1	Sandra A. Edwards (State Bar No. 154578) Joshua W. Malone (State Bar No. 301836)		
2	Farella Braun + Martel LLP 235 Montgomery Street, 17th Floor	ELECTRONICALLY	
3	San Francisco, CA 94104	FILED Superior Court of California,	
4	Telephone: (415) 954-4400; Fax: (415) 954-4480 sedwards@fbm.com	County of San Francisco 06/12/2018	
5	jmalone@fbm.com	Clerk of the Court BY:VANESSA WU	
6	Joe G. Hollingsworth (appearance <i>pro hac vice</i>) Martin C. Calhoun (appearance <i>pro hac vice</i>)	Deputy Clerk	
7	Kirby T. Griffis (appearance <i>pro hac vice</i>) William J. Cople (appearance <i>pro hac vice</i>)		
8	Hollingsworth LLP 1350 I Street, N.W.		
9	Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 898-5800; Fax: (202) 682-163	9	
10	jhollingsworth@hollingsworthllp.com mcalhoun@hollingsworthllp.com		
11	kgriffis@hollingsworthllp.com wcople@hollingsworthllp.com		
12	George C. Lombardi (appearance pro hac vice)		
13	James M. Hilmert (appearance <i>pro hac vice</i>) Winston & Strawn LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601 Telephores (212) 558 5000 Few (212) 558 5700		
14			
15	Telephone: (312) 558-5969; Fax: (312) 558-5700 glombard@winston.com jhilmert@winston.com		
16			
17	Attorneys for Defendant MONSANTO COMPANY		
18	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
19	COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO		
20			
21	DEWAYNE JOHNSON,	Case No. CGC-16-550128	
22	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT MONSANTO COMPANY'S REPLY REGARDING MOTION IN	
23	VS.	LIMINE NO. 8 TO EXCLUDE LETTER	
24	MONSANTO COMPANY,	FROM MARION COPLEY	
25	Defendant.	Trial Date: June 18, 2018	
26		Time: 9:30 a.m. Department: TBD	
27			
28			
	1		

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dewayne Johnson ("Plaintiff") seeks to introduce into evidence an unsigned, unauthenticated letter purportedly written by a deceased former United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") employee, Marion Copley, to another former EPA employee Jesudoss Rowland (the "Copley Letter" or the "Letter"). Plaintiff attempts to avoid the obvious hearsay issue presented by the Copley Letter by contending that he does not intend to use its unsubstantiated claims about glyphosate as proof that it caused his cancer, but instead seeks to use it only to challenge the credibility of Mr. Rowland. *See* Pl.'s Opp'n to MIL No. 8 at 2. However, Plaintiff's self-admitted intended use of the Letter – to show that Defendant Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") attempted to mislead the EPA – still violates the rule against hearsay. *Id.* at 3. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not presented any legal precedent that establishes the Copley Letter can be properly authenticated. As it stands, the Copley letter remains unsubstantiated hearsay with very dangerous prejudicial potential and should be excluded under California Code of Evidence §§ 210, 350, and 352.

II. ARGUMENT

Plaintiff seeks admission of the Copley Letter on the grounds that he does not intend to use its contents as support for his claim that glyphosate caused his cancer, but rather as evidence to challenge the credibility of a witness under California Evidence Code § 780. *See* Pl.'s Opp'n to MIL No. 8 at 2. The Copley Letter, however, contains much more than unproven claims regarding glyphosate. It also contains false and inflammatory allegations of illegal contacts between the EPA and Monsanto, as well as unfounded allegations of improper conduct by Mr. Rowland. By Plaintiff's own admission, he intends to use the letter to question Mr. Rowland's truthfulness and credibility by showing that he and other members of the EPA "had improper and illegal contacts with Monsanto." *Id.* at 4. Thus, Plaintiff still intends to use the Letter (an out-of-court statement) to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that Mr. Rowland's claims about Monsanto's contacts with the EPA are false), which makes it hearsay. *See* Cal. Evid. Code § 1200. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible. *Id.*

Plaintiff's reliance on California Evidence Code § 780 to circumvent the hearsay issue is

misplaced. Unless the contents of the Copley Letter are accepted as true, Section 780 would only make it admissible non-hearsay evidence as to Ms. Copley if she were to testify at trial in a manner inconsistent with the Letter. That is obviously not the case here. The Copley Letter cannot be probative of Mr. Rowland's truthfulness unless its contents are first accepted by the jury as true. Thus Plaintiff has to assert the Letter for the truth of the matters asserted therein; again making it inadmissible hearsay.

The Copley Letter is also due to be excluded from evidence because it cannot be authenticated. Plaintiff contends that the Letter may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from Mr. Rowland's deposition testimony. See Pl.'s Opp'n to MIL No. 8 at 5. While it is correct that a writing may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff has not presented the type of circumstantial evidence used to support authentication in the cases he cites for this proposition. Instead, Plaintiff points only to tenuous connections between the details of the Letter, publicly available information, and portions of Mr. Rowland's deposition as proof of the Copley Letter's authenticity. For example, Plaintiff contends that the portions of the letter in which the author describes disagreements between Mr. Rowland and Ms. Copley are somehow corroborated by innocuous deposition testimony in which Mr. Rowland describes the discussions held during CARC meetings and wherein he actually denies that he and Ms. Copley were on different sides of scientific issues. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also contends that the Letter's very conspicuous reference to Mr. Rowland's collegiate alma mater and year of graduation, a fact that anyone who has ever received Mr. Rowland's curriculum vitae during his career would know, somehow suggests a deep level of personal knowledge. *Id.* Simply put, this is not the type of legitimate circumstantial evidence needed to authenticate the mysterious Copley Letter. Without

27

28

¹ See, Ramos v. Westlake Services, LLC, 242 Cal. App. 4th 674 (2015) (contract in dispute contained the signature of the party contesting authenticity and had a print style that matched another document in evidence corroborating the location of its inception); People v. Valdez, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1429 (2011) (photograph in dispute was pulled from a social networking site which displayed the party opponent's face and he admitted was his); Daniel v. Wayans, 8 Cal. App. 5th 367 (2017) (circumstantial evidence included a signed declaration by someone with personal knowledge of the contents of the writing that corroborated the information contained therein and the party contesting authenticity did not dispute that the writing in question contained his signature).

1	any evidence of where the letter came from or other corroboration that it is what it purports to be,		
2	it should be excluded from evidence.		
3	III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>		
4	For the foregoing reasons, Monsanto respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion		
5	in Limine No. 8 and exclude the Copley Letter.		
6			
7	Dated: June 12, 2018	Respectfully submitted,	
8		FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP	
9		of and the total	
10		By: Sandra A. Edwards	
11		Attorneys for Defendant	
12		MONSANTO COMPANY	
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			

28