinese government.
Good job. Keep up the good work.
Love,
Courtney

On Thu, Apr 23, 2020 at 5:27 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> More press
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
> **To:** Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon
>
> # UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
>
> By Nick Powell
>
> Houston Chronicle
>
> •

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

Related Stories

Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

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As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

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He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

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Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

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Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

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> **Cc:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna

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R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

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"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

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The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab.

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The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health

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Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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- SMS
- Email

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

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Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

--
Courtney Morosetti
(b)(6)

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From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 5:22 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Jim,
Just wanted to send along the link to my new story: https://www.vox.com/2020/4/23/21226484/wuhan-lab-coronavirus-china

Thanks again for your help with it, and please let me know if you think there are any key angles of the Covid-19 story the media should be covering!
All the best,
Eliza

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 12:15 PM Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com> wrote:

> Hi Jim,
>
> Thank you so much for your response. You mentioned the key question of when the Wuhan Institute of Virology first obtained this specific virus. According to this Scientific American article based on an extensive conversation with Dr. Shi Zhengli, the WIV got the first samples of the virus on December 30, sequenced the virus, and then checked it against sequences of viruses the lab had sampled and found it didn't match any of them.
>
> I have emailed Dr. Shi Zhengli to verify this but have not heard back. It is too bad that she is not able to offer more information to the press on why she is sure her lab is not the source. She also apparently went on Chinese social media in February to defend herself, saying "'I swear with my life – [the virus] has nothing to do with the lab."
>
> In any case, just thought I would share these details with you, as I intend to use them in my story. And if you have any thoughts on them, I'd love to hear them!
>
> All best,
> Eliza
>
> On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 2:31 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> > Hi Eliza,

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In answer to your questions, I do not know if they were doing gain of function studies with bat-associated coronaviruses in Wuhan. The attached publication from 2013 attests to the longstanding program of research on this group of viruses in Wuhan with international collaborators.

Regarding the second question, I don't think that anyone can definitively state with certainty that the virus did not come from a laboratory, especially with the high rate of asymptomatic infections. **The key question for the Wuhan Institute of Virology is when they first obtained this specific virus, and so far I am unaware of the answer to this question. It could not have originated from their lab if they did not have it in their possession.** I like to think that we can take Zhiming Yuan at his word, but he works in a very different culture with pressures we may not fully appreciate.

Best wishes, Jim

From: Eliza Barclay <eliza.barclay@vox.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2020 3:50 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Vox question about new statement from the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Dr. LeDuc,

I hope you've been well during this wild time. I just saw your quote in the Washington Post article about the contamination at the CDC lab that hindered testing early on. What a tragedy!

I'm writing because I am finally finishing up my follow-up article about the still-potent theory that the SARS-CoV-2 was being studied at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and accidentally escaped. I will acknowledge that while this is possible, there is still no evidence that it did happen, and the virology and emerging infectious disease scientific communities still think direct spillover is the more plausible origin.

Since you have worked with the folks at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, I wanted to ask two specific questions:

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1) To your knowledge, were they doing gain-of-function work with bat coronaviruses there?

2) Here in this article we have Yuan Zhiming, the vice director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, saying, "As people who carry out viral study, we clearly know what kind of research is going on in the institute and how [it] manages viruses and samples. As we said early on, there is no way this virus came from us."

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/laboratory-wuhan-breaks-silence-deny-claims-coronvarius-originated-there-n1186856

In your opinion, can we take Yuan Zhiming at his word? I am inclined to, but wanted to ask you if there is any reason to not take him at his word.

Feel free to respond by email or I would be more than happy to discuss by phone this weekend or early next week if you prefer.

Thanks so much,
Eliza

--

Eliza Barclay • Science Editor



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Eliza Barclay • Science Editor

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Eliza Barclay • Science Editor

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From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

By **Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News**

's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel [b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.



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

ZOOM IN:



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ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



ZOOM BACK OUT:


Coronavirus Tracker
TOTAL
China
Korea, South
Italy
Iran
Rest of Europe
Total of Europe
Germany
Total of US
New York
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
10.00%
9.00%
8.00%
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Reported Cases [Solid Lines]
Death Rate % of Reported Cases [Dashed Lines]
3/1
3/4
3/7
3/10
3/13
3/16
3/19
3/22
Time

ALL DATA:


Coronavirus Tracker
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
10.00%
9.00%
8.00%
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Reported Cases [Solid Lines]
Death Rate % of Reported Cases [Dashed Lines]
2/15
2/18
2/21
2/24
2/27
3/1
3/4
3/7
3/10
3/13
3/16
3/19
3/22
Time
TOTAL
China
Korea, South
Italy
Iran
Rest of Europe
Total of Europe
Germany
Total of US
New York
Rest of US
Washington
California
Japan
Rest of Asia
Rest of Americas
Rest of Middle East
Africa
Other

See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N'' latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

''Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates,'' said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. ''That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data.''

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. ''Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk,'' said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

''I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses,'' said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. ''And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts.''

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

''Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future,'' said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. ''In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats.''

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

''This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies,'' said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. ''Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread.''

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel [(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel [(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

Sent: 4/24/2020 10:44:26 AM
To: Steven Lee Myers [myers@nytimes.com]
Subject: RE: Query from the New York Times
Attachments: Media Statement_UTMB and WIV-4-20-20.docx

Good morning Steven,

Attached is a summary of our engagement with the Wuhan Institute of Virology that may address many of your questions. There was also a detailed story published yesterday in the Houston Chronicle and separately in the Galveston County News on this same subject. The NASEM also just posted a brief statement regarding the US-China dialogue that has been in place since 2015 that is mentioned in the attached.

From: Steven Lee Myers <myers@nytimes.com>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 10:35 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Query from the New York Times

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dr. LeDuc,

Hello. I am the Beijing Bureau Chief for The New York Times, currently expelled from the country as part of China's spat with the US. We are writing an article trying to tamp down the conspiracy theories surrounding the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and I saw that you visited there in 2017. Would it be possible to speak by phone? I would be happy to call at your convenience.

I'm currently in Califorinia, in Santa Barbara, to be precise, while we sort out visas for our reporters in the region.

Best

Steven Lee Myers

The New York Times, Beijing
+86-186-1237-6686
Twitter: @stevenleemyers
Facebook: StevenLeeMyersNYT
What'sApp and Signal, (b)(6)

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 10:48 AM
To: Steven Lee Myers
Cc: Reyes, Raul
Subject: RE: Query from the New York Times
Attachments: Media Statement_UTMB and WIV-4-20-20.docx

Good morning Steven,

Attached is a summary of our engagement with the Wuhan Institute of Virology that may address many of your questions. There was also a detailed story published yesterday based on interviews earlier this week in the Houston Chronicle and separately in the Galveston County News on this same subject. The NASEM also just posted a brief statement regarding the US-China dialogue that has been in place since 2015 that is mentioned in the attached. Let me know if you have additional questions.

Thanks, Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Steven Lee Myers <myers@nytimes.com>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 10:35 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Query from the New York Times

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Best

Steven Lee Myers

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The New York Times, Beijing
+86-186-1237-6686
Twitter: @stevenleemyers
Facebook: StevenLeeMyersNYT
What'sApp and Signal, (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_002609

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 11:03 AM
To: Campbell, Stephen;Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Fwd: Query from the New York Times
Attachments: Media Statement_UTMB and WIV-4-20-20.docx; ATT00001.htm

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

Begin forwarded message:

From: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Date: April 24, 2020 at 10:48:02 AM CDT
To: Steven Lee Myers <myers@nytimes.com>
Cc: "Reyes, Raul" <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Query from the New York Times

Good morning Steven,

Attached is a summary of our engagement with the Wuhan Institute of Virology that may address many of your questions. There was also a detailed story published yesterday based on interviews earlier this week in the Houston Chronicle and separately in the Galveston County News on this same subject. The NASEM also just posted a brief statement regarding the US-China dialogue that has been in place since 2015 that is mentioned in the attached. Let me know if you have additional questions.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Twitter: @stevenleemyers
Facebook: StevenLeeMyersNYT
What'sApp and Signal, (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085383

From: Steven Lee Myers <myers@nytimes.com>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 11:19 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Query from the New York Times

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thank you very much for the quick response.

The thing I have puzzled over is why this has spread so widely now -- the conspiracy theory, I mean. No one seriously argues it was an intentional leak, but some have raised the possibility of the research work somehow spilling out.

I also wonder if you could share a bit about what Dr. Shi is like. She seems quite a character (crawling into caves, etc.) but she declined our request for an interview, alas.

Best

Steve

The New York Times, Beijing
+86-186-1237-6686
Twitter: @stevenleemyers
Facebook: StevenLeeMyersNYT
What'sApp and Signal, (b)(6)

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 11:47 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Good morning Steven,
>
> Attached is a summary of our engagement with the Wuhan Institute of Virology that may address many of your questions. There was also a detailed story published yesterday based on interviews earlier this week in the Houston Chronicle and separately in the Galveston County News on this same subject. The NASEM also just posted a brief statement regarding the US-China dialogue that has been in place since 2015 that is mentioned in the attached. Let me know if you have additional questions.

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Director

Galveston National Laboratory

University of Texas Medical Branch

Galveston, TX 77555-0610

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Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 10:35 AM
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Best

Steven Lee Myers

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The New York Times, Beijing
+86-186-1237-6686

Twitter: @stevenleemyers
Facebook: StevenLeeMyersNYT

What'sApp and Signal, (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 1:48 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com);Raymond Jeanloz;Lowenthal, Micah;Shi, Pei yong
Subject: RE: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks Jim,

Pei-yong have you mentioned the virtual dialogue letter to Zhiming?

FYI George Gao is scheduled to be on a virtual panel with Toni Fauci at the NAS annual meeting tomorrow afternoon at 2 pm.
http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/events/annual-meeting/nas157/covid19-update.html

Anyone can listen in.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 5:27 PM
To: Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Raymond Jeanloz <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

From the Houston Chronicle just posted.

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

Related Stories

Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another

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cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

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He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

nick.powell@chron.com

Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

- Galveston, Montgomery counties will not mandate face coverings
- UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
- State parks reopen, giving Texans a much-needed break from cabin fever

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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

> On Apr 23, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I thought the story was very transparent and very well done. My husband brought the paper to me this morning and said "hey, there's a great story on the GNL on the front page today." He is not aware of our struggling with how best to handle this at all.
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
> **To:** Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** GDN GNL/Wuhan story
>
> # Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan
>
> - By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
> - 33 min ago
>
> - 0
>
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> - Twitter
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> - SMS
> - Email
> - Save

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

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Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009652

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the

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virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

- Facebook
- Twitter
- WhatsApp
- SMS
- Email

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009654

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009655

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 1:53 PM
To: Benjamin Rusek
Cc: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Excellent! Thanks! Will do. d

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> Thanks Jim,
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>
> FYI George Gao is scheduled to be on a virtual panel with Toni Fauci at the NAS annual meeting tomorrow afternoon at 2 pm.
> http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/events/annual-meeting/nas157/covid19-update.html
>
> Anyone can listen in.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Ben
>
> Benjamin Rusek
> The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
> 1-202-334-3975
>
> **From:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 5:27 PM
> **To:** Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Raymond Jeanloz <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon
>
> From the Houston Chronicle just posted.
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 4:06 PM
> **To:** Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

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UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research

By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

A leading Texas scientist who visited a Chinese laboratory conducting coronavirus research acknowledged that while that facility made security a priority, it is possible that an accident could have led to the global virus outbreak.

James Le Duc, the director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, has had a professional relationship with several Chinese biocontainment labs since 2013, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory, which studies some of the world's most lethal infectious diseases, including coronaviruses in bats.

The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

Le Duc visited the Wuhan lab in 2017, shortly before it opened, and even hosted the lab's building engineers at the Galveston National Laboratory for a training program on building operations and maintenance while it was under construction. While Le Duc said he did not see anything during that visit to the lab that alarmed him or hinted at lax safety protocols, he acknowledged that even laboratories with the highest level of security are prone to accidents.

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Diplomatic cables from 2018 obtained by The Washington Post warned about questionable safety and inadequate training at the lab and the risk potential of coronaviruses from bats being transmitted to humans and causing a pandemic similar to SARS in 2003.

"Accidents happen," Le Duc told the Houston Chronicle. "You do your best to prevent it, and you prepare for an eventuality if it should happen. So all I can say is (the Wuhan lab) was built comparable to ours, with a whole series of redundant safety measures in place. We did our best to share best practices so that they knew how to drive it and keep it safe. But it would be foolish to say there's no risk, because there's risk in everything."

Senior officials at the Wuhan lab have consistently denied any link between their facility and the coronavirus outbreak. Yuan Zhiming, a top scientist at the Wuhan facility, told Chinese state television recently, "There is absolutely no way that the virus originated from our institute."

Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

"That really took a load off my mind," Shi said. "I had not slept a wink for days."

Yet the coronavirus research at the Wuhan lab so alarmed American science diplomats that they requested the United States provide further support beyond the assistance that the lab was getting from UTMB. In another cable, diplomats noted "the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained

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technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory."

As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

UTMB's relationship with China dates back to 2013, when the medical branch opened discussions with three labs that were under construction, including the facility in Wuhan. Through the Galveston National Laboratory's federally-funded national training center, Le Duc led a team that provided individualized, hands-on training in biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment laboratory operations to international partners from around the world who had built or were building new biocontainment laboratories.

As part of this engagement with the Chinese, the Galveston National Laboratory hosted a team of engineers that was building the lab in Wuhan to train them specifically on maintenance and operations of biocontainment labs. The national laboratory also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral scientists from the Wuhan lab. They completed the nearly year-long training needed to gain independent access to the Galveston facility and collaborated with UTMB faculty on Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus research.

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UTMB did not provide the specific dates when the Chinese staffers came to Galveston, but Le Duc said they arrived in the years prior to the Wuhan facility opening in 2017. The medical branch also declined to release the names of the two Chinese scientists from the Wuhan lab, citing federal law that protects the privacy of student records.

"We wanted to make sure that we were engaged with (China) because they're a huge country, they've got tremendous intellectual power, and a lot of ongoing scientific collaborations," Le Duc said. "We just wanted to make sure that as they stood up their new biocontainment labs, that they were aware of our experiences and kind of open up a dialogue so that we could share best practices."

Le Duc spoke highly of Shi, a professional colleague whose research he admires. Both scientists attended annual meetings hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, where Le Duc listened to Shi warn of the dangers of coronaviruses jumping from animals to humans as far back as 2015. Shi's presentations at these meetings have not been made public.

While one of the 2018 diplomatic cables obtained by The Post warned of the public health risk of bat-associated coronaviruses, Le Duc said the dangers of these viruses have been common knowledge in the scientific community for years, in large part because of Shi's research.

"I've never seen the cable but it's kind of being implied that this is breaking news," he said. "Well, in the scientific community we had been talking about this for at least five years. It wasn't breaking news and it wasn't a surprise to the scientists that are working in this field."

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He has kept in touch with Shi since the outbreak and is saddened her integrity has come into question. Le Duc said he believes Shi's account of when she was first notified of the first coronavirus infections and that the timeline of events suggests to him that the virus did not originate in the Wuhan lab.

"It's all speculation that the lab was involved and I think it's very appropriate that people look into this because that's where some of the work is done, but the timeline doesn't make sense," he said. "I'm not at all trying to defend her or the laboratory, and frankly I think the Chinese government has done themselves and the global community a big disservice by not being more transparent as to what's going on, but that's a whole different set of issues."

Federal officials had hoped UTMB's unique relationship with the Wuhan lab might led to an exchange that would help U.S. officials develop a diagnostic test for COVID-19, but Chinese officials nixed the idea in late January, The Post has reported.

Le Duc also dismissed conspiracy theories suggesting that the coronavirus was man-made in the Wuhan lab, saying it "almost certainly originated from nature" given its similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses. But he conceded that working with infectious diseases, even in the most secure facilities, is inherently risky.

"We as scientists try and use the best practices," he said. "Nobody wants to get sick, nobody wants to take their work home with them. Like anything, it's a highly specialized field, there are tools and procedures that protect the individuals working in the field and we all try and use them."

nick.powell@chron.com

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Nick Powell

Nick Powell covers Galveston and the Bay Area for the Houston Chronicle.

Past Articles from this Author:

- Galveston, Montgomery counties will not mandate face coverings
- UTMB scientist acknowledges safety risks at Chinese lab doing coronavirus research
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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:45 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Good to hear Sheila.

Thank you.

Raul

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

> On Apr 23, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I thought the story was very transparent and very well done. My husband brought the paper to me this morning and said "hey, there's a great story on the GNL on the front page today." He is not aware of our struggling with how best to handle this at all.

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From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: GDN GNL/Wuhan story

Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

- 0

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

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But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

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Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

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On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

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After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

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Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

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Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

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From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 1:13 PM
To: Ren, Ping
Subject: FW: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

You may join the presentation now

- Pei-Yong

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 1:48 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Raymond Jeanloz <jeanloz@berkeley.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: And here is the HC story that posted Thursday afternoon

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks Jim,

Pei-yong have you mentioned the virtual dialogue letter to Zhiming?

FYI George Gao is scheduled to be on a virtual panel with Toni Fauci at the NAS annual meeting tomorrow afternoon at 2 pm.
http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/events/annual-meeting/nas157/covid19-update.html

Anyone can listen in.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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By Nick Powell
Houston Chronicle

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The Wuhan laboratory's research has prompted speculation by Trump administration officials and others that it may have had a role in causing the coronavirus outbreak in China's Hubei Province, the virus's epicenter. Administration officials have also called on China to close its "wet markets," more widely viewed as the source of the COVID-19 outbreak linked to more than 183,000 deaths worldwide.

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Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan lab and one of the world's leading researchers on bat coronaviruses, told Scientific American last month that she initially feared the virus could have originated at her facility, but was relieved that none of the genetic sequences taken from infected patients matched the viruses her team had sampled from bat caves.

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As part of a team at UTMB that helped train staff from the Wuhan lab, Le Duc was hesitant to ascribe blame or speculate on any specific cause of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. He did, however, acknowledge China's relative lack of experience in establishing high-security biocontainment labs.

"I can say that this was a brand-new laboratory that was working at a level of biocontainment that they had not worked at in the past, so it's not surprising that they don't have a whole lot of people with experience in it," said Le Duc, who joined UTMB in 2006 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "I don't think that that means that they were any less appreciative of safety and security than anyone else."

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nick.powell@chron.com

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> **Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:11 PM
> **To:** Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** GDN GNL/Wuhan story
>
> # Galveston bio lab explains connections to Wuhan

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- By JOHN WAYNE FERGUSON The Daily News
- 33 min ago

- 0

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GALVESTON

In a biocontainment laboratory, there's always a risk of something going wrong, Dr. James LeDuc, director of the Galveston National Laboratory said.

People can unintentionally be stuck with a needle or bitten by an infected animal, causing a breach of even the most secure lab protocols.

But as a theory about a Chinese lab being the original source of the global coronavirus pandemic circulates at the highest level of the U.S. government, LeDuc was cautious about placing blame on the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

"I certainly wouldn't say that there isn't a possibility for something to get released out of our laboratory or any other lab around the world," LeDuc said. "I can say there are redundant safety mechanisms in place both here, and certainly in Wuhan, that guard against that.

"But sometimes accidents happen," he said

LeDuc is a former U.S. Centers for Disease Control official who once led the office responsible for preventing deaths from viral disease.

LeDuc wasn't just speculating about the safety of the Wuhan lab. The Galveston National Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch has a years-long relationship with the facility and its researchers.

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LeDuc, who visited the Wuhan lab while it was under construction in 2017, said it is comparable in quality and safety to biosafety labs in the United State and Europe.

Questions about the role of the Wuhan lab have increased in recent days because of statements by President Donald Trump and other political leaders. A widely read column in The Washington Post also raised new questions about where the virus originated.

Wuhan, a city in eastern China, was the site of the first major outbreak of the coronavirus. Speculation about the lab as the source of the outbreak has been fueled by multiple factors, including its location and by the efforts of the Chinese government to tamp down on reporting about the virus outbreak.

Recent news about the Wuhan lab has included mentions of the Galveston National Laboratory and the medical branch's connection to the Chinese lab.

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

The Galveston lab has worked with China since 2013, when construction began on the Wuhan laboratory. Both the Galveston and Wuhan research facilities operate Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, which are designed to safely contain the most lethal and infectious pathogens for research, LeDuc said.

While the Wuhan lab was under construction, the National Lab provided "short-term training experiences" to the staff, LeDuc said. The Galveston lab also hosted two Chinese post-doctoral students, who were trained to work safely in BSL-4 laboratories and who returned to China to work in the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

Those students started a biosafety and biocontainment training program for the Wuhan lab, LeDuc said.

The National Laboratory's role in training researchers from China isn't unusual. Between 2008 and 2016, the National Lab's National Biocontainment Training

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Center was funded the by U.S. Department of Defense to teach researchers from about 70 countries on laboratory safety techniques.

Defense department funding for the training center ended in 2016. Since then, the Galveston National Laboratory hasn't offered training to international researchers, LeDuc said.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAINING

Claims about a lack of training have been at the center of the latest news about the Wuhan lab's connection to the coronavirus outbreak.

On April 14, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin reported on U.S. State Department cables, written in 2018, that warned about safety management weaknesses at the Wuhan lab.

Rogin interviewed an unnamed U.S. official who called the cables a "warning shot" meant to bring more attention and support to the lab. The cables said the Wuhan lab had a shortage of trained technicians and researchers. Despite the cables, no extra U.S. assistance was given to the lab, Rogin said.

In recent months, the cables have circulated among Trump administration officials as possible evidence the coronavirus was released in China as the result of a lab accident, Rogin said. On the same day as Rogin's column, Yahoo News published its own report about the Trump administration's speculation about the Wuhan Lab that emphasized there was no hard evidence for the connection.

The intelligence community "has not come down on any one theory," about the origins of the virus, the Yahoo story said.

LeDuc didn't know anything about the State Department cables, he said. He didn't think the comments about training were a direct reference to the Galveston National Laboratory or its programs, he said.

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Rogin's report focuses on the concerns about Wuhan's BSL-4 lab. The Yahoo article and the CDC's own website note that coronavirus samples can be handled safely in laboratories with lower safety levels.

The Galveston National Laboratory received a sample of the coronavirus for research in February. Since then, researchers have worked with the virus in the medical branch's BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, officials confirmed Tuesday.

After the Washington Post column was published, some conservative news organizations, including Fox News, reported about "increased confidence," again from unnamed U.S. officials about the Wuhan lab being the origin of the virus. On Saturday, Trump said China should face consequences if it was "knowingly responsible" for releasing the virus.

The director of the Wuhan lab on Tuesday denied any connection between the lab and the outbreak. Also on Tuesday, the World Health Organization said evidence shows the virus likely originated in animals and that it was not manipulated or constructed in a laboratory.

LeDuc had similar sentiments about the origins of the coronavirus.

"There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses," LeDuc said.

John Wayne Ferguson: 409-683-5226; john.ferguson@galvnews.com or on Twitter @johnwferguson.

- Facebook
- Twitter
- WhatsApp
- SMS
- Email

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

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On Apr 22, 2020, at 5:36 PM, Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@utmb.edu> wrote:

Thank you Raul.

-----Original Message-----
From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 4:00 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Le Duc, HC and GDN

Good afternoon all.

Dr. Le Duc has spoken to the GDN and the HC in separate interviews.

In response to whether he thought that the virus could have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, Dr. Le Duc essentially said that we don't know. He pointed out all the safety redundancies that the lab there and the GNL have.

"You know there's always a risk of something going wrong." "Did that happen here? I have no idea."

Also, Dr. Le Duc was asked about the possibility of accidents by the Chronicle reporter "You do your best to prevent it. All I can say is that their lab was built with a bunch of safety redundancies...it would be foolish to say that there are no accidents.".

Both reporters asked about the State Department cables and Dr. Le Duc said that he hadn't seen the cables and could not speak to that specifically.

Both reporters wanted to know about the training that we had provided and Dr. Le Duc provided some good explanations. He also stressed why we think that the training is important because we want everyone to be safe and no one wants to have an accident or get sick.

I will send copies of the stories once they are posted or published.

Thank you everyone,

Raul

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 11:35 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

I'm coming back to you again. I hope you can speak with me.
This time, we see indications that the U.S. Dept of Education is asking UofT for all information related to its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and in particular "*gifts, contracts, and/or restricted and conditional gifts or contracts*" related to the ties. It specifically notes "*substantial contractual relations*" with Wuhan BSL-4 lab and refers to the Galveston lab.
I don't know if you have been approached directly about this yet but it's a fact-finding effort by the Education Depart to find any and all links with Wuhan institute.

Do you know what the U.S. government is looking for exactly?

The request notes its request is for: *True copies of each gift or donation agreement, contract, and/or conditional gift or donation agreement or contract to which your Institution and the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or the Chinese Academy of Sciences are parties.*

It also makes a request for: *All records (including but not limited to emails and true copies of contracts and/or gift or donation agreements) of, regarding, or relating to (a) the Wuhan MCL, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan MCL researcher Shi Zhengli, and Eric Yuan, Chief Executive Officer of Zoom Communications; and/or (b) any gift, contract, or conditional gift or contract from or with the Communist Party of China, its agents, employees, representatives, and instrumentalities.*

Do you have any idea what links there are between Dr. Shi and Eric Yuan?

I am interested in any perspective you can provide on any of the above. This also raises the question of money going the other way: to Wuhan from the U.S. government. Some media have said Galveston has been a bridge to the Wuhan institute for U.S. government funds. I mentioned this previously. I'd like to know more.

Quite separately, here is a story I recently did for WSJ on SHI Zhengli. I had hoped you might participate more in the story.

Going into this effort I didn't realize how much attention the Wuhan institute and the labs there would draw scrutiny. But clearly it's grabbing big attention now. I hope you can provide me some perspectives.

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Thanks for your time at what must be a busy time.

James T. Areddy

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On Sat, Apr 18, 2020 at 8:40 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

PS....this new interview in China seems to make reference to you. https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1251435120281542656

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 9:41 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

Jim
I'm having no luck tracking down that presentation that Shi Zhengli made by searching US and China sources, or contacting the organizers.

Have you spent much time with her? We are trying to write a profile on her and it would be beneficial to hear from you. I'm more interested in her contribution to the science of bats and coronavirus. (That might not be your specialty area.) I wonder if you saw her in Wuhan in her lab and what you might have observed, including live animals she might have kept.
If you have views on safety lapses I am definitely interested in that too. But finding those isn't really my primary goal.

Separately, there are reports about U.S. government funding that made its way to Wuhan Institute of Viriology, apparently some of it through Galveston. Is there something you can tell me about that such as amounts and time period and goals? Perhaps it was related to the two researchers from the institute your group trained and/or trips made to the institute by your team.

Can we speak today?

James T. Areddy

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[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:50 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:
She gave the presentation.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 14, 2020, at 4:48 PM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

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[redacted]

[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Zheng Li has been working on bat-associated coronaviruses since just after the original SARS outbreak in 2003. For at least the last 5 years she has been reporting the bat-associated coronaviruses may have the ability to infect humans and that we should be watching for their possible emergence as human activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

It's really fascinating. Here's an interview with the reporter on that story where he describes how the State Dept was concerned two years ago about procedures in Wuhan early on. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgnT2YK3BBI&feature=youtu.be He calls the link between the lab and the outbreak as a 'circumstantial' case. But do you know if Shi Zhengli's focus on bat coronavirus was a worry back a few years ago?

James T. Areddy

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<image004.jpg>

<image005.jpg>

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 11:09 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> James,

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Thank you for sharing the report below. I had not seen this previously and I find it quite interesting, especially the comment about our laboratory working to help train scientists and building engineers from the new BSL4 laboratory. We clearly recognized this need but unfortunately, were unable to identify funding to support our efforts. I do believe that between our efforts on a lab-to-lab basis and the overarching dialogue maintained by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have had a positive impact, although admittedly limited.

I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

Director

Galveston National Laboratory

University of Texas Medical Branch

Galveston, TX 77555-0610

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(f) 409-266-6810

(m) (b)(6)

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

Hi. We spoke several weeks ago when I did a story for The Wall Street Journal about BSL-4 labs. Since then the Washington Post has had two stories suggesting fears in USA that there could have been an accident in Wuhan. I'm curious to know what you think about these reports?

(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)

<image001.jpg>

Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan **lab** studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the **lab**, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan **lab** was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV

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issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October

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2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.
"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.
There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the

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first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this **lab** was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai **lab** that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan **lab**, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

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<image004.jpg>

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From: jwleduc@UTMB.EDU
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 9:16 PM
To: james.areddy@wsj.com
Subject: Re: wsj

Hi

Fist I've heard about the request for information from the Dept of Education. We have an agreement with WIV but I don't think there is money being transferred. I don't know

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 26, 2020, at 11:35 AM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim

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I don't know if you have been approached directly about this yet but it's a fact-finding effort by the Education Depart to find any and all links with Wuhan institute.

Do you know what the U.S. government is looking for exactly?

The request notes its request is for: *True copies of each gift or donation agreement, contract, and/or conditional gift or donation agreement or contract to which your Institution and the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or the Chinese Academy of Sciences are parties.*

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Do you have any idea what links there are between Dr. Shi and Eric Yuan?

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I am interested in any perspective you can provide on any of the above. This also raises the question of money going the other way: to Wuhan from the U.S. government. Some media have said Galveston has been a bridge to the Wuhan institute for U.S. government funds. I mentioned this previously. I'd like to know more.

Quite separately, here is a story I recently did for WSJ on SHI Zhengli. I had hoped you might participate more in the story.

Going into this effort I didn't realize how much attention the Wuhan institute and the labs there would draw scrutiny. But clearly it's grabbing big attention now. I hope you can provide me some perspectives.
Thanks for your time at what must be a busy time.

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On Sat, Apr 18, 2020 at 8:40 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:
PS....this new interview in China seems to make reference to you. https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1251435120281542656

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I'm having no luck tracking down that presentation that Shi Zhengli made by searching US and China sources, or contacting the organizers.

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Perhaps it was related to the two researchers from the institute your group trained and/or trips made to the institute by your team.

Can we speak today?

James T. Areddy

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> Jim
> Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
> I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
>
> **James T. Areddy**
>
> The Wall Street Journal.
> +86 1370 1700 594
>
> james.areddy@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001172

james.areddy@shnq-news.com (中文)
[redacted]
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

[redacted]

[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Zheng Li has been working on bat-associated coronaviruses since just after the original SARS outbreak in 2003. For at least the last 5 years she has been reporting the bat-associated coronaviruses may have the ability to infect humans and that we should be watching for their possible emergence as human activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

It's really fascinating. Here's an interview with the reporter on that story where he describes how the State Dept was concerned two years ago about procedures in Wuhan early on. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgnT2YK3BBI&feature=youtu.be He calls the link between the lab and the outbreak as a 'circumstantial' case. But do you know if Shi Zhengli's focus on bat coronavirus was a worry back a few years ago?

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal.

+86 1370 1700 594

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001173

james.areddy@wsj.com
james.areddy@shng-news.com (中文)
(b)(6)
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 11:09 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

James,

Thank you for sharing the report below. I had not seen this previously and I find it quite interesting, especially the comment about our laboratory working to help train scientists and building engineers from the new BSL4 laboratory. We clearly recognized this need but unfortunately, were unable to identify funding to support our efforts. I do believe that between our efforts on a lab-to-lab basis and the overarching dialogue maintained by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have had a positive impact, although admittedly limited.

I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

Director

Galveston National Laboratory

University of Texas Medical Branch

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Galveston, TX 77555-0610

(t) 409-266-6500

(f) 409-266-6810

(m) (b)(6)

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

Hi. We spoke several weeks ago when I did a story for The Wall Street Journal about BSL-4 labs. Since then the Washington Post has had two stories suggesting fears in USA that there could have been an accident in Wuhan. I'm curious to know what you think about these reports?

(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)

<image001.jpg>

Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan **lab** studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.
"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

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The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the

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level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

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The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai **lab** that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan **lab**, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal

+86 1370 1700 594

james.areddy@wsj.com
james.areddy@shng-news.com (中文)
[redacted]
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

<image004.jpg>

<image005.jpg>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001179

From: Samuel Valdebenito <svaldebenito@veterquimica.cl>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 8:06 AM
To: Eugenin, Eliseo
Cc: Valdebenito-Silva, Silvana;Jessica Valdebenito;Ajasin, David;Gorska, Anna;Luu, Ross H.
Subject: Re: mirenlo todo-look this

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Cheo;

saw the video.
Chinese pollute, lie, irresponsible

El sáb., 25 abr. 2020 a las 9:34, Eugenin, Eliseo (<eleugeni@utmb.edu>) escribió:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/coronavirusfilm?utm_source=Epoch_Times&utm_medium=Banner



Tracking Down the Origin of the Wuhan Coronavirus

"Additional studies of Shi Zhengli very strongly support the idea that this new coronavirus came from a recombination event. That is a cutting and pasting of two different viruses.

www.theepochtimes.com

Eliseo Eugenin. Ph.D.
William D. Willis, Jr., M.D., Ph.D. Professorship in Neuroscience
University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB)
Department of Neuroscience, Cell Biology, and Anatomy
105 11th Street
Galveston, Texas, 77555
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Lab :(409) 772-0155
FAX : (409) 747-2200
Cell Phone: (b)(6) (ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES)
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Síguenos

veterquimica.cl

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_061860

From: 赵喻莎 <zhaoyusha@globaltimes.com.cn>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 9:44 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Interview Request from the Global Times

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. LeDuc,

This is Yusha from Global Times, a Beijing-based newspaper. I've been reading reports about you and saw you has been vocal to defend Ms. Zhi Zhengli and the controversial Wuhan P4 lab, which have been center of criticism as many believed the P4 lab is the origin of coronavirus. So I am writing to invite you share your comments on this matter, at your convenience.

Our questions involve:

1. There have been some conspiracy theories floating (e.g. the virus escaped from a lab), as a scientist who closely involved in training the lab's virologists and toured the lab yourself, do you think the lab has adopted sufficient safety measures as the rest of the world to prevent possible leak of virus? And do you think there's possibility that the coronavirus was synthetized by the lab?

2. During your interaction with scientists from Wuhan Institute of Virology, including Ms. Shi Zhengli herself, do you think they are professional qualified to work in such a lab, full of highly pathogenic microorganisms; and how do you commend on their works?

3. Some politicians, especially from the US, kept talking about the virus for political purposes, how do you think from the perspective of science?

4. As WHO suggests people may need to co-exist with the virus for a long time, what is your suggestions?

Your opinion is vital for us to compile our reports and provide an international perspective to perceive the virus, so thank you Mr. LeDuc very much for your time! And I am looking forward to your reply!

All the best,

Sincerely,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Yusha
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globaltimes.com.cn

邮箱：zhaoyusha@globaltimes.co...

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009172

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: Interview Request from the Global Times

Just FYI. I will not be responding to this one.

Thanks, Jim

From: 赵喻莎 <zhaoyusha@globaltimes.com.cn>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 9:44 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Interview Request from the Global Times

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

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4. As WHO suggests people may need to co-exist with the virus for a long time, what is your suggestions?

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All the best,

Sincerely,

Yusha

---

globaltimes.com.cn

邮箱：zhaoyusha@globaltimes.co...

赵瑜莎

环球时报英...

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008861

From: Public Info Requests <PublicInfoRequests@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:02 AM
To: Wilson, Becky M.;King, Carolee A. (Legal);Andersen, Nathan J.;Pennington, Erin D.
Subject: FW: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle

From: Root, Jay[SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:01:25 AM
To: Public Info Requests
Subject: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle
Auto forwarded by a Rule

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Greetings,

Under all laws which guarantee access to public records, please provide me with the following:

1. Any and all records in any format, including but not limited to emails, attachments, text messages, communications via third party apps and any other records sent to or from anyone at the Wuhan Institute of Virology from Jan. 1, 2019 to the present.

2. Any and all records in any format, including but not limited to emails, attachments, text messages, communications via third party apps and any other records that in any way mention safety issues or concerns about safety issues and/or management issues and/or shortages of personnel at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and/or any other Level 4 lab in China.

3. Any and all records in any format, including but not limited to emails, attachments, text messages, communications via third party apps and any other records that in any way mention Zhengli Shi, including but not limited to any such records sent to or from Zhengli Shi.

4. Any and all records in any format used for presentations, including but not limited to Power Points, Slides, documents, photos, graphics, spreadsheets or any other records, about coronaviruses, including but not limited to any that were prepared for or used at NASEM/CAS meetings, including but not limited to the one held in September 2015.

5. And all communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, communications via third party apps and any other records sent to or from any Chinese scientists who received training at UTMB and who are or were affiliated in any way with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and/or the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences.

As you conduct a search for these records, allow me to call your attention to court precedent and laws, including SB 944 (2019), establishing that communications about government business are public records even if sent from private devices and/or non-government domains. So items 1-5 above would apply to any responsive records no matter what devices or domains were used.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067315

Additionally, I ask that you determine under 552.267 of the Texas Government Code that I am entitled to a waiver or reduction of any fees because as a member of the news media, I will be disseminating this information to the general public, which will benefit from the knowledge of this important topic.

Please do not hesitate to call me at (b)(6) or email me at jay.root@chron.com if you have any questions about the scope or nature of this request.

Respectfully,

Jay Root

Reporter/Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067316

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:03 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Interview Request from the Global Times

Thanks. Do you want me to send them the summary or just ignore their request?
It sounds as if they've already decided what they are going to write.

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Interview Request from the Global Times

Just FYI. I will not be responding to this one.

Thanks, Jim

From: 赵喻莎 <zhaoyusha@globaltimes.com.cn>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 9:44 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Interview Request from the Global Times

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. LeDuc,

This is Yusha from Global Times, a Beijing-based newspaper. I've been reading reports about you and saw you has been vocal to defend Ms. Zhi Zhengli and the controversial Wuhan P4 lab, which have been center of criticism as many believed the P4 lab is the origin of coronavirus. So I am writing to invite you share your comments on this matter, at your convenience.

Our questions involve:

1. There have been some conspiracy theories floating (e.g. the virus escaped from a lab), as a scientist who closely involved in training the lab's virologists and toured the lab yourself, do you think the lab has adopted sufficient safety measures as the rest of the world to prevent possible leak of virus? And do you think there's possibility that the coronavirus was synthetized by the lab?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008106

2. During your interaction with scientists from Wuhan Institute of Virology, including Ms. Shi Zhengli herself, do you think they are professional qualified to work in such a lab, full of highly pathogenic microorganisms; and how do you commend on their works?

3. Some politicians, especially from the US, kept talking about the virus for political purposes, how do you think from the perspective of science?

4. As WHO suggests people may need to co-exist with the virus for a long time, what is your suggestions?

Your opinion is vital for us to compile our reports and provide an international perspective to perceive the virus, so thank you Mr. LeDuc very much for your time! And I am looking forward to your reply!

All the best,

Sincerely,

Yusha

---

globaltimes.com.cn

邮箱：zhaoyusha@globaltimes.co...

赵瑜莎

环球时报英...

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008107

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:34 AM
To: Reyes, Raul
Subject: RE: Interview Request from the Global Times

Let's just ignore them. I don't want more attention in China.

Thanks, Jim

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:03 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Interview Request from the Global Times

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It sounds as if they've already decided what they are going to write.

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Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Interview Request from the Global Times

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All the best,

Sincerely,

Yusha

---

globaltimes.com.cn

邮箱：zhaoyusha@globaltimes.co...

赵瑜莎

环球时报英...

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008845

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:44 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Interview Request from the Global Times

K

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

On Apr 27, 2020, at 11:34 AM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

Let's just ignore them. I don't want more attention in China.

Thanks, Jim

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:03 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Interview Request from the Global Times

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Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Interview Request from the Global Times

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Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 9:44 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Interview Request from the Global Times

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008655

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. LeDuc,

This is Yusha from Global Times, a Beijing-based newspaper. I've been reading reports about you and saw you has been vocal to defend Ms. Zhi Zhengli and the controversial Wuhan P4 lab, which have been center of criticism as many believed the P4 lab is the origin of coronavirus. So I am writing to invite you share your comments on this matter, at your convenience.

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3. Some politicians, especially from the US, kept talking about the virus for political purposes, how do you think from the perspective of science?

4. As WHO suggests people may need to co-exist with the virus for a long time, what is your suggestions?

Your opinion is vital for us to compile our reports and provide an international perspective to perceive the virus, so thank you Mr. LeDuc very much for your time! And I am looking forward to your reply!

All the best,

Sincerely,

Yusha

<image001.png>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008656

From: /O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=A4CDFCC1E3F840ABAB8E29AF25BDD88C-WILSON, BEC
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:23 PM
To: SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM
Cc: Andersen, Nathan J.;Pennington, Erin D.
Subject: Your Texas Public Information Act Request - Jay Root PIA #2

Dear Mr. Root,

The University of Texas Medical Branch ("UTMB") has received your request for information (Jay Root PIA #2). In accordance with Galveston County's order to shelter in place effective 11:59 March 24, 2020, UTMB's physical offices are currently closed. Per the Attorney General's guidance, if a governmental body has closed its physical offices for purposes of a public health or epidemic response, then such day is not a business day, even if staff continues to work remotely or staff is present but involved directly in the public health or epidemic response. Please visit https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open-government/governmental-bodies/catastrophe-notice/update-calculation-business-days-and-covid-19 for more information.

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Becky M. Wilson
Senior Public Information Manager
UTMB Department of Legal Affairs
301 University Blvd., Rte 0171
Galveston, TX 77555-0171
(409) 747-8747 (direct)
(409) 747-8751 (fax)

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From: Public Info Requests <PublicInfoRequests@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:02 AM
To: Wilson, Becky M. <bemwilso@UTMB.EDU>; King, Carolee A. (Legal) <caaking@UTMB.EDU>; Andersen, Nathan J. <njanders@UTMB.EDU>; Pennington, Erin D. <edpennin@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067312

From: Root, Jay[SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:01:25 AM
To: Public Info Requests
Subject: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle
Auto forwarded by a Rule

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Greetings,

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4. Any and all records in any format used for presentations, including but not limited to Power Points, Slides, documents, photos, graphics, spreadsheets or any other records, about coronaviruses, including but not limited to any that were prepared for or used at NASEM/CAS meetings, including but not limited to the one held in September 2015.

5. And all communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, communications via third party apps and any other records sent to or from any Chinese scientists who received training at UTMB and who are or were affiliated in any way with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and/or the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences.

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Additionally, I ask that you determine under 552.267 of the Texas Government Code that I am entitled to a waiver or reduction of any fees because as a member of the news media, I will be disseminating this information to the general public, which will benefit from the knowledge of this important topic.

Please do not hesitate to call me at (b)(6) or email me at jay.root@chron.com if you have any questions about the scope or nature of this request.

Respectfully,

Jay Root

Reporter/Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067313

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067314

From: Wilson, Becky M.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:23 PM
To: SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM
Cc: Andersen, Nathan J.;Pennington, Erin D.
Subject: Your Texas Public Information Act Request - Jay Root PIA #2

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Subject: FW: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle

From: Root, Jay[SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:01:25 AM
To: Public Info Requests

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067310

Subject: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle
Auto forwarded by a Rule

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Please do not hesitate to call me at (b)(6) or email me at jay.root@chron.com if you have any questions about the scope or nature of this request.

Respectfully,

Jay Root

Reporter/Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067311

From: Wilson, Becky M.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:23 PM
To: SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM
Cc: Andersen, Nathan J.;Pennington, Erin D.
Subject: Your Texas Public Information Act Request - Jay Root PIA #2

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Subject: FW: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle

From: Root, Jay[SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:01:25 AM
To: Public Info Requests

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Subject: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle
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Respectfully,

Jay Root

Reporter/Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Wilson, Becky M.
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Cc: Andersen, Nathan J.;Pennington, Erin D.
Subject: Your Texas Public Information Act Request - Jay Root PIA #2

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Subject: FW: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle

From: Root, Jay[SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:01:25 AM
To: Public Info Requests

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067308

Subject: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle
Auto forwarded by a Rule

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Respectfully,

Jay Root

Reporter/Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067309

From: Wilson, Becky M.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:25 PM
To: JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM
Cc: Andersen, Nathan J.;Pennington, Erin D.
Subject: Your Texas Public Information Act Request - Jay Root PIA #2

Dear Mr. Root,

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Subject: FW: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle

From: Root, Jay[SMTP:JAY.ROOT@CHRON.COM]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:01:25 AM
To: Public Info Requests

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067305

Subject: ORR #2 from Jay Root at Houston Chronicle
Auto forwarded by a Rule

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Respectfully,

Jay Root

Reporter/Houston Chronicle

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_067306

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:15 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: wsj

Please see the inquiry below as per my call. I forwarded the invite for the call tomorrow separately.

Thanks, Jim

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 11:35 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

I'm coming back to you again. I hope you can speak with me.
This time, we see indications that the U.S. Dept of Education is asking UofT for all information related to its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and in particular "*gifts, contracts, and/or restricted and conditional gifts or contracts*" related to the ties. It specifically notes "*substantial contractual relations*" with Wuhan BSL-4 lab and refers to the Galveston lab.
I don't know if you have been approached directly about this yet but it's a fact-finding effort by the Education Depart to find any and all links with Wuhan institute.

Do you know what the U.S. government is looking for exactly?

The request notes its request is for: *True copies of each gift or donation agreement, contract, and/or conditional gift or donation agreement or contract to which your Institution and the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or the Chinese Academy of Sciences are parties.*

It also makes a request for: *All records (including but not limited to emails and true copies of contracts and/or gift or donation agreements) of, regarding, or relating to (a) the Wuhan MCL, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan MCL researcher Shi Zhengli, and Eric Yuan, Chief Executive Officer of Zoom Communications; and/or (b) any gift, contract, or conditional gift or contract from or with the Communist Party of China, its agents, employees, representatives, and instrumentalities.*

Do you have any idea what links there are between Dr. Shi and Eric Yuan?

I am interested in any perspective you can provide on any of the above. This also raises the question of money going the other way: to Wuhan from the U.S. government. Some media have

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said Galveston has been a bridge to the Wuhan institute for U.S. government funds. I mentioned this previously. I'd like to know more.

Quite separately, here is a story I recently did for WSJ on SHI Zhengli. I had hoped you might participate more in the story.

Going into this effort I didn't realize how much attention the Wuhan institute and the labs there would draw scrutiny. But clearly it's grabbing big attention now. I hope you can provide me some perspectives.
Thanks for your time at what must be a busy time.

James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal
+86 1370 1700 594
james.areddy@wsj.com
[redacted]
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

[redacted]

[redacted]

On Sat, Apr 18, 2020 at 8:40 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

> PS....this new interview in China seems to make reference to you. https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1251435120281542656

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 9:41 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

> Jim
> I'm having no luck tracking down that presentation that Shi Zhengli made by searching US and China sources, or contacting the organizers.
>
> Have you spent much time with her? We are trying to write a profile on her and it would be beneficial to hear from you. I'm more interested in her contribution to the science of bats and coronavirus. (That might not be your specialty area.) I wonder if you saw her in Wuhan in her lab and what you might have observed, including live animals she might have kept.
> If you have views on safety lapses I am definitely interested in that too. But finding those isn't really my primary goal.
>
> Separately, there are reports about U.S. government funding that made its way to Wuhan Institute of Viriology, apparently some of it through Galveston. Is there something you can tell me about that such as amounts and time period and goals? Perhaps it was related to the two researchers from the institute your group trained and/or trips made to the institute by your team.
>
> Can we speak today?

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James T. Areddy

The Wall Street Journal.
+86 1370 1700 594

james.areddy@wsj.com
james.areddy@shng-news.com (中文)
(b)(6)
@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp

[redacted]

[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:50 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

She gave the presentation.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 14, 2020, at 4:48 PM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

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[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Zheng Li has been working on bat-associated coronaviruses since just after the original SARS outbreak in 2003. For at least the last 5 years she has been reporting the bat-associated coronaviruses may have the ability to infect humans and that we should be watching for their possible emergence as human activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

It's really fascinating. Here's an interview with the reporter on that story where he describes how the State Dept was concerned two years ago about procedures in Wuhan early on. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgnT2YK3BBI&feature=youtu.be He calls the link between the lab and the outbreak as a 'circumstantial' case. But do you know if Shi Zhengli's focus on bat coronavirus was a worry back a few years ago?

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<image004.jpg>

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On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 11:09 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

James,

Thank you for sharing the report below. I had not seen this previously and I find it quite interesting, especially the comment about our laboratory working to help train scientists and building engineers from the new BSL4 laboratory. We clearly recognized this need but unfortunately, were unable to identify funding to support our efforts. I do believe that between our efforts on a lab-to-lab basis and the overarching dialogue maintained by the US National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, we have had a positive impact, although admittedly limited.

I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

Hi. We spoke several weeks ago when I did a story for The Wall Street Journal about BSL-4 labs. Since then the Washington Post has had two stories suggesting fears in USA that there could have been an accident in Wuhan. I'm curious to know what you think about these reports?

(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)



Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

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"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.
"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.
There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According

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to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.
The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for "rectification." Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

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

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:15 PM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: wsj

Please see the inquiry below as per my call. I forwarded the invite for the call tomorrow separately.

Thanks, Jim

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 11:35 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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Jim

I'm coming back to you again. I hope you can speak with me.
This time, we see indications that the U.S. Dept of Education is asking UofT for all information related to its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and in particular "*gifts, contracts, and/or restricted and conditional gifts or contracts*" related to the ties. It specifically notes "*substantial contractual relations*" with Wuhan BSL-4 lab and refers to the Galveston lab.
I don't know if you have been approached directly about this yet but it's a fact-finding effort by the Education Depart to find any and all links with Wuhan institute.

Do you know what the U.S. government is looking for exactly?

The request notes its request is for: *True copies of each gift or donation agreement, contract, and/or conditional gift or donation agreement or contract to which your Institution and the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or the Chinese Academy of Sciences are parties.*

It also makes a request for: *All records (including but not limited to emails and true copies of contracts and/or gift or donation agreements) of, regarding, or relating to (a) the Wuhan MCL, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan MCL researcher Shi Zhengli, and Eric Yuan, Chief Executive Officer of Zoom Communications; and/or (b) any gift, contract, or conditional gift or contract from or with the Communist Party of China, its agents, employees, representatives, and instrumentalities.*

Do you have any idea what links there are between Dr. Shi and Eric Yuan?

I am interested in any perspective you can provide on any of the above. This also raises the question of money going the other way: to Wuhan from the U.S. government. Some media have

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said Galveston has been a bridge to the Wuhan institute for U.S. government funds. I mentioned this previously. I'd like to know more.

Quite separately, here is a story I recently did for WSJ on SHI Zhengli. I had hoped you might participate more in the story.

Going into this effort I didn't realize how much attention the Wuhan institute and the labs there would draw scrutiny. But clearly it's grabbing big attention now. I hope you can provide me some perspectives.
Thanks for your time at what must be a busy time.

James T. Areddy

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[redacted]

On Sat, Apr 18, 2020 at 8:40 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

> PS....this new interview in China seems to make reference to you. https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1251435120281542656

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 9:41 AM James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

> Jim
> I'm having no luck tracking down that presentation that Shi Zhengli made by searching US and China sources, or contacting the organizers.
>
> Have you spent much time with her? We are trying to write a profile on her and it would be beneficial to hear from you. I'm more interested in her contribution to the science of bats and coronavirus. (That might not be your specialty area.) I wonder if you saw her in Wuhan in her lab and what you might have observed, including live animals she might have kept.
> If you have views on safety lapses I am definitely interested in that too. But finding those isn't really my primary goal.
>
> Separately, there are reports about U.S. government funding that made its way to Wuhan Institute of Viriology, apparently some of it through Galveston. Is there something you can tell me about that such as amounts and time period and goals? Perhaps it was related to the two researchers from the institute your group trained and/or trips made to the institute by your team.
>
> Can we speak today?

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On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:50 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

She gave the presentation.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 14, 2020, at 4:48 PM, James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com> wrote:

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Jim
Did Zheng Li present at that conference? I don't immediately find any such 2015 agenda or abstract online. I assume the dialogue is National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine/Chinese Academy of Sciences.
I'm definitely aware of her long-running work on this subject. Here's part of a presentation from CAS but it's been deleted from their website. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bHmXHrVC4lsJ:english.whiov.cas.cn/Newsletter2016/201712/P020171214655206018389.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

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[redacted]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 5:26 PM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Zheng Li has been working on bat-associated coronaviruses since just after the original SARS outbreak in 2003. For at least the last 5 years she has been reporting the bat-associated coronaviruses may have the ability to infect humans and that we should be watching for their possible emergence as human activity overlaps with the habitats of bats. So she has been worried about it. You may wish to check the NAS website to see if you can find the agenda and abstracts of the NASEM-CAS dialogue held in September, 2015 in Beijing China.

From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:54 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: wsj

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<image004.jpg>

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On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 11:09 AM LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@utmb.edu> wrote:

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I really do not have any information about the possibility that the new coronavirus was the result of a laboratory accident or accidental release. Further, I have no experience or association with the Hubei Province CDC located in Wuhan. Good luck with your continued investigations. Sorry to learn that you have been expelled from China.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.

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From: James T. AREDDY <james.areddy@wsj.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:01 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: wsj

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Jim

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(FWIW. I, along with a number of American reporters, have been kicked out of China so I'm now working for WSJ in the U.S.)



Editorial-Opinion

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Rogin

By Josh **Rogin**

1480 words

14 April 2020

Washington Post.com

WPCOM

English

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Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

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"Most importantly," the cable states, "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as "gain-of-function" experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.
"The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab's research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected," he said.
There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That's important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.
Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

"The cable was a warning shot," one U.S. official said. "They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on."

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.
Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According

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to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.
"The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there's almost nothing on the other side," the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government's original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn't sell bats.

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We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

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The Wall Street Journal

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@jamestareddy
WeChat/Signal/Telegram/Facetime/WhatsApp





FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_012427

From: Holubar, Connie J. [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=C03A165CED064E7EA21110EF12E525D8-HOLUBAR, CO]
Sent: 4/28/2020 3:44:13 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. [jwleduc@UTMB.EDU]; Reyes, Raul [rareyes@UTMB.EDU]; Campbell, Stephen [stepcamp@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: RE: Fact-check request

I'm assuming we are not interested in participating in a story about potential biosafety risks at BSL4 labs, whether WIV or in general, correct?

But do we want to dig out our "numerator/denominator"number of hours worked at BSL4 in the first ten years and our zero laboratory acquired infections? Those numbers do say that you can put into place training and safety measures that make these labs safe. At a minimum we could post something on our own website. Just trying to think proactively.

I didn't think WIV worked with coronavirus at their BSL4 lab. That lab wasn't finished when Dr. Shi was doing her work, correct?

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2020 1:51 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Fact-check request

FYI. I have not responded.

From: Laura Thompson <lthompson@motherjones.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2020 1:49 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fact-check request

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Hi Dr. Le Duc,

Hope you don't mind me dropping you a line, but I'm a fact-checker at Mother Jones and I'm currently going through an article about biosafety in light of the coronavirus pandemic. I saw that you were mentioned in this Wall Street Journal article as a biosafety expert, and I was hoping you could help me understand any safety concerns surrounding the Wuhan Institute of Virology, as well as BSL-4 facilities more generally. I'm happy to talk on background if you prefer, I'm just trying to gather as many expert opinions as possible before I start going through the author's draft. Do you have any time this week for a phone call?

Warmly,
Laura
--
Laura Thompson
Mother Jones
Ben Bagdikian Editorial Fellow
she/her

From: Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:38 PM
To: Reyes, Raul;LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: FW: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab
Attachments: P4 de Wuhan - enquête sur une affaire française.pdf

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Dear,
Please find attached the article I published.
It briefly mentions the cooperation between University of Texas and Institute of Virology. The mention is very neutral and just states that Pr. Le Duc and his team developed this collaboration following the failure of the French cooperation.
Don't hesitate to tell me if I made any mistake. I prefer to acknowledge them and amend my future articles.
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/p4-de-wuhan-enquete-sur-une-affaire-francaise-29-04-2020-2373525_24.php
Kindest regards,

Le mar. 28 avr. 2020 à 12:16, Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr> a écrit :

> Dear,
> Sorry for the late reply.
> I understand the answer. I will forward Dr. Le Duc my investigation. I am sure he will be mostly interested. If there is any details he would like to answer, even off-the-record (no quotes, even anonymously), please let me know.
> Best,
>
> Le jeu. 23 avr. 2020 à 05:39, Reyes, Raul <rareyes@utmb.edu> a écrit :
>
> > Hello,
> >
> > Dr. Le Duc forwarded me your interview request and he asked me to respectively decline your request.
> >
> > Thank you,
> >
> > Raul
> >
> > ---

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009829

Raul Reyes

Director of Media Relations
Department of Marketing and Communications

The University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77555-0128

Office 409 747 0794

Cell (b)(6)

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From: Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 7:33 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab

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Dear Professor,

As Asia correspondent of French newsmagazine Le Point, I am working on an investigation about the Wuhan P4 Lab. I interviewed former French Prime Ministers and members of former governments, and top scientists like Pr. Christian Brechot, who developed the project. He advised me to contact you, as you have been collaborating with Wuhan Institute of Virology in the last couple of years.

Would you be available for a short interview?

20 minutes would be enough. The point would be to discuss the training that your institute provided to Chinese researchers from Wuhan in the last couple of years. I would especially be interested to know why France hasn't developed a similar program.

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I want you to be sure that I am working in a very serious way.
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- I am applying very strict fact checking standards to my article.

- My main angle is trying to understand why France, after investing a lot in the french-chinese cooperation agreement and helping China to build the P4 Lab, didn't develop any scientific collaboration, that would have been very useful in this pandemic especially.

I would be available until next Sunday, for a call.

Le Point is France's leading newsmagazine, with 300 000 printed copies weekly and 5 million online readers per month. We have a strong focus on science and medecine, and will be making the cover of the magazine next week about China. This investigation will be included in the cover section of this printed issue.

Kindest regards,

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

Jérémy André
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

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Jérémy André
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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:21 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Cc: Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: FW: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab
Attachments: P4 de Wuhan - enquête sur une affaire française.pdf

See attached. Google translation of the section where we are mentioned is below:

American team from the University of Texas, led by James LeDuc, points to biosecurity, which has taken up the torch, "explains Christian Bréchot, now president of the Global Virus Network, a global network of virologists, headquartered in Florida. The Daily Mail revealed that the National Institute for health of the United States had even awarded a scholarship of 3.7 million dollars (3.4 million euros) to the Wuhan Institute of Virology

From: Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:38 PM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: FW: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab

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Kindest regards,

Le mar. 28 avr. 2020 à 12:16, Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr> a écrit :

> Dear,
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> Best,
>
> Le jeu. 23 avr. 2020 à 05:39, Reyes, Raul <rareyes@utmb.edu> a écrit :
>
> > Hello,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009760

Dr. Le Duc forwarded me your interview request and he asked me to respectively decline your request.

Thank you,

Raul

Raul Reyes

Director of Media Relations
Department of Marketing and Communications

The University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77555-0128

Office 409 747 0794

Cel (b)(6)

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From: Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 7:33 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab

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Dear Professor,

As Asia correspondent of French newsmagazine Le Point, I am working on an investigation about the Wuhan P4 Lab. I interviewed former French Prime Ministers and members of former governments, and top scientists like Pr. Christian Brechot, who developed the project. He advised me to contact you, as you have been collaborating with Wuhan Institute of Virology in the last couple of years.

Would you be available for a short interview?

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I would be available until next Sunday, for a call.

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Kindest regards,

--

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

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

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

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

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:21 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Cc: Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: FW: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab
Attachments: P4 de Wuhan - enquête sur une affaire française.pdf

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From: Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:38 PM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: FW: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab

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> Le jeu. 23 avr. 2020 à 05:39, Reyes, Raul <rareyes@utmb.edu> a écrit :
>
> > Hello,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_044227

Dr. Le Duc forwarded me your interview request and he asked me to respectively decline your request.

Thank you,

Raul

Raul Reyes

Director of Media Relations
Department of Marketing and Communications

The University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77555-0128

Office 409 747 0794

Cell (b)(6)

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From: Jérémy André <jandre@lepoint.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 7:33 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: On Behalf of Christian Brechot - interview request - Le Point - investigation on Wuhan P4 Lab

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_044228

Dear Professor,

As Asia correspondent of French newsmagazine Le Point, I am working on an investigation about the Wuhan P4 Lab. I interviewed former French Prime Ministers and members of former governments, and top scientists like Pr. Christian Brechot, who developed the project. He advised me to contact you, as you have been collaborating with Wuhan Institute of Virology in the last couple of years.

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

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

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

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

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The Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch, is one of two university-based maximum containment (BSL-4) laboratories in the U.S. focused on the study of highly infectious diseases and the development of medical countermeasures.

The GNL and UTMB have one of the country's most active programs to safely and securely study emerging and re-emerging high consequence pathogens and collaborate with scientists around the world. A BSL4 laboratory is the highest level of biocontainment labs.

The lab is part of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Biodefense Laboratory Network, and as part of its mission assists the U.S. in the event of a national emergency. Currently the lab is focused on diagnostic, and vaccine development for COVID-19, as well as testing of existing and new antiviral and antibody therapies.

According to Dr. James Le Duc, Director of the Galveston National Lab, "As a university-based lab, training the next generation of scientists to work safely and securely in high containment facilities to study dangerous pathogens and conduct pre-clinical studies is a major mission.

Through our Biosafety Training Center, UTMB has provided laboratory safety and security training for scientists and operations personnel in more than 70

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countries, including China. The relationship with Wuhan Institute of Virology and the GNL dates back to 2013 and has been facilitated through an ongoing dialogue co-sponsored by the Chinese Academies of Science and U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, with cooperation from the Chinese CDC and others.

In recent years, we have provided training to scientists, biosafety and engineering professionals, including China.

Academic research is a global pursuit, and collaboration, cooperation and support has always been the process for quickly developing countermeasures against the world's most dangerous public health threats."

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From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 1:47 PM
To: Frances Sharples
Cc: Bowman, Katherine;Dave Franz;Diane Griffin;Rusek, Benjamin;LeDuc, James W.;Boright, John;Shi, Pei yong;Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: Re: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

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I don't know if you have followed news but he just had an important grant rescinded because of how work with Wuhan Lab. A sad moment do science and the NIH. Might be good to talk with him about engaging in this call because it could help with the connectivity and certainly I dictate his continued standing in scientific community here. He has a lot of relevant experience and perspective of course

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 30, 2020, at 2:38 PM, Frances Sharples (b)(6) wrote:

Peter Daszak has, in fact, been collecting corona viruses in China. Perhaps he should be on the call?

From: Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:44 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Frances Sharples (b)(6) Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Wonderful news that a dialogue meeting will be able to take place! This may be far too futuristic given the many immediate needs with Covid-19, but I wanted to float the idea of an additional potential topic in case it could be of interest. It seems likely that scientists from research institutes in China will have had some of the most direct experience analyzing multiple strains of coronavirus – not only SARS and SARS-CoV-2, but also samples identified from animal surveillance. And that there are many other strains of coronaviruses out in the environment that could potentially cross over to humans in the future.

Will all that in mind, I wondered whether there might be a role for sharing information on whether it could be possible to develop vaccines that would provide protection against multiple coronavirus strains, and if so what targets or strategies might seem most promising to explore. If not for a May dialogue meeting, perhaps as an area you could consider exploring for future dialogue meetings in the upcoming year(s).

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Best,
Katie

Katherine Bowman, Ph.D.
Board on Life Sciences
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-334-2638
Email: kbowman@nas.edu

On Apr 29, 2020, at 10:51 AM, Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com> wrote:

Might the whole set of confusions and data limitations related to serologies and viral shedding be of interest as one of the topics…or is it just me? dave

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Including Linda, David and Ralph if possible, would be good.

Diane

Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
Baltimore, MD 21205
410-955-3459
dgriffi6@jhu.edu

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 10:14 AM
To: 'LeDuc, James W.' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Cc: Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; 'Frances Sharples' <(b)(6)
Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Lowenthal, Micah

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

<mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Greetings,

Diane suggested that staff take the lead on writing a draft response to the attached letter that includes proposing a date and agenda in consultation with you, her, Dave and Peggy with Marcia and Victor sending the response back. I am looping Diane and Peggy into this thread.

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Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 9:37 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Frances Sharples' <(b)(6)>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Yes, very good news indeed. Who is organizing the meeting on our side?

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:21 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001857

To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Frances Sharples' <(b)(6)>
Cc: Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: FW: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Importance: High

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Good news from CAS and CCDC.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 5:40 AM
To: NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>
Cc: McNutt, Marcia K. <MMcNutt@nas.edu>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn' <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; 'clbai@cas.cn' <clbai@cas.cn>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>
Subject: Re: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Importance: High

Dear colleagues,

Attached please find the letter replied by Prof. Chunli Bai and Prof. Fu Gao.

Best Regards,

Sun Hui

2020-04-29

SUN Hui (Mr.)
Director
Division of American and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau of International Cooperation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
52 Sanlihe Rd. Beijing, China 100864
Tel:+86-10-68597282

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001858

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Email: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn
http://english.cas.cn/
http://international-talent.cas.cn

发件人： NASPresident
发送时间： 2020-04-23 20:50:33
收件人： 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'; 'clbai@cas.cn'; 'gaof@im.ac.cn'; 'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'
抄送： McNutt, Marcia K.; Dzau, Victor J.; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'; 'peggy@hbfam.net'; JohnHildebrand; Boright,John; Rusek, Benjamin; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'
主题： Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt, Dzau, Griffin, and Hamburg.

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_001859

From: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 1:47 PM
To: Frances Sharples
Cc: Bowman, Katherine; Dave Franz; Diane Griffin; Rusek, Benjamin; LeDuc, James W.; Boright, John; Shi, Pei yong; Lowenthal, Micah
Subject: Re: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

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I don't know if you have followed news but he just had an important grant rescinded because of how work with Wuhan Lab. A sad moment do science and the NIH. Might be good to talk with him about engaging in this call because it could help with the connectivity and certainly I dictate his continued standing in scientific community here. He has a lot of relevant experience and perspective of course

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 30, 2020, at 2:38 PM, Frances Sharples (b)(6) wrote:

Peter Daszak has, in fact, been collecting corona viruses in China. Perhaps he should be on the call?

From: Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:44 AM
To: Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Frances Sharples (b)(6) ; Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@utmb.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@utmb.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Wonderful news that a dialogue meeting will be able to take place! This may be far too futuristic given the many immediate needs with Covid-19, but I wanted to float the idea of an additional potential topic in case it could be of interest. It seems likely that scientists from research institutes in China will have had some of the most direct experience analyzing multiple strains of coronavirus – not only SARS and SARS-CoV-2, but also samples identified from animal surveillance. And that there are many other strains of coronaviruses out in the environment that could potentially cross over to humans in the future.

Will all that in mind, I wondered whether there might be a role for sharing information on whether it could be possible to develop vaccines that would provide protection against multiple coronavirus strains, and if so what targets or strategies might seem most promising to explore. If not for a May dialogue meeting, perhaps as an area you could consider exploring for future dialogue meetings in the upcoming year(s).

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Katherine Bowman, Ph.D.
Board on Life Sciences
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Washington, DC 20001
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Email: kbowman@nas.edu

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Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
University Distinguished Service Professor
W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
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<mlowenth@nas.edu>
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Subject: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:21 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123851

To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com) <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6)
Cc: Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: FW: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Importance: High

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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
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2020-04-29

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Director
Division of American and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau of International Cooperation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
52 Sanlihe Rd. Beijing, China 100864
Tel:+86-10-68597282

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123852

Fax: +86-10-68511095
Email: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn
http://english.cas.cn/
http://international-talent.cas.cn

发件人： NASPresident
发送时间： 2020-04-23 20:50:33
收件人： 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'; 'clbai@cas.cn'; 'gaof@im.ac.cn'; 'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'
抄送： McNutt, Marcia K.; Dzau, Victor J.; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'; 'peggy@hbfam.net'; JohnHildebrand; Boright,John; Rusek, Benjamin; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'
主题： Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

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David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_123853

From: COGR Administrator <administrator@COGR.edu>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:07 AM
To: COGR LISTSERV
Subject: COGR News Digest

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COGR
Council On Governmental Relations

Please note, articles may require a subscription to view. Due to copyright considerations, COGR cannot send copies of subscription based articles to our membership.

COGR's Web Page on Institutional and Agency Responses to COVID-19 and Additional Resources (Including COGR's FAQs)
***Institutional policy links and COVID19 questions can be sent to COVID19@cogr.edu.*

5/1/20: U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus (Wall Street Journal) *The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic. The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-probes-university-of-texas-links-to-chinese-lab-scrutinized-over-coronavirus-11588325401 See DoEd Letter here:* https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/UTWuhan.pdf?mod=article_inline

5/1/20: No, Science Can't Tell Us How to Respond to the Coronavirus (National Review) *The invocation of science as the ultimate authority capable of settling questions of how we should govern ourselves is a persistent feature of modern Western life going back several centuries and has always been a mistake. It is especially so in this crisis, when so much is still unknown about the coronavirus and immensely complicated and consequential public-policy questions are in play…. Science has a limited competency, though. Once you are outside a lab*

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setting and dealing with matters of public policy, questions of values and how to strike a balance between competing priorities come into play, and they simply can't be settled by people in white lab coats. https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/05/coronavirus-response-science-cant-make-policy-decisions/#slide-1

4/30/20: NIH's axing of bat coronavirus grant a 'horrible precedent' and might break rules, critics say (Science) *The research community is reacting with alarm and anger to the National Institutes of Health's (NIH's) abrupt and unusual termination of a **grant** supporting research in China on how coronaviruses—such as the one causing the current pandemic—move from bats to humans. The agency axed the grant last week, after conservative U.S. **politicians** and media repeatedly suggested—without evidence—that the pandemic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) escaped from a laboratory in Wuhan, China, that employs a Chinese virologist who had been receiving funding from the grant. The termination, which some analysts believe might violate regulations governing NIH, also came 7 days after President Donald Trump, asked about the project at a press conference, said: "We will end that grant very quickly."* https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/nih-s-axing-bat-coronavirus-grant-horrible-precedent-and-might-break-rules-critics-say

4/30/20: Lawmakers Probe NIH Over Chinese Espionage Targeting U.S. Medical Research (Free Beacon) *Reps. Jim Banks (R., Ind.) and Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.) are petitioning NIH leaders to disclose how researchers with ties to adversarial regimes such as China continue to participate in confidential research projects and receive American grant money, according to a letter sent Thursday to NIH director Francis Collins. The lawmakers express concerns about a lack of oversight at the agency that they say might have allowed foreign spies to gain access to critical research.* https://freebeacon.com/national-security/lawmakers-probe-nih-over-chinese-espionage-targeting-u-s-medical-research/

4/30/20: Animal Oversight Changes for Institutions Receiving National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Funding (NIH Extramural) *On April 16, 2020, NIH and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) announced a new agreement to ensure consistent and effective oversight of the welfare of animals used in NASA-funded activities.* https://nexus.od.nih.gov/all/2020/04/30/animal-oversight-changes-for-institutions-receiving-national-aeronautics-and-space-administration-nasa-funding/

4/30/20: Stand Up to the Anti-Patent COVID-19 Narrative (IP Watchdog) *It may seem odd, as unprecedented public/private sector R&D alliances work to discover and develop therapies to counter COVID-19, that some are trying to punish the companies trying to get us out of this mess.* https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/30/stand-anti-patent-covid-19-narrative/id=121197/

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010986

4/29/20: Georgia Tech researcher pays a high price for mismanaging an NSF grant (Science) *When it comes to her research, Eva Lee sweats the details. The Georgia Institute of Technology engineering professor "is extraordinarily talented" at sifting through massive amounts of health care data and finding "novel insights" into how to save lives, improve care, and reduce costs… In contrast, she's paid much less attention to the reporting requirements on the grants that have supported her research for more than 2 decades at Georgia Tech. And the 55-year-old applied mathematician is now paying a steep price for that neglect.* https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/georgia-tech-researcher-pays-high-price-mismanaging-nsf-grant#

4/29/20: NIH launches competition to speed COVID-19 diagnostics (Science) *The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) today announced a $1.5 billion initiative to speed breakthroughs in diagnostic tests for the virus that causes COVID-19. The program aims to increase the U.S. capacity for SARS-CoV-2 testing up to 100-fold by late summer, in time for the start of the flu season.* https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/nih-launches-competition-speed-covid-19-diagnostics

4/29/20: US Marijuana Research Policy Violated International Law For Decades, DEA Lawsuit Memo Reveals (Marijuana Moment) *Scientists have successfully forced the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to release an internal document that was allegedly used to justify delaying the approval of additional marijuana manufacturers for research purposes. And it reveals that the Justice Department feels that the current licensing structure for cannabis cultivation has been in violation of international treaties for decades.* https://www.marijuanamoment.net/dea-agrees-to-release-secret-document-allegedly-used-to-justify-marijuana-research-delay/

4/29/20: Scientists wait months for coronavirus research grants. This economist is trying to fix that. (Washington Post) *Economist Tyler Cowen first sounded the alarm that America is unprepared for a pandemic in 2005, when he wrote a paper outlining ways the country should respond and, for a few years, ran a blog focused on the possibility of an avian flu outbreak. Fifteen years later, as a novel coronavirus brings Cowen's fears into reality, the George Mason University professor is trying to fix what he and others view as a structural problem impeding the scientific response to the crisis: the months-long application and review process scientists must endure to get their research funded.*
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/scientists-wait-months-for-coronavirus-research-grants-this-economist-is-trying-to-fix-that/2020/04/29/b5c8a3e0-896e-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010987

Administrative Officer and Policy Analyst
1200 New York Ave NW Suite 460
Washington DC 20005
(202) 289-6655 x110
www.cogr.edu

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010988

From: Skinner, Loren
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:09 AM
To: Mouton, Charles P.;McCallum, Rex;Moreno, Michelle E.;Moreno, Victor;Hutchison, Frances B.;Trieu, Robert
Subject: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.

The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than

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$6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries. Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

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The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."
The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

U.S. national security officials and independent cybersecurity researchers have raised concerns about Zoom and its reliance on China-based engineering, especially as more people turn to the service amid the pandemic to discuss company and government business as well as private health information.
Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

The Education Department's scrutiny of money that could have flowed from the China-based lab to the U.S. comes after other U.S. officials criticized money that went in the opposite direction. In an April 21 letter to House and Senate leadership, members of Congress led by Sen. Martha McSally (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R., Fla.) criticized a grant by the National Institutes of Health that supported global research on coronaviruses, including at the Wuhan lab.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043705

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043706

From: Skinner, Loren
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:09 AM
To: Mouton, Charles P.;McCallum, Rex;Moreno, Michelle E.;Moreno, Victor;Hutchison, Frances B.;Trieu, Robert
Subject: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.

The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010981

$6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries. Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010982

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."
The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010983

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_010984

From: Skinner, Loren
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:13 AM
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

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The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.
PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043642

By Kate O'Keeffe
May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

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The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

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The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

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The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043643

$6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries. Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

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The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043644

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043645

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

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The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043646

From: Sydney Skinner (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:19 AM
To: Skinner, Loren
Subject: Re: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Uh-oh.

Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone

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- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

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The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043690

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

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Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043691

year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

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In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.



The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.

PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043692

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043693

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Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043694

From: Sydney Skinner (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:19 AM
To: Skinner, Loren
Subject: Re: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

China exposed!!

Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone

On Friday, May 1, 2020, 9:18 AM, Sydney Skinner (b)(6) wrote:

Uh-oh.

Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone

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- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

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May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043683

and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043685



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PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043686

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Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043687

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

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The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043688

From: Skinner, Loren
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:20 AM
To: Sydney Skinner
Subject: RE: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

We might be too.

From: Sydney Skinner (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:19 AM
To: Skinner, Loren <leskinne@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

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China exposed!!

Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone

On Friday, May 1, 2020, 9:18 AM, Sydney Skinner (b)(6) wrote:

> Uh-oh.
>
> Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone
>
> On Friday, May 1, 2020, 9:12 AM, Skinner, Loren <leskinne@UTMB.EDU> wrote:
>
> - In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
> -
> - WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
> - POLITICS

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043696

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043697

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.

The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries.

Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043698

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.

PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043699

But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

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Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043700

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043701

From: Sydney Skinner (b)(6)
Sent: 5/1/2020 9:20:22 AM
To: Skinner, Loren [leskinne@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: Re: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

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Yeah...

Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone

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We might be too.

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China exposed!!

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Uh-oh.

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- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
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- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO



The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043677

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043679

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

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Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043681

From: McCallum, Rex
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:42 AM
To: Skinner, Loren
Subject: RE: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Cute...

Rex McCallum, MD, FACP, FACR
Chair, *ad interim*, Department of Internal Medicine
Edward Randall and Edward Randall, Jr. Distinguished Chair in Internal Medicine
Vice President, Chief Physician Executive
Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs
Professor of Medicine/Rheumatology

301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77555-0133
P 409.772.3639 **M** [redacted]
F 409.772.9598 **E** rex.mccallum@utmb.edu

Visit us at www.utmb.edu and www.utmbhealth.com

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From: Skinner, Loren <leskinne@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:09 AM
To: Mouton, Charles P. <cpmouton@UTMB.EDU>; McCallum, Rex <remccall@UTMB.EDU>; Moreno, Michelle E. <miemoren@UTMB.EDU>; Moreno, Victor <vimoreno@UTMB.EDU>; Hutchison, Frances B. <fbhutchi@UTMB.EDU>; Trieu, Robert <rotrieu@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.
PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe
May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

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The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043671

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043672

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043673

officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

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"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

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The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

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Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043675

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:44 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul (rareyes@UTMB.EDU)
Subject: FW: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

I guess this is the stuff we're supposed to stay away from? I have past experience and expertise in the area, but don't want to cross any lines established internally.

Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Ksiazek,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab. I saw your research into reverse transcription PCR on SARS and thought you might have some insights into these questions.

—Also as director of the High Containment Lab Operations at the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" WIV (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

—Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_061173

Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

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

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_061174

From: Hileman, David
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:01 AM
To: Skinner, Loren
Subject: RE: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Thanks for sharing…..

From: Skinner, Loren <leskinne@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:13 AM
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043665

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.
The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries. Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043666

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043667

officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

U.S. national security officials and independent cybersecurity researchers have raised concerns about Zoom and its reliance on China-based engineering, especially as more people turn to the service amid the pandemic to discuss company and government business as well as private health information. Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

The Education Department's scrutiny of money that could have flowed from the China-based lab to the U.S. comes after other U.S. officials criticized money that went in the opposite direction. In an April 21 letter to House and Senate leadership, members of Congress led by Sen. Martha McSally (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R., Fla.) criticized a grant by the National Institutes of Health that supported global research on coronaviruses, including at the Wuhan lab.

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043668

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043669

From: Hutchison, Frances B.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:27 AM
To: LeMay, C. Aaron;Delgado, Claudia Y.
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Let's just say "the party has just begun" 😊

Dr. Raimer's comments today were right on and very favorable (actually had me a little teary-eyed with UTMB pride).

Fran

In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.

WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

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The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp. The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043777

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

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

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PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

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The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043778

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

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The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

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"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043779

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043780

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:32 AM
To: Burke, Donald S
Subject: RE: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

There was a program between US NAS and China Academy of Science that we, UTMB, participated in. It was not directly targeted at BSL4, but it was one of the main focuses. We had folks from Wuhan that were opening the new lab come here. The Australian BSL4 in Geelong also had folks go there (not part of the NAS interchange). Wuhan lab is part of the China Academy of Sciences organization. They have 2 other BSL4 that I know about, one is part of the Chinese Medical Academy, the other is Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. There may be others, but they were not part of the NAS expchage.

The US-China did have one joint meeting in Wuhan. The lab was not yet open at the time.

UTMB's component focused mostly on helping train maintenance personel as well as having post-docs here for extended periods.

Tom K

-----Original Message-----
From: Burke, Donald S [mailto:donburke@pitt.edu]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 09:54
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fw: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Tom

FYI. I just sent this to my bosses here at Pitt for their information.

Do you know if a BSL exchange program did get set up. Was the Wuhan Inst of Virology involved?

Best, Don

From: Burke, Donald S <donburke@pitt.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 5:14 PM
To: Levine, Arthur Samuel; Gallagher, Patrick David
Subject: Fw: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

Art and Pat,

FYI. On my 2008 trip to China I visited the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where ironically enough I gave a lecture on "Predicting and Preventing Emerging Infectious Disease Epidemics." Per the email trail below, we considered a Pitt / WIV collaboration, but it never came together.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

My correspondent and potential collaborator below, Zhengli Shi, is the bat virologist - sometimes called the bat-woman -who identified the COVID virus SARS-CoV-2. She had hosted by lecture and visit.
https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scientificamerican.com%2Farticle%2Fhow-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1%2F&data=02%7C01%7Ctgksiaze%40UTMB.EDU%7C4e8eeae63f30457a5de908d7e2df1ec6%7C7bef256d85db4526a72d31aea2546852%7C0%7C0%7C637227320233083564&sdata=HnK0uy7EQZe%2BkKcmAhjUspM7SAFj2gKWmUatoogekzY%3D&reserved=0

There are concerns, which I think are legitimate, that the virus may have accidentally escaped from the Wuhan lab. Not intentionally. Bio-bungling, as we used to call it, not bio-terrorism. Maybe the future would have been different had this Pitt / WIV collaboration had come to fruition. I don't have records if/how DA responded to my note, but nothing further came of it. I lost touch with the Wuhan lab after this exchange.

I thought you might find this all to be of interest.

Regards, Don

From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 7:46 AM
To: Montelaro, Ronald C <rmont@pitt.edu>; Cole, Kelly Stefano <stefcole@pitt.edu>
Subject: FW: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

Ron, Kelly,

FYI. At this point in time, I'm just raising the possibility of future exchanges with Wuhan. If Tara is confirmed it is a safe bet that a formal exchange program will be launched. Then we'll have to decide if and how we become engaged.

Tom Ksiazek is at UTMB. He used to head the CDC's BSL4. The rest of the thread is self-explanatory.

Don

From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 7:37 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: BSL 4 in Wuhan

DA

I have not forgotten about our discussion in your office a few months ago about a possible exchange program of US and international scientists who work in high containment laboratories, with the idea that such a program could harmonize regulatory approaches, promote openness, and improve overall safety.

Recently Tom Ksiazek sent me a note because he had read in my last year's China trip blog about a BSL4 lab under construction in Wuhan, but in his inventory of BSL4 labs around the world he didn't have any prior information about this one (or any BSL4 labs in China, for that matter). Tom asked if I could provide any updated information about the Wuhan lab. Instead of asking directly about the BSL4 labI wrote a chatty note to the senior scientist Shi Zhengli who heads the BSL4 project for the Wuhan Institute of Virology (part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) proposing possible exchanges. Here is her response below.

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Seems that the BSL4 is well under way in Wuhan. Their group has done good work on SARS before, so my guess would be this will be their top priority.

If there will be an exchange program, this might be a useful connection. One of our Chinese post-docs at the Pitt Center for Vaccine Research worked on SARS at the Wuhan Inst of Virology a couple of years ago before coming to Pitt. Among our current ABSL-3 Pitt faculty team, only one person has recent experience in BSL-4 work (Amy Hartman, who worked on ebola at CDC before joining us). But there may be many ways to develop the relationship.

Best regards, Don

From: zlshi [zlshi@wh.iov.cn]
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 5:31 AM
To: Burke, Donald S; huzh
Subject: Re: Possible Pittsburgh - Wuhan exchange program

Dear Don,

It's nice to hearing from you. Thank you very much for your information. We are definitely interested in developing a collaboration project between our Institutes, particularly on highly fatal pathogens. Please let us know if you have further information.

Our BSL/3/4 lab is slowly progressing, but promising. We realy need well trained scientists working in these biosafety containment in the near future.

Best regards,

Zhengli,

From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 8:42 AM
To: 'zlshi'; huzh
Subject: Possible Pittsburgh - Wuhan exchange program

Dear Drs. Zhihong Hu and Shi Zhengli,

Greetings from Pittsburgh! This is an exciting time for us, as our city is hosting the G-20 summit. Last evening your President Hu Jintao, along with other world leaders, had dinner with President Obama at the Phipps Conservatory, a garden museum just down the street from my home. Today they are meeting downtown to discuss the world economy.

https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.xinhuanet.com%2Fenglish%2F2009-09%2F25%2Fcontent_12108235.htm&data=02%7C01%7Ctgksiaze%40UTMB.EDU%7C4e8eeae63f30457a5de908d7e2df1ec6%7C7bef256d85db4526a72d31aea2546852%7C0%7C0%7C637227320233093557&sdata=uiArIeeSBKMDtIZ5lebZvg6f7q214lpHoD46gP4fOLg%3D&reserved=0

I write to you today to suggest the possibility of collaborations between our institutes. Our own ABSL-3 laboratory in our Center for Vaccine Research has been operational for more than a year now, and we are approved to handle several select restricted agents. Currently we are working on H5N1, H1N1, Rift Valley Fever, tularemia, and tuberculosis, and will be adding other pathogens soon. Our primate aerobiology challenge system and CT/PET scanning are working well. How have you been progressing on building your BSL-3/4 laboratory in Wuhan?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043837

I have heard that the US government may be launching an international high containment lab scientist exchange program soon, and I would be interested to build a relationship between the University of Pittsburgh and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. At this stage, it is very preliminary. But I did want to find out if you might be interested to explore the possibilities.

Best regards, Don

Donald S. Burke, M.D.
Dean, Graduate School of Public Health
Director, Center for Vaccine Research
University of Pittsburgh
(412) 624-3001

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Burke, Donald S <donburke@pitt.edu>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:35 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks Tom

Donald S. Burke, M.D.
Distinguished University Professor of Health Science and Policy Jonas Salk Chair in Population Health University of Pittsburgh
(412) 383-3595

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 11:32 AM
To: Burke, Donald S
Subject: RE: BSL 4 in Wuhan [confidential]

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Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 7:37 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043821

To: (b)(6)
Subject: BSL 4 in Wuhan

DA

I have not forgotten about our discussion in your office a few months ago about a possible exchange program of US and international scientists who work in high containment laboratories, with the idea that such a program could harmonize regulatory approaches, promote openness, and improve overall safety.

Recently Tom Ksiazek sent me a note because he had read in my last year's China trip blog about a BSL4 lab under construction in Wuhan, but in his inventory of BSL4 labs around the world he didn't have any prior information about this one (or any BSL4 labs in China, for that matter). Tom asked if I could provide any updated information about the Wuhan lab. Instead of asking directly about the BSL4 labI wrote a chatty note to the senior scientist Shi Zhengli who heads the BSL4 project for the Wuhan Institute of Virology (part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) proposing possible exchanges. Here is her response below. Seems that the BSL4 is well under way in Wuhan. Their group has done good work on SARS before, so my guess would be this will be their top priority.

If there will be an exchange program, this might be a useful connection. One of our Chinese post-docs at the Pitt Center for Vaccine Research worked on SARS at the Wuhan Inst of Virology a couple of years ago before coming to Pitt. Among our current ABSL-3 Pitt faculty team, only one person has recent experience in BSL-4 work (Amy Hartman, who worked on ebola at CDC before joining us). But there may be many ways to develop the relationship.

Best regards, Don

From: zlshi [zlshi@wh.iov.cn]
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 5:31 AM
To: Burke, Donald S; huzh
Subject: Re: Possible Pittsburgh - Wuhan exchange program

Dear Don,

It's nice to hearing from you. Thank you very much for your information. We are definitely interested in developing a collaboration project between our Institutes, particularly on highly fatal pathogens. Please let us know if you have further information.

Our BSL/3/4 lab is slowly progressing, but promising. We realy need well trained scientists working in these biosafety containment in the near future.

Best regards,

Zhengli,

From: Burke, Donald S
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 8:42 AM
To: 'zlshi'; huzh
Subject: Possible Pittsburgh - Wuhan exchange program

Dear Drs. Zhihong Hu and Shi Zhengli,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043822

Greetings from Pittsburgh! This is an exciting time for us, as our city is hosting the G-20 summit. Last evening your President Hu Jintao, along with other world leaders, had dinner with President Obama at the Phipps Conservatory, a garden museum just down the street from my home. Today they are meeting downtown to discuss the world economy.

https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.xinhuanet.com%2Fenglish%2F2009-09%2F25%2Fcontent_12108235.htm&data=02%7C01%7Ctgksiaze%40UTMB.EDU%7C706150d2dc204a87c76008d7ede53c87%7C7bef256d85db4526a72d31aea2546852%7C0%7C0%7C637239441129784193&sdata=wZWg9D9ii6I32NrPO4h%2F1nrvYsf%2B4Ay%2FTulrGTBAskE%3D&reserved=0

I write to you today to suggest the possibility of collaborations between our institutes. Our own ABSL-3 laboratory in our Center for Vaccine Research has been operational for more than a year now, and we are approved to handle several select restricted agents. Currently we are working on H5N1, H1N1, Rift Valley Fever, tularemia, and tuberculosis, and will be adding other pathogens soon. Our primate aerobiology challenge system and CT/PET scanning are working well. How have you been progressing on building your BSL-3/4 laboratory in Wuhan?

I have heard that the US government may be launching an international high containment lab scientist exchange program soon, and I would be interested to build a relationship between the University of Pittsburgh and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. At this stage, it is very preliminary. But I did want to find out if you might be interested to explore the possibilities.

Best regards, Don

Donald S. Burke, M.D.
Dean, Graduate School of Public Health
Director, Center for Vaccine Research
University of Pittsburgh
(412) 624-3001

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043823

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:44 AM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.;Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Probably best not to engage at this point. Key phrase is the "origin of the virus" which is source of so many conspiracy theories being distributed.

I can decline on your behalf if you want. Or since you know the reporter, you can decline but just let me know. I'm keeping a log of all of these kind of inquiries.

Raul

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:44 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

I guess this is the stuff we're supposed to stay away from? I have past experience and expertise in the area, but don't want to cross any lines established internally.

Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Dr. Ksiazek,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab. I saw your research into reverse transcription PCR on SARS and thought you might have some insights into these questions.

—Also as director of the High Containment Lab Operations at the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" WIV (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

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—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

—Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

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www.futureplc.com

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_061310

From: LeMay, C. Aaron
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:58 AM
To: Hutchison, Frances B.;Delgado, Claudia Y.
Subject: RE: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Smoke and mirrors by the fed here. They want to blame someone else when it was them not listening. Dr. Raimer's comments were spot on and the facts will show through the smoke and mirrors.

Thank you for sending.

Aaron

C. Aaron LeMay, CPA, JD, MSEd
VP, Financial Accounting & Reporting
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77555-0128
P 409.266.2050
M (b)(6)
F 409.266.2005
E calemay@utmb.edu

utmb Health

From: Hutchison, Frances B. <fbhutchi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:27 AM
To: LeMay, C. Aaron <calemay@UTMB.EDU>; Delgado, Claudia Y. <cydelgad@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

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Fran

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.
PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe
May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

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An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.
The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries. Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043772

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043773

officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

U.S. national security officials and independent cybersecurity researchers have raised concerns about Zoom and its reliance on China-based engineering, especially as more people turn to the service amid the pandemic to discuss company and government business as well as private health information. Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

The Education Department's scrutiny of money that could have flowed from the China-based lab to the U.S. comes after other U.S. officials criticized money that went in the opposite direction. In an April 21 letter to House and Senate leadership, members of Congress led by Sen. Martha McSally (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R., Fla.) criticized a grant by the National Institutes of Health that supported global research on coronaviruses, including at the Wuhan lab.

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043774

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043775

From: Hutchison, Frances B.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 11:13 AM
To: LeMay, C. Aaron;Delgado, Claudia Y.
Subject: RE: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Especially when Fauci comments 😊

From: LeMay, C. Aaron <calemay@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 10:58 AM
To: Hutchison, Frances B. <fbhutchi@UTMB.EDU>; Delgado, Claudia Y. <cydelgad@UTMB.EDU>
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Thank you for sending.

Aaron

C. Aaron LeMay, CPA, JD, MSEd
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utmb Health

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To: LeMay, C. Aaron <calemay@UTMB.EDU>; Delgado, Claudia Y. <cydelgad@UTMB.EDU>
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Fran

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO



The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043765

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.
The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.
The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries.
Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043766

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043767

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043768

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The NIH added: “Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory.”

Write to Kate O’Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043769

From: McNees, Andrew G.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 11:24 AM
To: Skinner, Loren
Subject: RE: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Joy

From: Skinner, Loren <leskinne@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:13 AM
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043637

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043638

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PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

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The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department

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officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

U.S. national security officials and independent cybersecurity researchers have raised concerns about Zoom and its reliance on China-based engineering, especially as more people turn to the service amid the pandemic to discuss company and government business as well as private health information. Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

The Education Department's scrutiny of money that could have flowed from the China-based lab to the U.S. comes after other U.S. officials criticized money that went in the opposite direction. In an April 21 letter to House and Senate leadership, members of Congress led by Sen. Martha McSally (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R., Fla.) criticized a grant by the National Institutes of Health that supported global research on coronaviruses, including at the Wuhan lab.

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

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Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 12:57 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen;Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.
Subject: Dr. Ksiazek-BBC
Attachments: RE: BBC - Landmark Science Series, Horizon - Coronavirus documentary; RE: BBC - Landmark Science Series, Horizon - Coronavirus documentary

Good morning,

As noted in the media inquiry highlights, Dr. Ksiazek was going to write the reporter back and respectfully decline the Live Science interview that is noted as the last item in today's media inquiries update.

During the course of a conversation with him, he said that he had been contacted by the BBC last week and that he wanted to speak to them. I didn't recall that inquiry but I have subsequently found a message from Dr. Ksiazek that I had missed. (It was the day that we had TO put one of our dogs to sleep and I had checked out that when the messages were sent. The messages from the BBC are attached.

I suggested to Dr. Ksiazek that maybe we should reconsider the BBC request. Dr. Ksiazek said that perhaps we (UTMB) were creeping into infringing academic freedom.

I asked him to speak to Connie further before scheduling.

Thank you,

Raul

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:44 AM

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To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

I guess this is the stuff we're supposed to stay away from? I have past experience and expertise in the area, but don't want to cross any lines established internally.

Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Ksiazek,

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—Also as director of the High Containment Lab Operations at the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" WIV (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

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—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

—Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

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

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From: Lidstone, Sheila
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 1:13 PM
To: Reyes, Raul;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen;Raimer, Ben G.
Subject: RE: Dr. Ksiazek-BBC

Hey guys…

This is not meant to be critical; it is meant to be constructive. As I mentioned last night, we definitely need to get ALL the people at UTMB who are handling media relations together (either in person or virtually) to re-establish protocol.

One thing that I am noticing is inquiries are arriving to different people at different times; some get answered; some possibly not; some are answered later by the scientist without anyone knowing or tracking. I know a log has now been developed and implemented, and I applaud that, but I think a meeting is essential.

Raul – did you have any time to think about my from last night to host? If you need help, I am sure Eva Tillmon or Debbie Tabor can help. If you'd rather I pull the meeting together, I'll do it, but I'll need to know everyone on campus who has a media relations role (not, of course, those being interviewed).

Please let me know. Thanks, Sheila

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 12:57 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Dr. Ksiazek-BBC

Good morning,

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During the course of a conversation with him, he said that he had been contacted by the BBC last week and that he wanted to speak to them. I didn't recall that inquiry but I have subsequently found a message from Dr. Ksiazek that I had missed. (It was the day that we had TO put one of our dogs to sleep and I had checked out that when the messages were sent. The messages from the BBC are attached.

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I suggested to Dr. Ksiazek that maybe we should reconsider the BBC request. Dr. Ksiazek said that perhaps we (UTMB) were creeping into infringing academic freedom.

I asked him to speak to Connie further before scheduling.

Thank you,

Raul

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:44 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
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From: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:02 PM
To: Jeanna Bryner
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Sorry,

I'm, for the time being, going to have respectfully decline your request.

Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
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From: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:06 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: Re: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Thanks much for your response. If you are ever available and have information about the origin, I'd be interested to hear your insights.

Take care, Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

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On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 3:02 PM Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@utmb.edu> wrote:

> Sorry,
>
> I'm, for the time being, going to have respectfully decline your request.
>
> Tom Ksiazek

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From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

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—Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,

Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner

Editor-in-Chief

Live Science

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From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:08 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

As you see, things have become quite dicey. I chose to take today off rather than quit, because yesterday, I was really close to quitting, particularly after being lambasted by Sheila Lidstone at the end of the day (along with Raul and Steve Campbell) and being ACCUSED of being part of some conspiracy. I hit the roof. I told her I'd be happy to be fired for my incompetence from this THANKLESS job. She later wrote me and said she was worried I was depressed. I told her I was not depressed, I was pissed. There's a difference. Just got back from lunch with friends for (b)(6) birthday. That was a good break.

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:02 PM
To: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Sorry,

I'm, for the time being, going to have respectfully decline your request.

Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Take care,
Jeanna

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From: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Hang in there, we'll all get through this in spite of the superficial aspects of the politics, we're contributing in a meaningful way that will bear out in the end.

Tom

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: 1 May, 2020 14:08
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

As you see, things have become quite dicey. I chose to take today off rather than quit, because yesterday, I was really close to quitting, particularly after being lambasted by Sheila Lidstone at the end of the day (along with Raul and Steve Campbell) and being ACCUSED of being part of some conspiracy. I hit the roof. I told her I'd be happy to be fired for my incompetence from this THANKLESS job. She later wrote me and said she was worried I was depressed. I told her I was not depressed, I was pissed. There's a difference. Just got back from lunch with friends for (b)(6) birthday. That was a good break.

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may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab. I saw your research into reverse transcription PCR on SARS and thought you might have some insights into these questions.

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Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
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T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

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From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G.
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Yeh, I know. I am fine with letting an external resource handle the media. It has taken up a lot of time the last few months. I just don't want to do all their work for them (the written piece).

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:06 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Hang in there, we'll all get through this in spite of the superficial aspects of the politics, we're contributing in a meaningful way that will bear out in the end.

Tom

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: 1 May, 2020 14:08
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

As you see, things have become quite dicey. I chose to take today off rather than quit, because yesterday, I was really close to quitting, particularly after being lambasted by Sheila Lidstone at the end of the day (along with Raul and Steve Campbell) and being ACCUSED of being part of some conspiracy. I hit the roof. I told her I'd be happy to be fired for my incompetence from this THANKLESS job. She later wrote me and said she was worried I was depressed. I told her I was not depressed, I was pissed. There's a difference. Just got back from lunch with friends for (b)(6) birthday. That was a good break.

From: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 2:02 PM
To: Jeanna Bryner <jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com>
Subject: RE: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

Sorry,

I'm, for the time being, going to have respectfully decline your request.

Tom Ksiazek

From: Jeanna Bryner [mailto:jeanna.bryner@futurenet.com]
Sent: 17 April, 2020 08:19
To: Ksiazek, Thomas G. <tgksiaze@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: LiveScience/origin of SARS-CoV-2

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Hi Dr. Ksiazek,

I am an editor at LiveScience.com and we are putting together an article to explain the science of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of news that the U.S. government is looking into the possibility that the virus may have come from the Wuhan Institute of Virology biolab. I saw your research into reverse transcription PCR on SARS and thought you might have some insights into these questions.

—Also as director of the High Containment Lab Operations at the Galveston National Lab, do you have firsthand knowledge of this situation and whether there's a chance that SARS-CoV-2 "originated" WIV (naturally of course)?

—How might such a scenario have played out?

—If SARS-CoV-2 doesn't match anything that was being studied in the Wuhan lab, did it diverge from a common ancestor that we do know about? If so, how far back would that divergence have happened?

—Could this virus have evolved from one of the coronaviruses that the lab is known to have been studying?

—How could scientists figure out the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2?

—Which is more likely: that the virus emerged from a bat being studied at WIV or that the virus emerged in a bat somewhere else, spread to a second animal, and then spread to a human in Wuhan?

—Is it possible that the virus could have escaped from the lab without the researchers involved recognizing it, or is that unlikely? Shi Zhengli, who heads the lab, says it does not genetically match any coronaviruses they were studying.

Take care,
Jeanna

Jeanna Bryner
Editor-in-Chief
Live Science
T +1 212 703 5849
M (b)(6)

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From: Clements, Brian M. <BMClements@houstonmethodist.org>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:53 PM
To: Skinner, Loren
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

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Ouch!

Sent from my iPhone

On May 1, 2020, at 9:12 AM, Skinner, Loren <leskinne@utmb.edu> wrote:

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

<image001.jpg>

The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department

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investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.
The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.
The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries.

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Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

<image002.jpg>
The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."
The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

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The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

U.S. national security officials and independent cybersecurity researchers have raised concerns about Zoom and its reliance on China-based engineering, especially as more people turn to the service amid the pandemic to discuss company and government business as well as private health information.
Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

The Education Department's scrutiny of money that could have flowed from the China-based lab to the U.S. comes after other U.S. officials criticized money that went in the opposite direction. In an April 21 letter to House and Senate leadership, members of Congress led by Sen. Martha McSally (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R., Fla.) criticized a grant by the National Institutes of Health that supported global research on coronaviruses, including at the Wuhan lab.

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

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"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

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From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 2, 2020 1:05 AM
To: Chopra, Ashok; (b)(6) 'Eric Rothe'
Subject: UTMB and GNL being investigated?

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Ashok, It was great to speak with you. This is very interesting article, and timely given one of our topics discussed today. In particular the last statement of the article.

Prominent university bio lab urged to reveal extent of relationship with Wuhan lab at center of coronavirus outbreak

Hollie McKay, Drew Lynch | Fox News

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Federal officials are pressing one of the most advanced biocontainment laboratories in the U.S. to reveal more information relating to their extensive work and contractual relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a new letter from the Department of Education reveals.

The letter, dated April 24 and addressed to the University of Texas chancellor James Milliken, asks explicitly for disclosures as required under section 117 of the Higher Education Act.

"Between June 6, 2014, and June 3, 2019, U.T. reported approximately twenty-four contracts with various Chinese state-owned universities and ten contracts with Huawei Technologies, all purportedly worth a reported total of $12,987,896," the letter, signed by Reed D. Rubinstein, principal deputy general counsel for the U.S. Department of Education, states. "It is not clear, however, whether U.T. has, in fact, reported all gifts from or contracts with or relating to the Wuhan MCL, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and/or all other foreign sources, including agents and instrumentalities of the government of the Peoples' Republic of China."

CLICK HERE FOR COMPLETE CORONAVIRUS COVERAGE

"Therefore, to verify U.T.'s compliance with Section 117, the Department requests that your Institution produce the following records within thirty (30) days. Unless otherwise noted, the relevant time frame for these requests is January 1, 2012, through the present," the letter continues.

The GNL, which is part of the University of Texas system, is one of just 14 biosafety level 4 labs in the U.S.

The 2018 agreement provided for the exchange of some of America's most talented research and national security scientists, in addition to wide-ranging research sharing — an arrangement that experts say poses serious national security risks, especially considering the Wuhan lab's burgeoning scrutiny and linkage to the coronavirus pandemic, formally termed COVID-19.

CHINA UPS ITS SPY GAME ON US SOIL AS IT BIDS TO CONTROL CORONAVIRUS NARRATIVE

According to some national security and geopolitical experts, this flags a cause for steep concern and represents a larger piece of a problematic puzzle.

"The academic and research exchanges that have opened up more widely with China [have] reached a tipping point. Beijing [is] exploiting our open system with our help," said Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific

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security chair for the Hudson Institute. "Universities provided unguarded access to sensitive if unclassified data; American research institutions became hubs for information collection and the recruitment of spies; and universities with large numbers of Chinese students engaged in self-censorship lest they offend the Chinese government."

In this Tuesday, March 10, 2020, photo released by China's Xinhua News Agency, Chinese President Xi Jinping talks by video with patients and medical workers at the Huoshenshan Hospital in Wuhan in central China's Hubei Province. (Xinhua via AP)

The Galveston National Laboratory (GNL) boasted in a 2018 release about its work in directing operations of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, with the release reading: "In preparation for the opening of the new China MCL, we engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

Specifically, the Department of Education also asks for records and communications with famed Chinese virologist Shi Zhengli, the so-called "Batwoman" researcher at the Wuhan Institute.

As it stands, the U.S. government is conducting a comprehensive investigation into whether or not the novel pathogen, borne out of the Chinese city of Wuhan late last year, stemmed from a laboratory or a wet market as the Communist Party (CCP) leadership initially claimed.

The letter affirms that the investigation into U.T.'s China relations is being directed by the Department's Office of the General Counsel and cautions that the Department "recognizes that the COVID-19 virus may have a significant impact on certain U.T. operations. Nonetheless, the critical importance of the Department's investigation into the accuracy of U.T.'s foreign source reporting with respect to the Wuhan MCL and other Chinese Communist Party-related persons and entities is not diminished."

In a statement issued to Fox News late Friday afternoon, the University of Texas insisted that "each of the institutions within the UT System is required to complete and submit documentation annually to the Department of Education reporting gift and contract relationships with foreign entities, and UT institutions comply with these obligations.

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"We will continue to respond to any request from state and federal authorities, should they arise. As one of the nation's 14 Bio Safety Level 4 laboratories, the Galveston National Laboratory at UTMB belongs to the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Biodefense Laboratory Network. It has collaborated with more than 70 countries and with scientists from the U.S. and abroad on biosafety and biosecurity, as part of its broad mission to advance global scientific collaboration," the statement continued. "While it receives no financial support or gifts from global scientific laboratories, UTMB complies with obligations to report fiduciary relationships as required by statute."

This is not the first red flag raised when it comes to the relationship between U.S. universities and China.

In November 2016, it was reported that research partnerships between U.S. and Chinese scientists had surged significantly, with collaborations between the two economic leaders outnumbering all other international alliances.

"Increased collaboration between the United States and China is consistent with a general trend toward greater cross-border collaboration in science globally; however, the data also show a heavier reliance on bilateral collaboration with one another than with any other single country," noted Stephane Segal, a political economist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). "At the same time, the U.S. intelligence community has accused China of exploiting scientific collaboration and 'stealing innovation.'"

By 2018, it had become something of a cause for concern. In August that year, the director of the federal government's National Institutes of Health (NIH), Francis Collins, sent warnings to more than 10,000 academic institutions regarding threats from foreign entitles to biomedical research in the U.S.

An aerial view shows the P4 laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan in China's central Hubei province on April 17, 2020. - The P4 epidemiological laboratory was built in co-operation with French bio-industrial firm Institut Merieux and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The facility is among a handful of labs around the world cleared to handle Class 4 pathogens (P4) - dangerous viruses that pose a high risk of person-to-person transmission. (AFP via Getty)

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According to The Scientist, this was followed "by a subsequent wave of letters to a smaller number of universities requesting information about specific faculty members with potential links to foreign governments," prompting several scientists to leave their positions after being flagged for "undisclosed connections to China" and failing to report Chinese funding for projects.
In April of last year, NIH officials informed lawmakers that a further 16 investigations were underway, with regards to hidden influences of foreign governments on federal grant applications.

However, the concern continued throughout last year. In November, a U.S. Senate panel report pertaining to China's efforts to permeate U.S. research institutions lamented that the slow response from science agencies to warnings had allowed the CCP to divert U.S. government funds and private-sector technology to strengthen its economic and military ambitions.

CHINA DECIMATED US INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS YEARS AGO, POSING STEEP CHALLENGE DURING CORONAVIRUS COVER-UP

The analysis cast scrutiny on China's Thousand Talents Plan, an illustrious program tailored to recruit leading academics and promote domestic research. The contracts signed for the plan, to the ire of lawmakers and federal officials, mandated that "participating scientists abide by Chinese law, keep the contract secret, recruit postdocs and sign over any intellectual property rights to the sponsoring Chinese institution."

According to concerned lawmakers, the contracts thus offer incentives for scientists to set up "shadow labs" in China that emulate U.S. taxpayer-funded research at their home institutions.

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But with the novel coronavirus having claimed more than 60,000 lives in the United States alone, the Wuhan-U.S. academia trail is now being met with an even more discerning eye from Washington.

"The scope of China's exploitation of our open universities, including medical, biology, and other scientific labs, is only recently coming into focus," Cronin added. "At the end of 2019, the FBI and the NIH announced they were investigating 180 separate cases involving more than 70 institutions

"In almost all cases, the alleged theft of biomedical research information was done by Chinese citizens or Americans of Chinese descent. Bit by bit, China found ways into government scientific labs."

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Hollie McKay has a been a Fox News Digital staff reporter since 2007. She has extensively reported from war zones including Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, and Latin America investigates global conflicts, war crimes and terrorism around the world. Follow her on Twitter.

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From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 2, 2020 8:43 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Items-of-Interest--2 May 2020--COVID-19--Take 1

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FYI--

Jim

From Johns Hopkins WSSE Dashboard: 2 May 2020 at 0930 EDT

Total Confirmed

3,362,778

Confirmed Cases by Country/Region/Sovereignty

1,104,161 US

Total Deaths

239,227

Total Test Results in US

6,551,810

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

Taiwan: No new COVID-19 cases in nearly a week

by News Desk

May 1, 2020

The Taiwan CDC reported today there were no new COVID-19 cases in the country since April 25.

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The case and death toll remains unchanged at 429 total cases and six deaths. The total cases include 343 cases of overseas migration, 55 cases of local cases and 31 cases of Dunmu fleet.

http://outbreaknewstoday.com/taiwan-no-new-covid-19-cases-in-nearly-a-week-90893/

Study estimates 11% of children hospitalized with COVID-19 require PICU care

Pathak EB, et al. *J Public Health Manag Pract*. 2020; doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000001190.

May 1, 2020

Researchers recently estimated that 11% of all children hospitalized with COVID-19 will require admission to the PICU.

That estimate lines up with projections from the CDC, Beth Pathak, PhD, MSPH, founder and president of Women's Institute for Independent Social Enquiry, and colleagues explained.

Pathak and colleagues used U.S. data and modeling studies from China to estimate the number of children nationwide who have been infected with SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus that causes COVID-19, and found that it may be more than has been reported.

https://www.healio.com/pediatrics/emerging-diseases/news/online/%7Bca1f6e5e-7a2d-4a25-8c32-44cf57dfe89b%7D/study-estimates-11-of-children-hospitalized-with-covid-19-require-picu-care

SARS-CoV-2 Infection of Gut Organoids Bolsters Case for Intestinal Transmission

May 1, 2020

Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News

Gut organoids, three-dimensional cell culture models of the intestine, have been used to demonstrate that the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 can infect cells of the intestine and multiply there. The models indicate that SARS-CoV-2 might also infect and replicate in the cells lining the human intestine. It is even possible that the human intestine is—as researchers have suspected—a significant route for SARS-CoV-2 transmission. That is, SARS-CoV-2 transmission via gastrointestinal organs, as well as that via the respiratory organs, may account for the devastating spread of COVID-19.

Patients with COVID-19 show a variety of symptoms associated with respiratory organs—such as coughing, sneezing, shortness of breath, and fever—and the disease is transmitted via tiny droplets that are spread mainly through coughing and sneezing. One third of the patients, however, also have gastrointestinal symptoms, such as nausea and diarrhea. In addition, the virus can be detected in human stool long after the respiratory symptoms have been resolved. This suggests that the virus can also spread via so-called fecal-oral transmission.

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Though the respiratory and gastrointestinal organs may seem very different, there are some key similarities. A particularly interesting similarity is the presence of the ACE2 receptor, the receptor through which the COVID-19 causing SARS-CoV-2 virus can enter the cells. The inside of the intestine is loaded with ACE2 receptors. However, it has been unclear whether intestinal cells could get infected and produce virus particles.

https://www.genengnews.com/news/sars-cov-2-infection-of-gut-organoids-bolsters-case-for-intestinal-transmission/

COVID-19 and diabetes: Controlling blood glucose is key

by Press Release

May 1, 2020

A study reported in the journal *Cell Metabolism* on April 30 adds to the evidence that people with type 2 diabetes (T2D) are at greater risk of a poor outcome should they become infected with the virus that causes COVID-19. But there is some encouraging news: people with T2D whose blood sugar is well controlled fare much better than those with more poorly controlled blood sugar.

"We were surprised to see such favourable outcomes in well-controlled blood glucose group among patients with COVID-19 and pre-existing type 2 diabetes," says senior author Hongliang Li of Renmin Hospital of Wuhan University. "Considering that people with diabetes had much higher risk for death and various complications, and there are no specific drugs for COVID-19, our findings indicate that controlling blood glucose well may act as an effective auxiliary approach to improve the prognosis of patients with COVID-19 and pre-existing diabetes."

More than 500 million people around the world have T2D.

http://outbreaknewstoday.com/covid-19-and-diabetes-controlling-blood-glucose-is-key-94653/

Randomized trial underway to assess RAAS inhibitors in COVID-19

May 1, 2020

Healio

Many international medical societies have endorsed the continuation of renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system inhibitors such as ACE inhibitors and angiotensin II receptor antagonists to control BP in patients during the COVID-19 pandemic despite concerns about the drugs' relationship to ACE2, the receptor that helps the virus bind to cells. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine recently started the REPLACE COVID trial to provide more information about the effects of these medications in patients hospitalized with COVID-19.

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The REPLACE COVID trial recently started enrollment, and researchers aim to enroll 152 patients hospitalized for COVID-19 who will be assigned continuation or discontinuation of ACE inhibitors or angiotensin II receptor antagonists.

https://www.healio.com/cardiology/vascular-medicine/news/online/%7Bdeec874a-a5a2-4c43-b92c-76c0dd980176%7D/randomized-trial-underway-to-assess-raas-inhibitors-in-covid-19

Impact of mitigating interventions and temperature on the instantaneous reproduction number in the COVID-19 epidemic among 30 US metropolitan areas

Xinhua Yu

Posted May 01, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

Background:

After more than three months into the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) epidemic, over 170,000 people had died worldwide. The current study aims to evaluate how mitigating interventions affected the epidemic process in the 30 largest metropolitan areas in the US and whether temperature played a role in the epidemic process.

Methods:

Publicly available COVID-19 cases and deaths data and weather data were analyzed at the metropolitan level. The time-varying reproductive numbers were used to explore the trends.

Results:

We found that virus transmissibility, measured by instantaneous reproduction number (Rt), had declined significantly since the end of March for all areas and almost all of them reached a Rt of 1 or below by April 15, 2020. Cities with warm temperature tended to have a lower peak Rt than that of cities with cold temperature. However, large geographic variations exist.

Conclusions:

Though the end of epidemic of COVID-19 is near, temperature may have some weak effects on the virus transmission, and the return of the coronavirus outbreak is still possible.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.26.20081083v1

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Full lockdown policies in Western Europe countries have no evident impacts on the COVID-19 epidemic.

Thomas A. J. Meunier

Posted May 01, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

This phenomenological study assesses the impacts of full lockdown strategies applied in Italy, France, Spain and United Kingdom, on the slowdown of the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak. Comparing the trajectory of the epidemic before and after the lockdown, we find no evidence of any discontinuity in the growth rate, doubling time, and reproduction number trends. Extrapolating pre-lockdown growth rate trends, we provide estimates of the death toll in the absence of any lockdown policies, and show that these strategies might not have saved any life in western Europe. We also show that neighboring countries applying less restrictive social distancing measures (as opposed to police-enforced home containment) experience a very similar time evolution of the epidemic.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.24.20078717v1

The effect of a national lockdown in response to COVID-19 pandemic on the prevalence of clinical symptoms in the population

Ayya Keshet, et al.

Posted May 01, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

Here, we utilized nationwide surveys that assess COVID-19 associated symptoms to analyse the effect of the lockdown policy in Israel on the prevalence of clinical symptoms in the population

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Overall, these results demonstrate a profound decrease in a variety of clinical symptoms following the implementation of a lockdown in Israel. As our survey symptoms are not specific to COVID-19 infection, this effect likely represents an overall nationwide reduction in the prevalence of infectious diseases, including COVID-19. This quantification may be of major interest for COVID-19 pandemic, as many countries consider implementation of lockdown strategies.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.27.20076000v1

So we go from "no evident impacts" in the previous article to "profound decrease" in this one. One right, one wrong, both right, both wrong? Fog of war and confusion.--JTK

Individual variation in susceptibility or exposure to SARS-CoV-2 lowers the herd immunity threshold

M. Gabriela M. Gomes, et al.

Posted May 02, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

As severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) spreads, the susceptible subpopulation is depleted causing the rate at which new cases occur to decline. Variation in individual susceptibility or exposure to infection exacerbates this effect. Individuals that are frailer, and therefore more susceptible or more exposed, have higher probabilities of being infected, depleting the susceptible subpopulation of those who are at higher risk of infection, and thus intensifying the deceleration in occurrence of new cases. Eventually, susceptible numbers become low enough to prevent epidemic growth or, in other words, herd immunity is attained. Although estimates vary, it is currently believed that herd immunity to SARS-CoV-2 requires 60-70% of the population to be immune. Here we show that variation in susceptibility or exposure to infection can reduce these estimates. Achieving accurate estimates of heterogeneity for SARS-CoV-2 is therefore of paramount importance in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.27.20081893v1

High frequency of SARS-CoV-2 RNAemia and association with severe disease

Catherine A. Hogan, et al.

Posted May 01, 2020

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This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

Background

Detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the blood, also known as RNAemia, has been reported, but its prognostic implications are not well understood. This study aimed to determine the frequency of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in plasma and its association with the clinical severity of COVID-19

Conclusion:

This study demonstrated a high proportion of SARS-CoV-2 RNAemia, and an association between RNAemia and clinical severity suggesting the potential utility of plasma viral testing as a prognostic indicator for COVID-19.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.26.20080101v1

False positives in reverse transcription PCR testing for SARS-CoV-2

Andrew N Cohen, et al.

Posted May 01, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

Background:

Large-scale testing for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR is a key element of the response to COVID-19, but little attention has been paid to the potential frequency and impacts of false positives. Method: From a meta-analysis of external quality assessments of RT-PCR assays of RNA viruses, we derived a conservative estimate of the range of false positive rates that can reasonably be expected in SARS-CoV-2 testing, and analyzed the effect of such rates on analyses of regional test data and estimates of population prevalence and asymptomatic ratio.

Interpretation:

The high false discovery rate that results, when prevalence is low, from false positive rates typical of RT-PCR assays of RNA viruses raises questions about the usefulness of mass testing; and indicates that across a broad range of likely prevalences, positive test results are more likely to be wrong than are negative results, contrary to public health advice about SARS-CoV-2 testing

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https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.26.20080911v1

Pooled testing with replication: a mass testing strategy for the COVID-19 pandemics

Julius Žilinskas, et al.

Posted May 01, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

In absence of a vaccine or antiviral drugs for the COVID-19 pandemic, it becomes urgent to test for positiveness to the virus as many people as possible, in order to detect early outbreaks of the infection. Present testing solutions are based on the extraction of RNA from patients using oropharyngeal (OP) and nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs, and then testing with real-time PCR for the presence of specific RNA filaments identifying the virus. This approach is limited by the availability of reactants, trained technicians and laboratories. To speed up the testing procedures, some attempts have been done on group testing, which means that the swabs of multiple patients are grouped together and tested. Here we propose to use this technique in conjunction with a combinatorial replication scheme in which each patient is allocated in two or more groups to reduce total numbers of tests and to allow testing of even larger numbers of people. Under mild assumptions, a 13x average reduction of tests can be achieved.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.27.20076422v1

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab

Wall Street Journal

Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

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The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/us-probes-university-of-texas-links-to-chinese-lab/ar-BB13sOvn?ocid=spartandhp

ChowNow Launches a Loyalty Program Designed to Get Struggling Restaurants Paid

The Spoon

by Jennifer Marston

May 1, 2020Filed under:

Digital restaurant ordering platform ChowNow unveiled its Loyal Local Membership program this week. The restaurant-to-diner service gives customers ongoing discounts on their orders while simultaneously funneling a little extra money to the restaurants themselves, according to a company press release.

https://thespoon.tech/chownow-launches-a-loyalty-program-designed-to-get-struggling-restaurants-paid/

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From: professors-phds@googlegroups.com on behalf of Georgios Gialtouridis (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 2, 2020 12:24 PM
To: professors-phds@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [IHA-Professors & PhDs] Coronavirus

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Ντοσιέ με απόρρητη έκθεση 15 σελίδων επιβεβαιώνει τα παρακάτω γραφόμενά μου σχετικά με την προέλευση το κορονοϊού, με ειδική αναφορά στην "Bat Woman" ιολόγο Zhang-Li Shi, στην άμεση συγκάλυψη από τον ΠΟΥ, κ.ά.

https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/coronavirus/bombshell-dossier-lays-out-case-against-chinese-bat-virus-program/news-story/55add857058731c9c71c0e96ad17da60

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8279859/Bombshell-intelligence-lays-bare-China-lied-coronavirus-outbreak.html

https://nypost.com/2020/05/02/intelligence-report-says-china-lied-about-origin-of-coronavirus/

https://www.foxnews.com/world/new-dossier-condemns-china-for-destroying-evidence-of-covid-19-outbreak

Γεώργιος Γιαλτουρίδης
Westwood, MA

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From: professors-phds@googlegroups.com <professors-phds@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Martha Sinis (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 1:20 PM
To: Professors-PhDs@googlegroups.com <Professors-PhDs@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [IHA-Professors & PhDs] Coronavirus

My dear Fanoula,

I think you misinterpreted dr. Baltatzis sense of humor. I don't think he made fun of the deadly virus, as I understood it at least, but rather the
Kool-Aid references.
Humor is good and we , the Greeks have plenty of humor which has saved us from all kinds of misfortunes. Aristophanes was the father of
humor /comedy and in a funny way and some times in a brutal language
(which by the way is not my taste) but in this way he tried to correct the misdeeds of the Athenian society . Humor and laugh help the psyche overcome the misfortunes of humanity.

Kali Anastasi to you and all .
Let's try to do our best in order to overcome this pandemic.
"Μέ τό χαμόγελο στά χείλη " όπως
τραγουδήσαμε τό 40.
Martha Sinis

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Baltimore, Maryland

On Apr 14, 2020, at 02:17, Fanoulla Argyrou <fanoulla@rgyrou.com> wrote:

I believe this deadly virus that came from China does not offer any space for "fun". You either come out it alive or dead. And Prime Minister Boris Johnson did go very near the latter and returned. Therefore we should all count our blessings.

Kali Anastasi.

Fanoulla Argyrou, researcher/journalist/author
London.

From: professors-phds@googlegroups.com [mailto:professors-phds@googlegroups.com] **On Behalf Of** Panayiotis Baltatzis
Sent: 13 April 2020 21:34
To: Professors-PhDs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [IHA-Professors & PhDs] Coronavirus

Here we are in Holy Week I wish everybody Stay Well and prepare for the Holy Resurrection that Is coming. Happy Easter.
I am not a Biologist neither a Security analyst and I may had a little bit too much of Kool-Aid. After all we need some fun,SO....

I was thinking of poor Boris Johnson. I said ,shame on you Boris you let the whisky and drunk the Kool-Aid and ended at the Hospital and indeed the Intensive Care Unit.You spent there Easter Week.You should have gone to the Queen's Quarters, she would fix you some tea. She could even call our Konstantin (you know the Greek King) , would fix you some chicken soup (with avgolemono) or even better you could have called Donald your friend, he would Fed-Ex you some chloroquin and you would be up and running in no time. Fantastic(i) story.

Best Wishes to All.

Stay Well.

Panayiotis Baltatzis.

Baltimore Maryland.

On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 10:54 AM Georgios Gialtouridis <(b)(6) wrote:

Παρακάτω βλέπετε το email που μόλις έστειλα σε μια φίλη συγγραφέα.

Γεώργιος Γιαλτουρίδης
Westwood, MA

I have been following the pandemic on a daily basis and I have been conducting research as well. I appear regularly on Greek-American television and I update my viewers on the latest developments as well as offering my insight.

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In his speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Association on April 27, 1961 at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City, President John F. Kennedy praised the ancient Athenian lawmaker Solon who "decreed it a crime for any citizen to shrink from controversy." I use that as my motto.

I would like to begin with an extended excerpt from that eloquent oration. It's a long excerpt but definitely worth reading. Remember, this message was delivered almost 60 years ago and the same can be repeated today:

I want to talk about our common responsibilities in the face of a common danger. The events of recent weeks may have helped to illuminate that challenge for some; but the dimensions of its threat have loomed large on the horizon for many years. Whatever our hopes may be for the future--for reducing this threat or living with it--there is no escaping either the gravity or the totality of its challenge to our survival and to our security--a challenge that confronts us in unaccustomed ways in every sphere of human activity.

This deadly challenge imposes upon our society two requirements of direct concern both to the press and to the President--two requirements that may seem almost contradictory in tone, but which must be reconciled and fulfilled if we are to meet this national peril. I refer, first, to the need for a far greater public information; and, second, to the need for far greater official secrecy.

The very word "secrecy" is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths and to secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it. Even today, there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its arbitrary restrictions. Even today, there is little value in insuring the survival of our nation if our traditions do not survive with it. And there is very grave danger that an announced need for increased security will be seized upon by those anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official censorship and concealment. That I do not intend to permit to the extent that it is in my control. And no official of my Administration, whether his rank is high or low, civilian or military, should interpret my words here tonight as an excuse to censor the news, to stifle dissent, to cover up our mistakes or to withhold from the press and the public the facts they deserve to know.

But I do ask every publisher, every editor, and every newsman in the nation to reexamine his own standards, and to recognize the nature of our country's peril. In time of war, the government and the press have customarily joined in an effort based largely on self-discipline, to prevent unauthorized disclosures to the enemy. In time of "clear and present danger," the courts have held that even the privileged rights of the First Amendment must yield to the public's need for national security.

Today no war has been declared--and however fierce the struggle may be, it may never be declared in the traditional fashion. Our way of life is under attack. Those who make themselves our enemy are advancing around the globe. The survival of our friends is in danger. And yet no war has been declared, no borders have been crossed by marching troops, no missiles have been fired.

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If the press is awaiting a declaration of war before it imposes the self-discipline of combat conditions, then I can only say that no war ever posed a greater threat to our security. If you are awaiting a finding of "clear and present danger," then I can only say that the danger has never been more clear and its presence has never been more imminent.

https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/american-newspaper-publishers-association-19610427

Almost sixty years ago JFK warned the press not to serve the Kool-Aid. And as such, he warned the American people not to drink the Kool-Aid. So now, at these times of fear of an enemy without tanks and missiles, the mainstream press is serving the Kool-Aid by capitalizing on this "attack" by deflecting the artillery onto our Commander In Chief himself. It's the same mainstream media who promoted the Mueller Report and the Russia hoax, backed the failed impeachment attempt, the same actors who declared war on our president on the morning after election day, immediately after their election night-inflicted numbness passed.

I will give you some examples of the extraordinary leadership displayed by our Commander In Chief. Here is a tweet by the World Health Organization dated January 14, 2020. This was one week before Chinese authorities ordered a lockdown of Wuhan. The WHO has consistently supported China's positions for years now:

Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel #coronavirus (2019-nCoV) identified in #Wuhan, #China
https://twitter.com/WHO/status/1217043229427761152

In order for the Chinese government to decide to lockdown a city of 11 million, I would think that they didn't wake up one morning and suddenly made that decision. I would think the decision was preceded by weeks of research and statistical analysis, if not months. As far back as late November, U.S. intelligence officials were warning that a contagion was sweeping through China's Wuhan region, changing the patterns of life and business and posing a threat to the population:

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/intelligence-report-warned-coronavirus-crisis-early-november-sources/story?id=70031273

Yet, just one week before the January lockdown the WHO tweeted that calming and reassuring message to the world. Approximately a week after the January 14 tweet Chinese authorities cancelled flights to and from Wuhan and other cities in China. International flights to and from Wuhan continued however, until President Trump put a stop to all flights from China on January 30. That's called effective leadership. It also casts doubts on China's role.

But let's get back to the Kool-Aid. Where did this virus come from? Is it a natural phenomenon like the common cold or the flu? Why all the hype? Is the hype justified or premeditated? Let's go back to November 2015.

A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence

https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985.pdf

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The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV underscores the threat of cross-species transmission events leading to outbreaks in humans. Here we examine the disease potential of a SARS-like virus, SHC014- CoV, which is currently circulating in Chinese horseshoe bat populations. Using the SARS-CoV **reverse genetics** system, we generated and characterized a **chimeric virus** expressing the spike of bat coronavirus SHC014 in a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone. The results indicate that group 2b viruses encoding the SHC014 spike in a wild-type backbone can efficiently use multiple orthologs of the SARS receptor human angiotensin converting enzyme II (ACE2), **replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells** and achieve in vitro titers equivalent to epidemic strains of SARS-CoV. Additionally, in vivo experiments demonstrate replication of the chimeric virus in mouse lung with notable pathogenesis. Evaluation of available SARS-based immune-therapeutic and prophylactic modalities revealed poor efficacy; both monoclonal antibody and vaccine approaches failed to neutralize and protect from infection with CoVs using the novel spike protein. On the basis of these findings, we synthetically re-derived an infectious full-length SHC014 recombinant virus and demonstrate robust viral replication both in vitro and in vivo. **Our work suggests a potential risk of SARS-CoV re-emergence from viruses currently circulating in bat populations.**

So basically, the below scientists admitted that they created a hybrid synthetic chimeric virus using elements from Chinese horseshoe bats which can spread like wildfire without any therapy in sight:

Vineet D Menachery1, Boyd L Yount Jr1, Kari Debbink1,2, Sudhakar Agnihothram3, Lisa E Gralinski1, Jessica A Plante1, Rachel L Graham1, Trevor Scobey1, Xing-Yi Ge4, Eric F Donaldson1, Scott H Randell5,6, Antonio Lanzavecchia7, Wayne A Marasco8,9, Zhengli-Li Shi4 & Ralph S Baric1,2

1Department of Epidemiology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA.

2Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA.

3National Center for Toxicological Research, Food and Drug Administration, Jefferson, Arkansas, USA. 4Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and Biosafety, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China.

5Department of Cell Biology and Physiology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA.

6Cystic Fibrosis Center, Marsico Lung Institute, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA.

7Institute for Research in Biomedicine, Bellinzona Institute of Microbiology, Zurich, Switzerland.

8Department of Cancer Immunology and AIDS, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.

9Department of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.

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Vineet D Menachery, Boyd L Yount Jr, Kari Debbink, Lisa E Gralinski, Jessica A Plante, Rachel L Graham, Trevor Scobey, Scott H Randell, Eric F Donaldson and Ralph S Baric are all associated with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Xing-Yi Ge and Zhengli-Li Shi are associated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China. Zheng-Li Shi is the Chinese researcher nicknamed "Bat Woman" for her work with the animals.

It looks to me that these individuals created a monster.

"Studies have predicted the existence of nearly 5,000 coronaviruses in bat populations and some of these have the potential to emerge as human pathogens," said senior author Ralph Baric, PhD, a professor of epidemiology at the UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health and professor of microbiology and immunology the UNC School of Medicine and world-renowned expert in coronaviruses. *"So this is not a situation of 'if' there will be an outbreak of one of these coronaviruses but rather when and how prepared we'll be to address it."*

Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, pointed out at the time that these researchers have created a novel virus that "grows remarkably well" in human cells. "If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory," he said.

https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/did-we-see-this-coming/

Again, they created a hybrid synthetic chimeric virus using elements from Chinese horseshoe bats. Key word: chimeric, from the ancient Greek word Χίμαιρα, a monstrous fire-breathing hybrid creature composed of the parts of more than one animal. So in genetics, chimeric means a single organism composed of cells with more than one distinct genotype. This is how far their research went in order to create this artificial virus.

One of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill researchers named above was Ralph S. Baric. And what is Dr. Baric doing today? He, along with some of his UNC colleagues also named above now present themselves as "coronavirus hunters" racing against time to save the world:

https://www.independenttribune.com/news/in-a-locked-down-lab-the-unc-coronavirus-hunter-races/article_0f5e55a9-9222-5697-bd5f-d09bcc65335e.html

Hmm.

Now let's go back to the Kool-Aid. We hear the mainstream media criticize Trump for promoting the use of the antimalarial drug chloroquine to treat coronavirus. Some have even have gone as far as accusing Trump of profiting off the drug by supposedly owning stock in the company that makes the drug. Nevada's Democratic governor Steve Sisolak even signed emergency regulation limiting the use of Chloroquine.

Let's look at the Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) dated 16-24 February 2020. That's almost two months ago:

https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf

We already concluded that the WHO and the Chinese government are in bed with each other. Please go to page 35 of the report:

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Table 1 Priority research areas with immediate, intermediate and longer-term goals
Immediate Goals
Therapeutics: Remdesivir, favipiravir, chloroquine, plasma, TCM

Hmm, Chloroquine. Has Trump been right all along? Do people like Sisolak want to see more deaths? We also see Remdesivir on the above February list. Didn't Remdesivir just appear in the news as a new drug to fight against COVID-19?

Let me finish for now with Dr. Anthony Fauci, member of thecoronavirus task force. Look at how Dr. Fauci echoed Dr. Baric just nine days before Trump's inauguration:

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043725

Fauci: 'No doubt' Trump will face su infectious disease outbreak

January 11, 2017

Anthony S. Fauci, MD, director of the National Institute of Allergy an Diseases, said there is "no doubt" **Donald J. Trump** will be confronte surprise infectious disease outbreak during his presidency.

Fauci has led the NIAID for more than 3 decades, advising the past fi States presidents on global health threats from the early days of the A in the 1980s through to the current Zika virus outbreak.

During a forum on pandemic preparedness at Georgetown University Fauci said the Trump administration will not only be challenged by ongoing global health threats such as influenza and HIV, but also a surprise disease outbreak.

"The history of the last 32 years that I have been the director of the NIAID will tell the next administration that there is no doubt they will b challenges their predecessors were faced with," he said.

While observers have speculated since his election about how Trump such challenges, Fauci and other health experts said Tuesday that pr disease pandemics often starts overseas and that a proper response collaboration between not only the U.S. and other countries, but also private health sectors.

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https://www.healio.com/infectious-disease/emerging-diseases/news/online/%7B85a3f9c0-ed0a-4be8-9ca2-8854b2be7d13%7D/fauci-no-doubt-trump-will-face-surprise-infectious-disease-outbreak

Fauci estimated between 100,000 to 200,000 deaths in the US due to COVID-19. I can keep writing. It comes down to this. Trump survived everything the Deep State threw at him and came out even stronger. Now the same actors who killed millions in the Middle East, in Libya and in other parts of the world will stop at nothing in order to get rid of Trump, a shoo-in for the November elections. So they took out the heavy artillery. They need to bring Trump's record-breaking economy to a halt along with his popularity all while advancing their globalist agenda. These criminals have no consideration for human life as they have proven it for decades all over the world. And they know that many of their supporters are also willing to sacrifice thousands and thousands of human lives in order to get rid of Trump:

https://youtu.be/czgzOl9Vj8k

Imagine, these people have the right to vote.

Don't drink the Kool-Aid.

-George

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How to pay your annual DUES https://professors-phds.com/%ce%ba%ce%b1%cf%84%ce%b1%ce%b8%ce%b5%cf%83%ce%b5%ce%b9%cf%

IHA ANNUAL REPORT. 2018. https://professors-phds.com/ετησιοσ-απολογισμοσ-2018/
IHA ANNUAL REPORT 2017 https://professors-phds.com/iha/annual_reports/11245-2/
IHA ANNUAL REPORT 2016 https://professors-phds.com/iha/annual_reports/annual-report-2016/
IHA ANNUAL REPORT 2015 https://professors-phds.com/iha/annual_reports/2629-2/

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IHA ANNUAL REPORT 2017 https://professors-phds.com/iha/annual_reports/11245-2/
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IHA ANNUAL REPORT. 2018. https://professors-phds.com/ετησιοσ-απολογισμοσ-2018/
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043728

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 10:31 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	**2,028**	**327.1**	**66,336**
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

Location	Cases	Deaths	Fatality rate	Active	Recovered	Population	Cases/1M	Death/10M	More
TX	31,956	877	2.7%	16,860	14,219	28,995,881	1,102	302	







Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

By **Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News**

's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.



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

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

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ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



ZOOM BACK OUT:



ALL DATA:



FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N'' latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

''Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates,'' said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. ''That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data.''

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. ''Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk,'' said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

''I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses,'' said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. ''And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts.''

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

''Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future,'' said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. ''In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats.''

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

''This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies,'' said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. ''Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread.''

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal pate(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 10:33 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Items-of-Interest--3 May 2020--COVID-19--Take 2

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI--

Jim

From Johns Hopkins WSSE Dashboard: 3 May 2020 at 2330 EDT

Total Confirmed

3,506,729

Confirmed Cases by Country/Region/Sovereignty

1,158,040 US

217,466 Spain

210,717 Italy

187,842 United Kingdom

168,925 France

165,664 Germany

134,687 Russia

126,045 Turkey

101,826 Brazil

97,424 Iran

Total Deaths

247,470

Total Test Results in US

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7,053,366

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

Wuhan biosafety expert admits widespread security and maintenance concerns at China's top-secret labs which carry out research on lethal diseases

Daily Mail

By GLEN OWEN FOR THE MAIL ON SUNDAY

PUBLISHED: 17:03 EDT, 2 May 2020 | UPDATED: 20:30 EDT, 2 May 2020

International pressure was last night building on Beijing following the leak of a bombshell intelligence dossier which accuses **China** of having lied about the origins of Covid-19 – and cites evidence that the virus was passed to humans via the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

The dossier, which has been circulated between Western governments including Britain, also says China persecuted whistleblowers as part of the cover-up and obstructed efforts by other countries to develop a vaccine.

The classified document, from the Five Eyes security alliance of the US, UK, **Canada**, Australia and **New Zealand**, risks shattering the fragile consensus which has held among the nations – with the exception of US President **Donald Trump** – to avoid direct accusations against the Chinese government over the pandemic.

It comes a month after The Mail on Sunday first reported that British Cabinet Ministers were being briefed that the virus could have first spread after leaking from the institute, and 48 hours after President Trump announced that he had seen intelligence which gave him a 'high degree of confidence' that the global crisis had its origins in the laboratory.

Asked whether the UK was investigating whether China had not been fully open about the cause of the virus, Communities Secretary Robert Jenrick said yesterday: 'There will come a time when we will want to analyse the origins of the virus in detail and consider the actions of other countries.'

The dossier, leaked to Australia's Saturday Telegraph, makes scathing criticism of the alleged cover-ups and persecution mounted by the Chinese since the outbreak, as also detailed by this newspaper.

Trump's Five Eyes allies have been reluctant to join in with his criticisms of Beijing – despite having access to the same intelligence briefings – particularly when China is providing vital protective equipment and ventilators to countries such as the UK.

It is also likely to increase calls for China to pay reparations to other countries if the claims are substantiated with Trump already demanding $1trillion. The dossier says China moved to cover up the seriousness of the outbreak from early December, saying: 'Despite evidence of humanhuman transmission from early December, PRC authorities deny it until January 20.'

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043926

Describing Beijing's secrecy over the pandemic as an 'assault on international transparency', it points out that China imposed travel bans on people travelling throughout the nation but continued to tell the rest of the world that travel bans were unnecessary.

Addressing the possibility that the virus had leaked from the Wuhan Institute, the report cites several studies led by scientist Dr Shi Zhengli as concerns. It highlights the fact that Dr Zhengli – dubbed Bat Woman – and her team have conducted research in the lab into deadly bat-derived coronaviruses – with at least one of the virus samples being a 96 per cent genetic match for Covid-19.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8281083/Wuhan-biosafety-expert-admits-widespread-security-maintenance-concerns.html

A US researcher who worked with a Wuhan virology lab gives 4 reasons why a coronavirus leak would be extremely unlikely

Aylin Woodward, Business Insider US

May 2, 2020

A fringe theory suggests that the new coronavirus leaked by accident from a lab in Wuhan.

Researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) study infectious diseases, including coronaviruses, and did before the pandemic started. So as questions about how the pandemic started continue to go unanswered, the lab has drawn scrutiny.

Matthew Pottinger, Trump's deputy national security adviser, asked intelligence agencies in January to look into the idea of a Wuhan lab leak, The New York Times reported. But CIA officers didn't find any evidence.

There's a reason for that, according to Jonna Mazet, an epidemiologist at the University of California, Davis, who has worked with and trained WIV researchers in the past.

"I know that we worked together to develop very stringent safety protocol, and it's highly unlikely this was a lab accident," she told Business Insider. Here are four reasons why.

https://www.businessinsider.my/why-coronavirus-did-not-leak-from-wuhan-lab-researcher-2020-4

WHO says virus 'natural in origin' after Trump pins blame on China

Khmer Times

May 4, 2020

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043927

GENEVA (*AFP*) – The World Health Organization reiterated Friday that the new coronavirus was of natural origin after US President Donald Trump claimed he had seen evidence it originated in a Chinese lab.

Scientists believe the killer virus jumped from animals to humans, emerging in China late last year, possibly from a market in Wuhan selling exotic animals for meat.

Trump claimed Thursday that he had seen proof that the Wuhan Institute of Virology was actually the source of the outbreak, although he refused to give details.

Asked about Trump's claim during a virtual press conference, WHO emergencies chief Michael Ryan stressed that the UN health agency had "listened again and again to numerous scientists who have looked at the sequences" of the virus.

"We are assured that this virus is natural in origin," he said, reiterating a stance the UN agency has expressed previously.

https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50719678/who-says-virus-natural-in-origin-after-trump-pins-blame-on-china/

Cancer patients face high mortality from COVID-19

Largest study of cancer patients with COVID-19 provides guidance on how to protect this vulnerable population

Albert Einstein College of Medicine

Bronx, NY (May 1, 2020) People with cancer who develop COVID-19 are much more likely to die from the disease than those without cancer, according to physician-researchers at Montefiore Health System and Albert Einstein College of Medicine. The study, published today in the online edition of *Cancer Discovery*, is the largest so far to assess outcomes for patients with cancer who have also been infected with COVID-19.

"Our findings emphasize the need to prevent cancer patients from contracting COVID-19 and--if they do--to identify and closely monitor these individuals for dangerous symptoms," said Vikas Mehta, M.D., M.P.H., a co-lead author of the study, a surgical oncologist at Montefiore and associate professor of otorhinolaryngology--head and neck surgery at Einstein. "We hope that our findings can inform states and communities that have not yet been so severely struck by this pandemic about the unique vulnerability cancer patients face."

https://sciencesources.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-05/aeco-cpf043020.php

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043928

The effect of BCG vaccination on COVID-19 examined by a statistical approach: no positive results from the Diamond Princess and cross-national differences previously reported by world-wide comparisons are flawed in several ways

Masakazu Asahara

Posted May 03, 2020

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]. It reports new medical research that has yet to be evaluated and so should *not* be used to guide clinical practice.

Abstract

Recently, the controversial hypothesis that BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guerin) vaccination reduces infection or severity of COVID-19 has been proposed. The present study examined this hypothesis using statistical approaches based on the public data. Three approaches were utilized: 1) comparing the infection and mortality ratio of people on the cruise ship Diamond Princess, 2) comparing the number of mortalities among nations, and 3) comparing the maximum daily increase rate of total mortalities among nations.

Nevertheless, our results show that the effect of BCG vaccination, if any, can be masked by many other factors. Therefore, the possible effect might be relatively small. In fact, in Japan, where almost all citizens have been vaccinated, COVID-19 cases are constantly increasing. Given the importance of peoples behavior in preventing viral propagation, the spread of optimism triggered by this hypothesis would be harmful to BCG vaccination nations.

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.17.20068601v2

Study finds high blood pressure medications safe for patients with COVID-19 disease

NYU Langone Health / NYU School of Medicine

1-May-2020

Despite concerns expressed by some experts, common high blood pressure drugs did not increase the risk of contracting COVID-19 - or of developing severe disease - in a study of 12,594 patients.

Published online May 1 in the *New England Journal of Medicine*, the study was launched in response to a March 17 joint statement issued by the American Heart Association, the American College of Cardiology, and the Heart Failure Society of America. It urgently called for research to answer a question raised by past studies: do high blood pressure (antihypertensive) drugs worsen COVID-19 patient outcomes?

Led by researchers from NYU Grossman School of Medicine, the study found no links between treatment with four drug classes - angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, angiotensin

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043929

receptor blockers (ARBs), beta blockers, or calcium channel blockers -- and increased likelihood of a positive test for COVID-19.

https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-05/nlh-sfh050120.php

Timing of immune response to COVID-19 may contribute to disease severity

The interaction between the innate and the adaptive immune responses to COVID-19 may be impacting disease progression, according to a new study from the Keck School of Medicine of USC

Keck School of Medicine of USC

1-May-2020

A new USC study suggests that temporarily suppressing the body's immune system during the early stages of COVID-19 could help a patient avoid severe symptoms.

That's because the research, just published online in the *Journal of Medical Virology*, shows that an interaction between the body's two main lines of defense may be causing the immune system to go into overdrive in some patients.

https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-05/ksom-toi050120.php

New toolkit provides rapid implementation guide for adopting telemedicine during COVID-19

Stepwise approach enabled telemedicine program to get up and running in three days

American College of Surgeons

CHICAGO (May 1, 2020): Stay-at-home orders caught many medical practices and health care systems off guard, leaving them ill-equipped to rapidly adopt an efficient telemedicine platform so they could keep providing time-sensitive care to non-COVID-19 patients. To help organizations rapidly introduce telemedicine as an alternative option, a urology group in North Carolina developed a guide that enabled them to convert all in-person visits to telemedicine in three days. They report their experience in an "article in press" appearing on the *Journal of the American College of Surgeons* website ahead of print.

https://sciencesources.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-05/acos-ntp050120.php

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043930

Chinese scientists uncover structural basis for SARS-CoV-2 inhibition by Remdesivir

Chinese Academy of Sciences Headquarters

1-May-2020

A team of Chinese scientists have reported the high-resolution cryo-EM structure of Remdesivir-bound RNA replicase complex from SARS-CoV-2, the infective virus of COVID-19.

SARS-CoV-2 is a positive-strand RNA virus that mainly infects human cells through the mucosal system. The massive replication of the virus requires the rapid synthesis of its genetic RNA. This process is mediated by a multi-subunit replication transcription complex composed of multiple non-structural proteins (nsp) of the virus. The core element is the replicase complex, which is the core component of coronavirus replication. Numerous nucleoside drugs targeting replicase are currently under clinical testing, including Remdesivir.

After 46 days of hard work, the scientists were able to elaborate the replicase-targeting mechanism underlying the antiviral efficacy of these nucleoside drugs.

https://sciencesources.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-05/caos-csu050120.php

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043931

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	**2,028**	**327.1**	**66,336**
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

Location	Cases	Deaths	Fatality rate	Active	Recovered	Population	Cases/1M	Death/10M	More
TX	31,956	877	2.7%	16,860	14,219	28,995,881	1,102	302	







Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

By **Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News**

's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.



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

ZOOM IN:



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ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



ZOOM BACK OUT:



ALL DATA:



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See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N'' latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

''Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates,'' said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. ''That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data.''

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. ''Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk,'' said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

''I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses,'' said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. ''And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts.''

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

''Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future,'' said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. ''In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats.''

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

''This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies,'' said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. ''Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread.''

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From:	Peter Daszak
To:	calisher@cybersafe.net; Ksiazek, Thomas G.; Tesh, Robert B.; Tom Monath; Kevin Olival; "Rovnak,Joel"; "Quackenbush,Sandra"; Jeff Wilusz
Cc:	Shelley; "Dan Calisher"; "Sarah Haworth"; "Yanrong Lu"; "David Morens"
Subject:	RE: Summary of evidence that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a laboratory in Wuhan, China
Date:	3 May, 2020 18:48:05

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks Charlie – appreciate you sending that round. I've seen this, read it in detail and every single point they make can be easily countered.

I can assure everyone on this email chain, as someone who has worked with this lab for 15 yrs on bat-CoVs, that there is no evidence whatsoever to support these allegations – at the most basic they simply didn't have isolates of any virus anywhere close to SARS-CoV-2.

On the other hand, we've amassed substantial evidence of bat-CoVs able to infect human cells, to cause SARS-like disease in humanized mice, and of people exposed to bat-CoVs in rural China. Extrapolating the ~3% IgG prevalence we found in Yunnan communities to the rural populations in SE Asia where these bats live, we estimate 1-7 million people per year get exposed to bat CoVs just living and working in rural SE Asia. That's where we need to focus, in my opinion.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street
New York, NY 10001
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: @PeterDaszak

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: calisher@cybersafe.net <calisher@cybersafe.net>
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 6:53 PM
To: Tom Ksiazek <tgksiaze@utmb.edu>; 'Tesh, Robert B.' <rtesh@UTMB.EDU>; Peter Daszak <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; Tom Monath <tom.monath@crozetbiopharma.com>; Kevin Olival <olival@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Rovnak,Joel' <Joel.Rovnak@colostate.edu>; 'Quackenbush,Sandra' <Sandra.Quackenbush@colostate.edu>; Jeff Wilusz <jeffrey.wilusz@colostate.edu>

Cc: Shelley <rockpile@cybersafe.net>; 'Dan Calisher' <dcalisher@fostergraham.com>; 'Sarah Haworth' (b)(6) .com>; 'Yanrong Lu (b)(6) 'David Morens' <dm270q@nih.gov>

Subject: FW: Summary of evidence that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a laboratory in Wuhan, China

From a friend outside the USA.

No useful comment from me but just FYI.

Charlie

Forward to a friend | View it in your browser

Summary of evidence that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a laboratory in Wuhan, China

Researchers draw attention to hazards posed by biosafety labs and "gain-of-function" research

An excellent summary of evidence suggesting the virus responsible for the COVID19 pandemic may have originated in laboratory in Wuhan, China, has been published by “an anonymous group of researchers” who claim not to be “affiliated with any company, nation state, or organization”.

The document focuses on evidence implicating two potential culprits: the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Both are known to have been working on bat coronaviruses that are closely related to SARS-CoV-2.

The authors write, "The goal of this document is to examine evidence that may prove that (1) the SARS-CoV-2 virus was present at a biolaboratory in Wuhan, China, and (2) the SARS-CoV-2 virus was introduced into the greater Wuhan population by an infected lab worker or animal. These claims from this point on will be referred to as Claim 1 and Claim 2.

"This document does not attempt to provide a concrete conclusion on whether either claim is factually true. Rather, it examines the probability that each claim is true to allow the reader to make his or her own conclusions. While either claim cannot be irrevocably proven true, an attempt has been made to ensure

the evidence used to support these claims is as factual as possible."

The authors do not state or imply that the virus was deliberately engineered as a bioweapon or released as one. They are also keen to distance themselves from the anti-Chinese sentiment that is being whipped up in some sectors of the media around the lab escape hypothesis, calling this trend "racist".

The document does, however, present convincing evidence that the virus could have been the product of laboratory "gain-of-function" studies.

Gain-of-function studies are intended to make pathogenic viruses more virulent or more transmissible. They are often carried out for vaccine or therapeutics development, or for "biodefence" reasons. The authors state that one of their aims is "to further spread global awareness of the hazards posed by biolaboratories, in particular gain-of-function studies, and proximal location to urban areas".

These types of studies have been coming in for increasing criticism from scientists and others for several years, due to their ability to result in pathogen escapes.

The new document is extensively sourced and professionally written in a way that makes it easy for the layperson to understand the arguments. It clearly forms part of an ongoing investigation, as the authors periodically post notices of evidence gaps and ask for readers to contribute further evidence.

We are publishing the Conclusion to the new document below because it summarizes the arguments well – but do read the full document at the original URL to see all the evidence and sources cited.

Evidence SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a biological laboratory in Wuhan, China

Published April 16, 2020; Updated May 2, 2020
https://project-evidence.github.io/

Conclusion

Up until this point, we have been presenting each of our claims in a vacuum. Let us put them together:

At some point in late 2019, many people who visited the The Huanan Seafood Market fell ill due to a new disease. To date the origin of this disease is unknown.

This market is less than 9 miles away from The Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, which:
* Collaborated with French authorities to construct its BSL-4 lab, however the company meant to inspect its safety standards bailed out of the project and

French scientists who were supposed to work there were never sent there
* Developed chimeric SARS-like coronaviruses
* Conducted 'dangerous' gain-of-function research on the SARS-CoV-1 virus
* Established a 96.2% match with SARS-CoV-2 and a virus they sampled from a cave over 1,000 miles away from Wuhan
* Injected live piglets with bat coronaviruses as recently as July 2019: Paper 5, Paper 7, Paper 8
* Tested its disinfecting procedures with a bat coronavirus
* Published a paper on a close descendant of SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, in November 2019
* Collected bat samples with improper PPE even after a researcher was bitten by one
* Was hiring researchers to work on bat coronaviruses as recently as November 2019
* The United States State Department claimed had 'inadequate safety'
* Deleted a press release detailing a U.S. State Department visit
* Has not provided concrete evidence that one of their prior researchers is still alive, despite rumors on Chinese social media that they are "Patient Zero", despite one of their other top researchers coming out and swearing the virus had nothing to do with her lab
* Had a researcher accuse the director of the Institute of selling infected lab animals to vendors on Weibo (with pictures of herself and her employee ID included); afterwards, she claimed she was 'hacked'
* Had staff trained by a Chinese-Canadian scientist at Canada's only BSL-4 lab who has now been under RCMP investigation for nearly a year following a shipment of Ebola and Henipahvirus from that lab to a lab in China

The market is also less than 3 miles away from the Wuhan Centre for Disease Control, which:
* Was actually already accused of being the source of the outbreak from a now-withdrawn academic paper from a notable Chinese scholar at the South China University of China
* Once kept horseshoe bats, a known reservoir of SARS-CoV-1, within its labs
* Once performed surgery on live animals within its labs
* Had a researcher who quarantined on two separate occasions; once upon coming into contact with bat blood after being 'attacked' and another time when he was urinated upon in a cave while wearing inadequate personal protection

Let us also look at the actions of China before and after the outbreak, which:
* Had the SARS-CoV-1 virus escape from a lab in Beijing, twice
* Compensated families after 27 students were infected with Brucella bacteria during an anatomy course in 2011
* Is currently investigating a similar Brucella outbreak amongst "over 100 Students and Staff" in December 2019
* Issued bio-safety guidelines to 'fix chronic management loopholes at virus labs'
* Arrested a 'top academician' for illegally selling lab animals and 'experimental milk' in January 2020
* Censored local medical professionals who attempted to report the outbreak

* Ordered local labs to destroy any samples of the new virus
* Withheld the virus's genome nearly a week after they sequenced it
* Continually insisted on no human-to-human transmission
* Launched the largest national quarantine in human history once containment failed
* Issued an order preventing the unauthorized publishing of any academic material related to SARS-CoV-2
* Allowed a Party spokesperson to accuse the United States Army of intentionally bringing SARS-CoV-2 to Wuhan
* Is continuing to refuse an independent investigation into the outbreak origins and threatened Australia with boycotts if they investigated

Also in January 2020, the United States Department of Justice arrested two Chinese nationals and the Chair of the "Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University" for allegedly receiving illegal payments from China, "acting as an agent of a foreign government," and "attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China."

Back to the market: the The Huanan Seafood Market didn't even have bats for sale, and most bats species in Wuhan would be hibernating at the time of outbreak. It was reported that 34% of cases had no contact with the market, and 'No epidemiological link was found between the first patient and later cases'.

If an infected animal was indeed the culprit, why did it fail to infect a single person outside of the market? It could not have been infected at the market, because there were no bats that could serve as sources of infection. So, where were all the infected people outside of Wuhan by the time SARS-CoV-2 started spreading in the market?

We hope that this document adequately addressed each claim with what evidence is available and fulfilled its secondary responsibility of educating you on biolaboratory safety. By now, we hope you understand that these claims are not impossible; they are in fact more than likely.

We may never be certain of the truth. What we are certain of, however, is that these claims shouldn't be discounted, and far more research must be done to disprove either one.

Our work as a global community must continue.

Website: http://www.gmwatch.org
Profiles: http://www.powerbase.info/index.php/GM_Watch:_Portal
Twitter: http://twitter.com/GMWatch
Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/pages/GMWatch/276951472985?ref=nf

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From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 1:18 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: And comparing CV death rates to other deaths...
Attachments: CDC Death rates nvsr68_09-508.pdf

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To put coronavirus deaths so far in perspective:

1. If CV in the US ends up at 80-100k deaths, you can see all of the other causes of death in 2017, which comes from the attached file and from the CDC website link. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm CV would be number 7 in the table below right above the flu/influenza and near diabetes. If the elderly can be protected properly, which is possible if the Coronavirus does not mutate as much as influenza (even with flu vaccines), the annual death rate from CV might be lowered with treatment and vaccines. And if you only include the 44 US states from the email below which represent 83% of the US population, that group is at the bottom of the table with 21k deaths so far.
2. Another interesting column is the male to female column, where other than Alzheimer's, men have a much greater risk of dying than women accross all of the other categories with the greatest difference being accidents, suicide, and Parkinson's at over 2:1.
3. And if you flip through the many tables in the back, table 12 breaks down types of deaths by state. Table 11 gets into the injury deaths, where unintentional, suicide, poisoning, motor vehicle, firearms and falls all have more deaths in 2017 than the 44 US states have had with CV so far.

Deaths and Mortality

Data are for the U.S.

- Number of deaths: 2,813,503
- Death rate: 863.8 deaths per 100,000 population
- Life expectancy: 78.6 years
- Infant Mortality rate: 5.79 deaths per 1,000 live births

Source: Deaths: Final Data for 2017, tables 1, 3, 13 pdf icon[PDF – 2 MB]
Number of deaths for leading causes of death:

- Heart disease: 647,457
- Cancer: 599,108
- Accidents (unintentional injuries): 169,936
- Chronic lower respiratory diseases: 160,201
- Stroke (cerebrovascular diseases): 146,383
- Alzheimer's disease: 121,404
- Diabetes: 83,564
- Influenza and Pneumonia: 55,672
- Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis: 50,633
- Intentional self-harm (suicide): 47,173

Source: Deaths: Final Data for 2017, table B pdf icon[PDF – 2 MB]

Table B. Number of deaths, percentage of total deaths, death rates, and age-adjusted death rates for 2017, percent change in age-adjusted death rates in 2017 from 2016, and ratio of age-adjusted death rates by sex and by race and Hispanic origin for the 15 leading causes of death for the total population in 2017: United States

[Crude death rates are on an annual basis per 100,000 population; age-adjusted rates are per 100,000 U.S. standard population; see Technical Notes in this report. Asterisks (*) preceding cause-of-death codes indicate they are not part of the *International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision* (ICD–10); see Technical Notes. Race and Hispanic-origin categories are consistent with 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards]

					Age-adjusted death rate				
						Percent change	Ratio		
Rank[1]	Cause of death (ICD–10)	Number	Percent of total deaths, 2017	Crude death rate, 2017	2017	2016 to 2017	Male to female	Non-Hispanic black[2] to non-Hispanic white	Non-Hispanic white[2] to Hispanic
...	All causes	2,813,503	100.0	863.8	731.9	0.4	1.4	1.2	1.4
1	Diseases of heart (I00–I09,I11,I13,I20–I51)	647,457	23.0	198.8	165.0	–0.3	1.6	1.2	1.5
2	Malignant neoplasms (C00–C97)	599,108	21.3	183.9	152.5	–2.1	1.4	1.1	1.5
3	Accidents (unintentional injuries) (V01–X59,Y85–Y86)	169,936	6.0	52.2	49.4	4.2	2.1	0.8	1.7
4	Chronic lower respiratory diseases (J40–J47)	160,201	5.7	49.2	40.9	0.7	1.2	0.7	2.7
5	Cerebrovascular diseases (I60–I69)	146,383	5.2	44.9	37.6	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.1
6	Alzheimer disease (G30)	121,404	4.3	37.3	31.0	2.3	0.7	0.9	1.3
7	Diabetes mellitus (E10–E14)	83,564	3.0	25.7	21.5	2.4	1.6	2.1	0.7
8	Influenza and pneumonia (J09–J18)	55,672	2.0	17.1	14.3	5.9	1.3	1.1	1.3
9	Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis (N00–N07, N17–N19,N25–N27)	50,633	1.8	15.5	13.0	–0.8	1.4	2.2	1.0
10	Intentional self-harm (suicide) (*U03,X60–X84,Y87.0)	47,173	1.7	14.5	14.0	3.7	3.7	0.4	2.6
11	Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis (K70,K73–K74)	41,743	1.5	12.8	10.9	1.9	1.9	0.7	0.8
12	Septicemia (A40–A41)	40,922	1.5	12.6	10.6	–0.9	1.2	1.7	1.3
13	Essential hypertension and hypertensive renal disease (I10,I12,I15)	35,316	1.3	10.8	9.0	4.7	1.1	2.1	1.0
14	Parkinson disease (G20–G21)	31,963	1.1	9.8	8.4	5.0	2.3	0.5	1.5
15	Pneumonitis due to solids and liquids (J69)	20,108	0.7	6.2	5.1	–1.9	1.9	1.0	1.7
...	All other causes (residual)	561,920	20.0	172.5	...	...	...	...	...

... Category not applicable.
[1]Rank based on number of deaths; see Technical Notes.
[2]Multiple-race data reported according to 1997 OMB standards were bridged to the single-race categories of 1977 OMB standards. For more information on areas reporting multiple race, see Technical Notes.

SOURCE: NCHS, National Vital Statistics System, Mortality.

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Table 12. Number of deaths, death rates, and age-adjusted death rates for major causes of death: United States, each state, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and Northern Marianas, 2017

[Rates are per 100,000 population; age-adjusted rates are per 100,000 U.S. standard population; see Technical Notes in this report. Codes in parentheses after causes of death are categories of the *International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision* (ICD–10). Asterisks (*) preceding cause-of-death codes indicate they are not part of ICD–10: see Technical Notes]

Area	All causes			Malignant neoplasms (C00–C97)			Diseases of heart (I00–I09,I11,I13,I20–I51)			Accidents (unintentional injuries) (V01–X59,Y85–Y86)		
	Number	Rate	Age-adjusted rate[1]	Number	Rate	Age-adjusted rate[1]	Number	Rate	Age-adjusted rate[1]	Number	Rate	Age-adjusted rate[1]
United States[2]	2,813,503	863.8	731.9	599,108	183.9	152.5	647,457	198.8	165.0	169,936	52.2	49.4
Alabama	53,238	1,092.1	917.7	10,410	213.5	179.0	13,110	268.9	223.2	2,703	55.4	53.8
Alaska	4,411	596.2	708.8	926	125.2	139.2	814	110.0	135.0	436	58.9	63.7
Arizona	57,758	823.2	676.5	12,008	171.1	135.8	12,398	176.7	141.9	4,184	59.6	56.2
Arkansas	32,588	1,084.7	900.1	6,517	216.9	173.6	8,270	275.3	223.8	1,625	54.1	51.8
California	268,189	678.3	618.7	59,516	150.5	136.7	62,797	158.8	142.9	13,840	35.0	33.1
Colorado	38,063	678.8	663.4	7,829	139.6	130.9	7,060	125.9	122.7	3,037	54.2	53.6
Connecticut	31,312	872.6	651.2	6,608	184.2	139.5	7,138	198.9	141.6	2,078	57.9	53.2
Delaware	9,178	954.1	749.6	2,085	216.7	160.4	1,990	206.9	158.4	608	63.2	61.9
District of Columbia	4,965	715.4	725.4	1,031	148.6	152.8	1,284	185.0	189.8	427	61.5	61.0
Florida	203,636	970.4	672.1	45,131	215.1	145.9	46,440	221.3	145.8	13,059	62.2	56.1
Georgia	83,096	796.8	793.7	17,135	164.3	154.9	18,389	176.3	175.8	4,712	45.2	45.2
Hawaii	11,390	797.9	584.9	2,456	172.0	128.6	2,575	180.4	129.8	585	41.0	35.7
Idaho	14,011	816.0	741.8	3,020	175.9	153.2	3,084	179.6	162.4	876	51.0	49.8
Illinois	109,721	857.1	724.2	24,150	188.6	157.9	25,394	198.4	163.3	6,019	47.0	44.4
Indiana	65,597	983.9	846.6	13,462	201.9	170.0	14,445	216.7	183.2	3,978	59.7	58.7
Iowa	30,530	970.5	737.0	6,449	205.0	158.0	7,180	228.2	167.4	1,536	48.8	42.7
Kansas	27,063	929.0	771.2	5,494	188.6	157.2	5,723	196.5	157.9	1,567	53.8	49.4
Kentucky	48,212	1,082.4	929.9	10,145	227.8	185.7	10,343	232.2	195.9	3,264	73.3	72.9
Louisiana	45,804	977.8	881.1	9,513	203.1	174.9	11,260	240.4	214.4	2,780	59.3	58.8
Maine	14,676	1,098.6	771.6	3,391	253.8	170.8	2,844	212.9	143.5	990	74.1	68.0
Maryland	49,926	824.9	718.1	10,796	178.4	151.5	11,653	192.5	164.5	2,408	39.8	36.9
Massachusetts	58,803	857.2	677.1	12,934	188.5	149.3	12,140	177.0	134.6	3,821	55.7	51.5
Michigan	97,602	979.7	783.5	20,671	207.5	161.3	25,187	252.8	196.1	5,623	56.4	53.0
Minnesota	44,371	795.7	656.4	9,896	177.5	146.8	8,230	147.6	119.1	2,788	50.0	44.6
Mississippi	32,280	1,081.7	951.3	6,526	218.7	183.1	7,944	266.2	231.6	1,738	58.2	56.3
Missouri	61,876	1,012.1	820.1	12,971	212.2	167.2	14,820	242.4	191.1	3,776	61.8	58.8
Montana	10,200	971.0	757.5	2,145	204.2	152.6	2,164	206.0	155.0	579	55.1	50.2
Nebraska	16,878	879.0	726.0	3,502	182.4	152.6	3,581	186.5	149.3	811	42.2	38.5
Nevada	24,657	822.4	765.5	5,283	176.2	155.3	6,417	214.0	199.3	1,496	49.9	47.8
New Hampshire	12,504	931.2	717.2	2,760	205.5	153.5	2,721	202.6	149.7	907	67.5	62.9
New Jersey	74,846	831.1	667.5	16,264	180.6	144.6	18,840	209.2	162.3	4,482	49.8	47.3
New Mexico	18,673	894.3	754.7	3,620	173.4	138.3	3,896	186.6	151.4	1,460	69.9	68.2
New York	155,358	782.7	623.6	34,956	176.1	141.2	44,092	222.1	171.2	7,687	38.7	35.5
North Carolina	93,157	906.8	785.6	19,474	189.6	157.1	18,808	183.1	156.5	5,985	58.3	56.3
North Dakota	6,415	849.2	692.7	1,280	169.4	142.6	1,326	175.5	137.8	339	44.9	41.3
Ohio	123,648	1,060.6	849.7	25,643	219.9	171.2	28,008	240.2	186.2	8,971	76.9	75.1
Oklahoma	40,452	1,029.1	902.4	8,203	208.7	177.3	10,772	274.0	237.2	2,563	65.2	62.5
Oregon	36,624	884.0	717.2	8,083	195.1	154.2	6,942	167.6	134.0	2,076	50.1	44.7
Pennsylvania	135,656	1,059.4	777.3	28,387	221.7	161.0	32,312	252.3	176.0	9,527	74.4	70.2
Rhode Island	10,157	958.5	713.4	2,154	203.3	154.2	2,339	220.7	155.7	718	67.8	60.0
South Carolina	49,441	984.0	826.0	10,356	206.1	162.7	10,418	207.3	172.0	3,147	62.6	60.2
South Dakota	7,996	919.4	736.6	1,715	197.2	156.9	1,710	196.6	150.1	537	61.7	56.1
Tennessee	70,996	1,043.7	897.1	14,302	213.0	173.4	16,019	238.5	202.2	4,435	66.0	63.0
Texas	198,106	699.9	735.7	40,668	143.7	146.5	45,346	160.2	169.2	10,763	38.0	38.8
Utah	18,035	581.4	700.1	3,161	101.9	120.3	3,749	120.9	150.2	1,238	39.9	44.2
Vermont	6,007	963.2	714.9	1,434	229.9	164.5	1,332	213.6	152.5	394	63.2	56.9
Virginia	68,579	809.7	719.4	15,064	177.9	152.6	14,861	175.5	154.5	3,922	46.3	44.0
Washington	56,995	769.6	686.6	12,664	171.0	148.4	11,582	156.4	138.8	3,455	46.7	44.0
West Virginia	23,276	1,281.8	957.1	4,654	256.3	179.4	4,849	267.0	192.0	1,892	104.2	100.3
Wisconsin	52,681	909.0	722.0	11,318	195.3	153.2	11,860	204.6	157.6	3,746	64.6	58.3
Wyoming	4,768	823.0	714.5	948	163.6	136.1	1,001	172.8	148.9	348	60.1	56.9
Puerto Rico	30,777	922.2	658.0	5,210	156.1	109.1	5,557	166.5	113.6	966	28.9	23.3
U.S. Virgin Islands	707	659.1	625.6	115	107.2	92.5	153	142.6	124.6	36	33.6	34.1
Guam	990	591.5	870.8	182	108.7	146.1	336	200.8	316.5	44	26.3	27.1
American Samoa	304	590.2	1,087.7	41	79.6	153.0	79	153.4	260.4	16	*	*
Northern Marianas	232	443.9	805.3	45	86.1	135.2	39	74.6	117.9	22	42.1	55.0

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 11. Number of deaths, death rates, and age-adjusted death rates for injury deaths, by mechanism and intent of death for all injury death and the leading causes of injury death: United States, 2017

[Totals for selected causes of death may differ from those shown in other tables that use standard mortality tabulation lists: see Technical Notes in this report. Rates are per 100,000 population; age-adjusted rates are per 100,000 U.S. standard population; see Technical Notes. Populations used for computing death rates are postcensal estimates based on the 2010 census estimated as of July 1, 2017: see Technical Notes. Numbers in brackets [ ] apply to the code or range of codes preceding them. Asterisks (*) preceding cause-of-death codes indicate they are not part of the *International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision* (ICD–10): see Technical Notes]

Mechanism and intent of death (based on ICD–10)		Number	Rate	Age-adjusted rate[1]
All injury	(*U01–*U03,V01–Y36,Y85–Y87,Y89)	243,039	74.6	71.5
Unintentional	(V01–X59,Y85–Y86)	169,936	52.2	49.4
Suicide	(*U03,X60–X84,Y87.0)	47,173	14.5	14.0
Homicide	(*U01–*U02,X85–Y09,Y87.1)	19,510	6.0	6.2
Undetermined	(Y10–Y34,Y87.2,Y89.9)	5,799	1.8	1.8
Legal intervention/war	(Y35–Y36,Y89[.0,.1])	621	0.2	0.2
Poisoning	(*U01[.6–.7],X40–X49,X60–X69,X85–X90,Y10–Y19,Y35.2)	75,354	23.1	23.2
Unintentional	(X40–X49)	64,795	19.9	20.1
Suicide	(X60–X69)	6,554	2.0	1.9
Homicide	(*U01[.6–.7],X85–X90)	151	0.0	0.0
Undetermined	(Y10–Y19)	3,854	1.2	1.2
Legal intervention/war	(Y35.2)	–	*	*
Motor vehicle traffic	(V02–V04[.1,.9],V09.2,V12–V14[.3–.9],V19[.4–.6],V29–V28[.3–.9],V29–V79[.4–.9],V80[.3–.5],V81.1,V82.1,V83–V86[.0–.3],V87[.0–.8],V89.2)[2]	38,659	11.9	11.5
Occupant	(V30–V79[.4–.9],V83–V86[.0–.3])[2]	9,463	2.9	2.8
Motorcyclist	(V20–V28[.3–.9],V29[.4–.9])[2]	4,777	1.5	1.4
Pedal cyclist	(V12–V14[.3–.9],V19[.4–.6])[2]	679	0.2	0.2
Pedestrian	(V02–V04[.1,.9],V09.2)[2]	6,480	2.0	1.9
Other	(V80[.3–.5],V81.1,V82.1)[2]	15	*	*
Unspecified	(V87[.0–.8],V89.2)[2]	17,245	5.3	5.2
Firearm	(*U01.4,W32–W34,X72–X74,X93–X95,Y22–Y24,Y35.0)	39,773	12.2	12.0
Unintentional	(W32–W34)	488	0.1	0.2
Suicide	(X72–X74)	23,854	7.3	6.9
Homicide	(*U01.4,X93–X95)	14,542	4.5	4.6
Undetermined	(Y22–Y24)	338	0.1	0.1
Legal intervention/war	(Y35.0)	553	0.2	0.2
Fall	(W00–W19,X80,Y01,Y30)	37,587	11.5	9.8
Unintentional	(W00–W19)	36,338	11.2	9.4
Suicide	(X80)	1,124	0.3	0.3
Homicide	(Y01)	6	*	*
Undetermined	(Y30)	119	0.0	0.0

0.0 Quantity more than zero but less than 0.05.
– Quantity zero.
* Rate does not meet NCHS standards of reliability: see Technical Notes.
[1]For method of computation, see Technical Notes.
[2]Intent of death is unintentional.

SOURCE: NCHS, National Vital Statistics System, Mortality.

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UTSystem_044061

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Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	**2,028**	**327.1**	**66,336**
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

Location	Cases	Deaths	Fatality rate	Active	Recovered	Population	Cases/1M	Death/10M	More
TX	31,956	877	2.7%	16,860	14,219	28,995,881	1,102	302	







Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel [mailto:(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

By **Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News**

's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

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Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.



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

ZOOM IN:



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ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



ZOOM BACK OUT:



ALL DATA:



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See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N'' latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

''Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates,'' said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. ''That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data.''

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. ''Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk,'' said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

''I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses,'' said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. ''And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts.''

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

''Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future,'' said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. ''In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats.''

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

''This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies,'' said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. ''Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread.''

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: Spencer, Jamie
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 4:41 PM
To: Moore, Robert S.
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Jamie
x72149

From: Skinner, Loren <leskinne@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:13 AM
Subject: FW: WSJ.com -- U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

- In today's Wall Street Journal. We are referenced.
-
- WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
- POLITICS

U.S. Probes University of Texas Links to Chinese Lab Scrutinized Over Coronavirus

Education Department investigation into foreign financial ties also seeks records of school system's dealings with Huawei, Zoom CEO

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The Wuhan Institute of Virology has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak.

PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Kate O'Keeffe

May 1, 2020 5:30 am ET

The Education Department has asked the University of Texas System to provide documentation of its dealings with the Chinese laboratory U.S. officials are investigating as a potential source of the coronavirus pandemic.

The request for records of gifts or contracts from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its researcher Shi Zhengli, known for her work on bats, is part of a broader department investigation into possible faulty financial disclosures of foreign money by the Texas group of universities.

The Education Department's letter, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, also asks the UT System to share documents regarding potential ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party and some two dozen Chinese universities and companies, including Huawei Technologies Co. and a unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

The department is also seeking documents related to any university system contracts or gifts from Eric Yuan, a U.S. citizen who is the chief executive officer of Zoom Video Communications Inc.

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An official at the University of Texas System said it plans to respond to the department in a timely manner and declined to provide information about any potential links to the entities mentioned in the letter.

Huawei and CNPC didn't respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for Zoom said Mr. Yuan has "not given any gifts to the University of Texas."

Neither the Wuhan lab nor Dr. Shi—dubbed "Bat Woman" by Chinese media—responded to requests for comment.

The Wuhan lab has come under scrutiny from U.S. officials who accuse Beijing of withholding information about the origins of the outbreak, which was first detected in Wuhan.

Dr. Shi and the Chinese government have said the lab isn't the source of the pandemic. There is no concrete public evidence to confirm the theory that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the lab, which studied ways to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
Some scientists say a lab accident remains a possibility, but the current dominant theory is that bats passed the virus to humans either directly, or more likely, through another animal.
The Education Department's investigation into the UT System's disclosures is part of a continuing national review begun in 2019 that the department says has prompted universities to report more than $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding. Officials have sent letters to at least eight other schools, including Harvard and Yale Universities, who have said they are responding to the inquiries. Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth $250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to enforce it rigorously.

The Education Department has accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals hostile to the U.S. One goal of the new enforcement campaign, according to department officials, is to better enable the public to see where schools get their money.

U.S. universities have defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear. Department officials dispute that claim.

In its letter dated April 24, the department asked the chancellor of the University of Texas System to provide records related to its dealings with the Wuhan lab, citing UT's Galveston National Laboratory's relationship with the Chinese government-run lab.

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The Education Department asked for records related to dealings between the Wuhan lab and UT's Galveston National Laboratory, located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch.
PHOTO: KEVIN M. COX/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The letter cites a November 2018 article in Science magazine cosigned by officials at the Galveston and Wuhan labs stating: "We engaged in short- and long-term personnel exchanges focused on biosafety training, building operations and maintenance, and collaborative scientific investigations in biocontainment. We succeeded in transferring proven best practices to the new Wuhan facility."

The magazine article, also available on the Galveston lab's site, adds that the Wuhan and Texas labs recently signed formal cooperative agreements but that "funding for research and the logistics of exchanging specimens are challenges that we have yet to solve."

The university system previously reported to Education Department officials a series of contracts with Chinese universities and Huawei, purportedly collectively worth nearly $13 million, according to the letter. But it questioned whether the UT schools had reported all relevant foreign gifts and contracts.

The request for information about the American chief executive of U.S. videoconferencing firm Zoom stands out on a list of otherwise Chinese entities.

The department has said its statutory authority enables it to seek information on gifts or contracts from any entity, including a U.S. person, who could be acting as an agent of a foreign source. Department

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officials believe the broad statute provides the basis for many lines of inquiry at universities, according to a person familiar with the department's thinking.

U.S. national security officials and independent cybersecurity researchers have raised concerns about Zoom and its reliance on China-based engineering, especially as more people turn to the service amid the pandemic to discuss company and government business as well as private health information. Mr. Yuan has said the Chinese government has never asked for information on traffic from foreign users. "Zoom is no different than any other U.S. technology company with operations in China, including many of our videoconferencing peers," the company said in a statement. "Zoom is an American company, publicly traded on the Nasdaq, with headquarters in California and a founder and CEO who is an American citizen," the statement said, adding that his inclusion in a letter focused on UT's ties to China indicates the letter's authors "did not do their homework."

The Education Department's scrutiny of money that could have flowed from the China-based lab to the U.S. comes after other U.S. officials criticized money that went in the opposite direction. In an April 21 letter to House and Senate leadership, members of Congress led by Sen. Martha McSally (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R., Fla.) criticized a grant by the National Institutes of Health that supported global research on coronaviruses, including at the Wuhan lab.

"We're sure you agree that taxpayers' money should not be sent to a dangerous Chinese state-run bio-agent laboratory that lacks any meaningful oversight from U.S. authorities," the members wrote. "We hope to ensure that WIV will not receive federal funds in any future spending packages," they wrote.

Less than a week later, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., a New York-based grantee working on the project with the Wuhan lab, said the NIH had terminated coronavirus research funding.

"International collaboration with countries where viruses emerge is absolutely vital to our own public health and national security here in the USA," the group said in a statement, declining to comment further.

The NIH confirmed in a statement that the six-year, $3.4 million grant had been terminated. It said the money was distributed among both the primary awardee, EcoHealth Alliance, and sub-awardees including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, East China Normal University in Shanghai, the Institute of Pathogen Biology in Beijing, and Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore.

The NIH added: "Please note, scientific research indicates that there is no evidence that suggests the virus was created in a laboratory."

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Write to Kate O'Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

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From: jwleduc@UTMB.EDU
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

I'm reaching out to reserachers who work in this area, or have participated in policy discussions in the past to ask how they see the pandmic tinting that discussion. (I covered the NSABB meeting in Jan where a version of this discussion came up https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00210-5)

Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

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Sent from my iPhone

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

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Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008798

From: Lidstone, Sheila
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:41 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Dr. LeDuc and all:
If you are interested in this and have a trusted relationship with this reporter, is it possible for you to require a verbal agreement up front what you are willing to discuss and what you will not discuss? Based upon that agreement, the reporter may decide to pursue comment elsewhere.

Your thoughts, folks?

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.
>
> I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.
>
> I'm reaching out to reserachers who work in this area, or have participated in policy discussions in the past to ask how they see the pandmic tinting that discussion. (I covered the NSABB meeting in Jan where a version of this discussion came up https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00210-5)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007868

Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--

Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007869

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:09 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila;LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Unfortunately, not a reporter I personally know but I think it would be worth having the conversation with the reporter about what Dr. Le Duc will and wont discuss if this is an interview we'd like to participate in.

Nature is, of course, a very well respected outlet and not known for any kind of "gotcha" type questions or tricks.

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M(b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007866

Begin forwarded message:

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Date: May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
To: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007867

From: Lidstone, Sheila
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:15 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.;LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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I am a "yes" with an advance understanding of the content to be discussed.
Thanks.

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:09 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Your thoughts, folks?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007864

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
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> I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.
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>
> Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.
>
> Thank you, Nidhi
>
> --
> Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
> Senior reporter, *Nature*
> https://www.nature.com/news
> O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:46 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila;Smith, Christopher A.;Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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I'm a voting member of the NSABB and just called the NIH program officer in charge to make sure I could even talk to her. She assured me that I can discuss with her as long as I make it clear I am not speaking on behalf of the NSABB. (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity)

I think it's worth doing the interview.

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 3:15 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
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twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**
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>
> Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.
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> I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.
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>
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Thank you, Nidhi

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https://www.nature.com/news
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From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:01 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: FW: News query from Nature

Chris,

I don't think it would be necessary to call this reporter and define what he will/will not talk about. He spent a year or more on a national committee studying and then writing the rules regarding gain of function and dual use research, and he has a very good handle on the topic. Dr. Shi's (Wuhan) work was GOF (as was Vineet's at UNC), as was the guy in Wisconsin that did the flu research a couple years ago, which actually led to the NSAAB commtitee's study, etc., and Dr. Le Duc is very familiar with this type of research, its risks, federal guidance, etc. (We don't do any GOF work at UTMB, per IBC.)

Connie

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 3:46 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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I think it's worth doing the interview.

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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Christopher Smith Gonzalez
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O (409) 772.8790 M(b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
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To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

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> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

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Senior reporter, *Nature*
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O: +1 202 626 2523 | C (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Ok, this sounds fine to me. Can I give you a call? just want to make sure i understand all of these details

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
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To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: News query from Nature

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Your thoughts, folks?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085357

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

I'm reaching out to reserachers who work in this area, or have participated in policy discussions in the past to ask how they see the pandmic tinting that discussion. (I covered the NSABB meeting in Jan where a version of this discussion came up https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00210-5)

Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085358

From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:20 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Sure. I'm in the office 409 266 6518

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 4:19 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Ok, this sounds fine to me. Can I give you a call? just want to make sure i understand all of these details

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M(b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:00 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: News query from Nature

Chris,

I don't think it would be necessary to call this reporter and define what he will/will not talk about. He spent a year or more on a national committee studying and then writing the rules regarding gain of function and dual use research, and he has a very good handle on the topic. Dr. Shi's (Wuhan) work was GOF (as was Vineet's at UNC), as was the guy in Wisconsin that did the flu research a couple years ago, which actually led to the NSAAB commtitee's study, etc., and Dr. Le Duc is very familiar with this type of research, its risks, federal guidance, etc. (We don't do any GOF work at UTMB, per IBC.)

Connie

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 3:46 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085410

This will not be a straight-forward interview in that the NSABB policy is complex as are the implications for the scientific work.

I'm a voting member of the NSABB and just called the NIH program officer in charge to make sure I could even talk to her. She assured me that I can discuss with her as long as I make it clear I am not speaking on behalf of the NSABB. (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity)

I think it's worth doing the interview.

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 3:15 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
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I am a "yes" with an advance understanding of the content to be discussed.
Thanks.

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O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
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Dr. LeDuc and all:

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Your thoughts, folks?

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
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> Thank you, Nidhi
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> --
> Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
> Senior reporter, *Nature*
> https://www.nature.com/news
> O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) | @nidhisubs

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From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:41 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Dr. Le Duc, would you like me to respond to the reporter and workout an interview time? What time works best for you tomorrow?

Thanks
chris

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Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
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301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:46 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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I think it's worth doing the interview.

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Good commentary, Chris.
I am a "yes" with an advance understanding of the content to be discussed.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007856

Thanks.

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To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Unfortunately, not a reporter I personally know but I think it would be worth having the conversation with the reporter about what Dr. Le Duc will and wont discuss if this is an interview we'd like to participate in.

Nature is, of course, a very well respected outlet and not known for any kind of "gotcha" type questions or tricks.

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O (409) 772.8790 M(b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Dr. LeDuc and all:
If you are interested in this and have a trusted relationship with this reporter, is it possible for you to require a verbal agreement up front what you are willing to discuss and what you will not discuss? Based upon that agreement, the reporter may decide to pursue comment elsewhere.

Your thoughts, folks?

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To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007857

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Date: May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
To: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

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Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:48 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

I just passed him in the hall. He left for home. I can't see his calendar any more for some reason. And Ana (his assistant) is off.

Tomorrow is another day, Scarlett.

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
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Thanks
chris

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O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:46 PM
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Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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I think it's worth doing the interview.

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Your thoughts, folks?

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

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From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:49 PM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

haha ok, thanks!

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
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O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--

Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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From: Campbell, Stephen
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 5:21 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.;LeDuc, James W.;Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

First, I have to say I don't know what gain of function and dual use research means even after looking it up, and if that discussion leads it to directly talking about Wuhan lab. If the discussion can stay separate and not bring in the rumors, or any discussion around Wuhan, seems okay. If that would be difficult to do, I'd decline. Again, I don't really understand the topic!!!

Agree making it clear that there will be no discussion around Wuhan would be important.

My two cents!

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:41 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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Thanks
chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M(b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:46 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
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I'm a voting member of the NSABB and just called the NIH program officer in charge to make sure I could even talk to her. She assured me that I can discuss with her as long as I make it clear I am not speaking on behalf of the NSABB. (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity)

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Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Dr. LeDuc and all:

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If you are interested in this and have a trusted relationship with this reporter, is it possible for you to require a verbal agreement up front what you are willing to discuss and what you will not discuss? Based upon that agreement, the reporter may decide to pursue comment elsewhere.

Your thoughts, folks?

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Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

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> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**
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From: Holubar, Connie J.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 5:30 PM
To: Campbell, Stephen;Smith, Christopher A.;LeDuc, James W.;Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Steve,

Just fyi, it's been well documented in the press that the research that was being done at Wuhan fell into the category of gain of function research. (My non-scientific brain would describe it as a sort of "what-if analysis," like "what if this virus got stronger, then what would the pathology look like?" and the work that would be done to test that hypothesis.) Dr. Le Duc knows the topic very well. He served on a national committee that wrote a guidance document on it.

This became very controversial in the U.S. a few years back when a scientist at U of Wis did gain of function research with the flu. UTMB does not participate in this sort of research, to my knowledge. It is a part of the Institutional Biosafety Committee's reviews of protocol.

Connie

From: Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 5:21 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
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chris

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Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

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> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
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From: Raimer, Ben G.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 6:01 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila;Smith, Christopher A.;LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Yes, please.

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:15 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
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twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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From: Raimer, Ben G.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 7:46 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good luck 👍

Sent from my iPhone

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twitter: @csmithgonzalez

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From: jwleduc@UTMB.EDU
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 8:00 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.
Cc: Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Sure. After the incident command briefing to 1 pm and again after 2 pm is fine for me.

Thanks. Jim

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Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:46 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

This will not be a straight-forward interview in that the NSABB policy is complex as are the implications for the scientific work.

I'm a voting member of the NSABB and just called the NIH program officer in charge to make sure I could even talk to her. She assured me that I can discuss with her as long as I make it clear I am not speaking on behalf of the NSABB. (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity)

I think it's worth doing the interview.

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From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 3:15 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Good commentary, Chris.
I am a "yes" with an advance understanding of the content to be discussed.
Thanks.

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:09 PM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
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Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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Christopher Smith Gonzalez
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University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Dr. LeDuc and all:
If you are interested in this and have a trusted relationship with this reporter, is it possible for you to require a verbal agreement up front what you are willing to discuss and what you will not discuss? Based upon that agreement, the reporter may decide to pursue comment elsewhere.

Your thoughts, folks?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009412

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.
>
> I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.
>
> I'm reaching out to reserachers who work in this area, or have participated in policy discussions in the past to ask how they see the pandmic tinting that discussion. (I covered the NSABB meeting in Jan where a version of this discussion came up https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00210-5)
>
> Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.
>
> Thank you, Nidhi
>
> --
> Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
> Senior reporter, *Nature*
> https://www.nature.com/news
> O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009414

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 8:00 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.
Cc: Lidstone, Sheila;Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Sure. After the incident command briefing to 1 pm and again after 2 pm is fine for me.

Thanks. Jim

Sent from my iPhone

On May 7, 2020, at 4:41 PM, Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@utmb.edu> wrote:

Dr. Le Duc, would you like me to respond to the reporter and workout an interview time? What time works best for you tomorrow?

Thanks
chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
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Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Your thoughts, folks?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008773

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:30 PM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: News query from Nature

Another inquiry.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
> **Date:** May 7, 2020 at 1:58:48 PM CDT
> **To:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: News query from Nature**
>
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> Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.
>
> Thank you, Nidhi
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> --
> Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
> Senior reporter, *Nature*
> https://www.nature.com/news
> O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008775

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman
Cc: Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Hi Nidhi,

Thank you for reaching out to us. I would be pleased to chat with you later today (Friday) if that's still convenient for you. Chris Smith, copied here, will work with you to schedule a convenient time.

With best wishes,

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

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Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)

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Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008767

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good morning all,

Nidhi, Dr. Le Duc is available after a morning meeting until about 1 p.m. today or he is available again after 2 p.m. today. Would either of those windows work for you?

Let me know what works best and I can set up a conference call line we can all call in to.

Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Cc: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007789

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:55 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman;LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Great, I think that should work. Lets use the following number for the call:

Please call in to: 877-226-9790

When prompted, enter code 5465372#

If there are any issues, feel free to reach me on my cell at (b)(6)

Talk to you both at 2 p.m. CT

Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
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Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
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O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Thanks very much. Can we aim for 2pm CT?

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https://www.nature.com/news
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007737

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.; Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Cc: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Jim

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Director
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University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007738

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007739

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:01 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: FW: News query from Nature

Just FYI

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 08, 2020 9:55 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_085351

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:01 AM
To: Holubar, Connie J.
Subject: FW: News query from Nature

Just FYI

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 08, 2020 9:55 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Great, I think that should work. Lets use the following number for the call:

Please call in to: 877-226-9790

When prompted, enter code 5465372#

If there are any issues, feel free to reach me on my cell at (b)(6)

Talk to you both at 2 p.m. CT

Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Thanks very much. Can we aim for 2pm CT?

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008761

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.; Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good morning all,

Nidhi, Dr. Le Duc is available after a morning meeting until about 1 p.m. today or he is available again after 2 p.m. today. Would either of those windows work for you?

Let me know what works best and I can set up a conference call line we can all call in to.

Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Cc: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Hi Nidhi,

Thank you for reaching out to us. I would be pleased to chat with you later today (Friday) if that's still convenient for you. Chris Smith, copied here, will work with you to schedule a convenient time.

With best wishes,

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008763

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 12:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good afternoon Dr. Le Duc,

I just spoke with Nadhi and she wanted to see if we can move the interview to Monday. She's had some other pressing appointments come up this afternoon that would make it difficult conduct the interview today.

Do you have time Monday for the phone call? Let me know what windows you have open and we can reschedule.

Thanks!
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:20 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Sounds great. Thank you.

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C (b)(6) @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:55 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007649

To: Nidhi Subbaraman; LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Great, I think that should work. Lets use the following number for the call:

Please call in to: 877-226-9790

When prompted, enter code 5465372#

If there are any issues, feel free to reach me on my cell at (b)(6)

Talk to you both at 2 p.m. CT

Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Thanks very much. Can we aim for 2pm CT?

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) | @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.; Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good morning all,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

Nidhi, Dr. Le Duc is available after a morning meeting until about 1 p.m. today or he is available again after 2 p.m. today. Would either of those windows work for you?

Let me know what works best and I can set up a conference call line we can all call in to.

Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Cc: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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With best wishes,

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007651

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

I'm reaching out to reserachers who work in this area, or have participated in policy discussions in the past to ask how they see the pandmic tinting that discussion. (I covered the NSABB meeting in Jan where a version of this discussion came up https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00210-5)

Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007652

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 1:00 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A.
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Sure, any time after about 10 am CT when the incident command meeting should be finished.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 08, 2020 12:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good afternoon Dr. Le Duc,

I just spoke with Nadhi and she wanted to see if we can move the interview to Monday. She's had some other pressing appointments come up this afternoon that would make it difficult conduct the interview today.

Do you have time Monday for the phone call? Let me know what windows you have open and we can reschedule.

Thanks!
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:20 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Sounds great. Thank you.

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman; LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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Please call in to: 877-226-9790

When prompted, enter code 5465372#

If there are any issues, feel free to reach me on my cell at (b)(6)

Talk to you both at 2 p.m. CT

Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008717

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Thanks very much. Can we aim for 2pm CT?

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.; Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good morning all,

Nidhi, Dr. Le Duc is available after a morning meeting until about 1 p.m. today or he is available again after 2 p.m. today. Would either of those windows work for you?

Let me know what works best and I can set up a conference call line we can all call in to.

Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Cc: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Hi Nidhi,

Thank you for reaching out to us. I would be pleased to chat with you later today (Friday) if that's still convenient for you. Chris Smith, copied here, will work with you to schedule a convenient time.

With best wishes,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008718

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

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Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) | @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008719

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 1:02 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Great, how about for simplicity's sake, let's go for 2 p.m. CT on Monday May 11.

Does that work for you Nidhi?

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M(b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 12:59 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
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Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 08, 2020 12:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:20 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman; LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

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From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007585

Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
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University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007586

Thank you, Nidhi

--

Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007587

From: Gary Moore (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2020 4:57 PM
To: Tesh, Robert B.
Subject: More Than One Kind of Chimera

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks very much for the welcome breath of sanity (*Smithsonian*, Jan 25, 2018) as I've researched just now the almost unchallenged mountain of happy-warrior hype on USAID PREDICT. By contrast, a mere week seemed required for both the Shanghai clinic lab and Shi Zhengli, independently, to sequence SARS-CoV-2—once they knew what to sequence.

The PREDICT/EcoHealth complex seems to have countless journalists convinced they can catch the same bird a little more elaborately—by taking years to salt its never-quite-reachable tail.

My apologies for this outside-the-box comment, but I had met such a baffling blizzard of yea-sayers on the tail-salting that to suddenly see a sane statement of the obvious overcame me with relief.

Any references or links you might have a moment to supply on other cautionary assessments of the pandemic-prediction push, and/or serious related issues, would certainly be appreciated.

Gary Moore

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_063607

From: 孙辉 <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 6:44 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu';'peggy@hbfam.net';JohnHildebrand;Boright, John;LeDuc, James W.;'gaof@im.ac.cn';liyin;tongting@cashq.ac.cn
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Attachments: Chinese Participants-0511.docx

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. Rusek,

Thank you for sending us the Zoom link for the 1st session of the China-US vitural dialogue. Attached please find the updated list of the Chinese participants. Please note that some participants could only be available at one of the two sessions.We look forward to the dialogue tomorrow morning.

Best wishes,

Sun Hui

-----**原始**邮件-----
发件人**:**"孙辉" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
发送时间**:**2020-05-10 20:30:03 (**星期日**)
收件人: "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
抄送: "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "tongting@cashq.ac.cn" <tongting@cashq.ac.cn>
主题: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Mr. Rusek,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007687

Thank you for agreeing to accommodating the change of schedule and sharing with us the information of American participants. FYI, please find attached the list of the Chinese participants. Please note that some participants may only be available for one of the sessions. I am still waiting for the confirmation of Dr. Chen Wang, who might only be available on the 14th.

I don't see any problem of your using the feature of recording/transcription during the dialogue. We would be happy if you could share the notes with us.

We will do the test of connection with the zoom link you sent to us. See you tomorrow morning online.

Best wishes,

Sun Hui

-----**原始**邮件-----
发件人**:**"Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
发送时间**:**2020-05-09 05:53:57 (**星期六**)
收件人: "'孙辉'" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
抄送: "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "tongting@cashq.ac.cn" <tongting@cashq.ac.cn>
主题: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Greetings Mr. Sun,

Thank you for your email. We are pleased to hear that your group will be able to participate for two sessions.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007688

With regards to the exact timing, let's move the second session back 24 hours as you suggest. We can keep the first session scheduled for 9-11am on **May 12** (Beijing time) and then reschedule the second session for 9-11 am on **May 14** (Beijing Time).

Thank you for agreeing to conduct the call in English. One question: Zoom has a built in recording/transcription feature, does your group mind if we use this feature during the sessions? As noted in the letter "Information and insights from the meeting that may promote improved response to the pandemic would be shared with those government officials and researchers who need the information…but remarks and discussion comments would not be attributed without permission of the speaker." The transcript would only be used for internal notes and we would be happy to share it with you.

I would be happy to test the connection with you at 9:00 AM on Monday, May 11 Beijing time (9:00 PM on Sunday, May 10 in Washington, DC). I will send you a Zoom link/meeting invitation for that test call after this email.

I have attached the list of American participants for your information, we look forward to seeing the list of Chinese participants.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences

1-202-334-3975

From: 孙辉 <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:58 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; tongting@cashq.ac.cn
Subject: Re: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007689

Dear Mr. Rusek,

I am writing to follow up on the virtual dialogue meeting next week on behalf of Dr. George Gao. The topical agenda sent by Dr. Griffin to Dr. Gao looks fine to us.

With regard to the timing of the dialogue, we could have two 2-hour sessions as you suggested. However, Dr. Gao has some other emergent commitment on May 13, so we would like to suggest the dialogues be rescheduled to 9-11am on May 11 and 12, or 9-11am on May 12 and 14, or 9-11am on May 12 and 15 (all Beijing Time). Please let us know which time slot you would prefer. We are sorry for any inconvenience this may cause you.

The dialogue could be in English, and we could use the zoom videoconference. We will test it 24 hours in advance following your guidance.

FYI, we have sent invitations to potential speakers on our side, hopefully we could finalize the list of speakers very soon. We will have no more than 13 speakers on each side as you suggested. Please share with us the name and title of participants from the US side when it becomes available, and we will do the same.

Best wishes,

SUN Hui(Mr.)

Director

Division of American and Oceanian Affairs

Bureau of International Cooperation

Chinese Academy of Sciences

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007690

-----原始邮件-----

发件人:NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

发送时间:2020-05-01 21:42:08 (星期五)

收件人: "'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>

抄送: "McNutt, Marcia K." <MMcNutt@nas.edu>, "Dzau, Victor J." <VDzau@nas.edu>, "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'" <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, "'clbai@cas.cn'" <clbai@cas.cn>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

主题: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Colleagues:

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt and Dzau.

Best regards,

Anna

Anna Bashkirova

Assistant to the President

National Academy of Sciences

Office: 2101 Constitution Ave NW | Washington, DC 20418

Mailing address: 500 5th St NW, NAS 215 | Washington, DC 20001

(202) 334-2635 | abashkirova@nas.edu | www.nasonline.org

From: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 5:40 AM
To: NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007691

Cc: McNutt, Marcia K. <MMcNutt@nas.edu>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn' <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; 'clbai@cas.cn' <clbai@cas.cn>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>
Subject: Re: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Importance: High

Dear colleagues,

Attached please find the letter replied by Prof. Chunli Bai and Prof. Fu Gao.

Best Regards,

Sun Hui

2020-04-29

SUN Hui (Mr.)
Director
Division of American and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau of International Cooperation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
52 Sanlihe Rd. Beijing, China 100864
Tel:+86-10-68597282
Fax:+86-10-68511095
Email: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn
http://english.cas.cn/
http://international-talent.cas.cn

发件人： NASPresident

发送时间： 2020-04-23 20:50:33

收件人： 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'; 'clbai@cas.cn'; 'gaof@im.ac.cn'; 'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007692

抄送： McNutt, Marcia K.; Dzau, Victor J.; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'; 'peggy@hbfam.net'; JohnHildebrand; Boright,John; Rusek, Benjamin; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'

主题： Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt, Dzau, Griffin, and Hamburg.

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Chinese Participants

Zhu Chen: Dr. Zhu Chen is president of the Red Cross Society of China, CAS member. He was previously minister of the National Health Commission of China. (Only available on the 14th)

George F. Gao: Dr. George F. Gao is Director-General of CCDC, a professor at the CAS Institute of Microbiology, CAS member.

Dongfeng Gu: Dr. Dongfeng Gu is vice president of Southern University of Science and Technology, CAS member.

Hualiang Jiang: Dr. Hualiang Jiang is currently a professor at CAS Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica (SIMM), CAS member. He was previous director of SIMM, and now he is the chairman of the Scientific Committee of the institute. His research focuses on drug discovery and development. (Only available on the 12th)

Lanjuan Li: Dr. Lanjuan Li is a physician and professor in infectious diseases, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. She is currently director of the State Key Laboratory for Diagnosis and Treatment of Infectious Diseases. (Only available on the 12th)

Zhengli Shi: Dr. Zhengli Shi is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Chen Wang: Dr. Chen Wang is vice president and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and president of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. (Only available on the 14th)

Guiqiang Wang: Dr. Guiqiang Wang is a professor at the Peking University First Hospital and is president of the Society of Infectious Diseases, Chinese Medical Association. (Only available on the 12th)

Haiming Wei: Dr. Haiming Wei is a professor at the University of Science and Technology of China.

Zhiming Yuan: Dr. Zhiming Yuan is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology, Director of Wuhan P4 lab.

Yongqing Zhang: Dr. Yongqing Zhang is Deputy Director-General of CAS Bureau of Frontier Sciences and Education, a professor at CAS Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology. (Only available on the 12th)

Guoping Zhao: Dr. Guoping Zhao is a professor at CAS Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences, CAS member.

Qi Zhou: Dr. Qi Zhou is Deputy Secretary-General of CAS, Director of CAS Institute of Zoology, CAS member. (Only available on the 12th)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 AM
To: 'peggy@hbfam.net'
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu';LeDuc, James W.;Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com);Lowenthal, Micah;Sharples, Fran
Subject: FW: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: ZOOM link for first call
Attachments: Chinese Participants-0511.docx; Draft Covid-19 US-China dialogue agenda v4.docx; Bios for Americans v2.docx

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Greetings Peggy,

Can you make sure that Victor Dzau has what he needs for the call tonight?

The Zoom link is below and the revised American agenda and participant lists are attached. Please let him know that we have asked the Chinese to lead the discussion, Americans are listed after each question to ensure that we get an answer to that question during the discussion. The Chinese have the version of the agenda without names listed after the questions.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 12:06 AM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: ZOOM link for first call

And here is the Zoom link for the call on Monday night.

Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: [redacted]
Password: 613725

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007639

PS I tested Zoom with CAS and many of the Chinese group members earlier tonight, the video was clear and I could hear everyone well. Hopefully it will work well when we are all connected.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2020 12:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

The list of Chinese participants is attached.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Saturday, May 9, 2020 11:24 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7

Greetings,

We have created a proposed draft agenda (with topics slightly rearranged) that, as we discussed during the call on Thursday, starts with a brief introduction of the situation in China and the U.S. We hope that Harvey Fineberg can give a (very) brief overview of the situation in the U.S.

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To ensure that each question is addressed during the discussion, we have listed the names of American delegation member after each question. We have asked and expect the Chinese group to take the lead but we hope that those listed can ensure that each question is covered. (FYI this version is for your information only, we will send an agenda without the names listed after the questions to the Chinese.) Please let me know if you have thoughts or concerns about this plan.

FYI I plan to send a new version of the agenda to CAS and George Gao on Sunday evening (before I test the Zoom connection with CAS at 9:00 PM ET).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:31 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' [(b)(6) redacted]; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thanks for joining the call last night. We received good news from CAS this morning. They agreed to hold the two sessions as we requested. However because George Gao is not available on the second day they want to push the second session back by one day. That's not bad because as I noted on the call, Jim Le Duc and Harvey Fineberg were not available at that time anyway.

So for the Americans we will keep the time on Monday, May 11 (from 9-11:00 PM ET) as planned but move the second session back one day to Wednesday, May 13th (from 9-11:00 PM ET). I hope the new time for the second session works for most of you.

In addition they said that the topical agenda (topic list we sent) looks fine and that there would about a dozen Chinese experts (said no more than 13) on the call on their side.

I will send you more info later today.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007641

1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:58 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' <(b)(6) >; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Below you will find an agenda for tonight's **(8:00 PM ET)** call. Diane is the U.S. chair so will lead the call (with input from others).

1) Introductions (Diane, Ben, group)
2) The China bio dialogue: brief background, previous meetings and key Chinese participants (Jim, Dave, Diane, Peggy, Pei-yong, Ben, others)
3) Recent work (2020) to set up the virtual dialogue sessions, purpose of the call and issues we should probably avoid (Diane, Ben, others)
4) Discussion topics/questions (see attachment), assign discussion leaders for each question (Diane, others)
5) Call logistics (best way to interact on the Zoom call, recording the sessions, plan between calls, etc.) (Ben, Micah, Diane)
6) Other questions or concerns (group)

I have re attached the "agenda" (list of topics/questions) for the dialogue meetings next week for your information. Also the Zoom call in information is below:

https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 5:42 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007642

Cc: 'Frances Sharples' <fsharples_3@hotmail.com>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Information on how to join the planning call **at 8:00 PM ET, Thursday, May 7 is below:**

Zoom link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Please join by Zoom (but the call in phone number is below my email signature if you need it). Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the planned virtual dialogue meeting next week.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

***

Benjamin Rusek is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Topic: Zoom meeting to discuss U.S. China dialogue
Time: May 7, 2020 08:00 PM Eastern Time (US and Canada)

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Password: 662746

Or iPhone one-tap :
US: +16513728299,,93418637725# or +13017158592,,93418637725#
Or Telephone:
Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location) :
US: +1 651 372 8299 or +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 470 250 9358 or +1 646 518 9805 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 213 338 8477 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 602 753 0140 or +1 669 219 2599 or +1 669 900 6833 or +1 720 928 9299 or +1 971 247 1195 or 888 475 4499 (Toll Free) or 877 853 5257 (Toll Free)
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746
International numbers available: https://nasem.zoom.us/u/a5XnNJEND

Would you like to test your Zoom connection? Please click on the link below.
https://nasem.zoom.us/test

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007643

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 6:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; Harvey V. Fineberg <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu) <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; Alison Andre <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; Jennifer Ryan <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in a virtual bilateral dialogue meeting between Chinese and American experts studying and fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. I am reaching out to you now so 1) the group is connected by email and 2) to organize the planning teleconference for the American participants on May 7. The purpose of the May 7 discussion is to fill you in on the dialogue background, discuss the topics/questions (list in your invitation letter and attached) and issues we should probably avoid (origin questions, politics), logistics, and address any other questions or concerns you may have.

We are proposing that this ~1 hour discussion take place over Zoom at 8:00 PM ET on Thursday, May 7. If this time does not work for someone we could push the time up or back slightly. Please let me know. Also if Thursday evening is impossible I can brief you on the discussion over the phone sometime on Friday.

Re the actually dialogue meeting with the Chinese group, as your invitation letter notes we have proposed that the dialogue meeting take place on the evenings of Monday, May 11th (to address the first set of bullet points) and Tuesday, May 12th (to ask/answer follow-up questions and address the second set of bullet points), at 9:00 PM ET for the Americans. George Gao has not yet let us know if these exact times work but we should hear back from him soon (the Chinese May day holidays end on the 5th).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007644

Chinese Participants

Zhu Chen: Dr. Zhu Chen is president of the Red Cross Society of China, CAS member. He was previously minister of the National Health Commission of China. (Only available on the 14th)

George F. Gao: Dr. George F. Gao is Director-General of CCDC, a professor at the CAS Institute of Microbiology, CAS member.

Dongfeng Gu: Dr. Dongfeng Gu is vice president of Southern University of Science and Technology, CAS member.

Hualiang Jiang: Dr. Hualiang Jiang is currently a professor at CAS Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica (SIMM), CAS member. He was previous director of SIMM, and now he is the chairman of the Scientific Committee of the institute. His research focuses on drug discovery and development. (Only available on the 12th)

Lanjuan Li: Dr. Lanjuan Li is a physician and professor in infectious diseases, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. She is currently director of the State Key Laboratory for Diagnosis and Treatment of Infectious Diseases. (Only available on the 12th)

Zhengli Shi: Dr. Zhengli Shi is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Chen Wang: Dr. Chen Wang is vice president and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and president of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. (Only available on the 14th)

Guiqiang Wang: Dr. Guiqiang Wang is a professor at the Peking University First Hospital and is president of the Society of Infectious Diseases, Chinese Medical Association. (Only available on the 12th)

Haiming Wei: Dr. Haiming Wei is a professor at the University of Science and Technology of China.

Zhiming Yuan: Dr. Zhiming Yuan is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology, Director of Wuhan P4 lab.

Yongqing Zhang: Dr. Yongqing Zhang is Deputy Director-General of CAS Bureau of Frontier Sciences and Education, a professor at CAS Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology. (Only available on the 12th)

Guoping Zhao: Dr. Guoping Zhao is a professor at CAS Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences, CAS member.

Qi Zhou: Dr. Qi Zhou is Deputy Secretary-General of CAS, Director of CAS Institute of Zoology, CAS member. (Only available on the 12th)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:43 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Attachments: Chinese Participants-0511.docx

Not sure if you received this.

From: 孙辉 <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 6:44 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; tongting@cashq.ac.cn
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. Rusek,

Thank you for sending us the Zoom link for the 1st session of the China-US vitural dialogue. Attached please find the updated list of the Chinese participants. Please note that some participants could only be available at one of the two sessions.We look forward to the dialogue tomorrow morning.

Best wishes,

Sun Hui

-----原始邮件-----
发件人:"孙辉" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
发送时间:2020-05-10 20:30:03 (星期日)
收件人: "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
抄送: "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071634

"'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "tongting@cashq.ac.cn" <tongting@cashq.ac.cn>
主题: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Mr. Rusek,

Thank you for agreeing to accommodating the change of schedule and sharing with us the information of American participants. FYI, please find attached the list of the Chinese participants. Please note that some participants may only be available for one of the sessions. I am still waiting for the confirmation of Dr. Chen Wang, who might only be available on the 14th.

I don't see any problem of your using the feature of recording/transcription during the dialogue. We would be happy if you could share the notes with us.

We will do the test of connection with the zoom link you sent to us. See you tomorrow morning online.

Best wishes,

Sun Hui

-----**原始**邮件-----
发件人:"Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
发送时间:2020-05-09 05:53:57 (**星期六**)
收件人: "'孙辉'" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
抄送: "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "tongting@cashq.ac.cn" <tongting@cashq.ac.cn>
主题: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071635

Greetings Mr. Sun,

Thank you for your email. We are pleased to hear that your group will be able to participate for two sessions.

With regards to the exact timing, let's move the second session back 24 hours as you suggest. We can keep the first session scheduled for 9-11am on **May 12** (Beijing time) and then reschedule the second session for 9-11 am on **May 14** (Beijing Time).

Thank you for agreeing to conduct the call in English. One question: Zoom has a built in recording/transcription feature, does your group mind if we use this feature during the sessions? As noted in the letter "Information and insights from the meeting that may promote improved response to the pandemic would be shared with those government officials and researchers who need the information…but remarks and discussion comments would not be attributed without permission of the speaker." The transcript would only be used for internal notes and we would be happy to share it with you.

I would be happy to test the connection with you at 9:00 AM on Monday, May 11 Beijing time (9:00 PM on Sunday, May 10 in Washington, DC). I will send you a Zoom link/meeting invitation for that test call after this email.

I have attached the list of American participants for your information, we look forward to seeing the list of Chinese participants.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences

1-202-334-3975

From: 孙辉 <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:58 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071636

To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; tongting@cashq.ac.cn
Subject: Re: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Mr. Rusek,

I am writing to follow up on the virtual dialogue meeting next week on behalf of Dr. George Gao. The topical agenda sent by Dr. Griffin to Dr. Gao looks fine to us.

With regard to the timing of the dialogue, we could have two 2-hour sessions as you suggested. However, Dr. Gao has some other emergent commitment on May 13, so we would like to suggest the dialogues be rescheduled to 9-11am on May 11 and 12, or 9-11am on May 12 and 14, or 9-11am on May 12 and 15 (all Beijing Time). Please let us know which time slot you would prefer. We are sorry for any inconvenience this may cause you.

The dialogue could be in English, and we could use the zoom videoconference. We will test it 24 hours in advance following your guidance.

FYI, we have sent invitations to potential speakers on our side, hopefully we could finalize the list of speakers very soon. We will have no more than 13 speakers on each side as you suggested. Please share with us the name and title of participants from the US side when it becomes available, and we will do the same.

Best wishes,

SUN Hui(Mr.)

Director

Division of American and Oceanian Affairs

Bureau of International Cooperation

Chinese Academy of Sciences

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071637

-----原始邮件-----

发件人:NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

发送时间:2020-05-01 21:42:08 (星期五)

收件人: "'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>

抄送: "McNutt, Marcia K." <MMcNutt@nas.edu>, "Dzau, Victor J." <VDzau@nas.edu>, "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'" <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, "'clbai@cas.cn'" <clbai@cas.cn>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

主题: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Colleagues:

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt and Dzau.

Best regards,

Anna

Anna Bashkirova

Assistant to the President

National Academy of Sciences

Office: 2101 Constitution Ave NW | Washington, DC 20418

Mailing address: 500 5th St NW, NAS 215 | Washington, DC 20001

(202) 334-2635 | abashkirova@nas.edu | www.nasonline.org

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071638

From: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 5:40 AM
To: NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>
Cc: McNutt, Marcia K. <MMcNutt@nas.edu>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn' <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; 'clbai@cas.cn' <clbai@cas.cn>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>
Subject: Re: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Importance: High

Dear colleagues,

Attached please find the letter replied by Prof. Chunli Bai and Prof. Fu Gao.

Best Regards,

Sun Hui

2020-04-29

SUN Hui (Mr.)
Director
Division of American and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau of International Cooperation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
52 Sanlihe Rd. Beijing, China 100864
Tel:+86-10-68597282
Fax:+86-10-68511095
Email: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn
http://english.cas.cn/
http://international-talent.cas.cn

发件人： NASPresident

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071639

发送时间： 2020-04-23 20:50:33

收件人： 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'; 'clbai@cas.cn'; 'gaof@im.ac.cn'; 'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'

抄送： McNutt, Marcia K.; Dzau, Victor J.; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'; 'peggy@hbfam.net'; JohnHildebrand; Boright,John; Rusek, Benjamin; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'

主题： Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt, Dzau, Griffin, and Hamburg.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_071640

Chinese Participants

Zhu Chen: Dr. Zhu Chen is president of the Red Cross Society of China, CAS member. He was previously minister of the National Health Commission of China. (Only available on the 14th)

George F. Gao: Dr. George F. Gao is Director-General of CCDC, a professor at the CAS Institute of Microbiology, CAS member.

Dongfeng Gu: Dr. Dongfeng Gu is vice president of Southern University of Science and Technology, CAS member.

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Qi Zhou: Dr. Qi Zhou is Deputy Secretary-General of CAS, Director of CAS Institute of Zoology, CAS member. (Only available on the 12th)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:43 AM
To: Shi, Pei yong
Subject: FW: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Attachments: Chinese Participants-0511.docx

Not sure if you received this.

From: 孙辉 <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 6:44 AM
To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; tongting@cashq.ac.cn
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. Rusek,

Thank you for sending us the Zoom link for the 1st session of the China-US vitural dialogue. Attached please find the updated list of the Chinese participants. Please note that some participants could only be available at one of the two sessions.We look forward to the dialogue tomorrow morning.

Best wishes,

Sun Hui

-----原始邮件-----
发件人:"孙辉" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
发送时间:2020-05-10 20:30:03 (星期日)
收件人: "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
抄送: "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

"'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "tongting@cashq.ac.cn" <tongting@cashq.ac.cn>
主题: Re: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

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I don't see any problem of your using the feature of recording/transcription during the dialogue. We would be happy if you could share the notes with us.

We will do the test of connection with the zoom link you sent to us. See you tomorrow morning online.

Best wishes,

Sun Hui

-----**原始**邮件-----
发件人:"Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>
发送时间:2020-05-09 05:53:57 (**星期六**)
收件人: "'孙辉'" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
抄送: "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, "tongting@cashq.ac.cn" <tongting@cashq.ac.cn>
主题: RE: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008705

Greetings Mr. Sun,

Thank you for your email. We are pleased to hear that your group will be able to participate for two sessions.

With regards to the exact timing, let's move the second session back 24 hours as you suggest. We can keep the first session scheduled for 9-11am on **May 12** (Beijing time) and then reschedule the second session for 9-11 am on **May 14** (Beijing Time).

Thank you for agreeing to conduct the call in English. One question: Zoom has a built in recording/transcription feature, does your group mind if we use this feature during the sessions? As noted in the letter "Information and insights from the meeting that may promote improved response to the pandemic would be shared with those government officials and researchers who need the information…but remarks and discussion comments would not be attributed without permission of the speaker." The transcript would only be used for internal notes and we would be happy to share it with you.

I would be happy to test the connection with you at 9:00 AM on Monday, May 11 Beijing time (9:00 PM on Sunday, May 10 in Washington, DC). I will send you a Zoom link/meeting invitation for that test call after this email.

I have attached the list of American participants for your information, we look forward to seeing the list of Chinese participants.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences

1-202-334-3975

From: 孙辉 <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:58 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008706

To: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Cc: 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>; tongting@cashq.ac.cn
Subject: Re: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Mr. Rusek,

I am writing to follow up on the virtual dialogue meeting next week on behalf of Dr. George Gao. The topical agenda sent by Dr. Griffin to Dr. Gao looks fine to us.

With regard to the timing of the dialogue, we could have two 2-hour sessions as you suggested. However, Dr. Gao has some other emergent commitment on May 13, so we would like to suggest the dialogues be rescheduled to 9-11am on May 11 and 12, or 9-11am on May 12 and 14, or 9-11am on May 12 and 15 (all Beijing Time). Please let us know which time slot you would prefer. We are sorry for any inconvenience this may cause you.

The dialogue could be in English, and we could use the zoom videoconference. We will test it 24 hours in advance following your guidance.

FYI, we have sent invitations to potential speakers on our side, hopefully we could finalize the list of speakers very soon. We will have no more than 13 speakers on each side as you suggested. Please share with us the name and title of participants from the US side when it becomes available, and we will do the same.

Best wishes,

SUN Hui(Mr.)

Director

Division of American and Oceanian Affairs

Bureau of International Cooperation

Chinese Academy of Sciences

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008707

-----原始邮件-----

发件人:NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

发送时间:2020-05-01 21:42:08 (星期五)

收件人: "'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'" <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>

抄送: "McNutt, Marcia K." <MMcNutt@nas.edu>, "Dzau, Victor J." <VDzau@nas.edu>, "'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'" <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>, "'peggy@hbfam.net'" <peggy@hbfam.net>, JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>, "Boright, John" <JBoright@nas.edu>, "Rusek, Benjamin" <BRusek@nas.edu>, "'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'" <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>, "'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'" <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>, "'clbai@cas.cn'" <clbai@cas.cn>, "'gaof@im.ac.cn'" <gaof@im.ac.cn>, liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>, NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>

主题: RE: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Dear Colleagues:

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt and Dzau.

Best regards,

Anna

Anna Bashkirova

Assistant to the President

National Academy of Sciences

Office: 2101 Constitution Ave NW | Washington, DC 20418

Mailing address: 500 5th St NW, NAS 215 | Washington, DC 20001

(202) 334-2635 | abashkirova@nas.edu | www.nasonline.org

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008708

From: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn <sunhui@cashq.ac.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 5:40 AM
To: NASPresident <naspresident@nas.edu>
Cc: McNutt, Marcia K. <MMcNutt@nas.edu>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'peggy@hbfam.net' <peggy@hbfam.net>; JohnHildebrand <jhildebr@email.arizona.edu>; Boright, John <JBoright@nas.edu>; Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn' <jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn>; 'clbai@cas.cn' <clbai@cas.cn>; 'gaof@im.ac.cn' <gaof@im.ac.cn>; liyin <liyin@cashq.ac.cn>
Subject: Re: Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting
Importance: High

Dear colleagues,

Attached please find the letter replied by Prof. Chunli Bai and Prof. Fu Gao.

Best Regards,

Sun Hui

2020-04-29

SUN Hui (Mr.)
Director
Division of American and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau of International Cooperation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
52 Sanlihe Rd. Beijing, China 100864
Tel:+86-10-68597282
Fax:+86-10-68511095
Email: sunhui@cashq.ac.cn
http://english.cas.cn/
http://international-talent.cas.cn

发件人： NASPresident

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008709

发送时间： 2020-04-23 20:50:33

收件人： 'jh-cao@cashq.ac.cn'; 'clbai@cas.cn'; 'gaof@im.ac.cn'; 'sunhui@cashq.ac.cn'

抄送： McNutt, Marcia K.; Dzau, Victor J.; 'dgriffi6@jhmi.edu'; 'peggy@hbfam.net'; JohnHildebrand; Boright,John; Rusek, Benjamin; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU'

主题： Letter from the NASEM re: Virtual Dialogue Meeting

Please find the attached letter from Drs. McNutt, Dzau, Griffin, and Hamburg.

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Chinese Participants

Zhu Chen: Dr. Zhu Chen is president of the Red Cross Society of China, CAS member. He was previously minister of the National Health Commission of China. (Only available on the 14th)

George F. Gao: Dr. George F. Gao is Director-General of CCDC, a professor at the CAS Institute of Microbiology, CAS member.

Dongfeng Gu: Dr. Dongfeng Gu is vice president of Southern University of Science and Technology, CAS member.

Hualiang Jiang: Dr. Hualiang Jiang is currently a professor at CAS Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica (SIMM), CAS member. He was previous director of SIMM, and now he is the chairman of the Scientific Committee of the institute. His research focuses on drug discovery and development. (Only available on the 12th)

Lanjuan Li: Dr. Lanjuan Li is a physician and professor in infectious diseases, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. She is currently director of the State Key Laboratory for Diagnosis and Treatment of Infectious Diseases. (Only available on the 12th)

Zhengli Shi: Dr. Zhengli Shi is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Chen Wang: Dr. Chen Wang is vice president and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and president of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. (Only available on the 14th)

Guiqiang Wang: Dr. Guiqiang Wang is a professor at the Peking University First Hospital and is president of the Society of Infectious Diseases, Chinese Medical Association. (Only available on the 12th)

Haiming Wei: Dr. Haiming Wei is a professor at the University of Science and Technology of China.

Zhiming Yuan: Dr. Zhiming Yuan is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology, Director of Wuhan P4 lab.

Yongqing Zhang: Dr. Yongqing Zhang is Deputy Director-General of CAS Bureau of Frontier Sciences and Education, a professor at CAS Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology. (Only available on the 12th)

Guoping Zhao: Dr. Guoping Zhao is a professor at CAS Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences, CAS member.

Qi Zhou: Dr. Qi Zhou is Deputy Secretary-General of CAS, Director of CAS Institute of Zoology, CAS member. (Only available on the 12th)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 10:09 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good morning,

Just wanted to make sure we are still good for the interview today, 5/11, at 2 p.m. CT.

Thanks,
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 1:01 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Great, how about for simplicity's sake, let's go for 2 p.m. CT on Monday May 11.

Does that work for you Nidhi?

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 12:59 PM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Sure, any time after about 10 am CT when the incident command meeting should be finished.

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610
(t) 409-266-6500
(f) 409-266-6810
(m) (b)(6)

From: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 08, 2020 12:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good afternoon Dr. Le Duc,

I just spoke with Nadhi and she wanted to see if we can move the interview to Monday. She's had some other pressing appointments come up this afternoon that would make it difficult conduct the interview today.

Do you have time Monday for the phone call? Let me know what windows you have open and we can reschedule.

Thanks!
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:20 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

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Sounds great. Thank you.

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--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) | @nidhisubs

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:55 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman; LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Great, I think that should work. Lets use the following number for the call:

Please call in to: 877-226-9790

When prompted, enter code 5465372#

If there are any issues, feel free to reach me on my cell at (b)(6)

Talk to you both at 2 p.m. CT

Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks very much. Can we aim for 2pm CT?

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C: (b)(6) @nidhisubs

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Smith, Christopher A. [mailto:chrissmi@UTMB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 10:25 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.; Nidhi Subbaraman
Subject: Re: News query from Nature

Good morning all,

Nidhi, Dr. Le Duc is available after a morning meeting until about 1 p.m. today or he is available again after 2 p.m. today. Would either of those windows work for you?

Let me know what works best and I can set up a conference call line we can all call in to.

Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Cc: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: News query from Nature

Hi Nidhi,

Thank you for reaching out to us. I would be pleased to chat with you later today (Friday) if that's still convenient for you. Chris Smith, copied here, will work with you to schedule a convenient time.

With best wishes,

Jim

James W. Le Duc, Ph.D.
Director
Galveston National Laboratory
University of Texas Medical Branch
Galveston, TX 77555-0610

From: Nidhi Subbaraman <nidhi.subbaraman@us.nature.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 1:58 PM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: News query from Nature

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Dr Le Duc, I am reporting on the coronavirus for the news team at Nature, based in Washington DC.

I am looking into a story about gain of function and dual use research, and writing to ask if you'd be free for a brief call about this. We're wondering if the pandemic will re-ignite the debate about this research area – what should be allowed, what should be published, how the work should be communicated to the public. I'm also curious how you see the rumors about Shi Zhengli's lab in Wuhan influencing this.

I'm reaching out to reserachers who work in this area, or have participated in policy discussions in the past to ask how they see the pandmic tinting that discussion. (I covered the NSABB meeting in Jan where a version of this discussion came up https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00210-5)

Would value your thoughts on this. Please let me know if you're available for a phone call Friday or Monday.

Thank you, Nidhi

--
Nidhi Subbaraman (she/her)
Senior reporter, *Nature*
https://www.nature.com/news
O: +1 202 626 2523 | C(b)(6) @nidhisubs

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From: Lawrence, Tara <Tara.Lawrence@turner.com>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:42 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: CNN Documentary Inquiry

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr. James Le Duc,

I hope this message finds you and your community well.

My name is Tara Lawrence and I am reaching out from CNN. We are working on a documentary covering the study of coronaviruses and other pathogens in bats. We are also focusing on the work of the incredible Dr. Shi Zhengli and her collaborators. We will be also briefly be addressing the question of where did COVID 19 originated to debunk the myths and controversy.

I am reaching out to you due to your expertise in the fields of Global health, epidemiology of infectious diseases and their interface with biodefense and biosecurity along work with Dr. Shi Zhengli and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. We think your voice would be an invaluable one to thread through this documentary. We are also on the search for incredible bat footage from expeditions and wondered if you had any or had any suggestions of who would be best to reach out to.

Our mission is to cut through all the noise of the present as it relates to COVID 19 and delve into the science behind it.

If this is something you would be interested in, kindly let me know. Thank you for your time.

If you have any questions, you can reach me at (b)(6)

Kind regards,
Tara

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007465

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: CNN Documentary Inquiry

Let me know your thoughts on the invitation below.

Thanks, Jim

From: Lawrence, Tara <Tara.Lawrence@turner.com>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:42 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: CNN Documentary Inquiry

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr. James Le Duc,

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Our mission is to cut through all the noise of the present as it relates to COVID 19 and delve into the science behind it.

If this is something you would be interested in, kindly let me know. Thank you for your time.

If you have any questions, you can reach me at (b)(6)

Kind regards,
Tara

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: CNN Documentary Inquiry

Let me know your thoughts on the invitation below.

Thanks, Jim

From: Lawrence, Tara <Tara.Lawrence@turner.com>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:42 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: CNN Documentary Inquiry

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Our mission is to cut through all the noise of the present as it relates to COVID 19 and delve into the science behind it.

If this is something you would be interested in, kindly let me know. Thank you for your time.

If you have any questions, you can reach me at (b)(6)

Kind regards,
Tara

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From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 2:35 PM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.
Cc: Smith, Christopher A.;Ramirez, Donna R.
Subject: RE: CNN Documentary Inquiry

Hi Dr. Le Duc,

I just saw this. I don't believe that they intend to "briefly" address the questions about the origins of COVID-19. I can call the producer and get more info but I'm inclined to stay away from this one.

Raul

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: CNN Documentary Inquiry

Let me know your thoughts on the invitation below.

Thanks, Jim

From: Lawrence, Tara <Tara.Lawrence@turner.com>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 11:42 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: CNN Documentary Inquiry

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Dear Dr. James Le Duc,

I hope this message finds you and your community well.

My name is Tara Lawrence and I am reaching out from CNN. We are working on a documentary covering the study of coronaviruses and other pathogens in bats. We are also focusing on the work of the incredible Dr. Shi Zhengli and her collaborators. We will be also briefly be addressing the question of where did COVID 19 originated to debunk the myths and controversy.

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I am reaching out to you due to your expertise in the fields of Global health, epidemiology of infectious diseases and their interface with biodefense and biosecurity along work with Dr. Shi Zhengli and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. We think your voice would be an invaluable one to thread through this documentary. We are also on the search for incredible bat footage from expeditions and wondered if you had any or had any suggestions of who would be best to reach out to.

Our mission is to cut through all the noise of the present as it relates to COVID 19 and delve into the science behind it.

If this is something you would be interested in, kindly let me know. Thank you for your time.

If you have any questions, you can reach me at (b)(6)

Kind regards,
Tara

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008263

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 5:13 PM
To: 'David A Relman';'Baric, Ralph S';'Saif, Linda';'Perlman, Stanley';'Peter Daszak';'Harvey V. Fineberg';'Diane Griffin';'Peggy Hamburg';LeDuc, James W.;'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)';Shi, Pei yong;Dzau, Victor J.
Cc: 'Frances Sharples';Lowenthal, Micah;''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)';'Alison Andre';'Jennifer Ryan';Bowman, Katherine;Hare, Hope;Kanarek, Morgan;Clark, David
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: final docs, Zoom link (and back up phone number)
Attachments: Chinese Participants-0511.docx; Draft Covid-19 US-China dialogue agenda v4.docx; American Participants-0511.docx

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Greetings,

I have attached all the documents that you need for **the first U.S. China dialogue Zoom call tonight [Monday, May 11 from 9:00 PM – 11:00 PM (ET)]** so you have them all in one place. They are 1) the slightly updated Chinese participant list (availability is Beijing time) 2) the American participant list and 3) the American version of the agenda. Please remember that because we want the Chinese participants to lead the discussion their version of the agenda does not include your names after the questions.

At the beginning of the call Diane Griffin will ask each person to introduce themselves briefly (just say your name and affiliations). **Please do this in the order that you appear on the American participant list.** (FYI Peter Daszak and Victor Dzau will join the call later.) George Gao and then Harvey Fineberg will give the brief overviews and then we will discuss the Day 1 questions. Re this discussion, please try and prompt the Chinese participants to answer and address the questions and issues on the agenda, we will also need to mind the time closely if we are going to get through the entire Day 1 question list.

The Zoom link is here again:
Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: [redacted]
(Password: 613725, Meeting ID: 948 6152 5373, but you should not need it, it's in the link)

Re logistics, CAS agreed to allow us to use the Zoom record feature to produce a transcript of the call. I will have host access to Zoom and there will be an NAS IT professional (David Clark) in the Zoom call in case there is a problem. If for some reason we need to abandon the Zoom call and reconvene over the phone we have set up an alternative conference call in line (with Conference America). That number is 1-888-537-7715 (and then enter 12223052#), CAS will also be able to access the line via a toll free Chinese phone number. We will only activate this line if we decide to abandon the Zoom call.

If you have any final questions or concerns please feel free to email or call me (at the number below) before the meeting. Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the virtual dialogue, I looks forward to seeing and hearing you all later this evening.

Kind regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009388

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 12:06 AM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: ZOOM link for first call

And here is the Zoom link for the call on Monday night.

Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/94861525373?pwd=RG9LNTRRRjQrY3ZqTy9SclR5K05SQT09
Password: 613725

PS I tested Zoom with CAS and many of the Chinese group members earlier tonight, the video was clear and I could hear everyone well. Hopefully it will work well when we are all connected.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2020 12:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

The list of Chinese participants is attached.

Kind regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009389

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Saturday, May 9, 2020 11:24 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7

Greetings,

We have created a proposed draft agenda (with topics slightly rearranged) that, as we discussed during the call on Thursday, starts with a brief introduction of the situation in China and the U.S. We hope that Harvey Fineberg can give a (very) brief overview of the situation in the U.S.

To ensure that each question is addressed during the discussion, we have listed the names of American delegation member after each question. We have asked and expect the Chinese group to take the lead but we hope that those listed can ensure that each question is covered. (FYI this version is for your information only, we will send an agenda without the names listed after the questions to the Chinese.) Please let me know if you have thoughts or concerns about this plan.

FYI I plan to send a new version of the agenda to CAS and George Gao on Sunday evening (before I test the Zoom connection with CAS at 9:00 PM ET).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:31 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009390

Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thanks for joining the call last night. We received good news from CAS this morning. They agreed to hold the two sessions as we requested. However because George Gao is not available on the second day they want to push the second session back by one day. That's not bad because as I noted on the call, Jim Le Duc and Harvey Fineberg were not available at that time anyway.

So for the Americans we will keep the time on Monday, May 11 (from 9-11:00 PM ET) as planned but move the second session back one day to Wednesday, May 13th (from 9-11:00 PM ET). I hope the new time for the second session works for most of you.

In addition they said that the topical agenda (topic list we sent) looks fine and that there would about a dozen Chinese experts (said no more than 13) on the call on their side.

I will send you more info later today.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:58 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) ; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Below you will find an agenda for tonight's **(8:00 PM ET)** call. Diane is the U.S. chair so will lead the call (with input from others).

1) Introductions (Diane, Ben, group)
2) The China bio dialogue: brief background, previous meetings and key Chinese participants (Jim, Dave, Diane, Peggy, Pei-yong, Ben, others)
3) Recent work (2020) to set up the virtual dialogue sessions, purpose of the call and issues we should probably avoid (Diane, Ben, others)
4) Discussion topics/questions (see attachment), assign discussion leaders for each question (Diane, others)

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5) Call logistics (best way to interact on the Zoom call, recording the sessions, plan between calls, etc.) (Ben, Micah, Diane)
6) Other questions or concerns (group)

I have re attached the "agenda" (list of topics/questions) for the dialogue meetings next week for your information. Also the Zoom call in information is below:

https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 5:42 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) >; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Information on how to join the planning call **at 8:00 PM ET, Thursday, May 7 is below:**

Zoom link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Please join by Zoom (but the call in phone number is below my email signature if you need it). Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the planned virtual dialogue meeting next week.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

***

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009392

Benjamin Rusek is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Topic: Zoom meeting to discuss U.S. China dialogue
Time: May 7, 2020 08:00 PM Eastern Time (US and Canada)

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Password: 662746

Or iPhone one-tap :
US: +16513728299,,93418637725# or +13017158592,,93418637725#
Or Telephone:
Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location) :
US: +1 651 372 8299 or +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 470 250 9358 or +1 646 518 9805 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 213 338 8477 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 602 753 0140 or +1 669 219 2599 or +1 669 900 6833 or +1 720 928 9299 or +1 971 247 1195 or 888 475 4499 (Toll Free) or 877 853 5257 (Toll Free)
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746
International numbers available: https://nasem.zoom.us/u/a5XnNJEND

Would you like to test your Zoom connection? Please click on the link below.
https://nasem.zoom.us/test

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 6:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; Harvey V. Fineberg <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) ; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu) <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; Alison Andre <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; Jennifer Ryan <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in a virtual bilateral dialogue meeting between Chinese and American experts studying and fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. I am reaching out to you now so 1) the group is connected by email and 2) to organize the planning teleconference for the American participants on May 7. The purpose of the May 7 discussion is to fill you in on the dialogue background, discuss the topics/questions (list in your invitation letter and attached) and issues we should probably avoid (origin questions, politics), logistics, and address any other questions or concerns you may have.

We are proposing that this ~1 hour discussion take place over Zoom at 8:00 PM ET on Thursday, May 7. If this time does not work for someone we could push the time up or back slightly. Please let me know. Also if Thursday evening is impossible I can brief you on the discussion over the phone sometime on Friday.

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Re the actually dialogue meeting with the Chinese group, as your invitation letter notes we have proposed that the dialogue meeting take place on the evenings of Monday, May 11th (to address the first set of bullet points) and Tuesday, May 12th (to ask/answer follow-up questions and address the second set of bullet points), at 9:00 PM ET for the Americans. George Gao has not yet let us know if these exact times work but we should hear back from him soon (the Chinese May day holidays end on the 5th).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009394

Chinese Participants

Zhu Chen: Dr. Zhu Chen is president of the Red Cross Society of China, CAS member. He was previously minister of the National Health Commission of China. (Only available on the 14th)

George F. Gao: Dr. George F. Gao is Director-General of CCDC, a professor at the CAS Institute of Microbiology, CAS member.

Dongfeng Gu: Dr. Dongfeng Gu is vice president of Southern University of Science and Technology, CAS member.

Hualiang Jiang: Dr. Hualiang Jiang is currently a professor at CAS Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica (SIMM), CAS member. He was previous director of SIMM, and now he is the chairman of the Scientific Committee of the institute. His research focuses on drug discovery and development. (Only available on the 12th)

Lanjuan Li: Dr. Lanjuan Li is a physician and professor in infectious diseases, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. She is currently director of the State Key Laboratory for Diagnosis and Treatment of Infectious Diseases. (Only available on the 12th)

Zhengli Shi: Dr. Zhengli Shi is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Chen Wang: Dr. Chen Wang is vice president and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and president of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. (Only available on the 14th)

Guiqiang Wang: Dr. Guiqiang Wang is a professor at the Peking University First Hospital and is president of the Society of Infectious Diseases, Chinese Medical Association. (Only available on the 12th)

Haiming Wei: Dr. Haiming Wei is a professor at the University of Science and Technology of China.

Zhiming Yuan: Dr. Zhiming Yuan is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology, Director of Wuhan P4 lab.

Yongqing Zhang: Dr. Yongqing Zhang is Deputy Director-General of CAS Bureau of Frontier Sciences and Education, a professor at CAS Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology. (Only available on the 12th)

Guoping Zhao: Dr. Guoping Zhao is a professor at CAS Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences, CAS member.

Qi Zhou: Dr. Qi Zhou is Deputy Secretary-General of CAS, Director of CAS Institute of Zoology, CAS member. (Only available on the 12th)

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From: Shi, Pei yong [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=8906C46397AE48488FCC55537DC5D6D3-SHI, PEI YO]
Sent: 5/11/2020 7:38:06 PM
To: Xie, Xuping [xuxie@UTMB.EDU]
Subject: FW: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: final docs, Zoom link (and back up phone number)
Attachments: Chinese Participants-0511.docx; Draft Covid-19 US-China dialogue agenda v4.docx; American Participants-0511.docx

- Pei-Yong

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 5:13 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>; Kanarek, Morgan <MKanarek@nas.edu>; Clark, David <DClark@nas.edu>
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: final docs, Zoom link (and back up phone number)
Importance: High

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Greetings,

I have attached all the documents that you need for **the first U.S. China dialogue Zoom call tonight [Monday, May 11 from 9:00 PM – 11:00 PM (ET)]** so you have them all in one place. They are 1) the slightly updated Chinese participant list (availability is Beijing time) 2) the American participant list and 3) the American version of the agenda. Please remember that because we want the Chinese participants to lead the discussion their version of the agenda does not include your names after the questions.

At the beginning of the call Diane Griffin will ask each person to introduce themselves briefly (just say your name and affiliations). **Please do this in the order that you appear on the American participant list.** (FYI Peter Daszak and Victor Dzau will join the call later.) George Gao and then Harvey Fineberg will give the brief overviews and then we will discuss the Day 1 questions. Re this discussion, please try and prompt the Chinese participants to answer and address the questions and issues on the agenda, we will also need to mind the time closely if we are going to get through the entire Day 1 question list.

The Zoom link is here again:
Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/94861525373?pwd=RG9LNTRRRjQrY3ZqTy9SclR5K05SQT09
(Password: 613725, Meeting ID: 948 6152 5373, but you should not need it, it's in the link)

Re logistics, CAS agreed to allow us to use the Zoom record feature to produce a transcript of the call. I will have host access to Zoom and there will be an NAS IT professional (David Clark) in the Zoom call in case there is a problem. If for some reason we need to abandon the Zoom call and reconvene over the phone we have set up an alternative conference call in line (with Conference America). That number is 1-888-537-7715 (and then enter 12223052#), CAS will

also be able to access the line via a toll free Chinese phone number. We will only activate this line if we decide to abandon the Zoom call.

If you have any final questions or concerns please feel free to email or call me (at the number below) before the meeting. Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the virtual dialogue, I looks forward to seeing and hearing you all later this evening.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 12:06 AM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; "Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: ZOOM link for first call

And here is the Zoom link for the call on Monday night.

Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/94861525373?pwd=RG9LNTRRRjQrY3ZqTy9SclR5K05SQT09
Password: 613725

PS I tested Zoom with CAS and many of the Chinese group members earlier tonight, the video was clear and I could hear everyone well. Hopefully it will work well when we are all connected.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2020 12:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; "Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>;

'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

The list of Chinese participants is attached.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Saturday, May 9, 2020 11:24 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7

Greetings,

We have created a proposed draft agenda (with topics slightly rearranged) that, as we discussed during the call on Thursday, starts with a brief introduction of the situation in China and the U.S. We hope that Harvey Fineberg can give a (very) brief overview of the situation in the U.S.

To ensure that each question is addressed during the discussion, we have listed the names of American delegation member after each question. We have asked and expect the Chinese group to take the lead but we hope that those listed can ensure that each question is covered. (FYI this version is for your information only, we will send an agenda without the names listed after the questions to the Chinese.) Please let me know if you have thoughts or concerns about this plan.

FYI I plan to send a new version of the agenda to CAS and George Gao on Sunday evening (before I test the Zoom connection with CAS at 9:00 PM ET).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:31 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg'

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<harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thanks for joining the call last night. We received good news from CAS this morning. They agreed to hold the two sessions as we requested. However because George Gao is not available on the second day they want to push the second session back by one day. That's not bad because as I noted on the call, Jim Le Duc and Harvey Fineberg were not available at that time anyway.

So for the Americans we will keep the time on Monday, May 11 (from 9-11:00 PM ET) as planned but move the second session back one day to Wednesday, May 13th (from 9-11:00 PM ET). I hope the new time for the second session works for most of you.

In addition they said that the topical agenda (topic list we sent) looks fine and that there would about a dozen Chinese experts (said no more than 13) on the call on their side.

I will send you more info later today.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:58 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Below you will find an agenda for tonight's **(8:00 PM ET)** call. Diane is the U.S. chair so will lead the call (with input from others).

1) Introductions (Diane, Ben, group)

2) The China bio dialogue: brief background, previous meetings and key Chinese participants (Jim, Dave, Diane, Peggy, Pei-yong, Ben, others)
3) Recent work (2020) to set up the virtual dialogue sessions, purpose of the call and issues we should probably avoid (Diane, Ben, others)
4) Discussion topics/questions (see attachment), assign discussion leaders for each question (Diane, others)
5) Call logistics (best way to interact on the Zoom call, recording the sessions, plan between calls, etc.) (Ben, Micah, Diane)
6) Other questions or concerns (group)

I have re attached the "agenda" (list of topics/questions) for the dialogue meetings next week for your information. Also the Zoom call in information is below:

https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 5:42 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
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Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Information on how to join the planning call **at 8:00 PM ET, Thursday, May 7 is below:**

Zoom link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Please join by Zoom (but the call in phone number is below my email signature if you need it). Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the planned virtual dialogue meeting next week.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

***

Benjamin Rusek is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Topic: Zoom meeting to discuss U.S. China dialogue
Time: May 7, 2020 08:00 PM Eastern Time (US and Canada)

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Password: 662746

Or iPhone one-tap :
US: +16513728299,,93418637725# or +13017158592,,93418637725#
Or Telephone:
Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location) :
US: +1 651 372 8299 or +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 470 250 9358 or +1 646 518 9805 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 213 338 8477 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 602 753 0140 or +1 669 219 2599 or +1 669 900 6833 or +1 720 928 9299 or +1 971 247 1195 or 888 475 4499 (Toll Free) or 877 853 5257 (Toll Free)
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746
International numbers available: https://nasem.zoom.us/u/a5XnNJEND

Would you like to test your Zoom connection? Please click on the link below.
https://nasem.zoom.us/test

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 6:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; Harvey V. Fineberg <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) ; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu) <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; Alison Andre <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; Jennifer Ryan <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in a virtual bilateral dialogue meeting between Chinese and American experts studying and fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. I am reaching out to you now so 1) the group is connected by email and 2) to organize the planning teleconference for the American participants on May 7. The purpose of the May 7 discussion is to fill you in on the dialogue background, discuss the topics/questions (list in your invitation letter and attached) and issues we should probably avoid (origin questions, politics), logistics, and address any other questions or concerns you may have.

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We are proposing that this ~1 hour discussion take place over Zoom at 8:00 PM ET on Thursday, May 7. If this time does not work for someone we could push the time up or back slightly. Please let me know. Also if Thursday evening is impossible I can brief you on the discussion over the phone sometime on Friday.

Re the actually dialogue meeting with the Chinese group, as your invitation letter notes we have proposed that the dialogue meeting take place on the evenings of Monday, May 11th (to address the first set of bullet points) and Tuesday, May 12th (to ask/answer follow-up questions and address the second set of bullet points), at 9:00 PM ET for the Americans. George Gao has not yet let us know if these exact times work but we should hear back from him soon (the Chinese May day holidays end on the 5th).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

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Chinese Participants

Zhu Chen: Dr. Zhu Chen is president of the Red Cross Society of China, CAS member. He was previously minister of the National Health Commission of China. (Only available on the 14th)

George F. Gao: Dr. George F. Gao is Director-General of CCDC, a professor at the CAS Institute of Microbiology, CAS member.

Dongfeng Gu: Dr. Dongfeng Gu is vice president of Southern University of Science and Technology, CAS member.

Hualiang Jiang: Dr. Hualiang Jiang is currently a professor at CAS Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica (SIMM), CAS member. He was previous director of SIMM, and now he is the chairman of the Scientific Committee of the institute. His research focuses on drug discovery and development. (Only available on the 12th)

Lanjuan Li: Dr. Lanjuan Li is a physician and professor in infectious diseases, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. She is currently director of the State Key Laboratory for Diagnosis and Treatment of Infectious Diseases. (Only available on the 12th)

Zhengli Shi: Dr. Zhengli Shi is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Chen Wang: Dr. Chen Wang is vice president and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and president of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. (Only available on the 14th)

Guiqiang Wang: Dr. Guiqiang Wang is a professor at the Peking University First Hospital and is president of the Society of Infectious Diseases, Chinese Medical Association. (Only available on the 12th)

Haiming Wei: Dr. Haiming Wei is a professor at the University of Science and Technology of China.

Zhiming Yuan: Dr. Zhiming Yuan is a professor at CAS Wuhan Institute of Virology, Director of Wuhan P4 lab.

Yongqing Zhang: Dr. Yongqing Zhang is Deputy Director-General of CAS Bureau of Frontier Sciences and Education, a professor at CAS Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology. (Only available on the 12th)

Guoping Zhao: Dr. Guoping Zhao is a professor at CAS Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences, CAS member.

Qi Zhou: Dr. Qi Zhou is Deputy Secretary-General of CAS, Director of CAS Institute of Zoology, CAS member. (Only available on the 12th)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr LeDuc,

I hope this email finds you well.

My name is Maya Dykes, I'm writing to you from WhatsNext Productions. We are an independent television production company based in the UK.

We recently produced a documentary called *Race Against Pandemic* for the Singaporean broadcaster Channel News Asia, which you can view online here: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/video-on-demand/race-against-pandemic/race-against-pandemic-12628828

We are now planning a new documentary which will attempt to set the record straight about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, exploring the history of the Institute, its vital work on coronaviruses, and its role as a leading scientific authority before and during the current pandemic.

We are approaching the Chinese authorities to seek their permission to do some limited filming in Wuhan, and to interview key individuals there, including Professor Shi Zhengli.

We know that you and the team at the Galveston laboratory have worked closely with Professor Shi Zhengli and the Institute. We would therefore be keen to talk with you about your experience with the team in Wuhan, and your perspective on their running of a maximum containment laboratory.

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Thank you for taking the time to read this email. Please let me know if you need any more information when considering this request.

Yours sincerely,

Maya

--

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007875

Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;LeDuc, James W.;Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Yours sincerely,

Maya

--
Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:13 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Lidstone, Sheila;Campbell, Stephen
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Good morning,

This looks like a fishing expedition and they have no profile on the Internet that I could find. They don't have any commitment for broadcasting on any network and don't have a portfolio except for a "Sam Taylor" on LinkedIn who lists himself as a director.

This company may even turn out to be pay to play; I recommend that we decline.

Thank you,

Raul

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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Yours sincerely,

Maya

--
Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008632

From: Lidstone, Sheila
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:17 AM
To: Reyes, Raul;LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

I agree. Thank you!

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:13 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Good morning,

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This company may even turn out to be pay to play; I recommend that we decline.

Thank you,

Raul

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Yours sincerely,

Maya

--
Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Campbell, Stephen
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:34 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila;Reyes, Raul;LeDuc, James W.;Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Agree with declining.

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:17 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

I agree. Thank you!

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:13 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Thank you,

Raul

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Thank you for taking the time to read this email. Please let me know if you need any more information when considering this request.

Yours sincerely,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008602

Maya

--
Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Raimer, Ben G.
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:38 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila
Cc: Reyes, Raul;LeDuc, James W.;Holubar, Connie J.;Campbell, Stephen;Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: Re: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

I would avoid this one

Sent from my iPhone

On May 13, 2020, at 9:16 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:

I agree. Thank you!

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:13 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Thank you,

Raul

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009317

Thank you for taking the time to read this email. Please let me know if you need any more information when considering this request.

Yours sincerely,

Maya

--
Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009318

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:56 AM
To: Reyes, Raul
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.;Raimer, Ben G.;Campbell, Stephen;Lidstone, Sheila;Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Raul, please decline

Thanks, Jim

From: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:38 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

I would avoid this one

Sent from my iPhone

> On May 13, 2020, at 9:16 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I agree. Thank you!
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:13 AM
> **To:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology
>
> Good morning,
>
> This looks like a fishing expedition and they have no profile on the Internet that I could find. They don't have any commitment for broadcasting on any network and

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008730

don't have a portfolio except for a "Sam Taylor" on LinkedIn who lists himself as a director.

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Thank you,

Raul

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

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Dear Dr LeDuc,

I hope this email finds you well.

My name is Maya Dykes, I'm writing to you from WhatsNext Productions. We are an independent television production company based in the UK.

We recently produced a documentary called *Race Against Pandemic* for the Singaporean broadcaster Channel News Asia, which you can view online here: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/video-on-demand/race-against-pandemic/race-against-pandemic-12628828

We are now planning a new documentary which will attempt to set the record straight about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, exploring the history of the Institute, its vital work on coronaviruses, and its role as a leading scientific authority before and during the current pandemic.

We are approaching the Chinese authorities to seek their permission to do some limited filming in Wuhan, and to interview key individuals there, including Professor Shi Zhengli.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008731

We know that you and the team at the Galveston laboratory have worked closely with Professor Shi Zhengli and the Institute. We would therefore be keen to talk with you about your experience with the team in Wuhan, and your perspective on their running of a maximum containment laboratory.

In principle is this a project in which you would be willing to participate?

If the pandemic precludes our traveling to the US to make the documentary, we are likely to ask an American crew to film on our behalf. The project is yet to be commissioned, but if you are able to take part, could we as a next step have a telephone/Skype research chat? And could you let me know of your availability in the next few weeks and months?

Thank you for taking the time to read this email. Please let me know if you need any more information when considering this request.

Yours sincerely,

Maya

--
Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008732

From: Reyes, Raul
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:57 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Cc: Holubar, Connie J.;Raimer, Ben G.;Campbell, Stephen;Lidstone, Sheila;Koopmann, Kurt E.;Ramirez, Donna R.;Smith, Christopher A.
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Thank you. Will do.

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:56 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Raul, please decline

Thanks, Jim

From: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:38 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Re: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

I would avoid this one

Sent from my iPhone

> On May 13, 2020, at 9:16 AM, Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@utmb.edu> wrote:
>
> I agree. Thank you!
>
> **From:** Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:13 AM
> **To:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
> **Cc:** Koopmann, Kurt E. <kekoopma@UTMB.EDU>; Ramirez, Donna R. <d1ramire@UTMB.EDU>; Smith,

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Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Good morning,

This looks like a fishing expedition and they have no profile on the Internet that I could find. They don't have any commitment for broadcasting on any network and don't have a portfolio except for a "Sam Taylor" on LinkedIn who lists himself as a director.

This company may even turn out to be pay to play; I recommend that we decline.

Thank you,

Raul

From: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:46 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

Another inquiry. Please advise.

From: Maya Dykes <maya@whatsnextproductions.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:08 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Documentary Research - Wuhan Institute of Virology

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr LeDuc,

I hope this email finds you well.

My name is Maya Dykes, I'm writing to you from WhatsNext Productions. We are an independent television production company based in the UK.

We recently produced a documentary called *Race Against Pandemic* for the Singaporean broadcaster Channel News Asia, which you can view online here:

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/video-on-demand/race-against-pandemic/race-against-pandemic-12628828

We are now planning a new documentary which will attempt to set the record straight about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, exploring the history of the Institute, its vital work on coronaviruses, and its role as a leading scientific authority before and during the current pandemic.

We are approaching the Chinese authorities to seek their permission to do some limited filming in Wuhan, and to interview key individuals there, including Professor Shi Zhengli.

We know that you and the team at the Galveston laboratory have worked closely with Professor Shi Zhengli and the Institute. We would therefore be keen to talk with you about your experience with the team in Wuhan, and your perspective on their running of a maximum containment laboratory.

In principle is this a project in which you would be willing to participate?

If the pandemic precludes our traveling to the US to make the documentary, we are likely to ask an American crew to film on our behalf. The project is yet to be commissioned, but if you are able to take part, could we as a next step have a telephone/Skype research chat? And could you let me know of your availability in the next few weeks and months?

Thank you for taking the time to read this email. Please let me know if you need any more information when considering this request.

Yours sincerely,

Maya

--

Maya Dykes
Assistant Producer
Whatsnext Productions
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_007594

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 11:16 AM
To: 'Dave Franz';Diane Griffin
Cc: LeDuc, James W.;Peggy Hamburg;Sharples, Fran;Lowenthal, Micah;Bowman, Katherine
Subject: RE: Notes from Day 1 NAS-CAS
Attachments: On the Ground in Wuhan, Signs of China Stalling Probe of Coronavirus Origins - WSJ.pdf

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Yes I can write up proposal to send before the call. Might carry more weight if email comes from Diane though.

PS Attached good reporting from WSJ on origin detection efforts in Wuhan.

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:48 AM
To: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Notes from Day 1 NAS-CAS

Agree. It would be more efficient, in that we can just take the time of individuals who are truly interested in the given topic. And just keeping up the dialogue will be important. Dave

> On May 13, 2020, at 8:57 AM, Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu> wrote:
>
> Ben - I think that it is a good idea. Do you want to propose that to George?
>
> Diane
>
> Diane E. Griffin, MD PhD
> Vice President, National Academy of Sciences
> University Distinguished Service Professor
> W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology
> Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
> 615 N. Wolfe St, Rm E5636
> Baltimore, MD 21205
> 410-955-3459
> dgriffi6@jhu.edu

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From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 5:47 PM
To: 'Dave Franz' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Notes from Day 1 NAS-CAS

Greetings,

I would be happy to help set up additional, smaller virtual dialogue sessions. We might want to propose that idea to George before the call tomorrow night and if he agrees use the final portion of the call to discuss topics. My preference would be to try and do another session before the end of the month if possible.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Dave Franz <davidrfranz@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:38 PM
To: James W. LeDuc <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>; Diane Griffin <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; Peggy Hamburg <peggy@hbfam.net>; Sharples, Fran <FSharples@nas.edu>
Subject: Re: Notes from Day 1 NAS-CAS

I too thought it went very well and like Jim's idea of trying to set up additional visits with those involved who are interested on both sides. We might be able to do it with a smaller group and focus a little more on specific science quesitons. The Zoom meeting was of real value beyond what we learned technically, in my opinion.

Good list Jim. I see I'm listed to do the wrap up on tomorrow's meeting, but think it might be a good idea for you to continue what you started last night, if you don't mind. You are much closer to the science and potential for collaborations than I.

The one topic that I would hope we discuss with them is, under your category P&P: **What have you learned about 'recovered' patients, with positive serology (IgG) who are still PCR positive? Have you tested them—or looked at animal models—to see if the PCR is picking up intact virions or simply 'left-over' viral RNA?**

I also think Pei Youg was interrupted in the middle of his question last night. Diane, we should try to give him a priority slot to ask his question tomorrow. We wouldn't be where we are without him.

One question for Fran (or others). Am I correct in believing that I heard the following:

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In Wuhan there were/are 9% seropositive in community serological surveys
Over-all in China…or maybe outside Wuhan there were 1/1,000 seropositive in similar surveys

Thanks Ben for pulling it all together!

Best to all, dave

On May 12, 2020, at 11:37 AM, LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU> wrote:

<Topics for future collaborations between the NAS and CAS on COVID-draft 1.docx>

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

David R. Franz
(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009305

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 3:11 PM
To: Rusek, Benjamin
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: Zoom link for Wednesday May 13 call 9pm et

I note that Zhiming will not be on the call. Too bad; I wanted to ask about his animal model work.

From: Rusek, Benjamin <BRusek@nas.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 3:00 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>; Kanarek, Morgan <MKanarek@nas.edu>; Clark, David <DClark@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: Zoom link for Wednesday May 13 call 9pm et

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Greetings,

I have attached two ppts from the Monday evening Zoom call and an updated Chinese participant list for the Zoom call tonight. I look forward to seeing and speaking with you all again tonight.

Here is the Zoom link for the session tonight:
Meeting Time: **Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:00 -11:00 PM (ET)**
Meeting link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/98730322332?pwd=d2RodUlYVVZpT1pTZ1dHVFdKL1QvQT09
Meeting ID: 987 3032 2332
Meeting Password: 569674

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 4:10 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg'

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<harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>; Kanarek, Morgan <MKanarek@nas.edu>; Clark, David <DClark@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: Zoom link for Wednesday May 13 call 9pm et
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thank you for participating in and asking thoughtful questions during the Zoom call last night. Thanks especially to Diane Griffin for outstanding moderating, to Harvey Fineberg for giving a clear and concise overview of the U.S. situation and to Jim Le Duc for drafting a list (see attachment) of possible future areas of collaboration that came up during the discussion.

Although Zoom seemed to work well for most of the participants I asked CAS staff to help the group move on quickly if a Chinese speaker's audio is malfunctioning. I let CAS know that during the next session we want to start discussing the agenda / remaining list of questions right away. I reiterated that we find a discussion format to be the most useful and asked that they send any slide presentations to me in advance of the call (so I can send them to you). I also asked CAS for copies of the PPT slides that were shared with the group last night. Please let me know if you have any thoughts on how to make the Zoom session tomorrow night more productive.

Here is the Zoom link for the next session
Meeting Time: **Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:00 -11:00 PM (ET)**
Meeting link: [redacted]
Meeting ID: 987 3032 2332
Meeting Password: 569674

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 6:13 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>; Dzau, Victor J. <VDzau@nas.edu>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>; Kanarek, Morgan <MKanarek@nas.edu>; Clark, David <DClark@nas.edu>
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: final docs, Zoom link (and back up phone number)
Importance: High

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008888

Greetings,

I have attached all the documents that you need for **the first U.S. China dialogue Zoom call tonight [Monday, May 11 from 9:00 PM – 11:00 PM (ET)]** so you have them all in one place. They are 1) the slightly updated Chinese participant list (availability is Beijing time) 2) the American participant list and 3) the American version of the agenda. Please remember that because we want the Chinese participants to lead the discussion their version of the agenda does not include your names after the questions.

At the beginning of the call Diane Griffin will ask each person to introduce themselves briefly (just say your name and affiliations). **Please do this in the order that you appear on the American participant list.** (FYI Peter Daszak and Victor Dzau will join the call later.) George Gao and then Harvey Fineberg will give the brief overviews and then we will discuss the Day 1 questions. Re this discussion, please try and prompt the Chinese participants to answer and address the questions and issues on the agenda, we will also need to mind the time closely if we are going to get through the entire Day 1 question list.

The Zoom link is here again:
Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: [redacted]
(Password: 613725, Meeting ID: 948 6152 5373, but you should not need it, it's in the link)

Re logistics, CAS agreed to allow us to use the Zoom record feature to produce a transcript of the call. I will have host access to Zoom and there will be an NAS IT professional (David Clark) in the Zoom call in case there is a problem. If for some reason we need to abandon the Zoom call and reconvene over the phone we have set up an alternative conference call in line (with Conference America). That number is 1-888-537-7715 (and then enter 12223052#), CAS will also be able to access the line via a toll free Chinese phone number. We will only activate this line if we decide to abandon the Zoom call.

If you have any final questions or concerns please feel free to email or call me (at the number below) before the meeting. Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the virtual dialogue, I looks forward to seeing and hearing you all later this evening.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 12:06 AM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' <(b)(6)>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>; Hare, Hope <HHare@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: ZOOM link for first call

And here is the Zoom link for the call on Monday night.

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Time: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:00 PM (ET)
Meeting Link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/94861525373?pwd=RG9LNTRRRjQrY3ZqTy9SclR5K05SQT09
Password: 613725

PS I tested Zoom with CAS and many of the Chinese group members earlier tonight, the video was clear and I could hear everyone well. Hopefully it will work well when we are all connected.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2020 12:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) >; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

The list of Chinese participants is attached.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Saturday, May 9, 2020 11:24 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7

Greetings,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008890

We have created a proposed draft agenda (with topics slightly rearranged) that, as we discussed during the call on Thursday, starts with a brief introduction of the situation in China and the U.S. We hope that Harvey Fineberg can give a (very) brief overview of the situation in the U.S.

To ensure that each question is addressed during the discussion, we have listed the names of American delegation member after each question. We have asked and expect the Chinese group to take the lead but we hope that those listed can ensure that each question is covered. (FYI this version is for your information only, we will send an agenda without the names listed after the questions to the Chinese.) Please let me know if you have thoughts or concerns about this plan.

FYI I plan to send a new version of the agenda to CAS and George Gao on Sunday evening (before I test the Zoom connection with CAS at 9:00 PM ET).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:31 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6) ; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thanks for joining the call last night. We received good news from CAS this morning. They agreed to hold the two sessions as we requested. However because George Gao is not available on the second day they want to push the second session back by one day. That's not bad because as I noted on the call, Jim Le Duc and Harvey Fineberg were not available at that time anyway.

So for the Americans we will keep the time on Monday, May 11 (from 9-11:00 PM ET) as planned but move the second session back one day to Wednesday, May 13th (from 9-11:00 PM ET). I hope the new time for the second session works for most of you.

In addition they said that the topical agenda (topic list we sent) looks fine and that there would about a dozen Chinese experts (said no more than 13) on the call on their side.

I will send you more info later today.

Kind regards,

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008891

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 4:58 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' <(b)(6)>; Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Below you will find an agenda for tonight's **(8:00 PM ET)** call. Diane is the U.S. chair so will lead the call (with input from others).

1) Introductions (Diane, Ben, group)
2) The China bio dialogue: brief background, previous meetings and key Chinese participants (Jim, Dave, Diane, Peggy, Pei-yong, Ben, others)
3) Recent work (2020) to set up the virtual dialogue sessions, purpose of the call and issues we should probably avoid (Diane, Ben, others)
4) Discussion topics/questions (see attachment), assign discussion leaders for each question (Diane, others)
5) Call logistics (best way to interact on the Zoom call, recording the sessions, plan between calls, etc.) (Ben, Micah, Diane)
6) Other questions or concerns (group)

I have re attached the "agenda" (list of topics/questions) for the dialogue meetings next week for your information. Also the Zoom call in information is below:

https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 5:42 PM

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008892

To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Harvey V. Fineberg' <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; 'Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU)' <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; ''Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu)' <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; 'Alison Andre' <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; 'Jennifer Ryan' <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: RE: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Information on how to join the planning call **at 8:00 PM ET, Thursday, May 7 is below:**

Zoom link: https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746

Please join by Zoom (but the call in phone number is below my email signature if you need it). Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the planned virtual dialogue meeting next week.

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

***

Benjamin Rusek is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Topic: Zoom meeting to discuss U.S. China dialogue
Time: May 7, 2020 08:00 PM Eastern Time (US and Canada)

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android:
https://nasem.zoom.us/j/93418637725?pwd=OHBnamM1cWs5MUl1TWFiNmlNdGMwQT09
Password: 662746

Or iPhone one-tap :
US: +16513728299,,93418637725# or +13017158592,,93418637725#
Or Telephone:
Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location) :
US: +1 651 372 8299 or +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 470 250 9358 or +1 646 518 9805 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 213 338 8477 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 602 753 0140 or +1 669 219 2599 or +1 669 900 6833 or +1 720 928 9299 or +1 971 247 1195 or 888 475 4499 (Toll Free) or 877 853 5257 (Toll Free)
Meeting ID: 934 1863 7725
Password: 662746
International numbers available: https://nasem.zoom.us/u/a5XnNJEND

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008893

Would you like to test your Zoom connection? Please click on the link below.
https://nasem.zoom.us/test

From: Rusek, Benjamin
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 6:15 PM
To: 'David A Relman' <relman@stanford.edu>; 'Baric, Ralph S' <rbaric@email.unc.edu>; 'Saif, Linda' <saif.2@osu.edu>; 'Perlman, Stanley' <stanley-perlman@uiowa.edu>; 'Peter Daszak' <daszak@ecohealthalliance.org>; Harvey V. Fineberg <harvey.fineberg@moore.org>; 'Diane Griffin' <dgriffi6@jhmi.edu>; 'Peggy Hamburg' <peggy@hbfam.net>; 'jwleduc@UTMB.EDU' <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>; 'Dave Franz (davidrfranz@gmail.com)' <davidrfranz@gmail.com>; Shi, Pei yong (peshi@UTMB.EDU) <peshi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: 'Frances Sharples' (b)(6); Lowenthal, Micah <mlowenth@nas.edu>; 'Baric, Toni C' (antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu) <antoinette_baric@med.unc.edu>; Alison Andre <andre@ecohealthalliance.org>; Jennifer Ryan <jennifer.ryan@moore.org>; Bowman, Katherine <KBowman@nas.edu>
Subject: Virtual U.S. China dialogue meeting on COVID-19: planning discussion on May 7
Importance: High

Greetings,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in a virtual bilateral dialogue meeting between Chinese and American experts studying and fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. I am reaching out to you now so 1) the group is connected by email and 2) to organize the planning teleconference for the American participants on May 7. The purpose of the May 7 discussion is to fill you in on the dialogue background, discuss the topics/questions (list in your invitation letter and attached) and issues we should probably avoid (origin questions, politics), logistics, and address any other questions or concerns you may have.

We are proposing that this ~1 hour discussion take place over Zoom at 8:00 PM ET on Thursday, May 7. If this time does not work for someone we could push the time up or back slightly. Please let me know. Also if Thursday evening is impossible I can brief you on the discussion over the phone sometime on Friday.

Re the actually dialogue meeting with the Chinese group, as your invitation letter notes we have proposed that the dialogue meeting take place on the evenings of Monday, May 11th (to address the first set of bullet points) and Tuesday, May 12th (to ask/answer follow-up questions and address the second set of bullet points), at 9:00 PM ET for the Americans. George Gao has not yet let us know if these exact times work but we should hear back from him soon (the Chinese May day holidays end on the 5th).

Kind regards,

Ben

Benjamin Rusek
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1-202-334-3975

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_008894

From: Tal Giladi (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 2:27 AM
To: LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Dr. Le Duc,
It's great connecting with you.
My name is Tal Giladi, I'm a magazine journalist in Yedioth Ahronoth, the largest newspaper in Israel.

I'm working on an article about the starting point of the pandemic, that including the story behind the "bat woman" Dr. Shi Zhengli, the findings we know about bat viruses and how the virus source became a political issue.

I would be happy to do an interview with you on these topics, and ask you about your professional acquaintance with Shi Zhengli.

The article will be published in "7days", the strongest print weekend magazine in Israel.

I would be grateful for your prompt reply,

Best,

Tal Giladi

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 8:43 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
Subject: FW: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Press inquiry

From: Tal Giladi (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 2:27 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

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Best,

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(b)(6)

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From: LeDuc, James W.
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 8:43 AM
To: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.;Reyes, Raul
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Press inquiry

From: Tal Giladi (b)(6)
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To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
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The article will be published in "7days", the strongest print weekend magazine in Israel.

I would be grateful for your prompt reply,

Best,

Tal Giladi

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: Campbell, Stephen
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:18 AM
To: Reyes, Raul;Smith, Christopher A.
Cc: Raimer, Ben G.;Lidstone, Sheila;Holubar, Connie J.;LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

I recommend declining.

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:02 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

Begin forwarded message:

From: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Date: May 14, 2020 at 8:42:53 AM CDT
To: "Raimer, Ben G." <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>, "Lidstone, Sheila" <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>, "Holubar, Connie J." <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>, "Reyes, Raul" <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Press inquiry

From: Tal Giladi (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 2:27 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

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FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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The article will be published in “7days”, the strongest print weekend magazine in Israel.

I would be grateful for your prompt reply,

Best,

Tal Giladi

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009596

From: Lidstone, Sheila
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:50 AM
To: Campbell, Stephen;Reyes, Raul;Smith, Christopher A.
Cc: Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.;LeDuc, James W.
Subject: RE: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Agree that we should decline...is Chris onboard to do that with Raul out?

From: Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:18 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

I recommend declining.

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:02 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Date:** May 14, 2020 at 8:42:53 AM CDT
> **To:** "Raimer, Ben G." <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>, "Lidstone, Sheila" <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>, "Holubar, Connie J." <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>, "Reyes, Raul" <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject: FW: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel**
>
> Press inquiry
>
> **From:** Tal Giladi <(b)(6)
> **Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 2:27 AM
> **To:** LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
> **Subject:** Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel
>
> **WARNING:** This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Dear Dr. Le Duc,
> It's great connecting with you.

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

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I'm working on an article about the starting point of the pandemic, that including the story behind the "bat woman" Dr. Shi Zhengli, the findings we know about bat viruses and how the virus source became a political issue.

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The article will be published in "7days", the strongest print weekend magazine in Israel.

I would be grateful for your prompt reply,

Best,

Tal Giladi

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009828

From: Smith, Christopher A.
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:51 AM
To: Lidstone, Sheila;Campbell, Stephen;Reyes, Raul
Cc: Raimer, Ben G.;Holubar, Connie J.;LeDuc, James W.
Subject: Re: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Yes, definitely. I'll reach out to the reporter and decline.

Thanks
Chris

Christopher Smith Gonzalez
Senior Communications Specialist
Marketing and Communications
University of Texas Medical Branch
301 University Blvd., Galveston, TX 77550

O (409) 772.8790 M (b)(6)

twitter: @csmithgonzalez

From: Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:50 AM
To: Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>; Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Agree that we should decline…is Chris onboard to do that with Raul out?

From: Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:18 AM
To: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>; Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>
Cc: Raimer, Ben G. <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>; Lidstone, Sheila <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>; Holubar, Connie J. <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>; LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: RE: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

I recommend declining.

From: Reyes, Raul <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:02 AM
To: Smith, Christopher A. <chrissmi@UTMB.EDU>; Campbell, Stephen <stepcamp@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Fwd: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_009880

Sent from my iPhone8 Plus

Begin forwarded message:

From: "LeDuc, James W." <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Date: May 14, 2020 at 8:42:53 AM CDT
To: "Raimer, Ben G." <bgraimer@UTMB.EDU>, "Lidstone, Sheila" <shlidsto@UTMB.EDU>, "Holubar, Connie J." <cjholuba@UTMB.EDU>, "Reyes, Raul" <rareyes@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: FW: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

Press inquiry

From: Tal Giladi <(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 2:27 AM
To: LeDuc, James W. <jwleduc@UTMB.EDU>
Subject: Interview for Yediot Aharonoth newspaper, israel

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The article will be published in "7days", the strongest print weekend magazine in Israel.

I would be grateful for your prompt reply,

Best,

Tal Giladi

(b)(6)

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: snehal patel <(b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2020 2:37 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Not seeing spikes in states opening up since May 1

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

The numbers in the tables in the email below are still holding up as the US44 states are still recovering well. And you don't see any spikes in the states that have rapidly opened up, such as TX, GA, FL, and CO (most recent graphs below).

But what is spiking is the arrests of professors and researchers (7 out of 8 are of Chinese origin) at US universities - it is quite shocking and has probably been going on for decades (source is Dept of Justice).

#1 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related

Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases

The Department of Justice announced today that the Chair of Harvard University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department and two Chinese nationals have been charged in connection with aiding the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Charles Lieber, 60, Chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University, was arrested this morning and charged by criminal complaint with one count of making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement. Lieber will appear this afternoon before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler in federal court in Boston, Massachusetts.

Yanqing Ye, 29, a Chinese national, was charged in an indictment today with one count each of visa fraud, making false statements, acting as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy. Ye is currently in China.

Zaosong Zheng, 30, a Chinese national, was arrested on Dec. 10, 2019, at Boston's Logan International Airport and charged by criminal complaint with attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China. On Jan. 21, 2020, Zheng was indicted on one count of smuggling goods from the United States and one count of making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. He has been detained since Dec. 30, 2019.

#2 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-arkansas-professor-arrested-wire-fraud

University of Arkansas Professor Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, David Clay Fowlkes, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas, and FBI Special Agent in Charge Diane Upchurch of the FBI Little Rock Field Office announced today that Simon Saw-Teong Ang, 63, of Fayetteville, Arkansas, was arrested on Friday, May 8, 2020, on charges related to Wire Fraud. The complaint and complaint affidavit were unsealed this evening after Ang's initial appearance in court before The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks at the United States District Court in Fayetteville.

#3 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cleveland-clinic-employee-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-arrested-wire-fraud

Former Cleveland Clinic Employee and Chinese "Thousand Talents" Participant Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney Justin E. Herdman of the Northern District of Ohio, and FBI Cleveland Special Agent in Charge Eric B. Smith announced a former Cleveland Clinic employee was arrested yesterday without incident by law enforcement and had his initial court appearance today.

Dr. Qing Wang, a former Cleveland Clinic Foundation (CCF) employee, is charged with false claims and wire fraud related to more than $3.6 million in grant funding that Dr. Wang and his research group received from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

#4 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/former-emory-university-professor-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-convicted

Former Emory University professor and Chinese "Thousand Talents" participant convicted and sentenced for filing a false tax return

ATLANTA – Xiao-Jiang Li has pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with filing a false tax return and was sentenced by a U.S. District Judge on the same day. Dr. Li, a former Emory University professor and Chinese Thousand Talents Program participant, worked overseas at Chinese Universities and did not report any of his foreign income on his federal tax returns.

"This defendant thought that he could live two, separate lives—one here at Emory University and one in China as a Thousand Talents Program participant," said U.S. Attorney Byung J. "BJay" Pak. "Eventually, the truth caught up to this defendant, and he is now a convicted felon who is ordered to repay over $35,000 to the IRS."

#5 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-false-statements-about-affiliation

Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University

Anming Hu, a an Associate Professor in the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Biomedical Engineering at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) was arrested today on a federal indictment and charged with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of making false statements.

"Hu allegedly committed fraud by hiding his relationship with a Chinese university while receiving funding from NASA," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. "This is just the latest case involving professors or researchers concealing their affiliations with China from their American employers and the U.S. government. We will not tolerate it."

"The United States Attorney's Office takes seriously fraudulent conduct that is devised to undermine federally-mandated funding restrictions related to China and Chinese universities," said U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Overbey for the Eastern District of Tennessee. "The University of Tennessee has cooperated with the investigation, and the U.S. Attorney's Office values the university's assistance in this matter."



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	2,028	327.1	66,336
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178

NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

<u>China:</u>

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

<u>Texas:</u>

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

Location	Cases	Deaths	Fatality rate	Active	Recovered	Population	Cases/1M	Death/10M	More
TX	31,956	877	2.7%	16,860	14,219	28,995,881	1,102	302	



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says
State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.
U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."
A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."
He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.
The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

By **Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News**

's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.
Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.
For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.



FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System



ZOOM IN:



FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



ZOOM BACK OUT:



ALL DATA:



FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N'' latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

''Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates,'' said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. ''That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data.''

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. ''Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk,'' said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

''I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses,'' said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. ''And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts.''

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

''Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future,'' said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. ''In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats.''

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

''This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies,'' said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. ''Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread.''

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: 5/17/2020 3:01:39 PM
To: Chopra, Ashok [achopra@UTMB.EDU]; 'David McWilliams' (b)(6); 'Eric Rothe' (b)(6)
Subject: Let's protect our ideas - need to file patent asap

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Ashok, we need to make sure that we protect our ideas from your colleagues at UTMB. As they were connected to Wuhan Institute in setting up the institute, the Chinese communists are potentially targeting anyone at UTMB, especially those of Chinese orign, for bribery in exchange for medical research. See the cases this year, which is probably just scratching the surface. The Chinese have so much money and I bet that UTMB and any national laboratory is being heavily investigated by FBI right now.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2020 2:37 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Not seeing spikes in states opening up since May 1

The numbers in the tables in the email below are still holding up as the US44 states are still recovering well. And you don't see any spikes in the states that have rapidly opened up, such as TX, GA, FL, and CO (most recent graphs below).

But what is spiking is the arrests of professors and researchers (7 out of 8 are of Chinese origin) at US universities - it is quite shocking and has probably been going on for decades (source is Dept of Justice).

#1 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related

Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases

The Department of Justice announced today that the Chair of Harvard University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department and two Chinese nationals have been charged in connection with aiding the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Charles Lieber, 60, Chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University, was arrested this morning and charged by criminal complaint with one count of making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement. Lieber will appear this afternoon before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler in federal court in Boston, Massachusetts.

Yanqing Ye, 29, a Chinese national, was charged in an indictment today with one count each of visa fraud, making false statements, acting as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy. Ye is currently in China.

Zaosong Zheng, 30, a Chinese national, was arrested on Dec. 10, 2019, at Boston's Logan International Airport and charged by criminal complaint with attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China. On Jan. 21, 2020, Zheng was indicted on one count of smuggling goods from the United States and one count of making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. He has been detained since Dec. 30, 2019.

#2 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-arkansas-professor-arrested-wire-fraud

University of Arkansas Professor Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, David Clay Fowlkes, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas, and FBI Special Agent in Charge Diane Upchurch of the FBI Little Rock Field Office announced today that Simon Saw-Teong Ang, 63, of Fayetteville, Arkansas, was arrested on Friday, May 8, 2020, on charges related to Wire Fraud. The complaint and complaint affidavit were unsealed this evening after Ang's initial appearance in court before The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks at the United States District Court in Fayetteville.

#3 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cleveland-clinic-employee-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-arrested-wire-fraud

Former Cleveland Clinic Employee and Chinese "Thousand Talents" Participant Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney Justin E. Herdman of the Northern District of Ohio, and FBI Cleveland Special Agent in Charge Eric B. Smith announced a former Cleveland Clinic employee was arrested yesterday without incident by law enforcement and had his initial court appearance today.

Dr. Qing Wang, a former Cleveland Clinic Foundation (CCF) employee, is charged with false claims and wire fraud related to more than $3.6 million in grant funding that Dr. Wang and his research group received from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

#4 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/former-emory-university-professor-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-convicted

Former Emory University professor and Chinese "Thousand Talents" participant convicted and sentenced for filing a false tax return

ATLANTA – Xiao-Jiang Li has pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with filing a false tax return and was sentenced by a U.S. District Judge on the same day. Dr. Li, a former Emory University professor and Chinese Thousand Talents Program participant, worked overseas at Chinese Universities and did not report any of his foreign income on his federal tax returns.

"This defendant thought that he could live two, separate lives—one here at Emory University and one in China as a Thousand Talents Program participant," said U.S. Attorney Byung J. "BJay" Pak.

"Eventually, the truth caught up to this defendant, and he is now a convicted felon who is ordered to repay over $35,000 to the IRS."

#5 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-false-statements-about-affiliation

Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University

Anming Hu, a an Associate Professor in the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Biomedical Engineering at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) was arrested today on a federal indictment and charged with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of making false statements.

"Hu allegedly committed fraud by hiding his relationship with a Chinese university while receiving funding from NASA," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. "This is just the latest case involving professors or researchers concealing their affiliations with China from their American employers and the U.S. government. We will not tolerate it."

"The United States Attorney's Office takes seriously fraudulent conduct that is devised to undermine federally-mandated funding restrictions related to China and Chinese universities," said U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Overbey for the Eastern District of Tennessee. "The University of Tennessee has cooperated with the investigation, and the U.S. Attorney's Office values the university's assistance in this matter."



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	**2,028**	**327.1**	**66,336**
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008

US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

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

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.

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

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below. Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

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In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

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Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

by Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News

ina's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

eral homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families y day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

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The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

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Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.




Coronavirus Tracker
Reported Cases (Solid Lines)
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
1/22
1/25
1/28
1/31
2/3
2/6
2/9
2/12
2/15
2/18
2/21
2/24
2/27
3/1
3/4
3/7
3/10
3/13
3/16
3/19
3/22
Time
TOTAL
China
Korea, South
Italy
Iran
Rest of Europe
Total of Europe
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Total of US
New York
Rest of US
Washington
California
Japan
Rest of Asia
Rest of Americas
Rest of Middle East
Africa
Other

ZOOM IN:



ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):



ZOOM BACK OUT:


Coronavirus Tracker
TOTAL
China
Korea, South
Italy
Iran
Rest of Europe
Total of Europe
Germany
Total of US
New York
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Reported Cases [Solid Lines]
10.00%
9.00%
8.00%
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Death Rate % of Reported Cases [Dashed Lines]
3/1
3/4
3/7
3/10
3/13
3/16
3/19
3/22
Time

ALL DATA:



See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N" latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

"Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates," said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. "That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data."

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. "Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk," said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

"I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses," said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. "And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts."

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

"Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future," said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. "In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats."

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

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"This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies," said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. "Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread."

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6





Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.



Snehal
203-434-3290

From: Eric Rothe (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 6:23 PM
To: snehal patel
Cc: Chopra, Ashok;David McWilliams
Subject: Re: Let's protect our ideas - need to file patent asap

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Ashok, I am putting together a presentation and I need your help. What is interesting about the following antigens candidates? If you have any literature citations that would be helpful.

- nsp3
- nsp8
- Ubl1-nsp3
- 3ecto-nsp3

Thanks,
Eric

Sent from my iPhone

On May 17, 2020, at 3:02 PM, snehal patel (b)(6) wrote:

Ashok, we need to make sure that we protect our ideas from your colleagues at UTMB. As they were connected to Wuhan Institute in setting up the institute, the Chinese communists are potentially targeting anyone at UTMB, especially those of Chinese orign, for bribery in exchange for medical research. See the cases this year, which is probably just scratching the surface. The Chinese have so much money and I bet that UTMB and any national laboratory is being heavily investigated by FBI right now.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2020 2:37 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Not seeing spikes in states opening up since May 1

The numbers in the tables in the email below are still holding up as the US44 states are still recovering well. And you don't see any spikes in the states that have rapidly opened up, such as TX, GA, FL, and CO (most recent graphs below).

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But what is spiking is the arrests of professors and researchers (7 out of 8 are of Chinese origin) at US universities - it is quite shocking and has probably been going on for decades (source is Dept of Justice).

#1 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related

Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases

The Department of Justice announced today that the Chair of Harvard University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department and two Chinese nationals have been charged in connection with aiding the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Charles Lieber, 60, Chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University, was arrested this morning and charged by criminal complaint with one count of making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement. Lieber will appear this afternoon before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler in federal court in Boston, Massachusetts.

Yanqing Ye, 29, a Chinese national, was charged in an indictment today with one count each of visa fraud, making false statements, acting as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy. Ye is currently in China.

Zaosong Zheng, 30, a Chinese national, was arrested on Dec. 10, 2019, at Boston's Logan International Airport and charged by criminal complaint with attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China. On Jan. 21, 2020, Zheng was indicted on one count of smuggling goods from the United States and one count of making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. He has been detained since Dec. 30, 2019.

#2 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-arkansas-professor-arrested-wire-fraud

University of Arkansas Professor Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, David Clay Fowlkes, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas, and FBI Special Agent in Charge Diane Upchurch of the FBI Little Rock Field Office announced today that Simon Saw-Teong Ang, 63, of Fayetteville, Arkansas, was arrested on Friday, May 8, 2020, on charges related to Wire Fraud. The complaint and complaint affidavit were unsealed this evening after Ang's initial appearance in court before The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks at the United States District Court in Fayetteville.

#3 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cleveland-clinic-employee-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-arrested-wire-fraud

Former Cleveland Clinic Employee and Chinese "Thousand Talents" Participant Arrested for Wire Fraud

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Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney Justin E. Herdman of the Northern District of Ohio, and FBI Cleveland Special Agent in Charge Eric B. Smith announced a former Cleveland Clinic employee was arrested yesterday without incident by law enforcement and had his initial court appearance today.

Dr. Qing Wang, a former Cleveland Clinic Foundation (CCF) employee, is charged with false claims and wire fraud related to more than $3.6 million in grant funding that Dr. Wang and his research group received from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

#4 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/former-emory-university-professor-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-convicted

Former Emory University professor and Chinese "Thousand Talents" participant convicted and sentenced for filing a false tax return

ATLANTA – Xiao-Jiang Li has pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with filing a false tax return and was sentenced by a U.S. District Judge on the same day. Dr. Li, a former Emory University professor and Chinese Thousand Talents Program participant, worked overseas at Chinese Universities and did not report any of his foreign income on his federal tax returns.

"This defendant thought that he could live two, separate lives—one here at Emory University and one in China as a Thousand Talents Program participant," said U.S. Attorney Byung J. "BJay" Pak. "Eventually, the truth caught up to this defendant, and he is now a convicted felon who is ordered to repay over $35,000 to the IRS."

#5 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-false-statements-about-affiliation

Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University

Anming Hu, a an Associate Professor in the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Biomedical Engineering at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) was arrested today on a federal indictment and charged with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of making false statements.

"Hu allegedly committed fraud by hiding his relationship with a Chinese university while receiving funding from NASA," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. "This is just the latest case involving professors or researchers concealing their affiliations with China from their American employers and the U.S. government. We will not tolerate it."

"The United States Attorney's Office takes seriously fraudulent conduct that is devised to undermine federally-mandated funding restrictions related to China and Chinese universities," said U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Overbey for the Eastern District of Tennessee. "The University of Tennessee has cooperated with the investigation, and the U.S. Attorney's Office values the university's assistance in this matter."

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<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	2,028	327.1	66,336
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212

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FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

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Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043975

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report. U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus,

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although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."
A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."
He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

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The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.
The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

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Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

y Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News

-
-

China's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

Funeral homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

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URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

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Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

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Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme

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conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.

<Outlook.jpg>

<Outlook.jpg>

ZOOM IN:

<Outlook.jpg>

ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):

<Outlook.jpg>

ZOOM BACK OUT:

<Outlook.jpg>

ALL DATA:

<Outlook.jpg>

See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level

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of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N" latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

"Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates," said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. "That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data."

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. "Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk," said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

"I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses," said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. "And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts."

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

"Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future," said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. "In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats."

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries

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worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

"This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies," said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. "Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread."

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

<Outlook.jpg>

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Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System UTSystem_043986

From: Shi, Pei yong
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 7:13 PM
To: Xie, Xuping
Subject: MS
Attachments: Nat Comn May 20 2020.docx; Submission Letter Mat 20 2020.docx

Potential reviewers:

David Wentworth, Chief of Virology Surveillance and Diagnosis Branch, CDC, gll9@cdc.gov
Paul Masters, Coronavirus expert, New York State Department of Health, paul.masters@health.ny.gov
Linfa Wang, EID program Director, Duke-NUS, linfa.wang@duke-nus.edu.sg
Michael Lo, CDC, mko2@cdc.gov
Zhengli Shi, coronavirus expert, Wuhan Institute of Virology, China, zlshi@wh.iov.cn

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From: achopra@UTMB.EDU
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 9:02 PM
To: Eric Rothe
Cc: snehal patel; David McWilliams
Subject: Re: Let's protect our ideas - need to file patent asap

Will send the info

Sent from my iPhone

On May 20, 2020, at 6:23 PM, Eric Rothe <(b)(6) wrote:

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Ashok, I am putting together a presentation and I need your help. What is interesting about the following antigens candidates? If you have any literature citations that would be helpful.

- nsp3
- nsp8
- Ubl1-nsp3
- 3ecto-nsp3

Thanks,
Eric

Sent from my iPhone

On May 17, 2020, at 3:02 PM, snehal patel <(b)(6) wrote:

Ashok, we need to make sure that we protect our ideas from your colleagues at UTMB. As they were connected to Wuhan Institute in setting up the institute, the Chinese communists are potentially targeting anyone at UTMB, especially those of Chinese orign, for bribery in exchange for medical research. See the cases this year, which is probably just scratching the surface. The Chinese have so much money and I bet that UTMB and any national laboratory is being heavily investigated by FBI right now.

Snehal
203-434-3290

FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by Univ of Texas System

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2020 2:37 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Not seeing spikes in states opening up since May 1

The numbers in the tables in the email below are still holding up as the US44 states are still recovering well. And you don't see any spikes in the states that have rapidly opened up, such as TX, GA, FL, and CO (most recent graphs below).

But what is spiking is the arrests of professors and researchers (7 out of 8 are of Chinese origin) at US universities - it is quite shocking and has probably been going on for decades (source is Dept of Justice).

#1 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related

Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases

The Department of Justice announced today that the Chair of Harvard University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department and two Chinese nationals have been charged in connection with aiding the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Charles Lieber, 60, Chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University, was arrested this morning and charged by criminal complaint with one count of making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement. Lieber will appear this afternoon before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler in federal court in Boston, Massachusetts.

Yanqing Ye, 29, a Chinese national, was charged in an indictment today with one count each of visa fraud, making false statements, acting as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy. Ye is currently in China.

Zaosong Zheng, 30, a Chinese national, was arrested on Dec. 10, 2019, at Boston's Logan International Airport and charged by criminal complaint with attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China. On Jan. 21, 2020, Zheng was indicted on one count of smuggling goods from the United States and one count of making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. He has been detained since Dec. 30, 2019.

#2 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-arkansas-professor-arrested-wire-fraud

University of Arkansas Professor Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, David Clay Fowlkes, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas,

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and FBI Special Agent in Charge Diane Upchurch of the FBI Little Rock Field Office announced today that Simon Saw-Teong Ang, 63, of Fayetteville, Arkansas, was arrested on Friday, May 8, 2020, on charges related to Wire Fraud. The complaint and complaint affidavit were unsealed this evening after Ang's initial appearance in court before The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks at the United States District Court in Fayetteville.

#3 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cleveland-clinic-employee-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-arrested-wire-fraud

Former Cleveland Clinic Employee and Chinese "Thousand Talents" Participant Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney Justin E. Herdman of the Northern District of Ohio, and FBI Cleveland Special Agent in Charge Eric B. Smith announced a former Cleveland Clinic employee was arrested yesterday without incident by law enforcement and had his initial court appearance today.

Dr. Qing Wang, a former Cleveland Clinic Foundation (CCF) employee, is charged with false claims and wire fraud related to more than $3.6 million in grant funding that Dr. Wang and his research group received from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

#4 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/former-emory-university-professor-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-convicted

Former Emory University professor and Chinese "Thousand Talents" participant convicted and sentenced for filing a false tax return

ATLANTA – Xiao-Jiang Li has pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with filing a false tax return and was sentenced by a U.S. District Judge on the same day. Dr. Li, a former Emory University professor and Chinese Thousand Talents Program participant, worked overseas at Chinese Universities and did not report any of his foreign income on his federal tax returns.

"This defendant thought that he could live two, separate lives—one here at Emory University and one in China as a Thousand Talents Program participant," said U.S. Attorney Byung J. "BJay" Pak. "Eventually, the truth caught up to this defendant, and he is now a convicted felon who is ordered to repay over $35,000 to the IRS."

#5 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-false-statements-about-affiliation

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Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University

Anming Hu, a an Associate Professor in the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Biomedical Engineering at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) was arrested today on a federal indictment and charged with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of making false statements.

"Hu allegedly committed fraud by hiding his relationship with a Chinese university while receiving funding from NASA," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. "This is just the latest case involving professors or researchers concealing their affiliations with China from their American employers and the U.S. government. We will not tolerate it."

"The United States Attorney's Office takes seriously fraudulent conduct that is devised to undermine federally-mandated funding restrictions related to China and Chinese universities," said U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Overbey for the Eastern District of Tennessee. "The University of Tennessee has cooperated with the investigation, and the U.S. Attorney's Office values the university's assistance in this matter."

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

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If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	**2,028**	**327.1**	**66,336**
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209

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Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512
If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

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1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.
4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

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State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative

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view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."
He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston**

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National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.

The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

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Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

y Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News

-
-

China's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

Funeral homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

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URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There

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have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist

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country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is

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also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.

<Outlook.jpg>

<Outlook.jpg>

ZOOM IN:

<Outlook.jpg>

ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):

<Outlook.jpg>

ZOOM BACK OUT:

<Outlook.jpg>

ALL DATA:

<Outlook.jpg>

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See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N" latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

"Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates," said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. "That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data."

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. "Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk," said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help

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provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

"I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses," said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. "And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts."

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

"Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future," said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. "In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats."

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

"This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies," said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. "Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread."

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Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

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Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

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From: Chopra, Ashok [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E16F3C1CA8C7450E971E6DD6172D8273-CHOPRA, ASH]
Sent: 5/20/2020 9:02:31 PM
To: Eric Rothe (b)(6)
CC: snehal patel (b)(6); David McWilliams (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Let's protect our ideas - need to file patent asap

Will send the info

Sent from my iPhone

On May 20, 2020, at 6:23 PM, Eric Rothe (b)(6) wrote:

WARNING: This email originated from outside of UTMB's email system. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Ashok, I am putting together a presentation and I need your help. What is interesting about the following antigens candidates? If you have any literature citations that would be helpful.

- nsp3
- nsp8
- Ubl1-nsp3
- 3ecto-nsp3

Thanks,
Eric

Sent from my iPhone

On May 17, 2020, at 3:02 PM, snehal patel (b)(6) wrote:

Ashok, we need to make sure that we protect our ideas from your colleagues at UTMB. As they were connected to Wuhan Institute in setting up the institute, the Chinese communists are potentially targeting anyone at UTMB, especially those of Chinese orign, for bribery in exchange for medical research. See the cases this year, which is probably just scratching the surface. The Chinese have so much money and I bet that UTMB and any national laboratory is being heavily investigated by FBI right now.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2020 2:37 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Not seeing spikes in states opening up since May 1

The numbers in the tables in the email below are still holding up as the US44 states are still recovering well. And you don't see any spikes in the states that have rapidly opened up, such as TX, GA, FL, and CO (most recent graphs below).

But what is spiking is the arrests of professors and researchers (7 out of 8 are of Chinese origin) at US universities - it is quite shocking and has probably been going on for decades (source is Dept of Justice).

#1 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related

Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases

The Department of Justice announced today that the Chair of Harvard University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department and two Chinese nationals have been charged in connection with aiding the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Charles Lieber, 60, Chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University, was arrested this morning and charged by criminal complaint with one count of making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement. Lieber will appear this afternoon before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler in federal court in Boston, Massachusetts.

Yanqing Ye, 29, a Chinese national, was charged in an indictment today with one count each of visa fraud, making false statements, acting as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy. Ye is currently in China.

Zaosong Zheng, 30, a Chinese national, was arrested on Dec. 10, 2019, at Boston's Logan International Airport and charged by criminal complaint with attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China. On Jan. 21, 2020, Zheng was indicted on one count of smuggling goods from the United States and one count of making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. He has been detained since Dec. 30, 2019.

#2 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-arkansas-professor-arrested-wire-fraud

University of Arkansas Professor Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, David Clay Fowlkes, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas, and FBI Special Agent in Charge Diane Upchurch of the FBI Little Rock Field Office announced today that Simon Saw-Teong Ang, 63, of Fayetteville, Arkansas, was arrested on Friday, May 8, 2020, on charges related to Wire Fraud. The complaint and complaint affidavit were unsealed this evening after Ang's initial appearance in court before The

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Honorable Timothy L. Brooks at the United States District Court in Fayetteville.

#3 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cleveland-clinic-employee-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-arrested-wire-fraud

Former Cleveland Clinic Employee and Chinese "Thousand Talents" Participant Arrested for Wire Fraud

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney Justin E. Herdman of the Northern District of Ohio, and FBI Cleveland Special Agent in Charge Eric B. Smith announced a former Cleveland Clinic employee was arrested yesterday without incident by law enforcement and had his initial court appearance today.

Dr. Qing Wang, a former Cleveland Clinic Foundation (CCF) employee, is charged with false claims and wire fraud related to more than $3.6 million in grant funding that Dr. Wang and his research group received from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

#4 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/former-emory-university-professor-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-convicted

Former Emory University professor and Chinese "Thousand Talents" participant convicted and sentenced for filing a false tax return

ATLANTA – Xiao-Jiang Li has pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with filing a false tax return and was sentenced by a U.S. District Judge on the same day. Dr. Li, a former Emory University professor and Chinese Thousand Talents Program participant, worked overseas at Chinese Universities and did not report any of his foreign income on his federal tax returns.

"This defendant thought that he could live two, separate lives—one here at Emory University and one in China as a Thousand Talents Program participant," said U.S. Attorney Byung J. "BJay" Pak. "Eventually, the truth caught up to this defendant, and he is now a convicted felon who is ordered to repay over $35,000 to the IRS."

#5 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-false-statements-about-affiliation

Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University

Anming Hu, a an Associate Professor in the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Biomedical Engineering at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) was arrested today on a federal indictment and charged with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of making false statements.

"Hu allegedly committed fraud by hiding his relationship with a Chinese university while receiving funding from NASA," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. "This is just the latest case involving professors or researchers concealing their affiliations with China from their American employers and the U.S. government. We will not tolerate it."

"The United States Attorney's Office takes seriously fraudulent conduct that is devised to undermine federally-mandated funding restrictions related to China and Chinese universities," said U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Overbey for the Eastern District of Tennessee. "The University of Tennessee has cooperated with the investigation, and the U.S. Attorney's Office values the university's assistance in this matter."

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 10:33 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: New website for CV tracking

I have pasted below a website (made by 1st generation Chinese Americans/Canadians?) that I was shown that analyzes so much more that the Johns Hopkins website, but it relies heavily on the JHU data.

https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/en/world

Death per Capita:

I have been trying to find a website that tracks death per capita by country and state, as using the number of reported coronavirus cases is not reliable in any calculation as the diagnostics are different by country and state. They even normalize the timelines so you can impose one countries curves on top of the anothers, just like I tried to do in the first email below with China and the US.

If you scroll down to the middle of the website on the World tab you will see the death/10M population by country (column 9, with charts if you click on column 10) and if you click in the box they break it down by state/region. So you can track whatever you want by country or state as the economy is reopened.

For example, I have pulled the following data from the website. The US (at 2,028 deaths/10M population) is doing remarkably well with only Germany (821) doing better versus major western countries (non-Asian), but if you exclude our 6 states that had bad luck and/or did not manage/prepare well enough, the US-44 (774) are equal to or lower than Germany. US is even doing better than Sweden (2,620) , which went more to the opposite extreme on mandatory stay at home orders. Sweden is much worse than Norway (397), which did lock down.

Death/10 million population today:

	Deaths / 10M	Population ($m)	Deaths
US	**2,028**	**327.1**	**66,336**
TX	302	29.0	876
CA	560	39.5	2,212
FL	642	21.5	1,380
GA	1,111	10.6	1,178
NY	12,701	19.5	24,767
NJ	8,861	8.9	7,886
CT	6,832	3.6	2,460
MI	4,059	10.0	4,059
LA	4,328	4.6	1,991
MA	5,809	6.9	4,008
US-44 states, exlcuding NY-NJ-CT-MI-LA-MA (my calculation) =	774	273.6	21,165
World	**321**	**7,594.2**	**243,774**
Sweden	2,620	10.2	2,672
Denmark	819	5.8	475
Norway	397	5.3	210
Germany	821	82.9	6,806
Italy	4,750	60.4	28,690
France	3,696	67.0	24,756
Spain	5,372	46.7	25,087
UK	4,242	66.5	28,209
Skorea	48	51.6	248
Japan	37	126.5	468
China	33	1,392.7	4,596
Hubei (Province around Wuhan)	771	58.5	4,512

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If all deaths in Hubei are in Wuhan	4,065	11.1	4,512
Wuhan (my estimate based on urns)	37,838	11.1	42,000
China (my estimate)	3,000	1,392.7	417,810

China:

How could only 9 people die in Beijing and 7 people die in Shanghai. If China's death per 10M capita is more like 3,000, then they had 400,000 deaths and not just 4,500 deaths.

https://www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-residents-say-chinese-government-coronavirus-death-toll-is-low-2020-3 *According to RFA, some city residents said on social media that Wuhan's funeral homes were "handing out 3,500 urns every day." RFA's reporting, which could not be independently verified by Insider, said at the current rate, about "42,000 urns would be given out" between March 23 and April 5, when a traditional grave-tending festival begins.*

Wuhan's population is 11m, thus Wuhan's death per 10M capita could be 38,000.

Texas:

Here is the way to track your state death rate as the state is opened up, using column 10. This is the information for Texas:

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:52 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: How to decontaminate.....

From White House today:

1. Isopropyl alcohol kills in 30 seconds.
2. Bleach kills in 5 minutes.
3. Sun kills very quickly - see table below and column 4 (rows 4 & 6). Half life is the time to kill half of the virus, so more time is needed to kill all of it. It might be that putting all packages and groceries in the sun for an hour or less might work very well- but all sides would need to be exposed to the UV rays.

4. They are still doing more experiments, such that higher humidity and UV from sunlight may work even better.

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Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:23 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: Chinese conspiracies....

For some light reading today: **See attached paper for theory on origin of Virus. The Chinese researcher's email is there if you want to contact him, unless he has disappeared. Which is supported by article below.** Note UTMB, Galveston was trying to help the sloppy Wuhan research institue. **See second article below which shows that cremation urns show that more died in Wuhan than reported, and thus many more died throughout China.**

State Department leaked cables renew theories on origin of coronavirus

US sounded alarm on Wuhan lab studying coronavirus two years ago, report says

State Department cables obtained by The Washington Post warned about the safety and security of coronavirus testing on bats in China in 2018; Gillian Turner reports.

A Chinese laboratory at the center of new theories about how the coronavirus pandemic started was the subject of multiple urgent warnings inside the U.S. State Department two years ago, according to a new report.

U.S. Embassy officials warned in January 2018 about inadequate safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab and passed on information about scientists conducting risky research on coronavirus from bats, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

IF CHINA ACTED EARLIER, CORONAVIRUS CASES COULD HAVE BEEN CUT BY AS MUCH AS 95 PERCENT, FDA CHIEF

Those cables have renewed speculation inside the U.S. government about whether Wuhan-based labs were the source of the novel coronavirus, although no firm connection has been established. The theory, however, has gained traction in recent days.

The United Kingdom has said that the idea that the virus, which has turned into a full-blown global pandemic, was leaked from a Wuhan lab is "no longer being discounted."

A member of the U.K. government's emergency committee of senior officials claimed Sunday: "There is a credible alternative view (to the zoonotic theory) based on the nature of the virus. Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is a laboratory in Wuhan."

Foreign affairs expert Gordon Chang said in a recent opinion piece on Fox News that "many Chinese believe the virus either was deliberately released or accidentally escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a P4-level bio-safety facility."

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He added: "This lab, known for studying coronaviruses, is not far from the market that had been initially identified as the source of the outbreak."

In a series of diplomatic cables labeled "Sensitive But Unclassified," U.S. Embassy officials warned that the lab had massive management weaknesses, posed severe health risks and warned Washington to get involved.

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS

The first cable, which was obtained by the Post, also sent red flags about the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and more specifically how their potential human transmission represented the risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the Jan.19, 2018 cable, written by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists, said.

The cable argued that the United States should give Chinese researchers at the Wuhan lab more support because its research on bat coronaviruses was important and dangerous. **The lab had already been receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch.**

AUSTRALIA'S PM SAYS IT'S 'UNFATHOMABLE' THAT WHO SUPPORTS REOPENING OF WET MARKETS

The cable also called attention to Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who in November 2017 published a paper that showed the horseshoe bats collected from a case in Yunnan

province were most likely from the same bat population that had been behind the first SARS coronavirus in 2003.
The cable states that "the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

Despite evidence that points to dangerous practices inside the Wuhan labs, top U.S. military brass, as well as other senior officials, have told Fox News that the origins of COVID-19 did not come from a laboratory nor was it the result of a bioweapon.

"And if I could just be clear, there is nothing to that," Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Friedrichs told Fox News last week. "Someone asked me if I was worried. That is not something that I'm worried about. I think, you know, right now what we're concerned about is how do we treat people who are sick, how do we prevent people from getting sick. But no, I am not worried about this as a bioweapon."

Still, there are others who have been trying to trace the origin of the novel coronavirus back to the Wuhan lab.

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Wuhan residents say coronavirus figures released by China don't add up

by Barnini Chakraborty | Fox News

China's COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan seems false to locals

Funeral homes that serve Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. However, residents say those numbers put the 2,500 death toll the Chinese government has claimed into question.

Chinese officials, desperate to recast the country as a global leader that has conquered the coronavirus, have been saying that its death rates are decreasing in the city of Wuhan. The problem, residents say, is that the numbers don't add up.

Wuhan, the first epicenter of the global outbreak, began lifting its two-month lockdown over the weekend. The city in Central China restarted some subway service, reopened its borders and allowed families to reunite.

People wearing face masks wait for a subway train on the first day the city's subway services resumed following the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Wuhan of Hubei province, on March 28, 2020. REUTERS/Aly Song

The move is part of Beijing's choreographed campaign to mark a turning point in China's fight against the deadly virus, which has spread around much of the world and has infected over 732,000 people as of Monday morning. Of those, 34,686 people have died.

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URN DELIVERIES IN WUHAN RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACTUAL CORONAVIRUS DEATH TOLL

Despite China's propaganda pushers being all smiles for the international community, residents told Radio Free Asia that Beijing's claims that there were only 2,500 deaths in Wuhan is far from reality.

For more than a week, seven large funeral homes that serve Wuhan have been handing out the cremated remains of about 500 people to their families every day. When added, the figure puts the official number the Chinese government has claimed into question.

"It can't be right ... because the incinerators have been working round the clock, so how can so few people have died," said Zhang, a Wuhan resident who only gave Radio Free Asia his last name. "They started distributing ashes and starting interment ceremonies on Monday."

Wuhan accounts for about 60 percent of China's coronavirus cases, but the numbers the government has been putting out has fallen sharply in weeks, a sign, the government says, that its aggressive measures are working.

Social media users aren't buying it and have taken the country to task, doing basic math and finding faulty figures in the government's reporting.

The news website Caixin.com reported that 5,000 urns had been delivered by a supplier to the Hankou Funeral Home in one day. That's double the number of deaths Xi's officials claimed. There

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have also been social media posts that have claimed all seven of Wuhan's funeral homes have handed out 3,500 urns every day.

In this March 23, 2020 photo released by Xinhua News Agency, workers disinfect a subway train in preparation for the restoration of public transport in Wuhan, in central China's Hubei province. China's health ministry says Wuhan has now gone several consecutive days without a new infection, showing the effectiveness of draconian travel restrictions that are slowly being relaxed around the country. (Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP)

Radio Free Asia reported that funeral homes told families who have lost loved ones to COVID-19 that they will try to "complete cremations before the traditional grave-tending festival of Qing Ming on April 5, which would indicate a 12-day process beginning on Mach 23. Such an estimate would mean that 42,000 urns would be given out during that time."

Another online estimate is based on the cremation capacity of funeral homes in Wuhan, which runs 84 furnaces with a capacity over a 24-hour period of 1,560 urns. That estimate puts the number of estimated deaths in Wuhan at 46,800.

Another resident of the Hubei province – where Wuhan is the capital – told RFA that the majority of people there believe more than 40,000 people died before and during the lockdown. That's tens of thousands more than the government has claimed.

"Maybe the authorities are gradually releasing the real figures, intentionally or unintentionally, so that people will gradually come to accept the reality," the resident, who only gave his last name as Mao, said.

One source close to the civil affairs bureau told RFA that the true number of deaths was a sensitive subject in the communist country and that authorities probably know the real number but are keeping it under wraps.

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There have also been claims of city officials paying off families in exchange for their silence.

"There have been a lot of funerals in the past few days, and the authorities are handing out 3,000 yuan in hush money to families who get their loved ones remains laid to rest ahead of Qing Ming," Wuhan resident Chen Yaohui said. "It's to stop them keeing (a traditional expression of grief); nobody's allowed to keen after [the festival] Qing Ming has passed."

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP

Chen told the news outlet that no one in Wuhan believes the official death toll is 2,500.

"Before the epidemic began, the city's crematoriums typically cremated around 220 people a day," he said, adding that during the epidemic, the government transferred cremation workers from around China to Wuhan to cremate bodies around the clock.

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:06 AM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

I have some updated information on Coronavirus in case you are interested.

1. My tracking in the email below was not possible as EU became a hot spot and drowned out the US data in the ROW reported cases curves. Now the ramp up of testing in the US is also driving the total numbers, and is driving down the US death rate. It is very hard to compare countries to each other.

2. In the Johns Hopkins link, they went back to reporting by county so you can see your local county now. I asked them for the raw data, but

they never responded, but I did find a way to download the data so that one could sort the data and not lump the whole world together, which is not very informative in my opinion.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

3. See chart pasted below which I created from reported cases (solid lines) and death rates (dashed lines) by country that can now be updated using the JHU data when desired. The total ties to the JHU website as of 3/22, off by one day.

4. See article below about temperature and humidity sensitivity and potential for the virus to track latitudes going northward as temperatures rise and the colder climates start to warm up (like Northeast of US). If high temp and low or high humidity is best, maybe one could try to run the home HVAC accordingly. I tried to cool my house from 74 to 70, which dries the air via the condenser, and then I heated my house to 80. It was nearly impossible to bear the 2 extreme conditions for long periods of time, but one might be able to do so if they changed their clothing.

<Outlook.jpg>

<Outlook.jpg>

ZOOM IN:

<Outlook.jpg>

ADD DEATH RATES, BY DIVIDING DEATHS BY REPORTED CASES (dashed lines and right side axis):

<Outlook.jpg>

ZOOM BACK OUT:

<Outlook.jpg>

ALL DATA:

<Outlook.jpg>

See 3 highlights in red - temperature and humidity suggest that the virus is temperature sensitive and for those areas still warming up from freezing, the virus will do well, and those areas warm now, above 54 F, the virus will not do so well.

Weather to Play Major Role in Coronavirus Spread

03.16.20

Researchers predict potential spread and seasonality for COVID-19 based on climate where virus appears to thrive

Researchers at the University of Maryland School of Medicine's Institute of Human Virology (IHV), which is part of the Global Virus Network (GVN), predict that COVID-19 will follow a seasonal pattern similar to other respiratory viruses like seasonal flu. They base this on weather modeling data in countries where the virus has taken hold and spread within the community.

In a new paper published on the open-data site SSRN, the researchers found that all cities experiencing significant outbreaks of COVID-19 have very similar winter climates with an average temperature of 41 to 52 degrees Fahrenheit, an average humidity level of 47 to 79 percent with a narrow east-west distribution along the same 30-50 N" latitude. This includes Wuhan, China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Northern Italy, Seattle, and Northern California. It could also spell increasing trouble for the Mid-Atlantic States and—as temperatures rise—New England.

"Based on what we have documented so far, it appears that the virus has a harder time spreading between people in warmer, tropical climates," said study leader Mohammad Sajadi, MD, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Insitute of Human Virology at the UMSOM and a member of GVN. "That suggests once average temperatures rise above 54 degrees Fahrenheit (12 degrees Celsius) and higher, the virus may be harder to transmit, but this is still a hypothesis that requires more data."

The team based its predictions on weather data from the previous few months as well as typical patterns from last year to hypothesize on community spread within the next few weeks. "Using 2019 temperature data for March and April, risk of community spread could be predicted to occur in areas just north of the current areas at risk," said study co-author Augustin Vintzileos, Assistant Research Scientist in the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland, College Park. He plans to do further modeling of current weather data to help provide more certainty to the predictions.

Researchers from Shiraz University of Medical Sciences in Shiraz, Iran, and Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran, Iran also participated in this study.

"I think what is important is this is a testable hypotheses," said study co-author Anthony Amoroso, MD, UMSOM Associate Professor of Medicine

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and Associate Chief of Infectious Diseases who is also Chief of Clinical Care Programs for IHV. "And if it holds true, could be very helpful for health system preparation, surveillance and containment efforts."

In areas where the virus has already spread within the community, like Wuhan, Milan, and Tokyo, temperatures did not dip below the freezing mark, the researchers pointed out. They also based their predictions on a study of the novel coronavirus in the laboratory, which found that a temperature of 39 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity level of 20 to 80 percent is most conducive to the virus's survival.

"Through this extensive research, it has been determined that weather modeling could potentially explain the spread of COVID-19, making it possible to predict the regions that are most likely to be at higher risk of significant community spread in the near future," said Robert C. Gallo, Co-founder & Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and Co-Founder and Chairman of the International Scientific Leadership Board of the GVN. Dr. Gallo is also The Homer & Martha Gudelsky Distinguished Professor in Medicine and Director, Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, a GVN Center of Excellence. "In addition to climate variables, there are multiple factors to be considered when dealing with a pandemic, such as human population densities, human factors, viral genetic evolution and pathogenesis. This work illustrates how collaborative research can contribute to understanding, mitigating and preventing infectious threats."

Dr. Gallo is a co-founder of the Global Virus Network, which is a consortium of leading virologists spanning 53 Centers of Excellence and nine Affiliates in 32 countries worldwide, working collaboratively to train the next generation, advance knowledge about how to identify and diagnose pandemic viruses, mitigate and control how such viruses spread and make us sick, as well as develop drugs, vaccines and treatments to combat them. The Network has been meeting regularly to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic sharing their expertise in all viral areas and their research findings.

"This study raises some provocative theories that, if correct, could be useful in helping to direct public health strategies," said UMSOM Dean E. Albert Reece, MD, PhD, MBA, who is also University Executive Vice President for Medical Affairs and the John Z. and Akiko K. Bowers Distinguished Professor. "Perhaps we should be conducting heightened surveillance and expending more resources into areas that currently have the climate that is conducive to community virus spread."

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2020 4:23 PM
Subject: FW: Corona projections

Below is some data that I have been playing around with with my colleagues as we compare the Wuhan severe cases versus severe cases everywhere else (Rest of World, ROW). The rate of new reported cases is remarkably similar. The White House task force also stated that Korean and Wuhan curves are similar. We are looking for these curves to flatten, like they did in China. It is not clear, because of how out of control the virus is in open border Europe and Iran, if ROW will start to flatten soon, but at some point we will reach an inflection point where the rate of new cases will peak and the curves will start to flatten. The Chinese curve suggests that ROW will start to flatten soon.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 8:42 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Tracking of Rest of World curve in yellow is updated for the last 4 days in pink dots versus the super imposed Chinese curve in orange. It is possible, but still need more days to know, that we have already started to see a reduction in new cases per day.

2nd plot is today's data from website.
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:10 PM
To: 'snehal patel'
Subject: RE: Corona projections

Spiked to 7000 new cases today. Prior days it was about 4k per day.

Still tracking well with Chinese curve, projection is 7000 cases per day for the next 3-4 peak days, after which new cases slowed down dramatically, and prior days were also 4k per day in China.

Snehal
203-434-3290

From: snehal patel (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 6:34 PM
Subject: Corona projections

FYI, see below my projected curves for when we may see a decline in infection rates in the US (before April) and return to some normalcy for our planned IPO. Each dot is 1 day.

I have superimposed the orange Chinese infection curve (orange) on the Rest of the World curve (yellow). Assuming that similar precautions are taken globally, we could see peak infection rates in the next 2 weeks, with a noticeable decrease in infection rates mid to late next week.

I feel justified in superimposing because the growth rate in going from 5000 to 37,000 patients in both China and ROW is the same, exactly 13 days. The world governments and human behavior are probably reacting in a similar way to the Chinese government and population, other than the Chinese may have been more controlling, but they were also more incompetent, had less notice, and used very poor hygeine at the start.

<Outlook.jpg>

Snehal
203-434-3290

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Binding of tick-borne encephalitis virus to GLP2R in multiple nerve cells

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Tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) is an emerging viral disease of the central nervous system. TBE virus (TBEV) infection, encompassing a wide spectrum of diseases ranging from asymptomatic to full-blown encephalitis and even death (1, 2). The host factors required for TBEV entry remain unknown (3). Here we use a genome-scale CRISPR-Cas9 knockout screening to identify the G-protein-coupled receptor GLP2R as an entry mediator for TBEV. Knockdown or knockout of GLP2R reduced levels of viral infection of nerve cells and, reciprocally, trans-complementation of GLP2R in knockout cells restored infectivity. GLP2R via the extracellular loop 1 (ECL1) domain bound directly to the receptor binding domain

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(the DIII domain) of TBEV E protein (4) and mediated virus attachment and internalization into human brain-derived cell lines and primary progenitor-derived astrocytes. Consistently, both anti-GLP2R antibodies and TBEV neutralization 19/1786 mAbs inhibited TBEV infection. Also, GLP2R ligand H33D peptide or the ECL1 domain peptide blocked TBEV infection. Finally, GLP2R-deficient mice reduced TBEV infection as well as associated neuropathogenesis. This study shows that GLP2R mediates, at least in part, viral particle adherence to nerve cells for TBEV entry and illuminates novel host targets for antiviral therapy.

To comprehensively identify host factors with critical roles in the TBEV life cycles, we performed a genome-wide screen using the CRISPR-Cas9 system (5, 6) and lentiviruses delivering single-guide RNAs (sgRNA) targeting 19,050 human genes (Extended Data Fig 1a-d). We first infected lentivirus-transduced human glioma cell T98G with TBEV Far Eastern subtype (TBEV-FE, strain WH2012) (REF). Most cells died after TBEV infection at 48 h and a few cells survived, which were propagated for 39 d. Then, genomic DNA was extracted, sgRNAs were amplified by PCR and sequenced. We identified the top candidate was glucagon-like peptide-2 receptor (GLP-2R) that statistically were enriched using MAGeCK (7) (Supplementary Excel 1 and Extended Data Fig 1e-f). GO function analysis showed that the surviving genes function in the cell-matrix adhesion, membrane and vesicle, as well as a variety of cell proliferation process of relevance for virus infection (Extended Data Fig 2a–c and Supplementary Data Excel 2-4).

GLP2R, a G protein-coupled receptor superfamily member (Extended Data Fig 9 a, b), expressed in the central nervous system and enteric neurons (8-10) and shares homology with 'Glucagon, glucagon-like peptide and secretin' family of 7 trans-membrane receptors (11). We first validated GLP2R using three different small interfering RNA (siRNA) in two human glioma cells T98G and U251 (Extended Data Fig 3). Knockdown of GLP2R impaired infection of both TBEV-FE and TBEV European subtype (TBEV-Eu, strain Neudoerfl) in either T98G or U251 (Extended Data Fig. 3). We further conformed GLP2R function with four different sgRNAs by generating *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ single-cell clones in T98G and U251 cells and by conforming gene expression and cell viability (Extended Data Fig 4a-c, Fig 5a, e). Infection of TBEV-EF and TBEV-

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Eu were reduced in *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ cells compared to control cells (Fig 1a-d, Extended Data Fig 5) and trans-complementation of GLP2R in *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ cells restored infectivity (Fig 1c, d). To confirm that TBEV required GLP2R independently of other receptors of glucagon, glucagon-like peptide and secretin family, such as glucagon-like peptide-1 receptor (GLP1R), glucagon receptor (GL-R), secretin receptor (SCTR) and glucose-dependent insulinotropic polypeptide receptor (GIP-R), we detected their expression and tested for effects on TBEV infection. Only SCTR had low level expression in T98G cells and knockdown of SCTR had no effect on TBEV infection (Extended Data Fig 6a-c). We tested the requirement of GLP2R for infection by other neurotropic viruses. Knockout of GLP2R did not affect replication of Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV), Zika virus (ZIKV), Vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV), Human cytomegalovirus (HCMV) and Herpes simplex virus (HSV) in T98G cells (Fig 1e), indicating that GLP2R is not involved in these viruses' infection.

We further analyzed the function of GLP2R in other different cells. Besides human glioma cell T98G and U251, knockdown of GLP2R also reduced TBEV infection in human neuroblastoma cell SK-N-SH and human astrocyte CCF-STTG1 as well as the human progenitor derived astrocytes (HPDAs) (Extended Data Fig 7a-c). However, there were very low level or no transcription of GLP2R in BHK-21, Vero-E6 and Caco-2, TBEV permissive no nerve cells, and knockdown of GLP2R in these cell lines did not affect TBEV replication (Extended Data Fig 7d-f). On the other hand, ectopic expression of GLP2R in Vero-E6 cells enhanced TBEV infectivity (Fig 1f). Similarly, overexpression of GLP2R in U251 cells with low expression of GLP2R resulted in greater TBEV infection (Fig 1f).

We further analyzed at which step of TBEV replication cycle GLP2 is involved in. First we transfected TBEV genomic RNA into the control and *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ T98G cells. There was no difference in both TBEV RNA and NS1 protein levels. Thus，GLP2R does not appear to affect TBEV replication (Fig 2a). GLP2R is a cytoplasmic membrane protein receptor (11) and might be involved in TBEV entry, virus binding assays demonstrated knockout of GLP2R significantly reduced TBEV binding to T98G cells, and overexpression of GLP2R increased TBEV binding to cells (Fig 2b). When virus internalization assays were performed, less TBEV RNA was measured within *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$

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T98G cells, and more TBEV RNA was detected in cells overexpressing GLP2R (Fig. 2c). Consistent with a role for GLP2R in the entry pathway, pre-treatment of T98G cells with 19/1786 mAbs, a neutralizing antibody against TBEV E protein (REF), and anti-GLP2R mAbs reduced TBEV infection (Fig 2d). Treatment T98G cells with H33D, GLP2R ligand, but not the D31D, which misses 2 aa at the N-terminus of H33D with no binding capacity to GLP2R (13), reduced TBEV infection in T98G cells (Fig 2e-g). Thus, GLP2R is involved in TBEV entry. TBEV infection downregulated the levels of GLP2R mRNA and protein (Fig 2f). It appears to prevent further rounds of infection and cell death.

To determine whether GLP2R directly binds to TBEV E protein, we performed co-immunoprecipitation (co-IP). The results showed the association of E and human GLP2R or mouse GLP2R (Fig 3a, b). We next generated GLP2R or E deletions to characterize subdomains responsible for the interaction (Extended Data Fig 8c, d). Domain mapping analysis indicated that GLP2R extracellular loop 1 (ECL1) was associated with E DIII (Extended Data Fig 9a, b, d). Pre-incubation of TBEV with Y41L peptide (synthetic peptide based on ECL sequence) reduced TBEV infection in T98G cells (Extended Data Fig 9g).

To establish the importance of the GLP2R ECL1, we designed the constructs for replacement of ECL1 using a linker Gly-Ser-Gly (GSG) based on the sequence alignment of GLP2R (Extended Data Fig 10 a, b). The GLP2R mutant 239GSG254 lost the interaction with TBEV E protein even still located in cytoplasmic membrane (Fig 3b, c and Extended Data Fig 9e). In line with these findings, pre-incubation virus with Y16S peptide (synthetic peptide based on fragment Y239-S254 sequence in ECL1) reduced TBEV infection in T98G cells (Fig 3d). The ECD domain was not involved in the interaction; accordingly, GLP2R-ΔECD restored TBEV infection in a complementary assay (Extended Data Fig 9f).

To evaluate the physiological importance of GLP2R interaction with TBEV, we administered *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ mice with TBEV via an intraperitoneal route and found that the mortality of these *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ mice was lower than that of WT mice (Fig 4a). TBEV titers and RNA levels in various organs were also significantly lower in *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ mice than in WT mice (Fig 4b, c), and there was more infiltration of inflammatory cells into the brains

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of WT mice than in *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ mice (Fig. 4d). Consistent with these findings, *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ mice produced much less TBEV titers and RNA levels in serum than WT mice (Fig 4e). These data suggested that mouse GLP2R contributes to TBEV infection and is required for neuropathogenesis diseases.

Our mutagenesis mapping studies suggest that amino acids in the ECL1 contribute to the interaction of TBEV E with GLP2R. The interaction with the ECL1 may facilitate E conformational changes that are required for internalization or fusion or potentiate interactions with other host factors that bridge membrane penetration and entry (Fig 5). These studies could promote the development of small molecules or biological agents that disrupt GLP2R interaction with E protein, which could form the basis of therapeutic strategies for the improvement of neuropathogenesis diseases caused by TBEV.

Acknowledgements

We thank the National Virus Resource Center (NVRC, China) for provision of TBEV Far-Eastern subtype strain WH2012. We thank Professor F. X. Heinz for providing the infectious cDNA clones of TBEV European subtype prototypic strain Neudoerfl. We thank Professor P. Y Shi for constructive scientific discussions and valuable comments. We thank Professor J. K. Chen for providing the help for CRISPR–Cas9 screening data analysis. We thank Professor Z. H. Zheng for providing the TBEV subgenomic replicon. We acknowledge the Core Facility Center of Wuhan Institute of Virology for continuous and generous support. We also thank L. Zhang and J. Min for excellent technical support. This work was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation of China (),

Author contributions

Q. Yang and R. J. Pei performed CRISPR–Cas9 screening. Q. Yang designed the concept of the project, carried out the majority of the experiments, interpreted the results and wrote the manuscript. J. Z. Chen performed mouse experiments. J. K. Chen and J. Q. Kuang performed CRISPR–Cas9 screening data analysis. J. You performed mapping experiments. Y. Zhou provided reagents and advice for the experiments. Y. Wang contributed to the critical discussions. X. W. Chen and P. Y Shi contributed to the concept of the study, interpretation of the results and manuscript writing, supervised the project.

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Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Methods

Cell lines and virus strains. BHK-21 (a baby hamster kidney cell line, CCL-10), Vero-E6 (an african green monkey kidney cell line, CRL-1586), U251 (a human glioblastoma cell line, CM-1925), U-87 MG (a human glioblastoma cell line, HTB-14), and Caco-2 (a human colorectal adenocarcinoma cell line, HTB-37) cells were purchased from ATCC and cultured in Dulbecco's modified Eagle Medium (EMEM, HyClone). SK-N-SH (a human neuroblastoma cell line, HTB-11) and T98G (a human glioblastoma cell line, CRL-1690) cells were purchased from ATCC and cultured in Minimum Essential Medium (MEM, Gibco). CCF-STTG1 (a human astrocytoma cell line, CRL-1718) was grown in RPMI 1640 medium. All media were supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum except that the Caco-2 cells was used with 20% fetal bovine serum, 2 mM L-glutamine, 100 U ml^{-1} penicillin and 100 μg ml^{-1} streptomycin (Life Technologies, NY), and maintained at 37 °C in a fully humidified atmosphere containing 5% CO_2. The human primary astrocytes were purchased from ScienCell Research Laboratories and maintained on poly-lysine (Sigma-Aldrich)-coated plates in astrocyte medium serum-free medium. All experiments with WT and GLP2R knockout cell lines were performed within 20 cell passages. All cells were regularly tested for mycoplasma contamination and authenticated by visual observations of cell morphology.

TBEV Far-Eastern subtype strain WH2012 (KJ755186) was obtained from National Virus Resource Center, China. WH2012 stocks were prepared by virus amplification in BHK-21 cells. The TBEV strain Neudoerfl (U27495), a prototype strain of the European subtype, the infectious cDNA clones kindly provided by Professor F. X. Heinz from the Medical University of Vienna, Austria. Neudoerfl stocks were prepared by electroporation of BHK-21 cells with in vitro transcribed Neudoerfl RNA and subsequent virus amplification in VeroE6 cells. The TBEV subgenomic replicon (kindly provided by Professor Z. H. Zheng, Wuhan Institute of Virology, China) encodes Renilla luciferase. Quantification of TBEV RNA levels in cells and culture supernatants was done by qPCR/RT-PCR. TBEV RNA replication was measured by Renilla luciferase

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assay. TBEV titres were determined by plaque-forming unit (PFU) assay in VeroE6 cells using an overlay medium containing 1.0% carboxymethylcellulose.

Genome-Scale CRISPR-Cas9 Knockout Screening and data analysis. A pooled GeCKO v2 library encompassing 122,411 single-guide RNAs (sgRNAs) against 19,050 human genes was derived by the Zhang laboratory (13) and obtained from a commercial source (Addgene). Lentivirus production, purification, titres and cell transduction using the GeCKO library were performed as previously described (5). For the TBEV challenge screen, 8×10^7 T98G cells were transduced with the lentiviruses at a multiplicity of infection (MOI) of 0.3. Puromycin (2 ug/mL) was added to the cells 24 h post transduction and maintained for 10 days. After selection with puromycin, ~3×10^8 mutagenized cells were infected with TBEV (MOI of 1) and an additional 3×10^7 cells were frozen down for genomic DNA analysis. In parallel, untransduced T98G cells were infected to ensure virus-induced cell death. Cell pellets with a minimum of 1×10^8 cells were taken for 39 days at which point the screen was terminated. Genomic DNA (gDNA) was extracted from the uninfected control cells as starting population (1×10^8) or the cells (5×10^7) that survived TBEV infection for sgRNA sequencing with a Blood & Cell Culture Midi kit (Qiagen). The inserted sgRNAs sequences were amplified from the gDNA by flanking primers and prepared for next-generation sequencing on a MiSeq platform (Illumina) and the enrichment of each sgRNA was calculated by comparing the relative abundance in the uninfected and infected population. The Model-based Analysis of Genome-wide CRISPR/Cas9 Knockout (MAGeCK) (7) was performed on sgRNAs, genes and pathways (see Supplementary Excels).

Expression constructs and transfection. The WT human or mouse GLP2R and its mutants with HA-tag or egfp-tag at the C-terminus were cloned into the pcDNA3.1(-) or pLVX-puro expression vectors. Flag-tagged TBEV E and its mutants were cloned into the pcDNA3.1(-) expression vector. The plasmids transfection was performed using Lipofectamine 3000 (Invitrogen) transfection reagent according to the manufacturer's protocol. A list of cloning primers is displayed in Supplementary Table 1.

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Lentivirus production and titration. Delivery of expression plasmids for knockout or overexpression experiments was done through transduction with lentiviruses. For preparation of lentiviruses stocks, HEK-293T cells in T25 flasks were transfected at ~90% confluency with packaging plasmids psPAX2 (Addgene, 2250 ng) and pMD2.G (Addgene, 750 ng) and specific expression plasmids (3000 ng). After 60 h, the media was removed and centrifuged at 5,000 × g at 4 °C for 10 min to pellet cell debris. The supernatant was filtered through a 0.45 μm low protein binding membrane (Millipore). Lentiviruses were titrated by SYBR green I-based real-time PCR-enhanced reverse transcriptase (SG-PERT) assay (14). For all experiments, transductions were performed in the presence of 10 μg ml^{-1} polybrene.

RNA interference (RNAi) experiments. The small interfering RNA (siRNA) duplexes specific for GLP2R or SCTR were purchased from GenePharma. A list of siRNA sequences is described in Supplementary Table 2. The siRNA duplexes was transfected using Lipofectamine RNAiMAX reagent (Invitrogen) at a final concentration of 20 nM according to the manufacturer's instructions. Nonsilencing siRNA with a scrambled sequence were used as a negative control (control siRNA). To keep GLP2R silencing efficiency for the duration of the test, the cells were split at 24 h post-transfection and transfected with the same siRNA again. TBEV infection assay was performed 20 h after the second transfection. Cells were either mock treated or infected with TBEV at an MOI of 0.5.

CRISPR/Cas9-mediated GLP2R knockout and GLP2R rescue experiments. The 20-base single-guide RNAs (sgRNAs) used to target GLP2R are listed in Supplementary Table 3. CRISPR plasmids were constructed by insertion of the annealed oligonucleotides into the lentiCRISPRv2 plasmids (Addgene) encoding puromycin or GFP. To generate stable cell lines, T98G and U251 cells at ~50% confluency were infected with the respective lentivirus at an MOI of 0.3 and 24 h later the cells were cultured in medium containing 2 μg ml^{-1} puromycin for 10 days. The resulting knockout efficiency was analysed using western blotting assays and sanger DNA sequencing. GLP2R knockout monoclonal cells was sorted by flow cytometry (BD Bioscience) for the loss of GLP2R expression.

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For the rescue experiments, GLP2R-knockout cells were plated at 1×10^5 cells per well into 24-well plates and transduced with the specified lentivirus particles (MOI = 5). 72 h after transduction, cells were infected with TBEV at an MOI of 0.5, TBEV RNA levels in cells were determined by qPCR/RT-PCR and cell culture supernatants were evaluated for virus titre using PFU assay.

Cell viability assay. Cell viability was evaluated using a Cell Titer-Glo Luminescent Cell Viability Assay kit (Promega) according to the manufacturer's instructions. In brief, 1×10^4 cells in 100 μl culture medium were seeded into opaque-walled 96-well plates for 24 h, 100 μl of CellTiter-Glo reagent was added to each well and allowed to shake for 5 min. After a 10 min incubation at room temperature, luminescence was recorded by using a GloMax 20/20 (TurnerBioSystems). Three independent experiments in triplicates each were performed and one representative is shown.

Virus binding and internalization assays. Control or GLP2R$^{-/-}$ cells were washed twice with ice-cold PBS and incubated with TBEV at an MOI of 20 in cold medium supplemented with 2% FBS DMEM medium on ice for 1 h. For the binding assay, the supernatant was removed and cells were washed six times with ice-cold PBS. After washes, cells were collected and RNA was measured by qPCR/RT–PCR. For the internalization assay, after six washes, cells were incubated using medium supplemented with 2% FBS and 15 mM NH_4Cl and then incubated at 37 °C for 1 h. Cells were chilled on ice and treated with 500 ng/ml proteinase K on ice for 1 h. After three additional washes, cells were collected and RNA was measured by qPCR/RT–PCR.

Neutralizaion for GLP2R. 1×10^5 T98G cells were seeded into 24-well plates 16 h before treatment. Cells were preincubated with isotype control or GLP2R antibodies with different concentration gradients for 1 h at 37 °C in a volume of 100 μl, and then virions (MOI of 1) were added and incubated for 16 h. After three washes, cells were collected and RNA was measured by qPCR/RT–PCR.

Blocking assays with H33D, D33D or Y16S peptides. The peptides used for blocking assays in this study were purchased from GLSBioChem. A list of peptides information is

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described in Supplementary Table 6. For H33D or D31D peptides blocking experiments, 1×10^5 T98G cells were preincubated with serially diluted H33D peptide for 2 h at 37 °C in a volume of 200 μl. After three washes, TBEV (MOI of 0.5) were added and incubated for 24 h. Cells were collected and RNA was measured by qPCR/RT–PCR. For H33D peptide incubation experiments, 1×10^5 T98G cells were co-incubated with serially diluted H33D peptide and TBEV (MOI of 0.5) for 24 h. Cells were collected and RNA was measured by qPCR/RT–PCR. For Y16S peptide blocking experiments, 1×10^5 T98G cells were seeded into 24-well plates 16 h before treatment. Serially diluted Y16S peptide was incubated with TBEV (MOI of 20) for 1 h at 37 °C in a volume of 200 μl. The mixture was added to cells for 4 h. After three washes, cells were collected and RNA was measured by qPCR/RT–PCR.

qPCR/RT-PCR. Total cellular RNA was isolated with TRIzol (Invitrogen) reagent according to the manufacturer's protocols. Viral RNA in culture supernatants was extracted using a QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen) according to the manufacturer's instructions. The quantification of specific gene transcripts was analyzed by one-step real-time qPCR/RT-PCR with the HiScript II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR Green Kit (Vazyme) using specific primers and the Applied Biosystems QuantStudio 6 Flex. The primer sequences for qPCR/RT-PCR were designed using Primer3 software (see Supplementary Table 4). The data were normalized to levels of β-actin mRNA in each individual sample. For all experiments, $2^{-\Delta\Delta Ct}$ method and standard curve line were used to calculate relative expression changes and absolute quantification, respectively.

Western blotting (WB) and Co-immunoprecipitation (Co-IP). Whole-cell lysates for both WB and Co-IP were prepared using a lysis buffer containing 50 mM Tris-base (pH 7.5), 1 mM EGTA, 1 mM EDTA, 1% Triton X-100, 150 mM NaCl, 100 μM phenylmethylsulfonyl fluoride (PMSF) and protease inhibitors (Roche) for 30 min in 4°C. Cell lysates were centrifuged at 14,000×g for 10 min at 4 °C and quantified using the Bradford method. For WB, the supernatants were recovered and followed by denaturation at 95 °C for 10 minutes. For Co-IP, the supernatants were collected and mixed with Protein G-agarose (Millipore) and various antibodies for 16 h at 4 °C. After six washes

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using ice-cold lysis buffer , Protein G agarose-bound immune complexes were then eluted and subjected to WB analysis.

30 μg of total protein from each sample was resolved by SDS-PAGE and transferred to nitrocellulose. Membranes were blocked with TBST (pH 7.4, containing 0.1% Tween-20) containing 5% skimmed milk for 1 h at room temperature, followed by incubation with anti-sera containing primary antibodies overnight at 4 °C (see Supplementary Table 5). Membranes were washed and incubated for 1 h at room temperature with the HRP-conjugated secondary antibodies. Membranes were imaged using the FluorChem HD2 system (Alpha Innotech). Images were analysed using AlphaEaseFC software (Alpha Innotech).

Immunofluorescent confocal microscopy. T98G cells were transduced with the indicated lentivirus expression plasmids. The cells were split at 72 h post-transduction and grown on glass dishes for 24 h again. The cells were then fixed with 3.7% paraformaldehyde (PFA) at room temperature for 20 min and permeabilized in 0.5% Triton X-100 for 10 min at 4 °C. Cover slips were blocked in 1% normal goat serum (AR1009, Boster) in PBS for 1 h. Samples were then washed with PBS and stained with DAPI, followed by observing glass cover slips using a Perkin Elmer UltraView Vox confocal microscope under a 60× oil objective.

RNA-sequencing analysis. Total cellular RNA of T98G, Vero-E6 and BHK-21 cells, etc. were harvested. Whole-transcriptome sequencing was performed by Tsingke Biotechnology Inc. (Beijing, China). RNA-Seq short reads were aligned to genomes of the indicated species using GSNAP (15). Gene expression was counted as the number of short reads fully/partially aligned to the annotated gene model using Htseq (16). All original data see Supplementary Excels.

Mouse experiments. Experiments were carried out in accordance with the recommendations in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals of the Wuhan Institute of Virology after approval by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, China. *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ mice were generated in the C57BL/6J background by depleting exons 2–10 of the *GLP2R* using CRISPR/Cas9

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technology (Extended Data Fig 11). 10^4 PFU of TBEV WH2012 (with a volume of 20 μl of virus suspensions in PBS) was administered via an intraperitoneal route to four week-old WT or *GLP2R*$^{-/-}$ male C57BL/6J mice. Mice were then monitored daily for signs of neurological disease and survival. Mortality rate was assessed at the indicated time points. Animals were euthanized at 12 h, 24 h and 72 h post-infection, whole blood was obtained by cardiac puncture. Simultaneously, the brain, small intestine and spleen tissue were collected after perfusion with PBS. Then the TBEV RNA and titres in sera and tissue samples were determined, and serial 3–5 μm-thick sections were stained with hematoxylin-eosin (HE) for histopathological analysis.

Statistical analyses. The data are presented as the mean ± s.d. using Prism Version 6 (GraphPad). Statistical significance between groups were determined using Student's t-test or an analysis of variance (ANOVA) as indicated with 95% confidence intervals. The results of qPCR/RT-PCR or RNA-Seq were converted into β-actin expression to allow the relative gene expression of each sample to be presented within the same set of data. Unless otherwise stated, all qPCR/RT-PCR, WB and immunofluorescence images shown in this study are representative of at least 3 biological replicates.

Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this paper.

Data Availability. All primers, siRNAs, sgRNAs, antibodies and peptides used in this study are available within the paper and its Supplementary Information. The Supplementary Excels provide data for the CRISPR–Cas9 screen and NGS gene analysis. The remainder of the data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding authors upon reasonable request.

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China viral pathogens professional survey database

Database directory

Recommended database

Epidemic viral pathogenic history database

High throughput pathogen detection database



background database of viral pathogens



Viral Pathogen Genetic Resources Database



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

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

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International Biosafety Training Center

BSL3
Theoretical Class Roster

Instructor: Vickie Jones, MS
Date: April 16, 2018

Time: 1:30 - 5:00pm
Location: MMW #2.104

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5	Yong Wang			Wuhan University Ctr for Animal Exp.			
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