

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR JACKSON COUNTY

LARRY JOHNSON and GAYLE JOHNSON

Plaintiffs,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY, a corporation;
EAGLE POINT HARDWARE, LLC, a
corporation.

Defendants.

CASE NO.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT FOR PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, NEGLIGENCE, FRAUD,
BREACH OF WARRANTIES, LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM

Total Claim: \$39,037,679.39

Claim is Not Subject to Mandatory
Arbitration

Fee Authority: ORS 21.160(1)(e)

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, Larry Johnson and Gayle Johnson, by and through their undersigned counsel, and for their cause of action against Defendants Monsanto Company and Eagle Point Hardware, LLC, alleging the following upon information and belief (including investigation made by and through Plaintiffs' counsel), except those allegations that pertain to Plaintiffs, which are based on personal knowledge:

INTRODUCTION

All claims in this action are a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligent, willful, and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, and/or sale of the products as Roundup®. Plaintiffs in this action seek recovery for damages as a result of LARRY JOHNSON developing Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma ("NHL"), which was directly and proximately caused by such wrongful conduct by Defendant, the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of Roundup®, and its active ingredient, glyphosate, and the attendant effects of developing NHL. Plaintiffs did not know of an association between exposure to Roundup® and the increased risk of developing

NHL until well after the International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”), an agency of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), first published its evaluation of glyphosate.

THE PARTIES

PLAINTIFFS

Larry Johnson & Gayle Johnson

1. Plaintiffs Larry Johnson (“Plaintiff Johnson”) and Gayle Johnson are citizens and residents of Fayetteville, Washington County, Oregon.

2. Plaintiff Johnson was first exposed to Roundup® in approximately the 1990s in Washington County, Oregon, when he applied Roundup® to kill weeds at his home. Mr. Johnson sprayed concentrated and premixed Roundup® in his yard and garden on a monthly basis during the spring and summer. He continued to use Roundup® when he moved to his current residence in White City, Oregon. That usage continued until 2019. Plaintiff Johnson was routinely exposed to Roundup® during this time.

3. Plaintiff Johnson was diagnosed with NHL in September 2019 in Oregon, at Providence Medford Medical Center. He then proceeded to chemotherapy treatment and suffered the effects attendant thereto as a direct and proximate result of the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of Roundup® and Defendants’ wrongful and negligent conduct in the research, development, testing, manufacture, production, promotion, distribution, marketing, and sale of Roundup®.

4. As a direct and proximate result of these injuries, Plaintiff Larry Johnson incurred damages which include, but are not limited to, permanent injury; pain, suffering, and mental anguish in the past and will continue to incur pain, suffering, and mental anguish in the future; loss of enjoyment of life; and Plaintiff Johnson was otherwise damaged in a personal and/or

pecuniary nature. His non-economic damages are to be determined by a jury, but include a sum not to exceed \$35,000,000 to justly and fairly compensate him for his losses. As a further result of injuries received, Plaintiff has incurred medical expenses from the date of injury to the present in the approximate amount of \$567,703.39 and it is likely that he will need additional future medical care in an amount not presently known, but currently roughly estimated to be \$469,976.00 for purposes of ORCP 18(b).

5. As a direct and proximate result of these injuries, Plaintiff Gayle Johnson suffered loss of consortium and/or society. The damages for such harms shall be proved at trial, but such sums are not estimated to exceed \$3,000,000.

6. During the entire time that Plaintiff Johnson was exposed to Roundup[®], it was not known that exposure to Roundup[®] was injurious to his health or the health of others.

DEFENDANT

MONSANTO

7. Defendant Monsanto Company is a foreign corporation and was at all times relevant herein authorized to do, and actually doing, business in Jackson County, Oregon, through, among other ways set forth herein, the packaging, promoting, marketing, distributing, and/or selling of their products, specifically and including Roundup[®].

8. In 1970, Defendant Monsanto Company discovered the herbicidal properties of glyphosate and began marketing it in products in 1974 under the brand name Roundup[®]. Roundup[®] is a non-selective herbicide used to kill weeds that commonly compete with the growing of crops. By 2001, glyphosate had become the most-used active ingredient in American agriculture with 85–90 millions of pounds used annually. That number grew to 185 million pounds by 2007. As of 2013, glyphosate was the world's most widely used herbicide.

9. Monsanto is a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri. It is the world's leading producer of glyphosate. As of 2009, Monsanto was the world's leading producer of seeds, accounting for 27% of the world seed market. The majority of these seeds are of the Roundup Ready® brand. The stated advantage of Roundup Ready® crops is that they substantially improve a farmer's ability to control weeds, since glyphosate can be sprayed in the fields during the growing season without harming their crops. In 2010, an estimated 70% of corn and cotton, and 90% of soybean fields in the United States were Roundup Ready®.

10. Monsanto's glyphosate products are registered in 130 countries and approved for use on over 100 different crops. They are ubiquitous in the environment. Numerous studies confirm that glyphosate is found in rivers, streams, and groundwater in agricultural areas where Roundup® is used. It has been found in food, in the urine of agricultural workers, and even in the urine of urban dwellers who are not in direct contact with glyphosate.

11. On March 20, 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer ("IARC"), an agency of the World Health Organization ("WHO"), issued an evaluation of several herbicides, including glyphosate. That evaluation was based, in part, on studies of exposures to glyphosate in several countries around the world, and it traces the health implications from exposure to glyphosate since 2001.

12. On July 29, 2015, the IARC issued the formal monograph relating to glyphosate. In that monograph, the IARC Working Group provides a thorough review of the numerous studies and data relating to glyphosate exposure in humans.

13. The IARC Working Group classified glyphosate as a Group 2A herbicide, which means that it is probably carcinogenic to humans. The IARC Working Group concluded that the

cancers most associated with glyphosate exposure are non-Hodgkin lymphoma and other haematopoietic cancers, including lymphocytic lymphoma/chronic lymphocytic leukemia, B-cell lymphoma, and multiple myeloma.

14. The IARC evaluation is significant. It confirms what has been believed for years: that glyphosate is toxic to humans. Nevertheless, Monsanto, since it began selling Roundup®, has represented it as safe to humans and the environment. Indeed, Monsanto has repeatedly proclaimed and continues to proclaim to the world, and particularly to United States consumers, that glyphosate-based herbicides, including Roundup®, create no unreasonable risks to human health or to the environment.

DEFENDANT EAGLE POINT HARDWARE, LLC

15. Upon information and belief, Eagle Point Hardware, LLC is a domestic corporation who, at all times relevant herein, was authorized to do, and actually doing, business in Jackson County, Oregon with its principal place of business in Jacksonville, Jackson County, Oregon.

16. Upon information and belief, Eagle Point Hardware, LLC (“Eagle Point Hardware”) was responsible for marketing, selling, and/or distributing Roundup® and related Monsanto products to the general public and the Plaintiff during the time period in question.

17. On information and belief Eagle Point Hardware was, at all relevant times, engaged in the marketing and retailing of Roundup®, Roundup-ready® crops, and other glyphosate-containing products from Monsanto to customers in Oregon, including Plaintiff.

18. Eagle Point Hardware had superior knowledge compared to Roundup® users and consumers, including regarding the carcinogenic properties of the product, yet failed to accompany its sales and or marketing of Roundup® with any warnings or precautions for that

grave danger. On information and belief, Eagle Point Hardware was a retailer providing Roundup® and other glyphosate-containing products to Plaintiff, resulting in the exposure of Plaintiff Larry Johnson.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

19. At all times relevant hereto, Eagle Point Hardware was in the business of marketing, promoting, selling, and/or advertising Roundup® products in the State of Oregon and the County of Jackson.

20. At all times relevant hereto, Eagle Point Hardware was an Oregon corporation with its headquarters and principal place of business in Eagle Point, Jackson County, Oregon, and therefore is a local defendant for purposes of removal.

21. That this Court has jurisdiction over this matter and venue is proper in Jackson County under ORS 14.080 because Jackson, Oregon, is the county in which an individual defendant resided and had its principal office at the time of the event or omission giving rise to the cause of action.

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

22. In 1970, Defendant Monsanto Company, Inc. (“Monsanto”) discovered the herbicidal properties of glyphosate and began marketing it in products in 1974 under the brand name Roundup®. Roundup® is a non-selective herbicide used to kill weeds that commonly compete with the growing of crops. In addition to the active ingredient glyphosate, Roundup® contains the surfactant Polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA) and/or adjuvants and other so-called “inert” ingredients. In 2001, glyphosate was the most-used pesticide active ingredient in

American agriculture with 85–90 million pounds used annually. That number grew to 185 million pounds in 2007.¹ As of 2013, glyphosate was the world’s most widely used herbicide.

23. Monsanto is a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri, and incorporated in Delaware. It is the world’s leading producer of glyphosate. As of 2009, Monsanto was the world’s leading producer of seeds, accounting for 27% of the world seed market.² The majority of these seeds are of the Roundup Ready® brand. The stated advantage of Roundup Ready® crops is that they substantially improve a farmer’s ability to control weeds, because glyphosate can be sprayed in the fields during the growing season without harming the crops. In 2010, an estimated 70% of corn and cotton and 90% of soybean fields in the United States were Roundup Ready®.³

24. Monsanto’s glyphosate products are registered in 130 countries and approved for use on over 100 different crops.⁴ They are ubiquitous in the environment. Numerous studies confirm that glyphosate is found in rivers, streams, and groundwater in agricultural areas where Roundup® is used.⁵ It has been found in food,⁶ in the urine of agricultural workers,⁷ and even in the urine of urban dwellers who are not in direct contact with glyphosate.⁸

¹ Arthur Grube et al., U.S. Env’tl. Prot. Agency, *Pesticides Industry Sales and Usage, 2006–2007 Market Estimates* 14 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/pestsales/07pestsales/market_estimates2007.pdf.

² ETC Group, *Who Will Control the Green Economy?* 22 (2011), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf.

³ William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, *Farmers Cope With Roundup-Resistant Weeds*, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-environment/04weed.html?pagewan>.

⁴ Monsanto, *Backgrounder-History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicides* (Sep. 2, 2015), http://www.monsanto.com/products/documents/glyphosate-background-materials/back_history.pdf.

⁵ See U.S. Geological Survey, *USGS Technical Announcement: Widely Used Herbicide Commonly Found in Rain and Streams in the Mississippi River Basin* (2011), available at <http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2909>; see also U.S. Env’tl. Prot. Agency,

25. On March 20, 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”), an agency of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), issued an evaluation of several herbicides, including glyphosate. That evaluation was based, in part, on studies of exposures to glyphosate in several countries around the world, and it traces the health implications from exposure to glyphosate since 2001.

26. On July 29, 2015, IARC issued the formal monograph relating to glyphosate. In that monograph, the IARC Working Group provides a thorough review of the numerous studies and data relating to glyphosate exposure in humans.

27. The IARC Working Group classified glyphosate as a Group 2A herbicide, which means that it is *probably carcinogenic to humans*. The IARC Working Group concluded that the cancers most associated with glyphosate exposure are NHL and other haematopoietic cancers, including lymphocytic lymphoma / chronic lymphocytic leukemia, B-cell lymphoma, and multiple myeloma.⁹

28. The IARC evaluation is significant. It confirms what has been believed for years: that glyphosate is toxic to humans.

Technical Factsheet on: Glyphosate, available at
<http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pdfs/factsheets/soc/tech/glyphosa.pdf>.

⁶ Thomas Bohn et al., *Compositional Differences in Soybeans on the Market: Glyphosate Accumulates in Roundup Ready GM Soybeans*, 153 FOOD CHEMISTRY 207 (2013), available at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308814613019201>.

⁷ John F. Acquavella et al., *Glyphosate Biomonitoring for Farmers and Their Families: Results from the Farm Family Exposure Study*, 112(3) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 321 (2004), available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241861/>; Kathryn Z. Guyton et al., *Carcinogenicity of Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon & Glyphosate*, 112 IARC Monographs 76, section 5.4 (2015), available at [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045\(15\)70134-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(15)70134-8).

⁸ Dirk Brändli & Sandra Reinacher, *Herbicides found in Human Urine*, 1 ITHAKA JOURNAL 270 (2012), available at <http://www.ithaka-journal.net/druckversionen/e052012-herbicides-urine.pdf>.

⁹See Guyton et al., *Carcinogenicity of Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon & Glyphosate*, *supra*.

29. Nevertheless, Monsanto, since it began selling Roundup[®], has represented it as safe to humans and the environment. Indeed, Monsanto has repeatedly proclaimed and continues to proclaim to the world, and particularly to United States consumers, that glyphosate-based herbicides, including Roundup[®], create no unreasonable risks to human health or to the environment.

FACTS

30. Glyphosate is a broad-spectrum, non-selective herbicide used in a wide variety of herbicidal products around the world.

31. Plants treated with glyphosate translocate the systemic herbicide to their roots, shoot regions, and fruit, where it interferes with the plant's ability to form aromatic amino acids necessary for protein synthesis. Treated plants generally die within two to three days. Because plants absorb glyphosate, it cannot be completely removed by washing or peeling produce or by milling, baking, or brewing grains.

32. For nearly 40 years, farms across the world have used Roundup[®] without knowing of the dangers its use poses. That is because when Monsanto first introduced Roundup[®], it touted glyphosate as a technological breakthrough: it could kill almost every weed without causing harm either to people or to the environment. Of course, history has shown that not to be true. According to the WHO, the main chemical ingredient of Roundup[®]—glyphosate—is a probable cause of cancer. Those most at risk are farm workers and other individuals with workplace exposure to Roundup[®], such as garden center workers, nursery workers, and landscapers. Agricultural workers are, once again, victims of corporate greed. Monsanto assured the public that Roundup[®] was harmless. In order to prove this, Monsanto has championed falsified data and has attacked legitimate studies that revealed

Roundup®'s dangers. Monsanto has led a prolonged campaign of misinformation to convince government agencies, farmers, and the general population that Roundup® is safe.

The Discovery of Glyphosate and Development of Roundup®

33. The herbicidal properties of glyphosate were discovered in 1970 by Monsanto chemist John Franz. The first glyphosate-based herbicide was introduced to the market in the mid-1970s under the brand name Roundup®.¹⁰ From the outset, Monsanto marketed Roundup® as a “safe” general-purpose herbicide for widespread commercial and consumer use. It still markets Roundup® as safe today.¹¹

34. In addition to the active ingredient glyphosate, Roundup® formulations also contain adjuvants and other chemicals, such as the surfactant POEA, which are considered “inert” and therefore protected as “trade secrets” in manufacturing. Growing evidence suggests that these adjuvants and additional components of Roundup® formulations are not, in fact, inert and are toxic in their own right.

Registration of Herbicides under Federal Law

35. The manufacture, formulation, and distribution of herbicides, such as Roundup®, are regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA” or “Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 136 *et seq.* FIFRA requires that all pesticides be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Agency”) prior to their distribution, sale, or use, except as described by the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).

¹⁰ Monsanto, *Backgrounder, History of Monsanto's Glyphosate Herbicide* (Sep. 2, 2015), available at http://www.monsanto.com/products/documents/glyphosate-background-materials/back_history.pdf.

¹¹ Monsanto, *What is Glyphosate?* (Sep. 2, 2015), available at <http://www.monsanto.com/sitecollectiondocuments/glyphosate-safety-health.pdf>.

36. Because pesticides are toxic to plants, animals, and humans, at least to some degree, the EPA requires as part of the registration process, among other things, a variety of tests to evaluate the potential for exposure to pesticides, toxicity to people and other potential non-target organisms, and other adverse effects on the environment. Registration by the EPA, however, is not an assurance or finding of safety. The determination the Agency must make in registering or re-registering a product is not that the product is “safe,” but rather that use of the product in accordance with its label directions “will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D).

37. FIFRA defines “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” to mean “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). FIFRA thus requires EPA to make a risk/benefit analysis in determining whether a registration should be granted or a pesticide allowed to continue to be sold in commerce.

38. The EPA and the State of Oregon registered Roundup[®] for distribution, sale, and manufacture in the United States and the State of Oregon.

39. FIFRA generally requires that the registrant, Monsanto in the case of Roundup[®], conducts the health and safety testing of pesticide products. The EPA has protocols governing the conduct of tests required for registration and the laboratory practices that must be followed in conducting these tests. The data produced by the registrant must be submitted to the EPA for review and evaluation. The government is not required, nor is it able, however, to perform the product tests that are required of the manufacturer.

40. The evaluation of each pesticide product distributed, sold, or manufactured is completed at the time the product is initially registered. The data necessary for registration of a

pesticide has changed over time. The EPA is now in the process of re-evaluating all pesticide products through a Congressionally-mandated process called “re-registration.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1. In order to reevaluate these pesticides, the EPA is demanding the completion of additional tests and the submission of data for the EPA’s recent review and evaluation.

41. In the case of glyphosate, and therefore Roundup[®], the EPA had planned on releasing its preliminary risk assessment—in relation to the reregistration process—no later than July 2015. The EPA completed its review of glyphosate in early 2015, but it delayed releasing the risk assessment pending further review in light of the WHO’s health-related findings.

Scientific Fraud Underlying the Marketing and Sale of Glyphosate/Roundup[®]

42. Based on early studies showing that glyphosate could cause cancer in laboratory animals, the EPA originally classified glyphosate as *possibly carcinogenic to humans* (Group C) in 1985. After pressure from Monsanto, including contrary studies it provided to the EPA, the EPA changed its classification to *evidence of non-carcinogenicity in humans* (Group E) in 1991. In so classifying glyphosate, however, the EPA made clear that the designation did not mean the chemical does not cause cancer: “It should be emphasized, however, that designation of an agent in Group E is based on the available evidence at the time of evaluation and should not be interpreted as a definitive conclusion that the agent will not be a carcinogen under any circumstances.”¹²

43. On two occasions, the EPA found that the laboratories hired by Monsanto to test the toxicity of its Roundup[®] products for registration purposes committed fraud.

¹² U.S. Env’tl. Prot. Agency, *Memorandum, Subject: SECOND Peer Review of Glyphosate 1* (1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/cleared_reviews/csr_PC-103601_30-Oct-91_265.pdf.

44. In the first instance, Monsanto, in seeking initial registration of Roundup[®] by the EPA, hired Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories (“IBT”) to perform and evaluate pesticide toxicology studies relating to Roundup[®].¹³ IBT performed about 30 tests on glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products, including nine of the 15 residue studies needed to register Roundup[®].

45. In 1976, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) performed an inspection of IBT that revealed discrepancies between the raw data and the final report relating to the toxicological impacts of glyphosate. The EPA subsequently audited IBT; it too found the toxicology studies conducted for the Roundup[®] herbicide to be invalid.¹⁴ An EPA reviewer stated, after finding “routine falsification of data” at IBT, that it was “hard to believe the scientific integrity of the studies when they said they took specimens of the uterus from male rabbits.”¹⁵

46. Three top executives of IBT were convicted of fraud in 1983.

¹³ Monsanto, *Backgrounder, Testing Fraud: IBT and Craven Laboratories* (Sep. 2, 2015), available at http://www.monsanto.com/products/documents/glyphosate-background-materials/ibt_craven_bkg.pdf.

¹⁴ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Summary of the IBT Review Program Office of Pesticide Programs* (1983), available at <http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/91014ULV.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=1981+Thru+1985&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C81thru85%5CTxt%5C00000022%5C91014ULV.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=p%7Cf&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL>.

¹⁵ Marie-Monique Robin, *The World According to Monsanto: Pollution, Corruption and the Control of the World's Food Supply* (2011) (citing U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Data Validation, Memo from K. Locke, Toxicology Branch, to R. Taylor, Registration Branch. Washington, D.C.* (August 9, 1978)).

47. In the second incident of data falsification, Monsanto hired Craven Laboratories in 1991 to perform pesticide and herbicide studies, including for Roundup®. In that same year, the owner of Craven Laboratories and three of its employees were indicted, and later convicted, of fraudulent laboratory practices in the testing of pesticides and herbicides.¹⁶

48. Despite the falsity of the tests that underlie its registration, within a few years of its launch, Monsanto was marketing Roundup® in 115 countries.

The Importance of Roundup® to Monsanto's Market Dominance Profits

49. The success of Roundup® was key to Monsanto's continued reputation and dominance in the marketplace. Largely due to the success of Roundup® sales, Monsanto's agriculture division was out-performing its chemicals division's operating income, and that gap increased yearly. But with its patent for glyphosate expiring in the United States in the year 2000, Monsanto needed a strategy to maintain its Roundup® market dominance and to ward off impending competition.

50. In response, Monsanto began the development and sale of genetically engineered Roundup Ready® seeds in 1996. Since Roundup Ready® crops are resistant to glyphosate, farmers can spray Roundup® onto their fields during the growing season without harming the crop. This allowed Monsanto to expand its market for Roundup® even further; by 2000, Monsanto's biotechnology seeds were planted on more than 80 million acres worldwide and nearly 70% of American soybeans were planted from Roundup Ready® seeds. It also secured Monsanto's dominant share of the glyphosate/Roundup® market through a marketing strategy that coupled proprietary Roundup Ready® seeds with continued sales of its Roundup® herbicide.

¹⁶ Monsanto, *Background, Testing Fraud: IBT and Craven Laboratories, supra*.

51. Through a three-pronged strategy of increasing production, decreasing prices, and by coupling with Roundup Ready® seeds, Roundup® became Monsanto's most profitable product. In 2000, Roundup® accounted for almost \$2.8 billion in sales, outselling other herbicides by a margin of five to one, and accounting for close to half of Monsanto's revenue.¹⁷ Today, glyphosate remains one of the world's largest herbicides by sales volume.

Monsanto has known for decades that it falsely advertises the safety of Roundup®

52. In 1996, the New York Attorney General ("NYAG") filed a lawsuit against Monsanto based on its false and misleading advertising of Roundup® products. Specifically, the lawsuit challenged Monsanto's general representations that its spray-on glyphosate-based herbicides, including Roundup®, were "**safer than table salt**" and "**practically non-toxic**" to mammals, birds, and fish. Among the representations the NYAG found deceptive and misleading about the human and environmental safety of glyphosate and/or Roundup® are the following:

- a) "Remember that environmentally friendly Roundup herbicide is biodegradable. It won't build up in the soil so you can use Roundup with confidence along customers' driveways, sidewalks and fences . . ."
- b) "And remember that Roundup is biodegradable and won't build up in the soil. That will give you the environmental confidence you need to use Roundup everywhere you've got a weed, brush, edging or trimming problem."
- c) "Roundup biodegrades into naturally occurring elements."
- d) "Remember that versatile Roundup herbicide stays where you put it. That means there's no washing or leaching to harm customers' shrubs or other desirable vegetation."

¹⁷ David Barboza, *The Power of Roundup; A Weed Killer Is A Block for Monsanto to Build On*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/02/business/the-power-of-roundup-a-weed-killer-is-a-block-for-monsanto-to-build-on.html>.

- e) “This non-residual herbicide will not wash or leach in the soil. It . . . stays where you apply it.”
- f) “You can apply Accord with ‘confidence because it will stay where you put it’ it bonds tightly to soil particles, preventing leaching. Then, soon after application, soil microorganisms biodegrade Accord into natural products.”
- g) “Glyphosate is less toxic to rats than table salt following acute oral ingestion.”
- h) “Glyphosate’s safety margin is much greater than required. It has over a 1,000-fold safety margin in food and over a 700-fold safety margin for workers who manufacture it or use it.”
- i) “You can feel good about using herbicides by Monsanto. They carry a toxicity category rating of ‘practically non-toxic’ as it pertains to mammals, birds and fish.”
- j) “Roundup can be used where kids and pets will play and breaks down into natural material.” This ad depicts a person with his head in the ground and a pet dog standing in an area which has been treated with Roundup.¹⁸

53. On November 19, 1996, Monsanto entered into an Assurance of Discontinuance with NYAG, in which Monsanto agreed, among other things, “to cease and desist from publishing or broadcasting any advertisements [in New York] that represent, directly or by implication” that:

- a) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof are safe, non-toxic, harmless or free from risk.
- b) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof manufactured, formulated, distributed or sold by Monsanto are biodegradable
- c) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof stay where they are applied under all circumstances and will not move through the environment by any means.

¹⁸ Attorney General of the State of New York, In the Matter of Monsanto Company, Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) (Nov. 1996).

- d) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof are “good” for the environment or are “known for their environmental characteristics.”
- e) glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof are safer or less toxic than common consumer products other than herbicides;
- f) its glyphosate-containing products or any component thereof might be classified as “practically non-toxic.”

54. Monsanto did not alter its advertising in the same manner in any state other than New York, and on information and belief it still has not done so today.

55. In 2009, France’s highest court ruled that Monsanto had not told the truth about the safety of Roundup®. The French court affirmed an earlier judgement that Monsanto had falsely advertised its herbicide Roundup® as “biodegradable” and that it “left the soil clean.”¹⁹

Classifications and Assessments of Glyphosate

56. The IARC process for the classification of glyphosate followed IARC’s stringent procedures for the evaluation of a chemical agent. Over time, the IARC Monograph program has reviewed 980 agents. Of those reviewed, it has determined 116 agents to be Group 1 (Known Human Carcinogens); 73 agents to be Group 2A (Probable Human Carcinogens); 287 agents to be Group 2B (Possible Human Carcinogens); 503 agents to be Group 3 (Not Classified); and one agent to be Probably Not Carcinogenic.

57. The established procedure for IARC Monograph evaluations is described in the IARC Programme’s Preamble.²⁰ Evaluations are performed by panels of international experts, selected on the basis of their expertise and the absence of actual or apparent conflicts of interest.

¹⁹*Monsanto Guilty in ‘False Ad’ Row*, BBC, Oct. 15, 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8308903.stm>.

²⁰ World Health Org., *IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans: Preamble* (2006), available at <http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf>.

58. One year before the Monograph meeting, the meeting is announced and there is a call both for data and for experts. Eight months before the Monograph meeting, the Working Group membership is selected and the sections of the Monograph are developed by the Working Group members. One month prior to the Monograph meeting, the call for data is closed and the various draft sections are distributed among Working Group members for review and comment. Finally, at the Monograph meeting, the Working Group finalizes review of all literature, evaluates the evidence in each category, and completes the overall evaluation. Within two weeks after the Monograph meeting, the summary of the Working Group findings are published in *The Lancet Oncology*, and within a year after the meeting, the finalized Monograph is published.

59. In assessing an agent, the IARC Working Group reviews the following information: (a) human, experimental, and mechanistic data; (b) all pertinent epidemiological studies and cancer bioassays; and (c) representative mechanistic data. The studies must be publicly available and have sufficient detail for meaningful review, and reviewers cannot be associated with the underlying study.

60. In March 2015, IARC reassessed glyphosate. The summary published in *The Lancet Oncology* reported that glyphosate is a Group 2A agent and probably carcinogenic in humans.

61. On July 29, 2015, IARC issued its Monograph for glyphosate, Monograph Volume 112. For Volume 112, a Working Group of 17 experts from 11 countries met at IARC from March 3–10, 2015 to assess the carcinogenicity of certain herbicides, including glyphosate. The March meeting culminated a nearly one-year review and preparation by the IARC Secretariat and the Working Group, including a comprehensive review of the latest available scientific evidence. According to published procedures, the Working Group considered “reports

that have been published or accepted for publication in the openly available scientific literature” as well as “data from governmental reports that are publicly available.”

62. The studies considered the following exposure groups: (1) occupational exposure of farmers and tree nursery workers in the United States, forestry workers in Canada and Finland and municipal weed-control workers in the United Kingdom; and (2) para-occupational exposure in farming families.

63. Glyphosate was identified as the second-most used household herbicide in the United States for weed control between 2001 and 2007 and the most heavily used herbicide in the world in 2012.

64. Exposure pathways are identified as air (especially during spraying), water, and food. Community exposure to glyphosate is widespread and found in soil, air, surface water, and groundwater, as well as in food.

65. The assessment of the IARC Working Group identified several case control studies of occupational exposure in the United States, Canada, and Sweden. These studies show a human health concern from agricultural and other work-related exposure to glyphosate.

66. The IARC Working Group found an increased risk between exposure to glyphosate and NHL and several subtypes of NHL, and the increased risk persisted after adjustment for other pesticides.

67. The IARC Working Group also found that glyphosate caused DNA and chromosomal damage in human cells. One study in community residents reported increases in blood markers of chromosomal damage (micronuclei) after glyphosate formulations were sprayed.

68. In male CD-1 mice, glyphosate induced a positive trend in the incidence of a rare tumor: renal tubule carcinoma. A second study reported a positive trend for hemangiosarcoma in male mice. Glyphosate increased pancreatic islet-cell adenoma in male rats in two studies. A glyphosate formulation promoted skin tumors in an initiation-promotion study in mice.

69. The IARC Working Group also noted that glyphosate has been detected in the urine of agricultural workers, indicating absorption. Soil microbes degrade glyphosate to aminomethylphosphoric acid (AMPA). Blood AMPA detection after exposure suggests intestinal microbial metabolism in humans.

70. The IARC Working Group further found that glyphosate and glyphosate formulations induced DNA and chromosomal damage in mammals, and in human and animal cells in utero.

71. The IARC Working Group also noted genotoxic, hormonal, and enzymatic effects in mammals exposed to glyphosate.²¹ Essentially, glyphosate inhibits the biosynthesis of aromatic amino acids, which leads to several metabolic disturbances, including the inhibition of protein and secondary product biosynthesis and general metabolic disruption.

72. The IARC Working Group also reviewed an Agricultural Health Study, consisting of a prospective cohort of 57,311 licensed pesticide applicators in Iowa and North Carolina.²² While this study differed from others in that it was based on a self-administered questionnaire, the results support an association between glyphosate exposure and multiple myeloma, hairy cell leukemia (HCL), and chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), in addition to several other cancers.

²¹ Guyton et al., *Carcinogenicity of Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon & Glyphosate*, *supra* at 77.

²² Anneclare J. De Roos et al., *Cancer Incidence Among Glyphosate-Exposed Pesticide Applicators in the Agricultural Health Study*, 113 *Env'tl Health Perspectives* 49–54 (2005), available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1253709/pdf/ehp0113-000049.pdf>.

Other Earlier Findings About Glyphosate's Dangers to Human Health

73. The EPA has a technical fact sheet, as part of its Drinking Water and Health, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations publication, relating to glyphosate. This technical fact sheet predates IARC's March 20, 2015 evaluation. The fact sheet describes the release patterns for glyphosate as follows:

Release Patterns

Glyphosate is released to the environment in its use as a herbicide for controlling woody and herbaceous weeds on forestry, right-of-way, cropped and non-cropped sites. These sites may be around water and in wetlands.

It may also be released to the environment during its manufacture, formulation, transport, storage, disposal and cleanup, and from spills. Since glyphosate is not a listed chemical in the Toxics Release Inventory, data on releases during its manufacture and handling are not available.

Occupational workers and home gardeners may be exposed to glyphosate by inhalation and dermal contact during spraying, mixing, and cleanup. They may also be exposed by touching soil and plants to which glyphosate was applied. Occupational exposure may also occur during glyphosate's manufacture, transport storage, and disposal.²³

74. In 1995, the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides reported that in California, the state with the most comprehensive program for reporting of pesticide-caused illness, glyphosate was the third most commonly-reported cause of pesticide illness among agricultural workers.²⁴

The Toxicity of Other Ingredients in Roundup®

²³ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Technical Factsheet on: Glyphosate, supra*.

²⁴ Caroline Cox, *Glyphosate, Part 2: Human Exposure and Ecological Effects*, 15 J. PESTICIDE REFORM 4 (1995); W.S. Peas et al., *Preventing pesticide-related illness in California agriculture: Strategies and priorities. Environmental Health Policy Program Report*, Univ. of Cal. School of Public Health, Calif. Policy Seminar (1993).

75. In addition to the toxicity of the active ingredient, glyphosate, several studies support the hypothesis that the glyphosate-based formulation in Defendant's Roundup® products is more dangerous and toxic than glyphosate alone. Indeed, as early as 1991, available evidence demonstrated that glyphosate formulations were significantly more toxic than glyphosate alone.²⁵

76. In 2002, a study by Julie Marc, entitled "Pesticide Roundup Provokes Cell Division Dysfunction at the Level of CDK1/Cyclin B Activation," revealed that Roundup® causes delays in the cell cycles of sea urchins but that the same concentrations of glyphosate alone were ineffective and did not alter cell cycles.²⁶

77. A 2004 study by Marc and others, entitled "Glyphosate-based pesticides affect cell cycle regulation," demonstrated a molecular link between glyphosate-based products and cell cycle dysregulation. The researchers noted that "cell-cycle dysregulation is a hallmark of tumor cells and human cancer. Failure in the cell-cycle checkpoints leads genomic instability and subsequent development of cancers from the initial affected cell." Further, "[s]ince cell cycle disorders such as cancer result from dysfunction of a unique cell, it was of interest to evaluate the threshold dose of glyphosate affecting the cells."²⁷

78. In 2005, a study by Francisco Peixoto, entitled "Comparative effects of the Roundup and glyphosate on mitochondrial oxidative phosphorylation," demonstrated that Roundup®'s effects on rat liver mitochondria are far more toxic than equal concentrations of

²⁵ Martinez, T.T. and K. Brown, *Oral and pulmonary toxicology of the surfactant used in Roundup herbicide*, PROC. WEST. PHARMACOL. SOC. 34:43-46 (1991).

²⁶ Julie Marc, et al., *Pesticide Roundup Provokes Cell Division Dysfunction at the Level of CDK1/Cyclin B Activation*, 15 CHEM. RES. TOXICOL. 326-331 (2002), available at <http://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/tx015543g>.

²⁷ Julie Marc, et al., *Glyphosate-based pesticides affect cell cycle regulation*, 96 BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 245, 245-249 (2004), available at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1016/j.biolcel.2003.11.010/epdf>.

glyphosate alone. The Peixoto study further suggested that the harmful effects of Roundup[®] on mitochondrial bioenergetics could not be exclusively attributed to glyphosate but could be the result of other chemicals, such as the surfactant POEA, or in the alternative, due to a potential synergic effect between glyphosate and other ingredients in the Roundup[®] formulation.²⁸

79. In 2009, Nora Benachour and Gilles-Eric Seralini published a study examining the effects of Roundup[®] and glyphosate on human umbilical, embryonic, and placental cells. The study tested dilution levels of Roundup[®] and glyphosate that were far below agricultural recommendations, corresponding with low levels of residue in food. The researchers ultimately concluded that supposed “inert” ingredients, and possibly POEA, alter human cell permeability and amplify toxicity of glyphosate alone. The researchers further suggested that assessments of glyphosate toxicity should account for the presence of adjuvants or additional chemicals used in the formulation of the complete pesticide. The study confirmed that the adjuvants present in Roundup[®] are not, in fact, inert and that Roundup[®] is potentially far more toxic than its active ingredient glyphosate alone.²⁹

80. The results of these studies were at all times available to Defendant.

81. Monsanto’s chief toxicologist Donna Farmer has admitted that she cannot say that Roundup[®] does not cause cancer because Monsanto has not performed carcinogenicity studies with the formulated product Roundup[®], the very product that caused Plaintiff’s NHL.³⁰ Indeed,

²⁸ Francisco Peixoto, *Comparative effects of the Roundup and glyphosate on mitochondrial oxidative phosphorylation*, 61 CHEMOSPHERE 1115, 1122 (2005), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/7504567_Comparative_effects_of_the_Roundup_and_glyphosate_on_mitochondrial_oxidative_phosphorylation.

²⁹ Nora Benachour, et al., *Glyphosate Formulations Induce Apoptosis and Necrosis in Human Umbilical, Embryonic, and Placental Cells*, 22 CHEM. RES. TOXICOL. 97-105 (2008), available at <http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/france.pdf>.

³⁰ See Plaintiffs’ Submission in Response to Pretrial Order No. 8, Ex. 7, *In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation*, MDL No. 2741 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 187-7.

she further admitted that in the 35 years that Monsanto has marketed Roundup[®] to the public, Monsanto has conducted no chronic carcinogenicity studies on the formulated Roundup[®] product merely because EPA did not require that such a study be performed for registration of glyphosate.³¹

82. Defendant thus knew or should have known that Roundup[®] is more toxic than glyphosate alone and that safety studies of Roundup[®], Roundup's adjuvants, and "inert" ingredients, and/or the surfactant POEA were necessary to protect Plaintiff from Roundup[®].

83. Despite its knowledge that Roundup[®] is considerably more dangerous than glyphosate alone, Defendant continued to promote Roundup[®] as safe.

The EPA's Review of Glyphosate

84. In April 2016, personnel within the EPA's Office of Pesticides Program (OPP) leaked and posted on the internet a draft report on glyphosate carcinogenicity, entitled Cancer Assessment Review Committee (CARC) report, dated October 2015. The EPA removed the documents by May 2, 2016, within days of initially posting it online. An EPA spokesperson subsequently issued a statement on the agency's glyphosate review:

Glyphosate documents were inadvertently posted to the Agency's docket. These documents have now been taken down because our assessment is not final. EPA has not completed our cancer review. We will look at the work of other governments as well as work by HHS's Agricultural Health Study as we move to make a decision on glyphosate. Our assessment will be peer reviewed and completed by end of 2016.³²

³¹ *See id.*

³² Carey Gillam, *What Is Going On With Glyphosate? EPA's Odd Handling of Controversial Chemical*, HUFFINGTON POST, May 2, 2016, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carey-gillam/what-is-going-on-with-gly_b_9825326.html; see also P.J. Huffstutter, *EPA takes offline report that says glyphosate not likely carcinogenic*, REUTERS, May 2, 2016, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-glyphosate-epa-idUSKCN0XU01K>.

85. On September 12, 2016, EPA’s OPP submitted a report on the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate, wherein it issued a “proposed conclusion” that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans’ at doses relevant to human health risk assessment.”³³ There are no authors listed on this issue paper, which reiterates and adopts the conclusions of the October 2015 leaked assessment. The issue paper is based upon a review of industry-sponsored articles and studies. The OPP acknowledged that it rejected all studies that considered Roundup[®]—the formulated product—instead of studies that isolated glyphosate because “[g]lyphosate formulations contain various components other than glyphosate and it has been hypothesized these components are more toxic than glyphosate alone.”³⁴

86. Thus, the OPP notes dozens of studies considered by IARC were not reviewed by the OPP because the OPP’s “evaluation focused on studies on the active ingredient glyphosate” and “additional research could also be performed to determine whether formulation components, such as surfactants, influence the toxicity of glyphosate formulations.”³⁵

87. From December 13 to 16, 2016, the EPA held FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (“SAP”) meetings to consider issues raised by the OPP’s evaluation of glyphosate. Again, OPP only allowed the SAP to consider studies of glyphosate alone, and not any study of the formulated product. In its Charge to the FIFRA SAP, the OPP noted that “[a]lthough there are studies available on glyphosate-based pesticide formulations, the agency is soliciting advice from

³³ See EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs, Glyphosate Issue Paper: Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential (Sept. 12, 2016), *available at* https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/glyphosate_issue_paper_evaluation_of_carcinogenic_potential.pdf.

³⁴*Id.*

³⁵*Id.*

the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) on this evaluation of human carcinogenic potential for the active ingredient glyphosate only at this time.”³⁶

88. The OPP draft assessment therefore does not actually consider the product at issue in this litigation or, more importantly, how glyphosate, in conjunction with surfactants and other chemicals, affects carcinogenicity.

89. On March 16, 2017, the final SAP meeting minutes and report were released, revealing disagreement and lack of consensus among the scientists on whether there was a positive association between *glyphosate* exposure and NHL.³⁷

Monsanto’s Industry Ties

90. Recently unsealed documents in the federal Roundup[®] MDL litigation reveal the extent to which Monsanto has been able to leverage its contacts within the EPA to protect glyphosate and Roundup[®] from scrutiny and review.

91. Internal Monsanto documents, including email communications, demonstrate that Jess Rowland, former Deputy Division Director, Health Effects Division of the EPA’s OPP, and formerly the chair of the CARC (the same committee that inadvertently leaked the EPA’s glyphosate report in April 2016), repeatedly and directly intervened on Monsanto’s behalf. These same documents reveal that Monsanto was secure in the knowledge that it had allies within the EPA.

³⁶ EPA OPP, Glyphosate: Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential, Charge to the FIFRA SAP for the October 18-21, 2016 Meeting, *available at* https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-11/documents/glyphosate_sap_charge_questions_-final.pdf.

³⁷ FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel Meeting Minutes and Final Report No. 2017-01, A Set of Scientific Issues Being Considered by the Environmental Protection Agency Regarding: EPA’s Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Potential of Glyphosate, *available at* https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-03/documents/december_13-16_2016_final_report_03162017.pdf.

92. To begin, in the months following IARC's initial March 2015 announcement that it had classified glyphosate as a probable carcinogen, Monsanto turned its attention to the EPA's review of glyphosate. In one April 27, 2015 email, Monsanto official Bill Heydens wrote to colleagues to suggest "approaching EPA and.... ask if there is anything that would help them defend the situation?" His colleague Dan Jenkins responded: "I think you and I could get on the phone w Jess Rowland and discuss this pretty openly. He'll give us straight talk."³⁸

93. The following day, Mr. Jenkins spoke to Mr. Rowland by telephone and then relayed the substance of the conversation for his colleagues in an April 28, 2015 email. Specifically, he reported back that with respect to the CARC investigation, Mr. Rowland had stated: "We have enough to sustain our conclusions. Don't need gene tox or epi I am the chair of the CARC and my folks are running this process for glyphosate in reg review. I have called a CARC meeting in June."³⁹ Thus, even though the ostensible purpose of the CARC review was to evaluate the exhaustive IARC assessment on glyphosate, and even though the full IARC monograph on glyphosate would not be completed until July 2015, Mr. Rowland had already formed his conclusion months earlier—in April 2015.

94. Mr. Rowland also intervened to halt another agency's review of glyphosate. When the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a federal public health agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, announced in February 2015 that it planned to publish a toxicological review of glyphosate, it was Mr. Rowland who helped Monsanto stop the ATSDR's investigation. In the same April 28, 2015, email discussed above, Mr. Jenkins explained that Mr. Rowland wanted to help Monsanto stop an investigation

³⁸See Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the Deposition of Jess Rowland, Ex. D, In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2741 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 189-4.

³⁹*Id.*

concerning the carcinogenicity of glyphosate being conducted by ATSDR.⁴⁰ Since ATSDR is not controlled by the EPA, according to Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Rowland had bragged: “If I can kill this I should get a medal.”⁴¹ Jenkins cautioned, however, that Monsanto should not “get your hopes up, I doubt EPA and Jess can kill this; but it’s good to know they are going to actually make the effort now to coordinate due to our pressing and their shared concern that ATSDR is consistent in its conclusions with the EPA.”⁴² The ATSDR never published its toxicological profile of glyphosate.

95. Further, the released documents reveal Monsanto’s confidence that its allies within the EPA would continue to support glyphosate. In an internal memo on glyphosate, Monsanto executives wrote: “We know, *but cannot say*, that EPA’s Office of Pesticide Program scientists strongly feel that glyphosate does not cause cancer and have defended their written determination internally for months.”⁴³ Notably, when Mr. Rowland attended the IARC glyphosate meetings as an observed for the EPA, internal communications indicate Monsanto was not displeased with his attendance since, “we all know Jess.”⁴⁴

Recent Worldwide Bans on Roundup®/Glyphosate

96. Several countries around the world have instituted bans on the sale of Roundup® and other glyphosate-containing herbicides, both before and since IARC first announced its assessment for glyphosate in March 2015, and more countries undoubtedly will follow suit as the dangers of the use of Roundup® become more widely known. The Netherlands issued a ban on

⁴⁰ *See id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ *See* Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of Jess Rowland, Ex. E, *In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation*, MDL No. 2741 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 189-5 (emphasis original).

⁴⁴ *See* Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of Jess Rowland, Ex. G, *In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation*, MDL No. 2741 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 189-7.

all glyphosate-based herbicides in April 2014, including Roundup[®], which will take effect by the end of 2015. In issuing the ban, the Dutch Parliament member who introduced the successful legislation stated: “Agricultural pesticides in user-friendly packaging are sold in abundance to private persons. In garden centers, Roundup[®] is promoted as harmless, but unsuspecting customers have no idea what the risks of this product are. Especially children are sensitive to toxic substances and should therefore not be exposed to it.”⁴⁵

97. The Brazilian Public Prosecutor in the Federal District requested that the Brazilian Justice Department suspend the use of glyphosate.⁴⁶

98. France banned the private sale of Roundup[®] and glyphosate following the IARC assessment for Glyphosate.⁴⁷

99. Bermuda banned both the private and commercial sale of glyphosates, including Roundup[®]. The Bermuda government explained its ban as follows: “Following a recent scientific study carried out by a leading cancer agency, the importation of weed spray ‘Roundup’ has been suspended.”⁴⁸

⁴⁵*Holland’s Parliament Bans Glyphosate Herbicides*, The Real Agenda, April 14, 2014, available at <http://real-agenda.com/hollands-parliament-bans-glyphosate-herbicides/>.

⁴⁶ Christina Sarich, *Brazil’s Public Prosecutor Wants to Ban Monsanto’s Chemicals Following Recent Glyphosate-Cancer Link*, GLOBAL RESEARCH, May 14, 2015, available at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/brazils-public-prosecutor-wants-to-ban-monsantos-chemicals-following-recent-glyphosate-cancer-link/5449440>; see Ministério Público Federal, *MPF/DF reforça pedido para que glifosato seja banido do mercado nacional*, April, 14, 2015, available at http://noticias.pgr.mpf.mp.br/noticias/noticias-do-site/copy_of_meio-ambiente-e-patrimonio-cultural/mpf-df-reforca-pedido-para-que-glifosato-seja-banido-do-mercado-nacional.

⁴⁷ Zoe Schlanger, *France Bans Sales of Monsanto’s Roundup in Garden Centers, 3 Months After U.N. Calls it ‘Probable Carcinogen’*, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 2015, available at <http://www.newsweek.com/france-bans-sale-monsantos-roundup-garden-centers-after-un-names-it-probable-343311>.

⁴⁸ *Health Minister: Importation of Roundup Weed Spray Suspended*, Today in Bermuda, May, 11 2015, available at <http://www.todayinbermuda.com/news/health/item/1471-health-minister-importation-of-roundup-weed-spray-suspended>.

100. The Sri Lankan government banned the private and commercial use of glyphosate, particularly out of concern that glyphosate has been linked to fatal kidney disease in agricultural workers.⁴⁹

101. The government of Colombia announced its ban on using Roundup® and glyphosate to destroy illegal plantations of coca, the raw ingredient for cocaine, because of the WHO's finding that glyphosate is probably carcinogenic.⁵⁰

EFSA Report on Glyphosate

102. On November 12, 2015, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Union's primary agency for food safety, reported on its evaluation of the Renewal Assessment Report (RAR) on glyphosate.⁵¹ The Rapporteur Member State assigned to glyphosate, the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR), had produced the RAR as part of the renewal process for glyphosate in the EU.

103. BfR sent its draft RAR to EFSA and the RAR underwent a peer review process by EFSA, other member states, and industry groups. As part of the on-going peer review of Germany's reevaluation of glyphosate, EFSA had also received a second mandate from the European Commission to consider IARC's findings regarding the potential carcinogenicity of glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products.

104. Based on a review of the RAR, which included data from industry-submitted unpublished studies, EFSA sent its own report ("Conclusion") to the European Commission,

⁴⁹*Sri Lanka's New President Puts Immediate Ban on Glyphosate Herbicides*, Sustainable Pulse, May 25, 2015, available at <http://sustainablepulse.com/2015/05/25/sri-lankas-new-president-puts-immediate-ban-on-glyphosate-herbicides/#.VeduYk3bKAw>.

⁵⁰*Columbia to ban coca spraying herbicide glyphosate*, BBC, May 10, 2015, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32677411>.

⁵¹ European Food Safety Auth., Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of the active substance glyphosate, available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/scientific_output/files/main_documents/4302.pdf.

finding that “glyphosate is unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to humans and the evidence does not support classification with regard to its carcinogenic potential according to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008.”⁵² EFSA therefore disagreed with IARC: glyphosate was not genotoxic and did not present a carcinogenic threat to humans.

105. In explaining why its results departed from IARC’s conclusion, EFSA drew a distinction between the EU and IARC approaches to the study and classification of chemicals.⁵³ Although IARC examined “both glyphosate—an active substance—and glyphosate-based formulations, grouping all formulations regardless of their composition,” EFSA explained that it considered only glyphosate and that its assessment focuses on “each individual chemical, and each marketed mixture separately.”⁵⁴ IARC, on the other hand, “assesses generic agents, including groups of related chemicals, as well as occupational or environmental exposure, and cultural or behavioural practices.”⁵⁵ EFSA accorded greater weight to studies conducted with glyphosate alone than studies of formulated products.⁵⁶

106. EFSA went further and noted:

[A]lthough some studies suggest that certain glyphosate-based formulations may be genotoxic (i.e. damaging to DNA), others that look solely at the active substance glyphosate do not show this effect. It is likely, therefore, that *the genotoxic effects observed in some glyphosate-based formulations are related to the other constituents or “co-formulants”*. Similarly, certain glyphosate-based formulations display higher toxicity than that of the active ingredient, presumably because of the presence of co-formulants. In its assessment, *EFSA proposes that the toxicity of each pesticide formulation and in particular its genotoxic potential*

⁵²*Id.*

⁵³ EFSA Fact Sheet: Glyphosate, EFSA, *available at* http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/corporate_publications/files/efsaexplainsglyphosate151112en.pdf.

⁵⁴*Id.*

⁵⁵*Id.*

⁵⁶*Id.*

*should be further considered and addressed by Member State authorities while they re-assess uses of glyphosate-based formulations in their own territories.*⁵⁷

107. Notwithstanding its conclusion, EFSA did set exposure levels for glyphosate. Specifically, EFSA proposed an acceptable daily intake (ADI) of 0.5 mg/kg of body weight per day; an acute reference dose (ARfD) of 0.5 mg/kg of body weight; and an acceptable operator exposure level (AOEL) of 0.1 mg/kg bw per day.⁵⁸

Leading Scientists Dispute EFSA's Conclusion

108. On November 27, 2015, 96 independent academic and governmental scientists from around the world submitted an open letter to the EU health commissioner, Vytenis Andriukaitis.⁵⁹ The scientists expressed their strong concerns and urged the commissioner to disregard the “flawed” EFSA report, arguing that “the BfR decision is not credible because it is not supported by the evidence and it was not reached in an open and transparent manner.”⁶⁰

109. Signatories to the letter included Dr. Christopher J. Portier, Ph.D., and other renowned international experts in the field, some of whom were part of the IARC Working Group assigned to glyphosate.

110. In an exhaustive and careful examination, the scientists scrutinized EFSA's conclusions and outlined why the IARC Working Group decision was “by far the more credible”:

⁵⁷*Id.*

⁵⁸ European Food Safety Auth., Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of the active substance glyphosate, *supra*.

⁵⁹ Letter from Christopher J. Portier et al. to Commission Vytenis Andriukaitis, Open letter: Review of the Carcinogenicity of Glyphosate by EFSA and BfR (Nov. 27, 2015), *available at* <http://www.zeit.de/wissen/umwelt/2015-11/glyphosat-offener-brief.pdf>; <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/13/eu-scientists-in-row-over-safety-of-glyphosate-weedkiller>.

⁶⁰*Id.*

The IARC WG decision was reached relying on open and transparent procedures by independent scientists who completed thorough conflict-of-interest statements and were not affiliated or financially supported in any way by the chemical manufacturing industry. It is fully referenced and depends entirely on reports published in the open, peer-reviewed biomedical literature. It is part of a long tradition of deeply researched and highly credible reports on the carcinogenicity of hundreds of chemicals issued over the past four decades by IARC and used today by international agencies and regulatory bodies around the world as a basis for risk assessment, regulation and public health policy.⁶¹

111. With respect to human data, the scientists pointed out that EFSA agreed with IARC that there was “*limited evidence* of carcinogenicity” for NHL, but EFSA nonetheless dismissed an association between glyphosate exposure and carcinogenicity. IARC applies three levels of evidence in its analyses of human data, including sufficient evidence and limited evidence. EFSA’s ultimate conclusion that “there was no unequivocal evidence for a clear and strong association of NHL with glyphosate” was misleading because it was tantamount to IARC’s highest level of evidence: “sufficient evidence,” which means that a causal relationship has been established. However, the scientists argued, “[l]egitimate public health concerns arise when ‘causality is credible,’ i.e., when there is *limited evidence*.”⁶²

112. Among its many other deficiencies, EFSA’s conclusions regarding animal carcinogenicity data were “scientifically unacceptable,” particularly in BfR’s use of historical control data and in its trend analysis. Indeed, BfR’s analysis directly contradicted the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) testing guidelines while citing and purporting to follow those same guidelines. For instance, the EFSA report dismisses observed trends in tumor incidence “because there are no individual treatment groups that are significantly different from controls and because the maximum observed response is reportedly

⁶¹*Id.*

⁶²*Id.*

within the range of the historical control data.” However, according to the scientists, concurrent controls are recommended over historical controls in all guidelines, scientific reports, and publications, and, if it is employed, historical control data “should be from studies in the same timeframe, for the same exact animal strain, preferably from the same laboratory or the same supplier and preferably reviewed by the same pathologist.” BfR’s use of historical control data violated these precautions: “only a single study used the same mouse strain as the historical controls, but was reported more than 10 years after the historical control dataset was developed.” Further deviating from sound scientific practices, the data used by the BfR came from studies in seven different laboratories. The scientists concluded:

BfR reported seven positive mouse studies with three studies showing increases in renal tumors, two with positive findings for hemangiosarcomas, and two with positive findings for malignant lymphomas. BfR additionally reported two positive findings for tumors in rats. Eliminating the inappropriate use of historical data, the unequivocal conclusion is that these are not negative studies, but in fact document the carcinogenicity of glyphosate in laboratory animals.⁶³

113. The letter also critiqued the EFSA report’s lack of transparency and the opacity surrounding the data cited in the report: “citations for almost all of the references, even those from the open scientific literature, have been redacted from the document” and “there are no authors or contributors listed for either document, a requirement for publication in virtually all scientific journals.” Because BfR relied on unpublished, confidential industry-provided studies, it is “impossible for any scientist not associated with BfR to review this conclusion with scientific confidence.”⁶⁴

⁶³*Id.*

⁶⁴*Id.*

114. On March 3, 2016, the letter was published in the Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health.⁶⁵

Statement of Concern Regarding Glyphosate-Based Herbicides

115. On February 17, 2016, a consensus statement published in the journal *Environmental Health*, entitled “Concerns over use of glyphosate-based herbicides and risks associated with exposures: a consensus statement,” assessed the safety of glyphosate-based herbicides (GBHs).⁶⁶ The paper’s “focus is on the unanticipated effects arising from the worldwide increase in use of GBHs, coupled with recent discoveries about the toxicity and human health risks stemming from use of GBHs.”⁶⁷ The researchers drew seven factual conclusions about GBHs:

1. GBHs are the most heavily applied herbicide in the world and usage continues to rise;
2. Worldwide, GBHs often contaminate drinking water sources, precipitation, and air, especially in agricultural regions;
3. The half-life of glyphosate in water and soil is longer than previously recognized;
4. Glyphosate and its metabolites are widely present in the global soybean supply;
5. Human exposures to GBHs are rising;

⁶⁵ Christopher J. Portier, et al., *Differences in the carcinogenic evaluation of glyphosate between the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)*, JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH, Mar. 3, 2016, available at <http://jech.bmj.com/content/early/2016/03/03/jech-2015-207005.full>.

⁶⁶ John P. Myers, et al, *Concerns over use of glyphosate-based herbicides and risks associated with exposures: a consensus statement*, Environmental Health (2016), available at <http://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-016-0117-0>.

⁶⁷*Id.*

6. Glyphosate is now authoritatively classified as a probable human carcinogen; and
7. Regulatory estimates of tolerable daily intakes for glyphosate in the United States and European Union are based on outdated science.⁶⁸

116. The researchers noted that GBH use has increased approximately 100-fold since the 1970s. Further, far from posing a limited hazard to vertebrates, as previously believed, two decades of evidence demonstrated that “several vertebrate pathways are likely targets of action, including hepatorenal damage, effects on nutrient balance through glyphosate chelating action and endocrine disruption.”⁶⁹

117. The paper attributes uncertainties in current assessments of glyphosate formulations to the fact that “[t]he full list of chemicals in most commercial GBHs is protected as ‘commercial business information,’ despite the universally accepted relevance of such information to scientists hoping to conduct an accurate risk assessment of these herbicide formulations.” Further, the researchers argue, “[t]he distinction in regulatory review and decision processes between ‘active’ and ‘inert’ ingredients has no toxicological justification, given increasing evidence that several so-called ‘inert’ adjuvants are toxic in their own right.”⁷⁰

118. Among various implications, the researchers conclude that “existing toxicological data and risk assessments are not sufficient to infer that GBHs, as currently used, are safe.” Further, “GBH-product formulations are more potent, or toxic, than glyphosate alone to a wide array of non-target organisms including mammals, aquatic insects, and fish.” Accordingly, “risk assessments of GBHs that are based on studies quantifying the impacts of glyphosate alone

⁶⁸*Id.*

⁶⁹*Id.*

⁷⁰*Id.*

underestimate both toxicity and exposure, and thus risk.” The paper concludes that this “shortcoming has repeatedly led regulators to set inappropriately high exposure thresholds.”⁷¹

119. The researchers also critique the current practice of regulators who largely rely on “unpublished, non-peer reviewed data generated by the registrants” but ignore “published research because it often uses standards and procedures to assess quality that are different from those codified in regulatory agency data requirements, which largely focus on avoiding fraud.” In the researchers’ view, “[s]cientists independent of the registrants should conduct regulatory tests of GBHs that include glyphosate alone, as well as GBH-product formulations.”⁷²

120. The researchers also call for greater inclusion of GBHs in government-led toxicology testing programs:

[A] fresh and independent examination of GBH toxicity should be undertaken, and . . . this re-examination be accompanied by systematic efforts by relevant agencies to monitor GBH levels in people and in the food supply, none of which are occurring today. The U.S. National Toxicology Program should prioritize a thorough toxicological assessment of the multiple pathways now identified as potentially vulnerable to GBHs.⁷³

121. The researchers suggest that, in order to fill the gap created by an absence of government funds to support research on GBHs, regulators could adopt a system through which manufacturers fund the registration process and the necessary testing:

“[W]e recommend that a system be put in place through which manufacturers of GBHs provide funds to the appropriate regulatory body as part of routine registration actions and fees. Such funds should then be transferred to appropriate government research institutes, or to an agency experienced in the award of competitive grants. In either case, funds would be made available to independent scientists to conduct the appropriate long-term (minimum 2 years) safety studies in recognized animal model

⁷¹*Id.*

⁷²*Id.*

⁷³*Id.*

systems. A thorough and modern assessment of GBH toxicity will encompass potential endocrine disruption, impacts on the gut microbiome, carcinogenicity, and multigenerational effects looking at reproductive capability and frequency of birth defects.”⁷⁴

122. Despite these stated concerns, Monsanto, to date, has failed to test its formulated Roundup[®] products.

European Union Vote on Glyphosate Renewal

123. The license for glyphosate in the European Union (EU) was set to expire on June 30, 2016.

124. Without an extension of the license, Monsanto’s Roundup[®] and other glyphosate-based herbicides faced a general phase out in EU markets.⁷⁵

125. In the months leading up to the license expiration date, protracted meetings and votes among national experts from the 28 EU Member States failed to produce agreement on an extension.

126. On June 29, 2016, the EU Commission extended the European license for glyphosate for 18 months to allow the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) to rule on the safety of the chemical, which was expected by the end of 2017.⁷⁶

127. On July 11, 2016, the EU voted in favor of a proposal to restrict the conditions of use of glyphosate in the EU, including a ban on common co-formulant POE-tallowamine (POEA) from all glyphosate-based herbicides, including Roundup[®].⁷⁷

⁷⁴*Id.*

⁷⁵ Philip Blenkinsop, Alissa de Carbonnel & Barbara Lewis European, *Commission to extend glyphosate license for 18 months*, REUTERS, June 28, 2016, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-eu-glyphosate-idUSKCN0ZE25B>.

⁷⁶ Arthur Neslen, *Controversial chemical in Roundup weedkiller escapes immediate ban*, THE GUARDIAN, June 29, 2016, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/29/controversial-chemical-roundup-weedkiller-escapes-immediate-ban>

128. In March 2017, ECHA's Committee for Risk Assessment (RAC) concluded that the available scientific evidence did not meet the criteria to classify glyphosate as a carcinogen.⁷⁸

129. With the glyphosate license set to again expire on December 15, 2017, and after months of indecision among EU member states, on November 27, 2017, the EU voted to extend the glyphosate license for five more years.⁷⁹ Of the 28 EU members, 18 countries voted in favor of a European Commission proposal to extend the glyphosate license, 9 countries voted against, and 1 country abstained.⁸⁰

TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Discovery Rule Tolling

130. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

131. Plaintiff suffered an illness that has a latency period and does not arise until years after exposure. Plaintiff had no way of knowing about the risks of serious illness associated with the use of and/or exposure to Roundup[®] and glyphosate until he was made aware that their NHL could be caused by his use of and/or exposure to Roundup[®]. Consequently, the discovery rule applies to these cases, and the statute of limitations has been tolled until at least the day that Plaintiff knew or had reason to know that their NHL was linked to their use of and/or exposure to Roundup[®].

⁷⁷ Sarantis Michalopoulos, *EU agrees ban on glyphosate co-formulant*, EURACTIV, July 11, 2016, available at http://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-agrees-ban-on-glyphosate-co-formulant/?nl_ref=16562829

⁷⁸ <https://echa.europa.eu/-/glyphosate-not-classified-as-a-carcinogen-by-echa>.

⁷⁹ See Philip Blenkinsop, *Germany swings EU vote in favor of weed-killer glyphosate*, Reuters, Nov. 27, 2017, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-health-glyphosate/germany-swings-eu-vote-in-favor-of-weed-killer-glyphosate-idUSKBN1DR1SG>.

⁸⁰ See *id.*

132. Within the time period of any applicable statutes of limitations, Plaintiff could not have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that exposure to Roundup[®] and glyphosate is injurious to human health.

133. Plaintiff did not discover, and did not know of facts that would cause a reasonable person to suspect, the risks associated with the use of and/or exposure to Roundup[®] and glyphosate; nor would a reasonable and diligent investigation by her have disclosed that Roundup[®] and glyphosate would cause her NHL.

134. For these reasons, all applicable statutes of limitations have been tolled by operation of the discovery rule with respect to Plaintiff's claims.

Fraudulent Concealment

135. Furthermore, the running of the statute of limitations has been equitably tolled by reason of Defendant's fraudulent concealment and conduct, as alleged above. Through its affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, Defendant actively concealed from Plaintiff the true risks associated with use of or exposure to Roundup[®].

136. Furthermore, the running of the statute of limitations has been equitably tolled by reason of Defendant's fraudulent concealment and conduct, as alleged above. Through its affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, Defendant actively concealed from Plaintiff the true risks associated with use of or exposure to Roundup[®].

137. As a result of Defendant's actions, Plaintiff was unaware, and could not reasonably know or have learned through reasonable diligence, that Plaintiff had been exposed to the risks alleged herein and that those risks were the direct and proximate result of Defendant's acts and omissions.

138. Defendant is estopped from relying on any statute of limitations because of its concealment of the truth regarding the safety of Roundup[®]. Defendant was under a duty to disclose the true character, quality and nature of Roundup[®] because this was non-public information over which it continues to have exclusive control. Defendant knew that this information was not available to Plaintiff, her medical providers, and/or her health facilities, yet it failed to disclose the information to the public.

139. Defendant had the ability to and did spend enormous amounts of money in furtherance of its purposes of marketing and promoting a profitable product, notwithstanding the known or reasonably knowable risks. Plaintiff and medical professionals could not have afforded to and could not have possibly conducted studies to determine the nature, extent and identity of related health risks, and they were forced to rely on Defendant's representations.

Estoppel

140. Monsanto was under a continuous duty to disclose to consumers, users and other persons coming into contact with its products, including Plaintiff, accurate safety information concerning its products and the risks associated with the use of and/or exposure to Roundup[®] and glyphosate.

141. Instead, Monsanto knowingly, affirmatively, and actively concealed safety information concerning Roundup[®] and glyphosate and the serious risks associated with the use of and/or exposure to its products.

142. Based on the foregoing, Monsanto is estopped from relying on any statutes of limitations in defense of this action.

LIMITATION ON ALLEGATIONS

143. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

144. The allegations in this pleading are made pursuant to Oregon law. To the extent Oregon law imposes a duty or obligation on Defendants that exceeds those required by federal law, Plaintiff does not assert such claims. All claims asserted herein run parallel to federal law, *i.e.*, the Defendants' violations of Oregon law were also violations of federal law. Had Defendants honestly complied with Oregon law, they would also have complied with federal law.

145. Additionally, Plaintiff's claims do not seek to enforce federal law. These claims are brought under Oregon law, notwithstanding that such claims run parallel to federal law.

146. As alleged herein, Defendants violated U.S.C. § 136j and 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(5) by distributing Roundup®, which was misbranded pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 136(g). Federal law specifically prohibits the distribution of a misbranded herbicide.

COUNT I: STRICT LIABILITY (DESIGN DEFECT)

147. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

148. Plaintiff brings this strict liability claim against Defendants for defective design.

149. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in the business of testing, developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, and promoting Roundup® products, which are defective and unreasonably dangerous to consumers, including Plaintiff, thereby placing Roundup® products into the stream of commerce. These actions were under the ultimate control and supervision of Defendants. At all relevant times, Defendants designed, researched, developed, manufactured, produced, tested, assembled, labeled, advertised, promoted, marketed, sold, and distributed the Roundup® products used by Plaintiff, as described herein.

150. At all relevant times, Defendants' Roundup® products were manufactured, designed, and labeled in an unsafe, defective, and inherently dangerous manner that was dangerous for use by or exposure to the public, including Plaintiff.

151. At all relevant times, Defendants' Roundup® products reached the intended consumers, handlers, and users or other persons coming into contact with these products in Oregon and throughout the United States, including Plaintiff, without substantial change in their condition as designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, labeled, and marketed by Defendants. At all relevant times, Defendants registered, researched, manufactured, distributed, marketed, and sold Roundup® and other glyphosate-based formulations within Oregon and aimed at a Oregon consumer and industrial market. Eagle Point Hardware was at all relevant times involved in the marketing, distribution, and sale of Roundup® and glyphosate-based formulations marketed and sold in Oregon.

152. Defendants' Roundup® products, as researched, tested, developed, designed, licensed, manufactured, packaged, labeled, distributed, sold, and marketed by Defendants were defective in design and formulation in that, when they left the control of Defendants' manufacturers and/or suppliers, they were unreasonably dangerous and dangerous to an extent beyond that which an ordinary consumer would contemplate.

153. Defendants' Roundup® products, as researched, tested, developed, designed, licensed, manufactured, packaged, labeled, distributed, sold, and marketed by Defendants were defective in design and formulation in that, when they left the hands of Defendants' manufacturers and/or suppliers, the foreseeable risks exceeded the alleged benefits associated with their design and formulation.

154. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or had reason to know that Roundup® products were defective and were inherently dangerous and unsafe when used in the manner instructed and provided by Defendants.

155. Therefore, at all relevant times, Defendants' Roundup® products, as researched, tested, developed, designed, registered, licensed, manufactured, packaged, labeled, distributed, sold, and marketed by Defendants were defective in design and formulation, in one or more of the following ways:

- a. When placed in the stream of commerce, Defendants' Roundup® products were defective in design and formulation, and, consequently, dangerous to an extent beyond that which an ordinary consumer would contemplate;
- b. When placed in the stream of commerce, Defendants' Roundup® products were unreasonably dangerous in that they were hazardous and posed a grave risk of cancer and other serious illnesses when used in a reasonably anticipated manner;
- c. When placed in the stream of commerce, Defendants' Roundup® products contained unreasonably dangerous design defects and were not reasonably safe when used in a reasonably anticipated or intended manner;
- d. Defendants did not sufficiently test, investigate, or study its Roundup® products and, specifically, the active ingredient glyphosate;
- e. Exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products presents a risk of harmful side effects that outweigh any potential utility stemming from the use of the herbicide;
- f. Defendants knew or should have known at the time of marketing Roundup® products that exposure to Roundup® and specifically, its active ingredient glyphosate, could result in cancer and other severe illnesses and injuries;
- g. Defendants did not conduct adequate post-marketing surveillance of its Roundup® products; and
- h. Defendants could have employed safer alternative designs and formulations.

156. Plaintiff was exposed to Defendants' Roundup® products without knowledge of Roundup®'s dangerous characteristics.

157. At all times relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff used and/or was exposed to the use of Defendants' Roundup® products in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner without knowledge of Roundup®'s dangerous characteristics.

158. Plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the defects and risks associated with Roundup® or glyphosate-containing products before or at the time of exposure due to the Defendants' suppression of scientific information linking glyphosate to cancer.

159. The harm caused by Defendants' Roundup® products far outweighed their benefit, rendering Defendants' product dangerous to an extent beyond that which an ordinary consumer would contemplate. Defendants' Roundup® products were and are more dangerous than alternative products, and Defendants could have designed Roundup® products to make them less dangerous. Indeed, at the time Defendants designed Roundup® products, the state of the industry's scientific knowledge was such that a less risky design or formulation was attainable.

160. At the time Roundup® products left Defendants' control, there was a practical, technically feasible and safer alternative design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of Defendants' herbicides.

161. Defendants' defective design of Roundup® products was willful, wanton, fraudulent, malicious, and conducted with reckless disregard for the health and safety of users of the Roundup® products, including Plaintiff.

162. Therefore, as a result of the unreasonably dangerous condition of their Roundup® products, Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff.

163. The defects in Defendants' Roundup® products were substantial and contributing factors in causing Plaintiff's injuries, and, but for Defendants' misconduct and omissions, Plaintiff would not have sustained injuries.

164. Defendants' conduct, as described above, was reckless. Defendants risked the lives of consumers and users of its products, including Plaintiff, with knowledge of the safety problems associated with Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products, and suppressed this knowledge from the general public. Defendants made conscious decisions not to redesign, warn or inform the unsuspecting public. Defendants' reckless conduct warrants an award of punitive damages.

165. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants placing its defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, and the resulting injuries, Plaintiff has sustained pecuniary losses and non-economic damages all as set forth above.

166. As a proximate result of Defendants placing its defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, as alleged herein, there was a measurable and significant interval of time during which Plaintiff has suffered great mental anguish and other personal injury and damages all as set forth above.

167. As a proximate result of the Defendants placing its defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, as alleged herein, Plaintiff sustained loss of income, loss of earning capacity and/or property damage.

168. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor for compensatory damages as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5, together with

interest, costs herein incurred, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II: STRICT LIABILITY (FAILURE TO WARN)

169. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

170. Plaintiff brings this strict liability claim against Defendants for failure to warn.

171. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in the business of testing, developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, and promoting Roundup® products which are defective and unreasonably dangerous to consumers, including Plaintiff, because they do not contain adequate warnings or instructions concerning the dangerous characteristics of Roundup® and specifically, the active ingredient glyphosate. These actions were under the ultimate control and supervision of Defendants. At all relevant times, Defendants registered, researched, manufactured, distributed, marketed and sold Roundup® and other glyphosate-based formulations within Oregon and aimed at a Oregon consumer and industrial market. Eagle Point Hardware was at all relevant times involved in the marketing, distribution, and sale of Roundup® and glyphosate-based formulations marketed and sold in Oregon to Plaintiff.

172. Defendants researched, developed, designed, tested, manufactured, inspected, labeled, distributed, marketed, promoted, sold, and otherwise released into the stream of commerce its Roundup® products, and in the course of same, directly advertised or marketed the products to consumers and end users, including Plaintiff, and therefore had a duty to warn of the risks associated with the use of Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products.

173. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty to properly test, develop, design, manufacture, inspect, package, label, market, promote, sell, distribute, maintain, supply, provide proper warnings, and take such steps as necessary to ensure its Roundup® products did not cause

users and consumers to suffer from unreasonable and dangerous risks. Defendants had a continuing duty to warn Plaintiff of dangers associated with Roundup use and exposure. Defendants, as manufacturer, seller, or distributor of chemical herbicides are held to the knowledge of an expert in the field.

174. At the time of manufacture, Defendants could have provided the warnings or instructions regarding the full and complete risks of Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products because they knew or should have known of the unreasonable risks of harm associated with the use of and/or exposure to such products.

175. At all relevant times, Defendants failed and deliberately refused to investigate, study, test, or promote the safety or to minimize the dangers to users and consumers of their product and to those who would foreseeably use or be harmed by Defendants' herbicides, including Plaintiff.

176. Despite the fact that Defendants knew or should have known that Roundup® posed a grave risk of harm, they failed to exercise reasonable care to warn of the dangerous risks associated with use and exposure. The dangerous propensities of their products and the carcinogenic characteristics of glyphosate, as described above, were known to Defendants, or scientifically knowable to Defendants through appropriate research and testing by known methods, at the time they distributed, supplied or sold the product, and were not known to end users and consumers, such as Plaintiff.

177. Defendants knew or should have known that their products created significant risks of serious bodily harm to consumers, as alleged herein, and Defendants failed to adequately warn consumers, *i.e.*, the reasonably foreseeable users, of the risks of exposure to its products. Defendants have wrongfully concealed information concerning the dangerous nature of

Roundup® and its active ingredient glyphosate and, further, have made false and/or misleading statements concerning the safety of Roundup® products and glyphosate.

178. At all relevant times, Defendants' Roundup® products reached the intended consumers, handlers, and users or other persons coming into contact with these products in Oregon and throughout the United States, including Plaintiff, without substantial change in their condition as designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, labeled, and marketed by Defendants.

179. Plaintiff was exposed to Defendants' Roundup® products without knowledge of their dangerous characteristics.

180. At all relevant times, Plaintiff used and/or was exposed to the use of Defendants' Roundup® products while using them for their intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes, without knowledge of their dangerous characteristics.

181. Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered the defects and risks associated with Roundup® or glyphosate-containing products prior to or at the time of Plaintiff's exposure. Plaintiff relied upon the skill, superior knowledge, and judgment of Defendants to know about and disclose serious health risks associated with using Defendants' products.

182. Defendants knew or should have known that the minimal warnings disseminated with their Roundup® products were inadequate, failed to communicate adequate information on the dangers and safe use/exposure, and failed to communicate warnings and instructions that were appropriate and adequate to render the products safe for their ordinary, intended and reasonably foreseeable uses, including agricultural and horticultural applications.

183. The information that Defendants did provide or communicate failed to contain relevant warnings, hazards, and precautions that would have enabled consumers such as Plaintiff to utilize the products safely and with adequate protection. Instead, Defendants disseminated

information that was inaccurate, false and misleading, and which failed to communicate accurately or adequately the comparative severity, duration, and extent of the risk of injuries with use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate; continued to aggressively promote the efficacy of its products, even after they knew or should have known of the unreasonable risks from use or exposure; and concealed, downplayed, or otherwise suppressed, through aggressive marketing and promotion, any information or research about the risks and dangers of exposure to Roundup and glyphosate.

184. This alleged failure to warn is not limited to the information contained on Roundup®'s labeling. The Defendants were able, in accord with federal law, to comply with Oregon law by disclosing the known risks associated with Roundup® through other non-labeling mediums, *i.e.*, promotion, advertisements, public service announcements, and/or public information sources. But the Defendants did not disclose these known risks through any medium.

185. To this day, Defendants have failed to adequately and accurately warn of the risks of cancer associated with the use of and exposure to Roundup® and its active ingredient glyphosate.

186. As a result of their inadequate warnings, Defendants' Roundup® products were defective and unreasonably dangerous when they left the possession and/or control of Defendants, were distributed by Defendants, and used by Plaintiff.

187. Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for injuries caused by their negligent or willful failure, as described above, to provide adequate warnings or other clinically relevant information and data regarding the appropriate use of their products and the risks associated with the use of or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate.

188. Had Defendants provided adequate warnings and instructions and properly disclosed and disseminated the risks associated with their Roundup® products, Plaintiff could have avoided the risk of developing injuries and could have obtained or used alternative herbicides.

189. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants placing defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, Plaintiff was injured and has sustained pecuniary losses and non-economic damages as set forth above.

190. As a proximate result of Defendants placing defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, as alleged herein, there was a measurable and significant interval of time during which Plaintiff suffered great mental anguish and other personal injury and damages.

191. As a proximate result of Defendants placing defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, as alleged herein, Plaintiff sustained loss of income, loss of earning capacity and property damage.

192. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor for compensatory damages as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5, together with interest, costs herein incurred, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III: NEGLIGENCE

193. Plaintiff incorporate by reference each allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

194. Defendants, directly or indirectly, caused Roundup® products to be sold, distributed, packaged, labeled, marketed, promoted, and/or used by Plaintiff. At all relevant times, Defendants registered, researched, manufactured, distributed, marketed, and sold Roundup® and other glyphosate-based formulations within Oregon and aimed at a Oregon

consumer and industrial market. Eagle Point Hardware was at all relevant times involved in the marketing, distribution, and sale of Roundup® and glyphosate-based formulations marketed and sold in Oregon and to Plaintiff.

195. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, research, manufacture, marketing, advertisement, supply, promotion, packaging, sale, and distribution of Roundup products, including the duty to take all reasonable steps necessary to manufacture, promote, and/or sell a product that was not unreasonably dangerous to consumers and users of the product.

196. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing, advertisement, and sale of the Roundup® products. Defendants' duty of care owed to consumers and the general public included providing accurate, true, and correct information concerning the risks of using Roundup and appropriate, complete, and accurate warnings concerning the potential adverse effects of exposure to Roundup®, and, in particular, its active ingredient glyphosate.

197. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the hazards and dangers of Roundup® and, specifically, the carcinogenic properties of the chemical glyphosate.

198. Accordingly, at all relevant times, Defendants knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that use of or exposure to Roundup® products could cause or be associated with Plaintiff's injuries, and thus, create a dangerous and unreasonable risk of injury to the users of these products, including Plaintiff.

199. Defendants also knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that users and consumers of Roundup® were unaware of the risks and the magnitude of the risks associated with use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products.

200. As such, Defendants breached their duty of reasonable care and failed to exercise ordinary care in the design, research, development, manufacture, testing, marketing, supply, promotion, advertisement, packaging, sale, and distribution of Roundup® products, in that Defendants manufactured and produced defective herbicides containing the chemical glyphosate; knew or had reason to know of the defects inherent in its products; knew or had reason to know that a user's or consumer's exposure to the products created a significant risk of harm and unreasonably dangerous side effects; and failed to prevent or adequately warn of these risks and injuries. Indeed, Defendants deliberately refused to test Roundup® products because they knew that the chemical posed serious health risks to humans.

201. Defendants were negligent in their promotion of Roundup®, outside of the labeling context, by failing to disclose material risk information as part of their promotion and marketing of Roundup®, including the Internet, television, print advertisements, etc. Nothing prevented Defendants from being honest in their promotional activities, and, in fact, Defendants had a duty to disclose the truth about the risks associated with Roundup in their promotional efforts, outside of the context of labeling.

202. Despite their ability and means to investigate, study, and test the products and to provide adequate warnings, Defendants have failed to do so. Indeed, Defendants have wrongfully concealed information and have further made false and/or misleading statements concerning the safety and/or exposure to Roundup and glyphosate.

203. Defendants' negligence included:

- a. Manufacturing, producing, promoting, formulating, creating, developing, designing, selling, and/or distributing Roundup® products without thorough and adequate pre- and post-market testing;
- b. Manufacturing, producing, promoting, formulating, creating, developing, designing, selling, and/or distributing Roundup® while negligently and/or intentionally concealing and failing to disclose the results of trials, tests, and studies of exposure to glyphosate, and, consequently, the risk of serious harm associated with human use of and exposure to Roundup;
- c. Failing to undertake sufficient studies and conduct necessary tests to determine whether or not Roundup® products and glyphosate-containing products were safe for their intended use in agriculture and horticulture;
- d. Failing to use reasonable and prudent care in the design, research, manufacture, and development of Roundup® products so as to avoid the risk of serious harm associated with the prevalent use of Roundup/glyphosate as an herbicide;
- e. Failing to design and manufacture Roundup® products so as to ensure they were at least as safe and effective as other herbicides on the market;
- f. Failing to provide adequate instructions, guidelines, and safety precautions to those persons Defendants could reasonably foresee would use and be exposed to Roundup® products;
- g. Failing to disclose to Plaintiff, users/consumers, and the general public that use of and exposure to Roundup® presented severe risks of cancer and other grave illnesses;
- h. Failing to warn Plaintiff, consumers, and the general public that the product's risk of harm was unreasonable and that there were safer and effective alternative herbicides available to Plaintiff and other consumers;
- i. Systematically suppressing or downplaying contrary evidence about the risks, incidence, and prevalence of the side effects of Roundup® and glyphosate-

- containing products;
- j. Representing that their Roundup® products were safe for their intended use when, in fact, Defendants knew or should have known the products were not safe for their intended purpose;
 - k. Declining to make or propose any changes to Roundup® products' labeling or other promotional materials that would alert consumers and the general public of the risks of Roundup® and glyphosate;
 - l. Advertising, marketing, and recommending the use of the Roundup® products, while concealing and failing to disclose or warn of the dangers known (by Defendants) to be associated with or caused by the use of or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate;
 - m. Continuing to disseminate information to its consumers, which indicate or imply that Defendants' Roundup® products are not unsafe for use in the agricultural and horticultural industries; and
 - n. Continuing the manufacture and sale of their products with the knowledge that the products were unreasonably unsafe and dangerous.

169. Defendants knew and/or should have known that it was foreseeable consumers such as Plaintiff would suffer injuries as a result of Defendants' failure to exercise ordinary care in the manufacturing, marketing, labeling, distribution, and sale of Roundup®.

170. Plaintiff did not know the nature and extent of the injuries that could result from the intended use of and/or exposure to Roundup® or its active ingredient glyphosate.

171. Defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, *i.e.*, absent Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff would not have developed cancer.

172. Defendants' conduct, as described above, was reckless. Defendants regularly risked the lives of consumers and users of their products, including Plaintiff, with full knowledge of the dangers of their products. Defendants have made conscious decisions not to redesign, re-label, warn, or inform the unsuspecting public, including Plaintiff. Defendants' reckless conduct therefore warrants an award of punitive damages.

173. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants placing defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, Plaintiff was injured and has sustained pecuniary losses and non-economic damages as set forth above.

174. As a proximate result of Defendants placing defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, as alleged herein, there was a measurable and significant interval of time during which Plaintiff suffered great mental anguish and other personal injury and damages.

175. As a proximate result of Defendants placing defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce, as alleged herein, Plaintiff sustained a loss of income, loss of earning capacity and property damage.

176. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor for compensatory damages as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5, together with interest, costs herein incurred, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT IV: FRAUD
(MONSANTO)

177. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

178. Defendant Monsanto has defrauded the agricultural community in general and Plaintiff in particular by misrepresenting the true safety of its Roundup® and by failing to disclose known risks of cancer.

179. Defendant Monsanto misrepresented and/or failed to disclose, *inter alia*, that: glyphosate and its major metabolite aminomethylphosphonic acid (AMPA) could cause cancer; glyphosate and AMPA are known to be genotoxic in humans and laboratory animals because exposure is known to cause DNA strand breaks (a precursor to cancer); glyphosate and AMPA are known to induce oxidative stress in humans and laboratory animals (a precursor to cancer); glyphosate and AMPA interfere with the aromatic amino acids within the human gut, leading to downstream health conditions including cancer; exposure to glyphosate and AMPA is causally associated with non-Hodgkin lymphoma; and the laboratory tests attesting to the safety of

glyphosate were flawed and/or fraudulent.

180. Due to these misrepresentations and omissions, at all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant's Roundup® was misbranded under 7 U.S.C. § 136(g) and its distribution within Oregon and around the United States was a violation of 7 U.S.C. § 136j and 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(5).

181. Plaintiff relied on the Defendant's misrepresentations and/or material omissions regarding the safety of Roundup® and its active ingredient glyphosate in deciding whether to purchase and/or use the product. Plaintiff did not know nor could they reasonably have known of the misrepresentations and/or material omissions by Defendant concerning Roundup® and its active ingredient glyphosate.

182. The misrepresentations and/or material omissions that form the basis of this fraud claim are not limited to statements made on the Roundup® labeling, as defined under federal law, but also involve Defendant Monsanto's representations and omissions made as part of its promotion and marketing of Roundup®, including on the Internet, television, in print advertisements, etc. Nothing prevented Defendant Monsanto from disclosing the truth about the risks associated with Roundup® in its promotional efforts outside of the labeling context, using the forms of media and promotion Defendant Monsanto traditionally used to promote the product's efficacy and benefits.

183. When Defendant Monsanto made the misrepresentations and/or omissions as alleged in this pleading, it did so with the intent of defrauding and deceiving the public in general and the agricultural community and with the intent of inducing the public and agricultural community to purchase and use Roundup®.

184. Defendant Monsanto made these misrepresentations and/or material omissions with malicious, fraudulent and/or oppressive intent toward Plaintiff and the public generally. Defendant's conduct was willful, wanton, and/or reckless. Defendant deliberately recommended, manufactured, produced, marketed, sold, distributed, merchandized, packaged, promoted and advertised the dangerous and defective herbicide Roundup®. This constitutes an utter, wanton, and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of a large segment of the public, and by reason

thereof, Defendant is liable for reckless, willful, and wanton acts and omissions which evidence a total and conscious disregard for the safety of Plaintiff and others which proximately caused the injuries as set forth herein.

185. As a proximate result of Defendant Monsanto's fraudulent and deceitful conduct and representations, Plaintiff has sustained damages and other losses in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits for diversity of citizenship in Federal Court.

186. As a proximate result of Defendant Monsanto's fraud, as alleged herein, Plaintiff sustained a loss of income, loss of earning capacity, and property damage, including lost income.

187. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor for compensatory damages as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5, together with interest, costs herein incurred, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

**COUNT V: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES
(MONSANTO)**

188. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

189. At all relevant times, Defendant Monsanto engaged in the business of testing, developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, and promoting Roundup® products, which are defective and unreasonably dangerous to consumers, including Plaintiff, thereby placing Roundup® products into the stream of commerce. These actions were under the ultimate control and supervision of Defendant Monsanto.

190. Defendant Monsanto had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the research, development, design, testing, packaging, manufacture, inspection, labeling, distributing, marketing, promotion, sale, and release of Roundup® products, including a duty to:

- a. ensure that its products did not cause the user unreasonably dangerous side effects;
- b. warn of dangerous and potentially fatal side effects; and
- c. disclose adverse material facts, such as the true risks associated with the use

of and exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products, when making representations to consumers and the general public, including Plaintiff.

191. As alleged throughout this pleading, the ability of Defendant Monsanto to properly disclose those risks associated with Roundup® is not limited to representations made on the labeling.

192. At all relevant times, Defendant Monsanto expressly represented and warranted to the purchasers of its products, by and through statements made by Defendant Monsanto in labels, publications, package inserts, and other written materials intended for consumers and the general public, that Roundup® products were safe to human health and the environment, effective, fit, and proper for their intended use. Defendant Monsanto advertised, labeled, marketed, and promoted Roundup® products, representing the quality to consumers and the public in such a way as to induce their purchase or use, thereby making an express warranty that Roundup® products would conform to the representations.

193. These express representations include incomplete warnings and instructions that purport, but fail, to include the complete array of risks associated with use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate. Defendant Monsanto knew and/or should have known that the risks expressly included in Roundup® warnings and labels did not and do not accurately or adequately set forth the risks of developing the serious injuries complained of herein. Nevertheless, Defendant Monsanto expressly represented that Roundup® products were safe and effective, that they were safe and effective for use by individuals such as the Plaintiff, and/or that they were safe and effective as agricultural herbicides.

194. The representations about Roundup®, as set forth herein, contained or constituted affirmations of fact or promises made by the seller to the buyer, which related to the goods and became part of the basis of the bargain, creating an express warranty that the goods would conform to the representations.

195. Defendant Monsanto placed Roundup® products into the stream of commerce for sale and recommended their use to consumers and the public without adequately warning of the

true risks of developing the injuries associated with the use of and exposure to Roundup® and its active ingredient glyphosate.

196. Defendant Monsanto breached these warranties because, among other things, Roundup® products were defective, dangerous, and unfit for use, did not contain labels representing the true and adequate nature of the risks associated with their use, and were not merchantable or safe for their intended, ordinary, and foreseeable use and purpose. Specifically, Defendant Monsanto breached the warranties in the following ways:

a. Defendant Monsanto represented through its labeling, advertising, and marketing materials that Roundup® products were safe, and fraudulently withheld and concealed information about the risks of serious injury associated with use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate by expressly limiting the risks associated with use and/or exposure within its warnings and labels; and

b. Defendant Monsanto represented that Roundup® products were safe for use and fraudulently concealed information that demonstrated that glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup®, had carcinogenic properties, and that Roundup® products, therefore, were not safer than alternatives available on the market.

197. Plaintiff detrimentally relied on the express warranties and representations of Defendant Monsanto concerning the safety and/or risk profile of Roundup® in making a decision to purchase the product. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon Defendant Monsanto to disclose known defects, risks, dangers, and side effects of Roundup® and glyphosate. Plaintiff would not have purchased or used Roundup® had Defendant Monsanto properly disclosed the risks associated with the product, either through advertising, labeling, or any other form of disclosure.

198. Defendant Monsanto had sole access to material facts concerning the nature of the risks associated with its Roundup® products, as expressly stated within their warnings and labels, and knew that consumers and users such as Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered that the risks expressly included in Roundup® warnings and labels were inadequate and inaccurate.

199. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the falsity or incompleteness of Defendant Monsanto's statements and representations concerning Roundup.

200. Plaintiff used and/or was exposed to Roundup® as researched, developed, designed, tested, manufactured, inspected, labeled, distributed, packaged, marketed, promoted, sold, or otherwise released into the stream of commerce by Defendant Monsanto.

201. Had the warnings, labels, advertisements, or promotional material for Roundup® products accurately and adequately set forth the true risks associated with the use of such products, including Plaintiff's injuries, rather than expressly excluding such information and warranting that the products were safe for their intended use, Plaintiff could have avoided the injuries complained of herein.

202. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Monsanto's breach of express warranty, Plaintiff has sustained pecuniary losses and non-economic damages in the sums set forth above.

203. As a proximate result of Defendant Monsanto's breach of express warranty, as alleged herein, there was a measurable and significant interval of time during which Plaintiff suffered great mental anguish and other personal injury and damages.

204. As a proximate result of Defendant Monsanto's breach of express warranty, as alleged herein, Plaintiff sustained a loss of income, loss of earning capacity, and property damage.

205. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor for compensatory damages as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5, together with interest, costs herein incurred, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT VI: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES

(MONSANTO)

206. Plaintiff incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

207. At all relevant times, Defendant Monsanto engaged in the business of testing, developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, and promoting Roundup® products, which were and are defective and unreasonably dangerous to consumers, including Plaintiff, thereby placing Roundup® products into the stream of commerce.

208. Before the time Plaintiff was exposed to the aforementioned Roundup® products, Defendant Monsanto impliedly warranted to its consumers, including Plaintiff, that Roundup® products were of merchantable quality and safe and fit for the use for which they were intended; specifically, as agricultural herbicides.

209. But Defendant Monsanto failed to disclose that Roundup® has dangerous propensities when used as intended and that use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products carries an increased risk of developing severe injuries, including Plaintiff's injuries.

210. Plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the implied warranties made by Defendant Monsanto to purchasers of its herbicides.

211. The Roundup® products were expected to reach and did in fact reach consumers and users, including Plaintiff, without substantial change in the condition in which they were manufactured and sold by Defendant Monsanto.

212. At all relevant times, Defendant Monsanto was aware that consumers and users of its products, including Plaintiff, would use Roundup® products as marketed by Defendant Monsanto, which is to say that Plaintiff was a foreseeable user of Roundup®.

213. Defendant Monsanto intended that Roundup® products be used in the manner in which Plaintiff, in fact, used them and which Defendant Monsanto impliedly warranted to be of merchantable quality, safe, and fit for this use, despite the fact that Roundup® was not adequately tested or researched.

214. In reliance upon Defendant Monsanto's implied warranty, Plaintiff used Roundup® as instructed and labeled and in the foreseeable manner intended, recommended, promoted, and marketed by Defendant Monsanto.

215. Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered or known of the risks of serious injury associated with Roundup® or glyphosate.

216. Defendant Monsanto breached its implied warranty to Plaintiff in that Roundup® products were not of merchantable quality, safe, or fit for their intended use, or adequately tested. Roundup® has dangerous propensities when used as intended and can cause serious

injuries, including those injuries complained of herein.

217. The harm caused by Defendant's Roundup® products far outweighed their benefit, rendering the products more dangerous than an ordinary consumer or user would expect and more dangerous than alternative products.

218. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of implied warranty, Plaintiff has sustained pecuniary losses and non-economic damages in the sums set forth above.

219. As a proximate result of the Defendant's breach of implied warranty, as alleged herein, there was a measurable and significant interval of time during which Plaintiff suffered great mental anguish and other personal injury and damages.

220. As a proximate result of Defendant's breach of implied warranty, as alleged herein, Plaintiff sustained a loss of income, loss of earning capacity, and property damage.

221. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor for compensatory damages as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5, together with interest, costs herein incurred, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

NOTICE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

222. Plaintiff intends to seek leave to amend to allege punitive damages.

LOSS OF CONSORTIUM ALLEGATIONS

223. Plaintiff GAYLE JOHNSON incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the General Allegations and each and every paragraph of the Allegations herein.

224. Plaintiffs LARRY JOHNSON and GAYLE JOHNSON at all times relevant to this action were, and now are, husband and wife.

225. Prior to Plaintiff LARRY JOHNSON's injuries as alleged, he was able and did perform duties as a spouse. Subsequent to the injuries and as a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff LARRY JOHNSON, has been unable to perform the necessary duties as a spouse and the work and services usually performed in the care, maintenance, and management of the family home,

and he will be unable to perform such work, service, and duties in the future. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff GAYLE JOHNSON has been permanently deprived and will be deprived of the consortium of her spouse including the performance of duties all to his damage, in an amount presently unknown but which will be proved at the time of trial.

226. Plaintiff GAYLE JOHNSON's discovery of this cause of her loss of consortium, as herein alleged, first occurred within one year of the date this Complaint was filed.

227. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of Defendants, their alternate entities, and each of them, and the severe injuries caused thereby to Plaintiff LARRY JOHNSON, as set forth in this complaint, Plaintiff GAYLE JOHNSON has suffered, and for a long period of time will continue to suffer, loss of consortium, including but not limited to loss of services, marital relations, society, comfort, companionship, love and affection of said spouse, and has suffered severe mental and emotional distress and general nervousness as a result thereof.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

228. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all of the triable issues within this pleading.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

229. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the Court to enter judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against the Defendants for:

Plaintiff LARRY JOHNSON:

- a. A sum which will fully and fairly compensate Larry Johnson for pain and suffering and interference with normal and usual activities from the date of injury to the present, and from the present into the future, such sum not to exceed \$35,000,000; and
- b. Larry Johnson's past medical expenses estimated at \$567,703.39 and future expenses roughly estimated at \$469,976.00 for purposes of ORCP 18(b).

Plaintiff GAYLE JOHNSON:

- a. A sum which will fully and fairly compensate Gayle Johnson for her damages for loss of consortium and/or society such sum not to exceed \$3,000,000;

Plaintiffs LARRY AND GAYLE JOHNSON:

- a. pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
- b. costs including court costs and other litigation expenses; and
- c. any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

Date: March 17, 2021

By: /s/ Faith Morse
Faith M. Morse, OSB # 104562
Trial Attorney
Andersen Morse & Linthorst, PC
1730 E. McAndrews Road, Suite A
Medford, Oregon 97504
faith@andersenlaw.com
Phone: (541) 773-7000
Fax: (541) 608-0535

/s/ Andrew Kirkendall
Andrew F. Kirkendall
Texas Bar No. 24050882
Alexander G. Dwyer
Texas Bar No. 24054271
Erin M. Wood
Texas Bar No. 24073064
ad@kirkendalldwyer.com
ak@kirkendalldwyer.com
ewood@kirkendalldwyer.com
Kirkendall Dwyer LLP
4343 Sigma Rd, STE 200
Dallas, TX 75244
Tel: 214-271-4027
Fax: 214-253-0629

Pro Hac Vice Application Pending

/s/ Fletcher V. Trammell
Fletcher V. Trammell, Esq. (SBN: 24042053)
Melissa Binstock Ephron, Esq. (SBN: 24101518)
TRAMMELL, PC
3262 Westheimer Rd., Ste. 423
Houston, TX 77098
Tel: (800) 405-1740
Fax: (800) 532-0992
fletch@trammellpc.com

melissa@trammellpc.com

Pro Hac Vice Application Pending