Gary Ruskin  
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963  
Oakland, CA 94611  

Dear Mr. Ruskin:

As we noted in our letter dated October 24, 2022, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Since our last letter, the Department of State (“Department”) has processed in excess of 1,500 pages of material potentially responsive to your request. The Department has identified an additional 20 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined that the 20 records may be released in part.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Laurel Lum, Trial Attorney, at laurel.h.lum@usdoj.gov or (202) 305-8177. Please refer to the case number, FL-2021-00033, and the civil action number, 20-cv-08415, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Diamonece Hickson  
Chief, Litigation and Appeals Branch  
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.
The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:

1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
1.4(b) Foreign government information
1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMSEXP</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA PERS/ORG</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPORT CONTROL</td>
<td>Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS ACT</td>
<td>Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INA</td>
<td>Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAN</td>
<td>Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Personal privacy information

(b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:

(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
(B) deprive a person of a fair trial
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(D) disclose confidential sources
(E) disclose investigation techniques
(F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester
Hi there and yes. I need to be able to pull them out today. Can get them to you in the next hour?

Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S8, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone

-------- Original message --------
From: (b)(6)
Date: 4/16/20 4:48 PM (GMT-06:00)
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cables
Hi (b)(6)
Did you ever get approval to share HHS talking points?
(b)(6)
Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 5:38:47 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)
(CDC/DDPHIS/CNH/DGHP)(b)(6) (Beijing | NIH)(b)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cables

Please call back
Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 5:08:30 PM
To: (b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)
(CDC/DDPHIS/CNH/DGHP)(b)(6) (Beijing | NIH)(b)(6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cables

Yes 530. Does everyone have the number? Looking forward to talking to you all again.
(b)(6)
Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(6) (Beijing)(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 5:03:20 PM
To: (b)(6) (CDC/DDPHIS/CNH/DGHP)(b)(6)
(b)(6) (Beijing | NIH)(b)(6)
Subject: RE: WIV Cables

Hello everyone – We changed the time for this chat to 5:30 so just flagging that (b)(6) Talk shortly,
Will try to call in for 30 minutes (am back in Atlanta, too)

From: [b](6) NIH/NIAD [E] [b](6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 1:19 PM
To: [b](6) NIH/NIAD [E] [b](6)
Cc: [b](6) Beijing [b](6)
(CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/DGHP) [b](6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cables

Happy to have [b](6) join too. Here is the conference call information: USA Toll-Free: [b](7)(E)
International Toll: [b](7)(E) / Access Code: [b](7)(E)

Ron, does that time work for you?

Get Outlook for iOS

From: [b](6) NIH/NIAD [E] [b](6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 12:59:55 PM
To: [b](6)
Cc: [b](6) Beijing [b](6)
(CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/DGHP) [b](6)
Subject: Re: WIV Cables

6 pm work for me [b](5) [b](6) [b](5)
[b](5)
Please let me know the calling information.

Good to hear from you. Hope you are doing well. [b](6)

Take care

Talk to you later

From: [b](6)
Date: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 at 12:53 PM
To: [b](6)
Cc: [b](6) Beijing [b](6)
Excellent how about this evening at say 6pm? Most of this is about the cables and before their time though.

Get Outlook for iOS

From: [NIH/NIAID] [E] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 10:10 AM
To: 
Cc: (b)(6) Beijing (b)(6) (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/DGHP) 
Subject: Re: WIV Cables

I am in training now. Call in the evening would work for me.

Good to hear from you and hope you are doing well.

From: 
Date: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 at 9:32 AM
To: 
Cc: (b)(6) Beijing 
Subject: WIV Cables

Hi 

As I am sure you are quite aware at this point the cables on the WIV lab and the findings of the papers on bat coronavirus research have become big news lately. Do you all have time to discuss this with me?

It seems we are all back in the States now so perhaps we could do phone call?
From: NIH/NIAID [E] (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2018 4:43 AM
To: Beijing (b)(6)
Cc: Wuhan (b)(6) (Beijing)
(China/DIR) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing)
(Beijing | NSF) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing)
CDC/CGH/DGHP (b)(6)
Subject: Re: For your review -- Cable on Wuhan Institute of Virology visit

Thanks for the chance to review the cable. I am at the EID meeting. Dr. Zhi Hong Hu told me she was very impressed for the scientific knowledge that the US visitors have.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 12, 2018, at 3:48 PM, (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) wrote:

Hi (b)(6)
Thanks for the opportunity to review. Added in two suggested comments. (b)(6)

SUBJ
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Wuhan
Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2018 2:59 PM
To: Beijing; (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (Beijing); (b)(6) (China/DIR) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (China/DIR) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6) (Beijing) (b)(6)
Subject: For your review -- Cable on Wuhan Institute of Virology visit

All -- here's a cable on this institute from visit a couple weeks ago. thanks for your introduction to the institute, and thanks all as well for the help with the briefing paper – I hope we answered at least some of your questions in the meeting!

Please let me know if you have any corrections or comments, feel free to track changes on the attached if you’d prefer.

Wuhan
China Virus Institute Welcomes More U.S. Cooperation on Global Health Security

REFS:

A. 18 BEIJING 138  
B. 17 BEIJING 2458  
C. 11 MUMBAI 630  
D. 17 TOKYO 716  
E. 13 SEOUL 790

1. **Summary and Comment**: China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a global leader in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched "P4" lab -- the first such lab in China -- opens up even more opportunities for expert exchange, especially in light of the lab's shortage of trained staff (Ref A). Given the legacy of SARS and the likelihood that the next global pandemic will originate in China, the United States should prioritize expanding our already significant cooperation with this institute. This should include partnering with the institute on the Global Virome Project (Ref B), and possibly trilateral U.S.-China-EU projects, building on the institute's strong ties with France.  

**End Summary and Comment.**

2. **Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers and staff gave an overview of the lab and current cooperation with the United States to visiting Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counsellor Rick Switzer and Consulate Wuhan Consul General Jamie Fouss in late March. In the last year, the institute has also hosted visits from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation, and experts from the University of Texas Medical Center in Galveston. The institute reports to the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing.**

**P4 Lab is Open and Transparent, Officials Emphasize**

3. **The Wuhan P4 or biosafety level (BSL) 4 lab, referring to labs with the highest level of safety precautions, became fully operational and began working with live viruses early this year. Institute officials said they believed it is the only operational P4 lab in Asia aside from a U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC)-supported facility in Pune, India (Ref C). China plans to stand up a second P4 lab in Harbin. Institute officials said Japan's biosafety labs are "old" and lack cutting-edge equipment, so they consider Japan's labs to be "P3 Plus" (Note: the Japanese government says it has one P4-level lab in the Tokyo suburbs, though its activities are limited, and Japan is building a new P4 lab in Nagasaki, see Ref D. Taiwan operates at least one P4 lab. South Korea was close to opening a P4 lab as of last year, see Ref E. **End Note.**) Wuhan's lab is located about 20 miles from the city center in Zhendian district, and the institute plans to gradually consolidated its other training, classroom and lab facilities at that location.**

4. **Officials described the lab as a "regional node" in the global biosafety system and said it would play an emergency response role in an epidemic or pandemic. The lab's English brochure highlighted a national security role, saying that it "is an effective measure to improve
China's availability in safeguarding national bio-safety if [a] possible biological warfare or terrorist attack happens."

5. **(SBU)** Institute officials said there would be "limited availability" for international and domestic scientists for research who had gone through the necessary vetting and approval process, and stressed that the lab aimed to be a "worldwide, open platform" for virology. They said they welcomed U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) experts, noting that the Chinese Academy of Sciences was not strong on human disease expertise, having only focused on it in the last 15 years, after the SARS outbreak. An Wuhan-based French consulate official who works on science and technology cooperation with China also emphasized that the lab, which was initiated in 2004 as a France-China joint project, was intended to be "open and transparent" to the global scientific community. "The intent was to set up a lab to international standards, and open to international research," he said. French experts have provided guidance and biosafety training to the lab, which will continue, the French official said. Institute officials said that France provided the lab's design and much of its technology, but that it is entirely China-funded and has been completely China-run since a "handover" ceremony in 2016.

6. **(SBU)** In addition to French assistance, experts from the NIH-supported P4 lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston have trained Wuhan lab technicians in lab management and maintenance, institute officials said. The Wuhan institute plans to invite scientists from the Galveston lab to do research in Wuhan's lab. One Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher trained for two years at the Galveston lab, and the institute also sent one scientist to U.S. CDC headquarters in Atlanta for six months' work on influenza.

**NIH-Supported Research Revises SARS Origin Story**

7. **(SBU)** NIH was a major funder, along with China's National Science Foundation, of SARS research by the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Shi Zhengli and Cui Jie. The researchers spent five years of investigation and genome sequencing to show that a population of bats in a cave in Yunnan Province harbored a virus with all the "building blocks" of SARS. This lends weight to the theory that SARS originated in bat populations before jumping first to civet cats (likely via bat feces) and then to humans, after people transported the civet cats from Yunnan to Guangdong Province animal markets. The results were published late last year in *Nature* and other publications. Shi said that U.S. scientist Peter Daszak, a leading expert on emerging diseases and president of the New York-based EcoHealth Alliance, was a "strong partner." Daszak's team has provided support in statistical modeling to assess the risk of more coronaviruses like SARS crossing over to human populations.

**Ready to Help with the Global Virome Project**

8. **(SBU)** Institute officials expressed strong interest in the Global Virome Project (GVP), and said Chinese funding for the project would likely come from Chinese Academy of Sciences funding already earmarked for One Belt, One Road-related initiatives. The GVP aims to launch this year as an international collaborative effort to identify within ten years virtually all of the planet's viruses that have pandemic or epidemic potential and the ability to jump to humans. "We hope China will be one of the leading countries to initiate the Global Virome Project," one
Wuhan Institute of Virology official said. China attended the GVP meeting in January in Thailand and is waiting for more details on the initiative. The officials said that the Chinese government funds projects similar to GVP to investigate the background of viruses and bacteria. The effort falls under the 973 Program, or National Basic Research Program, which aims to help China advance in key scientific fields. This essentially constituted China's own Virome Project, officials said, but they noted the program currently has no official name.

9. (SBU) The Wuhan Institute of Virology's Shi Zhengli is the China Country Coordinator for the USAID-funded PREDICT project, which is designed to show "proof of concept" and be a forerunner to the Global Virome Project, with the EcoHealth Alliance (a New York City-based NGO that is working with the University of California, Davis to manage the PREDICT project), recently planned to visit Wuhan to meet with Shi.

U.S.-China Workshop Explores Research Partnerships

10. (SBU) The Institute also has ongoing collaboration with the U.S. National Science Foundation, including a just-concluded workshop in Shenzhen, involving about 20 scientists from the United States and China, on the topic of the "Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases." The Chinese lead for this workshop was the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Hu Zhihong, and the U.S. co-chair was the University of Oklahoma's Xiao Xiangming. The workshop developed broader ties between the U.S. and Chinese disease research communities, and explored opportunities for research cooperation in areas like using "big data" to predict emerging infectious diseases. A follow-on workshop will be held in June at the University of Berkeley.

CLEARED:  

NIH/NIAID (b)  
USAID (b)  
National Science Foundation  
HHS ()  
CDC ()  

APPROVED: Wuhan Consul General Jamie Fouss ()

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
From: "SMART Archive" <>
To: SMART Core <>
Subject: China Health Agency Wants to Expand Health Cooperation in G20, GHSA, Possibly West Africa
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 2016 07:42:32 GMT

MRN: 16 BEIJING 96
Date/DTG: Jan 08, 2016 / 080741Z JAN 16
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE IMMEDIATE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: EAID, ECIN, PGOV, PREL, AU-1, HHS, WHO, KGHI, KHIV, GV, LI, SL, XY, XA, UK, FR, GM, CH
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 15 STATE 84498
B) 15 STATE 80200
C) 15 BEIJING 3682
D) 15 BEIJING 3498
E) 15 BEIJING 3126
F) 15 BEIJING 2968
G) 15 BEIJING 1804
H) 15 BEIJING 1192
I) 14 BEIJING 775
J) 15 FREETOWN 518
K) 15 FREETOWN 514
L) 15 USA ADDIS ABABA 446
M) 15 USA ADDIS ABABA 412
N) 15 USA ADDIS ABABA 222
Subject: China Health Agency Wants to Expand Health Cooperation in G20, GHSA, Possibly West Africa

1. (SBU) Summary: The National Health and Family Planning Commission’s (NHFPC – China’s health ministry) top priority for overseas cooperation with the United States is helping the African Union (AU) stand up its Center for Disease Control (CDC). NHFPC Director General (DG) for International Cooperation (IC) Ren Minghui told Health and Human Services (HHS) Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Global Affairs Mitchell Wolfe December 16, 2015 in Beijing. The NHFPC was looking into how to cooperate with the United States to strengthen national health systems in West Africa, including Sierra Leone, DG Ren added. Asserting they were part of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), Ren advised that NHFPC wanted to
join national assessments to learn from them. Many countries were asking about including health security in the G20 agenda, Ren commented, so NHFPC was consulting with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) about hosting a G20 health meeting, possibly in June or July, before the September summit. If the United States supported the idea, the State Department should convey this to MFA, he suggested. China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) would need to approve and fund any new cooperation projects, NHFPC caveated. The two sides reviewed a series of meetings to flesh out ideas and coordinate, including a possible joint meeting in February with the AU in Addis Ababa and/or in Beijing. **End summary.**

**China’s Top Africa Health Priority – Help Establish AU Center for Disease Control**

2. *(SBU)* NHFPC was under pressure to make progress on the U.S.-China presidential commitment to collaborate to support the AU CDC, the NHFPC staff revealed. China CDC, the technical lead for China, was assisting in establishing the AU by “optimizing the implementation plan, conducting field investigations in Ethiopia, and offering technical support for a disease surveillance system in pilot AU States.” NHFPC confirmed China would assign one staff from China CDC and one from the NHFPC to China’s AU mission – “a policy official to coordinate with governments, MOFCOM, and MFA,” and a “technical staff.” The first would arrive by the end of January 2016. NHFPC Director Lu Guoping, who joined the meeting, had applied, but NHFPC was also trying to “get more candidates interested.” DG Ren noted he heard some AU countries were competing with Ethiopia to host the Africa CDC, which made messaging important as to the placement inside the AU, DAS Wolfe rejoined, rather than in Ethiopia per se.

**Role of WHO, UK, France, Other Partners in U.S.-China Cooperation on AU CDC**

3. *(SBU)* China CDC International Cooperation Director Doris Wang explained her agency’s “involvement in Africa issues was just beginning,” so China CDC had “discussed with U.S. colleagues how to work with AU headquarters.” Working with the AU was more difficult than working with the United States bilaterally, she noted. China was happy to integrate its information-based surveillance system with the U.S. evidence-based one, she offered. The UK was also interested in working together with the United States and China on the AU CDC, Wang reported. In contrast, France was focused on Guinea, she explained. The Chinese side agreed that the AU CDC would “play an important role but can’t replace the WHO,” when DAS Wolfe noted that the United States was committed to strengthening the World Health Organization and wanted to make sure the AU CDC complemented it. Both sides agreed to maintain close communication at respective HQs, and at the AU, regarding implementation.

**Next Steps on AU CDC – Possible Meetings in Beijing and Addis Ababa in 2016**

4. *(SBU)* China CDC Deputy Director Liang Xiaofeng proposed instructing three staff it would send to the AU on a “field visit” in late February 2016 to meet U.S. officials and recommended inviting AU representatives. NHFPC DG Ren said it would be a “complete disaster” if the AU were not on board. A China-U.S.-Africa working-level meeting in Beijing as early as late January could discuss cooperation and coordination in advance of the trip.
5. (SBU) A planned March 2016 Beijing visit by the WHO Africa Region Director Moeti could also be a platform for multi-stakeholder discussions, China CDC Director Wang Yu suggested, and the participants discussed ways to support it. (Comment: It is not clear to us if this visit is going to occur, but regardless, the next step would be to determine who would convene and host, how the U.S. would be involved, and to clarify aims, participants, and the timeline to sequence the discussions. End comment.) NHFPC noted that if HHS Secretary Burwell attended the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Consultation on People to People Exchange, China would organize side events. China would also host a global conference on health promotion in November 2016 and hoped Secretary Burwell could join and bring several U.S. mayors. Vice Ministers from NHFPC and the Ministry of Science and Technology would also visit the United States in 2016 to learn about NIH’s clinical center, as China is interested in setting up a similar institution, they previewed. (Comment: We understand it is unlikely Secretary Burwell will be able to travel to China for any of these events. End comment.)

China CDC Open to Exploring Joint Collaboration in West Africa, Including Sierra Leone

6. (SBU) While the AU CDC was a “pressing priority,” China CDC was also open to looking at “potential joint collaboration in Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.,” China CDC officials advised. NHFPC DG Ren noted China had 10-20 health staff in Sierra Leone on six month assignments. China CDC Director Wang said China was “now planning how to work with the United States, including in Sierra Leone.” China was excited about participating in a research project with the United States, Sierra Leone, and the WHO on Ebola survivors. China wanted to “work out a plan with U.S. CDC colleagues for animal research to determine if species were carrying the disease. “Animal monitoring could contribute to an early warning system,” according to China CDC Director Wang.

7. (SBU) In response to DAS Wolfe’s question about further cooperation, and specifically about laboratory strengthening, Wang added China wanted to help Sierra Leone “upgrade a lab into a tropical disease center, which would add a policy development function to support Sierra Leone,” but did not offer a timeline. U.S.-China health cooperation in Sierra Leone would be easier than with the AU, Director Wang commented, because the three sides could communicate directly. NHFPC Director Lu recalled the UK also had a big presence in Sierra Leone. NHFPC Director Feng advised that the United States and China should send a strong message to local staff in the field to coordinate because “staffss often have their own ideas, regardless of the vision from the top.” The two countries agreed to designate “focal points of contact in the field.”

China Wants to Join GHSA Assessments, Wants Health on G20 Agenda

8. (SBU) NHFPC stated that they had “signed on” to GHSA, and agreed to participate in the laboratory-related action package. NHFPC expressed interested in participating in an external/objective assessment so “China could learn how to do it and help countries with follow up actions,” in particular one taking place in Africa. The U.S. delegation shared the invitation letter and information on nominating experts, encouraged China to sign up and participate, and
offered to assist with the process. NHFPC added that “many countries were interested in using
the G20 to talk about health.” MFA supported NHFPC looking into the topic, they explained.
If there was “diverse interest,” a health-specific meeting in June or July would be useful, they
believed. China was “consulting stakeholders” and would “wait for MFA to confirm its support
and for other member states to show interest.” NHFPC asked if the U.S. State Department
could send a message to MFA, which was coordinating G20 plans. DAS Wolfe affirmed that
HHS supported a health event and shared the NSC-cleared draft G20 language.

Ministry of Commerce Must Approve and Fund “Technical” Agencies’ Plans

9. **(SBU)** Despite a willingness to work in Africa, NHFPC and China CDC noted their limited
funding for more projects. The Chinese health agencies reported they “had just talked to
MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Aid to get a clear understanding.” MOFCOM had
responded that the two countries should “first engage in a technical discussion, then
policymakers would offer final approval once budget support” was required. At that point,
MOFCOM would “join the briefings and green light the budgets.” As a result, MOFCOM did
not need to join technical discussions in February. But when the health agencies were “ready to
present something, we absolutely need to involve them.”

Staff Turnover at NHFPC

10. **(SBU)** Several staff changes were underway in NHFPC’s International Cooperation
Department: DG Ren was selected as the WHO Assistant Director General for HIV, TB,
Malaria and Neglected Tropical Diseases beginning in January. His replacement was not yet
named. NHFPC Director for America and Europe Lu Guoping would leave NHFPC for the
private sector and Director for Africa Feng Yong would be promoted to Deputy Director
General. This information was verified after the meeting with NHFPC.

Fighting Ebola Together Created Foundation for U.S.-China Health Cooperation in Africa

11. **(SBU)** NHFPC began the meeting with a PowerPoint presentation cataloguing China’s
Africa health contributions. 2014 was an important year, as China had sent over 1,200 medical
professionals to Ebola-affected areas, provided personal protective equipment (PPE),
ambulances, and food, and made cash donations to the WHO, AU, World Food Program (WFP),
and United Nations (UN) to combat the disease, they said. The Beijing Institute of Technology
conducted a vaccine trial. China converted a stadium into a temporary hospital where more than
200 Chinese professionals worked, built a 100-bed Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU) in Liberia, and,
in Sierra Leone, established a biosafety level three laboratory and clinic, the opening of which
Sierra Leone’s President had attended. Overall, China had conducted public health training for
12,471 people in 13 Ebola-affected and surrounding countries, the NHFPC documented.
NHFPC enjoyed close health cooperation with U.S. CDC officials on the ground, following up
on useful U.S. suggestions. Dr. Ren noted China did not have a lot of experience working with
other countries on collaborative technical or development projects, an area they would like to
build, and that collaboration with the United States on Ebola, and now on the A/CDC and in
Sierra Leone, were positive developments.
China Enlists its NGOs and Chinese Investment to Support Africa Health Drive

12. (SBU) African governments wanted to increase access to medicines on the continent but were unable to produce them even as per capita GDPS closed in on the World Bank amount above which imported drug costs would rise, according to the NHFPC team, so China had established four pharmaceutical joint venture enterprises in Mali, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria to produce and deliver low cost drugs and medical products in Africa. China encouraged its pharmaceutical firms to invest in African countries, they affirmed. Chinese NGOs supported the effort. The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation ran a child nutrition project in Sudan and Ethiopia and the China Africa Business Council organized a program in 10 African cities called “Increase love for Decrease HIV/AIDS.”

Beijing, Cape Town Declarations Define China-Africa Health Priorities, Implementation

13. (SBU) The Beijing Declaration released after the first China-Africa Ministerial Forum on Health Development in August 2013 had outlined shared health priorities, the NHFPC officials described. China wanted to support “public health, health systems strengthening, and health economics” in Africa, NHFPC summarized. The Cape Town Declaration of the second Ministerial Forum in South Africa in October 2015 had endorsed an implementation framework, NHFPC advised, to ensure that participants put “promises into action.” (Note: The Beijing Declaration is online here -- http://www.chinafrica.cn/english/The_Latest_Headlines/txt/2013-08/19/content_561632.htm. The Cape Town declaration is here -- http://en.nhfpc.gov.cn/2015-10/06/content_22117407.htm. End note.)

Chinese Medical Professionals Have Treated Over 200 Million Africans

14. (SBU) China had dispatched medical teams to Africa since 1963, when it sent medical professionals to Nigeria, NHFPC officials detailed. Fifty-one Chinese health care providers had died in Africa while treating over 200 million patients. Currently, 989 Chinese medical professionals served in 42 countries on one to two year rotations. This illustrated China’s humanitarian objective and “people-to-people friendship” with Africa, DG Ren explained. China was “proud of its great work” in Africa, he added.

15. (SBU) China had conducted 113 short-term training courses for 2,102 African health administration staff and professionals from countries that had diplomatic relations with China, the NHFPC staff continued. In 2014 and 2015, China had also supported 812 African students studying medicine and health policy in China. China had also established eight “sister hospital” relationships with medical institutions in African countries: Guinea, Mali, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Cape Verde, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Hospitals in Ghana and Algeria were in the process of establishing “sister institution” relationships. China had also established eight standardized traditional Chinese medicine clinics in Ethiopia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; clinics in Sierra Leone and Liberia were in process. China had also hosted the fifth China-Africa roundtable on health policy cooperation in Beijing for 350 experts from China and Africa, who had presented 16 joint research papers covering 5 topics: universal health coverage, essential medicines, health and development, traditional medicine, and health industry cooperation. (Comment: China is understandably proud of its
African health achievements. That said, NHFPC has had trouble recruiting qualified staff for long-term overseas assignments; hence most of their staff working in Africa do so for six months or less. End comment.)

16. (NO) China had conducted over 2,000 cataract surgeries in various countries including Botswana, Djibouti, and Eritrea as part of its “Journey of Brightness” program, the NHFPC officials explained. Its pilot public health program in the Comoros had reduced malaria prevalence from 14.2 percent to 2.8 percent in eight years with no deaths from malaria in the last year, compared to 400 eight years ago, they continued. The NHFPC assessed that the five-year Schistosomiasis (“snail fever”) control project in Zanzibar, Tanzania China began in 2013 with the WHO was “going well.” China had also built 38 health facilities and delivered 50 batches of medical supplies to various African countries Senegal.

Meeting Participants --

17. (U)

NHFPC –

Ren Minghui, DG for IC
Li Mingzhu, DDG for IC
Feng Yong, Director, Africa Division, IC
Lu Guoping, Director, European and American Affairs Division, IC
Gu Zhiqiang, Senior Program Officer, IC

China CDC –

Wang Yu, Director
Liang Xiaofeng, Deputy Director
Wang Xiaoji, Division Director, IC

United States --

Mitchell Wolfe, HHS DAS

Asia Pacific Director, OGA
Embassy Beijing Health Attaché
Deputy Director, U.S. CDC Programs in China
Embassy Beijing Economic Strategy and Investment Unit Chief

18. (U) This cable was cleared by the delegation.

Signature: BAUCUS

Drafted By: HHS Attaché

(b)(6)

(a)(6)

Clearer By: ECON (b)(6)

POL (b)(6) -- INFO

ECON (b)(6) (Beijing)
**Dissemination Rule:** Archive Copy

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On Thursday, April 23, 2020, 10:54:53 AM EDT, [b](6)@state.gov> wrote:

Some questions like:

1. [b](5)
2.
3.
4.

| Sender: | [b](6) |
|-------------------|
| Recipient: | [b](6)@state.gov> |
From: (b)(6)@state.gov
To: (b)(6)@state.gov;
(b)(6)@state.gov
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: Re: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 16:22:21 +0000

Thanks.

---

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On April 23, 2020 at 12:19:43 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

Paper is going to CM. (b)(6) will be a clearer.

Office of the Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:18:52 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov

Subject: FW:FW:HOT:Virology Labs Breakdown

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:18 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

(b)(5) thank you
---

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On April 23, 2020 at 12:08:36 PM EDT, (b)(6)@state.gov wrote:

(b)(6) (b)(5)

---

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:02 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

(b)(6)

Do you prefer (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5) Please let me know ASAP.
(b)(6)

---

From: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: FW: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Here are the 4 questions S asked (for upcoming 1200-1230 meeting).

---

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Stilwell, David R (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: HOT: Virology Labs Breakdown

Sir,

Here is the best I could come up with on short notice:
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
Sir,
Per our call I will get you my initial thoughts this morning. Figured I’d start with you.

Some questions like:

Feel free to call. I understand you probably don’t have all the data.

Thanks

Dave

David R. Stilwell
Ass’t Secretary East Asia Pacific
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Sure thing, [b](6) Will do it now [b](6)

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**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
DeControlled

From: [b](6)@state.gov  
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 2:09 PM  
To: [b](6)@state.gov  
Cc: [b](6)@state.gov  
Subject: Fwd: Draft report

[b](6) — can we print this out for S? I want to let him know that Rosen has not/not yet reported this. [b](5)S knows Rosen personally, so I wanted to flag this for Him.

Sent from an IPhone

---

From: James Rosen [b](6)  
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 1:39:03 PM  
To: [b](6)@state.gov  
Subject: Draft report

**EXCLUSIVE: U.S. intelligence will not find the origin of coronavirus, officials say**

By James Rosen

Top Trump administration officials do not expect the U.S. intelligence community to succeed in their quest to determine the precise origins of the coronavirus, sources said Thursday.

A senior intelligence official, speaking to Sinclair on condition of anonymity so as not to jeopardize an ongoing investigation, said that while the country of origin is not disputed, the difficulty of intelligence collection in China, and the nature of viral phenomena, make it exceedingly remote that U.S. spy agencies will locate the exact manner and location where the virus originated.

“China is a hard target to begin with,” the official said. “We’ll certainly keep looking at whatever we find. But even with our best people on it, it’s not as if we’re going to be able to say, ‘Here’s the witness we need,’ or ‘Here’s the document we need.’ It’s a waste of time. We’re not going to get there.”
The pessimistic conclusion came following a rare statement Thursday afternoon from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the nation’s top intelligence unit, saying that the virus “originated in China” and adding that the intelligence community “concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified.”

The statement said the spy agencies are “surging resources” to study these issues, as part of an effort “to determine whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or if it was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan.”

A separate report by the New York Times on Thursday had alleged that senior Trump aides have been “pressuring” intelligence analysts to deliver an assessment that the virus originated in a laboratory setting in China, either at the controversial Wuhan Institute of Virology or the less-publicized Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

The officials who spoke with Sinclair dismissed the Times report, without elaboration, as untrue. Separately, a senior official at the State Department, when contacted by Sinclair, also refuted the premise of the Times story, denying that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has applied pressure to intelligence analysts to deliver a particular assessment on the origins of the coronavirus.

The idea that the coronavirus may have emerged from a laboratory – not as the result of a deliberate weaponization program but rather as the result of an accident of some kind – gained traction last month, after the Washington Post reported that State Department officials had warned in cables sent in 2018 about unsafe conditions at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where researchers have worked with bats to study infectious diseases.

Until the disclosure of the cables, most senior U.S. officials – notably Dr. Anthony Fauci, head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases – had ventured publicly that the likeliest origin point for the coronavirus was the network of wet markets in Wuhan, where live animals have been sold. On April 17, however, three days after the Post disclosed the existence of the State Department cables, Secretary Pompeo told conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt, without elaborating on his source of information: “We know that the Chinese Communist Party, when it began to evaluate what to do inside of Wuhan, considered whether the W.I.V. was, in fact, the place where this came from.”

The intelligence officials who spoke with Sinclair confirmed that they had reviewed the State Department cables from 2018 as part of their effort to learn more about the origins of the virus. “We’ve got all the stuff,” one official said dourly, suggesting that the presence of a large body of documentation for intelligence analysts to review – typically an advantage in the development of a preliminary assessment – was not, in this instance, expected to provide much value.

[More as I have it]
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Clear.
Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b)(5) @state.gov
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 9:15:11 AM
To: (b)(6) @state.gov; OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; OES-SC-T-China <OES-SC-T-China@state.gov>; (b)(6) @state.gov; (b)(6) @state.gov
Cc: EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; Beijing ESTH Americans <BeijingESTHAmericans@state.gov>
Subject: Re: clearance (OOB Monday): AM to request (b)(5)

(b)(6)
OES/IHB clears with (b)(6)’s edits (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Regards,

(b)(6)
Office of International Health & Biodefense
U.S. Department of State

From: (b)(6) @state.gov
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 7:07 AM
To: OES-IHB-DG <OES-IHB-DG@state.gov>; OES-SC-T-China <OES-SC-T-China@state.gov>; (b)(6)
Cc: EAP-CM-ECON-DL <EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov>; Beijing ESTH Americans <BeijingESTHAmericans@state.gov>
Subject: Re: clearance (OOB Monday): AM to request (b)(5)

Colleagues,
Just a reminder that I'm looking for clearance on the AM and letter linked below as soon as possible today. I'm going to be sending these out for 7th floor clearances momentarily.

Thanks,

(b)(6)
Colleagues,

We’ve been tasked to draft an AM recommending\(\text{(b)(5)}\)\(\text{The draft AM and letter are linked below for your review.}\)

\(\text{1. AM for S Yang Letter}\ (\text{b)(5) docx}\)
\(\text{2. S Yang Letter} (\text{b)(5) docx}\)

I would greatly appreciate your clearance by OOB Monday.

Warm regards,

\(\text{(b)(6)}\)\]

Economic Unit (\text{b)(6)} EAP/CM
Economic Unit: EAP-CM-ECON-DL@state.gov
Personal: (h)(6)@state.gov
Mobile: (h)(6)
Please task an AM and letter to CM from the Secretary to (b)(5) (b)(5) (h)(6) has additional details. Due to the EAP/FO NLT COB Monday. I will ask whether (b)(6) intends to task formally.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Office of the Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(b)(6)
(b)(6) @state.gov

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FYI. [b](6) is talking with A/S now. Thanks.

Hi [b](6)

A/S Stilwell needs to talk to you as soon as possible. Please call us at 202-647-9596.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

Hi [b](6)

Washington Post Opinion Columnist Josh Rogin reports
Good morning.

Thank for any thoughts.

Please advise of your voluntary submissions as soon as possible.

REMINDER: Please help us to serve you better by copying the EAP-PRESS office distro when corresponding with individual members of the press team. Thank you for your cooperation.

EAP/PM/S: MK/D/MED/CHINA: Per today's Wash Post, can State confirm the existence of cables highlighting concerns about procedures at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab? Does the USG see any link between the labs research and safety protocols, and the emergence of Wuhan as the epicenter of the COVID-19 virus?
We plan to respond with the following: (b)(5)
Please let us know if you strongly recommend a different approach.

**EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK:** Please send updated lines on the DPRK’s missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.
Yep that is her.

The "batwoman," right?

It's that photo on their website – so many people have written me about the photo of (b)(6) standing next to the infamous Dr. Shi.

You're in the WaPo, man.
Hi [b] The link to the WaPo article is below. Just FYI, the line came from SPOX.

**Washington Post Opinion Columnist Josh Rogin reports**

---

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

From: [b]@state.gov

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:54 AM

To: [b][b]@state.gov; EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>; [b][b]@state.gov;

Cc: [b]@state.gov [b]@state.gov

Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

[b]

Good morning, [b]

[b]

[b]

[b]

Thank for any thoughts.

[b]

---

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

From: [b]@state.gov

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:13 AM

To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>

Subject: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

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We plan to respond with the following: *(b)(5)*

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FYI. (b)(6) is talking with A/S now. Thanks.

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<td>FW: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings</td>
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Hi Rick,

A/S Stilwell needs to talk to you as soon as possible. Please call us at 202-647-9596.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

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Hi (b) The link to the WaPo article is below. Just FYI, the line came from SPOX.

*Washington Post Opinion Columnist Josh Rogin reports*
From: [b](6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:54 AM
To: [b](6)@state.gov; EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>; [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov;
[b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov
Cc: [b](6)@state.gov; [b](6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

(b)(6)

Good morning, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Thank for any thoughts.

(b)(6)

---

From: [b](6)@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:13 AM
To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>
Subject: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

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We plan to respond with the following:\[b\](5)

Please let us know if you strongly recommend a different approach.

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Washington Post Opinion Columnist Josh Rogen reports
Good morning. *(b)(5)*

*(b)(5)*

Thank for any thoughts.

*(b)(6)*

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**SPECIALpressão BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

**From:** *(b)(6)*@state.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:13 AM

**To:** EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>

**Subject:** April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

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| **Sender:** *(b)(6)*@state.gov> |  |
| **Recipient:** *(b)(6)*@state.gov>; |  |
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| **Sender:** | (b)(6)@state.gov |
| **Recipient:** | (b)(6)@state.gov |


David Ignatius runs through the possible origins…


April 2, 2020 at 6:56 p.m. EDT
The story of how the novel coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, China, has produced a nasty propaganda battle between the United States and China. The two sides have traded some of the sharpest charges made between two nations since the Soviet Union in 1985 falsely accused the CIA of manufacturing AIDS.
U.S. intelligence officials don’t think the pandemic was caused by deliberate wrongdoing. The outbreak that has now swept the world instead began with a simpler story, albeit one with tragic consequences: The prime suspect is “natural” transmission from bats to humans, perhaps through unsanitary markets. But scientists don’t rule out that an accident at a research laboratory in Wuhan might have spread a deadly bat virus that had been collected for scientific study.
“Good science, bad safety” is how Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) put this theory in a Feb. 16 tweet. He ranked such a breach (or natural transmission) as more likely than two extreme possibilities: an accidental leak of an “engineered bioweapon” or a “deliberate release.” Cotton’s earlier loose talk about bioweapons set off a furor, back when he first raised it in late January and called the outbreak “worse than Chernobyl.”
President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added to the bile last month by describing the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” and the “Wuhan virus,” respectively. China dished wild, irresponsible allegations of its own. On March 12, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lijian Zhao charged in a tweet: “It might be [the] US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan.” He retweeted an article that claimed, without evidence, that U.S. troops might have spread the virus when they attended the World Military Games in Wuhan in October 2019.
China retreated on March 22, when Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai told “Axios on HBO” that such rumors were “crazy” on both sides. A State Department spokesman said Cui’s comment was “welcome,” and Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged in a March 27 phone call to “focus on cooperative behavior,” a senior administration official told me.
To be clear: U.S. intelligence officials think there’s no evidence whatsoever that the coronavirus was created in a laboratory as a potential bioweapon. Solid scientific research demonstrates that the virus wasn’t engineered by humans and that it originated in bats.

But how did the outbreak occur? Solving this medical mystery is important to prevent future pandemics. What’s increasingly clear is that the initial “origin story” — that the virus was spread by people who ate contaminated animals at the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan — is shaky.

Scientists have identified the culprit as a bat coronavirus, through genetic sequencing; bats weren’t sold at the seafood market, although that market or others could have sold animals that had contact with bats. The Lancet noted in a January study that the first covid-19 case in Wuhan had no connection to the seafood market.

There’s a competing theory — of an accidental lab release of bat coronavirus — that scientists have been puzzling about for weeks. Less than 300 yards from the seafood market is the Wuhan branch of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Researchers from that facility and the nearby Wuhan Institute of Virology have posted articles about collecting bat coronaviruses from around China, for study to prevent future illness. Did one of those samples leak, or was hazardous waste deposited in a place where it could spread?

Richard Ebright, a Rutgers microbiologist and biosafety expert, told me in an email that “the first human infection could have occurred as a natural accident,” with the virus passing from bat to human, possibly through another animal. But Ebright cautioned that it “also could have occurred as a laboratory accident, with, for example, an accidental infection of a laboratory worker.” He noted that bat coronaviruses were studied in Wuhan at Biosafety Level 2, “which provides only minimal protection,” compared with the top BSL-4.

Ebright described a December video from the Wuhan CDC that shows staffers “collecting bat coronaviruses with inadequate [personal protective equipment] and unsafe operational practices.” Separately, I reviewed two Chinese articles, from 2017 and 2019, describing the heroics of Wuhan CDC researcher Tian Junhua, who while capturing bats in a cave “forgot to take protective measures” so that “bat urine dripped from the top of his head like raindrops.”

And then there’s the Chinese study that was curiously withdrawn. In February, a site called ResearchGate published a brief article by Botao Xiao and Lei Xiao from Guangzhou’s South China University of Technology. “In addition to origins of natural recombination and intermediate host, the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories,” the article concluded. Botao Xiao told the Wall Street Journal in February that he had withdrawn the paper because it “was not supported by direct proofs.”

Accidents happen, human or laboratory. Solving the mystery of how covid-19 began isn’t a blame game, but a chance for China and the United States to cooperate in a crisis, and prevent a future one.

Read more from David Ignatius’s archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook.
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<tr>
<th><strong>Sender:</strong></th>
<th>(b)(6)@state.gov</th>
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| **Recipient:** | EAP-CM-Office-DL <EAP-CM-Office-DL@state.gov>;  
                     EAP-FO-Principals-DL <EAP-FO-Principals-DL@state.gov>;  
                     INR-China-Small Group <INR-ChinaSmallGroup@state.gov> |
Fyi from L on the Rogin article:

From: [REDACTED]@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:23 AM
To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

(b)(5)

I noticed that the piece referred to the Department as having "no comment" on the story. 

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Assistant Legal Adviser for Management Affairs
Room: HST 4805

From: [REDACTED]@state.gov
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:00 AM
To: EAP-PG-Taskings-DL <EAP-PG-Taskings-DL@state.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@state.gov; [REDACTED]@state.gov; [REDACTED]@state.gov

Subject: RE: April 14 EAP Press Guidance Taskings

Hi [b](6)The link to the WaPo article is below. Just FYI, the line came from SPOX.

**Washington Post Opinion Columnist Josh Rogin reports**
Good morning. On our suggested response on the described cables.

Thank for any thoughts.

Please advise of your voluntary submissions as soon as possible. REMINDER: Please help us to serve you better by copying the EAP-PRESS office distro when corresponding with individual members of the press team. Thank you for your cooperation.

EAP/PM/S: MK/D/MED/CHINA: Per today's Wash Post, can State confirm the existence of cables highlighting concerns about procedures at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab? Does the USG see any link between the labs research and safety protocols, and the emergence of Wuhan as the epicenter of the COVID-19 virus?

We plan to respond with the following:

EAP/PM/ISN/DPRK: Please send updated lines on the DPRK’s missile tests, or confirm that we will continue to use the current hold lines.
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<th><strong>Sender:</strong></th>
<th>&quot;Keshap, Atul&quot; <em>(b)(6)</em>@state.gov</th>
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<td><strong>Recipient:</strong></td>
<td>Buangan, Richard L <a href="mailto:BuanganRL@state.gov">BuanganRL@state.gov</a>; <em>(b)(6)</em>@state.gov; <em>(b)(6)</em>@state.gov; Stilwell, David R <em>(b)(6)</em>@state.gov; <em>(b)(6)</em>@state.gov</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Hi (b)(6)

Taiwan will be releasing its email correspondence with WHO about the human-to-human transmission issue in a press conference at 2:00 this afternoon. See below. This should raise the ante in the ongoing debate about who said what and when.

(h)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

Taiwan’s early efforts to alert WHO to possible danger of COVID-19

1. The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC) learned from online sources that there had been more than 7 cases of atypical pneumonia in Wuhan, China. In China, atypical pneumonia is commonly used to refer to SARS, a human-to-human transmitting disease caused by coronavirus.

2. Owing to its experience with the SARS epidemic in 2003, Taiwan vigilantly kept track of information about the new outbreak. On December 31, 2019, Taiwan sent an email to the World Health Organization contact window under the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism to inform WHO of its understanding of the disease and also to request further information from WHO. Given the lack of clarity at the time, as well as the many rumors that were circulating, Taiwan exercised caution in its communication with WHO. Although the email did not address the issue of human-to-human transmission, it did refer to the disease as atypical pneumonia and specifically noted that patients had been isolated for treatment, strongly implying there was a real possibility of human-to-human transmission. Taiwan’s aim was to ensure that all relevant parties remained alert, especially since the outbreak occurred just before the Lunar New Year holiday, which typically sees tremendous amounts of travel.

3. The Taiwan CDC also contacted the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention in a bid to obtain more information. However, in response to inquiries, the WHO IHR contact window only responded with a short message stating that Taiwan’s information had been forwarded to related departments, while China only provided a press release.

4. Even though Taiwan strongly suspected that human-to-human transmission of the disease was already occurring at the time, it was unable to gain confirmation through existing channels. Therefore, on the day the aforementioned email was sent to WHO, the Taiwan government activated enhanced border control and quarantine measures based on the assumption that human-to-human transmission was in fact occurring. For instance, it started to screen passengers on flights from Wuhan prior to disembarkation.

5. In mid-January, the Taiwan CDC dispatched experts to Wuhan to gain a better understanding of the epidemic, the control measures taken there, and patients’ exposure history. Based on preliminary research, Taiwan determined that this form of pneumonia could indeed spread via human-to-human transmission.
From: "Stilwell, David R"
To: [Redacted]
CC: [Redacted] @pacom.mil; [Redacted] @pacom.mil
Subject: FW: Latest timeline
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2020 18:40:08 +0000

---Original Message-----
From: [Redacted] @state.gov
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2020 2:24 PM
To: Stilwell, David R [Redacted] @state.gov; Keshap, Atul [Redacted] @state.gov
Subject: Latest timeline

Want to review before I circulate? Below/attached. Thanks.

This version notes at the top that major themes include:

[Redacted]
Researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology collect a sample of horseshoe bat feces from a cave in Yunnan Province, China. The sample, labeled RaTG13, is later found to contain a virus 96.2% identical to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19.

February 20: Researchers at Hong Kong University publish a study of bat coronaviruses, warning: “bat–animal and bat–human interactions, such as the presence of live bats in wildlife wet markets and restaurants in Southern China, are important for interspecies transmission of [coronaviruses] and may lead to devastating global outbreaks.”

January 13: The first coronavirus case outside of China is reported in Bangkok when a 61-year-old woman from Wuhan tests positive four days after arriving from China with a fever at the airport. The patient had begun exhibiting symptoms (fever, chills, sore throat, headache) three days before leaving Wuhan.

January 15: The patient who becomes the first confirmed U.S. case leaves Wuhan and arrives in the U.S., carrying the coronavirus.

January 22: WHO holds emergency committee meeting, decides not to declare the novel coronavirus a “public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says afterward that declaring a PHEIC is a decision he takes “extremely seriously” and is “only prepared to make with appropriate consideration of all the evidence.” The emergency committee meeting excluded Taiwan from its deliberations.

January 23: Despite locking down Wuhan and cutting off travel from the surrounding Hubei Province to the rest of China, PRC officials did not cut off travel from Hubei Province to the rest of the world.

January 24: Officials in Beijing prevent the Wuhan Institute of Virology from sharing samples of the novel coronavirus with the University of Texas biocontainment lab, overruling an initial agreement by the Wuhan lab to share these samples.

January 30: WHO declares a public-health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), after nearly 10,000 cases of the virus are confirmed, including in at least 18 countries outside of China.

February 23: Xi Jinping delivers speech to PRC officials, calls virus “a crisis for us and also a major test.” He stresses the need to maintain “social stability,” “positive energy” news reporting, and enhanced “external propaganda.” He states that “the effectiveness of the prevention and control work has once again demonstrated the significant advantages of the leadership of the
Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”

March 11: WHO declares the novel coronavirus a “pandemic,” after the official worldwide case count is 118,000 people in 114 countries.

March 26: China bars entry of all foreigners in attempt to limit virus spread. This measure is harsher than the travel restrictions of other countries that Beijing had criticized just weeks before.

April 3: While lifting lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, officials limit funerals of those who died from the coronavirus, suppress online discussions of fatalities, scrub images of funeral homes from social media, assign minders to families in mourning, and face questions from families such as why it took the government weeks to inform the public that the virus could spread among humans.

April 3: China’s Ministry of Science and Technology announces that ongoing clinical research on the coronavirus must be reported to authorities within three days or be halted.

April 7: Human rights activists report, citing public records alone, that Chinese police punished nearly 900 people for online speech or information-sharing about the virus over three months.

April 11: Chinese universities publish online—and then apparently delete—new guidelines stating that academic papers on the origin of the novel coronavirus can be published only with the approval of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Another CCP timeline.

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2020 5:47 PM
To: Stilwell, David R; [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Re: Latest timeline

We can pass that on to CNA.

Also, here is a recent "official" COVID timeline according to Xinhua:
https://mp.weixin.qq.noclick_com/s/E5HSjhlDnHeq6msIktl4LQ

-----Original Message-----
From: Stilwell, David R
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2020 8:40:08 AM
To: Daniel Tobin
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: Latest timeline

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2020 2:24 PM
To: Stilwell, David R; Keshap, Atul
Subject: Latest timeline
Want to review before I circulate? Below/attached. Thanks.

This version notes at the top that major themes include:

(b)(5)

New timeline elements in the attached:

--2013--

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--2019--

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--2020--

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Looks like the media is starting to report on this more factually — I wonder who set them straight. If they get my cables they’ll also know it was essentially predicted in 2018. They are unclassified and FOIA-able so I suspect at some point they’ll come out.

You heard it first from..

David Ignatius runs through the possible origins…


April 2, 2020 at 6:56 p.m. EDT
The story of how the novel coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, China, has produced a nasty propaganda battle between the United States and China. The two sides have traded some of the sharpest charges made between two nations since the Soviet Union in 1985 falsely accused the CIA of manufacturing AIDS.

U.S. intelligence officials don’t think the pandemic was caused by deliberate wrongdoing. The outbreak that has now swept the world instead began with a simpler story, albeit one with tragic consequences: The prime suspect is “natural” transmission from bats to humans, perhaps through unsanitary markets. But scientists don’t rule out that an accident at a research laboratory in Wuhan might have spread a deadly bat virus that had been collected for scientific study.
“Good science, bad safety” is how Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) put this theory in a Feb. 16 tweet. He ranked such a breach (or natural transmission) as more likely than two extreme possibilities: an accidental leak of an “engineered bioweapon” or a “deliberate release.” Cotton’s earlier loose talk about bioweapons set off a furor, back when he first raised it in late January and called the outbreak “worse than Chernobyl.”

President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added to the bile last month by describing the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” and the “Wuhan virus,” respectively. China dished wild, irresponsible allegations of its own. On March 12, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lijian Zhao charged in a tweet: “It might be [the] US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan.” He retweeted an article that claimed, without evidence, that U.S. troops might have spread the virus when they attended the World Military Games in Wuhan in October 2019.

China retreated on March 22, when Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai told “Axios on HBO” that such rumors were “crazy” on both sides. A State Department spokesman said Cui’s comment was “welcome,” and Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged in a March 27 phone call to “focus on cooperative behavior,” a senior administration official told me.

To be clear: U.S. intelligence officials think there’s no evidence whatsoever that the coronavirus was created in a laboratory as a potential bioweapon. Solid scientific research demonstrates that the virus wasn’t engineered by humans and that it originated in bats.

But how did the outbreak occur? Solving this medical mystery is important to prevent future pandemics. What’s increasingly clear is that the initial “origin story” — that the virus was spread by people who ate contaminated animals at the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan — is shaky.

Scientists have identified the culprit as a bat coronavirus, through genetic sequencing; bats weren’t sold at the seafood market, although that market or others could have sold animals that had contact with bats. The Lancet noted in a January study that the first covid-19 case in Wuhan had no connection to the seafood market.

There’s a competing theory — of an accidental lab release of bat coronavirus — that scientists have been puzzling about for weeks. Less than 300 yards from the seafood market is the Wuhan branch of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Researchers from that facility and the nearby Wuhan Institute of Virology have posted articles about collecting bat coronaviruses from around China, for study to prevent future illness. Did one of those samples leak, or was hazardous waste deposited in a place where it could spread?

Richard Ebright, a Rutgers microbiologist and biosafety expert, told me in an email that “the first human infection could have occurred as a natural accident,” with the virus passing from bat to human, possibly through another animal. But Ebright cautioned that it “also could have occurred as a laboratory accident, with, for example, an accidental infection of a laboratory worker.” He noted that bat coronaviruses were studied in Wuhan at Biosafety Level 2, “which provides only minimal protection,” compared with the top BSL-4.

Ebright described a December video from the Wuhan CDC that shows staffers “collecting bat coronaviruses with inadequate [personal protective equipment] and unsafe operational practices.” Separately, I reviewed two Chinese articles, from 2017 and 2019, describing the heroics of Wuhan CDC researcher Tian Junhua, who while
capturing bats in a cave “forgot to take protective measures” so that “bat urine dripped from the top of his head like raindrops.”
And then there’s the Chinese study that was curiously withdrawn. In February, a site called ResearchGate published a brief article by Botao Xiao and Lei Xiao from Guangzhou’s South China University of Technology. “In addition to origins of natural recombination and intermediate host, the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories,” the article concluded. Botao Xiao told the Wall Street Journal in February that he had withdrawn the paper because it “was not supported by direct proofs.”
Accidents happen, human or laboratory. Solving the mystery of how covid-19 began isn’t a blame game, but a chance for China and the United States to cooperate in a crisis, and prevent a future one.
Read more from David Ignatius’s archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook.
FYI. This might be useful if we want to brief the Ambassador. US CDC are using it for the new director in Atlanta.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: [mailto: info@ecohealthalliance.org]
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2017 12:28 AM
To: [Beijing]
Cc: [Beijing]
Subject: GVP 2-page Brief

Hi [Beijing].

Attached please find a 2-page brief about the GVP. You can also download it here: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/581a4a856b8f5bc98311fb03/t/59b18964e45a7c6238f0b697/1504909435037/GVP+2-page+Brief. and visit the website http://www.globalviromeproject.org/ for more information.

Best Regards,
Hongying
Hongying Li, MPH 李泓萤
China Programs Coordinator

EcoHealth Alliance
460 West 34th Street – 17th floor
New York, NY 10001

(U.S. mobile)
(China mobile)
(Skype)
(WeChat)

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge scientific research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science, we develop solutions that prevent pandemics and promote conservation.
I'm sure you saw this already, since you're mentioned...

Subject: Fw: WaPo - Regin: State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

From: <b>(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:24 AM
To: <b>(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: <b>(b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: WaPo - Regin: State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

FYSA

From: <b>(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2020 9:23 AM
To: <b>(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: T_SpecAsst <T_SpecAsst@state.gov>

Subject: WaPo - Regin: State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

In case you hadn't seen this yet...

State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

Josh Regin

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official
warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China’s first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy’s counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained, also warns that the lab’s work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

“During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory,” states the Jan. 19, 2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy’s environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S. organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials’ visit, Shi’s team had published research showing that horseshoe bats
they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

“Most importantly,” the cable states, “the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention.”

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi’s team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as “gain-of-function” experiments.

As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn’t come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

“The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab’s research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected,” he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That’s important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.
“The cable was a warning shot,” one U.S. official said. “They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on.”

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

Inside the Trump administration, many national security officials have long suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

“The idea that is was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there’s almost nothing on the other side,” the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government’s original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn’t sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for “rectification.” Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring
approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It’s crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one. The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

We don’t know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

“I don’t think it’s a conspiracy theory. I think it’s a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered,” he said. “To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future.”

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From: "Stilwell, David R"
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on March 31, 2020
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For (b)(6)

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Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2020 8:58 AM
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(b)(6)
Something has to be done about this. (b)(5)
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Stilly

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Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on March 31, 2020

2020/03/31

*** Question: Some officials in a handful of countries including the US have been trying to blame China for the pandemic outbreak, accusing China of covering up the actual caseload of the infected and disseminating disinformation on COVID-19. They also said that they will reckon with China after the pandemic passes. What is your response?

*** Answer: At present, COVID-19 is ravaging across the world, especially in Europe and the US. People of all countries have called for unity to fight the pandemic, but still some people have made jarring noises from time to time, quite discordant with the current atmosphere of unity against the pandemic. I want to stress a few points.

As the coronavirus is novel virus unseen in the past, its detection, research, testing and confirmation naturally requires time. According to reports, on December 27, 2019, Zhang Jixian, director of the Department of Respiratory and Critical Care at Hubei Hospital of Integrated Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine, reported the first three suspected cases. On December 29, Hubei and Wuhan health committees instructed related centers for disease control and prevention and hospitals to carry out epidemiological investigation. On December 30 Wuhan Municipal Health Committee issued an "urgent notice on the treatment of pneumonia of unknown cause". On December 31, the NHS sent an expert group to Wuhan to investigate on site. On January 3, 2020, China started to send timely updates to WHO and other countries, including the US. On January 11, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention put online five whole genome sequences of the novel coronavirus and shared data with the world and WHO. On January 23, Wuhan was put under lockdown and unprecedented comprehensive,
thorough and rigorous measures were taken. The Chinese government took decisive and strong measures at the earliest time possible and the Chinese people have been united as one in this fight against the pandemic, which ensured the life, safety and health of the Chinese people to the highest extent.

WHO estimates that the decisive, effective and timely measures taken by the Chinese government prevented the infection of tens of thousands of people. Many countries also think China’s practice offers explicable precedence. Our open, transparent and responsible attitude has been highly acclaimed by the international community.

We have no intention to judge other countries' response to the pandemic. But while China set an example and bought precious time for the world with huge efforts and sacrifice, as WHO, foreign leaders, experts and media say, did a certain country make full use of the time to enhance preparedness? I think its government knows that very well, and its people can feel it too.

Since January 3 China has been notifying the US of epidemic-related information on a regular basis. On January 7, the US CDC and its embassy in China issued warnings on traveling to Wuhan. On January 25, the US announced the decision to close its consulate in Wuhan and withdraw all staff. On February 2, the US government banned entry of all Chinese nationals and foreigners who had been to China in the past 14 days. Now so many days have passed, and some in the US still claim China should be held responsible for the COVID-19 in the US. Don't they feel guilty or ashamed? They are trying to shift the biggest blame of the century to China and make it the biggest scapegoat. However, such an attempt is just impossible as the blame is too heavy to be shifted. Sorry, it won't work.

The pandemic is in some way like a magical mirror that exposes a person's morality and character to the fullest extent. The virus knows no ideology, border or race. The destinies of all countries are closely intertwined. No one can make up for lost time by slandering others or shifting the blame. The only way to defeat the virus is through solidarity and cooperation.

At the G20 virtual summit last week, President Xi put forward propositions on overcoming the difficulties hand in hand. Upholding the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind, China would like to share our experience on COVID-19, conduct international cooperation, and provide as much help as we can to countries in need. That is what we say and what we do. We hope certain individuals will, like the CPC and the Chinese government, put people's life, health and safety first, abandon political bias and arrogance, and focus on international cooperation in pandemic response.

*** Question: In a recent interview, White House trade adviser Navarro accused China of a cover-up that has set the world back six weeks, saying China saw human-to-human transmission cases as early as mid-December. I wonder if you have any comment?

*** Answer: The lies told by this US politician are not worth refuting. I noticed that during that interview, even the host interrupted him several times and pointed out he was wasting everybody's time.

What is the truth? The truth is, since the epidemic broke out, we have always been open, transparent and responsible. We notified WHO and the international community of related information in a timely manner, shared genome sequencing findings of the virus at the earliest time possible, responded to
other countries’ concerns, conducted international cooperation and provided help to others. The sacrifice made by the Chinese people has bought valuable time for global anti-epidemic response.

Since the beginning of January, China has been sending regular updates to WHO and other countries, the US included. How can the US politician allege that China’s delay set the world back six weeks? What is his intention? He just wanted to muddy the water, shift the blame and undermine China-US cooperation as well as global cooperation in fighting COVID-19. No one with a sense of justice will fall for his words.

We advise Mr. Navarro to try and grasp the gist of the phone call between Chinese and US presidents on March 27. He should stop smearing China and undermining China-US relations, and work to advance rather than harm the two peoples’ interests.

*** Question: The US State Department Spokesperson said yesterday that Secretary Pompeo spoke with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and discussed the importance of countering efforts by China to spread disinformation and propaganda related to the virus. I wonder if you have a comment?

*** Answer: Since the epidemic broke out, China, in an open, transparent and responsible manner, has been providing timely updates to WHO and countries around the world including the US. We have also been doing our best to provide support and assistance to countries in need. All this has been widely applauded by the international community. Some US officials are accusing China of disinformation campaigns, I wonder if they could point out what information is not true? Were they referring to the effective containment China has achieved, or the assistance it has provided to other countries?

As to how the US has been dealing with this crisis, there has been abundant media coverage in the US and the American people have seen it with their own eyes. The Chinese people are following with concern the development of the situation and sincerely hope the US will overcome the epidemic as soon as possible to safeguard American people’s health and safety.

After the outbreak, China has been racing against time to fight the virus and contain its spread. Even as we speak, many Chinese businesses are working around the clock to produce medical supplies and reinforce other countries’ combat. We don’t have the interest or the time to launch any despicable “disinformation campaign”.

President Xi Jinping, upon invitation, held a telephone conversation with President Trump last Friday. The two heads of state agreed that under current circumstances, China and the US should stand united and fight COVID-19. The remarks you mentioned clearly run counter to the consensus of the two leaders. We hope they will focus on containing the spread of the virus at home and contribute to China-US cooperation in responding to the pandemic.

Question: A Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer collided with a Chinese fishing boat in waters of the East China Sea on late March 30. Do you have more details on the incident?

Answer: According to competent department, there was a collision around 19:30 yesterday in the East China Sea, east of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, involving a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese SDF vessel. The collision damaged the Chinese fishing boat and caused lower back injury in one fisherman. China Coast Guard is still dealing with this on site as we speak. The cause of the collision is under investigation.
I want to point out that the collision occurred in the coastal waters of China. The Chinese side has expressed concern to the Japanese side over the Japanese SDF warship sailing in the relevant waters and endangering the safety of the Chinese vessel.

We are in communication with the Japanese side over this and hope they will cooperate to determine the cause as soon as possible and prevent such incidents from happening again.

*** Question: As COVID-19 spreads all around the world, countries have an enormous need for N95 respirators and other medical supplies. Some people think China is hoarding medical products instead of assisting other countries. Do you have a comment on that?

*** Answer: That’s not at all true.

China’s fight against COVID-19 isn’t over yet. We are under heavy pressure to guard against imported cases and a rebound in indigenous cases, and so there is a huge demand for medical supplies. It is the government’s top priority to prevent and control the epidemic at home and safeguard people’s health. Ensuring the health of 1.4 billion Chinese people is in itself a great contribution to global public health security.

That said, we are also providing medical supplies to countries in need. Here are some figures for you. First, the Chinese government has provided 120 countries and four international organizations with surgical masks, N95 respirators, protective suits, nucleic acid test kits, ventilators and other assistance.

Second, local governments donated medical items to their sister cities in more than 50 countries. Chinese companies made donations to over 100 countries and international organizations.

Third, some countries requested via diplomatic channels Chinese assistance in their commercial procurement, and we recommended qualified exporters for them. To date, 30 countries and two international organizations have signed purchase contracts with Chinese exporters on masks, protective suits, nucleic acid test kits, etc. Buyers from many other countries are also discussing procurement with Chinese enterprises.

As our businesses resume work and production, I believe they will give more material support to the international community. The Chinese government will continue providing support and convenience for foreign procurement. We hope to see and welcome greater cooperation with foreign companies to help stabilize the global industrial chain of medical supplies.

You mentioned there is now a great demand for N95 respirators in other countries, I think you all know that there is a shortage of them in China as well. We have been reserving them for frontline medical workers whose posts make them most vulnerable. The general public, including Chinese leaders, all wear ordinary masks, as I’m sure you’ve noticed in news footage.

Question: According to reports, four Chinese students in Spain were confirmed to have contracted COVID-19. How has the Chinese embassy in Spain been helping them? How are these students now?
Answer: The CPC Central Committee attaches great importance to and cares deeply about the health and safety of Chinese citizens overseas. Our diplomatic missions overseas have been in close contact with the students in their host countries.

After four Chinese students were infected, our embassy in Spain and consulate-general in Barcelona have been closely following their conditions. They urged the Spanish side to ensure they are receiving all medical treatment they need, and also brought in Chinese doctors to offer advice online. We will continue to watch over them and offer every assistance possible.

Question: US President Donald Trump said that China has sent some medical supplies to the US to help fight COVID-19. Can you confirm this information and share some more details?

Answer: As I just said, President Xi Jinping held a telephone conversation with President Trump last Friday. President Xi said that the Chinese people sincerely hope that the US will contain the spread of the pandemic at an early date and minimize its impact on the American people. Under the current circumstances, China and the US should unite in the fight against the virus. Health departments and epidemic experts of the two sides have all along been in communication. Last night, Minister Ma Xiaowei of China's National Health Commission and US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar spoke over the phone to exchange ideas on the two countries' pandemic prevention and control efforts. Some provinces and cities and local businesses have already donated medical supplies to the US side. We have noted that some US media have reported that a commercial charter flight has taken a batch of epidemic control materials it purchased from China to the US. China understands the current difficulties the US is facing and stands ready to offer support within our capability.

We also hope that some US officials will act in accordance with the consensus reached between the two heads of state by phone and work to create enabling conditions for the two sides' joint fight against the pandemic.

Very Respectfully,

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