



**United States Department of State**

***Washington, D.C. 20520***

March 24, 2022

Case No. FL-2021-00033

Gary Ruskin  
4096 Piedmont Ave. #963  
Oakland, CA 94611

Dear Mr. Ruskin:

As we noted in our letter dated February 24, 2022, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (the "FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Since our last letter, the Department of State ("Department") has processed in excess of 550 pages of material potentially responsive to your request. The Department has identified an additional 10 responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined two records may be released in full, six records may be released in part, and two records must be withheld in their entirety.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each page. The pages that were withheld in full are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 5, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(5). All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Laurel Lum, Trial Attorney, at [laurel.h.lum@usdoj.gov](mailto:laurel.h.lum@usdoj.gov) or (202) 305-8177. Please refer to the case number, FL-2021-00033, and the civil action number, 20-cv-08415, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jeanne Miller".

Jeanne Miller  
Chief, Programs and Policies Division  
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

## EXPLANATION OF GROUNDS FOR WITHHOLDING

### The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemptions (5 USC 552)

(b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified.

#### Executive Order 12958, as amended, Classification Categories:

1.4(a) Military plans, systems or operations

1.4(b) Foreign government information

1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology

1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US including confidential sources

1.4(e) Scientific, technological or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism

1.4(f) USG programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities

1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism

1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of Title 5), e.g.:

INA Immigration and Nationality Act, Title 8 USC Section 1202(f)

CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Title 50 USC Section 403(g)

ARMEX Arms Export Control Act, Title 22 USC 2778(e)

EXPORT Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)

(b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person.

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney client privilege, or attorney work product.

(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

(b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:

(A) Interfere with enforcement proceedings.

(B) Deprive a person of a fair trial.

(C) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

(D) Disclose confidential sources.

(E) Disclose investigation techniques.

(F) Endanger life or physical safety of any individual.

NR Material not responsive to your FOIA request, excised in accordance with our agreement.

### Privacy Act Grounds for Withholding (5 USC 552a)

(d)(5) Information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding.

(j)(1) CIA records.

(j)(2) Enforcement of criminal law, including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals, except records of arrest.

(k)(1) Classified pursuant to E.O. 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign policy such as intelligence sources and methods.

(k)(2) Investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes.

(k)(3) Regarding protective services to the President of the US or other individual pursuant to Title 18, USC, Section 3056.

(k)(4) Required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records.

(k)(5) Investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability eligibility or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his identity would be held in confidence.

(k)(6) Testing or exam material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal service, the release of which would compromise the testing or exam process.

(k)(7) Material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services.

PP Information about another person or persons which does not constitute a record about the requester as defined in the access provision of the Privacy Act (section (d) (1)) and which may not be released except pursuant to a written request or with the prior written consent of the person or persons concerned (section (b)).

NR Material not responsive to your Privacy Act request.

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Re: For Flash Clearance: AM to S to Declassify Mission China Cables on the Wuhan Institute of Virology
<b>Date:</b>	Sun, 5 Apr 2020 18:04:46 +0000

thank you!

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, April 5, 2020 2:04 PM

**To:** (b)(6) (Wuhan) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: For Flash Clearance: AM to S to Declassify Mission China Cables on the Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hi (b)(6)

I clear without edits.

Best,

(b)(6)

Get Outlook for iOS

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, April 5, 2020 1:44:12 PM

**To:** (b)(6) (Wuhan) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** EAP-CM-Unit Chiefs-DL <EAP-CM-UnitChiefs-DL@state.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** For Flash Clearance: AM to S to Declassify Mission China Cables on the Wuhan Institute of Virology

Dear (b)(6)

Sincere apologies for the flash request, but A/S Stilwell would like to release the attached cables you drafted/approved to Washington Post reporter Josh Rogin for a piece he is doing on COVID-19.

(b)(5)

Thanks much for your help!

Best regards,

(b)(6)

**Sender:** (b)(6)

**Recipient:**

## **An Analysis of Circumstantial Evidence for Wuhan Labs as the Source of the Coronavirus**

BLUF: There is no direct, smoking gun evidence to prove that a leak from Wuhan labs caused the pandemic, but there is circumstantial evidence to suggest such is the case. In this analysis, Wuhan labs are Wuhan CDC (WCDC) and Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). The following is descriptive, not meant to promote the labs leak theory.

### **Origin of the outbreak:**

The Wuhan labs remained the most likely yet least probed. All other possible places of virus's origin have been proven false. WCDC and WIV are least scrutinized and remain mysterious:

There are five possible candidates so far:

1. The Wuhan Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market or the Wet Market
2. Other parts of China, especially Guangdong province in the south
3. Other countries, especially the United States and Italy
4. Origin of the virus unknown, yet to be determined by "scientists"
5. The WCDC and WIV

#### **#1: The Wet Market**

--The first known patient who was diagnosed 12/012019 was not related to the Wet Market

--The 1/24/2020 [Lancet article by 29 scientists from China](#) challenged the Wet Market theory, confirmed by the [journal Science two days later](#).

--the Wet Market did not sell bats, as [confirmed by China's own local medical expert in China's official media](#).

--David Ignatius of the Washington Post [calls the Wet Market theory "shaky."](#)

#### **#2: Other parts of China**

There have been several studies pointing to the southern Chinese province of Guangdong as the origin of the Wuhan virus, mostly because SARS, H1N1 viruses are all from there. But none has explained why there is no outbreak in other parts of China, except in Wuhan

#### **#3: U.S. and Italy**

Self explanatory.

#### **#4: Unknown, to be determined by scientists**

Widely considered a CCP decoy tactic to shield China from culpability after all the three above failed to convince

#### #5: The WDC and WIV

--The most logical place to investigate the virus origin has been completely sealed off from outside inquiry by the CCP. A gag order to both places was issued on 1/01/2020, and a Major General from the PLA took over the WIV since early Jan. Of the five possible theories, the WDC and WIV are most likely yet least investigated. All other proposed theories are likely to be a decoy to prevent inquiry to WDC and WIV.

#### **Direct charges against WDC and WIV as the virus leaker**

The central issue involves the WDC and WIV's obsession with collecting and testing a massive amount of virus-carrying bats. The earliest lab testing (12/26/2019) of the first treated patient at the Wuhan Central Hospital was determined to be "Bat SARS-like Coronavirus."

#### Circumstantial evidence against WDC

--The Chinese official media lionizes WDC's Batman virologist Tian Junhua as having collected over 10,000 virus-carrying bats as lab samples for China's virus research nationwide.

--Tian Junhua admitted that he was occasionally "rained" on by bat's urines and had to self quarantine at his WDC lab for 14 days a few years ago, proving WDC knew all along the lethality and incubation time length of the Bat coronavirus.

--Tian Junhua's unsafe handling of the bat virus was criticized by a 2/15/2020 article by scientists Xiao Botao and Lei Xiao of South China University of Technology in the scholarly website ResearchGate, and it indicates WDC was a possible source of the virus, not the Wet Market

-- WDC is a Level 2 virus safety facility which is low. The vast amount of experimental bats poses serious safety issue

--WDC is less than 300 meters away from the Wet Market. A virus from its lab could easily make its way to the Wet Market where 28 of the 41 initial cases studied by the Chinese scientists who authored the 1/24/2020 Lancet article were related to.

#### Circumstantial evidence against WIV

There are broadly three charges against WIV for leaking the virus:

A.) Its lead coronavirus scientist Shi Zhengli conducted genetic engineering of bat virus to make it easily transmittable to humans

B.) WIV is a Level-4 maximum safety standard facility yet it's poorly managed, causing unintentional leak of the deadly virus from its lab to the outside population

C.) It participated in a deliberate coverup, especially destruction of any evidence of leaks and disappearance of its employee as Patient Zero

Circumstantial evidence for A.) Human engineering of virus by Dr. Shi Zhengli

--On 1/31/2020, a group of Indian scientists published a bombshell article claiming the Wuhan virus was very likely genetically engineered in a lab. The only lab that's capable of doing such deed in all of China would be WIV. China immediately launched a fierce rebuttal forcing the Indian medical journal to

withdraw the article from its website, but the Indians refused to say their analysis and conclusions are wrong. The abstract of the article is still on its website and the original article in its entirety has been reprinted by other research publications.

--Other int'l scientists provide support for Shi's rebuttal, but suspicion lingers that Shi holds an important and powerful position in the field in China and has had extensive cooperation with many int'l virologists who might be doing her a favor.

--Wu Xiaohua's charges:

The most serious challenge against Shi and WIV as the leaker has come from another Chinese medical person presumably a plastic surgeon whose online name is Wu Xiaohua who has launched a series of crusade against Shi and WIV

--Wu's broadsides are serious, prompting Shi Zhengli to "swear with my life" that the virus did not come from WIV.

--Wu's charges involve two parts: A: Shi plays with God and uses bat virus to create a coronavirus that can infect humans. B. To make the transition from bat virus to human virus, Shi uses an intermediate animal vector in WIV lab, and it's those lab animals that got loose and created the pandemic. C. which is the most plausible, WIV's management of deadly viruses and virus-carrying lab animals has been appallingly poor and negligent.

--Circumstantial evidence supporting Wu Xiaohua's charges against Shi and WIV

--Shi Zhengli herself is a world-renown Bat Woman of China dedicated her research to specifically focus on Bat virus research.

--In 2015, Shi and 9 other Chinese scientists admitted in an article in Nature Medicine entitled "A SARS-like Cluster [ 25 ] of Circulating Bat Coronaviruses Shows Potential for Human Emergence" that she and her team did indeed genetically engineer "chimeric" and "hybrid" virus in her lab. In part, it says "we built a chimeric virus encoding a novel, zoonotic CoV spike protein ... isolated from Chinese horseshoe bats." "The hybrid virus allowed us to evaluate the ability of the novel spike protein to cause disease independently of other necessary adaptive mutations in its natural backbone."

--In an astonishing 3/2/2019 article called "Bat Coronavirus in China" published in the Switzerland-based medical journal Viruses, just 9 months before the Wuhan outbreak, Shi Zhengli and her co-authors warn that "it is highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China."

Circumstantial evidence against Shi and WIV on charge of poor management causing the virus leak from WIV lab

--US State Department cables in 2018 warning WIV safety problems as picked up Josh Rogin and Tobias Hoonhout.

--Wu Xiaohua charges that the WIV lab's virus-carrying animals are often sold as pets, dead lab animals were not properly cremated but placed randomly around, and even the lab workers boil and eat lab-used eggs. Wu's charges of WIV management negligence are specific and have not been convincingly rebutted by WIV.

---WIV is the only and highest safety level virus lab in China. It has an estimated 1,500 staff yet it is headed by a 39 year old woman named Wang Yanyi who is married to her former college professor Shu Hongbing, the Vice President of Wuhan University nearby.

--WIV has failed to convince the world of the whereabouts of its former employee Huang Yanlin, rumored to be Patient Zero. Huang worked at WIV but she is the only WIV employee whose bio, profile and picture have been deleted by WIV, fueling speculation of foul-play. WIV issued vigorous denial about Huang being infected claiming she has left WIV to another unnamed province to work and is currently healthy and fine. But Huang herself has never appeared in public and she has since "disappeared."

<b>From:</b>	"SMART Archive" <>
<b>To:</b>	SMART Core <>
<b>Subject:</b>	Japan's 17th Annual STS Forum: The COVID-19 Pandemic, Climate Change and the Future of Humankind
<b>Date:</b>	Mon, 19 Oct 2020 07:26:52 GMT

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SBU~~ DeControlled



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**MRN:** 20 TOKYO 1784  
**Date/DTG:** Oct 19, 2020 / 190726Z OCT 20  
**From:** AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
**Action:** WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*  
**E.O.:** 13526  
**TAGS:** ECON, PGOV, PREL, ETTC, TSPA, SHLH, SENV, KNCV, JP, CN, RU, TW, MX, EUN  
**Captions:** SENSITIVE  
**Subject:** Japan's 17th Annual STS Forum: The COVID-19 Pandemic, Climate Change and the Future of Humankind

1. ~~(SBU)~~ **Summary:** More than 1,500 global leaders in science and technology, policymaking, business, and media from nearly 120 countries participated in the 17th Annual Meeting of the Science and Technology in Society (STS) Forum, which took place virtually from October 3 to 6. Japanese and American voices were prominent in every panel discussion and represented one-third of the registered participants at the invitation-only event. The Forum tackled many challenging substantive topics despite a dramatically streamlined schedule to accommodate time differences and the virtual format. It focused on taking the lessons learned through COVID-19 response and mitigation and applying them to solve other global challenges, such as climate change. Panels also discussed ways that advanced communications are driving societal changes that require stronger data governance. The Forum released a summary statement, which is attached. End summary.

#### **Suga Administration Priorities Highlighted**

2. (U) Despite his resignation as prime minister, Shinzo Abe retained his role as honorary chair of the STS Forum, appearing via a pre-recorded video message and welcoming the more than 1,500 registered global participants. Newly-installed Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga delegated the delivery of his opening remarks to Asako Omi, Diet member and daughter of STS Forum founder Koji Omi. The comments emphasized his administration's intention to treat the COVID-19 pandemic and the Japanese people's safety as his number one priority. The remarks

also noted his desire to strengthen Japan's digitalization via a new digital agency. This effort will support implementation of Society 5.0 to tackle domestic issues like Japan's rapid aging and declining population and global problems such as climate change.

### **U.S. Voices Receive Top Billing**

3. (U) U.S. speakers received prominent placement throughout the STS Forum, especially in the first day's line-up, which featured a virtual conversation about COVID-19 between three Americans – National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases Director Dr. Anthony Fauci, University of Pennsylvania Professor Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and the moderator, Chairman Emeritus of Pfizer. Hank McKinnell. Dr. Kelvin Droegemeier, Science Advisor to the President, highlighted the vibrant bilateral S&T collaboration between the United States and Japan in his pre-recorded opening session remarks. He referenced the December 2019 signing of the Tokyo Statement on Quantum Information Science and Technology Collaboration and applauded the international collaboration in Japan's Moonshot Research and Development Program. Other U.S. government voices included U.S. Department of Energy Under Secretary for Science Paul Dabbar, National Institute of Standards and Technology Director Walter Copan, National Science Foundation (NSF) Director Sethuraman Panchanathan, and National Academy of Sciences President Marcia McNutt.

### **Global Leaders Emphasize Data Flow, Diversity, and Dialogue**

4. (U) Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko in his remarks noted that his country was the first to register and use a safe COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, but neglected to mention the Sputnik V vaccine had not been through a phase three clinical trial. Chernyshenko also highlighted the importance of cross-border data flows with the explosion of data that would be generated by the proliferation of connected devices. The European Union's Mariya Gabriel, Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education, and Youth, noted that correcting inequality in access to S&T benefits required investing in skills and promoting gender equality in STEM to avoid leaving people behind. She also flagged the unparalleled size and outreach of the E.U.'s Horizon R&D program, the open nature of the European data platform, Europe's green deal to achieve climate security by 2050, and the criticality of ocean health to the future of human life on the planet. [Comment: Although Gabriel was the only woman on her panel, overall the forum had better gender and diversity inclusion this year than in previous years. End comment.] Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Marcelo Luis Ebrard Casaubon spoke on behalf of all Latin American and the Caribbean nations about the increasing importance of the collaboration between the STS Forum for expanding dialogue between scientists and policymakers in the region to accelerate S&T innovation, including a new regional STS meeting that will begin next year.

### **Industry Embraces Changing Technology, Trust-Building, and Sustainability**

5. (U) Takeshi Uchiyamada, Toyota's Chairman of the Board and Chair of Japan's Council on Competitiveness, noted that the COVID-19 pandemic "made obvious Japan's delay in using technology in society," and lamented that "sub-optimized systems had been used for many years." Japan's Society 5.0 vision needs to leverage the pandemic as an opportunity to learn and change, he emphasized. Policymakers must identify privacy solutions and rebuild trust so that information sharing can help sustain lives and economic activity while respecting human freedoms. But beyond COVID-19 changes, he emphasized the importance of climate change

and said developing a decarbonized society based on sustainable energy was also critical to humankind's survival. This response is "even more important than the response to the pandemic," he stressed.

6. (U) Thanks to the virtual setting, the forum's largest financial supporters had a unique opportunity to get their messages out via commercial-style videos that ran between each session. For example, the BristolMyersSquibb CEO's speech targeted Japanese finance and health policymakers who have been cutting costs in the health care system by reducing reimbursements for innovative healthcare solutions with a catchphrase "patients are waiting."

### **COVID-19: Who Learned What? What's Next?**

7. (U) Chien-Jen Chen, distinguished research fellow at the Genomics Research Center, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, noted that all nations failed initially in their response to COVID-19. He called on governments to follow Taiwan's lead of providing information transparently, which gained the public's trust, created a virtuous cycle, and aroused the entire population in solidarity against the virus. He stressed that testing, contact tracing and isolation were the key to mitigating COVID-19 infections.

8. (U) On a separate panel, George Fu Gao, director-general of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (the PRC's CDC), stated that in a world with geopolitical and economic rivalries, scientists who wanted to collaborate globally had to learn to communicate very carefully. "Everything must be science-based, the public must understand all strategies, and the scientists must advise the leaders who have to make the decisions." Population-based medicine or public health is not the same as health care, and needs to be organized by the motto "of the people, by the people, for the people" with data sharing as a key, he said. Gao expressed optimism at the speed of vaccine progress, mentioning that the UAE approved emergency usage of a Chinese-made vaccine candidate, and likened combatting COVID-19 globally to fighting a blaze in an apartment building where "you have to work together, or soon the whole building will be on fire."

9. (U) Expanding on the remarks by Russia's Deputy Prime Minister, Russian panelist Arkady Dvorkovich, Chairman of the Skolkovo Foundation, clarified that two COVID-19 vaccines were being tested in Russia. No mass vaccinations have occurred yet, he clarified, indicating that vaccinations will start in November with doctors and essential workers. "Production is the tough part now," he commented, "and it will be impossible to achieve 100 percent vaccination, especially because the equipment to produce vaccines, primarily sourced from the United States, Germany, and China, is in short supply." "Vaccines should be funded by governments," he assessed, with a smile, "people trust the British vaccine more than the Russian vaccine."

### **Japanese Experts Address COVID and Digitalization**

10. (U) Yoshihide Hayashizaki, Program Director of Preventive Medicine and Diagnosis Innovation Program at RIKEN, Japan, noted that we needed to balance economic easing against the spread of infection until a vaccine is available. He cautioned that governments had lifted restrictions too early while the risk of rapid spread persisted and called on scientists to respond to the "fake information" and errors spread by media. Dr. Jun Murai, from the Keio University Cyber Civilization Research Center, stated that Japan had a clear 2040 digitalization vision that would enable people to do everything from home by 2040. He noted that COVID-19 forced

many companies to achieve that vision within only six months, but public services were the biggest laggard. Noting the importance of security and privacy, Murai called on interested participants and government to establish a new global forum to discuss ideas, data interoperability, and other legal frameworks, similar to ICAO. Dr. Hiroshi Yamakawa, President of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, JAXA, emphasized the importance of space systems supporting digitalization, noting growing interest in satellite-based Internet broadband service. Data links and portable terminals that provide health care and education are essential in bringing society back together to combat COVID-19 and other global challenges, he said.

### **Need to Focus on Adaptation, as a Climate Change Tipping Point Has Already Been Reached**

11. (U) Yuan Tseh Lee, President Emeritus of Academia Sinica in Taiwan and the 1986 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, shared a stark message that the earth had already reached a tipping point and there was a need to chart a new course toward adaptation via global collaboration. Only the most adaptable species will survive, he emphasized, so we need to learn to adapt better and recognize that the planet is “only safe anywhere if it is safe everywhere.” Hakan Bulgurlu, CEO of Arçelik, a leading manufacturer of home appliances, agreed and has focused his company on sustainability, carbon neutrality, and protection of the water supply from microplastics. In response to COVID-19, Arcelik collaborated with aviation companies to build mechanical ventilators, manufacturing 5,000 units in three months, shipping them to countries at cost, and sharing their plans as open source. But he is more concerned about climate change, predicting that more than two billion people who rely on the Everest basin for drinking water will soon face shortages, leading to a mass migration, “the likes of which the planet has not seen before.” “COVID-19 is a pinprick compared to the sledgehammer or nuclear bomb of the coming climate crisis,” he stated.

12. (U) Highlighting action against climate change and the importance of digitalization, METI Vice-Minister for International Affairs Shigehiro Tanaka stated that the COVID-19 pandemic had forced governments and societies to “accelerate long-needed changes.” The GOJ is fully prepared to make the difficult political decisions to support its climate goals through efforts such as the “connect and manage” scheme, which seeks to allocate one-quarter of Japan’s power grid capacity to renewable energy suppliers, Tanaka added. Makoto Gonokami, President of The University of Tokyo, emphasized the school’s new industry collaboration, the Center for Global Commons, and its issuance of 40-year bonds to promote upfront, innovative investments that will combat the global crises of COVID-19 and climate change.

### **Comment- The Future of the STS Forum?**

13. ~~(SBU)~~ Organizers announced the 18th STS Forum will be held October 3-5, 2021. However, the advanced age of Koji Omi, the forum’s founder and a former finance minister, leaves doubt about whether it can continue to thrive. Omi’s daughter, now a Diet member, has been more of an administrative caretaker of her father’s STS Forum legacy than an S&T influencer in her own right. Organizers hope to return to its usual in-person format and Kyoto venue. But the virtual format might be a positive change for the future, allowing broader participation and sometimes deeper conversations. It could also help encourage a younger generation to pick up the mantle of responsibility for S&T change. As the forum asks how to

expand its influence to new regions of the world and become more accessible to a diverse range of voices and personal circumstances, a hybrid live/virtual session might be its answer. End comment.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Signature:** YOUNG

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**Drafted By:** TOKYO: (b)(6)  
**Cleared By:** ECON: (b)(6)  
ECON: (b)(6)  
ESTH: (b)(6) (ECON)  
**Approved By:** ECON: (b)(6)  
**Released By:** TOKYO: (b)(6)

**Info:** NAGOYA, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; SAPPORO, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; NAHA, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; FUKUOKA, AMCONSUL ROUTINE; OSAKA KOBE, AMCONSUL ROUTINE

**Attachments:** Statement-2020.pdf

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**Dissemination Rule:** Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SBU~~

<b>Sender:</b>	"SMART Archive" <>
<b>Recipient:</b>	SMART Core <>

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	EAP-CM-Office-DL <EAP-CM-Office-DL@state.gov>
<b>CC:</b>	EAP-EX-FOIA-Taskings <EAP-EX-FOIA-Taskings@state.gov>; (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Fw: New FOIA Case (F-2020-05255) concerning COVID19/Tasker request
<b>Date:</b>	Tue, 19 May 2020 17:31:04 +0000

Hello China Desk,

Please find attached a cable for your review. This is a time sensitive request. FOIA is asking if there are any FOIA exemptions that you believe should be applied to this cable.

Please feel free contact (b)(6) directly if you have any questions regarding this request.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 1:18 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** EAP-EX-FOIA-Taskings <EAP-EX-FOIA-Taskings@state.gov>

**Subject:** New FOIA Case (F-2020-05255) concerning COVID19/Tasker request

Dear colleagues,

This is a sensitive tasker request concerning COVID19/Wuhan.

Please review the cable and let me know if any FOIA exemptions apply. We are planning to have a final draft **by tomorrow 10:00hrs** (b)(5)

Just to be clear, we are looking for your input, we are not requesting a search.

Please let me know if you have further questions. For the records, this case will be tasked out to you for further processing but since most of you don't have FOIAExpress access I'm enclosing the cable and requester letter.

Thanks again and let me know if you have further questions.

V/R,

(b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	EAP-CM-Office-DL <EAP-CM-Office-DL@state.gov>; EAP-EX-FOIA-Taskings <EAP-EX-FOIA-Taskings@state.gov>; (b)(6)

Tuesday, April 21, 2020

Office of Information Programs and Services  
(A/GIS/IPS/RL)  
Department of State  
2201 C St. NW, Rm. B266  
Washington, DC 205200000

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to: **20200340DOS094**

Dear FOIA Officer:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following:

*Copies of two official warnings that were sent from the U.S. consulate in Wuhan, China to State Headquarters between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018 concerning the Wuhan Institute for Virology (WIR). One of these cables was sent on January 19, 2018, and was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment, science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. Both cables are mentioned in the Washington Post article attached for your reference.*

*I request expedited processing for the release of these records, as they likely contain information pertinent to the COVID-19 pandemic. As outlined under 5 U.S.C. Sec 552(a)(6)(E), there is a "compelling need" for the release of these records as they concern a matter of current exigency to the American public. Please also note that the Office of Justice's Information Policy makes clear that "FOIA processing should be expedited whenever it is demonstrated that an individual's life or personal safety would be jeopardized by the failure to process a request immediately," as is the case with the current COVID-19 pandemic.*

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

The National Security Archive qualifies for "representative of the news media" status under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) and, therefore, may not be charged search and review fees. (See *National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense*, 880 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1989), *cert denied*, 110 S Ct. 1478 (1990)). This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project that is not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, visit our website at [www.nsarchive.org](http://www.nsarchive.org).

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. Please notify me before incurring any photocopying costs over \$100.

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If you have any questions regarding the identity of these records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, call (202) 994-7000 or send an email to [foiamail@gwu.edu](mailto:foiamail@gwu.edu). I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty-day statutory period.

Sincerely,

Lauren Harper

# The Washington Post

*Democracy Dies in Darkness*

## Coronavirus

[Live updates](#)[U.S. map](#)[World map](#)[FAQs](#)[How to help](#)[Flattening](#)

## State Department cables warned of safety issues at Wuhan lab studying bat coronaviruses

By **Josh Rogin**

April 14, 2020 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

Two years before the novel coronavirus pandemic upended the world, U.S. Embassy officials visited a Chinese research facility in the city of Wuhan several times and sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab, which was conducting risky studies on coronaviruses from bats. The cables have fueled discussions inside the U.S. government about whether this or another Wuhan lab was the source of the virus — even though conclusive proof has yet to emerge.

In January 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing took the unusual step of repeatedly sending U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which had in 2015 become China's first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international bioresearch safety (known as BSL-4). WIV issued a news release in English about the last of these visits, which occurred on March 27, 2018. The U.S. delegation was led by Jamison Fouss, the consul general in Wuhan, and Rick Switzer, the embassy's counselor of environment, science, technology and health. Last week, WIV erased that statement from its website, though it remains archived on the Internet.

What the U.S. officials learned during their visits concerned them so much that they  
FL-2021-00033 A-00000462845 "UNCLASSIFIED" 03/24/2022 Page 15  
dispatched two diplomatic cables categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified back to  
Washington. The cables warned about safety and management weaknesses at the  
WIV lab and proposed more attention and help. The first cable, which I obtained,  
also warns that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses and their potential human  
transmission represented a risk of a new SARS-like pandemic.

AD

“During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab  
has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators  
needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory,” states the Jan. 19,  
2018, cable, which was drafted by two officials from the embassy's environment,  
science and health sections who met with the WIV scientists. (The State  
Department declined to comment on this and other details of the story.)

The Chinese researchers at WIV were receiving assistance from the Galveston  
National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch and other U.S.  
organizations, but the Chinese requested additional help. The cables argued that  
the United States should give the Wuhan lab further support, mainly because its  
research on bat coronaviruses was important but also dangerous.

As the cable noted, the U.S. visitors met with Shi Zhengli, the head of the research project, who had been publishing studies related to bat coronaviruses for many years. In November 2017, just before the U.S. officials' visit, Shi's team had published research showing that horseshoe bats they had collected from a cave in Yunnan province were very likely from the same bat population that spawned the SARS coronavirus in 2003.

AD

“Most importantly,” the cable states, “the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS-coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like diseases. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention.”

The research was designed to prevent the next SARS-like pandemic by anticipating how it might emerge. But even in 2015, other scientists questioned whether Shi's team was taking unnecessary risks. In October 2014, the U.S. government had imposed a moratorium on funding of any research that makes a virus more deadly or contagious, known as “gain-of-function” experiments.

world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn't come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.

AD

“The cable tells us that there have long been concerns about the possibility of the threat to public health that came from this lab’s research, if it was not being adequately conducted and protected,” he said.

There are similar concerns about the nearby Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab, which operates at biosecurity level 2, a level significantly less secure than the level-4 standard claimed by the Wuhan Insititute of Virology lab, Xiao said. That’s important because the Chinese government still refuses to answer basic questions about the origin of the novel coronavirus while suppressing any attempts to examine whether either lab was involved.

Sources familiar with the cables said they were meant to sound an alarm about the  
FL-2021-00033 A-00000462845 "UNCLASSIFIED" 03/24/2022 Page 18  
grave safety concerns at the WIV lab, especially regarding its work with bat  
coronaviruses. The embassy officials were calling for more U.S. attention to this lab  
and more support for it, to help it fix its problems.

AD

“The cable was a warning shot,” one U.S. official said. “They were begging people to pay attention to what was going on.”

No extra assistance to the labs was provided by the U.S. government in response to these cables. The cables began to circulate again inside the administration over the past two months as officials debated whether the lab could be the origin of the pandemic and what the implications would be for the U.S. pandemic response and relations with China.

suspected either the WIV or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention lab was the source of the novel coronavirus outbreak. According to the New York Times, the intelligence community has provided no evidence to confirm this. But one senior administration official told me that the cables provide one more piece of evidence to support the possibility that the pandemic is the result of a lab accident in Wuhan.

AD

“The idea that it was just a totally natural occurrence is circumstantial. The evidence it leaked from the lab is circumstantial. Right now, the ledger on the side of it leaking from the lab is packed with bullet points and there’s almost nothing on the other side,” the official said.

As my colleague David Ignatius noted, the Chinese government’s original story — that the virus emerged from a seafood market in Wuhan — is shaky. Research by Chinese experts published in the Lancet in January showed the first known patient, identified on Dec. 1, had no connection to the market, nor did more than one-third of the cases in the first large cluster. Also, the market didn’t sell bats.

Shi and other WIV researchers have categorically denied this lab was the origin for the novel coronavirus. On Feb. 3, her team was the first to publicly report the virus known as 2019-nCoV was a bat-derived coronavirus.

AD

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has put a total lockdown on information related to the virus origins. Beijing has yet to provide U.S. experts with samples of the novel coronavirus collected from the earliest cases. The Shanghai lab that published the novel coronavirus genome on Jan. 11 was quickly shut down by authorities for “rectification.” Several of the doctors and journalists who reported on the spread early on have disappeared.

On Feb. 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new biosecurity law to be accelerated. On Wednesday, CNN reported the Chinese government has placed severe restrictions requiring approval before any research institution publishes anything on the origin of the novel coronavirus.

The origin story is not just about blame. It's crucial to understanding how the novel coronavirus pandemic started because that informs how to prevent the next one.

The Chinese government must be transparent and answer the questions about the Wuhan labs because they are vital to our scientific understanding of the virus, said Xiao.

AD

We don't know whether the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan lab, but the cable pointed to the danger there and increases the impetus to find out, he said.

"I don't think it's a conspiracy theory. I think it's a legitimate question that needs to be investigated and answered," he said. "To understand exactly how this originated is critical knowledge for preventing this from happening in the future."

### **Read more:**

[Read this piece in Chinese](#)

[Read this piece in Spanish](#)

[David Ignatius: How did covid-19 begin? Its initial origin story is shaky.](#)

**DCM Forden Initial Months Proposed Events****Internal Working Meetings**

(b)(5)

**POL**

<b>Proposed Event</b>	<b>Proposed Date (if known)</b>	<b>Justification (2-4 sentences)</b>
Join Ambassador's courtesy call with AG COS Matt Whitaker	July 31, TBC (1:30 pm)	Meet DC-based DOJ leadership with implications for Mission's law enforcement engagement. Meeting also likely to include DAAG for International Affairs Bruce Swartz.
Meeting with MFA Meidasi DG Cong Peiwu	Early- to Mid-August	Meet DCM's Main MFA counterpart.
Meeting with VFM Zheng Zeguang	Mid-August while serving as CDA	Meet Embassy's main MFA counterpart.
Host Scholars' Lunch at DCMR	Late August	Opportunity to discuss U.S.-China relations with leading Chinese foreign policy scholars.

**PAS**

<b>Proposed Event</b>	<b>Proposed Date (if known)</b>	<b>Justification (2-4 sentences)</b>
Lunch with selected leading foreign journalists	Sept TBD	Beijing is home to a large and dynamic foreign press corps. The Mission's profile—always substantial—has if anything increased with mounting tensions in our bilateral relationship. DCM Forden should host an off-the-record lunch event at his residence for leading Beijing-based journalists to become acquainted and exchange views on the current situation in China. The Ambassador supports this event and would likely also attend.

**FINATT**

<b>Proposed Event</b>	<b>Proposed Date (if known)</b>	<b>Justification (2-4 sentences)</b>
Meet with MOF Vice Minister Liao Min		Liao serves as the Vice Minister of Finance responsible for U.S.-China relations. He is also the Deputy Director of the Central Economic and Financial Affairs Commission, and has a direct line to Vice Premier Liu He.

**ESTH**

<b>Proposed Event</b>	<b>Proposed Date (if known)</b>	<b>Justification (2-4 sentences)</b>
Meeting with Zhang Jianguo, Vice Minister,	August 17	Zhang is responsible for MOST international cooperation and the State Administration of

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)		Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA). Before appointment as MOST Vice Minister in March, he was Deputy Administrator of SAFEA and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. He is familiar with the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement, which dates to 1979 and is set to expire on August 25, and he could speak broadly about China's S&T policies, including in the high-profile areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotech, and about China's restrictions on data sharing. He requested a meeting with the FO.
Meeting with Zhao Yingmin, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE)	TBD	Zhao is responsible for international cooperation at MEE. He started his career in the Environmental Protection Agency, the precursor to MEE, in 1989 and previously oversaw the departments of Science, Technology and Standards and of Pollution Prevention and Control. He could speak about the March 2018 reorganization of the MEE, about China's domestic environmental problems, and about U.S.-China bilateral cooperation.
Meeting with Tang Xiao'ou, founder of SenseTime, China's most valuable AI start-up	TBD	Tang, a Western-educated computer science professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, hopes to expand SenseTime, currently valued at \$4.5 billion, beyond China. The company makes much of its money selling facial recognition services to local public security bureaus, and Tang could discuss the Chinese government's

		attempt to integrate AI into its public security goals. Tang could also speak about AI development in China, including government support. The Ambassador met Tang in May.
Meeting with Zhang Jianyu, Country Director, Environmental Defense Fund China	TBD	Zhang is responsible for EDF China's strategic planning and implementation. EDF China works in a wide variety of areas including environmental supervision, regulation and legislation, green supply chain, greenhouse gas emissions, ocean and fishery conservation, and energy. He could discuss China's overall environmental concerns, including the impacts of China's rising consumption on global environments. He earned degrees from Stanford and Carnegie Mellon and has met with high-level Embassy visitors.
Meeting with George Gao, Director General of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC)	TBD	Gao, also a vice president of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), is an expert in pandemics and China's efforts to prepare for possible disease outbreaks, including bird flu. He leads China's recent work building public health capacity in Africa, including a new African Union Center for Disease Control. He could discuss China's health policies, cooperation between the CCDC and U.S. CDC, and China's growing health work in Africa, an area of possible cooperation.

## Key stakeholder mapping for food safety event

Generally speaking, after the Chinese government reshuffle, there are three government agencies covering food safety issues, they are SAMR, GACC and NHC (National Health Commission).

### **SAMR:**

Department of Food Safety Coordination (食品安全协调司)

Department of Food Manufacturing Safety Supervision (食品生产安全监督管理局)

Department of Food Producing Safety Supervision (食品经营安全监督管理局)

Department of Special Food Safety Supervision(特殊食品安全监督管理局)

Department of Food Spot Checking Supervision (食品安全抽检监测司)

\*Department of International Affairs (国合司)

As an option B, this might be a choice to invite officials from this department to give us a short keynote speak.

\* Department of Legal and Regulations (法规司)

The officials who pushing forward the food safety law are under this department and this maybe an option to invite them to share some insights.

### **GACC**

Import and Export Food Safety Bureau (进出口食品安全局)

This department was originally from AQSIQ and they are leading the food safety issues especially with oversea government agencies.

### **NHC**

Department of Food Safety Standards, Risk Surveillance and Assessment (食品安全标准与监测评估司)

### **Third-party Organizations**

国家食品安全风险评估中心 China National Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (直属  
于国家卫生健康委员会的公共卫生事业单位)

中国疾控中心营养和健康所 Institute for Nutrition and Health of CDC (Chinese Center for  
Disease Control and Prevention)

食品安全治理协同创新中心 Center for Coordination and Innovation of Food Safety Governance (原国家食药监总局支持的, 中国人民大学与清华大学、华南理工大学、国家食品安全风险评估中心、中国农业科学院、中国科学院、中国法学会、环保部等所属的科研机构, 共同开展协同创新合作, 共建食品安全治理协同创新中心)

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**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**To:** Stilwell, David R (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: ASEAN ADDENDUM - RE: April 22, 2020 Press Guidance for the EAP Region  
**Date:** Thu, 23 Apr 2020 16:14:52 +0000

(b)(5)

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**From:** Stilwell, David R (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 9:36 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: ASEAN ADDENDUM - RE: April 22, 2020 Press Guidance for the EAP Region

(b)(5)

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**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 11:26 PM  
**To:** Eapguidance <Eapguidance@state.gov>  
**Subject:** ASEAN ADDENDUM - RE: April 22, 2020 Press Guidance for the EAP Region

The following two items were released to the media at the conclusion of the Secretary's video teleconference tonight with his ASEAN counterparts.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Office of the Spokesperson

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

With U.S. support, Vietnam is on track to become the first President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief country to achieve full ownership of its HIV/AIDS response by the end of 2020 by mobilizing domestic resources and ensuring sustainable financing;

- Sustained support to ASEAN to reduce tuberculosis and malaria in the region. For example, the number of cases of malaria in Laos dropped 70 percent from 2014 to 2017;
- The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Global Disease Detection Operations Center monitors and reports on outbreaks and their risk to communities around the world, including 44 infectious disease outbreaks across ASEAN from 2014-2019, reducing the risk of further spread;
- USAID is working with the ASEAN Secretariat to develop a Public Health Emergency Coordination System, bringing together existing ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre Network, to prepare for and respond to emerging public health emergencies.

**DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL IN HEALTH:** *Fostering the next generation of health care professionals is a critical part of our shared goals for a healthy future. Efforts include:*

- Through the newly launched U.S.-ASEAN Health Futures Alumni Network, we are connecting 2,400 ASEAN medical and public health visiting scholar and program alumni to share best practices and directly engage with U.S. experts;
- Supporting ASEAN physicians, public health trainees, and science students to learn from U.S. expertise through Fulbright educational exchanges, the International Visitor Leadership Program, and other citizen exchanges;
- Training more than 1,300 disease detectives across ASEAN to track diseases, research outbreaks, and respond to health emergencies;
- Creating One Health university networks (four country-specific, one regional) to prepare health workforces to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of infectious diseases, which have trained more than 10,000 students and professionals since 2014.
- Promoting telehealth and e-records to help cities and healthcare professionals deliver services and information efficiently.

###

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**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 8:54 PM

**To:** Eapguidance <[Eapguidance@state.gov](mailto:Eapguidance@state.gov)>

**Subject:** April 22, 2020 Press Guidance for the EAP Region

**April 22, 2020 Press Guidance for the EAP Region**

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The Press Guidance below is intended for internal USG use only. Documents already released by the USG (such as statements, media notes, factsheets) may be issued in written form.

The final PA Guidance package is available, each day, at (Open Net):  
<https://infocentral.state.gov/outreach-tools/press-guidance-packages/>

There WAS NO State Department Press Briefing by the Spokesperson today.

**The Secretary held a Press Briefing today – see transcript below**

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**CORONAVIRUS - INFOCENTRAL SITE**

Information on Coronavirus/COVID-19, including Department guidance, other USG agency guidance (WH, NSC, CDC, HHS, DHS, DOD), and other useful resources are updated regularly on the [Coronavirus InfoCentral Page](#).

<https://infocentral.state.gov/topics/health/coronavirus/>

**CORONAVIRUS - US CITIZEN REPATRIATION AND DOS STAFF  
COVID STATISTICS**

Department of State statistics on U.S. citizen repatriation efforts as well as the health impact of COVID-19 on the Department's workforce. This information will be updated daily at 1pm DC time and available at

<https://www.state.gov/coronavirus/repatriation/>.

**WHITE HOUSE – BRIEFING VIDEOS**

COVID-19 Taskforce Press Briefings and more.

<https://www.youtube.com/user/whitehouse/videos>

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(b)(5)

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**Public Language:**

Secretary Pompeo has spoken on this topic several times recently. Excerpted below are two recent sets of remarks.

- *Excerpt – Secretary Pompeo’s March 26, 2020 Interview on The Hugh Hewitt Show*

**QUESTION:** Two final questions. One’s country specific. Venezuela was already on the brink. When the virus arrives there, and it probably already has, they will not be able to cope. What is the plan for that shattered country?

**SECRETARY POMPEO:** In countries like Venezuela – North Korea would be in a similar situation – we’re doing our best to ensure that humanitarian assistance can make its way in. As we’ve seen before, Hugh, in some of these countries, when humanitarian assistance is offered – we have offered assistance for Iran – they’ll often reject it. I think it’s indicative of these leaders who care so little about their people they execute plans that are corrupt. They take care of the leadership but don’t take care of their own people. I hope that we can do better in each of these three places to help those people make their way through this challenge as well.

<https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-hugh-hewitt-of-the-hugh-hewitt-show-2/>

- *Excerpt – Secretary Pompeo’s March 31, 2020 Press Conference:*

**QUESTION:** Thank you. And then in light of this global pandemic, there’s been a lot of renewed calls from the UN, from the Europeans, from others for sanctions relief. And I know what you’re going to say, we’ve talked about it in this room, that any shortfalls in their healthcare systems are the fault of these regimes themselves. But I’m wondering, if people are dying and sanctions relief would help, regardless of whether or not it empowers the regime, would it ever come to a point where you would reconsider your position? Thank you.

**SECRETARY POMPEO:** Well, of course, we evaluate all of our policies constantly. So the answer is would we ever rethink it – of course, we’re constantly trying to make sure we have our policies right. When it comes to humanitarian assistance, medical devices, equipment, pharmaceuticals, things that people need in these difficult times, those are not sanctioned anywhere at any time that I’m aware of. I mean, just read that whether it’s – it’s not always an American sanction. In North Korea there are UN Security Council resolutions. In other places they are, in fact, American provisions. But in each of those, if you read them, it’s quite on its face that these items aren’t sanctioned. There’s no prohibition on moving humanitarian assistance into these difficult and challenging places.

You rightfully point out some of these countries continue to build bombs and missiles and nuclear capability, all the while their people are starving. So when they make the claim that, boy, they just don’t have the money to feed their people, these are decisions that these people, leaders have often made, not in the best interest of those peoples. It’s, indeed, quite sad to see those governments make those decisions which harm their own people. The last thing I’ll say is not only do we not sanction any of those, nor does any global entity sanction humanitarian assistance, the United States has worked in every one of those places to provide assistance. We’ve worked to try and get assistance into North Korea. We’ve made offers of assistance to Iran. You’ll recall when we first began we’ve worked diligently in Venezuela to get humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan people well. No, the United States understands this is a humanitarian challenge, a humanitarian crisis, and we are deeply committed to ensuring that humanitarian assistance gets to the people of those countries. We care more often about the people in those countries than their own leaders do. That’s sad. That’s a reflection of those regimes too often. It’s the reason, in fact, that we’re working to help those people raise up in their countries, so that they can get a better outcome for themselves as well.

<https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-7/>

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(b)(5)

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

Stilwell, David R (b)(6)

**Recipient:** (b)(6)

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)@state.gov>
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>CC:</b>	Beijing EXEC Staffers <BeijingEXEC@state.gov>
<b>Subject:</b>	E-ACTION MEMO: (b)(5) Proposed Meeting with the Director of China CDC on October 10, 2017
<b>Date:</b>	Tue, 26 Sep 2017 23:34:29 -0400

(b)(6)

HHS would like (b)(5) to meet with the new director of the China CDC on October 10, 2017 (the day after Columbus Day) at the China CDC campus. HHS estimates that the travel between the Embassy and the China CDC Campus is 45 minutes to an hour each way and believes that, including travel time, the event will occupy about three hours on (b)(5) schedule.

Below please find an e-action memo.

(b)(6)

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**E- ACTION MEMORANDUM**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**TO:** Ambassador Terry Branstad

**THROUGH** A/DCM – Jonathan Fritz

**FROM:** HHS –(b)(6)  
CDC –(b)(6)

**DATE:** September 27, 2017

**SUBJECT:** (b)(5) Meeting with Dr. George Gao at China CDC  
on October 10, 2017

**Issue for Decision**

Whether to meet with Dr. George Gao, the new Director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), on October 10, 2017, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., at the China CDC Campus, 155 Changbai Road Changping District, Beijing.

### Background

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

HHS estimates that the travel between the Embassy and the China CDC Campus is 45 minutes to an hour each way and believes that, including travel time, the event will occupy about three hours (b)(5) (1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.).

### Recommendation

(b)(5)

Drafted by: HHS  
Cleared by: CDC  
ESTH  
HHS

(b)(6)

Official ~~-SBU~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**Sender:** (b)(6)@state.gov>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)  
Beijing EXEC Staffers <BeijingEXEC@state.gov>