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18	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
19	COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO			
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21	DEWAYNE JOHNSON	Case No. CGC-16-55012	8	
22	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT MONSA OPPOSITION TO PLA		
23	VS.	MOTION IN LIMINE N EXCLUDE EVIDENCE	NO. 8 TO	
24	MONSANTO COMPANY,	EXPERT/WITNESS EX WITH ROUNDUP®		
25	Defendant.	WITHROUNDER		
26		Trial Date: June 18 Time: 9:30 a.r		
27		Department: TBD	•••	
28				

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dewayne Johnson ("Plaintiff") proffers Dr. William Sawyer as an expert witness to opine that Plaintiff's cancer resulted from his "exposure" to Roundup PRO® or Ranger Pro® "drift" while applying the herbicide as the Integrated Pest Manager for Benicia Unified School District. The very same expert testified that he, Dr. Sawyer, also personally used Roundup® for 25 years and applied it in a "controlled *zero* exposure manner." Dr. Sawyer's "zero exposure" manner—using an extension wand, wearing gloves and long pants, and not spraying on windy days—is indistinguishable from Plaintiff's use, except Plaintiff wore far more protective equipment than Dr. Sawyer. Nevertheless, Dr. Sawyer claims that Plaintiff had "no way to control" the same alleged "drift" that caused "zero exposure" to Dr. Sawyer. Lacking any way to reconcile Dr. Sawyer's "zero exposure" use of Roundup® and his opinions about Plaintiff's "exposure," Plaintiff now seeks to exclude all evidence of Dr. Sawyer's personal use of Roundup®.

Plaintiff's motion *in limine* is frivolous. Dr. Sawyer's description of his "zero exposure" application of Roundup® is directly relevant to the very issue on which Plaintiff has proffered Dr. Sawyer to testify—the "exposure" to herbicide "drift" during application. It is also relevant to numerous other issues, including the credibility of Dr. Sawyer's supposedly long-held belief that Roundup® causes cancer, and to Plaintiff's assertions that Roundup® is a defective product. Plaintiff has failed to identify any legally cognizable basis for excluding the testimony, and there is none.

Although Plaintiff's motion focuses primarily on Dr. Sawyer, Plaintiff also asks in a footnote that the Court preclude questioning of Dr. Michael Sullivan—Defendant Monsanto Company's ("Monsanto") exposure expert—and other expert witnesses regarding their personal experiences with Roundup®. *See* Pl.'s Mot. at 1 n.1. As with Dr. Sawyer, these witnesses' experiences with Roundup® are relevant to their credibility, expertise, and the substance of their opinions. Plaintiff's motion should be denied in its entirety.

### II. BACKGROUND

Dr. Sawyer, a toxicologist, intends to tell the jury that he is "certain to a reasonable

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1	A. No			
2	Q. Do you wear goggles when using Roundup?			
3	A. Not in the past few years			
4	Q. Do you wear coveralls when applying glyphosate or Roundup?			
5	A. No."			
6	<i>Id.</i> at 86:21–88:25.			
7	By contrast, Plaintiff testified:			
8	Q. When you did mixing, did you wear your Tyvek suit?			
9	A. Yes.			
10	Q. Your gloves?			
11	A. Yes.			
12	Q. Boots?			
13	A. Everything.			
14	Q. So goggles and mask as well?			
15	A. Yeah. I never approach a chemical without my chemical suit and			
16	everything."			
17	Edwards Decl. at ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (Dep. of Dewayne Johnson ("Johnson Dep.") at 537:10–538:11			
18	8 (Jan. 19, 2018)).			
19	III. <u>ARGUMENT</u>			
20	Plaintiff seeks to exclude any reference to Dr. Sawyer's use of Roundup® in an effort to			
21	insulate his "exposure" opinion from cross-examination with his own inconsistent practices.			
22	There is no legal basis for the motion. Dr. Sawyer's testimony about his "zero exposure" manner			
23	of applying glyphosate is directly relevant to his opinions regarding Plaintiff's "exposure," his			
24	credibility, and other issues including Plaintiff's claims of a product defect. There is no			
25	conceivable reason to preclude Monsanto from introducing this evidence during the cross-			
26	examination of Dr. Sawyer, or from inquiring about the topic of Roundup® use with any other			
27	witness.			

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### A. Dr. Sawyer's Zero-Exposure Manner of Applying Roundup® is Directly Relevant to His Proffered "Exposure" Opinions and Numerous Other Issues

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence," including "the credibility of a witness." Cal. Evid. Code § 210. "In determining the admissibility of evidence, a trial court starts with the proposition [that] 'all relevant evidence is admissible." *Depalma v. Westland Software House*, (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1534, 1538 (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 351). Under these standards, Dr. Sawyer's testimony about his zero-exposure method of applying Roundup® is relevant.

First, the evidence is relevant to the very issue Plaintiff has proffered Dr. Sawyer to testify about: exposure. Plaintiff proffers Dr. Sawyer as an exposure expert. Dr. Sawyer's supposed role in this case is to assess the degree of Plaintiff's exposure to Roundup® and then draw conclusions about Plaintiff's exposure. Accordingly, Dr. Sawyer's admission that Roundup® can be applied in a "controlled zero exposure" manner such as his, where he used far less personal protective equipment than Plaintiff, tends to disprove Dr. Sawyer's conclusions about Plaintiff's inability to control exposure to Roundup®. When factoring in what weight to give Dr. Sawyer's exposure opinions, the jury must be permitted to hear that wearing protective equipment can prevent drift exposure as confirmed by Dr. Sawyer's own use of Roundup®. Indeed, it would be extraordinary to exclude such evidence directly refuting an expert opinion on a central issue.

Plaintiff complains that Dr. Sawyer's zero-exposure method is irrelevant because Dr. Sawyer's method of applying glyphosate is not comparable to Plaintiff's. That is an issue for the jury to decide in weighing the evidence, not for the Court in determining admissibility. It is also a meritless assertion factually. Dr. Sawyer's "zero exposure" manner of application involved the use of an application wand, and so did Plaintiff's. *See* Edwards Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. 5, (Sawyer Dep. at 291:18–292:5) ("Q. And did Mr. Johnson use a wand when applying glyphosate? A. Yes.... Q. And I believe you testified yesterday that you use a wand in your own application of Roundup, right? A. Yes."). Indeed, Dr. Sawyer's "zero exposure manner" involved the use of *significantly less* protective equipment than Plaintiff's, which involved a "chemical suit and everything." Edwards Decl. at ¶ 2, Ex. 1, (Johnson Dep. at 537:18–19); *see also* Edwards Decl. at ¶ 5, Ex. 4,

(Sawyer Report at 155) ("During spraying, Mr. Johnson used personal protective equipment including gloves, boots, a 'sweatshirt-type hoodie,' a permeable Tyvek suit, hat and goggles.").

Second, the evidence is relevant to the credibility of Dr. Sawyer's opinion that Roundup® is capable of causing cancer. Dr. Sawyer stands ready to testify that Roundup® is a dangerous carcinogen, a conclusion he claims to have reached in 1994. Because people do not generally engage in activities that cause harm to themselves, Dr. Sawyer's decades-long use of Roundup®, at a minimum, tends to undermine the credibility of his opinion that it causes cancer. Indeed, Dr. Sawyer testified that he continued to use Roundup® as little as two months before the deposition took place—a time *after* providing his expert report concluding that it caused Plaintiff's cancer. That evidence is plainly relevant for the jury in assessing Dr. Sawyer's credibility as a witness and the credibility of his opinions. *See* Cal. Evid. Code § 210; *Ng v. Hudson*, 75 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262 (1977) overruled on other grounds by *Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 8 Cal. 4th 548 (1994) (holding evidence "reasonably related to the credibility" of expert witnesses was properly admitted).

Third, Dr. Sawyer's testimony also tends to disprove other elements of Plaintiff's claims. For example, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Roundup® is a defective product in order to prevail on his strict liability claims for a design defect. Testimony by Plaintiff's own hand-picked witness—who continued to use Roundup® for over two decades despite allegedly believing it to be a carcinogen—speaks to the importance of the product, and tends to prove that the benefits of the product outweighed the alleged risks that Dr. Sawyer himself claims to have perceived in Roundup®. *See Morson v. Superior Court* (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 775, 785 ("A product is defective is its design embodies excessive preventable danger, unless the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design") (quotations and citation omitted).

### B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Identify Any Cognizable Prejudice

There is no basis to exclude evidence critical for the cross-examination of Plaintiff's exposure expert on the subject matter of his own opinion. Plaintiff offers the empty assertion that the cross-examination using the testimony would be "extremely prejudicial." Pl.'s Mot. at 3. That assertion misses the point. "Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material." *Kipp v. City* 

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27 28 & Cty. of San Francisco, 145 Cal. App. 3d 875 (1983) (citation omitted), hr'g denied.

The type of prejudicial evidence of concern under section 352 of the Evidence Code is evidence that evokes "an emotional response that has very little to do with the issue on which the evidence is offered," and thus "poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome." Piscitelli v. Salesian Soc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11 (2008) (citation omitted). Here, there is nothing inflammatory about the testimony, nothing emotional, and nothing confusing. Plaintiff's assertion that the jury may unfairly "compar[e] Dr. Sawyer's personal use to his professional analysis" does not come close to explaining how this evidence presents an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings. There is nothing remotely unfair about cross-examining an expert with his own testimony about the very issue he is presented to testify.

#### C. Plaintiff's Motion with Respect to Other Witnesses is Overbroad and Unexplained

Plaintiff also appears to be seeking to preclude any witness from being questioned about their personal use of Roundup®. Plaintiff does not identify any specific testimony of concern, or any legal basis for excluding it. The request is overbroad and encompasses plainly relevant evidence. For example, Monsanto proffers Dr. Kassim al-Khatib, a professor of weed science at the University of California-Davis, who is an expert witness in the safe use and application of herbicides. Dr. al-Khatib's expertise and opinions are based in part on his significant experience in safely applying Roundup® and other herbicides. Likewise, Monsanto has proffered Dr. Sullivan, an industrial hygienist expert, to respond to Dr. Sawyer's opinions about "exposure." There is no basis to prevent these or other witnesses from discussing their own expertise or experiences with the safe use of the product.

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### IV. **CONCLUSION** For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiff's motion in limine. Dated: June 7, 2018 Respectfully submitted, FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP By: Sandra A. Edwards Attorneys for Defendant MONSANTO COMPANY