

Agent: SARS-CoV-2 isolates from human patients – Strain: any; BSL3

Project: Biorepository for evaluating immune responses and gut microbiota composition in acute and convalescent Coloradans infected with SARS CoV-2 (20-057B); Human samples. NIH Guidelines category non-exempt rDNA: N/A

6. **Nett, Terry**

Project: Development of a Radioimmunoassay to Measure IgG/IgM in Serum from COVID19 Patients, for Surveillance (20-038B); BSL2 in vitro, Human samples. NIH Guidelines category non-exempt rDNA: N/A

The committee had no comments or clarifying questions for the above submissions.

IV. Amendments to be reviewed by full committee

1. **Schountz, Tony**

Project: Experimental infection of Jamaican fruit bats with MERS-CoV coronavirus (12-104B); BSL3 in vitro and in vivo in bats. NIH Guidelines category non-exempt rDNA: III-D-4

Amended to add rDNA section during renewal process.

The committee unanimously approved of the above project amendment without changes.

V. Unfinished business

1. **IBC Membership update and nominations**

a. **Jason Cummings** – Jason was nominated to replace Nikki, who is now a biosafety officer.

The committee unanimously approved of the above candidate as a laboratory representative.

b. **Stephen Pearce** – Stephen was nominated to replace Pat, who is retiring.

The committee unanimously approved of the above candidate as a plant expert.

c. **Nikki Marlenee** – Nikki will replace Sara as the Biosafety Officer for FY21.

d. **Heather Blair** – Heather will replace Dr. Ellis as Alternate BSO upon his retirement.

e. **Renewing IBC Members** – Chaoping Chen, Richard Bowen, Angelo Izzo, June Medford, Ann Powers

VI. New Business

None

VII. Reports

1. **Coordinator's report**

a. **Next IBC meeting:** Wednesday, June 10, 2020 through Microsoft Teams

b. **Save the Date** -- Biosafety and Biosecurity Fair – October 20, 2020- moving ahead cautiously due to current uncertainty about return to campus for the fall.

2. **Biosafety Officer's report**

a. **Incident reports:**

- Near miss: [REDACTED] airflow went down due to humidity while a PI was in an animal room. The PI was wearing a PAPR at the time and followed proper protocols.
- Laboratory acquired infection: While research was being ramped down and stopped for change to critical operations only in March, an individual had cold symptoms and a rash. The individual believed the cold was passed from their partner, and the rash was not uncommon for this individual during stressful times. Some time later the individual realized this could have been a Zika infection because the individual

did manipulations with infected mosquitoes before the symptoms occurred. The individual contacted Biosafety and Occupational Health for diagnostic testing. While waiting for the results the individual was feeling better and receive the go ahead to return to work. The initial PCR test was negative, but further testing confirmed Zika infection. The individual does not recall any off counts of mosquitoes, and typically does not experience symptoms of a mosquito bite. There were no reports of loose mosquitoes at the time and other people working in the area during this time frame were asked about symptoms with none reported. Most likely this was a mosquito bite that went undetected during a chaotic time due to COVID-19 shut downs and changes.

- Near miss: Autoclave bags were breaking during the autoclave cycle out from [REDACTED]. The bags were double bagged but fell apart upon removal. The autoclave cycles were successful, so this is not considered an exposure or spill. It was determined that the bags were of poor construction and changing the bags out has solved the problem.
- Protocol breach: An individual entered the BRB for work during the shutdown. At the time the work involved with the shutdown was not occurring in or impacting the area in which the individual went, and the individual wore a PAPR and used a biosafety cabinet. Because there have been three incidents like this, biosafety is reviewing the process to prevent another incident.
- Animal bite: An individual was working with an SARS-CoV-2 infected hamster and was bitten. The individual followed proper procedures and contacted biosafety and occupational health. Because of the transmission routes for the agent, it is considered a low risk incident but follow up is occurring. No outside reporting required.
- Protocol breach: An individual forgot to don an N95 when entering to dust the deer facility. The individual had noticed eye irritation and donned eye protection then forgot about the N95 before entering the infected deer room; when realized, exited and put on mask and entered to finish work. The individual is doing well. The agent used in the deer is very low risk for human infection, but the individual is being monitored.
- Cut: An individual was mincing infected tissue with a razor blade when they cut their finger. This happened today so biosafety and occupational health are currently investigating the incident and helping the individual.

The increase in incident frequency was discussed by the committee. It seems that an increase in stress due to COVID-19 situations both at home and at work may be impacting this. There is also a mandate to be on campus as little as possible for critical research functions, which may be causing people to rush. Changes from N95 to PAPR use in these environments can interfere with peoples' normal functioning, and has impacted the process of entering and exiting the area including lines building up to allow social distancing in the locker rooms. The committee discussed the IBC and biosafety working together to get feedback from users and addressing any issues, as nothing has been reported to biosafety. It was discussed that people may be hesitant to come forward because they do not want to have already restricted research limited further. Some suggestions for managing this include requesting researcher feedback, posting helpful guidance, and potentially starting a scheduling system to prevent locker room buildup. It was also discussed that in looking toward reopening, these challenges may increase and it is important that administrators be involved in the return to research process understand the limitations.

b. Inspections: None

c. Laboratory audit reports: Ms. Blair is planning to do a TB lab audit walk through. She will have PIs or lab managers fill out a form instead of going in together with each group. Select Agent inventory audits are needed for [REDACTED]. Dr. Ellis and Nikki will be working on