

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           SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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                    COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
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   DEWAYNE JOHNSON,
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                 Plaintiff,
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                           Case No. CGC-16-550128
            VS.
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   MONSANTO COMPANY, et al.,
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                 Defendants.
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        Proceedings held on Tuesday, August 7, 2018,
       Volume 25, before the Honorable Suzanne R. Bolanos,
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       at 9:07 a.m.
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21 REPORTED BY:
22 LESLIE ROCKWOOD ROSAS, RPR, CSR 3462
23 Job No. 2983883A
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25 Pages 5001 - 5129
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
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
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























































































this case. You must follow these instructions as well as 2 those that I previously gave you. You will have a copy of my instructions with you when you go to the jury room to deliberate. I have provided each of you with your own 09:51:09 copy of the instructions. 6 You must decide what the facts are. You must consider all the evidence and then decide what you think 8 happened. You must decide the facts based on the evidence admitted in this trial. 09:51:24 10 Please do not allow anything that happens 11 outside this courtroom to affect your decision. Do not 12 talk about this case or the people involved in it with 13 anyone, including family and persons living in your 14 household, friends and coworkers, spiritual leaders, 09:51:40 15 advisors or therapists. Do not do any research on your 16 own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries or other 17 reference materials. These prohibitions on communications and 18 19 research extend to all forms of electronic 09:51:53 20 communications. Please do not use any electronic devices 21 or media, such as a cell phone or smart phone, PDA, 22 computer, tablet device, the internet, any internet 23 service, any text or instant-messaging service, any 24 internet chat room, blog or website, including social 25 networking websites or online diaries, to send or receive 09:52:12

any information to or from anyone about this case or your 2 experience as a juror until after you have been 3 discharged from your jury duty. Do not investigate the case or conduct any 09:52:28 5 experiments. Please do not contact anyone to assist you, 6 such as a family accountant, doctor or lawyer. Do not 7 visit or view the scene of any event involved in this 8 case. If you happen to pass by the scene, do not stop or 9 investigate. All jurors must see or hear the same 09:52:45 10 evidence at the same time. Do not read, listen to or 11 watch any news accounts of this trial. You must not let 12 bias, sympathy, prejudice or public opinion influence 13 your decision. If you violate any of these prohibitions on 14 15 communications and research, including prohibitions on 09:53:01 16 electronic communications and research, you may be held 17 in contempt of court or face other sanctions. 18 I will now tell you the law that you must follow 19 to reach your verdict. You must follow the law exactly 09:53:16 20 as I give it to you, even if you disagree with it. If 21 the attorneys have said anything different about what the 22 law means, you must follow what I say. 23 In reaching or you verdict, do not guess what I 24 think your verdict should be from something I may have 25 said or done. 09:53:30

Pay careful attention to all the instructions 1 2 that I give you. All the instructions are important 3 because together they state the law that you will use in this case. You must consider all of the instructions 09:53:45 5 together. 6 After you have decided what the facts are, you 7 may find that some instructions do not apply. In that 8 case, follow the instructions that do apply and use them 9 together with the facts to reach your verdict. 09:53:58 10 If I repeat any ideas or rules of law during my 11 instructions, that does not mean that these ideas or 12 rules are more important than the others. In addition, 13 the order in which the instructions are given does not 14 make any difference. You must decide what the facts are in this case 09:54:14 15 16 only from the evidence you have seen or heard during the 17 trial, including any exhibits that I admit into evidence. 18 Sworn testimony, documents or anything else may be 19 admitted into evidence. You may not consider as evidence 09:54:30 20 anything that you saw or heard when court was not in 21 session, even something done or said by one of the 22 parties, attorneys or witnesses. 23 What the attorneys say during the trial is not 24 evidence. In their opening statements and closing 25 arguments, the attorneys talk to you about the law and 09:54:45

the evidence. What the lawyers say may help you 2 understand the law and the evidence, but their statements 3 and arguments are not evidence. The attorneys' questions are not evidence. Only 09:54:58 5 the witnesses' answers are evidence. You should not 6 think that something is true just because an attorney's question suggested that it was true. However, the 8 attorneys for both sides have agreed that certain facts 9 are true. This agreement is called a stipulation. No 09:55:14 10 other proof is needed and you must accept those fact as 11 true in this trial. 12 Each side had the right to object to evidence 13 offered by the other side. If I sustained an objection 14 to an question, ignore the question and do not quess as 15 to why I sustained the objection. If the witness did not 09:55:29 16 answer, you must not guess what he or she might have 17 said. If the witness already answered, you must ignore 18 the answer. 19 During the trial I granted a motion to strike 09:55:44 20 testimony that you heard. You must totally disregard 21 that testimony. You must treat it as though it did not 22 exist. 23 A witness is a person who has knowledge related 24 to this case. You will have to decide whether you 25 believe each witness and how important each witness' 09:55:59

testimony is to the case. You may believe all, part or 2 none of a witness' testimony. 3 In deciding whether to believe a witness' testimony, you may consider, among other factors, the 5 following: How well did the witness see, hear or 09:56:13 otherwise sense what he or she described in court? 7 How well did the witness remember and describe 8 what happened? 9 How did the witness look, act and speak while 09:56:25 10 testifying? 11 Did the witness have any reason to say something 12 that was not true? For example, did the witness show any 13|bias or prejudice or have a personal relationship with 14 any of the parties involved in the case or have a 15 personal stake in how this case is decided? 09:56:38 What was the witness' attitude toward this case 16 17 or about giving testimony? 18 Sometimes a witness may say something that is 19 not consistent with something else he or she said. 09:56:52 20 Sometimes different witnesses will give different 21 versions of what happened. People often forget things or 22 make mistakes in what they remember. Also, two people 23 may see the same event but remember it differently. You 24 may consider these differences, but do not decide that 25 testimony is untrue just because it differs from other 09:57:08

1 testimony. 2 However, if you decide that a witness did not tell the truth about something important, you may choose 4 not to believe anything that witness said. On the other 5 hand, if you think the witness did not tell the truth 09:57:22 6 about some things but told the truth about others, you 7 may accept the part you think is true and ignore the 8 rest. 9 Do not make any decisions simply because there 10 were more witnesses on one side than on the other. If 09:57:34 11 you believe it is true, the testimony of a single witness 12 is enough to prove a fact. 13 You must not be biased in favor of or against 14 any witness because of his or her disability, gender, 15 race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, 09:57:49 16 national origin or socioeconomic status. For purposes of these instructions and the 17 18 verdict form, the term "Monsanto" shall refer to 19 defendant Monsanto Company. 09:58:09 20 A corporation, Monsanto, is a party in this 21 lawsuit. Monsanto's entitled to the same fair and 22 impartial treatment that you would give to an individual. 23 You must decide this case with the same fairness that you 24 would use if you were deciding a case between 25 individuals. 09:58:24

When I use words like "person" or "he" or "she" 1 in these instructions to refer to a party, those instructions also apply to Monsanto. A party must persuade you by the evidence 09:58:37 5 presented in court that what he or she is required to prove is more likely to be true than not true. This is referred to as the burden of proof. After weighing all of the evidence, if you cannot decide that something is more likely to be true 09:58:54 10 than not true, you must conclude that the party did not 11 prove it. You should consider all the evidence, no 12 matter which party produced the evidence. 13 In criminal trials, the prosecution must prove 14 that the defendant is quilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 09:59:13 15 but in civil trials, such as this one, the party who is 16 required to prove something need prove only that it is 17 more likely to be true than not true. 18 Certain facts must be proved by clear and 19 convincing evidence, which is a higher burden of proof. 20 This means the party must persuade you that it is highly 09:59:30 21 probable that the fact is true. I will tell you 22 specifically which facts must be proved by clear and 23 convincing evidence. 24 Evidence can come in many forms. It can be 25 testimony about what someone heard or saw or smelled. 09:59:45 Ιt

can be an exhibit admitted into evidence. It can be 2 someone's opinion. 3 Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. For example, if a witness testifies she saw a jet plane 09:59:59 5 flying across the sky, that testimony is direct evidence 6 that a plane flew across the sky. Some evidence proves a fact indirectly. For example, a witness testifies that 8 he saw only the white trail that jet planes often leave. 9 This indirect evidence is sometimes referred to as 10:00:22 10 circumstantial evidence. In either instance, the 11 witness' testimony is evidence that a jet plane flew 12 across the sky. 13 As far as the law is concerned, it makes no 14 difference whether evidence is direct or indirect. You 10:00:37 15 may choose to believe or disbelieve either kind. Whether 16 it is direct or indirect, you should give every piece of 17 evidence whatever weight you think it deserves. 18 During the trial, you received deposition 19 testimony that was read from the deposition transcript or 10:00:56 20 shown by video. A deposition is the testimony of a 21 person taken before trial. At a deposition, the person 22 is sworn to tell the truth and is questioned by the 23 attorneys. You must consider the deposition testimony 24 that was presented to you in the same way as you consider 25 testimony given in court. 10:01:15

1 Before trial, each party has the right to ask 2 another party to admit in writing that certain matters 3 are true. If the other party admits those matters, you 4 must accept them as true. No further evidence is 10:01:32 5 required to prove them. 6 A party may offer into evidence any oral or written statement made by an opposing party outside the courtroom. 9 When you evaluate evidence of such a statement, 10 you must consider these questions: 10:01:46 11 One, do you believe that the party actually made 12 the statement? If you do not believe that the party made 13 the statement, you may not consider the statement at all. Two, if you believe that the statement was made, 14 15 do you believe that it was reported accurately? 10:02:03 16 You should view the testimony about an oral 17 statement made by a party outside the courtroom with 18 caution. During the trial, you heard testimony from 19 10:02:16 20 expert witnesses. The law allows an expert to state 21 opinions about matters in his or her field of expertise, 22 even if he or she has not witnessed any of the events 23 involved in the trial. 24 You do not have to accept an expert's opinion. 25 As with any other witness, it is up to you to decide 10:02:30

whether you believe the expert's testimony and choose to 2 use it as a basis for your decision. You may believe 3 all, part or none of an expert's testimony. In deciding whether to believe an expert's testimony, you should 10:02:51 consider: 6 The expert's training and experience; The facts the expert relied on; And the reasons for the expert's opinion. 8 9 The law allows expert witnesses to be asked 10 questions that are based on assumed facts. These are 10:03:04 11 sometimes called "hypothetical questions." In 12 determining the weight to give to the expert's opinion 13 that's based on the assumed facts, you should consider 14 whether the assumed facts are true. 10:03:21 15 If the expert witnesses disagreed with one 16 another, you should weigh each opinion against the 17 others. You should examine the reasons given for each 18 opinion and the facts or other matters that each witness 19 relied on. You may also compare the experts' 10:03:38 20 qualifications. 21 A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor 22 that a reasonable person would consider to have 23 contributed to the harm. It must be more than a remote 24 or trivial factor. It does not have to be the only cause 25 of the harm. 10:03:52

Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing 1 2 harm if the same harm would have occurred without that 3 conduct. Mr. Johnson claims that the design of Roundup 10:04:08 5 Pro or Ranger Pro was defective because Roundup Pro or 6 Ranger Pro did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected it to perform. To establish that claim, Mr. Johnson must prove all of the following: 9 One, that the product is one about which an 10:04:26 10 ordinary consumer can form reasonable minimum safety 11 expectations. 12 Two, that Monsanto manufactured, distributed or 13 sold Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro. 14 Three, that the Ranger Pro or Roundup Pro used 10:04:41 15 by Mr. Johnson did not perform as safely as an ordinary 16 consumer would have expected it to perform when used or 17 misused in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way. 18 That Mr. Johnson was harmed, and that Roundup 19 Pro or Ranger Pro or -- Ranger Pro's failure to perform 10:05:03 20 safely was a substantial factor in causing 21 Mr. Johnson's harm. 22 Mr. Johnson claims that Roundup Pro or Ranger 23 Pro lacked sufficient warnings of potential risk. 24 establish this claim, Mr. Johnson must prove all of the 25 following: 10:05:23

That Monsanto manufactured, distributed or sold 1 2 Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro. 3 That Ranger Pro or Roundup Pro had potential risks that were known or knowable in light of the 10:05:35 5 scientific and medical knowledge that was generally 6 accepted in the scientific community at the time of the manufacture, distribution and sale of Roundup Pro or 8 Ranger Pro. 9 That the potential risks presented a substantial 10:05:51 10 danger when Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro is used or misused 11 in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way. That ordinary consumers would not have 12 13 recognized the potential risks. 14 That Monsanto failed to adequately warn of the 10:06:07 15 potential risks. 16 That Mr. Johnson was harmed; and. That the lack of sufficient warnings was a 17 18 substantial factor in causing Mr. Johnson's harm. Mr. Johnson claims that Monsanto was negligent 19 10:06:21 20 by not using reasonable care to warn or instruct about a 21 dangerous condition of Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro or about 22 facts that made the Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro products 23 likely to be dangerous. To establish this claim, 24 Mr. Johnson must prove all of the following: 25 That Monsanto manufactured, distributed or sold 10:06:41

Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro; 1 2 That Monsanto knew or reasonably should have known that the Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro was dangerous or 4 was likely to be dangerous when used or misused in a 10:06:56 5 reasonably foreseeable manner; 6 That Monsanto knew or reasonably should have known that users would not realize the danger; That Monsanto failed to adequately warn of the danger of Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro products; 10:07:11 10 That a reasonable manufacturer, distributor or 11 seller under the same or similar circumstances would have 12 warned of the danger or instructed on the safe use of the 13 Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro products; 14 That Mr. Johnson was harmed; And that Monsanto's failure to warn or instruct 10:07:25 15 16 was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Johnson's harm. 17 If you decide that Mr. Johnson has proved his 18 claim against Monsanto, you also must decide how much 19 money will reasonably compensate Mr. Johnson for the 10:07:46 20 harm. This compensation is called "damages." 21 The amount of damages must include an award for 22 each item of harm that was caused by Monsanto's wrongful 23 conduct, even if the particular harm could not have been 24 anticipated. 25 Mr. Johnson does not have to prove the exact 10:08:03

amount of damages that will provide reasonable compensation for the harm. However, you must not speculate or guess in awarding damages. The damages claimed by Mr. Johnson for the harm 10:08:24 5 caused by Monsanto fall into two categories called economic damages and noneconomic damages. The parties have stipulated to the amount of economic damages. 8 stipulated amount has already been included on the 9 verdict form. You will, however, be asked on the verdict 10:08:46 10 form to state the amount of noneconomic damages, if any. 11 The following are the specific items of 12 noneconomic damages claimed by Mr. Johnson: 13 Past and future physical pain, mental suffering, 14 loss of enjoyment of life, disfigurement, physical 15 impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety, humiliation, 10:09:04 16 emotional distress and any other similar damages. 17 No fixed standard exists for deciding the amount 18 of these noneconomic damages. You must use your judgment 19 to decide a reasonable amount based on the evidence and 10:09:24 20 your common sense. 21 To recover for future pain, mental suffering, 22 loss of enjoyment of life, disfigurement, physical 23 impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety, humiliation 24 and emotional distress, Mr. Johnson must prove that he is 25 reasonably certain to suffer that harm. 10:09:43

1 For future noneconomic damages, determine the 2 amount in current dollars paid at the time of judgment that will compensate Mr. Johnson for future noneconomic damages. The arguments of the attorneys are not evidence 10:09:59 5 of damages. Your award must be based on your reasoned judgment applied to the testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence that has been admitted during trial. 9 If you decide Mr. Johnson has suffered damages 10:10:17 10 that will continue for the rest of his life, you must 11 determine how long he will probably live. According to 12 National Vital Statistics Report published by the 13 National Center For Health Statistics, a 46-year-old male 14 is expected to live another 33 years. This is the 10:10:37 15 average life expectancy. Some people live longer, and 16 others die sooner. This published information is evidence of how 17 18 long a person is likely to live, but is not conclusive. 19 In deciding a person's live expectancy, you should also 10:10:53 20 consider, among other factors, that person's health, 21 habits, activities, lifestyle and occupation. 22 Mr. Johnson seeks damages from Monsanto under 23 more than one legal theory. However, each item of 24 damages may be awarded only once, regardless of the 25 number of legal theories alleged. 10:11:12

1 If you decide that Monsanto's conduct caused 2 Mr. Johnson harm, you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the 5 conduct that harmed the plaintiff and to discourage 10:11:32 similar conduct in the future. You must not include in an award of punitive damages any amount intended as 8 compensation for loss, harm or damage that Mr. Johnson 9 has incurred or may incur. 10:11:51 10 You may award punitive damages against Monsanto 11 only if Mr. Johnson proves that Monsanto engaged in that 12 conduct with malice or oppression. To do this, 13 Mr. Johnson must prove one of the following by clear and 14 convincing evidence: One, that the conduct constituting malice or 10:12:11 15 16 oppression was committed by one or more officers, 17 directors or managing agents of Monsanto, who acted on 18 behalf of Monsanto; Or that the conduct constituting malice or 19 10:12:24 20 oppression was authorized by one or more officers, 21 directors or managing agents of Monsanto; or 22 That one or more officers, directors or managing 23 agents of Monsanto knew of the conduct constituting 24 malice or oppression and adopted or approved that conduct 25 after it occurred. 10:12:39

"Malice" means that Monsanto acted with intent 1 to cause injury or that Monsanto's conduct was despicable 3 and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the rights or safety of another. A person acts with knowing 10:12:56 5 disregard when he or she is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences. "Oppression" means that Monsanto's conduct was 9 despicable and subjected Mr. Johnson to cruel and unjust 10:13:16 10 hardship in knowing disregard of his rights. 11 "Despicable conduct" is conduct that is so vile, 12 base or contemptible that it would be looked down on and 13 despised by reasonable people. An employee is a "managing agent" if he or she 14 15 exercises substantial independent authority and judgment 10:13:36 16 in his or her corporate decision making, such that his or 17 her decisions ultimately determine corporate policy. There is no fixed formula for determining the 18 19 amount of punitive damages, and you are not required to 10:13:55 20 award any punitive damages. If you decide to award 21 punitive damages, you should consider all of the 22 following factors in determining the amount: 23 How reprehensible was Monsanto's conduct? 24 deciding how reprehensible Monsanto's conduct was, you 25 may consider, among other factors: 10:14:15

Whether the conduct caused physical harm. 1 2 Whether Monsanto disregarded the health or safety of others. Whether Mr. Johnson was financially weak or 5 vulnerable and Monsanto knew Mr. Johnson was financially 10:14:29 weak or vulnerable and took advantage of him. Whether Monsanto's conduct involved a pattern or practice. 9 And whether Monsanto acted with trickery or 10:14:46 10 deceit. 11 Is there a reasonable relationship between the 12 amount of punitive damages and Mr. Johnson's harm or 13 between the amount of punitive damages and potential harm 14 to Mr. Johnson that Monsanto knew was likely to occur 15 because of its conduct? 10:15:03 16 In view of Monsanto's financial condition, what 17 amount is necessary to punish it and discourage future 18 wrongful conduct? You may not increase the punitive 19 award above an amount that is otherwise appropriate 20 merely because Monsanto has substantial financial 10:15:23 21 resources. Any award you impose may not exceed 22 Monsanto's ability to pay. 23 Punitive damages may not be used to punish 24 Monsanto for the impact of its alleged misconduct on 25 persons other than Mr. Johnson. 10:15:39

1 You must not consider, or include as part of any 2 award, attorneys' fees or expenses that the parties incurred in bringing or defending this lawsuit. You have heard references to Agent Orange. The 10:15:56 5 defendant in this case did not make Agent Orange, and you should not consider that product or any references to it for any purpose. You have been told about lawsuits that were 9 filed against Monsanto in which a plaintiff claimed to 10:16:15 10 have developed NHL after being exposed to Roundup or to 11 Roundup as well as other chemicals. You may consider 12 these lawsuits only on the issue of whether Monsanto had 13 been placed on notice of claims of NHL in people exposed 14 to Roundup. You are instructed that a complaint contains 10:16:35 15 nothing more than allegations made against another party, 16 and so the existence of such complaints is not evidence 17 that Roundup, in fact, causes NHL. 18 During Dr. Portier's cross-examination, 19 reference was made to the California EPA. You must 10:16:57 20 disregard this reference and not consider it for any 21 purpose. 22 The following exhibits are being admitted for 23 the limited purpose of showing Monsanto's state of mind 24 regarding the state of the science and for no other 25 purpose: 10:17:12

One, EPA, Office of Prevention, Pesticides and 1 Toxic Substances, Reregistration Eligibility Decision, Glyphosate (September 1993) [Exhibit DX2489]; And Number 2, EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs, 4 10:17:41 5 Glyphosate Issue Paper: Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential, September 12th, 2016, [Exhibit DX2481]. 7 You must not consider whether any of the parties 8 in this case has insurance. The presence or absence of 9 insurance is totally irrelevant. You must decide this 10:18:05 10 case based only on the law and the evidence. 11 All right. We're going to stop here. At the 12 conclusion of the closing arguments, I will read to you 13 the final instructions before you go to the jury room. And so now we'll begin with the closing 14 15 statement of the plaintiffs. 10:18:21 16 Mr. Wisner, when you're ready. 17 MR. WISNER: Thank you, your Honor. 18 May it please the Court. Counsel. Hi, everyone. It's been a long trial, and it's 19 10:18:50 20 been a while since I've spoken to you, about a month. Αt 21 the beginning of this trial, I told you this case was 22 about choice and the fact that Monsanto, by not warning, 23 deprived consumers in California and Mr. Johnson the 24 right to make an informed choice about what chemicals he 25 exposed himself, and in this case, what chemicals he 10:19:12

actually exposed to children in the Benicia School 2 District. 3 But as this case has unfolded, it's occurred to 4 me that this isn't just about the choice that was robbed 5 from the client. It's also about the choices that 10:19:26 6 Monsanto made. You see, Monsanto made a choice when it got Dr. Parry's report in 2000 to not share it with the 8 EPA or anyone. They made a choice to not do the studies 9 that Dr. Parry recommended, because they knew what it 10:19:49 10 would show. They made a choice to not study the 11 formulated product in long-term carcinogenicity studies. 12 And the best explanation I could hear so far was that's 13 because it would have killed all the rats and mice. They made a choice when they didn't call 14 15 Mr. Johnson back, when he called the company desperate 10:20:10 16 for answers, asking for some information about the stuff 17 that he was spraying at that time. And when 18 Dr. Goldstein didn't call him back, that continued to 19 deprive him of that choice. Monsanto made a choice to engage in 10:20:25 20 21 ghostwriting. You've seen document after document where 22 Monsanto's response to scientific concerns, legitimate 23 scientific concerns, is to make up science. Put someone 24 else's name on it, and no one's the wiser. We saw that 25 email from Dr. Heydens, where he said, "That's what we 10:20:49

did with Williams in 2000." That's the same article 2 referenced in all of the literature, and it's the same 3 article that Monsanto's internal PowerPoint said served them well for over a decade. It's the same article in 10:21:06 5 the EPA report that's cited repeatedly. Monsanto made a choice to not put a cancer 6 warning on the label. Right now, you've heard testimony 8 that the Material Safety Data Sheet discloses the IARC 9 classification. Right now, that's the case. But the 10 very label that goes to actual people using it in the 10:21:29 11 field, using it in their job, doesn't say anything. 12 That's a choice. That is a choice that reflects reckless 13 disregard for human health. It is a choice that Monsanto 14 made and today is their day of reckoning. Every single cancer risk that has been found has 10:21:48 15 16 this moment, every single one, where the science finally 17 caught up, where they couldn't bury it anymore, where the 18 truth got shown to 12 people sitting in a jury box making 19 a true and honest decision, and that is this day. 10:22:08 20 is the day Monsanto is finally held accountable, and this 21 is the beginning of that day. Because after this trial 22 is over, after you return a verdict that says, "Monsanto, 23 no more. Warn. Call people back. Do the studies that 24 you needed to do for 30 years, studies that the EPA asked 25 them to do in the '80s. Do your job." 10:22:32

1 And if you return a verdict today that does 2 that, that actually changes the world. I mean, it's 3 crazy to say that; right? I told you all at the 4 beginning of this trial that you were part of history, 10:22:50 5 and you really are, and so let me just say thank you. 6 I know you guys didn't actually have a choice to 7 be on this jury, so it's kind of a weird thing to thank 8 you for your service, but you could be on a jury and not 9 pay attention, and not one of you has done that. You've 10:23:06 10 asked incredibly good questions. Some of them we were 11 able to answer. Some of them we were not. But the 12 questions told us exactly how closely you were tracking 13 this case. Some of you have five notebooks of notes. 14 That's unbelievable. The level with which you've paid 15 attention to this case, thank you, and I really mean 10:23:25 16 that. Not just for me, though, for Mr. Johnson and his 17 18 family. And Mrs. Johnson would be here, but her job 19 wouldn't let her off today, so she actually is working 10:23:41 20 right now. A consequence of the bills, you know, and 21 hopefully she'll be here tomorrow, but they wouldn't give 22 her paid leave, and they need the money to pay the bills, 23 so I'm sorry she couldn't be here today. 24 All right. So this case really involves three 25 fundamental questions. And the jury verdict form we're 10:24:00

going to go over in a little bit, and I'm going to go 2 through all the questions. There's actually a lot more than three questions, but they really boil down to three core issues. The first is: Can Monsanto be a 10:24:18 5 substantial contributing factor in causing cancer? sounds like a lot of legalese, because it is, and I'm going to discuss that in detail, why we use this terminology instead of just asking does Roundup cause cancer. 10:24:30 10 The second is: Was Roundup a substantial 11 contributing factor in causing Mr. Johnson's cancer? 12 And finally: Did Monsanto act with conscious 13 disregard of human health? 14 Let's start with the first question. Before I 15 get to this question, "Can Roundup be a substantial 10:24:44 16 contributing factor in causing cancer," you have to 17 understand the burden of proof here. 18 Now, a lot of you have actual pretty robust 19 scientific backgrounds, and that's great, because it 20 helps you understand the science in this case, but the 10:24:57 21 level required in the scientific field is not what's 22 required in this courtroom. It's not absolute. It is 23 something called preponderance of the evidence, more 24 likely than not. 25 And Mr. Dickens, during jury selection, talked 10:25:12

about a scale, right, and this is a commonly used 2 graphic. You have two scales of evidence, and on one 3 side -- they're exactly the same, except one side has a 4 feather on it. That is enough to meet our burden of 10:25:31 5 proof. I like the quote at the bottom. It says, "I'm 6 not sure, but I think so." And that's really the standard here. What we have to prove to you is not yes, 9 absolutely, it causes cancer, but you ask yourself, when 10:25:45 10 you're sitting in that deliberation room, maybe some of 11 you are going to say, "I'm not so sure, but I think so." 12 We're done. We've met our burden, and that's what's 13 required here. Now, what do we actually have to show, that goes 14 15 to the jury instruction about causation. It says, "A 10:25:59 16 substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a 17 reasonable person would consider to have contributed to 18 the harm. It must be more than a remote or trivial 19 factor. It does not have to be the only cause of the 20 harm. Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing 10:26:16 21 harm if the same harm would have occurred without that 22 conduct." 23 So let me break this down a little bit. 24 first issue is a substantial factor. It doesn't mean it 25 has to be the only cause of something; right? We all 10:26:28

know cancer is a complicated disease. 2 multi-factorial. It's multi-causal, and we don't have to 3 show that Roundup was the only cause of Mr. Johnson's cancer. We simply have to show that it contributed, that 10:26:47 5 it played a substantial role in contributing to it, and 6 we only have to do that more likely than not. That's actually what we have to prove here. And in a minute -- or after I'm done, after 9 lunch, Mr. Lombardi is going to come up here and he's 10 going to say they have to prove this, they have to prove 10:27:01 11 this, they have to prove this. Don't forget the law, 12 because this is not a criminal trial, as much as it feels 13 like it at times. It's a civil one. Now, it goes on to say, "Conduct is not a 14 15 substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would 10:27:15 16 have occurred without that conduct." The harm here, 17 Ladies and Gentlemen, is that right now Mr. Johnson has 18 cancer and all of the horror that that entails. And the 19 question you have to decide is, would he be sitting here 10:27:36 20 today with the cancer that he has without that 21 contribution? It is not the question of, would he 22 develop cancer at some point down the line, 20, 30 years 23 from now? It is, did he -- would he be where he is today 24 absent the Roundup? 25 Don't let the defendants, Monsanto, trick you on 10:27:51

this point. It's really important. So, for example, if you decide that the Roundup promoted the tumors, that it 3 contributed to the creation of his tumors on his skin, 4 then we've met our burden. Even if he ultimately would 5|have gotten that cancer 10, 15 years down the line, the 10:28:11 point is he wouldn't be here today absent the contributing factor. In addressing the issue of causation and the 9 general question, "Can Roundup be a substantial 10:28:26 10 contributing factor in causation of cancer," we've talked 11 about the three pillars of cancer science, and you guys 12 have heard a lot about this. You've heard about 13 epidemiology. You've heard about toxicology. You've 14 heard about mechanism. The weird thing is, though, you've heard that 10:28:38 15 16 from our experts. Because here's the simple truth, 17 Monsanto presented four live witnesses to you, four. The 18 first one was Dr. Mucci, and she only looked at the 19 epidemiology. She refused to look at toxicology or any 20 mechanistic data. 10:29:00 21 You heard from Dr. Foster. He only looked at 22 the animal data. He refused to look -- or he looked at 23 the epidemiology, but he refused to opine about it or 24 give you any opinions about or the mechanism data. And 25 then you heard from Dr. Kuzel, who had looked at 10:29:16

literally one epidemiology study, and then Dr. Al-Khatib 2 when actually had no opinions about caution whatsoever, 3 so he's really off the table. What did they do? They atomized the science. 10:29:33 5 They broke it into little parts and put everyone on their 6 little island and said, on this island, you don't have enough. But that's not science. We actually called five experts, and every 9 single one -- Dr. Portier, Dr. Neugut, Dr. Sawyer, 10:29:48 10 Dr. Benbrook and Dr. Nabhan -- looked at everything, 11 every animal study. They looked at every epidemiological 12 study. They looked at the hundreds of mechanism studies. 13 And when you look at the totality of the evidence, it 14 causes cancer. That's what IARC did. Because if you look at 10:30:03 15 16 just the epi -- we all agree, the epi by itself, you 17 don't get causation. The rodents alone, you don't get 18 causation. But when you put all three together, then you 19 have causation. 10:30:23 20 Why didn't Monsanto call somebody who could 21 testify to all three topics? They didn't present anybody 22 about mechanism, by the way, at all. Why didn't they 23 call somebody? Because they couldn't find anybody. 24 You've seen hundreds and hundreds of scientists sign 25 their names on Dr. Portier's letter, sign their names on 10:30:40

Dr. Blair's letter. The scientific advisory panel for 2 the EPA, they all agree that when you look at everything, there's a risk. But why did didn't they call a witness to say 10:30:55 5 the opposite? Because they couldn't find one. Because 6 Dr. Mucci has too much integrity. If you showed her the animal data, she'd go, you've got a problem. Dr. Foster, 8 if you showed him the epi and you showed him the 9 mechanism, he'd probably say they've got a problem. The 10:31:12 10 fact that Monsanto hasn't brought a single witness to 11 testify about all of this is glaring. It is astonishing. 12 It shows just actually how Monsanto likes to deal with 13 the science. Now, the only group, person or entity that 14 15 Monsanto points to that did look at all the evidence, 10:31:28 16 supposedly, is the EPA. But there's a special -- this is 17 the report. It's the OPP report from 2016, 18 September 12th, and it says it's an issue paper; right? 19 So what this was is a document that was actually sent to 10:31:46 20 the scientific advisory panel for their comments, that 21 group of 16 scientists who reviewed the merits of this 22 document. 23 Here's the instruction: "The following exhibits 24 may be admitted for the limited purpose of evaluating 25 Monsanto's state of mind regarding the state of science 10:32:04

and for no other purpose." This instruction does not 2 apply to the IARC Monograph. You can look at that 3 document, and you can believe the truth of the statements 4 made in it, but you cannot believe the truth of this 10:32:21 5 document. It has not been admitted for that purpose. 6 And the reason why is a really important one, because Monsanto didn't put anyone in this stand right 8 here to talk to you about it intelligently. We didn't 9 get to cross-examine the guy who authored this, ask him, 10:32:38 10 hey, why did you do this why did you violate your EPA 11 quidelines? They didn't put anyone up there because they 12 know if they did, I would have torn that person apart. 13 It wouldn't have been my criticisms. It would 14 be the scientific advisory panel's criticisms. They 10:32:53 15 didn't follow their own guidelines. Dr. Foster, he goes, 16 quidelines, well people, sometimes you go outside the guidelines. That's not science. Okay? 18 Science is not sticking an arrow in the wall and 19 drawing the bullseye around it. Guidelines dictate how 10:33:09 20 you do things and how you look at it and how you assess 21 it, how you weight things, and the only thing that the 22 independent scientists that reviewed this document agreed 23 on, all across the board, was that the EPA didn't follow the guidelines. That's what this document says. 25 Now, why is that? Why is it that this document 10:33:25

is given limited significance and was highly criticized 2 by the scientific advisory panel? Well, I have a couple theories. The first one is the EPA approved this product in 1970s. It's been on the market for 40 years, and the 10:33:45 5 scientists that approved it would have to go and tell 6 everybody in the world, we got it wrong. They have a dog in the fight, because they'd have to tell the world we 8 made a mistake, that the countless cancers that this product has caused in the United States, my bad. 10:34:04 10 They'd have to own up to that. And even after 11 the scientific advisory panel said, hey, you ain't 12 following your guidelines, you ain't doing it right, they 13 just doubled down on it. They didn't explain anything. 14 And that's why the 2017 report is not in evidence, and 15 that's why the SAP panel -- Monsanto didn't put that in 10:34:20 16 evidence. They only want you to see this little part of 17 the story, and even this part of the story is limited. 18 I think everybody here can agree that no one's 19 perfect, but the EPA has made mistakes before. 10:34:40 20 Government agencies make mistakes. We've heard time and 21 time again about the various things that we found out 22 were cancer after decades, if not hundreds of years, of 23 thinking they were safe. We've heard about it over and over again, and that's what's going on here. 25 It's also important to realize on page 19 of 10:34:56

this document, it says, unequivocally, that although 2 there are multiple lines of evidence -- okay. "Although 3 there are studies available on glyphosate-based pesticide 4 formulations, the agencies soliciting advice from the 5 FIFRA SAP on this evaluation of human carcinogenic 10:35:16 potential for the active ingredient glyphosate only at this time." So while they list a bunch of the formulated 9 studies, most of which are positive, for what it's worth, 10:35:30 10 they actually don't offer an opinion about the formulated 11 products. Just think about how is that possible? I 12 mean, they're approving a product. They know it's being 13 used in a formulated way in the real world, and they're 14 not even looking at it. Finally, I'm going to put together a story that 10:35:49 15 16 has come out in the videos but maybe was clearly 17 explained and that is Jess Rowland. Jess Rowland 18 authored the first version of this. You saw that. It 19 was presented to you. What do we know about Jess 20 Rowland? 21 This is an e-mail in evidence. It's from Daniel 22 Jenkins to William Heydens. It's just after the IARC 23 conclusion in April 2015. He says, "So Jess called me 24 out of the blue this morning." This is Jess Rowland. 25 Here's what Jenkins says. He actually quotes him. By 10:36:24

the way, this is April 2015. 1 2 So what's happened at that point is IARC's 3 announced a two-way classification, but they actually 4 haven't published the Monograph. They haven't shown 10:36:40 5 anybody the reasoning behind their decision. They just posted it. Before the Monograph comes out, Jess Rowland says, "We have enough to sustain our conclusions. Don't 8 need gene tox or epi. The only thing is the Cheminova 9 study" -- that's the consumer study, the one that has the 10:36:59 10 mystery virus that no one seems to know where it came 11 from -- "with the sarcoma in mice. We have that study 12 now and its conclusions are irrelevant because at limit 13 does? I'm the chair of the CARC, and my folks are 14 running this process for glyphosate in regulation review. 15 I have called a CARC meeting in June." 10:37:14 16 So we have the guy who's writing the document 17 calling Monsanto asking questions about how to get rid of 18 an animal study. That's what this is saying, and he's 19 saying we're going to disagree with IARC, even before 10:37:31 20 we've seen the Monograph. That's not science. I don't 21 know what that is. That's creepy. That's the person 22 when's doing the EPA evaluation. 23 But then it gets worse, because at this time the 24 ATSDR -- which Dr. Portier used to run, by the way, not 25 at this time, but he used to run it when he was working 10:37:49

for the federal government -- decided to run a review on glyphosate. They were looking specifically at the 3 carcinogenic potential. Here's what he said, "Jess called to ask for a contact name at ATSDR. I passed on 10:38:04  $5 \mid \text{Jesslyn's e-mail.}''$  That's the person at ATSDR. "He told  $6\,|\,\mathrm{me}$  no coordination is going on and he wanted to establish some saying 'If I can kill this, I should get an medal.'" This is the person in the EPA, the person who's 9 supposed to be looking out for our health, bragging to a 10:38:23 10 Monsanto employee that he's going to kill something, 11 another person's investigation of it, and if he does it, 12 he should get a medal. You have to put the EPA's 13 assessment in context, because the EPA's assessment is 14 not transparent. We don't get to see the e-mails and 10:38:39 15 16 conversations between Monsanto and EPA. But you know 17 what is transparent, hundred percent, everything 18 published and available to the world, it's IARC's 19 classification. They looked at all the evidence and 10:38:55 20 rated it. Epi is limited which means that it's a 21 credible causal association but you can't rule out chance 22 or bias. Toxicology is sufficient, the highest possible 23 rating, and the mechanism is strong, highest possible 24 rating. 25 And the fact that Monsanto has not called a 10:39:11

single witness to discuss mechanism with you, this is 2 undisputed. It is the strongest piece of evidence of carcinogenicity, and Monsanto didn't call a witness to talk about it. 10:39:25 5 I mean, they talk about -- they brought in these little specialized epi person, animal person. They could 7 have brought in a mechanism person, but they didn't even 8 bother because if they had brought in an expert to try to 9 tell you the mechanism data wasn't strong or didn't 10:39:42 10 support causation, it would have been a disaster for him. 11 I would have put study after study after study in front 12 of them and said, sir, how can you say that? 13 Let's look at the studies very quickly. You 14 quys have heard about this already. I don't want to 15 belabor all the evidence. If I need to address some 10:40:01 16 things that they bring up in rebuttal, I will. Just so you know, we're going to go until 12:15 17 18 with me. Mr. Lombardi's going to go two hours after 19 lunch, and then I will have the last 45 minutes or so to 10:40:18 20 respond. That's how it's going to work, and you should probably start deliberation tomorrow morning. 22 This is the epi data. We have something that no 23 one disputes. Whether or not you an have adjustment for 24 pesticides or not adjusted for other pesticides, whatever 25 you do, it's all to the right of one. Every single time 10:40:31

it's to the right of one with the exception of Orsi which 2 -- everyone agrees it's kind of an unuseful study because 3 it's a hospital-based study. Most of these -- with the exception of De Roos 10:40:48 5 2005, which is the AHS, most of these are population-based, so they're not just looking at farmers spraying in industrial cabs. They're looking at people 8 using it in the real world, and it's all to the right of 9 one. 10:40:59 10 I asked Dr. Foster about it. Remember, I put up 11 my notebook and I drew a line and I put X's on both sides 12 of the line and I said, if there was no risk, you would 13 expect to see some above and below the line, just by 14 random chance; right? He said yeah. But I said, here, 10:41:14 15 it's all to the right, what's the likelihood of that? He 16 said, yeah, that's pretty unexpected. He conceded. That 17 was their own witness. 18 Dr. Portier calculated the probability of this 19 occurring. It's a 3-percent chance. So if there's truly 10:41:29 20 no risk, and this is the data you're seeing, the 21 likelihood of seeing this data is 3 percent. Basic 22 probability (inaudible). We also have dose-response. 23 Sorry it's not on here, but for both the De Roos and --24 I'm sorry -- the McDuffie, it showed that greater than 25 two days per year use had a more than doubling of the 10:41:46

risk, and it was statistically significant. 1 2 Now, they've complained that it wasn't adjusting for confounders, but if you actually looked at the study -- and I showed Dr. Mucci -- they looked at this 5 issue and they said none of the other pesticides are 10:41:57 contributing to it. So there's a dose-response there. 7 In De Roos -- I'm sorry, Eriksson 2008, there 8 was also greater than 10 days per year analysis. 9 that was doubling and statistically significant. In the 10:42:11 10 Andreotti, there was an intensity-weighted measurement --11 I don't have it on here -- and that one was negative. Ιt 12 was all below one, which by the way is very weird. 13 Studies should not be consistently below one. But in any 14 event, all four of those metrics were below one, which --15 I'll explain why that's in a second. 10:42:29 16 In any event, there's a lot of evidence here 17 about the epidemiology, but let's be clear. Nobody is 18 saying it gets you there. Nobody. Dr. Portier, 19 Dr. Neugut, nobody says it gets you there, and IARC 10:42:45 20 themselves concluded it was limited. So if you were to 21 just look at the epidemiology and block everything else 22 out, that's not proper science. 23 So let's talk about some of the criticisms. 24 We'll do this quickly because I don't want to spend too 25 much time. They really raised three issues in the case. 10:43:01

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One was confounding, the second was proxy bias. And then
         2 their argument was you have to look at the NAPP and the
         3 AHS; right? Those are the issues at stake, so let's go
           through those quickly.
10:43:16
         5
                    On confounding, it's not an issue here, okay?
          6 In De Roos 2003 they examined 47 different pesticides.
         7 They looked at whether or not there was any confounding,
         8 and they said there was not. That's primarily the data
         9 this is based on. So the idea that there's confounding,
10:43:31
        10 it's just garbage and it's out of a playbook. Okay?
        11 This is what Dr. Mucci agreed to.
        12
                     I said, "Doctor, you said that one of the great
        13 accomplishments of epidemiology was that it helped expose
        14 that tobacco was associated with lung cancer; right?
10:43:46
        15
                     "Yes.
        16
                     "And isn't it true that when that fight was
        17 happening in the epidemiology world, the tobacco
        18 companies kept saying it's confounders?
                     "Maybe. I'm sure they did, yes."
        19
10:44:00
        20
                     It's a classic way of hiding a risk.
         21
                    MR. LOMBARDI: Objection, your Honor. Beyond
        22 the scope of the evidence. There's no evidence about
           anything other than Monsanto in this case.
         23
         24
                    THE COURT: Sustained.
         25
                    MR. WISNER: Let's look at another document.
10:44:15
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This is Exhibit 321, also in evidence. This is an e-mail
         2 from Dr. Goldstein. The subject is ACSH. It's an
         3 organization. He said, "While I would love to have more
          4 friends and more choices" -- by the way this is in
10:44:36
         5 February 2015, just before the IARC classification.
          6
                     "While I'd like to have more friends and more
           choices, we don't have a lot of supporters and can't
         8 afford to lose the few we have. I am well aware of the
         9 challenges of ACSH, and I know Eric has valid concerns,
        10 so I can assure you I'm not all starry-eyed about ACSH.
10:44:49
        11 They have plenty of warts, but you will not get a better
        12 value for your dollar than ACSH."
        13
                    Out of context, this e-mail doesn't tell you
        14 much. So I asked Dr. Benbrook to tell us about ACSH, and
        15 here's what he said.
10:45:05
        16
                     "The ACSH, what position did it take with
        17 regards to tobacco?
                     "They were one of the scientific organizations
        18
        19 that held out to the end and argued that the science
10:45:16
        20 really clear about tobacco causing cancer.
                     "QUESTION: Talked about how too many
        21
        22 confounders; right?
         23
                     "ANSWER: That's certainly one of the arguments
        24 that's brought up."
        25
                    That Monsanto is now raising confounders on this
10:45:31
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data, that they seek the allegiance of ACSH should tell you a lot. 2 3 The next problem, proxy bias. Now, I have the slides in here, but I don't have 10:45:53 5 enough time to get through it all. We looked at a study 6 by Dr. Blair from 1993. During Dr. Mucci's crossexamination, I put it up there and showed her the portion 8 when they discussed the issue of proxy bias. Basically 9 what they said was when you talk to proxies, they tend to 10:46:11 10 understand estimate the use of pesticides; right? 11 And so if you add that to your data, it will 12 tend to underestimate exposures. What that does is it 13 creates classification exposure -- misclassification 14 exposure error, and what that does is it doesn't inflate 10:46:29 15 risks. It pushes it towards one. That's what it does. Now, Dr. Mucci she took a remarkable position. 16 17 She said you have to exclude them from your analysis 18 completely. That's insane. You're looking at people who 19 have cancer and you're going to cut out everyone who's 10:46:49 20 already died? That is the definition of selection bias; 21 right? How can you estimate a risk when you ignore the 22 data from the people who've already died from the 23 disease? 24 Of course, if you do that, your risk is going to 25 disappear. But that's not how this works. People who 10:47:01

have cancer die. And in epidemiological studies, you ask 2 the next of kin for as much information as you can, but you adjust for it. You don't remove it. And when you adjust for proxy bias in this data, nothing happens. Ιt 10:47:19 5 doesn't -- it actually gets a little bit less. attenuates towards the null. So absolutely there's no evidence of any true proxy bias here. And Dr. Mucci's 8 reliance of excluding it all together from the data is 9 just a rampant violation of basic epidemiological 10:47:35 10 principles. 11 And so what happens is if you were properly 12 dealing with proxy bias -- if we didn't have proxy bias 13 as they say, these data would actually be closer to one. 14 It would not be greater. So the existence of proxy 15 respondents and the fact that we still see a risk 10:47:51 16 actually strengthens the evidence. 17 Let's talk about the North American Pooled 18 Project. And in what I can only describe as a fit of 19 I-don't-know-what's-going-on-here, Monsanto keeps trying 10:48:05 20 to argue that the NAPP supports their position. 21 simply doesn't. It just doesn't. Let's look at the 22 document. This is the actual draft manuscript. 23 the last one, September 21, 2015. This is the draft that 24 was there. 25 It's the same authors that we've talked about, 10:48:20

we've seen them in a bunch of other studies. And what 2 are the results that they report? Cases whoever used glyphosate had a significantly elevated risk of NHL overall. Odds ratio of 1.43, statistically significant. 10:48:37 5 And that's adjusting for proxies, confounders, and all the stuff that Dr. Mucci said you had to have. 7 Subjects who used glyphosate for greater than 3.5 years had increased SLL risk. Odds ratio -- again, 9 that's not statistically significant, but it's elevated. 10:48:54 10 And those who used glyphosate for greater than two days a 11 year -- remember, this is dose makes the poison; right? 12 So it's greater two days a year -- had significantly 13 elevated odds of NHL overall. 2.42, statistically 14 significant. These were suggested increases -- these 15 were suggested increases -- statistically increasing by 10:49:15 16 rate NHL overall, FL, and SLL with more days of 17 glyphosate use. 18 The data supports there's a problem here. 19 again, don't take my word. This is quite literally what 10:49:31 20 it says about IARC. It says, "Our results are also 21 aligned with findings from epidemiological studies of 22 other populations that found an elevated risk of NHL for 23 qlyphosate exposure and with a greater number of days per 24 year of glyphosate use as well as a meta-analysis of 25 glyphosate use and NHL risk. From an epidemiological 10:49:50

perspective, our results were supportive of the IARC 2 evaluation of glyphosate as a probable (Group 2A) 3 carcinogen for NHL." I don't know where they're getting this idea 10:50:06 5 that that somehow makes it weaker. The simple fact is 6 this was not published. It's never been published. It's still in the process of being published. We don't 8 actually know what's going on. It was never published, 9 so IARC couldn't actually look at it. They didn't 10:50:22 10 consider the data. And if they had, it would have 11 strength their conclusion. It would have strengthened 12 the epidemiological evidence, not weakened it. Finally, let's talk about the AHS. The AHS is 13 14 what it is. It is a cohort study. It's pretty big for a 15 cohort study. It's looking at professional pesticide 10:50:38 16 applicators. And what we know is that people who entered 17 the study, right, were people when had been spraying for 18 over 16 years and none of them had cancer. So the population begins off with people who are 19 10:50:53 20 clearly resistant to cancer. That's the starting basis 21 of the population. And then from there, we follow them 22 for 20 years, and it's still going. It will follow them, 23 hopefully, until the end of time, and we'll see what the 24 data shows. And over 80 percent of them are spraying 25 glyphosate and other pesticides; right? 10:51:11

1 And in addition to all that, Mr. Lombardi will 2 point out to you, and we'll hear repeatedly, that the 3 risks of NHL started long before glyphosate hit the 4 market for farmers, for this population. So we're 10:51:25 5 dealing with people who are resistant, people who are 6 already at increased risks of NHL. 7 And that's really important to understand; 8 right? Because when the numbers in the control group are 9 elated, let's say, it's 0, 1, 3, 5; right? There's a 10:51:46 10 clear pattern there. But if we add 5 to each of those --11 so it's 5, 6, 8, 10 -- the statistical significance 12 disappears because of the noise. When you start adding a 13 bunch of more cases, it's harder to see risks. That's 14 what we're seeing in the AHS. 10:52:04 15 Remarkably, you don't have to take my word for 16 it. In evidence is Exhibit 154. It was brought in by 17 stipulation, so you really haven't had a chance to look 18 at it, but it came in through the cross of Dr. Mucci. 19 This is a document created by John Acquavella, Monsanto's 10:52:23 20 epidemiologist at the time in July 22, 1997. They talk 21 about the AHS. This is before they have any data. This 22 is them just talking about the study before the results 23 come in. 24 And if you read through this document, they're 25 scared. They're not scared that they're going to get 10:52:36

data that supports that it doesn't cause cancer. Thev're 2 worried they're going to get data that shows that it 3 causes cancer. Dr. Acquavella goes on a tirade describing how bad the study is. 10:52:52 5 For example, one of his criticisms is, "Most of the diseases to be studied in the AHS have scant reasoning to link them putatively to pesticide exposure. 8 Thus, much of the research can be termed 'exploratory.'" 9 That should be amusing to a lot of people here because, 10:53:06 10 in a minute, Mr. Lombardi is going to come up and tell 11 you that every study but the AHS is exploratory, and this 12 is their own person saying that it is exploratory. Sort 13 of an amusing contradiction. "That's not unusual in epidemiology, but it is 14 15 unusual on this big a scale." By the way, this is 10:53:22 16 Exhibit 154. Read the whole thing cover to cover. It's 17 pretty amusing. It's Monsanto strongly accusing the AHS 18 before they get the results, and yet they have the 19 audacity to come in here and say it's the greatest study 10:53:41 20 since sliced bread, and they're going to do that in their 21 closing. 22 Here's the part that's really interesting. 23 Under the exposure assessment, Dr. Acquavella says, "The 24 exposure in the AHS will be inaccurate." It will be. 25 And we know why; right? 10:53:55

1 I showed you guys the questionnaire that people 2 had to fill out in 25 minutes after they just took an 3 exam. And among the 47, 80 or whatever pesticides that 4 they're looking at, there's one little section about 10:54:09 5 Roundup, and it asks them, on the spot, to not only 6 decide if they've ever used it, how much they've used it daily per year for the last 16 years. They have no access to their records. 9 can't call their spouse and say hey, did I use Roundup 10:54:27 10 last year? What was that product we used? They can't do 11 any of that. They just have to pick something on the 12 spot. So you're going to get misclassification. People 13 are going to say they were exposed who really weren't. 14 People are going to say they were much more exposed when 10:54:41 15 they really weren't and vice versa. And what happens in 16 the cohort study when you have all that crossing is it 17 just destroys any ability to actually see anything. Don't take my word for it. "Inaccurate exposure 18 19 classification can produce spurious results. The 20 conventional thinking in epidemiology is that exposure 10:54:59 21 misclassification will most often obscure exposure 22 disease relationships." This is what he's saying before 23 he gets the results. So because of this issue --24 concerned about this -- they actually studied it. 25 The AHS investigators looked at this issue. 10:55:16

They published an article about it. It's called the 2 | "Impact of Pesticide Exposure Misclassification on 3 Estimates of Relative Risks in the Agricultural Health 4 Study." Dr. Blair and all of the other people, many of 10:55:39 5 them are on the current AHS publication, they actually 6 looked at this exact issue, this issue of exposure misclassification. And what did they find? I covered this with Dr. Neugut, and what they 9 found was we draw several conclusions. "First, the 10:55:57 10 accuracy of reporting of pesticide use...is comparable to 11 that for many other factors commonly assessed by 12 questionnaire for epidemiologic studies. Second, except 13 in situations where exposure estimation is quite 14 accurate" -- which we know here it wasn't that accurate. 15 But assuming it was -- "and true relative risks are 3 or 10:56:14 16 more" -- which we do not have here, we're talking about 17 relative risks about 1.5 to 2 -- "pesticide" 18 misclassification may diminish risk estimates to such an 19 extent that no association is obvious which indicates 10:56:30 20 false negative findings might be common." 21 The investigators address this issue in a 22 publication, and they said, listen, unless you have a 23 really high risk rate because of exposure 24 misclassification, you ain't going to see anything. 25 So what do we know about Roundup? We know that 10:56:47

it has about a 2.0 -- maybe 1.5 to 2.0 risk. You're not 2 going to see it in the AHS. And they never did; right? 3 It was published in 2005. They didn't see any risk They did find an elevated rate, oddly enough, 10:57:06 5 with multiple myeloma, which is now considered a form of 6 NHL, but that was it. 7 Then they published it again in 2018. That's 8 the JNCI paper. We call it the Andreotti paper. 9 Whatever you want to call it, I don't care. Again, they 10:57:21 10 saw no risk with NHL overall. They did, interestingly 11 enough, see an elevated risk for T-cell lymphoma, which, 12 oddly enough, is exactly what Mr. Johnson has. They 13 studied this. They looked at it and said that you won't 14 see it. So we know before ever seeing the results from 10:57:35 15 16 the AHS that it won't show risk unless it's really high. 17 So it's not really compelling evidence that there's no 18 risk. It's compelling evidence that the AHS is being 19 properly predicted by the people who ran it. You heard 10:57:51 20 from Dr. Blair. He ran the IARC Monograph. He ran the 21 AHS. He concluded it caused cancer. That should be it. 22 They cite Anneclaire De Roos. She's on the JNCI 23 paper, but she also signed a letter with Dr. Portier 24 saying IARC got it right, this stuff causes cancer. I 25 mean, this idea that the AHS is some profound study that 10:58:11

answers the question that we've been trying to solve this 2 whole time is just not true. It tells us exactly what we 3 knew it would, not much. Compounded into this problem with the AHS, 10:58:30 5 separate and apart from the misclassification issue, 6 is -- well, it's actually related -- but it's the change this use in the product; right? We know starting -- the 8 first questionnaire was between 1983 and 1997. This is 9 glyphosate use amongst agricultural workers. This is the 10:58:48 10 same populate. They did a file study between 2001 and 11 2005, and that's where they lost 40 percent of their data 12 and had to impute it. There's all these problems 13 associated with the imputation based on her testimony, 14 but I really don't want to belabor it. The simple fact 10:59:03 15 is even if you use 2005, it's doubled since. 16 What's going on is you're studying a pesticide 17 that has just had a gargantuan increase in use, you can't 18 do that. It just doesn't work. It breaks the model. Ιt 19 breaks the system. That's what they all agreed to. 10:59:24 20 Remarkably, Dr. Mucci said oh, it shouldn't make 21 any difference. It's actually not true. If you actually 22 look at the study -- maybe I'll show it to you on 23 rebuttal, if I have to -- on the last page it says, if 24 there has been changes of use in the product it, will 25 affect the results. Everyone agrees that there has been. 10:59:38

1 Probably the most kind of basic point, though, 2 is that the IARC Monograph spent a lot of time discussing the AHS. You'll have it in evidence to take a look at. They discussed it. They looked at the De Roos 2005 data. 5 They discussed its strengths, weaknesses. It was fully 11:00:00 concluded and IARC concluded it was negative; right? 7 So the biggest attack on IARC is now they have 8 the new AHS. Well, the new AHS is negative. So it was 9 negative when they came to their conclusion, and it's 11:00:20 10 negative now. It wouldn't have impacted their results. 11 It's the same study. So this idea that IARC didn't 12 consider all the epidemiology, it's just not true. 13 All right. So those are the reasons that they 14 attack epidemiology. Let's quickly go through the mouse I don't want to spend too much time on it. 11:00:38 15 studies. 16 IARC classified it as sufficient, but let's look at what 17 the charts show. Let's start off with the rats. 18 Monsanto, to this day, has only offered evidence 19 about the skin keratoacanthomas and just refused to offer 11:00:59 20 any testimony about the repeated thyroid tumors, the fact 21 that there's a kidney carcinoma. Here we also see that 22 in mice, it crosses species. Some of these, sure, we 23 agree probably aren't a big deal. 24 Dr. Portier, when he said pick and choose which 25 ones you have to rely, he told you which ones are the 11:01:16

strongest. And probably the most interesting one for 2 this case is the skin case. It's not because it's a carcinoma. It's not. It's a benign tumor, but it shows that it creates tumors in the skin. We're dealing right 11:01:34 5 now with a man who has tumors in his skin. His are not 6 benign, but they exist and it shows that there's a plausible mechanism. It's called biological plausibility. 9 But the rat studies really aren't the crazy one. 11:01:50 10 The really intense one is the mouse data, and here we see 11 the kidney ones popping up again. This is a cross-12 species identification which is something that's really 13 important in assessing the animal data. And the Monsanto study's the first one, but 14 11:02:04 15 every single study after Monsanto looked at it found some 16 form of malignant lymphoma, every single one. And you 17 saw Monsanto try to explain it away. Dr. Foster went up 18 there and he said listen all of these, yeah, sure, but 19 they're all within the historical range of 12 percent. 11:02:25 20 He put a little chart up. He said it over and over 21 again. 22 At the very end of his examination, I showed him 23 the actual data and he went, yep, I'm wrong. So the 24 actual basis of his opinion is just wrong. It's not 25 12 percent, it's 4 percent. That's what the data shows. 11:02:41

And so instead of seeing six tumors in every group, the 2 max you would see is two. And that's really, really important in understanding this, because Dr. Foster, and even the EPA, oddly enough, they do the same thing. 11:03:01 5 dismiss all the malignant lymphoma because they say it's within the range of historical controls. 7 Now, we know that's in violation of the quidelines. The quidelines say don't do that. 9 never explain why they do it, but they do that. Putting 11:03:13 10 aside them violating the guidelines, Dr. Portier clearly 11 showed that it's popping up over and over again. 12 this case is about lymphoma. 13 You're seeing the very tumor in the mice that 14 you would expect -- that you're seeing in humans. 15 -- the parallels of the data are overwhelming. And if 11:03:32 16 you were to just to look at the epi and just look at the 17 animal data, you might not connect the dots. But when 18 you look at both, like our experts did, it's pretty clear 19 that there's something going on here, specifically with 11:03:49 20 lymphoma the cancer that starts in the bones and 21 manifests all over your body in different tumor sites. 22 IARC concluded it was sufficient. Now, one of 23 the things that I think came up -- and we didn't really 24 get to talk about it too much because it really came up 25 in Dr. Foster's testimony -- is this idea of the ways 11:04:05

that carcinogenesis happens. We have an initiator; 2 right? That's something that directly causes damage to 3 DNA. And after you damage them enough, it eventually 4 mutates in the cells and causes cancer; right? But 11:04:23 5 another way something causes cancer is something called a promoter, and the promoter affects all the other aspects of it. It doesn't initiate, but it takes the initiated 8 cells and progresses them quicker towards a tumor. 9 And both types of carcinogens are accepted and 11:04:42 10 understood, and there's actually a way to test if 11 something is a promotor. It's called a promoter test, 12 and there's only been one that's ever been done on 13 glyphosate. It wasn't done on glyphosate. It was 14 actually done on Roundup. It was done on mice skin. 15 It's called the George study from 2010, and it was done 11:04:56 16 by some scientists in India. And there was some 17 questions, I think, about what was the vehicle and was 18 there a vehicle control, so let me just walk you through 19 that very quickly. 11:05:10 20 So this is the study. This is the "Studies on 21 Glyphosate-Induced Carcinogenicity in Mouse Skin" -- so 22 they're doing a skin-tumor-promoter study -- "A 23 Proteomic Approach." I actually don't know what that 24 means, sorry. 25 Anyway, they do an analysis, glyphosate is 11:05:24

widely used, "Here we showed the carcinogenic effects of 2 glyphosate using a 2-stage mouse skin carcinogenesis 3 model and proteomic analysis. Carcinogenicity study 4 relieved that glyphosate has tumor promoting activity." 11:05:43 5 All right. Let me show you what they actually did, so you don't have to take my word for it. We know 7 that they specifically used Roundup original from 8 Monsanto Company, St. Louis Missouri. It's the same 9 stuff here, has the 41 percent glyphosate and the POEA 11:06:00 10 surfactant. The same thing that Mr. Johnson was using. 11 Okay? And they broke it into a bunch of different 12 13 groups, but the groups that we're interested in are the 14 first two and the last ones. What they do in these 11:06:12 15 studies is they actually give the -- they take the mouse 16 and they actually give it an initiator, right, something 17 we know causes cancer as an initiator, and then they 18 apply the substance like glyphosate to it to see if it 19 promotes the initiation. So was it a promotional effect? 11:06:31 20 And they break it into a bunch -- so DMBA is an 21 initiator. They also have DMBA plus TPA, and TPA is 22 specifically a promoter. We know it's a promoter. This 23 is a complete example. So you have a known initiator and 24 a known promoter; right? 25 But they also, in Group 2, did glyphosate alone. 11:06:48

And with glyphosate alone, they used the vehicle which is 2 the substance that gets mixed with it to apply it to the 3 mouse. That was the issue about the vehicle. 50 percent 4 ethanol and acetone, 50 percent solution. And so they 11:07:07 5 did glyphosate just -- had the vehicle in it, and so they 6 looked at what would happen if you just put glyphosate on 7 it without any initiator. But also down here, they did 8 the initiator and then applied glyphosate one week later 9 by topical treatment, three times a week. Okay? 11:07:23 10 So we actually have a control for the vehicle. 11 And what does it show? Here's the table, here's the 12 results. It shows that that group that just had 13 glyphosate had no tumors, zero across the board. So it 14 was not initiating tumors in this relatively short mouse 15 study on the skin. And the one that had the absolute 11:07:46 16 initiator plus the known promoter it had -- 100 percent 17 of the animals had tumors in their skin because it was a 18 known initiator and known promoter. But when you give it a known initiator and 19 11:08:00 20 glyphosate, 40 percent of the animals had tumors. So 21 what does that tell you? It's a pretty complicated 22 issue. Basically what it tells you is that glyphosate is 23 clearly promoting tumors; right? Because even when they 24 had just the DMBA, the initiator by itself, there was no 25 tumors; right? Glyphosate is doing something not as 11:08:20

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aggressive as TPA, but it's doing something, and
           40 percent of them had tumors in their skin.
         3
                    Dr. Foster dismissed this and actually IARC
           didn't consider it as well and EPA doesn't consider it
11:08:36
         5 mostly because there's only 20 animals in the group, even
          6 though it's statistically significant, but they didn't do
           a full histopathical examination. They didn't break
         8 apart those tumors to see if they were carcinogenic.
         9 Okay, fine.
11:08:52
        10
                    But it doesn't negate what the data does show.
        11 It shows that glyphosate, when applied to the skin,
        12 induces the promotion of tumors. That's literally what
        13 it shows. This is the only promotional study that's been
        14 published and shown, and it's overwhelmingly obvious what
        15 it shows.
11:09:09
        16
                    THE COURT: Mr. Wisner, we need to take the
        17 morning recess now.
        18
                    MR. WISNER: Perfect, your Honor.
                     THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to
        19
11:09:17
        20 take a 15-minute recess now, so we'll be in recess for
        21 15 minutes until 11:25. Please remember, do not discuss
        22 the case. We'll resume at 11:25. Thank you.
         23
                    Counsel, can you please approach.
         24
                     (Recess.)
         25
                     THE COURT: Welcome back, Ladies and Gentlemen.
11:26:24
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We'll now continue closing arguments with Mr. Wisner. 1 2 Mr. Wisner, when you're ready, you may proceed. 3 MR. WISNER: Thank you, your Honor. All right. So I just want to show you another 4 11:26:39 5 document that's in evidence, 366. This is an e-mail sent 6 from Ashley Roberts at Intertek to Dr. Farmer and Dr. Heydens to the people you've seen testify to in this Just so you know, Donna Farmer in her testimony 9 she actually said she considers herself the spokesperson 11:26:59 10 for Monsanto on safety issues and Roundup and Mr. --11 Dr. Heydens is her boss. That all came out in the 12 testimony. I just want to point that out because one of 13 issues in punitive damages is were these individuals 14 considered managing agents sufficient to either speak for 15 the company or -- the instructions say what the elements 11:27:16 16 are. They clearly do, but I just want to point that out. So Ashley Roberts sends an e-mail to Donna and 17 18 Bill. He's talking about Keith, who has asked a 19 question, "He has asked if we need to give any 11:27:35 20 consideration to exposures of formulants in the 21 commercial product, at least in the applicators? 22 under the impression that these were inert, but reading a 23 response this morning in the Ecologist makes it sound 24 like it's the combination that is toxic"; right? 25 So in response to a colleague that is writing a 11:27:53

paper that Monsanto is going to publish, essentially 2 refuting IARC, here's what he said, he says, "Ashley, I 3 think the short answer is no. The focus of this is what 4 is the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate." This is 11:28:07 5 what we see frequently. Just focus on glyphosate, not 6 the formula. 7 But then he says something that's particularly 8 revealing, "That said, the surfactant in the formulation 9 will come up in the tumor promotion skin study" -- that's 11:28:20 10 the one we were just talking about -- "because we think 11 it played a role there." 12 This is actually an admission by their chief 13 top-dog toxicologist at Monsanto saying, "That George 14 study that we just discussed, yeah, we think the fact 11:28:36 15 that it was a formulated product played a role in the 16 promotion of skin tumors." This is in 2015 August. It's 17 important, because Mr. Johnson, at this point -- we're 18 going go through his timeline in a second -- is actually 19 currently actively spraying Roundup at this time at the 11:28:54 20 Benicia school grounds, and at this time, he is still 21 waiting for a response from his second phone call. So 22 that's the context of this. 23 All right. So we've looked at the does it cause 24 cancer. I think we've got it. I'll respond to whatever 25 defense counsel brings up in rebuttal. First question, 11:29:09

"Can it be a substantial contributing factor?" Yes. 1 2 Question -- next one: "Was it a substantial contributing factor in Mr. Johnson's cancer?" And before 4 I get into this, I'm just going to quickly address a 11:29:27 5 couple of the big issues. The first one is something called latency. 7 And Monsanto wants you to believe that the 8 minimum amount of time between exposure and diagnosis for 9 mycosis fungoides because of a pesticide exposure is --11:29:40 10 it keeps changing what their number is. I think on the 11 opening it was, like, 12 years. I don't know what he's 12 going to say now. Maybe it's 6. I don't know. 13 simple fact is there is no minimum latency for 14 non-Hodgkin's lymphoma that is more than four months. 15 That's the minimum latency. 11:29:58 16 You don't have to take my word on that. That is 17 the number come up by the 9/11 Commission after exposure 18 to chemicals from the 9/11 incident. They said four 19 months is the minimum amount. That's it. Because 11:30:14 20 Dr. Sawyer explained very clearly that it's a curve; 21 right? And, you know, if it's a lot of exposure, then 22 it's slanted this way. If it's lower exposure, it's 23 slanted that way, but it's a curve. And some people will 24 get cancer in a few months, some will get cancer in four 25 months, and some will get cancer in 25, 30 years; right? 11:30:30

1 But between those two extremes is everybody else. 2 And you have to consider exposures and other potential risk factors, and for Mr. Johnson, there wasn't The only thing he had as a risk factor was the fact 5 that he's African American. That's it. Everything else 11:30:47 6 he didn't have for mycosis fungoides, except he had extreme exposures to Roundup for two years or two 8 spraying scenes. 9 There's a big fight about did he have a rash 10 starting in 2013 or early 2014. It's the fall of '13, 11:31:02 11 early '14. It doesn't matter. It's the most bizarre 12 fight I've ever had in a courtroom, because he had two 13 full spraying seasons; right? That's plenty of exposure 14 to get cancer, and so whether it started in the fall or 15 not is irrelevant. Although, the records don't support 11:31:22 16 that it's in the fall. But in any event, it's a red 17 herring. It's a non-issue. 18 All right. So here's the instruction again on 19 substantial contributing factor, and the same instruction 11:31:36 20 that applies to general causation applies to specific 21 causation. And that is: Do you think that it's likely, 22 more likely than not, 51 percent, that Mr. Johnson's 23 cancer was at least contributed to substantially by his 24 Roundup exposure? That's the question. If you think 25 yes, we're done. We've proven this element. 11:31:55

1 Let's quickly run through the chronology here. 2 I've got 15 minutes before I have to get to the last part 3 of this, so let's see if I can do this. All right. So Mr. Johnson is promoted to 5 integrated pest manager June 2012. He has an entire 11:32:11 6 spraying season. He testified, and there's been no countervailing evidence to this, that the machine that he 8 was using was putting out 50 gallons an hour. He'd go 9 through three full tanks in a morning. Now, they brought 10 up Dr. Al-Khatib who said, "No. That's not how it 11:32:30 11 works." And then I literally showed him printouts from 12 the internet that said the opposite, and he goes "No, no. 13 That's for something else." But his opinion was literally based on this 14 15 photograph. That's it. He was paid \$70,000, and he 11:32:41 16 looked at a photograph and said, "It's 12 gallons an 17 hour." That's not evidence. That's just rampant 18 speculation. We heard from Mr. Johnson that he'd go through 3 19 11:32:56 20 full tanks in a morning, and a tank has 50 gallons. 21 doesn't take rocket science. He was going through about 22 150 gallons per spraying session, and he'd have about 40 23 of them in the summer months and intermittently in 24 between. 25 So going through here, we have intermittent 11:33:11

spraying. Then we enter his second spraying season. 2 This is May of 2013. He starts spraying again, and 3 during this time period, we don't know the exact date, he 4 has the Mary Farmar incident. He's at the Mary Farmar 11:33:28 5 School District, and that's when he's pulling the hose on 6 the machine and spraying it everywhere, and it's getting everywhere, and he's spraying it, and something goes 8 wrong. It pops off the machine, and it's shooting out a 9 bunch of Roundup. And what does he do? He doesn't -- it 11:33:40 10 gets all over him. So the first thing he does is he 11 actually creates a dirt pile to prevent it from going 12 down the slope, because he doesn't want the children to 13 be exposed to it. And after he's drenched in it -- he finally gets 14 15 to the machine, he turns it off, and he's drenched, I 11:33:52 16 mean, head to toe, all over his body. And what does he 17 do? He drives back to his office, which is not there, a 18 couple miles away. He gets there, gets into the office, 19 takes off his clothes, and he wipes himself off, and he 11:34:08 20 doesn't take a shower for another six hours, so he's 21 getting just an incredible amount of exposure during this 22 incident sometime during the summer of 2013. We don't 23 know exactly when it happened. And this is obviously in 24 addition to his just regular drift exposure that happens 25 when he sprays. 11:34:25

1 So he completes it in August of 2013, and this 2 is where this mystery rash issue comes from, but the 3 simple fact is he went and saw a doctor for wasp stings 4 in September of 2013, and he's there for stings, and we 11:34:40 5 read into the record from a medical record, "Negative for 6 rash." So he actually gets a physical examination from doctors at the time, and it doesn't say -- it doesn't 8 omit anything about a rash. It literally says, "Negative 9 for rash." 11:34:57 10 Now, Dr. Kuzel took the stand and said he had a 11 rash on his face and on the side of his neck at this 12 time. How could any doctor looking at a person's rash on 13 their face write into a medical record "negative for 14 rash" if there was a rash there? There just wasn't. The only treating physician to have testified in 11:35:14 15 16 this case, the only one, is Dr. Ofodile. She came out 17 here on her own dime to testify from Atlanta because she 18 cared so much about Mr. Johnson. And she said, "Yeah, 19 there's no evidence that it actually started in 2013." 11:35:31 20 That her record, when she said it was a year prior, it 21 was late in the day, and if he had a rash, he would have 22 come into the hospital, because he was very good about 23 seeking treatment when he was injured. So that's the 24 testimony. 25 Separately, there's another medical examination 11:35:44

in December, a few months later, and the medical record 2 says, "No deformities, no shift, no scarring, no swelling." Again, no mention of any rash. In February of 2014, this is when he has his 11:36:00 5 second, sort of, mishap at work. At this point, he's 6 using a backpack sprayer for some reason. He only used it a couple times, but one of the few times he did, it 8 leaked through his suit and actually saturated his whole 9 back, and he actually thought it was sweat until he 10 realized, "Oh, my God. I'm literally drenched in 11:36:19 11 Roundup." We don't know how long he was exposed for. Ιt 12 could have been for an hour or two. We don't know, but 13 it happened in February of 2014. And then the first evidence of any serious rash 14 15 is May of 2014, so just a few months after. And if, in 11:36:33 16 fact, Roundup is a promoter, this is, kind of, what you'd 17 expect; right? You'd start expecting the tumors to start 18 manifesting after you have repeated exposures. After his 19 second season and another major exposure, he starts 11:36:46 20 seeing it occur. 21 After -- following several biopsies, he's 22 finally diagnosed -- well, sort of diagnosed, it's a 23 preliminary diagnosis -- in August of 2014, and his final 24 diagnosis was actually made by Dr. Ofodile, who testified 25 here, and that was in October of 2014. And this is what 11:37:02

he looked like. Okay? You can see by October 2014, he 2 has plaques all over his skin, on his leg, on his chest. There's some stuff on his face. There is absolutely zero evidence that he had 5 this in the fall of 2013, but again, I stress it doesn't 11:37:17 6 matter. So this is what he looks like. 7 After October 2014, we have that same month, 8 same month that he's diagnosed, IARC says they're going 9 to look at glyphosate. All right. We have an internal 10 email from Dr. Heydens talked about the IARC evaluation, 11:37:37 11 it's being sent to Dr. Farmer. And in this email, he 12 acknowledges, "At this time, we have vulnerability in the 13 area of epidemiology. We also have potential 14 vulnerabilities in the other areas that IARC will 11:37:55 15 consider, namely exposure, genotox and mode of action. 16 If there was a force working against glyphosate, there is 17 ample fodder to string together to help the cause, even 18 though it's not scientifically justified in is purest 19 form." 11:38:11 20 I don't know what that means, purest form. 21 anyway, this is -- this is what he says in October of 22 2014. This is in response to IARC saying they're going 23 to look at it. A month later, Mr. Johnson calls 24 Monsanto. So we have their main toxicologist saying, 25 "Yeah, we have vulnerabilities here. There's a lot of 11:38:27

science showing a risk." He called them. He told me he 2 works for a School District in California and about nine 3 months ago, February of that year, had a hose break on a 4 large tank sprayer. This resulted in him being soaked to 5 the skin on his face, neck and head with Ranger Pro. He 11:38:45 6 said he was wearing a white exposure suit, and it even went inside that. A few months after this incident, he 8 noticed a rash -- again, a few months after 9 February 2014, which might be consistent with what we 11:38:59 10 know to be true -- on his knee, on his face and later on 11 the side of his head. He has changed his laundry 12 detergent, dryer sheets and used all creams available to 13 him, but nothing seemed to help. His entire body is 14 covered in this now, and the doctors are saying it's skin 11:39:14 15 cancer. He's just trying to find out if it all could be 16 17 related to such a large exposure to Ranger Pro. He asks. 18 Dr. Goldstein says, "I'll call him," and we know he never 19 did. 11:39:28 20 After this, February 2015, Monsanto starts 21 plotting how it's going to deal with the IARC ruling. 22 There's another email from Dr. Heydens to Dr. Farmer and 23 others. In this email, they're talking about creating 24 science, and he specifically says, "A less expensive/more 25 palatable approach might be to involve experts only for 11:39:46

the areas of contention, epidemiology and possibly MOA (depending on what comes out of the IARC meeting) and we ghostwrite the tox -- exposure tox and genotox section." He says, "ghostwrite." This is the guy in 2015 11:40:06 5 saying, "We're going to ghostwrite." And he goes on: "Another option would be to add these people's names to the publication, but we would be keeping costs down by us 8 doing the writing and they would just edit and sign their 9 names, so to speak. Recall that's how we handled 11:40:21 10 Williams Kroes 2000." 11 He said, "Yeah, remember that's how we 12 ghostwrote that thing 15 years ago." And we know that 13 that was relevant, because in Exhibit 373, they say --14 this is in 2010 -- "Williams has served us well in 15 toxicology over the last decade." They create the 11:40:37 16 science and then sign to it. This is in February of 2015. They come up with 17 18 a plan. This is dated February 23rd, 2015. It's before 19 IARC's classification. Prepared as an engagement plan. 11:40:49 20 First point is to protect the reputation and freedom to 21 operate of Roundup by communicating the safety of 22 glyphosate. They want their freedom to operate, which 23 means no regulation, sell it to whoever they want, make 24 billions. And this is before the Monograph has come out. 25 Okay. So they don't even know what the result's going to 11:41:07

They don't know what the Monograph's going to say, 2 what data they relied upon. And they plan to orchestrate 3 outcry with the IARC decision. That's not science. 4 Okay. You don't plan to attack an adverse scientific 11:41:26 5 ruling before you've seen it. That's called deliberate 6 disregard for human health. 7 I have no problem with a company making money. 8 This is America, but I've got a problem when they don't 9 do it honestly, and that's what this is showing. This is 10 February of 2015. A month later, a few weeks later, IARC 11:41:41 11 classification comes out, and then just three weeks 12 later, Mr. Johnson calls again. A second time he reaches 13 out to them and says, "Hey, guys. I need some help 14 here." He goes on -- I'm not going to read all of this, 11:41:59 15 16 but he describes in detail that he's been using it for 17 his job, that he's been spraying with a 50-gallon tank. 18 He talks about the mixtures that he's using. He's 19 talking about his protective equipment. He states he 11:42:16 20 continues to get unexplained rashes and nodules all over 21 his body. 22 "The caller's level of fear is rising over his 23 continued use of Ranger Pro." One -- one phone call. 24 That's all it took, just one phone call to tell this guy, 25 "Hey, you know what, there's science that says it might 11:42:33

cause cancer." 1 2 This is what he looked like in March of 2015. 3 And as you can see, it's getting much worse. He has plaques all over his body, lesion on his arms and legs. 5 This is the sarcoma one, that we found out later is not 11:42:47 the MF. It's on his head. You can see it's breaking. 7 So he reaches out to them, and because Monsanto 8 hasn't said anything to him, Dr. Ofodile actually writes 9 a letter to the Benicia School District saying, "Hey, 11:43:03 10 maybe he should stop spraying it." 11 So Monsanto's going to come in here and they're 12 going to tell you all of his treating physicians don't 13 think Roundup caused his caner, and that is a flat-out 14 lie. Flat-out lie. The only person who's testified was 15 Dr. Ofodile. That's the only person. And what 11:43:20 16 Dr. Ofodile said is she told him to stop spraying it. 17 Yeah, she doesn't know for sure if it caused it, but 18 she's sure concerned. Concerned enough to write a 19 letter. 11:43:30 20 Finally -- not finally. Then in May, a few 21 months later, Monsanto creates a new plan. This is worth 22 taking a look at. What we see here is, you know, why do 23 more? They're talking about how to respond to IARC. 24 They can see there's a severe stigma associated with it, 25 and they need to provide new science to provide 11:43:47

additional support, care cover for future regulatory 2 reviews. They needed to combat the ATSDR evaluation. Wе talked about that with Jess Rowland. And the litigation support. I mean, they're 11:44:05 5 getting ready to fight off litigation. And they won't 6 even call back Mr. Johnson and tell him, "Hey, maybe you should stop spraying." It gets worse. They talk about 8 creating a genotox MOA plan. Could be important for 9 future litigation support. So they're more concerned 11:44:26 10 about litigation than they are about just calling the guy 11 back and saying, "Hey, maybe you should be careful." 12 So after this -- now we're in September 2015. 13 I'm going the spend a few minutes, and then I'll move on. 14 There's these two documents in evidence. I want you to 15 read them closely, so the first one is this email, and 11:44:43 16 this is in response to a newspaper article about labeling 17 Monsanto's Roundup carcinogenic, and it gets sent to 18 Steven Gould, who's the guy who actually deals with 19 Mr. Johnson's distributor, and he's saying, "It's hard to 20 understand how all science and law can do this." 11:45:00 21 And in response, the distributor says to him --22 this is in reference to people using this in 23 California -- "We are being overrun by liberals and 24 morons, sort of like a zombie movie, so we just have to 25 start taking them out one at a time, starting with the 11:45:18

elections next year." This is 2015. The elections next 2 year are the next presidential elections. How does 3 Monsanto's employee respond to this? "I like this 4 analogy." And he sends it on to other Monsanto 11:45:36 5 employees. Liberals and morons. 6 At the same time, they actually conduct a cost analysis of IARC's classification. They talk about 8 there's going to be a gradual reduction in use. School 9 districts are another big risk with the Healthy Schools 11:45:57 10 Act and increased attention. They frequently use PROMAX 11 and PRO Concentrate today, and it even says, "Customers 12 that I'm aware of that have already stopped using 13 glyphosate since the IARC ruling, Irvine Unified School 14 District and several Bay Area cities and school 15 districts." Yeah, that's right. Schools in San 11:46:12 16 Francisco don't use Roundup. It's right there in black 17 and white. 18 But you know what they didn't do, call up a man 19 who was spraying at a school district in the Bay Area and 11:46:25 20 say, "Hey, there's an IARC ruling," because at this time, 21 in September 2015, he's still spraying, because they 22 never called him back. And in 2015, it transforms. 23 goes from being a scary, although controllable type of 24 cancer, to the indolent form. It became a death 25 sentence. 11:46:46

1 Finally, in January of 2016, Mr. Johnson 2 succeeds in stopping the spraying, and as we know, the 3 story goes on. The cancer gets worse. This is 4 August 2016. You can see the lesions and the plaques are 11:47:03 5 getting worse, concentrated. December 2016, they're getting higher and thicker, and you can start seeing the plaquing all over his skin. You can see just chunks of 8 skin basically falling off his body. This is January of 9 2017. You can see it's literally everywhere, all over 10 his body. 11:47:19 11 June 2017, this is one of those ruptures that 12 you talked about where it's exposed skin and it's 13 painful. This is literally on his eyelid, so this is --14 every time he blinks, he's in pain. Every time. It's 15 all over his back, his feet, his legs. This is 11:47:35 16 November 2017. This is getting worse and worse. And 17 this is January of 2018. Monsanto called a doctor who took this stand and 18 19 said to you that Mr. Johnson was in complete remission. 11:47:54 20 What the heck is he talking about? I mean, there's 21 offensive, and then there's completely bonkers. 22 Mr. Johnson is not in complete remission. 23 starting chemo in a few weeks. And everyone agrees --24 and I'm sorry, but everyone agrees that if he makes it to 25 2020 -- he won't make it to 2020 absent a miracle. 11:48:13

That's the facts. 1 2 That Monsanto would call someone up here and 3 speculate about bone marrow transplants that no one has 4 ever offered to him, that he might live until he's 30, 11:48:30 5 when his most recent scan showed the exact opposite, is 6 outrageous. It is disgusting. It is reprehensible. 7 That man has no dignity. I'm thankfully I wasn't here 8 for that direct. I was writing a brief in the back room 9 for most of it. When I was reading the transcripts, I 11:48:46 10 turned red. 11 I go to sleep every night thinking about this 12 man and his family, because I know the consequences of 13 what's happening to him. It haunts me, and he cavalierly 14 says complete remission. We have testimony from Dr. Nabhan -- I'll be 11:49:05 15 16 quick about this -- it's about the differential 17 diagnosis. He looked at all the potential risk factors. 18 All of them didn't play. The only one that made sense 19 was Roundup. Supported by the animal data. Supported by 11:49:21 20 the epidemiology. 21 And so the question is: Did -- is there 22 evidence, more likely than not, that Roundup 23 substantially contributed to his cancer? Absolutely. 24 There is no real -- I mean, this is overwhelming 25 evidence. 11:49:37

As part of this process, you're going to have to 1 2 figure out damages. Now, the economic damages, that's the stuff we can calculate, and we actually stipulated to And this is this number right here. It will be in 11:49:53 5 your jury verdict form, so you don't have to remember it. You just have to add that to whatever you do. 7 The hard part is the noneconomic damages. And 8 this is a -- sort of, an awkward thing to deal with, 9 right, because you're trying to pay someone money for 11:50:11 10 physical pain, mental suffering, the loss of enjoyment in 11 life, disfigurement, physical impairment, grief, anxiety, 12 humiliation, emotional distress. 13 It's almost -- it's so weird to talk about this 14 in the context of money, because it's such a personal 15 thing. But we heard testimony from Mr. Johnson and his 11:50:29 16 wife -- I don't know, it moved me. It really did -- that 17 he's -- that he's, like -- you know, he's at night crying 18 to himself so his children don't see that he's afraid. 19 That he's afraid to get into a pool, because he's afraid 11:50:51 20 people will see his cancer and not want to get in the 21 pool after him. That he can't wear clothes that rub his 22 skin, because the lesions are so painful. That he can't 23 sleep at night. That he gets chemotherapy time after 24 time after time again. It's so bad he can't even leave 25 his bedroom for days at a time, and while this is 11:51:12

1 happening, while he's fighting this fight, his wife is 2 working 14 hours a day, two jobs to just pay the bills. 3 What is that worth? I mean, how do you put a price tag on -- I wish that upon no one. My worse enemy, 11:51:36 5 I would not wish that upon them. So it's a hard thing to 6 do, and Mr. Dickens talked about that a lot in jury selection, and we threw around -- and I think the -- the 8 cleanest way is to think about his life expectancy; 9 right? 11:51:53 10 What we know is that he's had four years of 11 this, since 2014 he was diagnosed, and he will live 12 between 2 more to 33 years. 13 The number's simple: A million dollars per 14 year. For all that suffering, all that pain, it's a 15 million dollars per year. 11:52:13 16 And if he lives for only two years, then the 17 remaining years that he doesn't get to live is also a 18 million dollars. So it doesn't matter if he dies in two years or 19 11:52:26 20 dies in 20. It's because he deserves that money. And so 21 the noneconomic damages are \$37 million. 22 That's the kind of money that fixes his 23 situation to the best we can, that he can spend the last 24 few years of his life, and pray to God it's more -- maybe 25 he'll be able to afford some experimental treatments. 11:52:43

But he'll be able to spend it with his wife. She sure 2 isn't going to have to work 14 hours a day. His children 3 will be taken care of in the sense that he will now have the personal pride of knowing that he's taken care of his 11:53:02 5 family. And his last few years of life can be spent 6 where it's deserved: In essential luxury instead of never seeing his family and crying alone at night. But will he stop? Probably not. I mean, will 9 the fear abate because he knows he's dying? Of course 10 not. But this is the best we can do. 11:53:22 11 And so when you combine both together, the 12 economic damages plus the noneconomic damages, it's this \$39,253,209.23. 13 number: I wish we didn't have to do this. I'd rather 14 11:53:51 15 not be here, actually, at all. I'd rather he been taking 16 his kids to a football game today. But he won't be able 17 to today or tomorrow or the day after, because he can't 18 be in the sun. It hurts his skin condition. And in a few weeks, when he starts chemo, he'll 19 20 be laid out again. Hopefully this time the chemo doesn't 21 actually kill him. It came pretty close last time. So that's the compensatory damages. 22 23 But separate and apart from compensatory damages 24 is the third issue here. And that is: Did Monsanto act 25 with knowing disregard of human health? 11:54:20

In the jury instructions, the Court has defined 1 2 malice. And malice is, sort of, and old-timey word; 3 right? It sounds like what somebody has in their mind 4 before they actively shoot somebody or stab them or 11:54:41 5 something. But that's actually not what malice is here. 6 It's anyone who -- will willful and knowing disregard to the rights or safety of another. A person 8 acts with knowing disregard when he or she is aware of 9 the probable dangers -- dangerous consequences of his or 11:54:58 10 her conduct and deliberately fails to avoid those 11 consequences. So if you know there's a risk, if you know 12 13 there's an issue, and you decide not to act -- knowing 14 that by not acting people will get hurt, that's malice. 15 And that fits what Monsanto has done here to the T. 11:55:15 16 Now, the standard by which you have to do this 17 is slightly different; right? Before, it's that feather 18 weight scale, that 51 percent. That's the compensatory 19 stuff. But for punitive, it's bigger. 11:55:32 20 Certain facts must be proven by clear and 21 convincing evidence, which is a higher burden of proof. 22 But what that means is the party must persuade you that 23 it is highly probable that the fact is true. Highly 24 probable that the fact is true. 25 So is it highly probable that Monsanto, a 11:55:47

1 multi-billion dollar corporation, was so concerned about 2 making money, specifically about making money in school 3 districts, that it didn't call Mr. Johnson back? That's 4 not rocket science. It's pretty obvious. 11:56:06 5 We have a host of information. Just literally a 6 host of evidence. And, actually, you're going to get two 7 big binders that go back into the evidence with you. And 8 that's the evidence that you're going to look at. And 9 it's replete with emails and damning documents. I 11:56:23 10 know -- I think the only document that helps Monsanto in 11 this entire piece of evidence is this EPA document, which 12 you can't even consider for the truth of the matter. It 13 can only be used to reflect a state of mind of Monsanto, 14 starting in December 2016. Long after Mr. Johnson was 15 given his death sentence. 11:56:38 16 So look at the evidence. And I could go through 17 it -- I'll probably go through some of it in rebuttal, 18 just to see what needs to be responded to. 19 But here's what we know: Dr. Parry, in 2000, 11:56:52 20 issued two different reports saying, "This stuff is 21 genotoxic, and you need to study the formulated product 22 in real people." 23 Monsanto redid one of those studies and never 24 did a single one after that. So they failed to test. 25 And they did that deliberately. You have an email from 11:57:04

Dr. Heydens, where he says, "We are not going to do the 2 studies Parry suggests." 3 More importantly, neither of those reports were ever given to anybody. They were buried. They were not 11:57:19 5 given to the EPA, and they should have been. That is 6 deliberate mischief. That is somebody who's trying to 7 hide something. At the same time that Dr. Parry's report comes 9 out, they ghostwrite and publish the Williams article in 11:57:36 10 2000. 11 So to compound the failure to disclose to the 12 EPA and everyone else, they then make up science that 13 says the opposite. There couldn't be more clear evidence 14 of intent that you could ask for. Now, I couldn't find an actual employee to go up 11:57:49 15 16 there -- well, we did find an employee, but he was a 17 former one, Dr. Azevedo. But we couldn't find an actual 18 current employee of Monsanto to say, "Yes, I intended to 19 hurt people." Okay. That's not the defense. 11:58:06 20 defense is: What does the document say? 21 We know that they actively secured Freedom to 22 Operate, which is a deliberate companywide program to 23 avoid regulation. They attacked IARC. Not just kind of. 24 They orchestrated outcry, and they did that before they 25 even knew the results. That's deliberate disregard for 11:58:25

human health. 1 2 They refused to test. You heard back in 1985 there was a scientific advisory panel that says, "Hey, 4 these kidneys that we're seeing in the mice, redo that 11:58:40 5|study. Let's see if we see the kidney tumors again." 6 Monsanto's response, "Hell no." Because they didn't want to turn over any That is deliberate disregard. And if they had, 9 and it had shown tumors, then it would have been 11:58:56 10 classified as a Class C carcinogen by the very EPA that 11 they rely upon. But by stonewalling them in the '80s, they were 12 13 able to hide that risk. And to this day, that test has 14 never been done. Never. And, sure, other people have done tests. 11:59:09 15 16 But they all continued to show tumor, after tumor, after 17 tumor. And Monsanto has done absolutely nothing to 18 address that beyond simply ghostwriting literature and 19 criticizing it. And that's literally their job. 11:59:28 20 We heard about the Greim article that everyone's 21 relied upon where that mysterious virus in the Kumar 22 appeared. It was written by Monsanto. 23 We also have them targeting schools. They 24 literally were targeting selling to school districts in 25 California to make money at the time of the -- after the 11:59:45

IARC classification. 1 2 I don't know how gross of an organization it can 3 be to do that. If you have any suspicion that your product can cause cancer, you don't try to increase sales 11:59:58 5 at schools. That is reprehensible conduct. And that's what they were doing. 7 The evidence of the materials safety data sheet 8 currently warns but the label that goes to consumers does There's absolutely no excuse for that. They cannot 9 not. 12:00:16 10 excuse it. That's conscious disregard. 11 And they never called Mr. Johnson back. I don't 12 know what kind of person knows about risks, has a guy 13 call you twice saying, "Hey, is this stuff causing my 14 cancer," you refuse to call him, and then it transforms 12:00:32 15 into the aggressive type. 16 That is -- that is not just conscious disregard, 17 that is conscious disregard for this man in this room 18 today. It is unacceptable. So how do we calculate punitive damages? 19 12:00:49 20 tough conversation. It's not about Mr. Johnson; right? 21 It's not about how we pay him or -- that's the 22 compensatory part. The question is: How do we punish 23 the company? 24 It says -- "Of Monsanto's financial condition, 25 what amount is necessary to punish it and discourage 12:01:02

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future wrongful conduct?"
         1
         2
                    Right now, Ms. Buck -- she's sitting over there
         3 in that corner. On her cell phone is a speed dial to a
          4 conference room in St. Louis, Missouri. And in that
12:01:18
         5 conference room, in that board room, there's a bunch of
          6 executives waiting for the phone to ring. Behind them is
           a bunch of champagne on ice.
                    MR. LOMBARDI: Your Honor, I object. This is
         9 supposed to be about the evidence. This is complete
12:01:30
        10 fantasy.
        11
                    THE COURT: Sustained.
        12
                    MR. WISNER: The number that you have to come
        13 out with is the number that tells those people -- they
        14 hear it, and they have to put the phone down, look at
12:01:43
        15 each other, and say, "We have to change what we're
        16 doing."
                    Because if the number comes out and it's not
        17
        18 significant enough, champagne corks will pop.
        19 "Attaboys," are everywhere.
12:01:58
        20
                   MR. LOMBARDI: Your Honor, it's the same
        21 objection.
         22
                     THE COURT: Sustained.
         23
                    Mr. Wisner, please do not engage in speculation.
         24
                    You may continue.
         25
                    MR. WISNER: Their net worth is $6.6 billion.
12:02:11
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They have in cash, on hand, \$3.1 billion. The annual 2 interest on just the cash on hand -- that means the 3 amount of money they make for doing nothing, and at a 4 2 percent interest rate, which that kind of money, you 12:02:32 5 could probably get better results. But at a 2 percent 6 interest rate, \$62 million a year. For doing nothing. 7 And I have been wracking my brain about what is 8 the proper publish for Monsanto? What is the number that 9 will make them deter future wrongful conduct? And I came 10 up with it. 11 Mr. Johnson was exposed in 2014. And by all 12 estimates, it looks like he will probably lose to his 13 cancer by 2020. That's six years. Six years of their 14 failure to warn and its effects on Mr. Johnson. I want 15 every dollar they made on interest for those six years. 12:03:14 16 Six times 62 is \$373 million. That's a number that makes people change their 17 18 way. That's a number that sends a signal to Monsanto and 19 everybody that works there. 12:03:35 20 We will not tolerate this kind of conduct. 21 the kind of number that makes sure that next time 22 somebody calls Monsanto and says, "Hey, should I keep 23 spraying this stuff," they call him back. 24 It's the kind of number that makes that label 25 change tomorrow. This is what we request in punitive 12:03:51

1 damages. Now, of course you can go higher. You can go 2 Same thing with compensatory, by the way. You lower. can go higher or lower. That's entirely up to you. But this is a number I'd like you to stay 12:04:06 5 around, because this is a number that I think is appropriate for this case and this conduct. Let's talk about the verdict form. 8 9 Let's go to the Elmo. Thanks. 12:04:33 10 So you're going to be presented with a verdict 11 form. And this is what it looks like. And you're going 12 to be asked to, sort of, answer a bunch of questions. 13 And what I'd like you to do is to answer "yes" 14 to every question, except Number 6, answer "no." That's 15 the shorthand. I'm actually going to walk you through 12:04:46 16 the questions. Now, that's what I'd like you to do. 17 The first question is: "Are Roundup Pro or 18 Ranger Pro products ones about which an ordinary consumer 19 can form a reasonable minimum safety expectation?" 12:05:06 20 Simply put, in using Roundup as it's sold on the 21 market today, would you think that it causes cancer? 22 Typically the label specifically says it doesn't have any 23 risk of that. So the answer is obviously "yes"; right? 24 You can look at a Roundup product and say, "Oh, 25 yeah. I have a minimum expectation of safety." 12:05:23

1 "Did Roundup fail to perform as safely as an 2 ordinary consumer would have expected when used or 3 misused in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way?" 4 So when you follow the label, would you expect to get 12:05:39 5 cancer? 6 The label is in evidence. Take a look at it. There is nothing about cancer. And all it says is that 8 it's non-toxic to animals. That's what it says. And 9 there might be an eye irritant. 12:05:52 10 So if you follow the directions, there is no 11 reason to believe that it causes cancer. 12 "Was the Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro design a 13 substantial factor in causing harm to Mr. Johnson?" So 14 did the fact that it had glyphosate and it had the 15 surfactants and all the stuff and impurities that go into 12:06:08 16 it -- we heard testimony about formaldehyde, ethyl 17 dioxide. There's still, like, a bunch of really bad 18 known carcinogens in the mixture. Did any of that design 19 contribute to his injury? 12:06:25 20 Absolutely it did; right? Because without the 21 surfactant, the one that they used, it wouldn't have been 22 able to penetrate his suit, his skin and get to him. 23 So it's the design itself that's the problem. 24 And we know, because we heard testimony about it, there's 25 other types of surfactants they could use that are not as 12:06:38

problematic. 1 2 We saw a slideshow from Monsanto's own employee 3 saying, "This stuff is toxic, POEA." There's no reason 4 why they have to use POEA in this country. There's no 5 reason for it. 12:06:52 6 Now we're on to the next -- that was, by the way, the design defect claim. Okay? Now we're on to the next claim. Strict 9 liability, failure to warn. "Did Roundup have potential 12:07:08 10 risks that were known or knowable in light of the 11 scientific knowledge that was generally accepted in the 12 scientific community at the time of their manufacture, 13 distribution or sale?" So did Monsanto know or should they have known 14 15 that it could cause cancer? They have studies that 12:07:20 16 started in the 1990s onward. There is absolutely no 17 question. And if you look at the documents, they 18 constantly raise along. This adds fuel to the fire about 19 Hardell. How do we combat this? That's from Eriksson in 12:07:38 20 2008. 21 The evidence is overwhelming that they knew 22 about the risk. So they knew about it. Not even 23 knowable. They knew about it based on the published 24 literature at the time. 25 "Did the potential risks of Roundup Pro or 12:07:49

1 Ranger Pro present a substantial danger to persons using 2 or misusing the products?" Yes, they did; right? 3 Obviously anybody who used it, there's a potential risk of cancer they didn't warn about. That's 12:08:05 5 clearly a potential risk. 6 This is the "no." "Would ordinary consumers 7 have recognized the potential risk?" Of course not; 8 right? 9 It's not on the label. How do you know Roundup 12:08:15 10 causes cancer? Mr. Johnson was actually told -- he was 11 told by the Horizon distributor that it's safe enough to 12 drink. 13 So clearly there was no warning about it causing 14 cancer. So the answer to this one is "no." 12:08:29 15 "Did Monsanto fail to adequately warn?" Yes, 16 because they didn't say it could cause cancer. "Was the lack of a sufficient warning a 17 18 substantial factor in causing Mr. Johnson's harm?" 19 Of course it was. He testified unequivocally he 20 would never have used it if he had known it would cause 12:08:44 21 cancer. 22 And as soon as he found out he had cancer, and 23 he was suspicious about it, he did everything in his 24 power to stop using it. So clearly if they had warned, 25 he wouldn't have used it, and it probably wouldn't have 12:08:59

1 gotten worse. 2 So that's the first claim. The -- that's the strict liability, failure to warn. Now we're on to claim of negligent failure to 12:09:09 5 warn. "Did Monsanto know or should have reasonably known 6 that that Roundup Pro or Ranger Pro were dangerous or 7 were likely to be dangerous when used or misused in a 8 reasonably foreseeable manner?" The same issue, did they 9 know or could they have known it caused cancer? 12:09:24 10 answer is "yes." 11 "Did Monsanto know or should it reasonably have 12 known that users would not realize the danger?" Well, if it doesn't say on the label, how could 13 14 they have known? The only people who knew that it could 12:09:37 15 cause cancer were the people who were studying the 16 literature. And a reasonable consumer is not somebody 17 who would be doing that. So the answer here is "yes." 18 "Did Monsanto fail to adequately warn of the 19 danger or instruct on the safe use of Roundup or Ranger 20 Pro?" Yes. 12:09:56 21 "Would a reasonable manufacturer, distributor or 22 seller under the same or similar circumstances have 23 warned of the danger or instructed on the safe use?" 24 Obviously; right? 25 It's not just what a -- this is the law. 12:10:06 If you

1 have something that causes cancer, then you warn. you have to warn. 3 And so would they have done it? Absolutely. 4 Monsanto, of course, didn't care. They wanted to make 12:10:19 5 money, so they didn't. 6 And then: "Was it a substantial contributing factor in causing harm?" Yes. We've discussed this. Then below that is the claim of damages. We've 9 talked about what are Mr. Johnson's damages. And this 10 one, you can write in, you know, past noneconomic 12:10:35 11 damages. We estimated that at 4 million. Future 12 noneconomic damages, that was 33 million based on his 13 potential life expectancy over the years he won't live. Then we get to punitive damages. "Do you find 14 15 by clear and convincing evidence that Monsanto acted with 12:10:55 16 malice, " as we defined earlier, "or oppression in the 17 conduct, which you base your finding of liability for 18 Mr. Johnson?" So if you think they acted with reckless 19 20 disregard for human health in failing to warn 21 Mr. Johnson, then the answer is "yes." 22 If you think it's highly probable that that's 23 what was going on, then you answer "yes" to this 24 question. 25 And then: "Was the conduct constituting malice, 12:11:18

oppression, committed, ratified or authorized by one or 2 more officers, directors or managing agents of Monsanto 3 acting on behalf of Monsanto?" We've already discussed Dr. Heydens and 5 Dr. Farmer. Dr. Goldstein, the guy who didn't call 12:11:35 6 Mr. Johnson back, he's actually the lead toxicologist for 7 Monsanto. I think he testified that he's been personally 8 responsible for human toxicological needs for over 9 19 years. So the answer here is "yes." 12:11:56 10 And obviously you put in the punitive damages 11 amount here, and then the presiding juror will sign it 12 and date it. 13 Now, one of the things that you're going to have 14 to do when you go back in the jury room, and we're going 12:12:12 15 to be wrapping up in a second for lunch, is you're going 16 to have to pick a presiding juror. And that's really 17 important. 18 If you want to be the presiding juror, speak up. 19 Say, "Hey, I want to be -- to be the foreman." That's 20 what they typically call them. But we call them 12:12:25 21 presiding juror in California. 22 And your role, really, is just to help 23 facilitate the conversation. And a lot of you are going 24 to have questions. And what's great about a jury is you 25 get to ask each other questions. And hopefully you guys 12:12:34

can help answer them. And if there's evidence you need 2 to see, testimony you want to read, you ask us for it. 3 All right? That's our job. And your job is to base your 4 decisions on the record. I think the record here is 5 pretty overwhelming. 12:12:47 6 Monsanto didn't really put up much of a defense. 7 Their defense really, for what it's worth, consists of 8 EPA, EPA, EPA. We all know that that is not enough. 9 Because the EPA gets things wrong. And we know it got it 12:13:05 10 wrong here. 11 So in a minute Mr. Lombardi -- or after lunch, 12 Mr. Lombardi's going to come up here, and he's going to 13 plaster up parts of the EPA. And that's what he's going 14 to do. That's what he did in his opening. That's what 12:13:17 15 he's going to do here. 16 But where is the Monsanto employees? I mean, 17 think about this for a second. They're being sued. I 18 think we have a valid case here. And they didn't bring a 19 single human being from the company to look into your 12:13:33 20 eyes and say why they did what they did. They didn't 21 bring a single live human being here to talk to you, talk 22 straight, and say, "Here, this is what we thought. This 23 is why we did it." 24 Why? Why didn't they bring anybody? There's 25 two possibilities. One, they couldn't find somebody who 12:13:49

could do that and not commit perjury. Or, two, they were 2 afraid of all the documents I would have to run through 3 them showing that there's no conceivable way they didn't know the risk. 12:14:02 5 You have to look at the quality of the evidence presented. Look at the quality of the experts we presented. Literally the leaders in their field. I mean, literally nobody knows glyphosate better 9 than Dr. Portier. I don't think anybody would even 10 dispute that. He's been studying it on his own, going 12:14:20 11 out and talking to regulators on his own dime, because he 12 cares. He did this for a living for the federal 13 qovernment, and he's outraged that the EPA is violating 14 their own guidelines. Why does Monsanto get special treatment from the 12:14:33 15 16 EPA? I don't know. Maybe it's Jess Rowland. Maybe 17 there's something more sinister. I don't know. But what 18 I do know is they got it wrong. And today, in this room, tomorrow in 19 12:14:46 20 deliberation, and when you return a verdict, we're going 21 to make it right. And your verdict will be heard around 22 the world. And Monsanto will have to finally do 23 something, conduct those studies they never conducted, 24 and warn those people they never will. 25 Thank you for your time. 12:15:08

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                     THE COURT: All right. Ladies and Gentlemen,
         2 we're going to break now for the lunch recess. Please
         3 remember during the lunch recess: Do not discuss the
         4 case with anyone. Do not do any research.
                 We ran till 12:15 today, so we'll resume again
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12:15:22
          6 at 1:45.
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                    (Time Noted: 12:15 p.m.)
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## 1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 I certify that the proceedings in the within-titled cause were taken at the time and place 5 herein named; that the proceedings were reported by 6 me, a duly Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California authorized to administer oaths and 8 affirmations, and said proceedings were thereafter 9 transcribed into typewriting. 10 I further certify that I am not of counsel or 11 Attorney for either or any of the parties to said 12 Proceedings, not in any way interested in the outcome of 13 the cause named in said proceedings. 14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand: 15 August 7th, 2018. 16 17 18 19 <%signature%> Leslie Rockwood Rosas 20 Certified Shorthand Reporter State of California 21 Certificate No. 3462 22 23 24 25