1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Sandra A. Edwards (State Bar No. 154578) Joshua W. Malone (State Bar No. 301836) Farella Braun + Martel LLP 235 Montgomery Street, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 954-4400; Fax: (415) 954-4480 sedwards@fbm.com jmalone@fbm.com Joe G. Hollingsworth (appearance pro hac vice) Martin C. Calhoun (appearance pro hac vice) Kirby T. Griffis (appearance pro hac vice) William J. Cople (appearance pro hac vice) Hollingsworth LLP 1350 I Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 898-5800; Fax: (202) 682-1639 jhollingsworth@hollingsworthllp.com mcalhoun@hollingsworthllp.com kgriffis@hollingsworthllp.com wcople@hollingsworthllp.com George C. Lombardi (appearance pro hac vice) James M. Hilmert (appearance pro hac vice) Winston & Strawn LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 558-5969; Fax: (312) 558-5700 glombard@winston.com jhilmert@winston.com Attorneys for Defendant MONSANTO COMPANY	O6/12/2018 Clerk of the Court BY:VANESSA WU Deputy Clerk	
18	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
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20	DEWAYNE JOHNSON,	Case No. CGC-16-550128	
21	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT MONSANTO COMPANY'S	
22	VS.	REPLY ISO MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 28 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT,	
23	MONSANTO COMPANY,	OR REFERENCE TO MONSANTO'S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES,	
24	Defendant.	REVENUE OR PROFITS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SALE OF ROUNDUP PRO®,	
25		RANGERPRO®, OR OTHER GLYPHOSATE-BASED HERBICIDES	
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2728		Trial Date: June 18, 2018 Time: 9:30 a.m. Department: TBD	

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I. INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT

Defendant Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") seeks to exclude evidence, argument, or reference to Monsanto's financial position, revenue, or profits associated with the sale of Roundup PRO®, Ranger Pro®, or any of its glysophate-based herbicides ("GBHs"). Evidence of Monsanto's wealth is irrelevant to any of Plaintiff Dewayne Johnson's ("Plaintiff") claims in this case, and it is well-established that such evidence would risk substantial undue prejudicial to Monsanto. This evidence must be excluded.

First, Plaintiff claims, without citation to facts or the record, that evidence of Monsanto's financial circumstances is relevant to rebut any claim by Monsanto that the "proper testing" proposed by Plaintiff is cost-prohibitive. Pl.'s Opp'n to MIL No. 28 at 3 (noting "[i]t is then likely that Monsanto will seek to introduce evidence . . ."). Plaintiff's speculation has no basis in the record and is in fact incorrect – and it certainly should not be a basis for allowing in irrelevant information about Monsanto's finances.

While its response is devoid of specifics, the testing to which Plaintiff presumably refers is long-term rodent carcinogenicity testing on GBHs, specifically two or three of its most popular Roundup® products. *See, e.g.*, Declaration of Sandra A. Edwards ("Edwards Decl.") at ¶ 4, Ex. 3 (Benbrook Rpt. at ¶ 69) ("Without doubt, Monsanto should have conducted long-term carcinogenicity tests of at least its top two or three Roundup formulations in the 1990s"). Rather than decry the expense of such testing, Monsanto instead intends to show, in part through the admissions of Plaintiff's own expert, Dr. Charles Benbrook (1) that no pesticide company in history has conducted such testing¹, (2) that neither the U.S. EPA² nor any other worldwide

¹ Edwards Decl. at ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (Dep. of Charles Benbrook ("Benbrook Dep.") at 211:7-15 (May 23, 2018)) ("Q: Given you're not aware of a single pesticide company in the US or abroad that has conducted a long-term rodent carcinogenicity study on one of its formulated pesticide products, it certainly isn't industry standard for a company to do that kind of testing, correct? A: Yes, sir, that's exactly what I just said.").

² *Id.* at 205:16-20 ("Q: EPA does not require chronic animal carcinogenic testing on any end use formulated pesticide product, correct? A: Not – certainly not as a routine approach, no."); *see also id.* at 205:6-15 (agreeing that EPA does not require chronic animal carcinogenicity testing on Ranger PRO®).

regulator³ require such testing, and (3) that therefore it is entirely reasonable that Monsanto did not conduct that testing. Monsanto's financial condition is simply not relevant to these arguments.

Second, Plaintiff argues that evidence of Monsanto's financial circumstances is relevant to Plaintiff's claim that Monsanto "extensively lobbied senators, congressmen, EPA officials, and foreign governments to ensure that glyphosate remained on the market with few restrictions," and that "evidence of Monsanto's financial condition will tend to show that it was capable and effective of the lobbying that Plaintiff alleges occurred." Pl.'s Opp'n to MIL No. 28 at 3. But whether Monsanto has the financial resources to pay for such lobbying is wholly irrelevant to whether Monsanto used its financial resources to actually lobby. Since Monsanto does not argue that it could not have lobbied because it did not have the financial resources to do so, evidence purporting to rebut this non-argument is inadmissible. Thus, whether Monsanto had the financial means to conduct such lobbying activities is not at issue and thus irrelevant to this case.

Third and finally, even assuming evidence of Monsanto's financial circumstances carries any probative value – which it does not – California courts have consistently excluded such evidence as unduly prejudicial when used to prove liability. *See, e.g., Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs.*, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220, 1241 (1991) ("[E]vidence of a defendant's wealth can induce fact finders to abandon their objectivity and return a verdict based on passion and prejudice."); *Collins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.*, 207 Cal. App. 4th 867, 883 (2012) ("Deliberate attempts by counsel to appeal to the social or economic prejudices of the jury are misconduct, where irrelevant to the issues of the case."). Plaintiff's attempt to introduce evidence of Monsanto's financial position is intended to unfairly sway the jury in favor of liability based solely on Monsanto's perceived ability to absorb Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff's response to Monsanto's very real claim of prejudice merely restates his argument that it is somehow relevant

^{25 | 3} *Id.* at 221:10-222:6 (noting that he is not aware of any formal request by anyone in the public to a regulator to conduct long-term animal carcinogenicity testing on formulated pesticide products, nor is he aware of any statements from regulators regarding such testing).

⁴ At the outset, *there is no* evidence of any such "lobbying" efforts in the record. Indeed, Plaintiff cites to no record evidence, merely claiming "Monsanto was able to influence government officials and regulators through lobbying." Pl.'s Opp'n to MIL No. 28 at 2.

1	to the issue of Monsanto's testing of glyphosate, which is both incorrect and a thinly-veiled	
2	pretext for allowing highly prejudicial evidence. Such evidence should be excluded.	
3	II. <u>CONCLUSION</u>	
4	For the foregoing reasons, the Court should exclude Plaintiff from introducing evidence of	
5	Monsanto's financial position, revenue, or profits.	
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7	Dated: June 12, 2018	Respectfully submitted,
8		FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP
9		of and the total
10		By: Sandra A. Edwards
11		Attorneys for Defendant
12		MONSANTO COMPANY
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